ÿWPCGI ^#ß@ÆâlBDèl@D$^¥ï/˜Ùj ˜ùýÅ$ù¸iøgw‹fCF )±Z³rXÆ«‰°†yL‹~Æ5꣩š„ŸGÞ„ïÓ¶Æ>an¢c€¥ÔÛ°\ôæÌÃOTíý«á‡â[w´¿øŒ4Bà±>‘>&ö59¹ Áó¢€0YT§&Nã¼4·Üô3®˜DO®:ˆÏ·xo‡¡_ZÃrßUr·Ñ­Áù óÙÑ ÿt‚60ÝÉ_dÕÁÆ ¨b ÒJÓ¦Ò¹¨ù›¶œZÝÆDÉàlHeÒÔÖ!í€óŒ¥JáYž”n’7¢n†!¡>åzÏÖÉa#¯«?H× 6CÕ¦” ô±|Vbe¼ÉT¸v¼ö[*D2j‰ÑÌ-…‘ò ¢4o'Û¦€ðjkù¤E_y‚nížãÔ'†H›Ö¤H‰=…÷C×HŒÁVZ =à£'¸Ò³¾²<\í\L Å3­h3b#É\ %% ^ + 0ˆ7 U4N¿ w 4 z% ÒŸ q € m‚ š™ Æ3ÆùÆ¿Æ… 0DKNâ‘sE{^}4ÛUN]U@qqR±"Ç‚)I/I/à_/–?1Õ2Õ2†Ú8Ú8Ú8Ú8Ú8L`=`=`=b¬@¬@Ž´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@´@ 0ëBDBDBDBD B-E-E 0¤JE D5îE D-#F 0KPFPF AS›FÆîF 0¤´G 0DXH A«œH˜\\IB01S01\CLERK1NASÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»€Ÿ/Ï (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¨ƒž/ê:i¢×+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔCounsel€for€Mr.€Silva€had€made€this€argument€at€the€close€of€plaintiffððs€proof.€€Similarly,€Mr.€Silva€testifiedÐ ° Ðthat€when€he€received€Mr.€Buckleyððs€answer,€he€interpreted€it€as€admitting€to€the€contract€and€admitting€that€servicesÐ tÄ Ðwere€performed€under€the€contract€and,€therefore,€that€the€only€issue€was€the€reasonableness€of€the€fee.€€On€appeal,€Mr.Ð 8ˆ ÐSilva€acknowledges€that€the€Answer€denied€that€Mr.€Silva€was€entitled€to€the€requested€$117,079.43€because€he€was€notÐ üL Ðentitled€to€anything€more€than€a€fee€calculated€by€multiplying€the€hours€worked€by€the€hourly€rates.€€The€brief€assertsÐ À Ðthat€the€issue€of€whether€Mr.€Buckleyððs€Answer€judicially€Ô_ÔestoppedÔ_Ô€him€from€raising€the€question€of€interpretation€ofÐ „Ô Ðthe€contract€was€irrelevant€because€the€parties€tried€the€issue€of€ð ðwhether€Mr.€Buckley€and€Mr.€Silva€entered€into€anÐ H ˜ Ðattorney„client€agreement€that€anticipated€a€results„oriented€fee.ðð€€I€agree,€and€the€majority€opinion€likewise€does€notÐ  \ Ðaddress€the€issue.€€Mr.€Buckley€had€also€denied€in€his€Answer€that€the€agreement€entitled€Mr.€Silva€to€more€than€$185Ð Ð  Ðper€hour,€a€clear€indication€that€the€client€took€a€different€interpretation€of€the€agreement.€€Consequently,€the€AnswerÐ ” ä  Ðsquarely€raised€the€question€of€whether€the€client€and€the€attorney€shared€the€same€understanding€of€the€fee€arrangement.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ØÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔA€portion€of€the€fee€agreement€acknowledges€receipt€of€$2500€as€a€non„refundable€retainer.  TÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔBoth€parties€conducted€their€discussions€regarding€the€fee€dispute€with€admirable€civility€and€continued€aÐ ° Ðprofessional€relationship€through€the€conclusion€of€the€divorce€case€and€its€aftermath. *Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAt€this€point,€I€simply€note€that€the€fee€structure€described€by€Mr.€Silva€does€not€fit€the€foregoing€descriptionÐ ° Ðexactly.€€As€the€attorney€described€his€intent€with€regard€to€the€fee,€there€was€no€baseline€or€minimum€fee,€other€thanÐ tÄ Ðthe€Ô_ÔnonrefundableÔ_Ô€retainer.€€Thus,€the€result€fee€herein€was€not€exactly€a€bonus€or€only€a€portion€of€the€entire€fee.€€Mr.Ð 8ˆ ÐSilva€envisioned€his€total€fee€to€be€determined€by€consideration€of€the€factors€listed,€and€in€his€brief€characterizes€theÐ üL Ðfee€as€a€results„oriented€fee,€reflecting€the€predominant€emphasis€he€placed€on€that€factor.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMr.€Buckley€was€an€experienced€and€successful€business€person,€involved€in€real€estate,€and€was€familiar€withÐ ° Ðcontracts.(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman  HÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€Ô_ÔECÔ_Ô€2„19€states:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àAs€soon€as€feasible€after€a€lawyer€has€been€employed,€it€is€desirable€that€he€reachÐ 8ˆ Ða€clear€agreement€with€his€client€as€to€the€basis€of€the€fee€charges€to€be€made.€€SuchÐ üL Ða€course€will€not€only€prevent€later€misunderstanding€but€will€also€work€for€goodÐ À Ðrelations€between€the€lawyer€and€the€client.€€It€is€usually€beneficial€to€reduce€toÐ „Ô Ðwriting€the€understanding€of€the€parties€regarding€the€fee,€particularly€when€it€isÐ H ˜ Ðcontingent.€€A€lawyer€should€be€mindful€that€many€persons€who€desire€to€employÐ  \ Ðhim€may€have€had€little€or€no€experience€with€fee€charges€of€lawyers,€and€for€thisÐ Ð  Ðreason€the€rationale€for€the€particular€fee€arrangement€proposed€should€be€fullyÐ ” ä  Ðexplained€to€such€persons. uÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Supreme€Court€first€determined€that€the€fee€agreement€was€not€a€contingent€fee€because,€under€theÐ ° Ðagreement,€there€was€no€question€that€the€attorneys€would€be€paid€regardless€of€the€outcome€of€the€case.€€The€CourtÐ tÄ Ðdetermined€that€because€payment€itself€was€certain€and€only€the€amount€of€payment€uncertain,€the€arrangement€was€notÐ 8ˆ Ða€contingent€fee.€€Consequently,€the€Court€held,€the€fee€arrangement€at€issue€was€not€subject€to€the€enhancedÐ üL Ðconsiderations,€such€as€a€higher€quantum€of€proof,€applicable€to€contingent€fee€arrangements€€ð ðbegrudginglyðð€permittedÐ À Ðin€domestic€relations€cases.€€òòAlexander€IIóó,€974€S.W.2d€at€693.€€The€Court€stated€contingent€fees€in€domestic€relationsÐ „Ô Ðcases€are€ð ðunsavory,ðð€subjected€to€enhanced€scrutiny,€and€rarely€found€to€be€justified.€€òòIdóó.€€The€newly€adopted€TennesseeÐ H ˜ ÐRules€of€Professional€Conduct,€effective€March€1,€2003,€prohibit€the€charging€or€collecting€of€fees€in€a€domestic€relationsÐ  \ Ðmatter€ð ðthe€payment€ò òor€amountó óðð€of€which€is€contingent€upon€the€amount€of€support€or€the€value€of€the€property€division.€Ð Ð  ÐAlthough€the€retainer€letter€in€the€case€before€us€does€not€make€the€fee€contingent€on€the€results€of€the€case,€the€attorneyÐ – æ  Ðtestified€that€the€fee€was€a€ð ðresultsðð€fee€based€upon€the€small€property€and€support€awards€relative€to€the€potential€awards.€Ð Z ª  ÐOf€course,€the€contract€at€issue€herein€predates€the€new€Rules,€and€we€are€not€presented€with€the€question€of€whetherÐ  n  Ðthose€Rules€would€allow€the€type€of€arrangement€described€by€the€attorney€herein. ½Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€the€trial€courtððs€order€on€Mr.€Buckleyððs€motion€to€alter€or€amend,€the€court€quoted€from€Mr.€Silvaððs€trialÐ ° Ðcounsel:Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àOur€position€in€the€case€was€that€the€engagement€letter€said,€youððll€pay€$185€an€hour€for€the€currentÐ üL Ðwork€that€we€do,€but€based€upon€the€disciplinary€factors,€which€we€cannot€yet€evaluate,€weððll€set€anÐ À Ðultimate€fee€at€the€end€of€the€case.€€Thatððs€really€what€this€is€about,€and,€in€my€opinion,€Mr.€BuckleyÐ „Ô Ðdidnððt€offer€any€satisfactory€explanation€as€to€why€that€wasnððt€the€agreement€of€the€parties.ÐH ˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àFollowing€that€statement,€the€trial€court€quoted€from€òòLyons€v.€Farmers€Ins.€Exch.óó,€26€S.W.3d€888,€892€(Tenn.Ð Ð  ÐCt.€App.€2000),€with€regard€to€the€parol€evidence€rule,€stating€that€parol€evidence€is€not€admissible€to€contradict,€vary,Ð ” ä  Ðor€alter€a€written€contract,€when€a€written€instrument€is€valid,€complete,€and€unambiguous.€€Relying€on€that€authority,Ð X ¨  Ðthe€trial€court€held€that€the€argument€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€counsel€must€be€sustained€because€Mr.€Buckleyððs€testimony€couldÐ  l  Ðnot€alter€the€terms€of€the€agreement€which€the€court€had€found€was€unambiguous.€€ Ñ ° Ñ ÖÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔFees€were€sought€pursuant€to€an€agreement€between€a€husband€and€wife€to€pay€ð ðreasonable€feesðð€incurred€Ð ° Ðin€enforcing€a€separation€agreement.€€The€court€viewed€a€portion€of€its€task€as€determining€whether€the€fee€charged€toÐ tÄ Ðthe€winning€party€was€reasonable€and,€therefore,€covered€by€the€agreement. ŒÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMr.€Silva€also€asserts€the€results€obtained€factor€meant€the€relative€success€of€his€efforts€in€the€litigation,€and,Ð ° Ðas€he€described€it€in€this€situation€where€he€intended€a€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee,€it€was€the€primary€justification€for€his€fee.€ ûÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Court€further€stated,€Ð ° ÐÌà8  àÔ‡ôú òòôú ÔThis€Court€has€allowed€a€law€firm€to€enforce€a€promissory€note€created€pursuant€to€a€similarly€wordedÐ 8ˆ Ðfee€agreement.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔWallerÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔLansdenÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔDortchÔ_Ô,€&€Davis€v.€Ô_ÔHaneyÔ_Ôóó,€851€S.W.2d€131,€132€(Tenn.€1992)Ð üL Ð(the€retainer€agreement€provided€that€the€firm€be€paid€a€reasonable€fee€based€on€the€amount€involved,Ð À Ðthe€time€expended,€the€novelty€of€the€transaction,€and€the€deadlines€imposed€upon€counsel).ЄÔÐ Ð  ÐÌòòIdóó.€€The€initial€agreement€in€that€case€was€for€a€reasonable€fee,€based€upon€the€listed€factors,€as€was€the€agreement€inÐ  \ ÐòòAlexander€IIóó,€but€unlike€the€agreement€herein.€€The€Court€in€òòÔ_ÔWallerÔ_ÔÔ#†ôú òòôú »#Ôóó€explained€that€after€the€original€retainer€agreement,Ð Ð  Ðthe€parties€had€negotiated€a€specific€fee€based€upon€a€specified€amount€per€$1,000€value€of€bonds€involved€in€the€closing.€Ð ” ä  ÐThe€note€was€prepared€after€this€re„negotiation.€€The€court€found€that€the€fee€was€negotiated€ð ðapparently€to€defendantððsÐ X ¨  Ðsatisfaction.ðð€€851€S.W.2d€at€133. |Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔNeither€was€its€credibility€finding.€€The€trial€courtððs€earlier€statement€that€Mr.€Buckley€knew€or€had€reasonÐ ° Ðto€know€he€would€owe€Mr.€Silva€more€than€his€hourly€rate€was€not€based€upon€the€courtððs€weighing€of€their€testimonyÐ tÄ Ðabout€their€pre„agreement€discussions.€€It€was€not€a€finding€that€the€court€credited€Mr.€Silvaððs€testimony€over€that€of€Mr.Ð 8ˆ µ ÐBuckley€as€to€the€substance€of€those€discussions.€€Because€the€court€considered€the€written€agreement€unambiguous,€Ð ° Ðand€parol€evidence€inadmissible,€the€courtððs€ð ðcredibilityðð€finding€is€based€upon€its€interpretation€of€the€agreement€asÐ tÄ Ðunambiguous.€€Consequently,€the€well„settled€standard€of€review€applicable€to€credibility€determinations€by€a€trial€courtÐ 8ˆ Ðdoes€not€apply€to€any€consideration€by€this€court€of€the€partiesðð€testimony€regarding€their€discussions€or€understandingsÐ üL Ðof€the€written€agreement.€ BÝ ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€the€case€before€us,€the€attorney€also€argues€that€if€the€written€agreement€is€determined€to€be€so€vague€asÐ ° Ðto€be€unenforceable,€he€is€still€entitled€to€a€reasonable€fee,€and€the€fee€he€requested€was€found€to€be€reasonable€basedÐ tÄ Ðupon€expert€testimony.€€This€argument€is€another€reason€why€the€written€contract€should€be€interpreted€against€theÐ 8ˆ Ðdrafting€attorney.€€If€the€written€agreement€supports€a€reasonable€clientððs€understanding€that€the€fee€is€to€be€one€basedÐ üL Ðupon€hourly€rate€and€hours€worked,€then€it€should€not€be€set€aside€because€of€an€ambiguity€written€into€the€agreementÐ À Ðby€the€attorney.€€- ù- „Ý ƒRk…$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€his€brief€he€states€the€most€important€of€the€factors€listed€were€the€amount€involved€and€the€resultsÐ ° Ðobtained.€€It€is€clear€that€a€reasonable€estimate€of€the€amount€involved,€òòi.eóó.€Mr.€Buckleyððs€property,€was€known,€orÐ tÄ Ðdiscoverable,€at€the€initiation€of€the€representation.€€Additionally,€the€existence€of€and€issues€raised€by€the€prenuptialÐ 8ˆ µ Ðagreement€were€known€at€the€beginning€of€the€representation,€and,€to€the€extent€he€contends€that€agreement€added€to€theÐ ° Ðcomplexity€of€the€case€or€that€its€upholding€was€a€benchmark€of€his€success,€the€attorney€could€have€factored€that€intoÐ tÄ Ðhis€billing€arrangement€and€tied€the€ð ðresults€obtainedðð€factor€to€it.(|G2k…$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Nå»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôú ò»»Ô d(|3‰i$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Nå»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‰i$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Nå»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Nå»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Nå»»»ÔÑ8€ùXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÑ€ OYÑà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îS,NåÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼Nå»îîS,-#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓOctober€9,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XùX»¼NåÔÌò òÔ#†¼Nå»XXù#ÔEDWARD€PAUL€SILVAòòóó€v.€ALBERT€W.€BUCKLEY,€JR.òòóóÔ‡XùX»¼NåÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàÌNo.€27884€€€€€€Russ€Heldman,€JudgeÐ Ò " ÐÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2002„00045„COA„R3„CVÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€„€Filed€December€31,€2003ó óÔ#†XùXXXù#ÔÔ#†¼Nå»XXù’#ÔÔ‡XùX»¼NåÔò òó óÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  ÐÌÌÓ  ÓòòPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€J.,óóÔ#†¼Nå»XXù‰#ÔÔ‡XùX»¼NåÔ€dissenting.Ð d´ ÐÌÌÔ#†¼Nå»XXùj#ÔÔ€XùX»¼NåÔà  àI€respectfully€dissent€from€the€majorityððs€holding€that€the€agreement€herein€established€aÐ (x Ðbasis€for€a€results„oriented€fee€that€totaled€more€than€three€times€the€amount€billed€on€an€hourlyÐ d Ðbasis.€€The€majority€finds€the€contract€less€than€crystal€clear€and€relies€upon€the€trial€courtððsÐ P Ðcredibility€finding€to€hold€that€Mr.€Buckley€understood€the€agreement€to€provide€for€anÐ ì< Ðunascertainable,€undefined€amount€to€be€determined€by€application€of€the€listed€factors.€€I€disagreeÐ Ø( Ðwith€the€impact€of€the€trial€courtððs€credibility€finding€because€that€finding€was€based€upon€the€courtððsÐ Ä Ðinterpretation€of€the€written€agreement€as€unambiguous€and€does€not€represent€a€determinationÐ ° Ðregarding€which€witnessððs€version€of€their€discussions€is€more€believable.€€Additionally,€I€would€findÐ œì Ðthat€the€written€agreement€itself€did€not€establish€the€mutual€understanding€requirement€and€theÐ ˆØ Ðattorney€failed€to€prove€that€he€otherwise€informed€the€client€of€the€nature€of€the€arrangement€asÐ tÄ Ðenvisioned€by€the€lawyer.Ð `° ÐÌà@++#ìàò òòòI.€€Backgroundó óˆÐ 8!ˆ  ÐóóÌà  àThe€attorney,€Mr.€Silva,€testified€that€he€intended€that€the€contract€provide€for€something€heÐ #`" Ðcalled€a€ð ðresultsðð€fee;€that€is,€some€amount€other€than€and€additional€to€the€hourly€fee,€to€beÐ ü#L# Ðdetermined€after€the€divorce€case€was€concluded€and€the€results€were€known.€€The€client,€Mr.Ð è$8 $ ÐBuckley,€takes€the€position€that€the€contract€itself€does€not€provide€for€such€a€fee€or€is€so€indefiniteÐ Ô%$!% Ðas€to€be€unenforceable€and€that€he€never€understood€the€agreement€to€include€any€additional,€bonus,Ð À&"& Ðor€ð ðresultsðð€fee.€€The€attorney€considered€theÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€result€he€obtained€in€the€divorce€action€extremely€good.Ô#†XùXXXù¥ #ԀР¬'ü"' Ðâ âMr.€Buckley€does€not€dispute€the€quality€of€representation€provided,€stating€Mr.€Silva€ð ðdid€a€greatÐ ˜(è#(ý ÐÔ_Ôjob,ðð€that€he€was€pleased€with€the€result,€and€that€Mr.€Silva€had€been€everything€he€wanted€in€a€trialÐ ° Ðlawyer.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àAlthough€not€the€subject€of€litigation€in€this€state€very€often,€the€result€fee€is€not€unheard€of.€Ð tÄ ÐDissatisfaction€with€hourly€billing€among€both€lawyers€and€clients€has€led€to€consideration€and€useÐ `° Ðof€alternative€methods.