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U>a U*Ÿ B)É DCò AM5 ‚ v~‰vÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX('\$¡¡Ô€XåÙXXMXÔ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular À Á { à EÄ Å [Æ È É Ó€Õ  ƒ‰#ÔŒ ® _L3|xÕ C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPTÏ"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd "-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ýÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€*ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌò òDecember€22,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€+ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€*ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€œ­XXdðXXdð7ÑÞ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÌÙ€ ÙßR€./-A1-j|¹y` Å `€€@ÿRßÌSTATE€AUTOMOBILE€INSURANCEà à)ÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àò ò)€€Gibson€Chancery€No.€H€3443Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9703„CH„00071Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌLASHLEE„RICH,€INC.,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellant.à àò ò)ó óÌÌ›Ìà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€GIBSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€HUMBOLDT,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€GEORGE€R.€ELLIS,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌò òMITCHELL€G.€TOLLISONó óÌò òHAWKS€&€TOLLISONó óÌHumboldt,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òJAMES€E.€CONLEY,€JR.ó óÌò òTHOMASON,€HENDRIX,€HARVEY,€JOHNSON€&€MITCHELLÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó óà àœÌÓÓà àDefendant/Appellant,›€Lashlee„Rich,€Incorporated€(ð ðLashlee„Richðð)€appeals€theÏÑ7€ Øî XXdðXXdð7Ñjudgment€of€the€trial€court€granting€Plaintiff/Appelleeððs,€State€Automobile€MutualÏInsurance€Company€(ð ðState€Autoðð),€request€for€declaratory€judgment€whereby€the€trialÏcourt€ruled€that€œLashlee„Rich›€had€violated€the€clear€language€of€the€insurance€œpolicies›Ïissued€by€State€Auto€and€that€no€coverage€existed€under€œsaid›€insurance€policiesÏissued€by€State€Auto€to€œLashlee„Rich.€€For€reasons€stated€hereinafter,€we€affirm€theÏtrial€courtððs€judgment.›ÌÌÓ  Óò òœFACTS›€œAND›€œPROCEDURAL›€œHISTORYó ó›ÌÓ  Óà àOn€November€œ9,›€1994,€Lashlee„Rich€was€engaged€in€commercial€constructionÏservices€when€it€was€chiseling€out€a€concrete€water€drainage€ditch€on€the€interior€of€aÏproduction€facility€owned€by€J.€Hungerford€Smith€(ð ðSmithðð).€€œDuring›€the€work€process,Ïan€employee€of€Lashlee„Rich€was€using€a€jackhammer€to€chisel€out€the€existingÏconcrete€trench€when€his€bit€severed€a€pipe€under€which€there€was€œelectrical›€œserviceÏrunning.›€€œAs›€a€result,€the€electrical€wiring€was€damaged.€€œÌÌà àSmith›€is€in€the€business€of€making€ice€cream€toppings.€€The€electrical€lineÏsevered€by€Lashlee„Rich€supplied€power€to€the€office€area,€the€sugar€systemÏcomponent€of€the€production€process,€the€main€computer,€the€finance€area,€and€theÏshipping€department€of€Smith.€œÌ›Ìà àOn€November€10,€1994,€the€day€after€the€damage€was€done,€Lashlee„RichÏœcontracted€with›€Heglar€Plumbing€to€perform€the€necessary€repairs.€€œAt›€the€time€of€theÏincident€in€question,€there€was€œa€general›€liability€policy€in€effect€issued€by€State€Auto.€œÌ›Ìà àBy€letter€dated€November€11,€1994,€Lashlee„Rich€sent€State€Autoððs€agent€noticeÏof€the€occurrence€of€the€incident€in€question.