ÿWPCô /# ¢UN­ %û 0(b)w@14q…” 0Jœ 0Tæ 0^: 0h˜ 0r 0|r 0†î 0t 1u 0dyU>ÝB) AQD Æ• 0D[ 0@Ÿ 0Dß DC# D/f B• B² D3Ï AM U*O *y v~£ vÓ!˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- Í&DÎ& Ï&DÐ&Ñ&EÒ&Ó&Ô&UÕ&Ó€ß&ê‚_#3|xß&2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó7Border 1dd(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd!#%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌDecember€5,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€ÆaXXdìXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò ò›Þ ÞÌFREDRIKA€A.€STEINER,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)à àNo.€94C„2468Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌTHE€PARMAN€CORPORATION,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9705„CV„00233ÌÙ€!ÙœßR€*,%A1-j|tÿ*` ç `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌà@ àHONORABLE€WALTER€C.€KURTZ,€JUDGEÌó óÌÌÌÌBen€C.€Fordham,€#6408ÌHARWELL€HOWARD€HYNE€GABBERT€&€MANNER,€P.C.Ì1800€First€American€CenterÌ315€Deaderick€StreetÌNashville,€TN€37238ÌATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌGlen€L.€Krause,€#12691ÌBREWER,€KRAUSE,€BROOKS€&€MILLSÌSuite€2600,€The€TowerÌ611€Commerce€StreetÌNashville,€TN€37203ÌATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌÌÌÓ  Óò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDED.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœCONCUR:›ÌœWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR€IN€SEPARATE€IN€OPINION›ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌœÌò òFREDRIKA›€A.€STEINER,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)à àNo.€94C„2468Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌTHE€PARMAN€CORPORATION,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9705„CV„00233Ìó óÌÌà@ àòòò òÔ€„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€XÔó óóóÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àÌà àThe€plaintiff,€Fredrika€A.€Steiner,€has€appealed€from€the€summary€dismissal€of€her€suitÏagainst€the€defendant,€The€Parman€Corporation,€for€damages€for€personal€injury€sustained€in€aÏfall€on€the€premises€of€defendant.ÌÌà àPlaintiffððs€injuries€occurred€on€œpremises›€occupied,€controlled€and€used€by€the€defendantÏas€a€combination€convenience€store€and€gasoline€station.€€The€purpose€of€plaintiffððs€presenceÏon€the€premises€was€to€use€one€of€the€public€telephones€on€the€premises.€€The€first€telephoneÏshe€approached€was€in€use,€so€she€went€to€and€used€a€second€telephone.€€During€her€walkÏfrom€the€second€telephone€to€her€vehicle,€her€foot€struck€an€irregularity€in€the€pavement,€andÏshe€fell.€€The€precise€location€of€her€fall€and€the€location€and€nature€of€the€alleged€defect€in€theÏpavement€are€not€clearly€shown€by€the€œtestimony.€€Exhibits€A,€B€&€C€to€the€record€are€picturesÏof€the€scene€and€are€made€exhibits€to€this€opinion.›ÌÌà àœFrom€said€pictures›€of€the€œscene,›€œthis›€Court€has€drawn€an€œunscaled›€plan€of€the€œareaÏwhich€is€exhibit€D€to€this€opinion.›€€The€parking€area€and€vehicle€driveways€œare€asphalt€exceptÏfor€a€concrete€area€of€driveway€extending€from›€the€store€œout›€to€the€pump€island.ÌÌà àThe€testimony€of€plaintiff€as€to€conditions€at€the€place€of€her€fall€includes€the€following:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àQ.à àYou€believe€that€you€parked€in€an€area€theÏday€you€arrived€at€the€market€which€would€have€placed€youÏto€the€rear€of€the€red€truck€we€see€in€this€photograph€ExhibitÏNumber€3?ÌÌà àA.à àYes,€sir.ÌÌà àQ.à àAnd€you€would€have€walked€towards€theÏmarket€in€the€area€between€these€two€trucks,€correct?ÌÌà àA.à àRight.ÌÌà àQ.à àAll€right.€€You€would€have€walked€on€thisÏhigher€surface,€this€concrete€surface,€correct?ÌÌà àA.à àUh„huh.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àYou€stepped€down€onto€the€lower€asphaltÏsurface€that€you€were€depicting€in€this€photograph;€is€thatÏcorrect?ÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àA.à àYes.