ÿWPCø …4Vj 0(y¡w@© 0lé 0DU 0J™ 0Tã 0^7 0h• 0rý 0|o 0†ë UBq %³ 0¹ 1uI 0d¾ U6" U>X B– B)³ DCÜ AM D3lU*ŸÉ 0@âS"GuF¼v~vÓ€ AOSÆ¢ 0Dh D/¬ BÛf|œ$ÔøÔô3|x”($¡¡ xÕD‚ƒ„…†E‡ˆ‰Ó€((3úÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman d% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ&&&&'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌò òAugust€17,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€+ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò IÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&Ôà0 àPlaintiffs€subsequently€entered€into€a€written€contract€executed€by€the€managerÏwith€the€Dalton€restaurant.Ì =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&Ôà0 àThere€is€material€evidence€that€a€manager€had€ð ðactualðð€authority€to€enter€suchÏcontracts.Ì <Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&Ôà0 àAfter€withdrawing€the€affirmative€defense,€defendant€essentially€raised€it€againÏduring€trial.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÑ ý ÑÑ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€Z6XXdÈdÈ7ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€%ŠÔÙ€€ÙßR€),(A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌÌÌ€€€€à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌó óÌÌÌÌJERRY€W.€RAGON€and€JERRY€à àà à)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9711„CH„00499à àÌLEBRON€RAGON,€a€Partnershipà àà à)€€Ìd/b/a€ACTION€LINEN€SERVICE,à à)€HAMILTON€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs„Appellees,à àà à)€HON.€€R.€VANN€OWENS,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€CHANCELLORÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€AFFIRMED€IN€PART,ÌOððCHARLEYððS,€INC.,à àà àà à)€REVERSED€IN€PART,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€AND€REMANDED€FOR€A€NEW€TRIALÌà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà à)€ON€THE€ISSUE€OF€DAMAGESÌÌÌÌÌROBERT€D.€BRADSHAW€and€B.€STEWART€JENKINS,€JENKINS€&€BRADSHAW,ÏP.C.,€Chattanooga,€for€Plaintiffs„Appellees.ÌÌÌJOHN€G.€JACKSON,€CHAMBLISS,€BAHNER€&€STOPHEL,€Chattanooga,€forÏDefendant„Appellant.ÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFranks,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àIn€this€breach€of€contract€action€for€damages,€the€jury€returned€specialÏverdicts€in€plaintiffsðð€favor,€and€the€Chancellor€entered€a€judgment€for€damagesÏagainst€defendant.€€Defendant€has€appealed.€€The€issues€on€appeal€raised€byÍdefendants€are:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àI.€à0 àWhether€the€Chancellor€erred€in€not€sustaining€OððCharleyððsÏobjection€to€defective€verdict,€or€in€the€alternative€in€notÏgranting€a€new€trial,€as€the€juryððs€verdict€was€inconsistent€andÏcontrary€to€the€manifest€weight€of€the€evidence?ÌÌà0 àà0 àII.à0 àWhether€in€the€alternative,€the€Chancellor€erred€in€refusing€toÏsuggest€a€remittitur,€as€the€juryððs€award€of€damages€wasÏexcessive€and€contrary€to€the€manifest€weight€of€the€evidence?ÌÌà0 àà0 àIII.à0 àWhether€the€Chancellor€erred€in€failing€to€grant€OððCharleyððsÏmotion€in€limine,€and/or€for€directed€verdict€on€the€allegedÏHixson€contract.€€As€the€proof€clearly€showed,€the€plaintiffÏdestroyed€and€rescinded€a€copy€of€the€alleged€contract€with€theÏintent€to€release€OððCharleyððs€from€any€obligation€it€may€haveÏhad€under€the€alleged€contract?ÌÌÓÓThe€focal€point€of€this€dispute€is€a€contract€for€linen€service€entered€betweenÏplaintiffs€and€defendantððs€kitchen€manager,€Jason€Giacchi,€at€the€Hixson€restaurant.€ÏPlaintiff€had€begun€providing€linen€service€to€defendantððs€Dalton€restaurant€in€1993.€ÏThe€original€contract€with€the€Dalton€restaurant€was€an€oral€agreement× ƒ. ××  ×€with€theÏkitchen€manager€to€supply€linens.