’WPCE b^ l %x 0ˆ~UNwT4Xl z{ŅõĒ mÉ 0DąĘ$Ęźʰ Ęv N< 0J> 0Tˆ EÜ #ĮŽ 0^Ÿ Ŗż 0h§ 0r 0| 0†ż 0ƒ 1u 0dˆU:>ģU**iTK½bĮõŻmŅÜ? "0š'ŅŹ)·œ-7S/FŠ0%Š3’õ4^‡7v~å8vÓc: 0ė6@ B!A 0ˆ>A D3ĘA D-łA 0K&B ASqBĘÄB 0¤ŠC 0D.D A«rDyy.+s »(`£Ŗ$””Ń€.ŃŃ8€½­»»d»»d8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  Ó(ķ€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularŃB+¼  3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt’U‹’ĄĄĄ(#Ć$ņņŚ  Ś0Ś  ŚóóLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ’’0Indent1Ō2ŌŌ3  Ō2" ’’0Indent2ą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  ԘHP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eČČ,,,,ČČ02, ’’0Indent3ą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō HeldmannonmaritalGrayson GoodlettsvilleRivkindivorc)ehad had GMCJambroneFawleyBrideheadHeartbalmEldridge a]ny Fye S.W. Eviddisbelieve[dquitclaimed Gard i]tFarettaTapmanCarlonLarrabeeGoodenowStriblingCommwEasterlin CasHartzHickersonSchuylerGoodalThurmanSpaffordRissbergerDunlapdonativeSmalling M.J.GraceyMaddinIntlMemlCrowellPenningtonPeralesOverstreetShoneyBeatyMcGrawcolorableunrefutedMaryenChukier definitionallyHarpeth Vict26 ’’0Indent4ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2@ ’’0Indent5ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2J ’’0Indent6ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2T ’’0Indent7ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2^ ’’0Indent8ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō ’’?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ’’8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times _Ż ƒ!ŻŃ  ŃŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌMr.€Rivkin€had€married€Maryen€Cukier€Rivkin€in€March€1977.€€He€and€Ms.€Rivkin€had€separated€in€JuneĻ1993.Ģ AŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌEmily€Post,€ņņEmily€Postššs€Wedding€Etiquette€óó12€(Peggy€Post€ed.,€4th€ed.€2001).Ģ üŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_Ō1€Clark€šš€1.1.Ģ üŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_Ō1€Clark€šš€1.1.Ģ- ł- ·Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌņņSeeóó,€ņņe.g.óó,€ņņPoster€v.€Andrewsóó,€182€Tenn.€671,€189€S.W.2d€580€(1943);€ņņGoodner€v.€Goodneróó,€147€Tenn.Ļ517,€249€S.W.€805€(1923);€ņņBrown€v.€Odillóó,€104€Tenn.€250,€56€S.W.€840€(1900).Ģ ėŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌDeceit€actions€for€damages€resulting€from€a€fraudulent€promise€to€marry€have€as€their€object€compensatingĻa€party€for€expenditures€made€in€reliance€on€the€deceitful€promise.€€Note,€ņņHeartbalm€Statutes€and€Deceit€Actionsóó,€83ĻMich.€L.€Rev.€at€1772€n.10.Ģ cŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌAct€of€April€8,€1949,€ch.€161,€1949€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€486,€now€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šššš€36„3„401,Ļ„405€(1996).Ģ ŅŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌIn€fact,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„403€specifically€provided€that€š š[a]ny€previous€marriage€on€the€part€ofĻsuch€plaintiff€shall€be€considered€by€the€court€and€jury€in€mitigation€of€the€damages€that€might€otherwise€beĻallowed.ššĢ uŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌIn€its€April€21,€1999€amended€memorandum,€the€trial€court€concludes€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401€isĻš šdefinitionally€unclearšš€and€then€states:€€€š šDoes€this€mean€a€complete€written€contract€or€a€writing€supporting€theĻconclusion€that€a€promise€or€contract€of€marriage€exists?€€If€the€latter,€then€Mr.€Rivkinššs€Quitclaim€Deed€to€Ms.ĻPostal€renders€moot€a€determination€of€whether€the€promise€or€contract€has€been€proven€by€at€least€two€ššdisinterestedĻwitnesses.šš€€Therefore,€considering€all€the€foregoing,€the€Court€will€not€place€a€construction€on€the€statute€whichĻwould€be€the€most€extreme€deviation€from€common€law€or€antique€appellate€decisions€governing€the€breach€ofĻpromise€of€marriage.šš€€Ms.€Postalššs€appellate€brief€characterizes€the€trial€courtššs€reasoning€as€follows:€€š šThe€trialĻcourt€appears€to€have€interpreted€the€quitclaim€deed€executed€by€Mr.€Rivkin€shortly€after€the€purchase€of€the€HarpethĻSchool€Road€property,€to€possibly€constitute€the€type€of€writing€called€for€by€the€statute.€.€.€.€However,€the€trialĻcourt€did€not€elaborate€further€on€how€it€found€the€deed€to€satisfy€the€requisites€of€the€statute.ššĢ &Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌWhile€not€intended€to€be€an€exhaustive€list,€the€following€signed€writings€might€fit€the€bill:€anĻapplication€for€a€marriage€license,€an€attested€petition€to€waive€the€age€or€waiting€requirements€for€marriage,Ļcorrespondence€between€the€parties,€writing€dealing€with€wedding€arrangements,€or€pre„nuptial€agreements.Ģ ČŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌThe€preamble€to€the€Evidence€Further€Amendment€Act,€1869,€32€&€33€Vict.€68€(Eng.)€states,€in€part,Ļš šWhereas€the€discovery€of€truth€in€courts€of€justice€has€been€signally€promoted€by€the€removal€of€restrictions€on€theĻadmissibility€of€witnesses,€and€it€is€expedient€to€amend€the€law€of€evidence€with€the€object€of€still€further€promotingĻsuch€discovery€.€.€.šš€€Section€2€of€the€Act€provides:€š šThe€parties€to€any€action€for€breach€of€promise€of€marriageĻshall€be€competent€to€give€evidence€in€such€action:€Provided€always,€that€no€plaintiff€in€any€action€for€breach€ofĻpromise€of€marriage€shall€recover€a€verdict€unless€his€or€her€testimony€shall€be€corroborated€by€some€other€materialĻevidence€in€support€of€such€promise.ššĢ ­Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌAct€of€Mar.€13,€1868,€ch.€75,€1867„1868€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€94;€see€also€Act€of€Dec.€17,€1868,€ch.€7,Ļ1868„1869€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€7;€Act€of€Feb.€24,€1870,€ch.€78,€šš€1,€1869„1870€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€95.Ģ -Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌŌ_ŌEldridgeŌ_Ō,€21€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€at€452.Ģ <Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌBecause€Mr.€Rivkin€and€Ms.€Postal€never€held€themselves€out€as€married,€any€of€the€equitable€principlesĻgenerally€used€to€divide€the€property€of€ersatz€husbands€and€wives€likewise€also€have€no€application.€ņņSeeóó,€ņņe.g.óó,ĻņņPickens€v.€Pickensóó,€490€So.2d€872,€875„76€(Miss.€1986)€(employing€an€implied€partnership€theory€to€divide€aĻcoupleššs€property);€ņņŌ_ŌGoodeŌ_Ō€v.€Ō_ŌGoodeŌ_Ōóó,€396€S.E.2d€430,€435„39€(W.€Va.€1990)€(dividing€a€longtime€coupleššs€propertyĻusing€theories€of€implied€contract€and€constructive€trust).€€€Ģ Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌTenn.€Code€Ann.€šššš€29„27„101,€„219€(2000).Ģ ˆŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_ŌThe€quitclaim€deed€recites,€in€part,€š šI,€David€B.€Ō_ŌRivkinŌ_Ō,€Grantor,€by€these€presents,€do€hereby€quitclaimĻand€convey€unto€David€B.€Ō_ŌRivkinŌ_Ō€and€Lori€Postal,€Grantees,€their€heirs€and€assigns,€as€joint€tenants€in€commonĻwith€right€of€survivorship,€all€my€right,€title€and€interest€in€the€following€described€property€in€Williamson€CountyĻ.€.€..šš€Ģ TŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŌ€'ōŌŌ_Ō€The€trial€court€added€that€š šIššm€looking€at€them,€and€the€court€is€not€happy€with€what€it€sees.ššĢPtPtHHŲ(’į’āłFG(üHHŲ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆŠ ŠŠHHŠŠ  ŠŠ2ŠŠ’’øę$’ŠŠHHŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ  ŠŠ ŠŠ ŠŃŃŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŃ € ŃŃ<Px–ČŃŅŅŅ443!