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àAnd€to€go€in€the€door€to€the€market€youÏwould€have€had€to€œagain›€stepped€from€the€lower€asphalt€toÏthe€higher€concrete€that€we€see€here€where€the€word€ð ðnoÏparkingðð€is€painted;€is€that€correct?ÌÌà àA.à àYes.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àAll€right.€€Did€you€buy€anything€in€theÏmarket?ÌÌà àA.à àNo.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àAll€right.€€You€were€looking€for€directions?ÌÌà àA.à àYes.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àYou€decided€you€werenððt€going€to€wait€in€theÏlong€line€to€get€directions€nor€were€you€going€to€butt€line€andÏget€directions,€so€you€went€back€outside€to€use€the€phone;€isÏthat€correct?ÌÌà àA.à àYes.€€œÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà àà àI›€came€out€this€door€(indicating)€and€I€cameÏaround€and€I€went€to€this€phone€(indicating).€€I€didnððt€go€toÏthe€front€pay€phone.ÌÌà àQ.à àYou€went€to€the€phone€that€is€shown€inÏExhibit€Number€1?ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àA.à àTo€this€phone€(indicating).ÌÌà àQ.à àThat€is€shown€in€Exhibit€Number€1?ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óœà àà àIs€that€correct?ÌÌ›à àA.à àYes.à àÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  Óà àœ„€„€„€„›ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓ  Óà àQ.à àOkay.€€Now,€you€had€talked€to€him,€youÏœhang›€up.€€Did€you€make€any€other€phone€calls?ÌÌà àA.à àNo.ÌÌà àQ.à àThen€where€did€you€go?ÌÌà àA.à àI€was€walking€back€to€my€car.ÌÌÓ  Óà àQ.à àNow,€letððs€use€our€Exhibit€Numbers€1€and€3Ïhere€because€I€want€to€follow€your€path€of€travel.€€Youððre€atÏthe€phone€on€the€far€left€of€Exhibit€Number€1.€€Your€car€isÏparked,€weððve€decided,€approximately€behind€what€wouldÏhave€been€the€red€truck€we€see€on€the€left€of€Exhibit€NumberÏ3?ÌÌà àA.à àCorrect.ÌÌà àQ.à àOkay.€€So€you€have€to€leave€the€sidewalk€atÏsome€point€in€travel€to€get€from€the€phone€to€your€car,€doÏyou€not?ÌÌÓ  Óà àA.à àYes,€sir.ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àà àAs€I€said,€there€were€other€people€out€thereÏon€the€sidewalk€and€I€was€walking€directly€back€to€my€car€toÏavoid,€you€know,€being€in€anyoneððs€way.ÌÌà àQ.à àOkay.€€So€you€stepped€off€the€sidewalk€in€theÏvicinity€of€the€phone€you€were€using?ÌÓ  Óœ„€„€„€„›ÌÓ  Óà àWhen€youððre€heading€back€towards€your€car€beforeÏyou€stumble€and€fall,€the€area€that€in€these€photographs€hasÏno€parking€painted€on€it€would€have€been€to€your€left?ÌÌà àA.à àYes,€sir.ÌÌà àQ.à àAnd€you€would€have€been€traveling€parallelÏto€that€area?ÌÌà àA.à àYes.ÌÌà àQ.à àAll€right.€€And€you€were€going€to€cross€this€„„€Mr.€Hamilton€called€it€a€lip.€€I€think€he€also€called€it€aÏridge.€€What€do€you€want€to€call€that?€€Iððll€call€it€whateverÏyou€want.ÌÌà àA.à àA€step„down.ÌÌà àQ.à àOkay.€€You€would€have€been€approachingÏthis€step„down€at€a€90„degree€angle;€is€that€correct?ÌÌà àA.à àNo.€€At€that€point€I€would€have€been€goingÏstraight€on.ÌÌà àQ.à àOkay.ÌÌà àA.à àBecause€when€I€hit€my€foot€„„€I€stubbed€myÏtoe€straight€on€and€thatððs€what€cause€me€to€fall.ÌÌÒ X ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ S ÒÒ ° Òà àFrom€the€œexhibits€and€foregoing›€testimony€of€plaintiff,€it€is€clear€that€she€fell€at€orÏnear€a€line€where€asphalt€joins€concrete€œand€where›€the€asphalt€is€measurably€œand€visiblyÏlower›€than€the€œconcrete;›€that€she€had€œwalked›€across€the€same€line€œa€few€minutes€prior€toÏthe€fall;€and€that€where€plaintiff€thinks€she€fell,€the›€asphalt€was€ð ðabout€1„1/2€to€2€inchesÏlower€than€the€adjoining€concrete.ÌÒ ]ý ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ S ÒÒ s* Òà àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€states:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ « ÒÓÓà àThis€is€a€premises€liability€case€in€which€the€plaintiffÏalleges€that€she€tripped€and€fell€in€the€parking€lot€of€a€gasÏstation€and€convenience€store€owned€by€the€defendant.€€TheÏplaintiff€tripped€over€a€ð ðstep€downðð€where€there€was€aÏheight€variation€where€an€asphalt€section€of€the€parking€lotÏmet€the€concrete€surface.ÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà àThe€Court€believes€that€the€plaintiff€proceeding€inÏbroad€daylight€should€have€seen€the€change€in€the€level€ofÏthe€parking€area€surface€and€that€the€condition€of€theÏparking€lot€was€open€and€obvious€to€anyone€to€such€anÏextent€that€a€reasonably€prudent€person€exercisingÏreasonable€care€for€her€own€safety€should€have€noticed€andÏrecognized€the€peril.ÌÌà àThe€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€granted.ÌÒ X ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓœÌÒ S ÒÒ ° Òà àWith€due€respect€to€the€use€of€the€word€ð ðstep„downðð€by€the€plaintiff€and€the€TrialÏJudge,€the€place€where€plaintiff€ð ðstubbedðð€her€toe€must€have€been€a€ð ðstep€upðð€rather€than€aÏð ðstep„down.ðð€€As€she€described€her€movements,€she€negotiated€a€ð ðstep„up,ðð€as€she€firstÏwalked€across€the€junction€of€the€asphalt€and€concrete.€€On€the€occasion€of€her€fall,€theÏð ðstep„upðð€at€which€she€ð ðstubbedðð€her€toe,€was€at€the€opposite€edge€of€the€concrete,€as€sheÏapproached€it€from€the€telephone€she€used.€€The€pictures€exhibited€to€the€record€show€thatÏplaintiff€measured€the€ð ðstep„downðð€which€she€crossed€without€injury,€and€not€the€ð ðstep„downðð€at€which€she€ð ðstubbedðð€her€toe.ÌÒ X ÒÒ ° Ò›ÌÒ S ÒÒ ° Òà àOn€appeal,€plaintiff€presents€a€single€issue,€as€follows:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à1.à àWhether€given€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances€faced€by€the€œPlaintiff€there›€were€genuineÏissues€of€material€fact€whether€her€conduct€was€reasonableÏthus€precluding€granting€summary€judgment€for€theÏDefendant.ÌÒ X ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ S ÒÒ ° Òà àIn€òòEaton€v.€McLainóó,€Tenn.€1994,€891€S.W.2d€587,€the€plaintiff„guest€was€injuredÏwhen€she€attempted€to€go€to€the€bathroom€in€the€dark€without€turning€on€an€available€light,Ïerroneously€opened€the€door€to€a€basement€stair,€stepped€through€the€doorway€and€fellÏdown€the€stairs.€€The€Supreme€Court€affirmed€a€directed€verdict€for€the€homeowners€andÏsaid:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à[1„3]à àThe€standards€governing€trial€courts€inÏruling€on€motions€for€directed€verdict€or€JNOV€inÏnegligence€cases€are€well€established.€€In€ruling€on€theÏmotion,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€ofÏthe€evidence€in€favor€of€the€non„moving€party.€€In€otherÏwords,€the€court€must€remove€any€conflict€in€the€evidenceÏby€construing€it€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€non„movant€and€discarding€all€countervailing€evidence.€€TheÏcourt€may€grant€the€motion€only€if,€after€assessing€theÏevidence€according€to€the€foregoing€standards,€it€determinesÏthat€reasonable€minds€could€not€differ€as€to€the€conclusionsÏto€be€drawn€from€the€evidence.€€òòSauls€v.€Evansóó,€635ÏS.W.2d€377€(Tenn.€1982);€òòHolmes€v.€Wilsonóó,€551ÏS.W.2d€682€(Tenn.€1977).€€If€there€is€any€doubt€as€to€theÏproper€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€the€evidence,€theÏmotion€must€be€denied.€€òòCrosslin€v.€Alsupóó,€594€S.W.2dÏ379€(Tenn.€1980).ÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà à[4]€€This€Courtððs€adoption€of€the€doctrine€ofÏcomparative€fault€in€òòMcIntyreóó€does€not€change€theseÏstandards€governing€the€trial€courtððs€assessment€of€theÏevidence;€nor€does€it€change€the€established€standardÏgoverning€the€trial€courtððs€ultimate€decision€of€whether€toÏgrant€the€motion.€€The€trial€court€still€must€take€theÏstrongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€theÏnon„movant;€and€it€must€grant€the€motion€only€if€reasonableÏminds€could€not€differ€as€to€the€legal€conclusions€to€beÏdrawn€from€that€evidence.ÌÌà àThe€recitation€of€these€standards€of€review€does€not,Ïhowever,€provide€a€satisfactory€answer€to€the€issue€beforeÏus€because€òòMcIntyreóó€has€radically€changed€the€question€toÏbe€asked€by€the€trial€court€on€a€motion€for€directedÏverdict/JNOV€which€alleges€negligence€on€the€part€of€theÏplaintiff.