€€œAlso›€stated€in€the€letter€was€the€fact€thatÏthe€necessary€repairs€had€been€undertaken€to€keep€Smithððs€manufacturing€facility€Ïoperational.€€œHowever,›€absent€from€this€letter€was€any€notice€to€State€Auto€thatÏLashlee„Rich€had€assumed€œan›€obligation€to€pay€œHeglar€Plumbing€for›€said€repairs.€ÏœLashlee„Rich›€never€sought€nor€received€any€advice€nor€authorization€from€anyÏrepresentative€of€State€Auto€to€hire€Heglar€Plumbing€to€repair€the€damage€to€SmithððsÏfacility.€œÌ›Ìà àThe€bill€from€Heglar€Plumbing€for€$17,245.95€was€submitted€to€State€AutoððsÏagent€by€letter€dated€November€18,€1994.€€œBy›€letters€dated€December€15,€1994,€StateÏAuto€advised€Lashlee„Rich€and€œSmith›€that€its€investigation€revealed€no€negligence€orÏliability€on€the€part€of€Lashlee„Rich.€€œAfter›€receiving€this€letter€from€State€Auto,€Lashlee„Rich€made€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing€for€the€repair€work.€œÌ›Ìà àState€Auto€filed€a€complaint€for€declaratory€judgment€in€the€Chancery€Court€œat›ÏGibson€County,€Tennessee,€at€Humboldt€on€March€30,€1995.€€œLashlee„Rich›€filed€anÏanswer€and€motion€for€joinder€on€December€5,€1995.€€œOn›€January€11,€1996,€SmithÏfiled€its€response€to€motion€for€joinder€and€œa€motion›€to€dismiss.€€œBy›€order€dated€MarchÏ8,€1996,€the€trial€court€denied€Lashlee„Richððs€motion€for€joinder€and€granted€theÏmotion€to€dismiss€Smith.€€œOn›€December€19,€1996,€this€cause€came€before€œthe›ÏChancery€Court€œat€Gibson€County.Ì›€Ìà àAt€trial,€Lashlee„Rich€asserted€that€their€prompt€action€in€retaining€electricalÏservice€to€restore€Smithððs€facility€resulted€in€a€mitigation€of€the€down€time€and€loss€ofÏrevenues€of€Smith.€€Lashlee„Rich€presented€further€testimony€that€it€acted€out€of€aÏsense€of€urgency€in€getting€the€electrical€supply€restored€to€Smith.€€œSmoke›€and€sparksÏwere€emanating€from€the€electrical€line€and€Lashlee€was€afraid€of€further€damage€toÏSmithððs€facility.€€œAdditionally,›€Lashlee„Rich€contended€that€there€was€a€safety€issueÏinvolved€as€the€exposed€main€electrical€feed€was€of€sufficient€power€to€pose€a€dangerÏto€life.€œÌ›Ìà àIn€anticipation€of€and€in€response€to€these€assertions,€State€Auto€presentedÏevidence€that€Smith€would€have€done€whatever€necessary€to€get€the€plant€operationalÏif€Lashlee„Rich€had€not€arranged€for€Heglar€Plumbing€to€make€the€repairs.€€State€AutoÏproduced€additional€testimony€that€Lashlee„Rich€had€a€long€standing€businessÍrelationship€with€Smith€which€would€have€been€put€into€jeopardy€if€Lashlee„Rich€hadÏnot€€undertaken€to€repair€the€damage.€€œState›€Auto€contended€that€Lashlee„RichððsÏassumption€of€the€obligation€to€pay€for€the€repair€work€was€for€these€reasons€and€notÏfor€safety€reasons€or€to€mitigate€damages€as€Lashlee„Rich€œasserted.€€Most€importantly,ÏState€Auto€relied€upon€the€provisions€in€the€policies€stating€that€no€insureds€were€toÏassume€an€obligation,€except€at€their€own€expense,€incur€an€expense€or€voluntarilyÏmake€any€payments€without€the€consent€of€State€Auto.€€State€Auto€contended€thatÏLashlee„Rich€assumed€an€obligation€and€voluntarily€made€payment€to€HeglarÏPlumbing€without€their€consent€and,€thus€these€actions€were€undertaken€at€Lashlee„Richððs€own€expense.Ì›Ìà àThe€trial€court€determined€that€State€Auto€had€no€obligation€under€the€œpolicies›Ïof€insurance€it€had€issued€to€Lashlee„Rich€and€entered€a€judgment€to€this€effect€onÏJanuary€27,€1997.€€œThis›€appeal€ensued.€œÌ›Ìà àOn€appeal,€the€issues€for€review€are€as€follows:€(1)€Whether€the€trial€court€erredÏin€deciding€that€Lashlee„Rich€violated€the€language€of€the€œpolicies›€issued€by€StateÏAuto;€(2)€Whether€Lashlee„Rich€acted€in€accordance€with€general€contract€principles€inÏmitigating€damages€thus€excusing€any€technical€breach€of€the€insurance€contract;€andÏ(3)€Whether€State€Auto€was€estopped€to€assert€the€defense€of€voluntary€payment€byÏLashlee„Rich€under€principles€of€waiver€and€estoppel.Ìà à€ÌÓ  Óò òœLAW›€œAND›€œDISCUSSIONó ó›ÌÓ  Óà àInasmuch€as€this€case€was€tried€by€the€trial€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€thisÏCourtððs€review€on€appeal€is€governed€by€Tennessee€Rule€of€Appellate€ProcedureÏ13(d),€which€directs€us€to€review€the€case€òòde€novoóó.€€òòRoberts€v.€Robertson€County€Bd.€ofÏEduc.óó,€692€S.W.2d€863,€865€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985);€òòHaverlah€v.€Memphis€Aviation,€Inc.óó,Ï674€S.W.2d€297,€300€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984);€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€€In€conducting€a€òòde€novoóóÏreview€of€the€record€below,€however,€this€Court€must€presume€that€the€trial€courtððsÏfindings€of€fact€are€correct.€€Under€this€standard€of€review,€we€must€affirm€the€trialÏcourtððs€decision€unless€the€trial€court€committed€an€error€of€law€affecting€the€result€orÏunless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€€òòRobertsóó,€692ÏS.W.2d€at€865.€€œÌ›Ìà àThe€applicable€provisions€of€the€commercial€general€liability€policy€issued€byÏState€Auto€to€Lashlee„Rich€are€as€follows:ÌÓÓà àSECTION€I€„€COVERAGESÌÌà àCoverage€A.€€BODILY€INJURY€AND€PROPERTY€DAMAGE€LIABILITYÌÌà àà à1.€€Insuring€AgreementÌà àà àà àÌà àà àà àa.€à8 àWe€will€pay€those€sums€that€theÏinsured€becomes€legallyÏobligated€to€pay€as€damagesÏbecause€of€ð ðbodily€injuryðð€orÏð ðproperty€damageðð€to€which€thisÏinsurance€applies.€€We€will€haveÏthe€right€and€duty€to€defend€anyÏð ðsuitðð€seeking€those€damages.€ÏWe€may€at€our€discretionÏinvestigate€any€ð ðoccurrenceðð€andÏsettle€any€claim€or€ð ðsuitðð€that€mayÏresult.€.€.ÌÌà àà àà à€€€à8 àNo€other€obligation€or€liability€toÏpay€sums€or€perform€acts€orÏservices€is€covered€unlessÏexplicitly€provided€for€underÏSUPPLEMENTARY€PAYMENTSÏ„€COVERAGES€A€AND€B.ÌÌà àSECTION€IV€„€COMMERCIAL€GENERAL€LIABILITY€CONDITIONSÌÌà àà à2.€€Duties€in€Event€of€Occurrence,€Offense,€Claim€for€Suit.Ìà àà àà àd.à8 àNo€œinsureds›€will,€except€at€theirÏown€cost,€voluntarily€make€aÏpayment,€assume€an€obligation,Ïor€incur€any€expense,€other€thanÏfor€first€aid,€without€our€œconsent.Ì›ÌÌà àThe€applicable€provisions€of€the€commercial€umbrella€liability€policy€issued€byÏState€ÌÌAuto€to€Lashlee„Rich€are€as€follows:ÌÌà àà àPART€B.€€COVERAGES€„€EXCLUSIONS€„€CONDITIONS„€DEFINITIONSÌÌà àà àSECTION€I,€COVERAGE€A€„€Excess€Liability€Coverage.Ìà àà àÌà àà à1.€€Insuring€AgreementÌÌà àà àà àa.à8 àWe€will€pay€those€sums,€inÏexcess€of€the€amount€payableÏunder€the€terms€of€anyÏð ðunderlying€insurance,ðð€that€theÏinsured€becomes€legallyÏobligated€to€pay€as€damagesÏbecause€of€injury€or€damage€toÏwhich€this€insurance€applies,Ïprovided€that€the€ð ðunderlyingÏinsuranceðð€also€applies,€or€wouldÏapply€but€for€the€exhaustion€of€itsÏapplicable€limits€of€insurance.ÌÌà àà àà àb.à8 àWe€will€have€the€right€toÏparticipate€in€the€defense€ofÏclaims€or€suits€against€theÍinsured€seeking€damagesÏbecause€of€injury€or€damage€toÏwhich€this€insurance€may€apply.€ÏWe€will€have€a€duty€to€defendÏsuch€claims€or€suits€when€theÏapplicable€limit€of€insurance€ofÏthe€ð ðunderlying€insuranceðð€hasÏbeen€used€up€by€payment€ofÏjudgments,€settlements€and€anyÏcost€or€expense€subject€to€suchÏlimit.ÌÌà àà àà àd.à8 àThis€insurance€is€subject€to€theÏsame€terms,€conditionsÏagreements,€exclusions€andÏdefinitions€as€the€ð ðunderlyingÏinsurance,ðð€except:ÌÌà àà àà àà8 à(1)à8 àWe€will€have€noÏobligation€underÏthis€insurance€withÏrespect€to€any€claimÏor€suit€that€is€settledÏwithout€ourÏconsent.ÌÌà àà àSECTION€II,€COVERAGE€B€„€Extended€Liability€CoverageÌÌà àà à1.€€Insuring€AgreementÌÌà àà àPART€E€„€General€ConditionsÌÌà àà àà àC.€€à8 àDuties€in€the€event€of€an€incident,Ïclaim€or€ð ðsuit.ððÌÌà àà àà àà à4.à8 àNo€insureds€will,Ïexcept€at€their€ownÏcost,€voluntarilyÏmake€a€payment,Ïassume€anyÏobligation€or€incurÏany€expenseÏwithout€ourÏconsent.ÌÌÓ  Óà àò òÌÌœWHETHER€THE€TRIAL€COURT€ERRED€IN€DECIDING€THAT€LASHLEE„RICHÌVIOLATED€THE€LANGUAGE€OF€THE€POLICIES€ISSUED€BY€STATEÏAUTO.ó ó›ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àWhen€the€terms€of€an€insurance€contract€are€plainly€written€and€there€is€nothingÏto€€the€contrary,€the€parties€are€bound€thereby.€€òò€€Artress€v.€State€Farm€Fire€andÏCasualty€Co.óó,€221€Tenn.€636,€429€S.W.2d€430,€432€(Tenn.€1968).€€Where€an€insuranceÏcontract€is€plain€and€unambiguous,€the€parties€are€bound€by€its€terms,€and€courtsÏcannot€under€the€guise€of€construction€make€a€new€and€different€contract€for€theÏparties.€€òòUnited€States€Stove€Corp.€v.€Aetna€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€169€Tenn.€264,€84€S.W.2dÏ582€(Tenn.€1935).€€Insurance€contracts€are€subject€to€the€same€rules€of€constructionÏand€enforcement€as€applied€to€contracts€generally.€€òòMcKimm€v.€Bellóó,€790€S.W.2d€526Ï(Tenn.€1990).€€In€the€absence€of€fraud€or€mistake,€a€contract€must€be€interpreted€andÏenforced€as€written€even€though€it€contains€terms€which€may€be€thought€harsh€andÏunjust.€€òòBallard€v.€North€American€Life€&€Casualtyóó,€667€S.W.2d€79€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1983);€òòAllstate€Insurance€Co.€v.€Wilsonóó,€856€S.W.2d€706,€708€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€InÏconstruing€contracts,€the€words€expressing€the€partiesðð€intentions€should€be€given€theÏusual,€natural€and€ordinary€meaning.€€òòId.óó€Ìà àIn€their€brief,€State€Auto€relies€on€òòAnderson€v.€Dudley€Moore€Ins.€Co.óó,€640ÏS.W.2d€556€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982)€as€factually€similar€to€the€case€at€bar.€€In€òòAndersonóó,Ïa€broker€took€a€fire€insurance€application€but€failed€to€relay€the€application€to€insurerÏfor€nearly€three€months.€€òòAndersonóó,€640€S.W.2d€at€556.€€When€the€applicantsðð€mobileÏhome€burned,€the€broker€voluntarily€paid€the€applicants€$10,000€for€fire€loss,€and€tookÍfrom€the€applicants€an€assignment€of€rights€against€insurer.€€œThe›€broker€then€broughtÏan€action€against€the€insurer€to€recover€its€payment€to€the€applicants,€and€laterÏamended€its€complaint€to€include€cause€of€action€against€the€brokerððs€errors€andÏomissions€carrier.€€œPertinent›€language€in€the€brokerððs€policy€with€the€errors€andÏomissions€carrier€€provided€that€ð ð[t]he€insured€shall€not,€except€at€his€own€cost,Ïvoluntarily€make€any€payment,€assume€any€obligation€or€incur€any€expense.ðð€€òòId.€óóatÏ559.€œThe›€middle€section€œnoted›€that€although€the€brokerððs€errors€and€omissions€carrierÏhad€notice€of€the€potential€demand€for€repayment,€the€broker€never€made€any€formalÏrequest€that€the€carrier€investigate,€defend,€or€pay€the€claim€until€long€after€it€had€madeÏthe€òòex€parteóó€payment€to€the€applicants.€€òòId.óó€at€560.€€The€court€went€on€to€state€that€itÏcould€not€ignore€the€express€words€contained€in€the€agreement€between€the€brokerÏand€his€errors€and€omissions€carrier€and€ruled€that€coverage€could€be€denied€on€thatÏbasis.€€Ìà àIn€this€œcase,›€under€both€the€commercial€general€and€commercial€umbrellaÏliability€policies,€State€Auto€has€the€right€and€duty€to€defend€any€suit€seeking€damages,Ïthe€right€to€investigate€any€claim€and€the€right€to€settle€any€claim€or€suit€that€may€result.€ÏHowever,€by€making€the€€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing€and€then€seekingÏreimbursement€for€such€payment,€Lashlee„Rich€attempted€to€bypass€the€plain,Ïunambiguous€language€in€the€insurance€contracts€and€thereby€divest€State€Auto€of€itsÏrights€to€oversee€the€handling€of€any€œclaim.Ì›Ìà àFurthermore,€under€the€commercial€general€liability€policy,€State€Auto€œis›€underÏno€obligation€to€reimburse€an€insured€for€payments€made€by€that€insured€for€anyÍobligation€assumed€or€expense€incurred€without€the€consent€of€State€Auto€other€thanÏfor€first€aid.€€œIn›€this€case,€Lashlee„Rich€assumed€the€obligation€to€pay€Heglar€PlumbingÏon€November€10,€1994.€œ€After›€a€careful€examination€of€the€record,€however,€we€findÏthat€Lashlee„Rich€never€informed€State€Auto€of€this€assumed€obligation€to€HeglarÏPlumbing€until€after€the€insurance€adjuster€made€the€determination€of€no€liability€onÏLashlee„Richððs€behalf.€€State€Auto€never€consented€to€Lashlee„Richððs€assumption€ofÏthe€obligation€to€make€payment€for€the€repair€work€at€Smith.€€Lashlee„Rich€incurred€anÏobligation€to€pay€Heglar€Plumbing€before€State€Auto€ever€made€any€kind€of€decisionÏor€had€the€opportunity€to€make€a€decision€on€the€claim.€€This€is€in€direct€contraventionÏof€the€œprovision›€in€œquestion.Ì›Ìà àIn€their€brief,€Lashlee„Rich€argues€that€their€actions€fall€within€the€ð ðfirst€aidððÏœexception€of€the€provision.›€€They€contend€that€the€term€ð ðfirst€aidðð€is€ambiguous€and,Ïtherefore,€should€be€construed€in€their€favor.€€œHowever,›€we€believe€that€the€plain,Ïordinary€meaning€of€ð ðfirst€aidðð€concerns€the€emergency€handling€of€personal€illnessesÏor€injuries€and€not€property€damage.€€In€fact,€Websterððs€Ninth€New€CollegiateÏDictionary€defines€ð ðfirst€aidðð€as€ð ðemergency€care€or€treatment€given€to€an€ill€or€injuredÏperson€before€regular€medical€aid€can€be€obtained.ðð€€òòWebsterððs€Ninth€New€CollegiateÏDictionaryóó€466€(1985).€€Lashlee„Rich€would€have€this€Court€believe€that€it€acted€in€aÏreasonably€prudent€manner€to€an€urgent€and€dangerous€situation€requiringÏemergency€action€so€as€to€render€such€situation€in€ð ðthe€nature€of€ððfirst€aid.ðððð€€€œWe›€fail€toÏfind€in€the€record€any€evidence€of€personal€illness€or€injury€to€anyone€thereby€causingÏthis€incident€to€fall€within€the€ð ðfirst€aidðð€exception€to€the€œgeneral€commercial€policy.Ì›Ìà àAdditionally,€under€the€terms€of€both€the€commercial€general€and€umbrellaÏliability€policies,€State€Auto€is€only€obligated€to€pay€those€sums€that€the€insuredÏbecomes€legally€obligated€to€pay€as€damages.€€œIn›€the€case€at€bar,€Lashlee„Rich€hasÏnot€been€found€legally€obligated€to€pay€any€amount€as€damages;€therefore,€State€AutoÏis€not€obligated€to€pay€the€$17,245.95€that€Lashlee„Rich€paid€to€Heglar€œPlumbing.Ì›Ìà àLike€òòAndersonóó,€we€conclude€that€Lashlee„Richððs€actions€were€in€directÏcontravention€of€the€unambiguous€language€of€the€policies€in€question.€€Lashlee„RichÏdid€undertake€an€obligation€to€pay€Heglar€Plumbing€for€the€repair€work€and€did,€in€fact,Ïvoluntarily€pay€Heglar€Plumbing€for€said€work.€€Lashlee„Rich€gave€no€notice€to€StateÏAuto€and€did€not€demand€payment€from€State€Auto€until€after€it€had€assumed€theÏobligation€to€make€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing.€€In€doing€so,€undoubtedly,€Lashlee„Rich€violated€the€clear€language€of€the€policies€by€assuming€an€obligation,€voluntarilyÏmaking€payment€and€incurring€an€expense€without€State€Autoððs€consent.€€Lashlee„Rich€did€all€of€the€foregoing€to€their€own€peril.€ÌœÌÓ  ÓÓÓò òWHETHER€LASHLEE„RICH€ACTED€IN€ACCORDANCE€WITH€GENERALÌPRINCIPLESIN€MITIGATING€DAMAGES€THUS€EXCUSING€ANYÌTECHNICAL€BREACH€OF€THE€INSURANCE€CONTRACT.òò›ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓó óóóà àLashlee„Rich€submits€that€in€paying€Heglar€Plumbing€it€was€mitigating€œitsÏdamages.›€€œWe›€find€this€argument€to€be€without€merit.€€The€doctrine€of€mitigation€ofÏdamages,€sometimes€called€the€doctrine€of€avoidable€consequences,€imposes€uponÏan€injured€party€a€duty€to€exercise€reasonable€diligence€and€ordinary€care€inÍattempting€to€minimize€his€or€her€damages€after€the€injury€has€been€inflicted.€€òòBlackððsÏLaw€Dictionaryóó€904€(5th€€ed.€1979).€€In€this€case,€Lashlee„Rich€is€not€the€injured€party.€ÏSmith€is€the€party€that€sustained€an€injury.€€We€feel€that€Lashlee„Richððs€reliance€on€theÏdoctrine€of€mitigation€of€damages€is€œmisplaced.Ì›Ìà àFurthermore,€even€if€the€doctrine€of€mitigation€of€damages€were€germane€toÏthird€party€œinjuries€in€liability€insurance€contracts,›€this€doctrine€would€not€apply€to€theÏfacts€of€this€case.€€Malcom€Chapin,€plant€manager€of€Smith,€when€asked:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQ.€œ€.›€.€.€but€as€the€plant€manager€faced€with€the€electricalÏproblem,€you€would€have€taken€whatever€steps€wereÏnecessary€to€be€sure€your€plant€was€ready€to€go€theÏfollowing€Monday;€wouldnððt€you?ÌÌà0 àà8 àA.€€Yes.Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 àQ.€€You€would€have€done€whatever€it€took?ÌÌà8 àà8 àA.€€Yes.ÌÌÓÓThus,€Lashlee„Richððs€assumption€of€an€obligation€to€pay€for€the€repair€work€was€notÏnecessary€to€place€Smithððs€facility€in€an€operational€mode.€€No€damages€wereÏmitigated€because€if€Lashlee„Rich€had€not€agreed€to€pay€for€the€repair€work,€SmithÏwas€going€to€œdo€whatever€it€took€to€regain€its€plant€operation.›€€At€this€point,€it€isÏimperative€that€we€note€that€State€Auto€did€not€deny€the€claim€of€Lashlee„Rich.€€œHad›ÏLashlee„Rich€been€sued€for€payment€of€the€repair€work,€the€record€evinces€that€StateÏAuto€would€have€defended€the€suit,€and€any€judgment€that€might€have€been€enteredÏwould€have€been€paid€pursuant€to€the€terms€of€the€œpolicy.€€However,›€Lashlee„RichÏstepped€outside€the€policies€by€assuming€the€obligation€to€pay€and€subsequentlyÍpaying€for€the€repair€work.