#4ŅŅ$ *$ŅŅ$*$ŅŅ ’KK ŅŅ  Geneva ŅŅ  Geneva ŅÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŅ  Serv Geneva ŅŅ  Serv Geneva Ņ(|G2Ót$¤¤Ż ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€=»»dXXdģ8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą  ąņņŚ  Ś0Ś  ŚóóŌ€ō¼%ņ»»Ō d(`"’’$££Ņ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅŅ  ŅVVVV'’’dxd)!ČČČČdxdx( ±ž$’’ņ ņFigure€Ś  Ś1Ś  Śó ó^_X`YEž’<<C’’ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Į;$¢¢Ż ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€=»»dXXdģ8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Ż($$””ņ ņŚ  Ś1Ś  Śó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8’’’’’’’’’’C’’ HKKKKŻ ƒ!ŻŌ . ŌŌ€'ŌŌ€'¼ŌŃ#€))¼d#ŃŃ#€))¼d#ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  ŻŃ  ŃŃ\R3Ų'\ŃŌ_ŌŃ8€RQXXdģ»»d8ŃŃ  Ńą@ ąŌ€'īŌIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEĢą@ ąAT€NASHVILLEŌ€'¼ŌĢÓ  ÓApril€13,€2000€SessionĢŌ€'XŌĢņ ņŌ€'¼ŌDAVID€RIVKIN€v.€LORI€POSTALŌ€'XŌó óĢĢņ ņ€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€CountyĢNo.€24930€€€€€€Russ€Heldman,€JudgeĢą@ ąßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½ ` AßĢNo.€M1999„01947„Ō_ŌCOAŌ_Ō„R3„CV€„€Filed€September€14,€Ō_Ō2001Ō_ŌĢßA€V) °°` dE<` Aßó óĢÓ  ÓThis€appeal€involves€the€financial€aftermath€of€a€short„lived€nonmarital€affair€that€ended€badly.€€TheĻman€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€County€seeking€a€partition€of€the€jointly„owned€property€and€the€return€of€his€personal€property.€€The€woman€responded€with€a€counterclaimĻfor€breach€of€promise€to€marry.€€Following€a€bench€trial,€the€trial€court€divided€the€jointly„ownedĻproperty€and€awarded€the€woman€$150,000€in€damages€on€her€breach€of€promise€claim.€€BothĻparties€now€take€issue€with€the€judgment.€€The€man€asserts€that€the€evidence€does€not€supportĻawarding€the€woman€$150,000€or€granting€the€woman€such€a€large€share€of€the€jointly„ownedĻproperty.€€The€woman€takes€issue€with€the€reduction€of€her€share€of€the€property€because€ofĻdamage€to€the€manššs€personal€property€while€it€was€in€her€possession.€€We€have€determined€thatĻthe€evidence€does€not€support€the€trial€courtššs€conclusion€that€a€promise€to€marry€existed€or€that€theĻwoman€was€damaged€by€the€failure€of€the€marriage€to€take€place.€€We€have€also€determined€that,Ļwith€the€exception€of€a€cedar€chest€belonging€to€the€manššs€grandmother,€the€manner€in€which€theĻtrial€court€divided€the€partiesšš€jointly„owned€property€was€proper.ĢĢÓ  Óņ ņTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Affirmed€in€PartĻ&€Reversed€in€Partó óĢĢÓ  ÓņņWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€ņņWilliam€B.€Cainóó€andĻņņPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€JJ.óó,€joined.ĢĢMary€Arline€Evans€and€John€Michael€Garrett,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€David€Rivkin.ĢĢGrayson€Smith€Cannon,€Goodlettsville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Lori€Postal.ĢÓ  ÓĢņ ņOPINIONó óĢĢņ ņI.ó óĢĢÓ  Óą ąDavid€Rivkin€and€Lori€Postal€met€in€April€1994€at€a€music€convention€in€Memphis.€€Mr.ĻRivkin€was€a€successful,€award„winning€producer.€€Ms.€Postal€was€a€28„year„old€divorce€who€wasĻliving€in€Atlanta€with€her€mother€and€stepfather.€€She€sold€bathing€suits€at€wholesale€and€had€alsoĻstarted€a€record€label.€€Ms.€Postal€was€attending€the€Memphis€convention€to€obtain€a€record€contractĻfor€a€singer€and€a€band€that€she€represented.€€Even€though€Ms.€Postal€knew€that€Mr.€Rivkin€wasĻmarried€and€had€three€children,× ƒ* ××  ׀she€welcomed€his€romantic€advances.€€Within€a€short€period€ofĻtime,€they€began€living€together€at€the€Peabody€Hotel€in€Memphis€and€later€moved€into€a€house€Mr.ĻRivkin€bought€in€a€Memphis€suburb.ĢĢą ąIn€early€1995,€Ms.€Postal€discovered€she€was€pregnant€with€Mr.€Rivkinššs€child.€€Mr.€RivkinĻsuggested€an€abortion,€but€Ms.€Postal€did€not€agree.€€Their€child€was€born€in€September€1995.€ĻShortly€after€their€child€was€born,€Mr.€Rivkin€sold€the€house€in€Memphis,€and€the€parties€moved€toĻWilliamson€County€because€they€believed€that€Mr.€Rivkin€would€have€greater€success€as€a€producerĻin€the€Nashville€area.€€Mr.€Rivkin€was€the€partiesšš€sole€source€of€support,€and€he€was€able€toĻprovide€an€exceptionally€affluent€lifestyle€for€Ms.€Postal€and€their€child€despite€his€continuingĻobligations€to€his€wife€and€children.€€He€purchased€a€$420,000€home€in€Williamson€County€andĻhorses€for€Ms.€Postal.€€He€also€hired€a€nanny€for€the€child.€€Not€surprisingly,€Ms.€Postal€took€toĻthis€lifestyle.€She€did€not€work€outside€the€home€but€rather€spent€her€time€raising€the€partiesšš€child,Ļtraining€her€horses,€and€entertaining€her€personal€friends€and€Mr.€Rivkinššs€business€associates.ĢĢą ąBut€all€was€not€well€with€the€parties.€€They€entered€counseling€in€an€effort€to€save€theirĻrelationship.€€One€of€their€problems€stemmed€from€Ms.€Postalššs€concern€that€her€family€knew€thatĻshe€was€living€with€a€married€man€and€had€given€birth€to€his€child.€€She€insisted€that€Mr.€RivkinĻbuy€her€an€engagement€ring€to€enable€her€to€save€face€with€her€family.€€When€Mr.€Rivkin€did€notĻpurchase€a€ring€for€her,€Ms.€Postal€ordered€a€ring€herself.€€Mr.€Rivkin€eventually€paid€for€the€ringĻafter€Ms.€Postal€refused€to€return€it€and€also€permitted€her€to€wear€it€in€front€of€her€family.€€MsĻPostal€told€her€parents€that€she€and€Mr.€Rivkin€were€planning€to€wed€after€he€was€divorced,€and€Mr.ĻRivkin€did€not€contradict€her.€€However,€the€parties€themselves€never€discussed€specific€weddingĻplans.ĢĢą ąThe€partiesšš€relationship€had€disintegrated€further€by€August€1996.€€Ms.€Postal€accusedĻMr.€Rivkin€of€sexually€molesting€their€child,€and€the€Williamson€County€Juvenile€Court,€at€theĻinsistence€of€the€Department€of€Human€Services,€ordered€Mr.€Rivkin€to€move€out€of€the€house€andĻto€stay€away€from€the€child€while€the€Department€conducted€its€investigation.€€Despite€her€chargesĻagainst€Mr.€Rivkin,€Ms.€Postal€continued€to€have€sexual€relations€with€him.€€Although€Mr.€RivkinĻwas€eventually€cleared€of€all€the€molestation€charges,€Ms.€Postalššs€allegations€irretrievably€damagedĻthe€partiesšš€relationship.ĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkin€was€finally€divorced€from€his€wife€in€March€1997.€€However,€by€this€time,€Mr.ĻRivkin€was€no€longer€living€in€the€partiesšš€house.€€He€saw€Ms.€Postal€on€occasion€and€continued€toĻpay€for€all€her€living€expenses,€the€mortgage€on€the€house,€the€payments€on€her€truck,€and€all€of€theĻchildššs€expenses.€€One€of€their€last€meetings€was€Ms.€Postalššs€birthday€in€May€1997.€€On€thisĻoccasion,€Mr.€Rivkin€asked€Ms.€Postal€to€return€the€š šengagementšš€ring€and€to€begin€paying€someĻof€her€living€expenses.€€Ms.€Postal€returned€the€ring,€and€approximately€one€month€later,€Mr.ĻRivkin€told€her€that€their€relationship€was€over€and€that€he€no€longer€wished€to€see€her.€€ĢĢą ąWhen€it€became€evident€that€their€relationship€had€ended,€neither€party€followed€EmilyĻPostššs€sage€advice€š što€take€the€high€road€š!š€and€move€on.šš× ƒ+ ××  ׀€In€September€1997,€Mr.€Rivkin€filedĻsuit€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€County€seeking€a€partition€of€the€partiesšš€jointly„ownedĻproperty€and€the€return€of€his€personal€property€that€was€still€in€Ms.€Postalššs€possession.€€Ms.ĻPostal€responded€with€a€counterclaim€seeking€damages€for€breach€of€promise€to€marry.€€As€a€resultĻof€this€litigation,€Mr.€Rivkin€stopped€paying€Ms.€Postalššs€living€expenses€and€the€mortgage€on€theĻhouse.€€Ms.€Postal€was€required€to€borrow€money€from€her€mother€and€father€in€order€to€stave€offĻforeclosure.€€Eventually,€the€parties€agreed€to€sell€the€house€and€to€place€the€proceeds€in€escrow.€ĻBefore€the€case€came€to€trial,€Ms.€Postalššs€father€attempted€to€intervene€in€the€lawsuit€to€recover€theĻmoney€he€had€loaned€his€daughter.€€ĢĢą ąThe€trial€court€heard€the€case€without€a€jury€in€November€1998.€€In€April€1999,€the€trialĻcourt€filed€a€memorandum€concluding€that€Mr.€Rivkin€had€breached€his€promise€to€marry€Ms.ĻPostal€and€that€Ms.€Postal€was€entitled€to€$150,000€in€damages.€€The€trial€court€awarded€the€partiesĻequal€shares€of€the€remaining€proceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€house€and€divided€the€other€pieces€ofĻpersonal€property€generally€according€to€schedules€submitted€by€the€parties,€except€for€Mr.ĻRivkinššs€grandmotherššs€cedar€chest€which€was€awarded€to€Ms.€Postal.€€The€court€also€reduced€Ms.ĻPostalššs€award€by€$2,000,€representing€the€damage€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€gold€and€platinum€records€thatĻhad€been€in€her€possession,€and€dismissed€Ms.€Postalššs€fatherššs€motion€to€intervene.ĢĢą ąBoth€parties€filed€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59.04€motions€asking€the€trial€court€to€address€the€1993ĻGMC€truck€that€had€been€overlooked€in€the€memorandum€opinion€and€judgment.€€The€trial€courtĻfiled€an€order€in€August€1999€awarding€the€truck€to€Ms.€Postal,€and€then€vacated€and€re„entered€theĻorder€in€October€1999€because€neither€of€the€parties€had€received€its€August€1999€order.€€On€thisĻappeal,€Mr.€Rivkin€takes€issue€with€the€$150,000€damage€award€and€the€division€of€the€jointly„owned€property.€€Ms.€Postal€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtššs€decision€to€deduct€$2,000€from€herĻjudgment€because€of€the€damage€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€gold€and€platinum€records.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņII.ó óĢĢą ąThomas€Hardy€offended€the€Victorian€opinionmakers€of€his€day€by€suggesting€in€his€1896Ļnovel€ņņJude€the€Obscureóó€that€marriage€was€merely€a€contract€that€some€persons€entered€into€asĻunwisely€as€they€entered€into€other€contracts.€€Many€persons,€other€than€clerics€and€literary€critics,Ļsensed€that€Hardy€had€a€point.€€Less€than€three„quarters€of€a€century€after€the€publication€of€ņņJudeĻthe€Obscure€óóin€book€form,€much€of€the€polite€squeamishness€over€Hardyššs€suggestion€hadĻevaporated,€and€even€the€courts€were€openly€characterizing€marriage€as€a€contract.€€ņņSeeóó,€ņņe.g.óó,ĻņņJambrone€v.€Davidóó,€156€N.E.2d€569,€571€(Ill.€1959);€ņņDiemer€v.€Diemeróó,€203€N.Y.S.2d€829,€834Ļ(N.Y.€1960).€€ĢĢą ąThough€some€may€still€object€to€characterizing€marriage€as€a€contract,€promises€to€marryĻhave€been€enforceable€as€contracts€well€before€Hardy€wrote€about€Jude€Fawley€and€SusannaĻBridehead.€€ņņSee€óó1€Homer€H.€Clark,€Jr.,€ņņThe€Law€of€Domestic€Relations€in€the€United€Statesó󀚚€1.1Ļ(2d€ed.€1987)€(š šClarkšš)€(discussing€the€history€of€breach€of€promise€to€marry).€€The€contract€toĻmarry€has€been€described€as€š šessentially€different€from€every€other€contract€known€to€the€law.šš€ĻņņLewis€v.€Tapmanóó,€45€A.€459,€461€(Md.€1900).€€Some€courts€have€said€that€it€š šstands€on€a€differentĻfooting€from€the€general€commercial€contract.šš€€ņņMinsky€v.€Satensteinóó,€143€A.€512,€514€(N.J.€1928).€ĻProfessor€Williston€points€out€that€while€ordinary€contract€principles€š šfind€special€and€peculiarĻapplicationsšš€to€contracts€to€marry,€such€executory€mutual€promises€are€nevertheless€subject€for€theĻmost€part€to€the€rules€governing€any€other€bilateral€contract.€€10€Samuel€Williston,€ņņTreatise€on€theĻLaw€of€Contractsó󀚚€1289€(Walter€H.€Jaeger€ed.,€3d€ed.€1967).€€As€far€as€contracts€go,€one€is€just€asĻbinding€as€the€other.€€ņņAttridge€v.€Pembrokeóó,€256€N.Y.S.€257,€260€(App.€Div.€1932).ĢĢą ąIn€England,€before€the€founding€of€this€country,€questions€touching€on€marriage€and€breachĻof€a€promise€of€marriage€were€chiefly€the€province€of€the€ecclesiastical€courts.€€ņņLewis€v.€Tapmanóó,Ļ45€A.€at€460;€Lawrence€M.€Friedman,€ņņA€History€of€American€Lawóó€202€(2d€ed.€1985).€€ThoseĻcourts,€however,€lacked€power€to€grant€relief€in€breach€of€promise€to€marry€cases€other€than€toĻdecree€a€performance€of€the€marriage€on€pain€of€spiritual€punishment.€€Eventually,€€as€marriageĻbegan€to€be€viewed€as€š šlargely€a€property€transaction,€entered€into€as€much€for€material€advantagesĻas€for€reasons€of€sentiment,šš× ƒ, ××  ׀actions€for€breach€of€promise€to€marry€found€their€way€into€theĶKingššs€courts€where€the€aggrieved€parties€could€obtain€what€they€actually€wanted€š!š€moneyĻdamages.€€ņņLewis€v.€Tapmanóó,€45€A.€at€460.ĢĢą ąThe€common„law€action€for€breach€of€promise€to€marry€made€its€way€to€the€AmericanĻcolonies€along€with€most€of€the€common€law€of€England.€€Here,€it€started€out€as€š ša€popular€meansĻof€soothing€the€sufferings€of€rejected€love.šš× ƒ- ××  ׀€In€time,€however,€it€became€subject€to€abuse.€ĻBorrowing€ideas€from€tort€law,€the€courts€began€permitting€juries€to€award€punitive€damages.€€Note,ĻņņHeartbalm€Statutes€and€Deceit€Actionsóó,€83€Mich.€L.€Rev.€1770,€1773„74€(1985);€Comment,ĻņņCalifornia€Reopens€the€š šHeartbalmšš€Actionóó,€9€Stan.€L.€Rev.€406,€408€(1957).€€Most€breach€ofĻpromise€to€marry€actions€were€brought€by€women€against€men,× ƒ/ ××  ׀and€menššs€fears€of€excessiveĻverdicts€and€their€distaste€for€the€scandal€surrounding€such€suits€gave€women€the€power€to€wield€theĻcause€of€action€almost€as€blackmail.€€1€Clark€šš€1.1;€Note,€ņņHeartbalm€Statutes€and€Deceit€Actionsóó,Ļ83€Mich.€L.€Rev.€at€1776„77.ĢĢą ąBy€the€1930s,€newspapers€were€publishing€accounts€of€š šspectacular€ššextortion€andĻblackmail€racketsšššš€based€on€these€claims.€€William€B.€Eldridge,€ņņDomestic€Relations€š!š€Breach€ofĻPromise€Actionsóó,€21€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€451,€451€(1950)€(š šEldridgešš).€€The€publicity€of€theĻš šunfounded€suits,€perjury,€and€excessive€verdicts€at€the€hands€of€.€.€.€seemingly€ever€gullible€.€.€.Ļ[juries]€armed€with€unrestrained€discretionšš€eventually€prompted€a€movement€to€reform€theseĻclaims.€€Eldridge,€21€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€at€452.€€Beginning€with€Indiana€in€1935,€the€states€beganĻenacting€statutes€aimed€at€ending€the€perceived€abuses€associated€with€breach€of€promise€claims.€€1ĻClark€šš€1.1;€Note,€ņņHeartbalm€Statutes€and€Deceit€Actionsóó,€83€Mich.€L.€Rev.€at€1770„71;€Comment,ĻņņCalifornia€Reopens€the€š šHeartbalmšš€Actionóó,€9€Stan.€L.€Rev.€at€408.€€ĢĢą ąMany€states€abolished€the€cause€of€action€altogether,€prompting€courts€to€jump€on€aĻbandwagon€of€sorts€that€some€thought€went€too€far.€€It€became€increasingly€evident€that€theĻpendulum€was€swinging€too€far€in€the€other€direction.€€The€barriers€erected€to€correct€one€evil€gaveĻlegal€protection€to€another.€€The€courts,€perhaps€overzealous€in€their€interpretation€of€legislativeĻintent,€construed€these€statutes€as€prohibiting€tort€actions€between€formerly€betrothed€parties€forĻfraud€and€deceit€.€.€..× ƒ0 ××  ׀€Eldridge,€21€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€at€452.ĢĢą ąTennessee€chose€a€middle€course.€€Rather€than€abolish€the€common„law€cause€of€action€forĻbreach€of€promise€to€marry,€this€state€chose€to€rein€it€in€a€bit.€€In€1949,€the€Tennessee€GeneralĻAssembly€passed€an€act€which,€according€to€its€caption,€was€designed€š što€prevent€certain€injusticesĻin€suits€for€damages€for€the€breach€of€promise€or€contract€of€marriage.