€€One€of€those€is€the€result€fee,€which€has€been€described€in€various€ways,Ð L œ Ðincluding:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àResult€fees,€also€known€as€success€or€retrospective€fees,€are€an€additional€feeÐ  ` Ðassessed€by€the€attorney€at€the€conclusion€of€the€case€based€on€the€outcome€of€theÐ ü L  Ðcase€and€the€skill€required€to€achieve€the€result.€€Result€fees€specifically€ð ðendorse€aÐ è 8  Ðsurcharge€for€beneficial€results€to€the€client.ðð€€Result€fees€may€be€imposed€inÐ Ô$  Ðconjunction€with€an€hourly€fee€or€a€flat€fee€and€can€be€structured€as€either€aÐ À  Ðmaximum€or€minimum€fee.€€They€are€similar€to€contingent€fees€in€that€the€amountÐ ¬ü  Ðof€additional€fee€the€lawyer€earns,€if€any,€is€contingent€on€a€favorable€result€for€theÐ ˜è  Ðclient.€€Result€fees€can€be€distinguished€from€contingency€fees,€however,€in€that€theÐ „Ô  Ðcontingent€fee€applies€whenever€there€is€any€recovery€while€result€fees€focus€on€theÐ pÀ Ðcontent€of€the€recovery,€and€the€extent€to€which€it€met€the€clientððs€objectives.€€ThisÐ \¬ Ðbilling€method€has€the€obvious€advantage€of€perfect€hindsight€in€setting€the€final€feeÐ H˜ Ðto€be€charged€to€the€client,€and€ð ðbecause€the€judgment€as€to€the€amount€of€the€fee€isÐ 4„ Ðsubjective,€it€can€be€more€equitable€than€if€some€mechanical€system€is€utilized.ðð€€ThisÐ  p Ðtype€of€fee€arrangement€requires€a€great€deal€of€trust€between€the€attorney€and€client,Ð  \ Ðand€can€lead€to€fee€disputes€where€the€clientððs€perception€of€the€achieved€objectiveÐ øH Ðdiffers€significantly€from€that€of€his€counsel.€€Ðä4Ð Ð  ÐÌLinda€J.€Ravdin,€ð ðòòLegal€Ethicsóó:€Some€Current€Issues€in€the€Practice€of€Family€Law,ðð€33€òòFam.€L.Ð ¼  ÐQ.,óó€Summer€1999,€at€387,€397€(footnotes€omitted).׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Like€all€billing€methods,€the€result€fee€has€itsÐ ¨ø Ðsupporters€and€detractors.€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà8  àCritics€of€hourly€billing€occasionally€levy€the€attack€that€while€the€client€stands€toÐ l¼ Ðsuffer€if€the€outcome€is€poor,€the€attorney€is€not€rewarded€if€the€outcome€is€evenÐ X ¨ Ðmore€favorable€than€anticipated.€€In€response,€critics€of€premium€billing€liken€suchÐ D!” Ðbonus„like€compensation€to€paying€a€doctor€an€agreed„to€amount€X€to€perform€aÐ 0"€  Ðnecessary€operation,€but€X+a€if€the€operation€is€a€success.€€These€critics€contend€thatÐ #l! Ðthey€would€run€from€the€examining€room€because€they€believe€that€the€serviceÐ $X" Ðprovider€should€always€perform€to€the€best€of€his€or€her€abilities€in€return€forÐ ° Ðvaluable€consideration€or€compensation,€instead€of€premising€the€quality€of€serviceÐ œì Ðprovided€upon€how€much€the€attorney€himself€decides€to€bill,€allegedly€outside€theÐ ˆØ Ðcontrol€of€the€client.€€Otherwise,€lawyers€might€be€encouraged€to€perform€atÐ tÄ Ðminimally€acceptable€standards€for€the€initial€fee€but€hold€the€client€captive€forÐ `° Ðgreater€remuneration€in€order€to€deliver€more€satisfactory€or€optimal€results.€€This€isÐ L œ Ðnot€to€say€that€this€is€how€lawyers€respond€or€will€respond€under€such€a€regime,€butÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€invitation€is€too€great€to€be€ignored,€when€the€ethics€of€billing€already€are€beingÐ $ t Ðquestioned.€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌAdam€C.€Altman,€11€òòGeo.€J.€Legal€Ethics,€óóWinter€1998,€at€òò203,€228€óó(footnotes€omitted).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€question€before€us,€however,€is€not€whether€such€an€arrangement€is€a€good€thing€or€not.€Ð À  ÐInstead,€the€question€is€what€fee€agreement€the€parties€reached,€if€any.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àThe€thrust€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€testimony€was€that€he€intended€to€charge€a€ð ðresult€feeðð€if€the€resultsÐ „Ô  Ðof€the€litigation€were€satisfactory,€and€the€potential€size€of€that€fee€would€be€determined€byÐ pÀ Ðapplication€of€various€factors€and,€apparently,€Mr.€Silvaððs€determination€of€what€was€reasonable€inÐ \¬ Ðview€of€those€factors.€€When€asked€whether€the€agreement€set€forth€a€maximum€and€minimum€rangeÐ H˜ Ðof€fees,€Mr.€Silva€testified€that€the€minimum€was€the€$2,500׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€retainer€and€the€maximum€was:Ð 4„ ÐÌà8  àwhat€a€lawyer€of€ordinary€prudence€would€believe€a€reasonable€fee€would€be€afterÐ  \ Ðapplying€the€disciplinary€rule€standards€and€factors€that€are€included€in€thisÐ øH Ðengagement€letter.€€The€ceiling€is€based€on€what€is€reasonable€under€the€SupremeÐ ä4 ÐCourt€and€the€floor€is€my€retainer.ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMr.€Silva€acknowledged€that€he€had€not€discussed€an€amount€or€range€of€figures€until€afterÐ ¨ø Ðthe€divorce€case€was€over,€obviously€well€after€the€engagement€agreement€was€signed.€€Mr.€BuckleyÐ ”ä Ðmaintained€throughout€these€proceedings€that€he€never€understood€there€would€be€a€fee€other€thanÐ €Ð Ðthe€hourly€fee€and€was€never€told€about€an€undeterminable€additional€€fee€based€upon€results€untilÐ l¼ Ðafter€the€divorce€case€was€concluded.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àThe€parties€herein€dispute€the€proper€construction€of€the€agreement,€and€the€question€ofÐ 0"€  Ðinterpretation€of€a€contract€is€a€question€of€law.€€òòGuiliano€v.€CLEO,€Inc.óó,€995€S.W.2d€88,€95€(Tenn.Ð #l! Ð1999).€€Therefore,€the€trial€courtððs€interpretation€of€this€document€is€not€entitled€to€a€presumptionÐ $X" Ðof€correctness€on€appeal.€€òòIdóó.;€òòAngus€v.€Western€Heritage€Ins.€Co.óó,€48€S.W.3d€728,€730€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ô$D # ÐApp.€2000).€€This€court€must€review€the€document€ourselves€and€make€our€own€determinationÐ à%0!$ Ðregarding€its€meaning€and€legal€import.€€òòHillsboro€Plaza€Enters.€v.€Moonóó,€860€S.W.2d€45,€47€(Tenn.Ð Ì&"% ÐCt.€App.€1993).Ð ¸'#& ÐÌÐ  )à$( Ðà@R R ìàòòò òII.€€The€Law€Regarding€Attorney„Client€ContractsˆÐ ° Ðó óóóÌà  àThe€trial€court€herein€was€not€called€upon€to€award€a€reasonable€fee.€€Rather,€the€court€wasÐ ˆØ Ðasked€to€interpret€and€enforce€the€contractual€fee€arrangement€between€the€parties.€€ContractsÐ tÄ Ðbetween€attorneys€and€their€clients€are€subject€to€the€general€rules€of€contract€law.€€òòAlexander€v.Ð `° ÐInmanóó,€903€S.W.2d€686,€694€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995)€(òòAlexander€Ióó);€òòIn€re€Ellisóó,€822€S.W.2d€602,€607Ð L œ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€The€attorney„client€relationship€is€essentially€contractual.€€òòFell€v.€Ramboóó,Ð 8 ˆ Ð36€S.W.3d€837,€852€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòStarks€v.€Browningóó,€20€S.W.3d€645,€650€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð $ t Ð1999)òòóó.€€However,€the€contractual€relationship€between€an€attorney€and€client€is€different€from€otherÐ  ` Ðcontractual€relationships.Ð ü L  ÐÌà8  àThe€relationship€of€attorney€and€client€is€ð ðextremely€delicate€and€fiduciary;ððÐ Ô$  Ðtherefore,€attorneys€must€deal€with€their€clients€in€utmost€good€faith.€€This€level€ofÐ À  Ðgood€faith€is€significantly€higher€than€that€required€in€other€business€transactionsÐ ¬ü  Ðwhere€the€parties€are€dealing€at€armððs€length.€€òòCooper€&€Keys€v.€Bellóó,€127€Tenn.€142,Ð ˜è  Ð150,€153€S.W.€844,€846€(1913);€òòAlexanderóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€693.€€The€client€must€beÐ „Ô  Ðable€to€trust€the€attorney€to€deal€fairly€at€all€times,€including€during€the€negotiationÐ pÀ Ðof€the€attorneyððs€terms€of€employment.€òò€Cummings€v.€Pattersonóó,€59€Tenn.€App.€536,Ð \¬ Ð541,€442€S.W.2d€640,€643€(1968).ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àIn€this€context,€this€Court€has€long€held€that€an€attorney€is€entitled€to€compensationÐ  p Ðin€the€amount€agreed€upon€by€contract,€provided€that€the€contract€is€fair€at€itsÐ  \ Ðinception€and€entered€into€in€good€faith.€€òòPeoples€Natððl€Bank€of€Washington€v.€Kingóó,Ð øH Ð697€S.W.2d€344,€346€(Tenn.€1985).€€In€order€to€prove€such€good€faith€and€fairness,Ð ä4 Ðand€attorney€seeking€to€enforce€a€contract€for€attorneyððs€fees€must€show:ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€the€client€fully€understood€the€contractððs€meaning€and€effect,Шø` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€the€attorney€and€client€shared€the€same€understanding€of€theÐ €Ð Ðcontract,€andÐl¼` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(3)€the€terms€of€the€contract€are€just€and€reasonable.ÐD!”` x` x ÐÌà8  àòòCooper€&€Keysóó,€153€S.W.€at€846€(citing€òòPlantersðð€Bank€of€Tennessee€v.€Hornbergeróó,Ð #l! Ð44€Tenn.€531,€573€(1867).Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌòòAlexander€v.€Inmanóó,€974€S.W.2d€689,€693„94€(Tenn.€1998)(òòAlexander€IIóó).Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€burden€placed€on€the€attorney€seeking€to€enforce€a€fee€agreement€to€demonstrate€(1)€thatòòÐ ¸'#& Ðóóthe€client€fully€understood€the€meaning€and€effect€of€the€employment€contract€between€them€and€(2)Ð ¤(ô#' Ðthat€the€attorney€and€the€client€shared€the€same€understanding€of€the€agreement,€reflects€theÐ )à$( Ðobligation€of€an€attorney€to€act€in€the€utmost€good€faith€in€any€transaction€with€his€or€her€client.€€ThisÐ |*Ì%) Ðprinciple€is€long„standing.Ð h+¸&* Їà8  àAn€attorney,€dealing€with€his€client€for€further€professional€services,€and€the€contractÐ ° Ðis€reduced€to€writing,€is€bound€to€show,€when€he€seeks€to€enforce€it,€that€the€latterÐ œì Ðfully€understood€its€meaning€and€effect,€and€that€each€understood€it€in€the€sameÐ ˆØ Ðsense,€otherwise€it€can€not€be€enforced.ÐtÄÐ Ð  ÐÌòòUnion€Planters€Bank€v.€Hornbergeróó,€44€Tenn.€531,€572€(1867).€€The€requirement€that€the€attorneyÐ L œ Ðand€the€client€share€the€same€understanding€of€the€fee€agreement€incorporates€general€contract€lawÐ 8 ˆ Ðregarding€meeting€of€the€minds,€but€places€it€in€the€context€of€the€fiduciary€obligation€of€the€attorney,Ð $ t Ðwhose€duty€it€is€to€ensure€that€such€a€mutual€understanding€exists.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àBecause€of€the€special€fiduciary€relationship€between€an€attorney€and€client€and€the€influenceÐ è 8  Ðthat€relationship€gives€to€an€attorney€with€regard€to€the€client,€courts€scrutinize€most€closely€allÐ Ô$  Ðtransactions€between€an€attorney€and€his€or€her€client.€€òòHutchinson€v.€Crowderóó,€8€Tenn.€App.Ð À  Ð(Higgins)€114,€119€(1917).€€Consequently,€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà8  àTo€sustain€a€transaction€of€advantage€to€himself€with€his€client,€the€attorney€has€theÐ „Ô  Ðburden€of€showing,€not€only€that€he€used€no€undue€influence,€but€that€he€gave€hisÐ pÀ Ðclient€all€the€information€and€advice€which€is€(sic)€would€have€been€his€duty€to€giveÐ \¬ Ðif€he€himself€had€not€been€interested€.€.€.€.ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌòòId.€€óóThis€rule€is€applicable€to€any€contract€between€an€attorney€and€his€or€her€client,€including€a€feeÐ  p Ðagreement.€€òòAlexander€Ióó,€903€S.W.2d€at€694.€€The€fiduciary€obligations€of€the€attorney€extend€to€theÐ  \ Ðprocess€by€which€the€attorney€and€client€reach€agreement€on€the€terms€of€employment,€includingÐ øH Ðcompensation.€òò€Idóó.€at€693.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€Code€of€Professional€Conduct€in€force€in€Tennessee€at€the€time€of€the€contract€hereinÐ ¼  Ðencouraged€attorneys€to€reduce€their€employment€agreements€with€clients€to€writing.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Whether€theÐ ¨ø Ðagreement€is€written€or€not,€the€attorney€has€the€duty€to€ensure€that€the€client€has€a€clearÐ ”ä Ðunderstanding€of€how€the€fee€will€be€calculated€and€billed.€€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€EC€2„19;€òòAlexanderÐ €Ð ÐIóó,€903€S.W.2d€686;òò€In€re€Estate€of€Davisóó,€719€S.W.2d€526,€528€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986).€€Our€SupremeÐ l¼ ÐCourt€has€held€that€an€unambiguous€written€fee€agreement€can€satisfy€the€ethical€requirement€thatÐ X ¨ Ðâ âan€attorney€explain€the€fee€arrangement€and€its€basis,€at€least€where€the€client€is€experienced€withÐ D!” Ðcontracts€and€possesses€business€acumen€or€sophistication.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òò€Alexander€IIóó,€974€S.W.2d€at€695.€€InÐ ° Ðâ âthe€case€before€us,€the€attorneyððs€primary€contention€is€that€the€written€agreement€at€issueÐ œì Ðunambiguously€set€forth€the€fee€arrangement€as€he€describes€it.€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€the€òòAlexander€IIóó€case,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€considered€a€contractual€feeÐ `° Ðarrangement€for€a€highly€contested€divorce,€entered€into€only€four€weeks€before€trial€was€scheduled,Ð L œ Ðand€involving€a€very€large€marital€estate€whose€assets€had€not€entirely€been€disclosed€to€orÐ 8 ˆ Ðdiscovered€by€the€clientððs€former€attorneys.€€The€fee€agreement€in€òòAlexanderóó€provided:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€amount€of€the€final€fee€to€be€paid€by€Client€for€legal€services€ofÐ ü L  ÐAttorneys€and€lawyers€and€clerks€under€their€supervision€ò òshall€be€a€reasonableÐ è 8  Ðamountó ó€taking€into€consideration€the€time€and€labor€required€the€novelty€andÐ Ø(  Ðdifficulty€of€the€questions€involved,€the€skill€required€to€perform€the€servicesÐ È  Ðproperly,€the€amount€involved€and€results€obtained,€and€other€relevant€factors.€€SaidÐ ´  Ðfinal€fee€ò òshall€not€exceedó ó€15%€of€the€total€sum€(in€money€and€property)€awarded€toÐ  ð  ÐClient€after€commencement€of€the€trial€of€said€action€for€divorce€for€alimony€òòinÐ à  Ðsolidoóó,€for€five€years€of€alimonyòò€in€futuroóó,€and€distribution€and€division€of€property,Ð |Ì Ðor€10%€of€such€total€sum€awarded€to€Client€by€settlement€prior€to€the€commencementÐ h¸ Ðof€such€trial,€provided€that€said€fee€ò òshall€in€no€event€be€less€thanó ó€(a)€$10,000;€or€(b)Ð T¤ Ðthe€total€amount€on€a€time€basis€for€work€of€Attorneys€and€other€attorneys€and€clerksÐ D” Ðunder€their€supervision€at€their€usual€hourly€charges€for€work.€Ð0€Ð Ð  ÐÌòòAlexander€IIóó,€974€S.W.2d€at€690„91€(emphasis€added).Ð X ÐÌà  àThe€Court€determined€that€the€contract€was€subject€to€the€criteria€generally€applicable€toÐ à0 Ðattorney€fee€agreements,€as€set€out€above.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€its€analysis€of€the€first€two€factors,€the€Court€foundÐ Ì Ðthat€the€client€in€òòAlexander€IIóó€fully€understood€the€agreement€with€her€attorneys€and€had€the€sameÐ ¸ Ðunderstanding€as€her€attorneys.€€The€Court€found€it€was€obvious€the€attorneys€understood€theÐ ¤ô Ðagreement€to€allow€them€to€charge€up€to€fifteen€percent€of€any€award€to€the€client.€€It€also€found€thatÐ ° Ðthere€was€no€plausible€basis€to€conclude€that€the€client€did€not€understand€the€plain€words€of€theÐ œì Ðcontract,€ð ðSaid€fee€shall€not€exceed€15%€of€the€total€sum€(in€money€and€property)€awarded€toÐ ˆØ ÐClient.ððÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àThus,€the€Supreme€Courtððs€findings€as€to€the€partiesðð€understanding€of€the€contract€inÐ L œ ÐòòAlexander€II€óówere€premised€on€the€courtððs€interpretation€of€the€fee€agreement€as€unambiguous.€€TheÐ 8 ˆ ÐCourt€reiterated€the€ethical€requirement€that€ð ðan€attorney€should€reach€a€clear€agreement€about€feesÐ $ t Ðwith€the€client€and€should€explain€the€reasons€for€preferring€one€arrangement€over€another,ðð€andÐ  ` Ðfound€that€requirement€could€be€met€by€a€written€fee€agreement.€€974€S.W.2d€at€695.€€The€CourtððsÐ ü L  Ðdecision€was€also€largely€based€on€the€fact€that€the€agreement€plainly€established€minimum€andÐ è 8  Ðmaximum€limits€to€the€total€amount€of€fees.€€In€fact,€the€Court,€in€its€discussion€of€whether€theÐ Ô$  Ðagreement€was€just€and€reasonable,€stated€that€it€was€so€because€it€provided€for€a€minimum€andÐ À  Ðmaximum€fee€to€be€charged.€€ð ðIndeed,€the€maximum€fee€provided€a€protection€to€[the€client]€byÐ ¬ü  Ðdefining€the€limit€beyond€which€the€fee€could€not€rise.ðð€€òòIdóó.€974€S.W.2d€at€695.€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àWith€regard€to€the€just€and€reasonable€factor,€the€Court€found€that€the€mere€inclusion€of€theÐ pÀ Ðword€ð ðreasonableðð€and€the€provision€of€a€minimum€and€maximum€fee€in€the€agreement€do€not€aloneÐ \¬ Ðmake€the€agreement€enforceable,€and€that€the€court€was€also€required€to€determine€whether€the€feeÐ H˜ Ðultimately€charged€was€a€reasonable€fee.€€The€Court€then€determined€that€the€fee€at€issue€was€withinÐ 4„ Ðthe€range€of€reasonableness€upon€a€careful€analysis€of€the€factors€determining€the€reasonableness€ofÐ  p Ðan€attorneyððs€fees,€specifically€those€set€out€in€the€fee€agreement€and€those€enumerated€in€òòConnorsÐ  \ Ðv.€Connorsóó,€594€S.W.2d€672,€676€(Tenn.€1980).€€Those€factors€are€essentially€the€same€as€the€factorsÐ øH Ðset€out€in€the€agreement€herein.Ð ä4 ÐÌÓ  Óòòò òIII.€€The€Contract€HereinÐ ¼  Ðó óóóÓßXÓÌà  àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€the€only€issue€was€whether€the€$175,000Ð ”ä Ðfee€was€reasonable.€€The€court€determined€that€the€issue€of€whether€the€contract€was€fair€and€enteredÐ €Ð Ðinto€in€good€faith€was€pretermitted€by€Mr.€Buckleyððs€Answer€in€which€he€admitted€that€he€acceptedÐ l¼ Ðand€agreed€to€the€terms€and€conditions€of€the€engagement€letter€or€fee€agreement.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€conclusionÐ X ¨ Ðis€based€on€the€premise€that€the€fee€agreement€as€written€was€unambiguous.Ð D!” ÐÐ 0"€  Ðà  àIn€its€amended€memorandum€the€trial€court€noted€that€both€Mr.€Silva€and€Mr.€BuckleyÐ ° Ðappeared€to€be€credible€witnesses€at€trial.€€The€court€further€stated:Ð œì ÐÌà8  àHowever,€upon€thoughtful€consideration€of€their€appearance€as€witnesses€in€light€ofÐ tÄ Ðall€the€evidence,€the€Court€finds€that€Mr.€Buckley€was€not€credible€on€one€followingÐ `° Ðpoint:€that€he€did€not€reasonably€anticipate€or€expect€that€he€would€ever€owe€Mr.Ð L œ ÐSilva€more€than€a€mere€$185€per€hour€for€all€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€services€rendered€underÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€agreement.€€Mr.€Buckley€knew,€should€have€known€or€at€least€had€reason€to€knowÐ $ t Ðthat€his€final€or€ultimate€fee€may€very€well€exceed€$185€per€hour€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€timeÐ  ` Ðonce€the€case€was€concluded€and€all€the€factors€had€been€considered€and€applied.Ðü L Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThis€finding€is€also€based€on€the€courtððs€interpretation€of€the€fee€agreement€as€unambiguous,Ð Ô$  Ðthus€providing€the€basis€upon€which€the€client€ð ðshould€have€knownðð€or€ð ðhad€reason€to€knowðð€thereÐ À  Ðwas€going€to€be€a€fee€in€addition€to€the€total€derived€from€the€hourly€rate€times€the€hours€worked.€Ð ¬ü  ÐIn€fact,€in€its€order€denying€Mr.€Buckleyððs€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€court€applied€the€parolÐ ˜è  Ðevidence€rule€and€found€that:Ð „Ô  ÐÌà8  àwhat€Mr.€Buckley€unilaterally€may€have€ð ðunderstoodðð€in€retrospect€cannot€alter€orÐ \¬ Ðvary€the€terms€of€the€unambiguous,€clear€contract€between€him€and€Mr.€Silva.€€ð ðTheÐ H˜ Ðprovision€of€the€agreement€says€what€it€means€and€means€what€it€says.ððÐ4„Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThus,€the€trial€court€herein,€like€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòAlexander€IIóó,€found€the€language€ofÐ  \ Ðthe€agreement€clear€enough€to€provide€evidence€of€the€clientððs€understanding€of€the€fee€arrangementÐ øH Ðthat€was€consistent€with€the€attorneyððs€interpretation€and€intent.€€I€disagree€with€that€interpretationÐ ä4 Ðof€the€agreement€herein.€€The€differences€in€the€language€of€the€agreement€in€òòAlexanderóó€and€thatÐ Ð  Ðused€in€the€agreement€in€the€case€before€us€are€significant,€and€those€differences€create€an€entirelyÐ ¼  Ðdifferent€fee€arrangement.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àUnder€the€agreement€in€òòAlexanderóó,€the€client€actually€agreed€to€pay€a€fee€defined€as€aÐ €Ð Ðð ðreasonable€amountðð€taking€into€consideration€various€listed€factors.€€In€contrast,€the€agreement€atÐ l¼ Ðissue€herein€does€not€include€an€agreement€to€pay€a€fee€of€a€ð ðreasonableðð€amount.€€Instead,€theÐ X ¨ Ðagreement€states,€ð ðThis€letter€will€confirm€the€basis€upon€which€we€have€agreed€to€represent€yourÐ D!” Ðinterests€in€the€above„referenced€matter.€€We€will€bill€you€for€our€services€on€account€on€an€hourlyÐ 0"€  Ðrate€basis.ðð€€This€language€expresses€an€agreement€that€the€attorney€will€be€paid€based€upon€hisÐ #l! Ðhourly€rate€and€the€number€of€hours€worked.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àAlthough€the€attorney€bases€his€claim€upon€language€of€the€agreement€providing€that€the€Ð à%0!$ Ðultimate€fee€may€vary€depending€upon€the€factors€enumerated,€that€language,€unlike€the€languageÐ Ì&"% Ðin€theòò€Alexanderóó€agreement,€does€not€make€it€clear€that€the€actual€fee€is€to€be€an€undetermined,Ð ¸'#& Ðunquantifiable€ð ðreasonableðð€amount.€€In€fact,€placed€as€it€is€immediately€after€the€hourly€rateÐ ¤(ô#' Ðlanguage,€the€ultimate€fee€language€simply€acknowledges€that€it€is€impossible€to€estimate€the€totalÐ )à$( Ðnumber€of€hours€that€would€be€spent€on€the€matter€and,€therefore,€the€total€or€ultimate€amount€thatÐ |*Ì%) Ðwould€be€billed.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àIn€addition,€the€òòAlexanderóó€agreement€set€as€a€maximum€on€the€reasonable€fee€amount€aÐ ° Ðpercentage€of€any€award€to€the€client.€€It€clearly€established€as€a€minimum€either€the€retainer€ò òoró ó€theÐ œì Ðsum€derived€from€the€hours€worked€multiplied€by€the€hourly€rate.€€Thus,€it€was€apparent€that€theÐ ŒÜ Ðhourly€charges€were€a€minimum€and€that€some€amount,€with€a€definite€limit,€in€addition€to€theÐ xÈ Ðminimum€might€be€expected€and€ð ðreasonable.ððÐ d´ ÐÌÔ‡XùXXXùÔà  àMr.€Silvaððs€expert,€Mr.€Hollins,€testified€that€he€also€uses€a€fee€arrangement€somewhatÐ < Œ Ðsimilar€to€that€intended€by€Mr.€Silva€herein€in€complex€litigation€involving€large€sums€of€money€and€Ð ( x Ðread€the€language€he€uses€in€such€a€fee€agreement:Ð  d ÐÌà8  àThe€language€in€my€letter,€and€you€can€see€the€differences€in€my€letter€and€Mr.Ð ì <  ÐSilvaððs€letter,€is€this:€€The€final€bill€may€include€an€amount€ò òin€addition€toó ó€theÐ Ø(  Ðcalculation€for€time€expended,€based€on€the€results€and€difficulty€of€the€matter,€theÐ È  Ðskill€required€to€perform€the€services€properly€and€the€amount€involved.€€(emphasisÐ ´  Ðadded.)Рð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€document€prepared€by€Mr.€Silva€does€not€include€any€language€making€it€clear€that€someÐ xÈ Ðamount€will€be€due€or€expected€in€addition€to€or€in€place€of€the€hourly€rate.€€It€also€does€not€establishÐ d´ Ða€maximum.Ô#†XùXXXùüm#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€€Mr.€Silva€admitted€that€the€agreement€did€not€include€any€formulation€by€which€oneÐ P  Ðcould€calculate,€at€the€time€of€its€signing,€a€maximum€fee,€that€the€agreement€did€not€include€anyÐ <Œ Ðlanguage€about€an€additional€fee€beyond€the€hourly€rate,€and€it€did€not€contain€any€languageÐ (x Ðindicating€that€the€final€fee€would€be€discussed€at€the€end€of€the€caseÔ#†XùXXXùVr#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ.€€However,€he€contended€thatÐ d Ðð ðultimateðð€fee€meant€final€fee,€that€the€final€fee€may€vary,€depending€on€the€factors€listed,€and€that€Ô#†XùXXXù0t#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔÐ P Ðthe€results€obtained€factor€could€not€be€applied€until€that€time.€€Ô#†XùXXXùu#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔÐ ì< ÐÔ#†XùXXXù«u#ÔÌà  àIt€is€true€that€one€of€the€factors€listed€is€ð ðresults€obtained,ðð€and€that€factor€cannot€beÐ Ä Ðdetermined€until€after€the€conclusion€of€the€case.׃#×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€However,€its€appearance€in€the€list€of€factorsÐ ° Ðaffecting€Mr.€Buckleyððs€ultimate€fee€does€not€serve€to€put€the€client€on€notice€that€the€agreementÐ œì Ðcontemplates€an€undefined€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee€as€was€Mr.€Silvaððs€intent.€€Further,€the€writtenÐ ˆØ Ðagreement€does€not€define€success€or€any€relative€degrees€thereof,€and,€therefore,€does€not€reflect€aÐ tÄ Ðmutual€understanding€of€a€successful€result€from€the€clientððs€perspective.Ð ` ° ÐÌà  àThe€listing€of€factors€in€the€agreement€has€a€meaning€with€legal€effect€to€those€trained€in€theÐ 8"ˆ  Ðlaw.€€The€factors€set€out€in€Tenn.€R.€S.€Ct.€8,€DR€2„106€(B)€apply€to€fees€set€by€the€courts€and€areÐ $#t! Ðalso€used€to€determine€the€reasonableness€of€fee€provisions€in€contracts€and€in€the€context€of€a€feeÐ $`" Ðdispute€between€a€lawyer€and€a€former€client.€€òòAlexander€Ióó,€903€S.W.2d€at€695.€€It€cannot€be€assumedÐ ü$L # Ðthat€a€non„lawyer,€even€a€sophisticated€business€person,€would€know€or€appreciate€the€purpose€forÐ è%8!$ Ðincluding€the€factors.€€More€significantly€herein,€nothing€in€the€language€or€listing€of€factors€wouldÐ Ô&$"% Ðalert€the€reader€to€the€possibility€that€one€factor€would€predominate€the€others€or€that€the€attorneyÐ À'#& Ðintended€to€charge€an€amount€almost€three€times€the€hourly€billing€as€a€result€fee.€€Even€manyÐ ¬(ü#' Ðexperienced€attorneys€are€unfamiliar€with€the€result€fee€concept€or€all€its€various€permutations€andÐ ° Ðwould€not€necessarily€associate€the€language€used€in€the€agreement€herein€with€that€concept.€Ð œì ÐConsequently,€it€is€unlikely€that€a€layperson€should€have€understood€the€agreement€to€be€a€results„Ð ˆØ Ðoriented€fee€as€described€by€the€attorney.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€ð ðA€tribunal€should€construe€a€contract€between€client€and€lawyer€as€a€reasonableÐ L œ Ðperson€in€the€circumstances€of€the€client€would€have€construed€it.ðð€€òòRestatement€of€the€LawÐ 8 ˆ ÐGoverning€Lawyersóó€ðð€18(2).€€This€includes€the€fee€agreement.€€òòId.óó€ðð€38.€€I€would€conclude€thatÐ $ t Ða€reasonable€person€in€Mr.€Buckleyððs€position€would€have€interpreted€the€written€agreement€asÐ  ` Ðobligating€him€to€pay€a€fee€based€on€the€hourly€rate€and€the€hours€worked.€€That€is€how€he€was€billedÐ ü L  Ðand€what€he€paid.€€Consequently,€I€would€find€that€the€written€agreement€does€not€meet€theÐ è 8  Ðattorneyððs€burden€to€show€that€the€client€clearly€understood€the€agreement€consistently€with€theÐ Ô$  Ðattorneyððs€understanding.€€To€the€contrary,€the€written€agreement€is€consistent€with€the€clientððsÐ À  Ðexpressed€understanding.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÓ  Óòòò òIV.€€Ambiguity€and€the€Partiesðð€UnderstandingÐ „Ô  Ðó óóóÓ‚ÓÌà  àA€finding€that€the€written€agreement€does€not€establish€the€first€two€factors€necessary€to€theÐ \¬ Ðenforcement€by€an€attorney€of€a€fee€contract€raises€the€question€of€whether€the€attorney€met€hisÐ H˜ Ðburden€through€other€evidence,€namely€testimony€about€the€discussions€regarding€the€feeÐ 4„ Ðarrangement€before€the€agreement€was€signed.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€parol€evidence€ruleÐ  p Ðprohibited€consideration€of€Mr.€Buckleyððs€understanding€of€the€agreement€because€Mr.€BuckleyððsÐ  \ Ðtestimony€could€not€alter€the€terms€of€the€agreement€which€the€court€had€found€was€unambiguous.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð øH ÐPresumably,€on€the€same€basis,€the€court€also€considered€Mr.€Silvaððs€testimony€about€his€intent€andÐ ä4 Ðthe€partiesðð€discussions€equally€inadmissible.€€In€fact,€nowhere€in€the€trial€courtððs€orders€does€itÐ Ð  Ðdiscuss€the€testimony€of€either€party€about€their€discussions€regarding€the€nature€of€the€fee€agreementÐ ¼  Ðprior€to€its€signing.€€The€trial€courtððs€decision€was€simply€not€based€on€that€testimony.׃&„ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ¨ø Їà  àAs€the€trial€court€held,€parol€evidence€cannot€be€considered€to€vary€the€terms€of€anÐ ° Ðunambiguous€written€contract.€€Ô‡XùXXXùÔð ðSince€the€courts€should€not€look€beyond€a€written€contract€whenÐ œì Ðits€terms€are€clear,€the€parol€evidence€rule€provides€that€contracting€parties€cannot€use€extraneousÐ ˆØ Ðevidence€to€alter,€vary,€or€qualify€the€plain€meaning€of€an€unambiguous€written€contract.ðð€€òòGRWÐ tÄ ÐEnters.,€Inc.€v.€Davisóó,€797€S.W.2d€606,€610€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€However,€parol€evidence€isÐ `° Ðadmissible€to€uncover€and€reveal€the€true€intentions€of€the€parties€in€the€event€of€an€ambiguity€in€theÐ L œ Ðcontract.€€Where€the€contract€is€ambiguous,€parol€evidence€is€allowed€to€explain€the€writtenÐ 8 ˆ Ðagreement.€Ô#†XùXXXùâˆ#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€òòJones€v.€Brooksóó,€696€S.W.2d€885,€886€(Tenn.€1985).€Ð $ t ÐÔ#†XùXXXùÝ‹#ÔÌà  àMr.€Silva€has€consistently€and€adamantly€argued€in€this€appeal€and€throughout€the€trial€thatÐ ü L  Ðthe€written€agreement€is€unambiguous€and€establishes€a€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee.€€While€the€majorityÐ è 8  Ðfinds€the€agreement€sufficiently€ambiguous€to€allow€consideration€of€other€evidence€of€intent,€IÐ Ô$  Ðwould€find€that€the€agreement€establishes€a€fee€based€on€the€hourly€rate,€contrary€to€Mr.€SilvaððsÐ À  Ðinterpretation€of€the€agreement.€€It€is€arguable€that€the€inclusion€of€the€ð ðresults€obtainedðð€factorÐ ¬ü  Ðcreates€an€ambiguity€and€that€such€an€ambiguity€opens€up€the€possibility€of€consideration€of€parolÐ ˜è  Ðevidence€to€explain€the€partiesðð€intent.€€It€also,€however,€calls€into€play€rules€of€construction€courtsÐ „Ô  Ðare€to€use€to€resolve€any€ambiguity.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àUnder€the€most€applicable€of€those€rules,€any€ambiguity€in€the€language€of€the€agreementÐ H˜ Ðwould€be€construed€against€the€drafter,€the€attorney.€€òòAlexander€Ióó,€903€S.W.2d€at€694.€€This€well„Ð 4„ Ðsettled€principle€of€contract€law€applies€with€greater€force€to€an€employment€contract€between€anÐ  p Ðattorney€and€client€because€of€the€attorneyððs€fiduciary€duty€to€ensure€that€the€client€fully€understandsÐ  \ Ðthe€agreement€consistently€with€the€lawyerððs€interpretation.€€Possessing€the€superior€knowledge€ofÐ øH Ðcontract€law€and€documents€of€legal€import,€the€lawyer€is€in€the€position€to€prevent€ambiguity€in€theÐ ä4 Ðwritten€document.€€It€is€the€lawyerððs€responsibility€to€draft€a€document€that€accurately,€fully,€andÐ Ð  Ðclearly€reflects€the€agreement€between€the€parties.€€The€principle€of€construction€against€the€drafterÐ ¼  Ðð ðsurely€counts€double€when€the€drafter€is€a€lawyer€writing€on€his€or€her€account€to€a€clientðð€becauseÐ ¨ø Ðof€a€lawyerððs€fiduciary€duties.€€òòBeatty€v.€NP€Corp.óó,€581€N.E.2d€1311,€1315€(Mass.€App.€Ct.€1991).€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àAs€discussed€above,€the€Restatement€adopts€as€the€primary€rule€of€construction€for€attorney„Ð l¼ Ðclient€contracts,€including€fee€contracts,€that€such€agreements€are€to€be€construed€from€the€standpointÐ X ¨ Ðof€a€reasonable€person€in€the€clientððs€circumstances.€òòRestatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÐ D!” ÐLawyersóó€ðððð€18,€38.€€ð ðThe€lawyer€thus€bears€the€burden€of€ensuring€that€the€contract€states€any€termsÐ 0"€  Ðdiverging€from€a€reasonable€clientððs€expectations.ðð€€òòIdóó.€ðð€18€cmt.€h.€The€reasons€for€the€rule€includeÐ #l! Ðthe€fact€that€the€lawyer€is€the€author,€a€contract€is€traditionally€interpreted€against€the€author,€and€theÐ $X" Ðlawyer€is€more€able€to€detect€and€correct€error,€ambiguities,€and€omissions€in€the€agreement.€òòId.€Ð ô$D # ÐóóAdditionally,€rather€than€applying€only€when€other€means€of€interpreting€the€contract€have€beenÐ à%0!$ Ðunsuccessful,€ð ð[t]he€principle€that€the€contract€is€construed€as€a€reasonable€client€would€understandÐ ° Ðit€governs€the€construction€of€the€contract€in€the€first€instance.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ œì ÐÌà  àI€agree€with€the€Restatementððs€approach.׃+×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Unlike€the€majorityððs€approach€of€consideringÐ tÄ Ðother€evidence€of€intent€before€applying€the€rule€of€construction,€I€would€follow€the€RestatementððsÐ `° Ðapproach€and€apply,€in€the€first€instance,€the€interpretation€of€a€reasonable€client.€€Because€anyÐ L œ Ðambiguity€in€an€attorney„client€fee€agreement€was€created€by€the€attorney,€such€an€agreement€mustÐ 8 ˆ Ðbe€interpreted,€in€the€first€instance,€from€a€reasonable€clientððs€perspective.€€Reading€the€agreementÐ $ t Ðherein€from€that€perspective,€a€reasonable€client€would€interpret€the€language€as€creating€a€fee€basedÐ  ` Ðupon€the€time€worked€and€the€hourly€rate.€€From€that€viewpoint,€there€is€no€ambiguity.€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àWhile€I€would€conclude€there€is€no€ambiguity€needing€clarification€when€applying€theÐ Ô$  ÐRestatementððs€rule,€to€the€extent€there€remains€any€ambiguity€after€construction€of€the€writtenÐ À  Ðagreement€from€a€reasonable€clientððs€perspective,€or€to€the€extent€evidence€of€the€circumstancesÐ ¬ü  Ðsurrounding€the€agreement€is€necessary€in€determining€whether€the€attorney€has€shown€a€mutualÐ ˜è  Ðunderstanding€of€the€agreement,€we€can€consider€those€circumstances.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àEven€if€the€partiesðð€discussions€were€considered,€however,€the€attorney€in€this€case€has€notÐ \¬ Ðdemonstrated€that€the€client€clearly€and€fully€understood€the€agreement€as€envisioned€or€intendedÐ H˜ Ðby€the€attorney.€€That€conclusion€is€based,€not€on€any€determination€of€the€credibility€of€either€partyÐ 4„ Ðregarding€their€discussions,€but€instead€is€based€upon€the€omission€of€critical€details€in€the€attorneyððsÐ  p Ðexplanation,€as€testified€to€by€the€attorney,€of€the€fee€arrangement.€€Those€critical€details€are€definedÐ  \ Ðby€the€lawyerððs€duty€to€inform€the€client€of€any€terms€diverging€from€a€reasonable€clientððsÐ øH Ðexpectations,€so€that€the€agreement€clearly€incorporates€those€terms,€as€the€Restatement€puts€it.€€ThatÐ ä4 Ðduty€is€akin€to€the€well„established€duty€to€provide€the€client€with€all€the€information€and€advice€theÐ Ð  Ðlawyer€would€have€given€regarding€the€clientððs€entering€into€the€same€transaction€with€someone€else.€Ð ¼  ÐÌà@† † ìàò òòòV.€€The€Attorneyððs€InterpretationˆÐ ”ä Ðóóó óÌà  àMr.€Silva€interpreted€the€written€agreement€as€reflecting€his€intention€that€the€fee€would€beÐ l¼ Ðan€amount€to€be€determined€after€the€case€was€over€by€application€of€the€factors€listed.€€Mr.€SilvaÐ X ¨ Ðhas€emphasized€that€he€intended€a€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee,€indicating€he€considered€the€ð ðresultsÐ D!” Ðobtainedðð€factor€to€be€the€predominant,€if€not€exclusive,€factor€in€the€final€or€ultimate€fee.׃0(×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð 0"€  ÐÔ‡XùXXXùÔà  àIn€the€òòAlexander€IIóó€case,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€theòò€óóagreement€therein,€on€its€face,Ð ° Ðprovided€for€a€ò òreasonable€feeó ó€with€that€fee€to€be€determined€based€upon€the€expressed€factors.€€TheÐ œì ÐCourt€stated,€€ð ðIn€general,€an€agreement€which€utilizes€broad€terms€and€does€not€fix€an€exact€fee€isÐ ŒÜ Ðstill€acceptable.ðð€€òòAlexander€IIóó,€974€S.W.2d€at€695.׃$ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô#†XùXXXùo¦#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€€However,€the€Court€specifically€found€that€theÐ xÈ Ðagreement€at€issue€was€just€and€reasonable€ð ðbecause€it€provides€for€a€minimum€and€maximum€feeÐ d´ Ðto€be€charged.ðð€òòIdóó.€€In€addition,€the€court€stated:Ð P   ÐÌà8  àWhile€no€single€factor€determines€reasonableness,€on€balance€we€conclude€that€theÐ ( x Ðfee€.€.€.€€is€reasonable.€€In€sum,€because€the€fee€agreement€provided€both€a€minimumÐ  d Ðfee€and€a€protective€cap€on€the€fee,€and€because€the€fee€ultimately€charged€was€basedÐ  P  Ðon€the€reasonable€value€of€services€rendered,€the€attorneys€have€satisfied€the€thirdÐ ì <  Ðcriterion€of€òòCooper€&€Keysóó,€that€the€terms€of€the€agreement€be€just€and€reasonable.€Ð Ø(  ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐòòIdóó.€at€697.Ð °  ÐÌÔ#†XùXXXù¨#Ôà  àEven€under€Mr.€Silvaððs€interpretation€of€the€agreement€reached,€that€agreement€provided€noÐ ˆØ  Ðmaximum,€no€range€of€fees,€and€no€quantifiable€method€for€the€client€to€determine€his€potentialÐ tÄ Ðmaximum€liability.€€Of€equal€significance,€the€attorney€did€not€testify€that€he€told€the€client€that,€ofÐ `° Ðthe€factors€listed€in€the€agreement,€the€results€obtained€factor€would€predominate€or€that€applicationÐ Lœ Ðof€that€factor€could€result€in€a€total€fee€three€times€the€billed€amount.€€Ð 8ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€relationship€between€a€result€based€portion€of€a€fee€and€the€portion€based€on€time€andÐ ` Ðeffort€was€considered€in€Ô‡XùXXXùÔòòHead€v.€Headóó,€505€A.2d€868€(Md.€Ct.€Sp.€App.€1986),€wherein€the€court€Ð üL Ðâ âreviewed€the€reasonableness€of€a€fee€that€was€in€part€result€based€and€there€was€no€prior€agreementÐ è8 Ðas€to€the€rate.׃"×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€court€held€that€in€that€situation€the€attorney€was€entitled€to€be€paid€theÐ ° Ðâ âreasonable€value€of€his€services.€€The€court€found€that€while€time€spent€and€hourly€rate€are€importantÐ œì Ðfactors€in€determining€the€reasonableness€of€a€fee,€the€disciplinary€rule€includes€other€factors€as€well;Ð ˆØ Ðbut,€while€factors€other€than€time€spent€may€be€taken€into€account,€they€must€produce€a€reasonableÐ tÄ Ðfee.€€505€A.2d€at€876.€Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€that€case,€the€hours€worked€and€an€assigned€reasonable€hourly€rate€of€$200€produced€a€fee,Ð 8 ˆ Ðreferred€to€by€the€court€as€the€ð ðlodestar,ðð€of€$45,400.€€The€trial€court€awarded€a€fee€of€$120,000.€€TheÐ $ t Ðreviewing€court€characterized€the€$75,000€difference€as€the€result€fee€or€result„based€bonus.Ô#†XùXXXùJ¯#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùԀР ` ÐAcknowledging€that€the€results€obtained€factor€may€be€included€in€determining€a€reasonable€fee,€theÐ ü L  Ðcourt€nonetheless€determined€that€the€result€fee€in€that€case€was€excessive€and€held:Ð è 8  ÐÌà8  àDR€2„106(B)Ô#†XùXXXù<´#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ,€supra€lists€eight€general€and€several€inclusive€factors€to€consider€whenÐ À  Ðarriving€at€the€amount€to€charge€a€client.€€The€result€obtained€is€but€one€of€thoseÐ ¬ü  Ðfactors.€€Its€prominence€in€the€total€fee€must€bear€a€reasonable€relationship€to€the€timeÐ ˜è  Ðand€labor€required.€€An€attorney€is€retained€and€paid€for€expending€his€or€her€bestÐ „Ô  Ðefforts€to€secure€the€best€results.€€Counsel€should€not€be€overpaid€merely€forÐ pÀ Ðperforming€his€or€her€job.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌ505€A.2d€at€877.€€The€court€found€that€the€$75,000€result€fee€did€not€bear€a€reasonable€relationshipÐ 4„ Ðto€the€time€and€labor€required,€and€because€it€was€more€than€one€and€one„half€times€the€lodestarÐ  p Ðfigure,€ð ðIt€no€longer€serves€as€a€bonus,€but€instead€becomes€the€primary€source€of€funds€for€counsel.ðð€Ð  \ Ð505€A.2d€at€877.Ð øH ÐÌà  àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€total€amount€billed€by€Mr.€Silva€based€upon€the€hours€expended€andÐ Ð  Ðthe€contract€rate€per€hour€was€$57,920.57.€€Accordingly,€the€$175,000€fee€asserted€by€Mr.€Silva€wasÐ ¼  Ðthree€times€the€amount€reflecting€the€time€and€labor€spent.€€Using€the€language€of€the€òòHeadóó€court,€Ð ¨ø Ðthe€results€bonus€was€twice€the€hourly€billing€component.€€As€Mr.€Silvaððs€expert€testified,€the€timeÐ ”ä Ðand€labor€factor€was€reflected€in€the€313€hours€Mr.€Silva€spent€on€the€case.Ô#†XùXXXùŽµ#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€€Mr.€Silva€testified€thatÐ €Ð Ðhis€bills€reflected€the€time€he€actually€spent€on€a€matter€as€accurately€as€possible.€€Mr.€Silva€did€notÐ l¼ Ðtestify€that€he€quoted€a€lower€hourly€rate€than€was€his€custom.Ô#†XùXXXùÜ»#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€€He€stated€that€$185€was€his€baseÐ X ¨ Ðbilling€rate€in€1998,€when€the€agreement€was€signed,€and€that€it€was€raised€to€$200€and€$225€in€theÐ D!” Ðfollowing€year.€€ð ðSo€at€the€conclusion€of€this€case€my€billing€rate€would€be€$225€an€hour.ðð€€He€didÐ 0"€  Ðnot€raise€the€rate€billed€to€Mr.€Buckley€because€ð ðthat€was€my€contracted€base€rate€under€the€feeÐ #l! Ðengagement€letter.ððÔ#†XùXXXù ½#ÔÔ‡XùXXXùÔ€€Based€upon€the€hours€spent€on€this€case,€a€fee€of€$175,000€would€result€in€anÐ $X" Ðhourly€rate€of€$559.€Ô#†XùXXXù¿#Ô€The€question€is€not€whether€this€fee€is€reasonable,€but€rather€whether€aÐ ô$D # Ðreasonable€client€could€have€anticipated€it€from€the€written€agreement€or€from€explanation€by€theÐ à%0!$ Ðlawyer.Ð Ì&"% ÐÐ ¸'#& ÐÑ OYÑâ  âÑ°°Ñâ  âÑ  Ñà  àIt€is€not€entirely€clear€whether€our€Supreme€Court,€if€called€upon€to€review€theÐ ° Ðreasonableness€of€a€fee€in€the€absence€of€a€specific€agreement€setting€a€maximum€or€establishing€theÐ œì Ðmethod€for€computing€a€result„based€fee,€would€adopt€the€òòHeadóó€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€resultÐ ˆØ Ðcomponent€must€bear€a€reasonable€relationship€to€the€time€and€effort€spent€and€that€a€doubling€ofÐ tÄ Ðthe€amount€attributable€to€effort€would€be€unreasonable.€€That€is€not€the€precise€question€before€us,Ð `° Ðhowever.€€The€question€is€whether€a€reasonable€client€could€have€understood€that€the€attorneyÐ L œ Ðenvisioned€a€predominantly€result€based€fee,€when€compared€with€the€other€factors€listed,€that€tripledÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€amount€based€on€time€and€effort€factor,€where€neither€the€predominance€of€the€results€obtainedÐ $ t Ðfactor€nor€its€relationship€to€the€time€and€effort€factor€were€disclosed€or€explained.€€€€€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àIn€òòAlexander€IIóó,€accurate€contemporaneously€kept€time€records€were€not€produced.€Ð è 8  ÐConsequently,€the€Supreme€Court€chose€to€ð ðdisregard€the€attempted€reconstruction€of€the€attorneysððÐ Ô$  Ðtime€records€and€the€allegations€of€over„staffing€and€duplicative€servicesðð€€because€the€reasonableÐ À  Ðfee€agreed€to€by€the€parties€was€not€controlled€by€the€hourly€rates€since€the€parties€clearly€agreed€toÐ ¬ü  Ðð ðsome€leeway€beyond€the€hourly€rates.ðð€€974€S.W.2d€at€696€n.7.€€Instead,€the€Court€statedÐ ˜è  ÐÌà8  àThe€time€devoted€to€the€case€is€but€one€of€several€factors€determining€the€overallÐ pÀ Ðreasonableness€of€the€fee€charged.€€Because€it€is€clear€that€the€attorneys€putÐ \¬ Ðinnumerable€hours€into€Inmanððs€case,€the€time€and€labor€factor€suggests€that€theÐ H˜ Ð$501,514.50€fee€is€reasonable.€€Ð4„Ð Ð  ÐÌòòId.€óóÐ  \ ÐÌà  àNot€only€in€this€footnote,€but€also€it€its€analysis€of€the€reasonableness€of€the€fee,€the€CourtÐ ä4 Ðmade€it€clear€that€all€of€the€factors€enumerated€in€the€agreement€had€to€be€considered.€€Because€theÐ Ð  ÐCourt€had€no€accurate€numbers€regarding€the€hours€actually€worked€it€did€not,€and€could€not,Ð ¼  Ðcompare€the€time€and€labor€factor€to€the€total€fee€or€any€other€component.€€However,€the€CourtððsÐ ¨ø Ðfinding€that€the€time€and€labor€factor€suggested€the€reasonableness€of€the€fee€indicates€that€the€CourtÐ ”ä Ðrecognized€that€some€reasonable€relationship€between€that€factor€and€the€total€fee€is€necessary.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àA€reasonable€client€told€that€the€fee€would€be€determined€based€on€all€the€factors€listed€inÐ X ¨ Ðthe€agreement€would€not€assume€that€one€factor,€the€results€obtained,€would€predominate.€€Similarly,Ð D!” Ða€reasonable€client€would€anticipate€that€the€results€obtained€factor€would€have€a€reasonable,€and€IÐ 0"€  Ðthink€identifiable,€relationship€to€the€factor€of€hourly€rates€for€time€expended.€€Consequently,€theÐ #l! Ðattorneyððs€intent€contrary€to€these€reasonable€expectations€was€required€to€be€disclosed€to€andÐ $X" Ðexplained€to€the€client.€€òòRestatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyersóó€ðð€18,€cmt.€h.€€Since€thereÐ ô$D # Ðwas€no€testimony€herein€that€it€was,€the€attorney€has€failed€to€meet€his€burden€of€establishing€anÐ à%0!$ Ðagreement€for€a€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àBy€this€discussion€of€the€relationship€between€the€time€and€labor€factor€and€the€results€factor,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðor€the€relationship€among€all€the€factors,€I€do€not€mean€to€suggest€that€an€attorney€and€client€cannotÐ )à$( Ðagree€to€a€fee€arrangement€giving€disproportionate€emphasis€to€the€results€obtained€or€any€otherÐ |*Ì%) Ðfactor.€€As€the€òòHeadóó€court€stated,€if€the€attorney€and€client€in€that€case€had€agreed€to€a€result€fee€ofÐ h+¸&* Ð$75,000,€there€would€have€been€no€question€of€the€propriety€of€the€agreement.€€òòHeadóó,€505€A.2d€atÐ ° Ð878.€€Similarly,€the€fact€that€the€attorneys€and€client€in€òòAlexander€IIóó€agreed€to€a€fee€based€upon€theÐ œì Ðreasonableness€factors€whose€maximum€was€set€at€a€percentage€of€the€property€awarded€made€theÐ ˆØ Ðagreement€enforceable€because€the€client€was€clearly€on€notice€of€her€maximum€potential€liability.€Ð tÄ Ð974€S.W.2d€at€697.Ð `° ÐÌà  àThat€is€simply€not€the€situation€before€us.€€The€attorney€herein€seeks€to€enforce€hisÐ 8 ˆ Ðinterpretation€of€a€written€agreement€that€in€my€opinion€does€not€reflect€that€interpretation.€€NeitherÐ $ t Ðhas€he€met€his€burden€of€proving€that€the€client€had€an€understanding€of€the€fee€agreement€that€wasÐ  ` Ðconsistent€with€his€own€since€in€neither€the€written€agreement€nor€in€his€discussions€with€the€clientÐ ü L  Ðdid€he€advise€the€client€of€critical€details€of€his€intent€regarding€a€ð ðresults„orientedðð€fee.€Ð è 8  ÐConsequently,€I€would€find€that€the€attorney€has€not€proved€an€agreement€to€pay€a€result€based€feeÐ Ô$  Ðand€is€not€entitled€to€enforcement€of€his€intent€to€charge€such€a€fee.Ð À  ÐÌà  àLet€me€be€clear.€€I€do€not€intend€to€imply€in€any€way€that€the€fee€arrangement€envisioned€orÐ ˜è  Ðintended€by€the€attorney€was€improper€or€unreasonable.€€It€was€simply€a€failure€to€clearly€convey€hisÐ „Ô  Ðintent€so€that€he€could€show€that€the€client€understood€that€intent€that€compels€my€conclusion.€Ð pÀ ÐArmed€with€that€understanding,€the€client€could€have€made€an€informed€choice€whether€to€proceedÐ \¬ Ðwith€the€arrangement,€negotiate€different€terms,€or€hire€another€lawyer€on€terms€acceptable€to€him.Ð H˜ ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à__________________________________________Ð øH Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE