ÿWPC S=øjðnù§6wÕÆñÔü6±'g†LàÖ#O¾¸×jò)á£VjT¼)ÆHÒUµøt†²“:“žM«}Uâ‰Ý¾ÏGŒ“d'°Q ¾Ñý¡WÜh6f8íøV0ê´F~¡Ú~äe…|å‡u ÛSÄù–ô¬ çïEªÃéŽlµd¥4Sn쬧UbÿâšÅ¨LIìSÙ“$…½\Öä׌Ʋ¼î©-ÖØ•¯sU*gz숋mBaÈÙp¾À#U9Øê|tolÞ¤él8¦Â!ÙøÃü• hÀ ž ä«9ŒÅ£ÀwcªM¤5µ[±#µ§Û½[ÈsÄ°Ö÷ i~7!¥¾µ×ëíÀ)-Ò¼•~‰óÅâç˜u"f¼R•è\¶GÐë÷*W¤(ƒe˜ê9øßàËe¨³u—š¿rsƼe#5Û=f¨˜D> Í?C”¥Š0Lбþ\ÂäžH*ƒ’N‚lDÙƒO¹[=6Ðí½¡èP!é*5°~r§í†¯Ò0°G#q®ý{ k ¶/×K ƒa0÷sû‹ê:ißg¦`Äî¥o±'0ºÀiyÕQ±&>†GþÔxuT– ”EéàPÁÒrhûM«ÍbUN\ %ª 0ˆ°^ 8wD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë U N±NÿÿÿEb 0ë     Böö 0¤ D3· D-ê 0K ASbƵ 0¤{ 0D A«c(ÈhH  Z6Times New Roman Regular»(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó[d+â HEô*pNk3¸su3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0 Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular- ù-(|G2¨ $¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€1M»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôP‘ò»»Ô d(|3Íã$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€1M»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Íã$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€1M»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€7-»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Üà»»»ÔÑ8€YíXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îÛAÜàÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼Üà»îîÛA #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓMay€10,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X™ÜX»¼ÜàÔÌò òÔ#†¼Üà»XX™Üñ#ÔDEBRA€SMITH€v.€EZ€PAWN€COMPANY,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡X™ÜX»¼ÜàÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Anderson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€00CH0362€€€€€€William€E.€Lantrip,€ChancellorÐ æ 6 ÐÌFILED€AUGUST€28,€2001Ð ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2000„02741„COA„R3„CVÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€is€a€suit€by€Debra€Smith€seeking€damages€against€EZ€Pawn€Company€and€others€because€ofÐ xÈ  Ðsexual€harassment€visited€upon€her€by€James€Cameron,€the€owner€of€the€company.€€The€Trial€CourtÐ d´ Ðfound€that€her€claim€under€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€and€under€the€Malicious€HarassmentÐ P  ÐStatute€were€barred€by€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations.€€We€affirm.Ð <Œ ÐÓ~ÓÌò òTenn.R.App.P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Affirmed;Ð d ÐCause€Remandedó óÐ P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Üà»àX™Üc#ÔÔ‡X™ÜX.¼ÜàÔHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHerschel€P.€Franksóó€andÐ Ø( ÐòòD.€Michael€Swiney,€óóJJ.,€joined.Ð Ä ÐÌJerrold€L.€Becker,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€Debra€SmithÐ œì ÐÌDavid€S.€Clark,€Oak€Ridge,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellees,€EZ€Pawn€Company,€EZ€Enterprises€andÐ tÄ ÐJames€CameronÐ `° ÐÓÜÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Üà»XX™Ü #ÔÔ‡X™ÜX»¼ÜàÔÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼Üà»XX™Ü #ÔÔ€X™ÜX»¼ÜàÔÓ  Óà  àDebra€Smith€appeals€the€Trial€Courtððs€dismissal€of€her€suit€seeking€damages€against€EZÐ #`" ÐPawn€Company,€EZ€Enterprises€and€James€Cameron€for€sexual€harassment€under€the€TennesseeÐ ü#L# ÐHuman€Rights€Act€in€violation€of€T.C.A.€4„21„101,€et€seq.,€and€malicious€harassment€in€violationÐ è$8 $ Ðof€T.C.A.€4„21„701,€et€seq.€€The€Trial€Court€was€of€the€opinion€that€both€claims€were€barred€by€theÐ Ô%$!% Ðapplicable€statute€of€limitations.€€Although€the€motion€filed€by€the€Defendants€is€styled€ð ðMotion€toÐ À&"& ÐDismiss€and/or€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment,ðð€it€would€appear€that€the€Trial€Court€sustained€theÐ ¬'ü"' Ðmotion€to€dismiss€as€no€affidavits€or€depositions€were€introduced.€€Ð ˜(è#( ÐÌà  àHer€issue€on€appeal€contends€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€dismissing€her€complaint€becauseÐ p*À%* ÐMr.€Cameron€engaged€in€a€continuing€violation€of€her€rights.Ð \+¬&+ Ðâ âÐ H,˜',ýÿ Ðà  àThe€record€is€clear€that€Ms.€Smith€was€employed€in€February€1994€by€Mr.€Cameron€and,Ð ° Ðâ âaccording€to€her€complaint,€forced€to€retire€on€or€about€July€30,€1998.€€It€is€also€clear€that€the€initialÐ œì Ðsuit€filed€on€October€14,€1999,€in€Knox€County,€which€was€non„suited,€was€more€than€one€year€afterÐ ˆØ Ðthe€termination€of€her€employment.€€€She€insists,€however,€that€the€statute€did€not€bar€her€claimÐ tÄ Ðbecause€of€continuing€acts€occurring€after€her€termination€and€less€than€one€year€from€the€filing€ofÐ `° Ðher€Knox€County€suit.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àAs€to€EZ€Pawn€Company€and€EZ€Enterprises,€it€appears€that€there€are€no€such€legal€entitiesÐ $ t Ðsubject€to€suit€and€at€best€the€complaint€should€be€styled€ð ðJames€Cameron,€d/b/a€EZ€Pawn€CompanyÐ  ` Ðand€EZ€Enterprises.ðð€€Consequently,€the€Trial€Court€acted€properly€in€granting€summary€judgmentÐ ü L  Ðas€to€the€Company€and€Enterprises.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àAs€to€Mr.€Cameron,€it€appears€that€the€statute€of€limitations€as€to€both€causes€of€action€is€oneÐ À  Ðyear€and€that€the€initial€filing€of€the€complaint€in€Knox€County€was€more€than€one€year€after€theÐ ¬ü  Ðalleged€acts€of€Mr.€Cameron.€€Ms.€Smith,€however,€took€a€non„suit€as€to€the€case€in€Knox€CountyÐ ˜è  Ðand€re„filed€a€virtually€identical€case€in€Anderson€County,€which,€as€already€noted,€was€dismissed.€Ð „Ô  ÐThe€entry€of€summary€judgment€as€to€Mr.€Cameron€is€based€upon€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations.€Ð pÀ ÐMs.€Smith€contends,€however,€that€the€one„year€statute€was€extended€by€an€allegation€of€continuingÐ \¬ Ðdiscrimination€and€cites€several€Federal€cases€in€support€of€this€assertion.€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àAlthough€we€have€reviewed€the€Federal€cases€cited,€we€believe€the€definitive€case€addressingÐ  p Ðthe€question€was€decided€by€our€own€Supreme€Court€in€the€case€of€òòSpicer€v.€Beaman€Bottling€Co.óó,Ð  \ Ð937€S.W.2d€884€(Tenn.€1996),€wherein€the€Court€stated€the€following€(at€page€889).Ð øH ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àState€courts€adopting€the€continuing€violation€doctrine€enumerate€severalÐ Ð  Ðfactors€that€militate€against€strict€application€of€the€statute€of€limitations€in€theÐ ¼  Ðcontext€of€employment€discrimination.€òòSumner€v.€Goodyear€Tire€&€Rubber€Co.óó,Ð ¨ø Ð427€Mich.€505,€398€N.W.2d€368,€377€(1986).€€First,€they€emphasize€that€Title€VIIÐ ”ä Ðis€a€remedial€statute€designed€to€eliminate€discrimination€and€make€parties€whole.Ð €Ð ÐSecond,€they€stress€that€employees€are€generally€lay€people€and€are€unaware€thatÐ l¼ Ðthey€must€act€quickly€or€risk€losing€their€cause€of€action.€€Often€employees€fearÐ X ¨ Ðreprisal€or€turn€to€others€for€help,€and€in€so€doing,€delay€action€on€their€cause€untilÐ D!” Ðthe€statute€has€expired.€€Finally,€and€perhaps€most€importantly,€those€courtsÐ 0"€  Ðrecognize€that€many€discriminatory€acts€cannot€be€viewed€as€discrete€incidents,Ð #l! Ðand€often€unfold€rather€than€occur,€making€it€difficult€to€precisely€pinpoint€theÐ $X" Ðtime€when€they€take€place.€òòIdóó.€€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà Ø àAlthough€application€of€the€continuing€violation€doctrine€is€not€alwaysÐ Ì&"% Ðclear€and€simple,€there€appears€to€be€near€universal€agreement€as€to€the€abstractÐ ¸'#& Ðlegal€formulation€of€the€doctrine.€€After€a€review€of€the€relevant€case€law,€we€findÐ ¤(ô#' Ðpersuasive€the€rationale€supporting€the€continuing€violation€doctrine€and€adopt€itÐ )à$( Ðin€Tennessee.€€Courts€have€recognized,€however,€only€two€narrowly€limitedÐ |*Ì%) Ðinstances€in€which€the€continuing€violation€doctrine€applies.€€The€first€categoryÐ h+¸&* Ðarises€where€there€is€some€evidence€of€òòpresentóó€discriminatory€activity€giving€riseÐ ° Ðto€a€claim€of€a€continuing€violation,€for€example€where€an€employer€continues€toÐ œì Ðpresently€impose€disparate€work€assignment€or€pay€rates€between€similarlyÐ ˆØ Ðsituated€employee€groups.€€Key€to€establishing€this€exception€is€proof€that€at€leastÐ tÄ Ðone€of€the€forbidden€discriminatory€acts€occurred€within€the€relevant€limitationsÐ `° Ðperiod.€òòDixonóó,€928€F.2d€at€216.€€(Emphasis€in€original.)€€Ð L œ ÐÌà Ø àThe€second€category€of€"continuing€violation"€arises€where€there€has€beenÐ $ t Ða€longstanding€and€demonstrable€policy€of€discrimination€such€as€an€establishedÐ  ` Ðand€repeated€pattern€of€paying€men€more€than€women.€òòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòJanikowski€v.Ð ü L  ÐBendix€Corp.óó,€823€F.2d€945,€948€(6th€Cir.€1987).€To€constitute€such€anÐ è 8  Ðestablished€pattern,€the€plaintiff€must€clearly€demonstrate€some€"overarchingÐ Ô$  Ðpolicy€of€discrimination,"€and€not€merely€the€occurrence€of€an€isolated€incidentÐ À  Ðof€discriminatory€conduct.€€òòIdóó.€€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àClearly,€in€the€case€at€bar,€under€the€allegations€of€the€complaint,€it€cannot€be€said€that€theÐ „Ô  Ðmost€important€factor€the€Supreme€Court€says€we€should€considerð!ðð ðdiscrete€incidents,€and€oftenÐ pÀ Ðunfold€rather€than€occur,€making€it€difficult€to€precisely€pinpoint€the€time€when€they€take€placeððð!ðareÐ \¬ Ðpresent€in€that€Ms.€Smith€certainly€understood€the€sexual€harassment€occurring€from€its€inception.€Ð H˜ ÐMoreover,€it€is€difficult€to€understand€how€any€continuing€action€after€her€termination,€whichÐ 4„ Ðoccurred€outside€the€workplace,€would€meet€the€test€laid€down€in€òòSpiceróó.Ð  p ÐÌà  àThe€reasoning€applied€as€to€the€first€point€above€set€out€would€also€apply€to€the€case€ofÐ øH Ðintentional€infliction€of€emotional€distress.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àFinally€as€to€both€points,€the€complaint€relative€to€continuing€violation€is€imprecise€and,€forÐ ¼  Ðthe€most€part,€conclusory.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àMr.€Cameronððs€motion€that€this€be€declared€a€frivolous€appeal€is€denied.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€and€the€cause€remandedÐ X ¨ Ðfor€collection€of€costs€below.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€adjudged€against€Debra€Smith€and€her€surety.Ð D!” ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð ô$D # Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ à%0!$ ÐÌ