šš× ƒ1 ××  ׀€This€act€circumscribesĻbreach€of€promise€claims€in€four€significant€ways.€€First,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„405€provides€thatĶthese€claims€could€not€be€joined€with€other€damage€claims.€€Second,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401Ļrequires€that€promises€or€contracts€of€marriage€could€only€be€established€using€either€signed,Ļwritten€evidence€of€the€promise€or€contract€or€the€testimony€of€at€least€two€disinterested€witnesses.€ĻThird,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„403€requires€juries€to€consider€the€partiesšš€age€and€experience€inĻcalculating€damages.× ƒ2 ××  ׀€Finally,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„404€prohibits€awarding€punitive€damagesĻin€cases€where€the€alleged€breaching€party€was€over€sixty€years€old.€€These€statutes€survive€to€theĻpresent€day,€and€thus€this€case€is€governed€by€their€strictures.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņIII.ĢÓ  ÓņņEvidence€of€the€Contract€or€Promise€to€MarryóóĢÓ  Óó óĢą ąA€suit€for€breach€of€promise€or€contract€to€marry€follows€the€procedures€generallyĻassociated€with€other€actions€for€breach€of€contract.€€ņņKaufman€v.€Fyeóó,€99€Tenn.€145,€167,€42€S.W.Ļ25,€30€(1897).€€Thus,€the€plaintiff€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€existence€of€a€contract,€that€is€anĻoffer€of€marriage€and€an€acceptance,€along€with€consideration€(which€need€only€be€a€return€promiseĻto€marry).€€ņņWeeks€v.€Maysóó,€87€Tenn.€442,€443,€10€S.W.€771,€771„72€(1889);€ņņConn€v.€Wilsonóó,€2ĻTenn.€(2€Overt.)€234,€234€(1814);€Clark€šš€1.2,€at€6.€€The€plaintiff€must€also€prove€the€other€partyššsĻrefusal€to€marry€or€the€disavowal€of€intent€to€perform.€€ņņCrossett€v.€Brackettóó,€105€A.€5,€6€(N.H.Ļ1918).ĢĢą ąMs.€Postalššs€testimony€alone€is€insufficient€to€prove€the€existence€of€a€promise€or€contractĻto€marry.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„402.€€To€meet€her€burden€of€proof€in€this€case,€Tenn.€CodeĻAnn.€šš€36„3„401€requires€her€to€present€either€š šwritten€evidence€of€such€contract,€signed€by€theĻparty€against€whom€the€action€is€broughtšš€or€with€the€testimony€of€š šat€least€two€disinterestedĻwitnesses.šš€€As€best€we€can€determine,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€Ms.€Postal€presented€evidenceĻof€both€sorts.€€We€have€concluded€that€the€trial€court€erred€on€both€counts.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņA.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņWritten€Evidence€of€a€Contact€or€Agreement€to€Marryó óĢĢą ąWe€turn€first€to€the€š šwritten€evidence.šš€€In€March€1996,€one€month€after€he€purchased€theĻWilliamson€County€house,€Mr.€Rivkin€executed€a€quitclaim€deed€conveying€the€property€to€himselfĻand€Ms.€Postal€as€joint€tenants€with€right€of€survivorship.€€The€trial€court€appears€to€have€decidedĶthat€this€quitclaim€deed€is€the€sort€of€written€evidence€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401€requires.× ƒ3 ××  ׀ĻThe€quitclaim€deed,€however,€falls€far€short€of€the€mark.ĢĢą ąWe€presume€that€the€Tennessee€General€Assembly€intended€to€make€a€useful€contributionĻto€the€law€governing€breach€of€promise€to€marry€cases€when€it€enacted€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401.€€Accordingly,€the€statute€must€contemplate€that€any€writing€proffered€to€satisfy€Tenn.€CodeĻAnn.€šš€36„3„401€must€have€real€probative€force€with€regard€to€the€existence€of€both€an€offer€toĻmarry€and€an€acceptance.€€The€writing€must,€in€the€language€of€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€401,€make€theĻexistence€of€Mr.€Rivkinššs€promise€to€marry€more€probable€than€it€would€be€without€the€evidence.ĢĢą ąš šIt€is€obvious,šš€as€one€treatise€puts€it,€š šthat€not€only€are€most€engagements€to€marryĻarrived€at€informally€and€without€witnesses€or€written€record,€but€in€many€instances€there€is€noĻexplicit€exchange€of€promises€at€all.šš€€1€Clark€šš€1.2.€€Accordingly,€proof€of€an€engagement€wouldĻbe€impossible€if€the€plaintiff€were€required€to€produce€evidence€that€at€some€specific€moment€theĻparties€formally€exchanged€promises€and€reduced€these€promises€to€writing.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ššĻ36„3„401€is€not€intended€to€go€that€far.€€Rather,€it€calls€for€signed,€written€evidence€that€the€partiesĻwere,€by€mutual€agreement,€on€the€way€to€becoming€husband€and€wife.€€Many€kinds€of€writingsĻwould€suffice.× ƒ4 ××  ×ĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkin€testified€that€he€gave€Ms.€Postal€a€joint€tenantššs€interest€in€the€WilliamsonĻCounty€house€as€a€way€of€making€sure€that€their€child€would€be€provided€for€should€somethingĻhappen€to€him.€€In€his€words,€the€quitclaim€deed€was€executed€š šfor€the€child,€in€the€event€somethingĻhappened€to€me;€[so]€that€the€child€would€have€a€house€to€live€in.šš€€If€we€discount€this€explanationĻbecause€the€trial€court€stated€that€it€š šdisbelieve[d]€Mr.€Rivkin€and€his€denial€of€any€agreement€toĻmarry€Ms.€Postal,šš€we€are€left€with€no€other€direct€evidence€of€Mr.€Rivkinššs€reasons€for€thisĻconveyance.€€Ms.€Postal€herself€conceded€that€Mr.€Rivkin€never€explained€to€her€why€heĻquitclaimed€an€interest€in€the€Williamson€County€property€to€her.ĢĢą ąThus,€the€only€evidence€we€have€regarding€the€significance€of€the€deed€is€the€deed€itself.€ĻNothing€within€the€four€corners€of€the€deed€alludes€to€any€promise€or€contract€of€marriage€or€to€theĻpartiesšš€betrothed€status.€€Executing€quitclaim€deeds€is€not€only€within€the€province€of€persons€whoĻhave€agreed€or€contracted€to€marry€the€grantee€named€in€the€deed.€€Quitclaim€deeds€are€commonlyĻused€for€business€transactions€between€partners,€conveyances€between€family€members,€cleaning€upĻa€title€for€title€insurance€purposes,€or€gifts.€€Thus,€in€light€of€the€ubiquitous€nature€of€quitclaimĶdeeds,€we€decline€to€hold€that€an€unexplained€quitclaim€deed€between€an€unmarried€man€and€anĻunmarried€woman,€without€much,€much€more,€suffices€as€signed,€written€evidence€of€a€promise€ofĻmarriage€for€the€purpose€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņB.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņTestimony€of€Two€Disinterested€Witnessesó óĢĢą ąWithout€a€writing€signed€by€Mr.€Rivkin,€Ms.€Postalššs€only€remaining€avenue€for€provingĻthat€Mr.€Rivkin€promised€to€marry€her€consisted€of€presenting€at€least€two€disinterested€witnessesĻwho€could€substantiate€Mr.€Rivkinššs€promise.€€The€requirement€that€a€witness€be€š šdisinterestedšš€isĻa€familiar€legal€concept.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņ1.ó óĢĢą ąUnlike€todayššs€rules€of€evidence,€the€old€common„law€rules€of€evidence€disqualifiedĻpersons€from€testifying€if€there€was€any€concern€that€they€were€dishonest,€that€they€did€not€fullyĻappreciate€the€sanctity€of€the€oath,€that€they€were€biased€either€for€or€against€one€of€the€parties,€orĻthat€they€were€interested€in€the€outcome€of€the€proceeding€in€any€way.€€3€Spencer€A.€Gard,€ņņJones€onĻEvidenceó󀚚€20:1€(6th€ed.€1972)€(š šJones€on€Evidencešš).€€Thus,€over€one€hundred€years€ago,€Mr.ĻJustice€Brewer€wrote€that€š š[i]t€is€familiar€knowledge€that€the€old€common€law€carefully€excludedĻfrom€the€witness€stand€.€.€.€those€who€were€interested€in€the€result;€and€this€rule€extended€to€bothĻcivil€and€criminal€cases.€€Fear€of€perjury€was€the€reason€for€the€rule.šš€€ņņBenson€v.€United€Statesóó,€146ĻU.S.€325,€335,€13€S.€Ct.€60,€63€(1892).€ĢĢą ąBy€the€end€of€the€Sixteenth€Century,€parties€in€civil€lawsuits€were€considered€incompetent€toĻtestify€in€their€own€cases.€€The€principle€rationale€for€their€exclusion€from€the€stand€was€the€lawššsĻfear€that€their€testimony€would€be€untrustworthy.€€As€unbelievable€as€it€seems€today,€even€criminalĻdefendants€were€disqualified€for€interest€from€testifying€during€their€own€prosecutions.€€ņņFaretta€v.ĻCaliforniaóó,€422€U.S.€806,€850„51,€95€S.€Ct.€2525,€2549€(1975)€(Blackman,€J.,€dissenting);ĻņņFerguson€v.€Georgiaóó,€365€U.S.€570,€574„75,€81€S.€Ct.€756,€759€(1961).€€By€the€mid„SeventeenthĻCentury,€the€courts€began€to€apply€the€disqualification€rule€to€non„party€witnesses.€€ņņFerguson€v.ĻGeorgiaóó,€365€U.S.€at€573,€81€S.€Ct.€at€759.€ĢĢą ąThis€blanket€disqualification€rule€began€to€erode€over€time.€€In€1843,€England€abrogated€theĻrule€in€civil€cases€by€statute.€€ņņFerguson€v.€Georgiaóó,€365€U.S.€at€575,€81€S.€Ct.€at€760.€€In€thisĻcountry,€many€states,€including€Tennessee,€also€enacted€statutes€during€Reconstruction€doing€awayĻwith€the€common„law€disqualification€for€interest€rules.€€Shannonššs€Code€of€Tennessee€šš€5596Ļ(1896);€Donald€F.€Paine,€ņņTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceó󀚚€151,€at€170€(1974).€€Today€nothing€remainsĻof€the€old€common„law€rule€debarring€witnesses€from€testifying€because€of€an€interest€in€theĻproceeding.€€Now€all€persons€presented€as€witnesses€must,€as€a€general€matter,€simply€meet€theĻcompetency€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€601€through€603.€€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņ2.ó óĢĢą ąSuperimposed€on€this€general€background€are€the€unique€evidentiary€rules€applicable€toĻcases€involving€claims€for€breach€of€promise€or€contract€of€marriage.€€At€one€time,€the€parties€inĻthese€cases,€as€in€other€civil€proceedings,€could€not€testify€in€their€own€behalf€because€they€wereĻdisqualified€for€interest.€€ņņLewis€v.€Tapmanóó,€45€A.€at€462.€€The€English€Parliament€removed€theĶdisqualification€in€breach€of€promise€cases€in€1869.× ƒ5 ××  ׀€The€Tennessee€General€Assembly€hadĻaccomplished€the€same€result€one€year€earlier€when€it€enacted€the€first€of€several€statutes€permittingĻparties€and€interested€persons€to€testify€in€civil€cases.× ƒ6 ××  ׀€By€necessary€implication,€these€statutesĻapplied€to€actions€for€breach€of€promise€or€contract€to€marry.€ĢĢą ąPermitting€plaintiffs€to€establish€their€breach€of€promise€claims€with€nothing€more€than€theirĻown€testimony€was€most€likely€one€of€the€š šallied€evilsšš× ƒ8 ××  ׀the€Tennessee€General€Assembly€set€outĻto€address€in€1949.€€The€enactment€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šššš€36„3„401,€„402,€while€not€a€full€return€toĻthe€common„law€rule€disqualifying€parties€and€interested€persons€as€witnesses,€was€a€studied€stepĻback€in€that€direction.€€As€a€result€of€these€statutes,€interested€witnesses€remain€competent€to€testify,Ļwhich€is€more€than€what€the€common„law€rule€permitted.€€However,€their€testimony€alone€can€neverĻcarry€the€day.€€With€reference€to€the€plaintiffššs€burden€of€proof,€the€testimony€of€parties€and€otherĻinterested€witnesses€can€only€corroborate€the€testimony€of€at€least€two€š šdisinterested€witnessesšš€orĻthe€written€evidence€of€the€promise€to€marry.€€Of€course,€any€showing€of€interest€on€the€part€of€aĻwitness€will€continue€to€affect€the€weight€of€the€witnessššs€testimony.€€ņņCreeping€Bear€v.€Stateóó,€113ĻTenn.€322,€326,€87€S.W.€653,€653„54€(1905).€€€€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņ3.ó óĢĢą ąAll€this€brings€us€to€the€precise€question€that€appears€to€have€perplexed€the€trial€court€in€thisĻcase€š!š€who€is€a€š šdisinterested€witnessšš€for€purposes€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401?€€To€find€theĻanswer,€we€begin€with€the€statute€itself.€€The€term€š šdisinterested€witnessšš€is€a€legal€term€of€art€ofĻlong€standing.€€€Thus,€we€must€give€this€term€its€technical€meaning€unless€the€context€makes€plainĻthat€some€other€meaning€was€intended.€€ņņState€v.€Smithóó,€893€S.W.2d€908,€929€(Tenn.€1994)€(Reid,€J.,Ļconcurring€&€dissenting€in€part);€ņņCordis€Corp.€v.€Tayloróó,€762€S.W.2d€138,€139„40€(Tenn.€1988).€ĻThe€language€of€law€is€as€full€of€terms€of€art€as€any€other€mode€of€professional€discourse.€€In€thisĻcontext,€š šdisinterested€witnessšš€happens€to€be€such€a€term.€€Thus,€as€Justice€Frankfurter€onceĻwrote,€š š.€.€.€if€a€word€is€obviously€transplanted€from€another€legal€source,€whether€the€common€lawĻor€other€legislation,€it€brings€the€old€soil€with€it.šš€€Felix€Frankfurter,€ņņSome€Reflections€on€theĻReading€of€Statutesóó,€47€Colum.€L.€Rev.€527,€537€(1947).ĢĢą ąThe€concept€of€š šdisinterestednessšš€is€commonly€associated€with€a€personššs€ability€to€beĻimpartial.€€As€applied€to€witnesses,€a€š šdisinterested€witnessšš€is€one€who€has€no€right,€claim,€title,€orĻlegal€stake€in€the€claim€or€matter€at€issue.€€ņņCarlon€Co.€v.€Board€of€Reviewóó,€572€N.W.2d€146,€150Ļ(Iowa€1997).€€Thus,€a€š šdisinterested€witnessšš€does€not€stand€to€gain€a€benefit€or€suffer€a€detrimentĶas€a€result€of€the€outcome€of€the€case,€ņņJones€v.€Larrabeeóó,€47€Me.€474,€475€(Me.€1860)€(separateĻopinion€by€Goodenow,€J.);€ņņSmith€v.€Striblingóó,€649€A.2d€1003.€1006€(Pa.€Commw.€Ct.€1994);€ņņStateĻv.€Easterlinóó,€39€S.E.250,€251€(S.C.€1901);€1€Simon€Greenleaf,€ņņA€Treatise€on€the€Law€of€EvidenceóóĻšššš€390,€395€(15th€ed.€1892)€(š šGreenleafšš),€and€thus€has€no€motivation€based€on€personal€orĻpecuniary€interest.€€ņņSands€v.€Prudential€Prop.€&€Cas.€Ins.óó,€789€So.€2d€745,€748€(La.€Ct.€App.Ļ2001).ĢĢą ą€Frequently,€statutes€and€contracts€require€persons€selected€to€place€a€value€on€property€toĻbe€š šdisinterested.šš€€In€this€context,€a€disinterested€appraiser€is€one€who€is€impartial,€unbiased,€freeĻfrom€partisanship,€and€able€to€do€equal€justice€between€the€parties.€€ņņHeller€v.€Hartz€MountainĻIndus.,€Inc.óó,€636€A.2d€599,€605€(N.J.€Super.€Ct.€1993).€€Thus,€as€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€hasĻnoted,€the€term€š šdisinterested,€as€applied€to€appraisers,€does€not€simply€mean€lack€of€pecuniaryĻinterest,€but€requires€the€appraiser€to€be€one€not€biased€or€prejudiced.šš€€ņņHickerson€&€Co.€v.ĻInsurance€Cos.óó,€96€Tenn.€193,€203,€33€S.W.€1041,€1043€(1896).€ĢĢą ąA€pecuniary€interest,€of€course,€involves€having€a€direct€or€indirect€financial€stake€in€theĻoutcome€of€the€proceeding.€€ņņSee€generallyóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€39„16„101(3)€(1997);€ņņCreeping€BearĻv.€Stateóó,€113€Tenn.€at€325„26,€87€S.W.€at€653€(comparing€pecuniary€interests€to€other€potentialĻinfluences€on€a€witnessšš€testimony).€€In€determining€whether€pecuniary€interest€exists,€the€courtsĻlook€not€at€how€great€or€how€little€money€may€be€at€stake€but€rather€at€the€nature€of€the€interest.€€3ĻņņJones€on€Evidence€ó󚚀20:6.€€The€pecuniary€advantage€or€personal€interest€may€be,€in€some€cases,Ļindirect€or€removed.€€For€example,€a€witness€may€not€be€considered€disinterested€if€the€witnessĻdesires€a€certain€outcome€that€could€then€be€used€in€support€of€the€witnessššs€own€monetary€claimsĻor€as€defenses€against€monetary€claims€in€another€action.€€1€Greenleaf€šššš€386,€404.€€Thus,€aĻcreditor€of€one€of€the€parties,€who€may€be€testifying€with€an€eye€toward€a€fund€that€he€or€she€mayĻlater€pursue,€may€not€qualify€as€a€disinterested€witness.€€1€Greenleaf€šš€392.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņ4.ó óĢĢą ąBecause€we€have€already€determined€that€the€March€1996€quitclaim€deed€does€not€suffice€asĻwritten€evidence€of€a€promise€to€marry€for€the€purpose€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401,€Ms.ĻPostalššs€breach€of€promise€claim€hinges€on€whether€she€produced€at€least€two€disinterestedĻwitnesses€to€substantiate€her€claim€that€Mr.€Rivkin€had€promised€to€marry€her.€€The€only€witnessesĻshe€called€regarding€this€issue€were€her€parents,€Diana€Schuyler€and€Barry€Postal.€€While€it€isĻdoubtful€that€a€claimantššs€parent€can€ever€be€a€disinterested€witness€in€cases€of€this€sort,€Ms.ĻPostalššs€parents€are€clearly€not€disinterested€witnesses€because€at€the€time€of€trial€they€were€alsoĻMs.€Postalššs€creditors.ĢĢą ąMs.€Postal€turned€to€her€parents€for€financial€support€in€1997€when€Mr.€Rivkin€stoppedĻsupporting€her.€€She€borrowed€money€from€Ms.€Schuyler€which€she€used€to€pay€the€mortgage,€toĻpay€the€utility€bills,€to€purchase€food,€and€to€pay€for€her€childššs€school€expenses.€€Ms.€SchuylerĻalso€loaned€Ms.€Postal€$10,000€to€enable€her€to€purchase€her€current€home.€€Ms.€Schuyler€testifiedĻthat€she€expects€her€daughter€to€repay€her,€and€Ms.€Postal€testified€that€she€intended€to€use€herĻrecovery€in€this€case€to€repay€her€mother.ĢĢą ąThe€story€regarding€Ms.€Postalššs€father€is€essentially€the€same.€€At€the€time€of€trial,€he€wasĻliving€with€Ms.€Postal€and€was€apparently€being€supported€by€her.€€He€had€loaned€his€daughterĻ$8,500€to€help€her€purchase€her€current€home,€and€he€also€expected€to€be€repaid.€€He€evenĻattempted€to€intervene€in€this€case€to€recover€the€money€he€had€loaned€his€daughter.€€The€lastĻquestion€put€to€Mr.€Postal€by€Mr.€Rivkinššs€lawyer€was€š šAre€you€interested€in€whether€you€getĻyour€money€back€or€not,€sir?šš€€Mr.€Postalššs€answer€was€simple€and€direct:€š šYes,€I€am.šš€€€ĢĢą ąIt€is€plain€that€both€Mr.€Postal€and€Ms.€Schuyler€had€immediate,€outstanding€financialĻclaims€against€their€daughter€when€they€testified€in€support€of€her€breach€of€promise€claim€againstĻMr.€Rivkin.€€Each€of€them€expected€that€their€claims€would€be€satisfied€once€Ms.€Postal€gotĻsomething€out€of€this€suit.€€Therefore,€both€had€a€financial€interest€in€the€outcome€of€thisĻproceeding.€€In€light€of€these€witnessesšš€financial€stake€in€the€outcome,€the€trial€court€erred€byĻconcluding€that€they€were€š šdisinterested€witnessesšš€for€the€purposes€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401.€€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņC.ó óĢĢą ąIn€summary,€we€have€concluded€that€Ms.€Postal€failed€to€carry€the€statutory€burden€of€proofĻplaced€on€persons€seeking€money€damages€for€a€breach€of€promise€or€contract€of€marriage.€€HerĻown€self„serving€testimony€was€insufficient.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„402.€€She€offered€no€writtenĻevidence€that€this€promise€or€contract€ever€existed,€and€she€failed€to€produce€the€two€disinterestedĻwitnesses€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„3„401€to€substantiate€her€claim.€€Accordingly,€we€findĻthat€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtššs€finding€that€Mr.€Rivkin€had€promised€orĻcontracted€to€marry€Ms.€Postal.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņIV.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņņņMs.€Postalššs€Proof€of€Damagesóóó óĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkin€also€takes€issue€with€the€$150,000€damage€award€by€asserting€that€Ms.€PostalĻfailed€to€prove€that€she€had€been€damaged€by€his€refusal€to€marry€her.€€This€issue€is€now€largelyĻacademic€in€light€of€our€conclusion€that€Ms.€Postal€failed€to€prove€that€Mr.€Rivkin€ever€promised€orĻagreed€to€marry€her.€€It€would€be€anomalous€to€award€damages€for€breach€of€contract€in€the€absenceĻof€proof€of€the€existence€of€a€contract.€€However,€the€issue€merits€some€comment€in€light€of€theĻunique€nature€of€the€damages€in€cases€of€this€sort.ĢĢą ąEven€though€breach€of€promise€of€marriage€claims€are€essentially€contract€claims,€theĻmeasure€of€damages€is€not€the€same€as€the€customary€measure€of€damages€for€breach€of€contract.€ĻWhen€it€comes€to€damages,€š šthe€complexion€of€the€action€mysteriously€changes€from€contract€toĻtort,€with€the€corresponding€broadening€of€the€principles€governing€the€damages€which€the€.€.€.Ļ[fact„finder]€may€impose.šš€€1€Clark€šš€1.4.€€Cases€of€this€sort€are€all€about€the€plaintiffššs€characterĻand€honor.€€By€filing€the€suit,€the€plaintiff,€usually€a€woman,€š šdeclares€herself€suitable€for€a€wife,Ļand€the€mother€of€a€family,šš€ņņWeeks€v.€Maysóó,€87€Tenn.€at€443,€10€S.W.€at€771,€and€seeks€to€recoverĻdamages€for€the€harm€done€to€her€happiness,€honor,€and€character.€€ņņGoodal€v.€Thurmanóó,€38€Tenn.Ļ(1€Head)€Ō_Ō209,Ō_Ō€215€(1858).€€These€damages€are€based€upon€€(1)€disappointment€of€reasonableĻexpectations€of€social,€domestic,€and€material€advantage€from€the€promised€marriage,€(2)€injury€toĻthe€plaintiffššs€future€prospects€in€life,€(3)€harm€to€the€plaintiffššs€affections,€and€(4)€anguish€andĻmortification€stemming€from€the€rejection.€€ņņBrown€v.€Odillóó,€104€Tenn.€at€265„66,€56€S.W.€at€844.€ĢĢą ąMs.€Postal€never€articulated€at€trial€exactly€what€specific€social,€domestic,€and€materialĻadvantages€she€expected€to€derive€from€marrying€Mr.€Rivkin€that€she€had€not€already€obtained.€ĻNor€did€she€testify€about€the€injuries€to€her€future€expectations,€her€mental€anguish€andĻmortification,€or€how€not€being€married€to€Mr.€Rivkin€had€destroyed€her€happiness,€honor,€andĻcharacter.€€Simply€asserting€that€she€š šwould€certainly€have€gained€such€advantagesšš€by€a€marriageĻis€no€substitute€for€proof.€€Thus,€in€addition€to€failing€to€present€sufficient€evidence€of€the€existenceĻor€a€promise€or€contract€of€marriage,€Ms.€Postal€failed€to€present€any€evidence€regarding€the€sortsĻof€injuries€that€would€have€entitled€her€to€$150,000€in€damages.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņV.ó óĢą@ ąņņņ ņThe€Division€of€the€Partiesšš€Jointly„owned€Propertyó óóóĢĢą ąThe€remaining€issues€involve€the€manner€in€which€the€trial€court€divided€the€partiesšš€jointly„owned€property.€€Mr.€Rivkin€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtššs€decision€to€award€Ms.€Postal€a€1993ĻGMC€pickup€truck,€a€cedar€chest€that€once€belonged€to€his€grandmother,€and€a€share€of€theĻproceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€partiesšš€Williamson€County€house.€€Ms.€Postal€complains€that€theĻtrial€court€should€not€have€reduced€her€share€of€the€jointly„owned€property€by€$2,000€because€ofĻthe€damage€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€gold€and€platinum€records€before€she€returned€them€to€him.€€We€willĻconsider€each€of€these€issues€in€turn.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņA.ó óą ąĢĢą ąThis€case€involves€parties€whose€association€is€simply€one€of€cohabitation€rather€than€one€ofĻmarriage.€€Accordingly,€the€factors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„4„121€(Supp.€2000)€and€the€otherĻprinciples€governing€the€division€of€marital€property€are€inapplicable.€€ņņMartin€v.€Colemanóó,€19ĻS.W.3d€757,€761€(Tenn.€2000);€ņņKohler€v.€Flynnóó,€493€N.W.2d€647,€649€(N.D.€1992).× ƒ9 ××  ׀€TheĻprinciples€governing€the€division€of€jointly„owned€property€in€cases€such€as€this€one€are€derivedĻfrom€the€statutes€and€legal€precedents€involving€the€partition€of€jointly„owned€property.× ƒ: ××  ×ĢĢą ąOutside€marriage,€the€right€to€insist€on€a€division€of€property€depends€on€common€legalĻownership,€not€simply€cohabitation.€€ņņKohler€v.€Flynnóó,€493€N.W.2d€at€649.€€Accordingly,€the€firstĻtask€of€the€court€is€to€identify€the€partiesšš€property€and€then€classify€each€piece€of€property€either€asĻbelonging€to€one€of€the€parties€or€as€being€jointly€owned.€€ņņSpafford€v.€Coatsóó,€455€N.E.2d€241,€243„45€(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1983);€ņņRissberger€v.€Gortonóó,€597€P.2d€366,€369„70€(Or.€Ct.€App.€1979).€€TheĻcourt€should€award€each€piece€of€separately„owned€property€to€its€owner,€and€then€turn€its€attentionĻto€the€jointly„owned€property.€€It€is€only€the€jointly„owned€property€that€is€subject€to€partition.ĢĢą ąPartitioning€the€jointly„owned€property€should€be€consistent€with€the€respective€co„ownersššĻinterests€as€shown€by€the€evidence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€29„27„116.€€Even€though€joint€owners€areĻentitled€to€a€partition€in€kind,€ņņHelm€v.€Franklinóó,€24€Tenn.€(5€Hum.)€404,€404„05€(1844),€mostĻpersonal€property€is€not€subject€to€be€divided€in€kind.€€Accordingly,€partitions€of€jointly„ownedĻpersonal€property€will€most€often€entail€selling€the€jointly„owned€property€and€then€dividing€theĻproceeds€of€the€sale€consistently€with€the€co„ownersšš€interests.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šššš€29„27„201,€„218(a).€€A€partition€of€jointly„owned€property€need€not€be€equal.€€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņB.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņThe€Proceeds€from€the€Sale€of€the€Williamson€County€Propertyó óĢĢą ąWe€turn€first€to€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€partiesšš€property€in€Williamson€CountyĻthat€Mr.€Rivkin€purchased€in€February€1996€for€$420,000.€€In€March€1996,€Mr.€Rivkin€quitclaimedĶthe€property€to€himself€and€Ms.€Postal€as€tenants€in€common€with€rights€of€survivorship.€€TheĻparties€sold€the€property€by€agreement€in€August€1998,€and€the€proceeds€of€this€sale,€after€payingĻthe€outstanding€mortgage,€amounted€to€$86,524.88.€€The€trial€court€awarded€Mr.€Rivkin€and€Ms.ĻPostal€equal€shares€of€the€proceeds.€€Mr.€Rivkin€now€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€awardingĻMs.€Postal€any€interest€in€these€proceeds€because€she€failed€to€prove€that€he€intended€to€give€her€anĻinterest€in€the€property.ĢĢą ąA€party€seeking€to€establish€an€interest€in€property€by€gift€must€prove€(1)€that€the€donor€Ļintended€to€make€a€gift€to€the€donee€and€(2)€that€the€donor€delivered€or€transferred€the€property€toĻthe€donee.€€ņņDunlap€v.€Dunlapóó,€996€S.W.2d€803,€814„15€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€ņņArnoult€v.€Griffinóó,Ļ490€S.W.2d€701,€710€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1972).€€Ms.€Postal€proved€both€donative€intent€and€transferĻin€this€case.€€The€language€of€the€quitclaim€deed€itself€× ƒ; ××  ׀is€evidence€of€Mr.€Rivkinššs€present€intentĻto€convey€ownership€of€the€property€to€Ms.€Postal.€€€€ņņCfóó.€ņņDenton€v.€Dentonóó,€33€S.W.3d€229,€232„33€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000)€(holding€that€grant€language€in€a€deed€is€rebuttable€evidence€of€donativeĻintent).€€The€evidence€that€Mr.€Rivkin€caused€the€quitclaim€deed€to€be€recorded€provides€theĻevidence€of€delivery.€€ņņSmalling€v.€Terrellóó,€943€S.W.2d€397,€399€n.4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);€ņņMast€v.ĻShepardóó,€56€Tenn.€App.€473,€479,€408€S.W.2d€411,€414€(1966).ĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkinššs€attempt€to€undermine€the€legal€significance€of€the€quitclaim€deed€by€assertingĻthat€he€did€not€understand€the€legal€import€of€a€quitclaim€deed€was€too€weak€to€rebut€Ms.€PostalššsĻevidence.€€Jointly„owned€real€property€may€be€partitioned€in€kind,€or€the€proceeds€from€its€sale€mayĻbe€divided€into€equal€shares.€€In€light€of€the€evidence€that€Mr.€Rivkin€gave€Ms.€Postal€an€undividedĻone„half€interest€in€the€property€by€executing€and€recording€the€quitclaim€deed€in€March€1996,€theĻtrial€court€did€not€err€by€awarding€each€party€an€equal€share€of€the€proceeds€of€the€sale€of€theĻproperty.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņC.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņThe€1993€GMC€Pickup€Truckó óĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkin€also€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtššs€decision€to€award€Ms.€Postal€the€1993ĻGMC€pickup€truck.€€Even€though€the€truck€was€titled€in€both€partiesšš€names,€Mr.€Rivkin€complainsĻthat€he€paid€over€$22,000€for€the€truck€and€that€the€trial€courtššs€ruling€shortchanged€him€of€hisĻinterest€in€the€truck.€€We€do€not€agree.ĢĢą ąOwnership€is€a€purely€legal€concept.€€3€Roscoe€Pound,€ņņJurisprudenceóó€129€(1959).€€ItĻconnotes€a€š šbundle€of€rightsšš€or€legally€protected€interests€with€regard€to€specific€property.€ĻņņWoods€v.€M.J.€Kelley€Co.óó,€592€S.W.2d€567,€570€(Tenn.€1980).€€Included€in€this€bundle€of€rightsĻare€(1)€the€right€of€possession,€enjoyment,€and€use,€(2)€an€unrestricted€right€of€disposition,€and€(3)Ļthe€right€of€testamentary€disposition.€€ņņGracey€v.€Maddinóó,€769€S.W.2d€497,€500€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ļ1989);€ņņState€ex€rel.€Elvis€Presley€Intššl€Memššl€Found.€v.€Crowellóó,€733€S.W.2d€89,€96„97€(Tenn.€Ct.ĻApp.€1987);€Ray€A.€Brown,€ņņThe€Law€of€Personal€Propertyó󀚚€1.5,€at€6€(3d€ed.€1975).€€Proof€ofĻownership€generally€involves€evidence€with€regard€to€possession€and€exercise€of€one€or€more€of€theĻprerogatives€in€this€bundle€of€rights.€€Thus,€ownership€is€a€question€for€the€trier„of„fact€to€determineĻfrom€the€evidence.ĢĢą ąTo€determine€ownership€of€a€vehicle,€a€trier„of„fact€may€consider€and€weigh€evidenceĻrelating€to€(1)€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€vehicleššs€purchase,€(2)€the€registration€of€theĻvehicle,€(3)€all€aspects€of€insuring€the€vehicle,€(4)€all€partiesšš€financial€stake€in€the€vehicle,€(5)€theĻactual€possession€of€the€vehicle,€(6)€the€responsibility€for€bearing€the€expense€of€operating,Ļmaintaining,€and€licensing€the€vehicle,€and€(7)€the€ultimate€right€to€control€the€vehicle,€including€theĻright€to€make€major€decisions€concerning€the€vehicle€such€as€its€use€and€restrictions€on€its€use€orĻthe€sale€or€other€disposition€of€the€vehicle.€€ņņCunningham€v.€Department€of€Safetyóó,€No.€01A01„9509„CH„00411,€1997€WL€266851,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€May€21,€1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11Ļapplication€filed).€€Mere€titling€of€a€vehicle€is€not€conclusive€evidence€of€ownership.€€ņņSmith€v.€Smithóó,Ļ650€S.W.2d€54,€56€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983);€ņņPolland€v.€Safeco€Ins.€Co.óó,€52€Tenn.€App.€583,€588,€376ĻS.W.2d€730,€732€(1963).ĢĢą ąThe€disputed€1993€GMC€pickup€truck€was€titled€in€both€partiesšš€names.€€Mr.€Rivkin€madeĻthe€payments€on€the€truck€while€he€was€living€with€Ms.€Postal;€however,€the€evidence€is€clear€thatĻthe€truck€was€intended€for€Ms.€Postalššs€primary€use.€€She€drove€it€for€her€transportation€and€used€itĻin€connection€with€raising€and€training€horses.€€After€the€couple€separated€in€1997,€Mr.€RivkinĻstopped€paying€on€the€truck€because€he€considered€it€to€š šheršš€truck€and€š šheršš€responsibility.€ĻMs.€Postal€had€exclusive€possession€of,€use€of,€and€responsibility€for€the€truck€while€the€partiesĻwere€living€together€and€after€the€parties€separated.€€Under€these€circumstances,€each€truck€paymentĻthat€Mr.€Rivkin€made€while€the€parties€were€still€living€together€amounted€to€a€gift€to€Ms.€Postal.€ĻAccordingly,€we€cannot€say€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtššs€conclusion€thatĻMr.