€€Ìà àà àPlaintiff€Jerry€Ragon€testified€that€he€first€contacted€the€generalÏmanager€of€the€ð ðShallowford€Driveðð€restaurant€in€Chattanooga,€Jerry€Madden,Ïabout€providing€linen€service€to€OððCharleyððs€restaurants.€€Madden€advised€that€heÏwas€under€a€contract€with€another€service,€but€informed€of€the€opening€of€the€DaltonÏrestaurant.€€Madden€referred€Ragon€to€Alan€Goins€who€would€be€the€manager€of€theÏDalton€restaurant,€and€plaintiffs€entered€into€an€oral€agreement€to€provide€linenÍservice€for€the€Dalton€outlet.€€Subsequently,€Madden€advised€that€defendant€hadÏpurchased€the€Black€Eyed€Pea€restaurant€in€Hixson€and€was€converting€it€to€anÏOððCharleyððs.€€Madden€told€plaintiff€to€contact€Wes€Wilkerson,€who€would€be€theÏgeneral€manager€of€the€Hixson€restaurant,€about€supplying€linen€services.€€PlaintiffÏwent€to€the€Hixson€restaurant€where€construction€was€underway,€and€approachedÏWilkerson€about€providing€linen€service.€€Wilkerson€told€him€to€talk€to€Jason€GiacchiÏwho€was€the€kitchen€manager€and€handled€the€linen€for€the€restaurant.€€PlaintiffÏspoke€with€Giacchi€and€discussed€the€type€of€service€needed,€and€they€negotiated€aÏcontract€for€linen€service.€€Plaintiff€explained€that€he€wanted€a€written€contractÏbecause€the€Hixson€restaurant€needed€uniforms€supplied,€which€plaintiffs€wouldÏhave€to€purchase,€as€well€as€the€increased€volume€would€require€additionalÏequipment€to€service€that€volume.€€Ìà àà àA€boiler€plate€contract€was€furnished€Giacchi€who€filled€it€out€with€theÏaid€of€plaintiff,€and€Giacchi€signed€as€kitchen€manager€and€Ragon€also€signed.€ÏGiacchi€retained€the€original€and€Ragon€the€copy.€€Subsequently,€plaintiff€was€calledÏby€Alan€Goins€at€the€Shallowford€restaurant,€who€advised€that€his€linen€contract€wasÏup€with€the€other€company,€and€plaintiff€entered€into€an€oral€agreement€to€provideÏlinen€service€for€the€Shallowford€restaurant.€€He€explained€that€a€written€contractÏwas€not€needed,€since€he€was€only€supplying€linens,€and€that€plaintiff€had€anÏadequate€inventory€to€service€this€restaurant.€€Ìà àà àPlaintiff€testified€that€on€January€8,€1996,€plaintiffs€went€to€the€HixsonÏstore€on€a€regular€service€call€and€was€advised€by€the€manager€that€he€had€a€newÍlinen€company,€and€that€ð ðI€needed€to€gather€my€stuff€and€get€out€of€the€storeðð.€€HeÏdenied€that€he€had€received€any€complaints€about€the€quality€of€his€service€prior€toÏthe€abrupt€termination.Ìà àà àIn€the€special€interrogatories€submitted€to€the€jury,€the€jury€was€asked€ifÏGiacchi€had€ð ðactual€authorityðð€to€execute€the€contract,€to€which€the€jury€respondedÏin€the€negative.€€The€jury€was€also€queried€as€to€whether€Giacchi€had€ð ðapparentÏauthorityðð€to€execute€the€contract.€€The€jury€responded€affirmatively,€and€the€TrialÏJudge€approved€this€verdict.Ìà àà àDefendant€contends€under€the€first€issue€that€these€findings€areÏinconsistent,€and€argues€that€there€was€no€evidence€that€defendant€had€ever€allowedÏa€kitchen€manager€to€sign€such€contracts,€there€was€no€evidence€that€kitchenÏmanagers€had€theretofore€signed€such€contracts,€and€no€proof€was€offered€thatÏplaintiff€had€ever€been€told€that€kitchen€managers€could€sign€such€contracts.€€TheseÏfindings€are€not€inconsistent,€but€contrast€the€distinction€between€actual€andÏapparent€authority.€€Our€Supreme€Court€gave€this€explanation€in€òòOððShea€v.€FirstÏFed.€Savings,€etc.,€óó218€Tenn.€619„624€(1966),€and€said:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àIt€is€further€the€settled€law€of€this€State€that€a€general€agent€isÏauthorized€to€act€within€the€apparent€scope€of€his€authority,€thoughÏthis€may€be€different€from€his€actual€powers;€that€is€to€say,€an€agentÏmay€bind€his€principals€by€acts€within€the€general€scope€of€his€apparentÏauthority,€notwithstanding€the€use€of€powers€in€excess€of€authorityÏactually€given€by€the€principal.