ÿWPCŽ  WWܳ¼h[Ã=Z«–R–»ðœ×”d—š» ­÷Äb[Á=U –„;@±ŽÝÃå @ÒÁæÞ\^] ˆ{Sî4;Üxy:àǶk |c”´oe÷Ö0ü=‹È5:'5¦íd¯Â±b™jh8$š!û–‡sØÀíbtaÆê6ܬ­–ü«Õ™:š5ÖñHX;|©z¶]å“ÔÂ-}:†9/¬Œë ¯QßXHþW¦'xKÛM;$–qÖ˜\mÖ-ʹd2 kôG‚æð^—ß’ÊI õºEåØŠ;ݧéNätöm¼ŒŸ…›úš…^–w0þ†/÷>¹[¿Df:f‚+–Gò žaû²pÔ ïW7ÿsîÑ’ñl{ dU1køÝ°²‹á·3:^ï§r€ÅÆ ?Žqö™ÚœÎúÔð^;aÇrÕœÒøo>Õ1V¾¯üV:»Œœð©ÌjxþGøÞgΈ›¿ô<=aÆ»r­áêI9g§PÈ¡1ÓïÕˆ¥óýÅ£9^<-œòçyœ’=ÝÓ?»«BÇ}¼ eI…È®•‚´áN¸v[¨zÛ ˆ!$w4ÍV[ Á˜¯Vùœ&JÞV¨(* Ðparalegal€time€is€$60.00.€€Hourly€billing€will€be€to€the€tenth€(1/10th)Ð Ú-*)+ ÐÔ_Ôof€an€hour.€€Your€ultimate€fee€may€vary€depending€on€the€timeÐ ° Ðlimitations€imposed€by€you,€the€time€and€labor€required,€the€noveltyÐ œì Ðand€difficulty€of€the€questions€involved,€the€skill€requisite€to€performÐ ˆØ Ðthe€legal€service€properly,€or€the€amount€involved€and€the€resultsÐ tÄ Ðobtained.€€Accounts€are€due€and€payable,€in€full,€within€30€days€of€theÐ `° Ðfinal€billing€and€are€subject€to€a€monthly€service€charge€of€1.5%€ofÐ L œ Ðany€balance€outstanding€after€30€days.€€Ð8 ˆ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àÐ ` x` x Ðà  àA€critical€part€of€the€case€was€an€antenuptial€agreement€signed€by€Mrs.€Buckley.€€Her€lawyerÐ  ` Ðattacked€the€agreement€on€the€grounds€of€duress€and€lack€of€full€disclosure,€but€Mr.€Silva€persuadedÐ ü L  Ðthe€Court€that€the€agreement€should€be€enforced€according€to€its€terms.€€Mrs.€Buckley,€therefore,Ð è 8  Ðreceived€only€$200,000.00€in€marital€assets€and€$150,000.00€in€alimony,€where€Mr.€BuckleyððsÐ Ô$  Ðpersonal€estate€had€increased€approximately€$18,000,000.00€during€the€marriage.€€Ð À  ÐÌà  àMr.€Silva€billed€Mr.€Buckley€a€total€of€$57,920.57€as€the€trial€progressed.€€At€a€meeting€inÐ ˜è  ÐDecember€of€2000€to€go€over€the€final€judgment,€Mr.€Silva€told€Mr.€Buckley€that€they€needed€toÐ „Ô  Ðdiscuss€the€final€bill.€€Several€weeks€later€they€met,€and€Mr.€Silva€said€that€based€on€the€feeÐ pÀ Ðagreement€he€thought€a€total€fee€of€$150,000.00€to€$175,000.00€was€reasonable.€€Mr.€Buckley€wasÐ \¬ Ðð ðnonplussed,ðð€according€to€Mr.€Silva,€and€asked€for€a€chance€to€think€about€the€proposal.€Ð H˜ ÐUltimately,€Mr.€Buckley€refused€to€pay€anything€more€than€he€had€already€paid€and€this€lawsuitÐ 4„ Ðfollowed.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àThe€trial€judge€held€that€Mr.€Buckley€ð ðknew,€should€have€known€or€at€least€had€reason€toÐ øH Ðknowðð€that€the€agreement€provided€for€a€fee€in€addition€to€Mr.€Silvaððs€customary€hourly€fee.€€TheÐ ä4 Ðcourt€noted€that€the€ð ðultimate€feeðð€provision€in€the€contract€could€only€mean€ð ðthe€entire€fee€chargedÐ Ð  Ðafter€the€entire€divorce€case€has€concluded€or€ended.ðð€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àMr.€Buckley€contends€on€appeal€that€he€understood€the€ð ðresult€feeðð€portion€of€the€contractÐ ”ä Ðto€mean€that€the€ultimate€fee€would€depend€on€how€many€hours€Mr.€Silva€had€to€spend€on€the€case;Ð €Ð Ðand€that€the€number€of€hours€would€vary€depending€on€the€factors€set€out€in€the€agreement€(theÐ l¼ Ðnovelty€and€difficulty€of€the€questions,€the€skill€requisite€to€perform€the€service,€etc.).€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àOur€review€is€òòde€novoòòóóóó€on€the€record.€€As€to€factual€matters€we€presume€the€judgment€isÐ 0"€  Ðcorrect€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€it.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€Proc.€13(d);€òòóóòòLimbaugh€v.€CoffeeÐ #l! ÐCo.€Med.€Ctr.,€óó59€S.W.€3d€73€(Tenn.€2001).€€We€review€questions€of€law,€òòde€novoóó,€without€theÐ $X" Ðpresumption€of€correctness.€€òòKline€v.€Eyrick,€óó69€S.W.€3d€197€(Tenn.€2002).€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà@……)ìàò òII.ˆÐ Ì&"% ÐRULES€REGARDING€THE€INTERPRETATION€OF€ATTORNEY„CLIENT€CONTRACTSÐ ¸'#& Ðó óÌà  àThe€interpretation€of€a€written€agreement€is€a€question€of€law€for€the€Court:€òòDoe€v.€HCAÐ )à$( ÐHealth€Services€of€Tennessee,€óó46€S.W.€3d€191€(Tenn.€2001).òò€óóThe€Courtððs€primary€purpose€is€to€findÐ |*Ì%) Ðwhat€the€parties€intended.€€òòOhio€Cas.€Co.,€Inc.€v.€Travelers€Indemnity€Co.óó,€493€S.W.€2d€465€(Tenn.Ð h+¸&* Ð1973).€€When€the€language€of€a€contract€is€plain€and€unambiguous,€the€court€must€determine€theÐ ° Ðpartiesðð€intention€from€the€four€corners€of€the€writing.€€òòSimonton€v.€Huff,€óó60€S.W.€3d€820€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð œì ÐApp.€2000).€€But€as€an€aid€to€finding€that€intention,€the€court€may€consider€the€situation€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðparties,€the€business€to€which€the€contract€relates,€the€subject€matter€of€the€contract,€theÐ tÄ Ðcircumstances€surrounding€the€transaction,€and€the€construction€placed€on€the€contract€by€the€partiesÐ `° Ðin€carrying€out€its€terms.€€òòid.€óóat€825.€€Proof€of€that€nature€does€not€violate€the€parol€evidence€rule.€Ð L œ ÐòòSeeóó€òòCoble€Systems,€Inc.€v.€Gifford,óó627€S.W.€2d€359€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1981).€€These€general€rules€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðcontract€law€also€apply€to€contracts€between€òòóóattorneys€and€clients.€€òòAlexander€v.€Inman,€óó903€S.W.Ð $ t Ð2d€686€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€(Alexander€I)Ð  ` ÐÌà  àAn€attorney„client€agreement,€however,€is€subject€to€a€higher€level€of€scrutiny€by€the€courts.€Ð è 8  ÐAttorneys€must€deal€with€their€clients€in€utmost€good€faith.€€òòAlexander€v.€Inman,€óó974€S.W.€2d€689Ð Ô$  Ðat€694€(Tenn.€1998).€(Alexander€II)€ð ðThis€level€of€good€faith€is€significantly€higher€than€that€requiredÐ À  Ðin€other€business€transactions€where€the€parties€are€dealing€at€armððs€length.ðð€€€òòid.€€óóTherefore,€in€orderÐ ¬ü  Ðto€enforce€a€contract€with€a€client€an€attorney€must€demonstrate:€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌÓ€ (¦Ù83ÓÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£û"ÝÔ2¦ÙÔ(Ú  Ú1Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  Ý€that€he€or€she€provided€the€client€with€the€same€information€and€advice€that€theÐ pÀ Ðattorney€would€have€provided€the€client€had€he€or€she€not€been€personally€interestedÐ \¬ Ðin€the€transaction;݃3£û"4#ÝŒÐH˜` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  ÝÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£³$ÝÔ2¦ÙÔ(Ú  Ú2Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  Ýthat€the€client€fully€understood€the€meaning€and€effect€of€the€contract;€Ýƒ3£³$ì$ÝŒÐ4„` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  ÝÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£Ò%ÝÔ2¦ÙÔ(Ú  Ú3Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  Ýthat€the€clientððs€understanding€of€the€contract€was€the€same€as€the€attorneyððs;€and݃3£Ò% &݌Рp` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  ÝÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£'ÝÔ2¦ÙÔ(Ú  Ú4Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  Ýthat€the€contract€is€just€and€reasonable.݃3£':'݌Р\` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  ÝÌà  àòòAlexander€I,€óó903€S.W.€2d€at€694.€€à À àà  àà p àà È àà  àà x àà Ð àÐ ä4 Ðà  àÌà  àCourts€have€imposed€these€conditions€on€attorneys€in€order€to€protect€the€client€from€any€hintÐ ¼  Ðof€unfairness€or€misunderstanding.€€But€the€high€burden€of€proof€placed€on€attorneys€does€not€giveÐ ¨ø Ðclients€an€automatic€escape€from€the€contract€by€simply€saying€that€their€understanding€of€theÐ ”ä Ðagreement€differed€from€the€attorneyððs.€€The€Supreme€Court€in€Alexander€II€said,€ð ðThe€argument€thatÐ €Ð Ða€fee€agreement€is€unenforceable€unless€verbally€explained€to€the€client€would€effectively€create€aÐ l¼ Ðpresumption€that€all€attorneyððs€fee€contracts€are€unenforceable€.€.€.we€do€not€find€such€a€presumptionÐ X ¨ Ðappropriate.ðð€€à ` àòòAlexander€IIóó,€974,€S.W.€2d€at€695.€€After€analyzing€the€facts€in€the€record€showingÐ D!” Ðthe€circumstances€surrounding€the€transaction,€especially€the€clientððs€òòóóacumen€and€her€experience€asÐ 0"€  Ða€businesswoman,€the€Court€said€ð ðwe€discern€no€plausible€basis€for€concluding€that€[the€client]€didÐ #l! Ðnot€understand€[the€terms€of€the€agreement].ðð€€òòid.€óóat€694.€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àWe€think€that€òòóóAlexander€I,€and€Alexander€II€establish€at€a€minimum€that€the€client€must€fullyÐ à%0!$ Ðunderstand€the€contractððs€meaning€and€effect.€€If€the€agreement€is€clear€and€unambiguous€the€burdenÐ Ì&"% Ðis€on€the€client€to€show€that€the€client€did€not€have€the€same€understanding€as€the€attorney.€Ð ¸'#& ÐòòAlexander€IIóó.€A€simple€denial€by€the€client€is€not€sufficient.€€òòid.€€óóWe€think€it€follows€that€if€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcontract€is€not€clear€and€unambiguous€the€burden€is€on€the€attorney€to€show€that€the€client€didÐ )à$( Ðunderstand€it.€Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà@^^(ìàò òIII.ˆÐ ° Ðà@ìàTHE€CONTRACT€IN€QUESTIONó óˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àIf€the€agreement€had€stopped€after€the€first€four€sentences,€there€would€have€been€no€questionÐ tÄ Ðabout€the€amount€of€the€fee.€€Up€to€that€point€the€agreement€describes€a€straight€hourly€fee.€€The€nextÐ `° Ðsentence,€however,€introduces€another€idea:€ð ðYour€ultimate€fee€may€vary€depending€on€the€timeÐ L œ Ðlimitations€imposed€by€you,€the€time€and€labor€required,€the€novelty€and€difficulty€of€the€questionsÐ 8 ˆ Ðinvolved,€the€skill€requisite€to€perform€the€legal€service€properly,€or€the€amount€involved€and€theÐ $ t Ðresults€obtained.ðð€€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àWe€do€not€think€that€a€sophisticated€and€intelligent€businessman€would€read€that€sentenceÐ è 8  Ðas€simply€a€restatement€of€the€first€four€sentences.€€We€are€not€as€confident€as€the€trial€judge€that€theÐ Ô$  Ðentire€agreement€is€crystal€clear,€but€when€the€ð ðultimate€feeðð€is€made€to€depend€on€ð ðthe€amountÐ À  Ðinvolved€and€the€result€obtained,ðð€that€expression€must€mean€something€more€than€a€straight€hourlyÐ ¬ü  Ðfee.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àBut€even€if€the€sentence€were€clear€to€us,€this€being€an€attorney„client€contract,€we€would€notÐ pÀ Ðenforce€that€provision€against€Mr.€Buckley€unless€we€could€find€that€he€did€in€fact€understand€it.€Ð \¬ ÐSee€òòAlexander€Ióó,€903€S.W.€2d€at€694;€òòAlexander€IIóó,€974€S.W.€2d€at€694.€€On€this€point,€Mr.€SilvaÐ H˜ Ðtestified€that€he€had€given€the€contract€to€Mr.€Buckley€on€May€18,€1998.€€Mr.€Buckley€came€to€Mr.Ð 4„ ÐSilvaððs€office€on€August€19€to€prepare€an€answer€to€the€complaint.€€He€signed€the€agreement€on€thatÐ  p Ðday,€and€Mr.€Silva€testified€that€he€explained€to€Mr.€Buckley€how€the€final€fee€would€be€determined.Ð  \ ÐHe€explained€that€the€Supreme€Court€had€established€certain€factors€to€be€considered€and€had€setÐ øH Ðthose€factors€out€in€the€Disciplinary€Rules€for€lawyers;€that€the€final€fee€could€not€be€ascertainedÐ ä4 Ðuntil€the€case€was€over€when€they€would€sit€down€and€discuss€the€fee€based€on€all€the€factors.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMr.€Buckley€testified€that€Mr.€Silva€told€him€that€he€could€only€charge€$185.00€per€hour.€Ð ¨ø ÐHe€testified€further€that€when€he€signed€the€engagement€letter€on€August€19,€1998€Mr.€Silva€put€itÐ ”ä Ðin€the€file€and€that€was€it.€€The€first€time€Mr.€Buckley€learned€that€he€would€be€charged€a€ð ðtail€endððÐ €Ð Ðfee,€as€he€put€it,€was€in€December€of€2000.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àAt€the€close€of€the€proof€the€trial€judge€complimented€Mr.€Silva€and€Mr.€Buckley€for€theirÐ D!” Ðtruthfulness,€but€in€a€memorandum€filed€later,€the€court€stated:€€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àIn€making€the€aforementioned€findings,€the€Court€notes€that€both€Mr.Ð $X" ÐSilva€and€Mr.€Buckley€appeared€to€be€credible€witnesses€at€trial.€Ð ô$D # ÐHowever,€upon€thoughtful€consideration€of€their€appearance€asÐ à%0!$ Ðwitnesses€in€light€of€all€the€evidence,€the€Court€finds€that€Mr.€BuckleyÐ Ì&"% Ðwas€not€credible€on€one€following€point:€that€he€did€not€reasonablyÐ ¸'#& Ðanticipate€or€expect€that€he€would€ever€owe€Mr.€Silva€more€than€aÐ ¤(ô#' Ðmere€$185€per€hour€for€all€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€services€rendered€underÐ )à$( Ðtheir€agreement.€€Mr.€Buckley€knew,€should€have€known€or€at€leastÐ |*Ì%) Ðhad€reason€to€know€that€his€final€or€ultimate€fee€may€very€well€exceedÐ h+¸&* Ð$185€per€hour€of€Mr.€Silvaððs€time€once€the€case€was€concluded€andÐ ° Ðall€the€factors€had€been€considered€and€applied.€€Ðœì` x` x ÐÌà  àWe€think€the€trial€judgeððs€memorandum€amounts€to€a€finding€that€Mr.€Buckley€did,€in€fact,Ð tÄ Ðunderstand€that€his€ultimate€obligation€on€Mr.€Silvaððs€fee€would€depend€on€the€other€factors€set€outÐ `° Ðin€the€agreement€and€not€simply€on€the€hourly€rate.€€A€trial€judgeððs€determination€of€the€facts€basedÐ L œ Ðon€the€credibility€of€the€witness€is€binding€on€the€reviewing€court€unless€other€real€evidence€compelsÐ 8 ˆ Ða€contrary€conclusion.€€òòState€ex.€rel.€Balsinger€v.€Town€of€Madisonville,€óó435€S.W.€2d€803€(Tenn.Ð $ t Ð1968).€€See€also€òòòòóóTennessee€Valley€Kaolin€Corp.€v.€Perryóó,€526€S.W.€2d€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1975).€€WeÐ  ` Ðthink€the€question€of€whether€Mr.€Buckley€understood€the€agreement€turns€entirely€on€the€credibilityÐ ü L  Ðof€the€witnesses.€€Without€other€real€evidence€in€the€record€to€compel€a€contrary€conclusion,€weÐ è 8  Ðaffirm€the€trial€judgeððs€finding€on€that€issue.€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àWe€acknowledge€that€one€of€the€rules€of€contract€construction€says€that€an€ambiguousÐ ¬ü  Ðcontract€should€be€construed€most€strongly€against€the€drafter,€òòAlexander€I,€óó903€S.W.€2d€at€694,Ð ˜è  ÐòòóóThere€is€also€authority€for€a€double„€barreled€application€of€this€rule€when€the€contract€is€betweenÐ „Ô  Ða€lawyer€and€client.€òòBeatty€v.€NP€Corp.,€óó58I€NE2d€1311€(Mass.€App.€Ct.€1999).€€But€we€have€alsoÐ pÀ Ðsaid€that€this€rule€should€be€invoked€only€when€all€other€rules€of€construction€fail.€€See€òòCobleÐ \¬ ÐSystems,€Inc.€v.€Gifford€Co.,€óó627€S.W.€2d€359€(Tn.€Ct.€App.€1981).€€Where€the€intent€of€the€partiesÐ H˜ Ðcan€be€ascertained€by€other€means,€this€rule€should€not€be€mechanically€applied€to€negate€that€intent.€Ð 4„ Ðòòid.Ð  p ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òóóIV.ˆÐ øH Ðà@&ìàTHE€FEESˆÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àó óMr.€Silva€offered€the€opinion€of€an€attorney€with€extensive€experience€in€trying€high„profileÐ ¼  Ðdivorce€cases.€€He€said€that€a€reasonable€fee€based€on€the€factors€set€out€in€the€engagement€letterÐ ¨ø Ðwould€be€$200,000.00.€€The€court€found€that€Mr.€Buckley€should€pay€a€total€fee€of€$175,000.00.€Ð ”ä ÐThis€finding€is€entitled€to€the€presumption€of€correctness€set€forth€in€13(d)€Tenn.€R.€App.€Proc.€€WeÐ €Ð Ðcannot€say€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€it.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€is€affirmed€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Chancery€CourtÐ D!” Ðof€Williamson€County€for€any€further€proceedings€that€may€be€necessary.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appealÐ 0"€  Ðto€the€Appellant,€Albert€W.€Buckley,€Jr.€Ð #l! ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð Ì&"% Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àóóBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€P.J.,€M.S.Ð ¸'#& Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à