€Rivkin€gave€the€truck€to€Ms.€Postal.€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņD.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņThe€Cedar€Chestó óĢĢą ąFinally,€Mr.€Rivkin€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€awarding€Ms.€Postal€a€cedar€chestĻthat€had€belonged€to€his€grandmother.€€Mr.€Rivkin€brought€the€chest€from€Minnesota€when€theĻparties€began€living€together.€€When€asked€during€the€trial€why€she€wanted€this€chest,€Ms.€PostalĻreplied:€š šItššs€just€because€I€can€store€stuff€in€it,€but€it€is€Mr.€Rivkinššs.šš€€In€light€of€the€undisputedĻevidence€that€the€chest€belonged€to€Mr.€Rivkin,€the€trial€court€should€have€returned€it€to€him.€ĻAccordingly,€we€reverse€the€portion€of€the€judgment€awarding€the€cedar€chest€to€Ms.€Postal.€€OnĻremand,€the€trial€court€should€enter€an€order€directing€Ms.€Postal€to€return€the€chest€to€Mr.€RivkinĻforthwith.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņE.ó óĢą@ ąņ ņThe€Off„set€for€Damage€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€Gold€and€Platinum€Recordsó óĢĢą ąMs.€Postal€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtššs€decision€to€reduce€her€share€of€the€proceedsĻfrom€the€sale€of€the€Williamson€County€property€by€$2,000€to€compensate€Mr.€Rivkin€for€theĻdamage€to€his€gold€and€platinum€records€before€she€returned€them€to€him.€€She€asserts€that€thisĻreduction€was€improper€because€(1)€Mr.€Rivkin€did€not€request€it€in€his€pleadings,€(2)€Mr.€RivkinĻdid€not€prove€that€she€caused€the€damage€to€the€awards,€and€(3)€the€amount€of€the€off„set€is€purelyĻspeculative.ĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkin€left€a€number€of€items€of€personal€property€in€the€Williamson€County€houseĻwhen€the€juvenile€court€ordered€him€to€move€out.€€Among€this€property€were€several€awards,Ļincluding€a€framed€multi„platinum€record€plaque€and€a€golden€reel€tape€award.€€After€Mr.€RivkinĻmoved€out,€Ms.€Postal€and€her€mother€removed€the€awards€from€the€wall€where€they€were€hangingĻand€laid€them€on€the€floor€in€anticipation€that€professional€movers€hired€by€Mr.€Rivkin€would€soonĻremove€them€from€the€house.€€According€to€Ms.€Postal,€the€partiesšš€child€defaced€the€awards€whileĶthey€were€on€the€floor.€€Ms.€Schuyler€then€put€the€awards€in€the€garage€where€they€were€furtherĻdamaged€by€her€daughterššs€pets.€€The€trial€court€observed€the€awards€and€described€them€as€š šallĻmarked€up€and€damagedšš€and€š šdefaced€very€badly.šš× ƒ< ××  ׀€After€Mr.€Rivkin€testified€that€theseĻawards€could€not€be€repaired€or€replaced,€the€trial€court€deducted€$2,000€from€Ms.€Postalššs€shareĻof€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€house€to€compensate€Mr.€Rivkin€for€the€damage.ĢĢą ąMr.€Rivkinššs€August€1997€complaint€for€partition€and€to€recover€his€personal€property€didĻnot€specifically€request€monetary€relief€for€the€damage€to€his€gold€and€platinum€records.€€However,Ļit€is€not€altogether€clear€that€Mr.€Rivkin€knew€that€his€awards€had€been€damaged€when€he€filed€hisĻcomplaint.€€The€complaint€did€contain€a€prayer€for€general€relief,€and€courts€may€properly€grantĻwhatever€relief€a€prevailing€party€has€proved€that€it€is€entitled€to.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€54.03;€ņņAaron€v.ĻAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€408,€412€(Tenn.€1995).€€Ms.€Postal€did€not€object€to€the€trial€courtššsĻconsideration€of€the€damage€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€awards,€and€both€Ms.€Postal€and€Mr.€Rivkin€presentedĻevidence€regarding€the€matter.€€Accordingly,€even€though€Mr.€Rivkinššs€complaint€did€notĻspecifically€pray€for€this€relief,€we€have€concluded€that€the€parties€tried€the€issue€by€consent.ĢĢą ąMs.€Postal€also€insists€that€the€trial€court€should€not€have€reduced€her€share€of€the€houseĻsale€proceeds€because€Mr.€Rivkin€failed€to€prove€that€she€caused€the€damage€to€his€awards.€ĻHowever,€even€if€the€trial€court€believed€Ms.€Postalššs€explanation€of€how€the€awards€were€damaged,Ļthe€fact€that€she€did€not€deliberately€damage€the€awards€would€not€necessarily€relieve€her€ofĻresponsibility.€€As€the€bailee€of€Mr.€Rivkinššs€property,€Ms.€Postal€was€required€to€use€diligenceĻand€attention€commensurate€with€the€value€of€the€property.€€ņņPennington€v.€Farmersšš€&€MerchantsššĻBankóó,€144€Tenn.€188,€194,€231€S.W.€545,€547€(1921).€€The€facts€of€this€case€support€a€conclusionĻthat€Ms.€Postal€did€not€exercise€reasonable€care€by€removing€Mr.€Rivkinššs€irreplaceable€awardsĻfrom€the€wall€and€leaving€them€where€they€could€be€damaged€by€children€and€pets.€ĢĢą ąFinally,€Ms.€Postal€asserts€that€the€off„set€is€inappropriate€because€it€is€speculative.€€It€is€aĻbasic€principle€of€damage€law€that€damages€are€too€speculative€to€be€awarded€only€if€the€existenceĻof€damage€is€uncertain,€not€merely€when€the€amount€of€damage€is€uncertain.€€ņņChurch€v.€Peralesóó,€39ĻS.W.3d€149,€172€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€ņņJennings€v.€Hayesóó,€787€S.W.2d€1,€3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ļ1989).€€The€evidence€required€to€support€a€damage€award€need€only€establish€the€amount€of€theĻdamages€with€reasonable€certainty.€€ņņOverstreet€v.€Shoneyššs,€Inc.óó,€4€S.W.3d€694,€703€(Tenn.€Ct.ĻApp.€1999).€€The€amount€of€damages€is€a€question€of€fact.€€ņņSpence€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€883€S.W.2dĻ586,€594€(Tenn.€1994).€€Thus,€following€a€bench€trial,€we€review€the€record€to€determine€whether€theĻtrial€court€adopted€the€wrong€measure€of€damages€or€whether€the€evidence€preponderates€againstĻthe€amount€of€damages€the€trial€court€awarded.€€ņņBeaty€v.€McGrawóó,€15€S.W.3d€819,€829€(Tenn.€Ct.ĻApp.€1998).ĢĢą ąMs.€Postal€cannot€claim€that€the€existence€of€Mr.€Rivkinššs€damage€is€speculative.€€After€all,Ļthe€evidence€is€undisputed€that€Mr.€Rivkinššs€awards€were€damaged€and€that€they€were€damagedĻwhile€they€were€in€Ms.€Postalššs€possession.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€examined€the€awards€andĻremarked€that€they€were€damaged€and€defaced.€€Thus,€the€only€colorable€argument€Ms.€Postal€canĻmake€is€that€Mr.€Rivkin€failed€to€prove€that€damage€to€his€awards€was€worth€$2,000.€€While€Mr.ĻRivkin€did€not€place€a€dollar€amount€on€the€damage€to€his€gold€and€platinum€records,€he€testifiedĻthat€they€could€not€be€replaced.€€In€light€of€this€testimony€which€stands€unrefuted,€we€haveĻconcluded€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtššs€decision€that€Mr.€RivkinĻhas€suffered€$2,000€in€damages€and€that€this€amount€should€be€deducted€from€Ms.€Postalššs€shareĻof€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€Williamson€County€property.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņVI.ó óĢĢą ąFor€the€reasons€stated€herein,€we€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€awarding€Ms.ĻPostal€$150,000€on€her€breach€of€promise€claim€and€by€awarding€Ms.€Postal€the€cedar€chest€thatĻhad€belonged€to€Mr.€Rivkinššs€grandmother.€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€these€portions€of€theĻjudgment€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€the€entry€of€orders€consistent€with€this€opinion.€ĻWe€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€in€equal€proportions€to€David€Rivkin€and€his€surety€and€to€LoriĻPostal€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.ĢĢą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą_____________________________Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE