˙WPCē -# †U:‘ %Ë 0(Ņb ųw@4EYLh 0J´ 0Tū 0^R 0h° 0r 0|Š 0† 0Œ 1u 0d‘U*õB) DCH AQ‹ ÆÜ 0Dĸ 0@æ 0D& AMj D/ˇ Bæ B D3 S v~i vĶį˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øđ AZ‹"Arial RegularX($ĄĄ- ų - 'D(D)*D+,-D./Ķ€9ę‚_#xÂ;3|x9C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT2 ˙˙0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ˙˙0Indent2ā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ˙˙0Indent3ā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ˙˙0Indent4ā0 āā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ˙˙0Indent5ā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ˙˙0Indent6ā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ˙˙0Indent7ā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ˙˙0Indent8ā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āā0 āÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ˙˙?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ˙˙8Mac DefaultMac DefaultĶ ` °šXĶ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd!"#$&Cū˙<< C˙˙ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$ĸĸŨ ƒ!ŨŨ  Ũ("˙˙$ŖŖŌ  ŌŌ  Ō($$””ō ōÚ  Ú1Ú  Úķ ķ!#Cū˙ << G˙˙(('÷˙ dxd dü˙P Pd'''''˙˙dxd Ũ ƒ!ŨŅ  ŅŅ#€d#ŅÔ€ÔŨ  ŨŨ ƒ""ŨŨ  ŨÔ€ÔĶ  Ķō ōÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔĖĖDecember€12,€1997ĖĖCecil€W.€CrowsonĖAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôķ ķPtPtHHÚ(˙á˙âųFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃĐ ĐĐHHĐĐ  ĐĐ2ĐĐ˙˙¸æ$˙ĐĐHHĐĐĐĐĐĐĐĐ  ĐĐ ĐĐ ĐŅŅŅGenevaŅŅ ŅŅ € ŅŅ<Px–ČŅŌŌŌ443!#4ŌŌ$ *$ŌŌ$*$ŌŌ ˙KK ŌŌ  Geneva ŌŌ  Geneva ŌĶ.,ĶĶĶĶ6ĶĶ ĶßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßŅGenevaŅŅ ŅŌ  ion-F Geneva ŌŌ  ion-F Geneva ŌŨ ƒ!ŨÔ . ÔÔ€ÔŨ  ŨŌ € ŌŌ „ ŌŅ  ŅŅ\R AØ'\ŅŅ€ŅŅ7€/čXXdæXXdđ7ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŪ ŪĖELSIE€MARIE€RICHARDSON€andā ā)ĖBRIDGET€DENYSE€RICHARDSON,ā ā)Ėā āā āā āā āā āā ā)Ėā āPlaintiffs/Appellants,ā āā ā)Ėā āā āā āā āā āā ā)ā āAppeal€No.Ėā āā āā āā āā āā ā)ā ā01„A„01„9704„CH„00169ĖVS.ā āā āā āā āā āā ā)Ėā āā āā āā āā āā ā)ā āBedford€ChanceryĖŲ€!ŲßR€%*A1-j|Ķv` į `€€@˙Rßā āā āā āā āā āā ā)ā āNo.€10,556ĖJIMMIE€LEE€RICHARDSON,ā āā ā)Ėā āā āā āā āā āā ā)Ėā āDefendant/Appellee.ā āā ā)ĖĖĖā@ āCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEĖā@ āMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEĖĖĖAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€BEDFORD€COUNTYĖAT€SHELBYVILLE,€TENNESSEEĖĖTHE€HONORABLE€TYRUS€H.€COBB,€CHANCELLORĖĖĖĖĖDONALD€M.€BULLOCH,€JR.ĖFRANK€M.€FLYĖBULLOCK,€FLY€&€MCFARLINĖ301€North€Spring€StreetĖP.€O.€Box€398ĖMurfreesboro,€TN€37133„0398Ėā āAttorneys€for€Plaintiffs/AppellantsĖĖC.€KELLY€WILSONĖWILSON€&€WILSONĖ200€East€Depot€StreetĖShelbyville,€Tennessee€37160Ėā āAttorney€for€Defendant/AppelleeĖĖĖĖĖĖā@ āAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDĖĖĖĖĖĖā āā āā āā āā āā āā āBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEĖĖCONCUR:ĖTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ĖKOCH,€J.ĖĖĖĖĶ  ĶĶĶā@ āō ōōōÔ€„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NĖķ ķķķÔ€XÔā āĖā āā āThis€case€encompasses€three€proceedings€involving€child€supportĪin€the€Chancery€Court€of€Bedford€County,€and€the€orders€resulting€from€thoseĪproceedings.€The€first€order,€issued€in€1980,€granted€the€wife€a€divorce€and€gaveĪher€custody€of€the€partiesđđ€minor€child.€€The€husband€was€directed€to€pay€$400Īper€month€in€child€support.