€€To€quote€the€direct€language€of€the€commercial€generalÏliability€policy:€ð ðNo€insured€will,€except€at€their€own€cost,€voluntarily€make€a€payment,Ïassume€any€obligation,€or€incur€any€expense,€other€than€for€first€aid,€without€ourÏœconsent.ðð€€Consequently,€Lashlee„Rich€made€the€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing€ð ðat€theirÏown€cost.ððÌÌÓÓò òà@ àWHETHER€STATE€AUTO€WAS€ESTOPPED€TO€ASSERT€THE€DEFENSEÏOF€à@ àVOLUNTARY€PAYMENT€BY€LASHLEE„RICH€UNDER€THE€PRINCIPLESÏOF€à@ àWAIVER€AND€ESTOPPELó óòòò òÌóóó óÌÓÓà àLashlee„Richððs€claim€of€estoppel€as€to€State€Auto€is€likewise€without€merit.€ÏLashlee„Rich€contends€that€State€Auto€should€be€estopped€from€asserting€theÏcontractual€provision€excluding€coverage€if€the€insured€ð ðassumed€an€obligation€andÏincurred€expensesðð€or€made€ð ðvoluntary€paymentðð€in€order€to€attempt€to€defeatÏcoverage€after€Lashlee„Rich›€made€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing€for€the€repair€œwork.›€€InÏlight€of€òòAndersonóó,€had€Lashlee„Rich€asked€State€Auto€to€do€something€in€relation€toÏthe€claim€which€it€had€refused€to€do,€or€had€suit€been€filed€against€Lashlee„Rich€andÏState€Auto€failed€to€defend,€Lashlee„Rich€might€have€an€estoppel€argument.€€NothingÏof€this€nature€occurred.€€State€Auto€œwas›€notified€of€the€œmatter€only›€after€Lashlee„RichÏhad€already€assumed€the€obligation€to€pay€Heglar€Plumbing€for€the€repair€work€atÏSmith.€€No€advice€was€sought;€no€authorization€was€obtained.€€œÌ›Ìà àWe€feel€it€is€imperative€to€note€that€at€the€time€of€the€December€œ15›€€letter€fromÏState€Auto€informing€Lashlee„Rich€that€the€insurance€adjuster€found€no€œnegligence›€onÏLashlee„Richððs€part,€State€Auto€was€not€cognizant€of€the€fact€that€Lashlee„Rich€hadÍassumed€the€obligation€to€make€payment€to€Heglar€Plumbing€for€the€repair€workÏundertaken€at€Smith.€€Neither€the€November€11€or€the€November€18€letter€fromÏLashlee„Rich€advised€State€Auto€that€Lashlee„Rich€had€assumed€such€an€obligation.€ÏœAs›€a€result,€State€Autoððs€basis€for€nonpayment,€as€stated€in€the€December€15€letter,Ïwas€a€finding€of€no€liability€or€negligence€on€the€part€of€Lashlee„Rich.€€State€Auto€hadÏno€reason€to€invoke€the€provisions€of€its€policies€concerning€assumption€of€anÏobligation€without€the€consent€of€State€Auto€when€they€were€devoid€of€any€knowledgeÏthat€Lashlee„Rich€had€assumed€an€obligation€to€pay€Heglar€Plumbing€for€repair€workÏat€œSmith.Ì›à àÌà àLike€the€trial€court,€we€too€understand€that€œLashlee„Rich€may€have›€acted€as€theyÏdid€for€several€reasons.€€œThey›€œundoubtedly›€œhave›€a€long,€well€established€businessÏrelationship€with€Smith€and€desired€to€maintain€such€a€relationship.€œ€In›€doing€œso,Ïhowever,€›€they€found€themselves€in€direct€contravention€of€the€language€in€theÏinsurance€policies€issued€by€State€Auto.€€œ€As€mentioned›€above,€€in€the€absence€ofÏfraud€or€mistake,€an€insurance€contract€must€be€interpreted€and€enforced€as€writtenÏeven€though€it€contains€terms€which€may€be€thought€to€be€harsh€and€unjust.€€œÌ›Ìà àœAccordingly,›€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€areÏtaxed€to€œappellant€Lashlee„Rich,›€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€€€€€€€€ÌÓÓœÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àóóHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.›à àœ(not€participating)›Ìà àœÌ›