ÌÌÓÓAccordingly,€the€lack€of€evidence€of€actual€authority€does€not€necessarily€defeat€aÏfinding€of€apparent€authority.Ìà àà àThe€issue€thus€becomes€whether€there€is€material€evidence€to€supportÏthe€juryððs€verdict.€€We€are€only€authorized€to€set€aside€a€jury€verdict€if€there€is€noÏmaterial€evidence€to€support€it.€€T.R.A.P.€Rule€13(d).€€Ìà àà àIn€addition€to€the€foregoing,€plaintiffs€offered€the€testimony€of€DarrylÏMacConkey,€who€had€served€as€the€first€assistant€manager€at€the€Hixson€restaurant.€ÏHe€testified€that€he€had€never€heard€of€plaintiff€when€he€went€to€work€at€the€HixsonÏstore,€but€was€told€by€Giacchi€that€plaintiff€was€providing€the€linen€service.€€HeÏfurther€testified:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€you€at€some€point€in€time€see€written€proof€that€ActionÏLinen€Service€would€be€the€provider€of€the€linen€service€there?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes,€I€did.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€did€you€see?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€saw€a€contract€from€Action€Linen.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€you€have€occasion€to€look€at€the€contract€and€see€who€hadÏsigned€it?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€glanced€at€it,€but€I€was€in€the€process€of€filing€a€lot€ofÏwarranties€and€stuff,€trying€to€get€the€office€put€together.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àNow€explain€that€to€us.€€How€did€you€come€about€filingÏwarranties,€etc.?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àWes€Wilkerson€was€the€general€manager€and€he€had€ShellyÏPerry€and€myself€filing€all€the€warranties€on€the€equipment€in€theÏkitchen€that€fall€in€my€domain€as€being€a€first€assistant,€so€weÏwere€filing€them€away.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àAnd€you€had€occasion€to€file€the€document€that€youððve€.€ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àYouððve€.€.€.€referred€to.ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes.ÌÌÓÓà àà àA€good€statement€of€what€the€plaintiff€is€required€to€show€to€establishÏthe€apparent€authority€of€the€agent€is€set€forth€in€3€Am.Jur.2d€Agency€ðð80,€p.587:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àIn€order€to€establish€that€an€agent€had€the€apparent€authority€to€do€theÏact€in€question,€it€must€be€established€(1)€that€the€principal€hasÏmanifested€his€consent€to€the€exercise€of€such€authority€or€hasÏknowingly€permitted€the€agent€to€assume€the€exercise€of€suchÏauthority,€(2)€that€the€third€person€knew€of€the€facts€and,€acting€inÏgood€faith,€had€reason€to€believe,€and€did€actually€believe,€that€theÏagent€possessed€such€authority,€and€(3)€that€the€third€person,€relyingÏon€such€appearance€of€authority,€has€changed€his€position€and€will€beÏinjured€or€suffer€loss€if€the€act€done€or€transaction€executed€by€theÏagent€does€not€bind€the€principal.ÌÌÓÓòòAccordóó:€òòRich€Printing€Co.€v.€McKellarððs€Estateóó,€46€Tenn.€444,€478„9€(1959).€€WeÏconclude€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€this€verdict.€€The€trier€of€fact€couldÏreasonably€infer€that€the€manager× ƒ/ ××  ×€had€knowingly€permitted€the€agent€to€enter€intoÏthe€contract€from€the€foregoing€evidence.€€Evidence€that€an€agent€who€acts€with€theÏknowledge€and€approval€of€his€principal€is€circumstantial€evidence€of€what€the€agentÏwas€authorized€to€do.€€òòBoillin„Harrison€Co.€V.€Lewis€&€Co.óó,€182€Tenn.€342,€187ÏS.W.2d€17.€€òòRich€Printing€Co.óóÌà àà àWe€find€the€first€issue€to€be€without€merit.Ìà àà àThe€juryððs€verdict€approved€by€the€Trial€Judge€was€for€$52,960.00€asÏliquidated€damages€for€breach€of€the€Hixson€restaurant€contract,€and€unliquidatedÍdamages€of€$33,000.00€for€the€breach€of€the€Dalton€restaurant€contract.€€Ìà àà àDefendantððs€second€issue€questions€the€propriety€of€the€damagesÏawarded,€on€two€bases.€€It€asserts€that€the€$33,000.00€award€of€actual€damages€forÏthe€breach€of€the€Dalton€contract€ð ðis€contrary€to€the€manifest€weight€of€theÏevidenceðð€and€that€there€is€no€evidence€to€support€the€juryððs€finding€of€liquidatedÏdamages€for€the€breach€of€the€Hixson€contract.€€Ìà àà àWe€again€observe€that€our€review€is€not€to€weigh€the€evidence,€but€toÏdetermine€if€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€the€juryððs€finding.€€T.R.A.P.€RuleÏ13(d).€€Under€the€evidence,€the€liquidated€damage€clause€in€the€Dalton€contract€setÏdamages€at€$44,798.20.€€The€jury,€in€answer€to€questions,€concluded€as€to€thisÏcontract€amounted€to€an€unenforceable€penalty,€and€found€actual€damages€to€beÏ$33,000.00.€€However,€as€to€the€Hixson€contract,€the€jury€found€that€the€damagesÏcalculated€by€the€liquidated€damage€clause€was€reasonable€and€not€a€penalty.€€ItÏthen€found€that€the€liquidated€damage€clause€was€enforceable,€and€set€the€liquidatedÏdamages€as€heretofore€noted.€€The€provision€for€liquidated€damages€in€the€HixsonÏand€Dalton€contracts€state:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àThe€parties€agree€that€in€the€event€of€any€termination€of€service€by€theÏcustomer€in€breach€of€this€contract,€the€supplier€shall€be€entitled€toÏliquidated€damages€in€the€amount€equal€to€forty€(40%)€percent€of€theÏaverage€weekly€fees€charged€for€services€hereunder€prior€to€the€date€ofÏtermination,€multiplied€by€the€number€of€weeks€remaining€in€theÏunexpired€term€of€this€contract.€€Said€liquidation€is€not€a€penalty,€but€isÏintended€to€compensate€the€supplier€for€expenses€which€would€haveÏbeen€absorbed€and€profit€which€would€have€been€generated€by€theÏcustomerððs€fulfillment€of€its€obligation€under€this€contract.ÌÌÓÓà àà àDefendant€contends€that€the€liquidated€damages€awarded€by€the€juryÍunder€the€Hixson€contract€is€ð ðgrossly€in€excess€of€actual€damagesðð.€€The€SupremeÏCourt€in€òòV.L.€Nicholson€Co.€v.€Transcon€Inv.,€óó595€S.W.2d€474,€484€(Tenn.€1980),Ïexplained€why€and€when€liquidated€damages€are€appropriate:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àThe€term€ð ðliquidated€damagesðð€means€a€sum€stipulated€and€agreedÏupon€by€the€parties€at€the€time€they€enter€their€contract,€to€be€paid€toÏcompensate€for€injuries,€should€a€breach€occur.€€22€Am.Jur€DamagesÏ212,€1965.€€òòSee€Railroad€v.€Cabinet€Co.óó,€104€Tenn.€568,€58ÏSouthwestern€303€(1900).€€The€reason€for€allowing€parties€to€stipulateÏthe€amount€of€damages€is€to€create€certainty€where€damages€are€likelyÏto€be€uncertain€and€not€easily€proven.€€òòRailroad€v.€Cabinet€Co.,€supra.óó€ÏThe€amount€stipulated€should€be€reasonable€in€relation€to€the€terms€ofÏthe€contract€and€the€certainty€with€which€damages€can€be€measured;Ïthere€must€exist€a€reasonable€relationship€between€the€amount€andÏwhat€might€reasonably€be€expected€in€the€event€of€a€breach.€€òòId.óó€€If€theÏprovision€is€a€reasonable€estimate€of€the€damages€that€would€occurÏfrom€a€breach,€then€the€provision€is€normally€construed€as€anÏenforceable€stipulation€for€liquidated€damages.ÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€evidence€establishes€that€damages€for€breach€of€contracts€of€thisÏnature€are€not€easily€established.€€Plaintiff€testified€to€inventory€investment€in€excessÏof€$10,000.00,€and€included€40%€of€the€cost€for€equipment,€van,€overhead,€includingÏinsurance,€license,€rent€and€anticipated€profits€as€elements€of€damages.€€He€was€of€theÏopinion€that€his€losses€for€œbreach›€of€the€œcontract›€exceeded€the€stipulated€liquidatedÏdamages.€€In€his€analysis,€he€did€the€same€cost€scenario€for€the€Dalton€contract,€andÏoffered€an€opinion€that€his€losses€for€that€breach€were€slightly€in€excess€ofÏ$40,000.00.€Ìà àà àWhile€plaintiff€was€permitted€to€offer€his€opinion€of€damages€withoutÏobjection,€there€is€no€material€evidence€to€support€a€finding€that€plaintiffððs€actualÏdamages€bore€a€reasonable€relationship€to€the€stipulated€damages€in€the€contracts.€ÍThe€evidence€does€not€establish€that€plaintiffððs€opinion€of€his€losses€is€based€onÏaccurate€analysis€derived€from€sound€œcost€accounting›€principles.€€Accordingly,€weÏset€aside€the€jury€verdict€on€the€amount€of€damages,€and€award€a€new€trial€on€theÏissue€of€actual€damages€for€breach€of€these€contracts.€€Ìà àà àPrior€to€trial,€defendant€had€withdrawn€its€defense€of€theÏunreasonableness€of€the€liquidated€damage€clauses,€but€took€the€position€at€trial€thatÏit€intended€to€argue€that€liquidated€damages€were€not€the€œproper›€measure€of€damagesÏunder€the€contracts.€€The€Trial€Judge€agreed€to€this€procedure€after€the€parties€agreedÏthat€the€plaintiff€could,€after€the€defendantððs€proof,€offer€evidence€of€his€damages.€€ItÏis€clear€the€plaintiff€suffered€damages,€but€œit€is€also€clear€that€he€was€not€prepared€toÏoffer€evidence€on€the€issue€of€actual€damages.€€Because›€of€the€procedural€œtactics× ƒ0 ××  ×€ofÏdefendant€and›€our€dissatisfaction€with€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€on€the€œissue€ofÏactual€damages,›€we€remand€for€a€new€trial€on€the€issue€of€actual€damages,€œfor›€theÏbreach€of€both€contracts.€€On€remand,€plaintiff€will€be€entitled€to€offer€proof€ofÏdamages€in€the€nature€of€œreasonable€expenses›€made€in€preparation€for€performingÏthese€contracts.€€òòSee€óó22€Am.Jur.2d€òòDamagesóó€ðð596,€and€profits€lost€as€a€result€of€theÏbreach€of€the€contract.€€Plaintiff€will€be€required€to€establish€his€lost€profits€to€aÏreasonable€degree€of€certainty,€but€since€prospective€profits€are€to€some€extentÏuncertain€and€problematical,€uncertainty€as€to€the€amount€of€profits€that€would€haveÏbeen€realized,€will€not€prevent€a€recovery.€€22€Am.Jur.2d€òòDamages€óóðð625,€p.€686.Ìà àà àFinally,€defendant€argues€that€it€should€have€been€granted€a€directedÏverdict€on€the€Hixson€contract€because€the€proof€established€that€plaintiff€hadÏdestroyed€and€rescinded€the€contract€with€the€intent€of€releasing€defendant€from€anyÏobligations€under€the€contract.€€We€do€not€agree.€€Plaintiff€testified€that€he€advisedÏdefendantððs€agents€that€he€would€ð ðtear€upðð€the€Hixson€contract€if€defendant€wouldÏhonor€the€other€two€contracts€with€their€outlets.€€He€further€testified€that€the€agentÏhad€indicated€that€plaintiff€would€lose€the€other€business€if€he€attempted€to€enforceÏthe€Hixson€contract.€€œHowever,€after€that€conversation,€plaintiff€also€lost€the€otherÏcontracts€within€a€short€time.€€Under›€these€circumstances,€there€was€materialÏevidence€to€support€the€juryððs€finding€that€there€was€no€meeting€of€the€minds€on€aÏð ðcancellationðð€of€the€Hixson€contract.Ìà àà àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€in€part€and€reverse€in€part,Ïand€remand€for€a€new€trial€on€the€issue€of€damages€for€breach€of€the€contracts.Ìà àà àThe€cost€of€the€appeal€is€assessed€one„half€to€plaintiffs€and€one„half€toÏdefendant.ÌÓÓ€ÌÌÌà@ àòòà àÌóóà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€Sr.J.Ì