€€One„half€of€that€amount€was€to€be€paid€to€the€mother,Īand€the€other€half€was€to€be€deposited€into€a€trust€fund€for€the€benefit€of€the€child.ĖĖā āā āThe€second€order,€issued€in€1987,€reduced€the€husbandđđs€childĪsupport€obligation€to€$200€per€month,€but€made€no€mention€of€the€trust.€€The€thirdĪorder€was€issued€in€1996,€after€the€wife€petitioned€the€trial€court€to€compel€theÍhusband€to€fund€the€trust.€€The€court€held€that€its€1987€order€had€the€effect€ofĪterminating€the€husbandđđs€obligation€to€the€trust.€€We€affirm€the€trial€court.ĖĖā@ āō ōI.ķ ķĖĖā āā āOn€August€1,€1980,€the€trial€court€granted€Elsie€Marie€Richardson€aĪdivorce€from€Jimmie€Lee€Richardson€on€the€ground€of€cruel€and€inhumanĪconduct.€The€partiesđđ€minor€child€was€three€years€old€at€the€time.€€The€divorceĪdecree€adopted€the€partiesđđ€agreement€on€child€support,€visitation€and€division€ofĪmarital€property.€€The€clause€in€the€final€decree€that€deals€with€child€support€readsĪas€follows:ĖŌ 0 ŌŌ  ŌĶĶā ā1.ā āThe€defendant€is€to€pay€the€plaintiff€$50.00Īper€week€child€support€until€such€time€as€he€has€paid€offĪthe€remaining€payments€due€and€owing€on€the€plaintiffđđsĪcar.€€At€that€time€the€defendant€is€to€pay€the€Law€Offices€ofĪJohn€Norton€$200.00€on€the€1st€and€then€on€the€15th€ofĪeach€month.€From€each€$200.00€payment€$100.00€is€to€beĪforwarded€to€the€Plaintiff€and€the€other€$100.00€is€to€beĪforwarded€to€the€Bedford€County€Bank€as€Trustee€for€theĪuse€and€benefit€of€the€minor€child€of€the€parties,€BridgetteĪDenyse€Richardson.€The€Trust€Agreement€under€whichĪthe€said€Trustee€will€disburse€said€funds€will€be€draftedĪpursuant€to€agreement€between€counsel€of€record.€€TheĪDefendant€is€also€to€maintain€health€insurance€on€saidĪchild.ĖĖŌ € ŌŌ „ ŌĶĶĖā āā āA€trust€agreement€was€drafted€in€accordance€with€the€decree,€andĪwas€signed€by€Mr.€Richardson€on€December€29,€1981.€€On€January€12,€1982,€Mr.ÍRichardson€made€his€first€payment€to€John€Norton.€€Mr.€Norton€forwarded€theĪmoney€in€accordance€with€the€orders€of€the€court€until€May€15,€1984.€Mr.ĪRichardson€testified€that€on€that€date€he€went€to€Mr.€Nortonđđs€office€to€present€hisĪcheck,€and€he€was€told€by€the€attorneyđđs€secretary€that€Mr.€Norton€had€been€firedĪby€Mrs.€Richardson.€€He€asked€what€he€was€supposed€to€do,€and€was€allegedlyĪtold€đ đsomeone€will€tell€you€later.đđĖā āĖā āā āIn€1986,€the€Department€of€Human€Services€petitioned€the€court€onĪbehalf€of€Mrs.€Richardson€to€hold€Mr.€Richardson€in€contempt€for€failing€to€payĪchild€support.€€The€court€found€that€Mr.€Richardson€hadnđđt€made€any€paymentsĪsince€May€15,€1984,€and€that€he€was€in€arrears€$6,800.€€Mr.€Richardsonđđs€onlyĪexcuse€was€that€Mr.€Norton€would€no€longer€accept€payments.€€In€its€order€ofĪJanuary€6,€1987,€the€court€found€him€in€contempt,€but€suspended€punishment€onĪthe€condition€that€he€immediately€pay€$1,000€to€the€petitioner,€and€that€he€beginĪmeeting€his€obligation€by€paying€$300€per€month€into€the€court:€$200€for€hisĪregular€child€support€obligation€and€$100€to€be€applied€to€the€arrearage.€ĖĖā āā āOn€February€25,€1991,€and€again€on€December€31,€1991,€Mrs.ĪRichardson€filed€Petitions€for€Contempt€against€Mr.€Richardson.€€Both€petitionsĪalleged,€among€other€things,€that€Mr.€Richardson€had€failed€to€fund€the€trust.€€ItĪappears€that€both€petitions€were€dismissed€for€failure€to€prosecute.€€ĖĖā āā āOn€January€26,€1995,€Mrs.€Richardson€petitioned€the€court€forĪcontempt€and€for€an€increase€in€child€support.€€She€claimed€that€the€defendantĪhad€failed€to€fund€the€trust€and€failed€to€maintain€health€insurance€on€BridgetteĪDenyse.€€The€defendant€did€not€dispute€that€if€he€had€fully€funded€the€trust€untilĪhis€daughter€reached€her€majority€in€June€of€1995,€the€principal€balance€wouldĪhave€been€$34,800.€The€record€showed€that€his€actual€payments€into€the€trustĪamounted€to€$4,225.€€€ĖĖā āā āMr.€Richardsonđđs€attorney€argued€that€his€trust€obligation€had€beenĪterminated€in€1987.€€The€trial€court€agreed,€ruling€as€follows:€ĖŌ 0 ŌŌ  ŌĶĶđ đAfter€careful€consideration€of€the€evidence€and€the€recordĪthe€Court€finds€that€the€final€decree€of€divorce€wasĪmodified€by€the€Courtđđs€order€entered€January€9,€1987.€ĪThe€1987€order€effectively€terminated€the€deposits€into€theĪtrust€and€reduced€the€child€support€obligation€to€$200.00Īper€month.€The€Court€has€no€independent€recollection€ofĪthe€evidence€necessitating€a€reduction€in€the€amount€ofĪchild€support.€€The€Defendant€testified€that€it€was€becauseĪof€his€financial€difficulties€almost€forcing€him€intoĪbankruptcy.€€Nevertheless,€the€Court€must€speak€throughĪits€minutes€which€the€Court€interprets€as€a€discontinuationĪof€further€payments€into€the€trust.€€ĖŌ € ŌŌ „ ŌĶĶĖā āā āThis€appeal€followed.ĖĖā@ āō ōII.€€The€Power€of€the€Court€Over€the€Trustķ ķĖĖā āā āTwo€questions€determine€the€outcome€of€this€appeal.€€First,€whetherĪthe€trial€court€had€the€power€to€terminate€the€appellantđđs€obligation€to€fund€theĪtrust;€secondly,€if€it€did€have€the€power,€whether€the€trial€court€was€correct€inĪfinding€that€it€had€exercised€that€power€in€its€1987€order.ĖĖā āā āIn€regard€to€the€first€question,€the€appellant€argues€that€the€terms€ofĪthe€trust€instrument€imposed€a€binding€and€irrevocable€obligation€on€Mr.ĪRichardson€to€fund€the€trust€at€the€rate€of€$200€per€month€until€Bridgette€DenyseĪreached€the€age€of€eighteen.€€One€clause€of€the€agreement,€reads:€€đ đ[t]hisĪagreement€and€the€trust€created€hereby€shall€be€irrevocable,€and€shall€not€beĪaltered,€amended,€revoked€or€terminated€by€Settlor€or€any€other€person.đđĖĖā āā āThe€trust€instrument€also€recites€that€it€was€made€đ đin€furtherance€ofĪthe€terms€of€the€Final€Judgment€in€a€divorce€action€between€myself€and€my€formerĪwife,€Elsie€Marie€Richardson€.€.€.€.đđ€€It€directs€the€trustee€to€đ đ.€.€.€Pay€or€apply€soĪmuch€of€the€net€income€or€the€corpus€as€the€Trustee€shall€in€its€sole€andĪuncontrolled€discretion€deem€proper€for€the€education€and€extraordinaryĪmaintenance€and€support€of€the€said€Bridgette€Denyse€Richardson€.€.€.€.đđ€€AnyĪamount€accumulated€but€not€disbursed€before€Ms.€Richardson€reached€herĪmajority€was€to€be€paid€to€her€in€three€installments,€at€age,€21,€24,€and€25Īrespectively.ĖĖā āā āThe€appellant€concedes€that€the€obligation€to€fund€the€trust€is€part€ofĪMr.€Richardsonđđs€general€child€support€obligation.€€We€therefore€believe€that€theĪtrust€instrument€stands€on€a€different€footing€than€a€contract€entered€into€byĪindividuals€acting€on€their€own,€without€the€participation€of€the€trial€court.ĖĖā āā āIn€ōōPenland€v.€Penlandķķ,€521€S.W.2d€222€(Tenn.€1975),€our€SupremeĪCourt€examined€the€nature€of€a€contract€drafted€pursuant€to€a€child€support€order.€ĪThe€wife€sought€to€enforce€a€clause€in€the€contract€that€required€the€husband€toĪpay€all€future€educational€expenses€of€the€partiesđđ€two€daughters€beyond€highĪschool.€€The€husband€argued€that€the€clause€in€question€was€unenforceableĪbecause€he€could€not€be€legally€compelled€to€support€his€daughters€after€theyĪreached€the€age€of€majority.€The€trial€court€agreed.ĖĖā āā āThe€Supreme€Court€reversed,€finding€that€as€the€clause€in€questionĪwas€outside€the€scope€of€the€legal€duty€of€support€during€minority,€it€retained€itsĪcontractual€nature,€and€could€be€enforced€in€accordance€with€its€terms.€€As€forĪprovisions€consistent€with€the€legal€obligations€of€child€support,€the€Court€said:€€€€€€€ĖŌ 0 ŌŌ  ŌĶĶđ đWhen€the€husband€and€wife€contract€with€respect€to€theĪlegal€duty€of€child€support,€upon€approval€of€that€contract,Īthe€agreement€of€the€parties€becomes€merged€into€theĪdecree€and€loses€its€contractual€nature.ĖĖā āHowever,€it€is€clear€that€the€reason€for€stripping€theĪagreement€of€the€parties€of€its€contractual€nature€is€theÍcontinuing€statutory€power€of€the€Court€to€modify€its€termsĪwhen€changed€circumstances€justify.đđĖŌ € ŌŌ „ ŌĖĶĶ521€S.W.2d€at€224.ĖĖā āā āSince€funding€the€trust€for€his€daughterđđs€benefit€was€a€part€of€Mr.ĪRichardsonđđs€child€support€obligation,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€retained€theĪsame€power€to€make€changes€to€that€obligation€as€to€any€other€provision€of€itsĪchild€support€order,€notwithstanding€any€language€in€the€trust€instrument€as€to€theĪirrevocability€of€its€terms.€€We€note€that€Denyse€Richardson€is€still€entitled€toĪreceive€the€corpus€of€the€trust€in€accordance€with€the€instrumentđđs€original€terms,Ībecause€that€portion€of€the€trust€agreement€is€not€part€of€the€duty€of€child€support,Īand€it€retains€its€contractual€nature.ō ōĖĖā@ āIII.€€The€1987€Order€ķ ķĖĖā āā āIn€regard€to€the€question€of€whether€the€trial€court€was€correct€inĪfinding€that€it€had€in€fact€terminated€the€appelleeđđs€trust€obligation€in€1987,€theĪappellant€offers€us€a€two„pronged€argument.€€First€she€points€out€that€there€isĪnothing€in€the€procedural€history€leading€up€to€the€courtđđs€1987€order,€and€nothingĪin€the€order€itself,€to€indicate€that€the€trust€agreement€was€at€issue.€€Second,€sheĪargues€that€because€the€appellee€failed€to€plead€the€1987€order€as€an€affirmativeÍdefense€to€his€obligations€under€the€trust€agreement,€she€was€deprived€of€noticeĪthat€the€appellee€would€rely€on€that€defense€during€the€1995€proceedings.Ė€ā āā āAs€the€appellant€points€out,€there€is€nothing€in€the€record€to€indicateĪthat€Mr.€Richardson€ever€requested€that€his€trust€fund€obligation€be€terminated,Īand€he€has€admitted€that€he€never€filed€a€petition€to€have€his€child€supportĪobligation€reduced.€€He€apparently€did€argue€at€the€1986€hearing€that€hisĪworsening€financial€state€would€make€it€difficult€for€him€to€comply€with€the€courtđđsĪprevious€child€support€order.€€The€1987€order€does€not€specifically€mention€theĪtrust,€and€does€not€even€state€that€it€constitutes€a€reduction€in€child€support,€butĪmerely€orders€Mr.€Richardson€to€henceforth€pay€$300€monthly,€with€$200€to€beĪapplied€to€his€regular€child€support€obligation€and€$100€to€the€arrearage.ĖĖā āā āThe€appellant€argues€that€the€lack€of€any€reference€to€the€trust€fundĪproves€that€the€trial€court€did€not€intend€to€terminate€the€obligation.€€But€the€sameĪfacts€can€be€interpreted€both€ways.€€The€1987€order€was€the€last€order€of€the€courtĪon€child€support,€and€was€clearly€meant€to€supersede€its€earlier€order.€€TheĪappellee€notes€that€if€the€trial€judge€intended€for€the€trust€obligation€to€continue,Īhe€could€have€specifically€said€so€in€the€order,€but€he€did€not.ĖĖā āā āIt€seems€most€likely€that€the€court€and€the€attorneys€simplyĪoverlooked€the€trust€fund€in€1987,€especially€in€light€of€the€fact€that€the€$6,800Īarrearage€that€the€courtđđs€order€attempted€to€cure€was€only€about€half€of€theÍamount€that€Mr.€Richardson€was€obligated€to€pay€between€1984€and€1987.€€ButĪsuch€an€oversight€did€not€relieve€the€court€of€the€obligation€to€rule€on€the€legalĪeffect€of€its€1987€order€after€the€parties€returned€to€court.€ĖĖā āā āEven€though€the€judge€has€no€independent€memory€of€theĪproceedings,€we€still€believe€that€the€trial€court€is€the€best€interpreter€of€its€ownĪorders.€€This€court€is€even€further€removed€from€the€events€surrounding€the€1987Īorder€than€is€the€trial€court,€and€we€would€be€reluctant€to€say€that€the€judgeđđsĪorder€means€something€different€from€what€he€says€it€means.ĖĖā āā āThe€appellant€points€out€that€the€appellee€did€not€plead€theĪtermination€of€the€trust€as€an€affirmative€defense,€and€did€not€raise€that€argumentĪin€any€form€in€any€of€his€pleadings.€€The€transcript€indicates€that€the€appellantĪseized€upon€this€argument€after€she€realized€that€the€affirmative€defense€that€sheĪdid€plead,€laches,€would€not€apply€if€the€trust€obligation€were€considered€to€be€inĪthe€nature€of€child€support.ĖĖā āā āThe€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€require€a€party€to€đ đset€forth€affirmativelyĪfacts€in€short€and€plain€terms€relied€upon€to€constitute€[avoidances€and€affirmativeĪdefenses].đđ€€Rule€8.03,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€€A€party€may€be€deemed€to€have€waived€anyĪdefense€(with€some€exceptions€not€relevant€here)€that€he€does€not€present€byĪpleadings€or€motions.€€Rule€12.08,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€€Thus€the€trial€court€could€haveÍrefused€to€hear€Mr.€Richardsonđđs€argument€that€his€failure€to€fund€the€trust€wasĪexcused€by€that€same€courtđđs€prior€order.€€But€we€do€not€believe€that€it€wasĪobligated€to€do€so.€€€ĖĖā āā āThe€appellant€argues€that€the€lack€of€prior€notice€of€the€affirmativeĪdefense€prevented€her€from€making€preparations€to€meet€it,€such€as€by€searchingĪfor€a€transcript€of€the€1986€proceedings€to€unearth€evidence€that€the€courtĪintended€at€that€time€for€the€trust€obligation€to€continue.€€However€we€note€that€theĪRules€of€Civil€Procedure€permitted€her€to€file€a€Motion€to€Alter€or€Amend€theĪJudgment,€or€a€Motion€for€New€Trial,€which€would€have€given€her€time€andĪopportunity€to€develop€new€evidence€or€counter„arguments€to€present€to€the€trialĪcourt.€€See€Rule€59,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€€The€record€does€not€indicate€that€the€appellantĪtook€advantage€of€that€opportunity,€nor€was€anything€said€at€oral€argument€to€leadĪthis€court€to€believe€that€such€evidence€was€likely€to€emerge.€€We€therefore€holdĪthat€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€ruling€that€Mr.€Richardsonđđs€obligations€under€theĪtrust€fund€ended€in€1987.€ĖĖā@ āō ōIV.€€Medical€Insuranceķ ķĖĖā āā āThe€divorce€decree€included€an€order€for€Mr.€Richardson€to€provideĪmedical€insurance€for€his€daughter.€€In€her€1995€petition,€Mrs.€Richardson€askedĪthe€court€for€a€judgment€for€the€money€she€herself€paid€to€insure€her€daughterÍ($2,319)€and€for€medical€and€surgical€expenses€that€were€not€covered€byĪinsurance€($1,545).€Mr.€Richardson€testified€that€he€did€in€fact€maintain€insuranceĪon€Denyse€for€the€years€1980€to€1995,€except€for€two€or€three€years€during€whichĪhe€did€not€have€insurance€himself.€€€€€ĖĖā āā āMrs.€Richardson€apparently€asked€Mr.€Richardson€about€medicalĪinsurance€only€once,€in€a€1987€letter€which€reads€in€pertinent€part:€ĖŌ 0 ŌŌ  ŌĶĶā āđ đBy€order€of€the€court,€you€are€to€maintain€healthĪinsurance€for€your€daughter€to€cover€costs€of€doctorđđs€fees,Īmedical€fees€and€hospitalization;€etc.€€In€the€past€you€haveĪshown€nothing€but€your€unwillingness€to€comply€by€theĪcourt€order,€so€I€feel€safe€in€assuming€that€you€have€neverĪbothered€to€acquire€any€insurance€coverage€for€your€child.Ī.€.€.€€If€you€do€not€have€adequate€insurance€coverage€forĪher€at€this€time,€please€obtain€the€coverage€for€her€now!đđĖĖŌ € ŌŌ „ ŌĶĶĖā āā āMr.€Richardson€denied€ever€receiving€the€letter,€and€Mrs.ĪRichardson€never€followed€it€up€with€further€inquiry.ĖĖā āā āIt€obviously€would€have€been€helpful€for€Mr.€Richardson€toĪvoluntarily€notify€his€ex„wife€that€he€had€complied€with€the€courtđđs€order€onĪmedical€insurance€for€his€daughter,€and€to€give€her€the€name€of€the€insuranceĪcompany,€a€claim€form,€and€an€insurance€card.€€We€can€go€even€further,€and€sayĪthat€it€would€have€been€the€right€thing€to€do.€€But€a€moral€obligation€is€not€theĪsame€as€a€legal€obligation,€and€we€are€unaware€of€any€law€that€would€requireÍhim€to€do€so,€if€he€does€not€receive€a€request€for€these€items€from€her.€€We€mustĪcount€the€resulting€financial€loss€to€Mrs.€Richardson€as€among€the€manyĪunfortunate€consequences€flowing€from€the€lack€of€communication€between€theĪparties.€ĖĖā@ āō ōIV.€€Attorney€Feesķ ķĖĖā āā āThe€appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€declining€to€grantĪher€attorney€fees€for€pursuing€this€action.€€A€plaintiff€spouse€may€recover€from€theĪother€spouse€€reasonable€attorney€fees€incurred€in€enforcing€any€decree€for€childĪsupport.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€đđ€36„5„103(c).€€However€the€award€of€attorney€fees€is€inĪthe€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€ōō€Sherrod€v.€Wixķķ,€849€S.W.2d€780,€785Ī(Tenn.€App.€1992).ĖĖā āā āThere€is€no€exhaustive€list€of€the€factors€a€trial€court€should€take€intoĪaccount€in€exercising€its€discretion€on€the€question€of€attorney€fees.€€Such€anĪaward€would€seem€to€be€most€appropriate,€however,€where€the€plaintiff€provesĪthat€she€is€entitled€to€an€award€for€the€benefit€of€her€minor€child,€and€where€theĪcost€of€vindicating€that€right€produces€an€an€inequitable€reduction€in€the€actualĪamount€the€child€receives.€€In€this€case€the€petitioner€did€not€prove€that€she€wasĪentitled€to€the€relief€she€sought,€so€we€can€see€no€abuse€of€discretion€in€the€trialĪcourtđđs€determination€that€she€is€not€entitled€to€attorney€fees.€€ĖĖĖĖĖĖĖā@ āō ōV.ķ ķĖĖā āā āThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Remand€this€cause€to€theĪChancery€Court€of€Bedford€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisĪopinion.€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ĖĖĶĶĖĖĖā āā āā āā āā āā ā________________________________Ėā āā āā āā āā āā āBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEĖĖĖĖCONCUR:ĖĖĖĖĖ_______________________________ĖHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEĖMIDDLE€SECTIONĖĖĖĖĖ_______________________________ĖWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEĖĖĖĮŅ  ŅŅ Ü ŅŅ X Ņā@ ā