€€The€question€now€is€òònotóó€whether€the€plaintiff€wasÏguilty€of€òòanyóó€negligence€that€proximately€caused€theÏresulting€injuries.€€Instead,€the€question€is:€assuming€thatÏboth€plaintiff€and€defendant€have€been€found€guilty€ofÍnegligent€conduct€that€proximately€caused€the€injuries,€wasÏthe€òòfault€attributable€to€plaintiff€equal€to€or€greater€than€theÏfault€attributable€to€the€defendantóó.ÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà à[8]à àIn€summary,€the€percentage€of€faultÏassigned€to€each€party€should€be€dependent€upon€all€theÏcircumstances€of€the€case,€including€such€factors€as:€(1)€theÏrelative€closeness€of€the€causal€relationship€between€theÏconduct€of€the€defendant€and€the€injury€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)Ïthe€reasonableness€of€the€partyððs€conduct€in€confronting€aÏrisk,€such€as€whether€the€party€knew€of€the€risk,€or€shouldÏhave€known€of€it;€(3)€the€extent€to€which€the€defendantÏfailed€to€reasonably€utilize€an€existing€opportunity€to€avoidÏthe€injury€to€the€plaintiff;€(4)€the€existence€of€a€suddenÏemergency€requiring€a€hasty€decision;€(5)€the€significanceÏof€what€the€party€was€attempting€to€accomplish€by€theÏconduct,€such€as€an€attempt€to€save€anotherððs€life;€and€(6)Ïthe€partyððs€particular€capacities,€such€as€age,€maturity,Ïtraining,€education,€and€so€forth.ÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà àWe€need€not,€however,€decide€the€question€ofÏwhether€Ms.€Eatonððs€fault€equaled€or€exceeded€that€of€theÏMcLainsðð€as€a€matter€of€law€because€we€agree€with€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€that€Ms.€Eaton€failed€to€submit€legallyÏsufficient€evidence€as€to€the€duty€element€of€her€claims€ofÏnegligence.Ìà àÌÒ X ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ S ÒÒ ° Òà àBecause€of€the€last€sentence€of€the€preceding€quotation,€it€is€arguable€that€theÏremainder€of€the€quotation€is€dicta.€€However,€said€remainder€is€the€last€publishedÏexpression€of€the€Supreme€Court,€and€this€Court€will€follow€its€guidelines.ÌÌà àThe€liability€of€the€owner€or€controller€of€a€premises€to€a€person€injured€thereon€isÏbased€upon€superior€knowledge€of€the€owner€or€controller€as€to€the€condition€of€theÏpremises,€but€such€owner€or€controller€is€not€liable€for€injuries€sustained€from€dangersÏthat€are€obvious,€reasonably€apparent€or€as€well€known€to€the€invitee€as€to€the€owner€orÏcontroller.€€òòIllinois€Cent.€Ry.€Co.€v.€Nicholsóó,€173€Tenn.€602,€118€S.W.2d€213€(1937);ÏòòPark€v.€Sinclair€Refining€Coóó.,€24€Tenn.€App.€204,€142€S.W.2d€321€(1940).€€The€œinvitee›Íassumes€all€normal€or€obvious€risks€attendant€upon€the€use€of€the€premises.òò€€œGargaro›€v.ÏKroger€Groc.€&€Baking€Co.óó,€22€Tenn.€App.€70,€118€S.W.2d€561€(1938);€65€C.J.S.ÏNegligence.€ðð€50,€p.€541.ÌÌà àPlaintiffððs€fall€occurred€in€broad€daylight€at€a€point€where€the€alleged€dangerousÏcondition€was€clearly€visible,€and€plaintiff€had€an€opportunity€to€see€the€condition€a€fewÏminutes€before€her€fall.€€Under€these€undisputed€conditions,€it€is€unnecessary€to€considerÏwhether€the€difference€in€level€was€sufficient€to€support€an€action€against€the€defendant.ÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ›à àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€at€the€cost€of€appellant.€€The€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€Trial€Court€for€any€necessary€further€proceedings.ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓӜ̛ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€¼Ôò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÔ€XÔó óÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àœÌÌ›à àà àà àà àœà à___________________________________à à›à àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODDÌà àà àà àà àœà àPRESIDING›€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌ̛̜CONCUR:›ÌœÌ›œ›Ì_______________________________ÌWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à̛̜à àà àà àà àà àà àÌœCONCUR€IN€SEPARATE€OPINION›ÌœBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGE›