ÿWPC W “ê¯@‚Ü¸Õ Šºt®qéPºlŠLmJèì2{“q׋òB6@H`¤:è̶ě8A-…¥ü,˜9 (b õ¹ä.ƒQ>ý²€Ê •yWn®†¹yX+"Q¹ƒÎ*Hc$? 9ÇëŽÿÚìmg¿w²›ö͉•SôÉýº>¦aO¿Ï+.ΩK%=šw£ž&IeúoÀŽäV7¢ˆßÌv¾À™˜ýÎ?)×ÉÕ‡?*ŽÇïÅaNÑý ¨Q8,½ø‘å ( Zâfú‹Ç†ñðw®H4ÎÁÕ&Þ@Ãå‚þŸüGCÕ!„‡ÇlÔX ùeÒ¤¡7_°¸Á¼r^ ã‹(†gŸŽóÐ:µÊ«|eYv~ø Õ‰íq³’Ée8¡P–D‰InDmð§nrygë@Às©f`YÀ›Ý¾bΫµ²ìÙ°èþÉ ´ƒìdJm²´þÙ{Å\vˆ5ðÙrÒ{ÁœV%òýYù V}…x³œªGhRöª6­îmçŒqWA¸|((¢'‘WoÙ¼²lðá)¿±¸å¥íûMt7K”ïÎujÃeWÛ †0« î0« î0 1 1z 1z 1z 1 ®0ð …0£ 50q h0` }0, À0 c0ò F0¶ ë/æ Ë/ö ¿/ ¡/ç s/Ô c/™ +/™ +/± /± /Ç /Ç /Ç /þ ;/ O/< |/< |/Ý à.Ý à.P m.P m.P m.Ž ..õ W.{ â.» #/á U/·/·/ úÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XlXXXÔÔ€$XXlÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XlX$ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"T$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝT^yúÿ  <<= 8ÀÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ____3 TripledxdCTriple 1+| d d dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XXXXÔÔ‡XXX XÔÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡¼®#¼XXÔÓ'€Ð‡Xè“X°œX'ÓÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€v¸Ññ¢ñÖ€ÿÿÖñ¢ññ­ññ£ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` 8ttxP,°ð  rßñ£ññ­ññ­ññ­ñEDITH›€STROMATT,à à àà 8 àà  à)Ð ° Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)ÌÓ6€ü(‚X˜‘X€Ð‡Xè“X6Óà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellant,à  à)à  àAppeal€No.Ð Ð  Ðà Ø àà  à)à  à01„A„01„9707„CH„00354Ð à0 Ðñ­ññ­ñv.à Ø àà  à)Ð ð@ Ðà Ø àà  à)à  àÐ  P Ðñ­ññ­ñTHE€METROPOLITAN€à  à)à  àDavidson€ChanceryÐ  ` ÐEMPLOYEE€BENEFIT€BOARDà  à)à  àNo.€96„1250„IÐ  p Ðñ­ñœßt€ )>.*jxgÿ¡` `€€@E[Ñ ` 8ttxP“0 ð ¡ tß›ñ­ñOF€THE€METROPOLITAN€à  à)Ð 0 € ÐGOVERNMENT€OF€NASHVILLEà  à)Ð @  ÐAND€DAVIDSON€COUNTY,à  à)Ð P   ÐTENNESSEE,à  à)Ð `°  Ðà Ø àà  à)à  àÐ pÀ  Ðà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à  à)Ð €Ð  Ðà Ø àà  à)ÌÌÌÔ#†XX¼¼®#u#ÔÔ‡». »XXÔÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ À ÐÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€KILCREASE,€JR.,€CHANCELLORÌÓ9°,X‚Xì“X€ü(‚X˜‘X9ÓÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓCHARLES€R.€RAYÌJEFFERY€S.€FRENSLEYÌ211€Third€Avenue€NorÔ#†XX»». j#ÔÔ‡¼®#¼XXÔthÐ À'#! ÐP.€O.€Box€198288ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219„8288Ìà Ø àATTORNEYS€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌJOHN€L.€KENNEDYÌWM.€MICHAEL€SAFLEYÌ204€Metropolitan€CourthouseÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37201Ìà Ø àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEE¹Ó  ÓÌÌÌœAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDED›ÌÌÌñ£ñÑv¸ÑÑ7€ XXdðXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  ÑÑv¸ÑÑ#€mXÿÿd#ÑÑ € ÑÑ  Ññ£ñÓ  ÓWALTER€W.€BUSSART,Ìñ£ñÑv¸ÑÑ7€ XXdðXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ£ñÓ  Óà Ø àà ¼ àà è àà @ à€€€SPECIAL€JUDGEÐ à:063 ÐÑv¸ÑÑ7€ XXdðXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ£ñÑv¸ÑÑ7€Ö=XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ£ñœÌ›ÓÓÓ  ÓòòÔ#†XX¼¼®#E#ÔÔ€èøÆèXXÔOPINIONóóÐ À ÐÓ  Óò òÔ€¼®#¼èèøÆÔÓ€Óà Ø àó óThe€appellant€in€this€action€is€Edith€Stromatt,€a€former€employee€of€theÐ Ä ÐMetropolitan€Government€of€Nashville,€Tennessee.€€When€Ms.€Stromatt€soughtÏdisability€with€the€Metropolitan€Employee€Benefit€Board€("the€Benefit€Board"),Ïshe€was€granted€a€medical€disability€pension;€however,€she€was€denied€the€in„line„¼of„duty€pension€(IOD)€that€she€desired.€€Ms.€Stromatt€brought€suit€in€chanceryÏcourt€claiming€that€the€Benefit€Board€erred€in€its€failure€to€grant€her€an€IODÏpension.€€She€also€claims€that€the€Benefit€Board€denied€her€the€constitutional€rightÏto€be€heard€prior€to€its€decision.€€The€trial€court€agreed€with€the€conclusions€of€theÏBenefit€Board€and€dismissed€Ms.€Stromatt's€appeal.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.€€FACTS€AND€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYÌÓµÓÌà Ø àAt€the€time€that€she€ceased€work,€Ms.€Stromatt€had€been€employed€by€theÏMetropolitan€Government€for€23€years.€€At€all€times€material€to€this€case,€she€heldÏa€position€as€the€Executive€Assistant€to€Bill€Covington,€the€County€Clerk€of€theÏMetropolitan€Government.€€In€September€of€1995,€following€a€lengthy€medicalÏleave€of€absence,€Ms.€Stromatt€was€advised€that€she€would€never€be€medically€fitÏto€return€to€work.€€ÌÌà Ø àThese€proceedings€began€when,€on€May€12,€1995,€€Ms.€Stromatt€filed€aÏclaim€with€the€Benefit€Board€seeking€disability€in€the€form€of€an€IOD€pension.€ÏThe€Metropolitan€Government€offers€two€types€of€pensions,€an€IOD€pension€andÏa€medical€disability€pension.€€Though€the€two€pensions€are€the€same€in€amount,Ïonly€the€medical€disability€pension€is€treated€as€income€for€federal€income€taxÏpurposes€making€it€the€less€desirable€of€the€two.€€In€Ms.€Stromatt's€claim€for€anÏIOD€pension,€she€alleged€that€she€suffered€from€a€condition€of€"stress/depression"Ïwhich€had€begun€at€her€work€on€March€28,€1995.€€Among€Ms.€Stromatt'sÏallegations€were€that€she€was€falsely€accused€of€going€through€the€desk€of€herÏboss,€Mr.€Covington,€that€she€was€often€confronted€with€Mr.€Covington'sÏexcessive€in„office€alcohol€consumption€as€well€as€his€illicit€fraternizing€with€aÏfemale€co„worker,€and€that€she€was€ostracized€by€her€co„workers€at€the€instructionÐ ”8ä3? Ðof€Mr.€Covington.Ð ,:|5A Ðñ¢ñœñ¢ñ‡à Ø àAt€the€September€11,€1995€Benefit€Board€meeting,€a€staff€report€on€Ms.ÏStromatt€shows€that€the€Board€considered€information€from€Dr.€Robert€Cochran,ÏDr.€Michael€Bottari,€and€Dr.€Jack€Corban.€€The€Board€approved€a€medicalÏdisability€pension€for€Ms.€Stromatt€and€referred€the€matter€to€the€IOD€CommitteeÏto€decide€the€issue€of€whether€she€could€qualify€for€an€IOD€pension.€€As€Mr.ÏJames€Luther,€the€Benefit€Board's€Executive€Secretary,€€notified€Ms.€Stromatt€byÏletter,€"[t]he€issue€to€be€dealt€with€at€[IOD€œCommittee]›€stage€is€not€whether€aÏdisability€exists€as€this€has€already€been€decided€by€the€Board,€but€to€determineÏwhether€the€basis€of€the€disability€is€job„related€and€arises€out€of€[Ms.€Stromatt's]Ïemployment."€€Ìà Ø àà ¼ àÌà Ø àOn€February€26,€1996,€the€IOD€Committee€held€a€meeting€at€which€itÏconsidered€the€Executive€Secretary's€Staff€Report€to€the€IOD€Committee€("theÏStaff€Report").€€In€this€report,€Mr.€Luther€summarized€information€from€many€ofÏMs.€Stromatt's€co„workers,€Mr.€œCovington,›€and€the€doctors€who€treated€Ms.ÏStromatt.€€œPlaintiff›€and€her€attorney€were€present€at€the€February€26€meeting;Ïhowever,€the€Committee€denied€their€requests€to€make€any€legal€argument€or€toÏpresent€any€evidence€to€the€Committee.€€The€Committee€adopted€the€ExecutiveÏSecretary's€Staff€Report€which€had€the€effect€of€denying€Ms.€Stromatt'sÏapplication€for€an€IOD€disability€pension.€€The€Benefit€Board€then€adopted€theÏIOD€Committee's€report.Ìò òÌà Ø àó óAs€stated€above,€Ms.€Stromatt€petitioned€for€a€writ€of€certiorari€in€theÐ ½' #, Ðchancery€court€pursuant€to€œTennessee›€Code€œAnnotated€section›€27„8„101€andÏœTennñžñ.ñžññŸñ›ñŸññŸñesseeñŸñ›€Code€œAnnñ ñ.ñ ññ¢ñ›ñ¢ññ¡ñotatedñ¡ñ›€œsection›€27„9„101.€€The€trial€court€found€that€Ms.ÏStromatt€was€given€the€opportunity€to€submit€her€own€argument€to€the€IODÏCommittee€in€writing€and€that€she€presented€no€other€witnesses€at€the€hearing.€ÏFurther,€the€court€found€that€her€claim€to€a€property€right€in€the€IOD€disabilityÏpension€before€it€is€ever€granted€is€without€merit.€€It€was€the€court's€position€thatÏMs.€Stromatt€would€only€have€such€a€right€if€the€requirements€for€the€pensionÏwere€met€and€the€pension€granted.€€Therefore,€in€this€case,€there€was€no€dueÏprocess€violation.€€Finally,€the€court€found€that€the€Board's€decision€to€deny€Ms.ÏStromatt€an€IOD€disability€pension€was€supported€substantial€and€materialÏevidence.Ð E9•4B ЇÓ  ÓII.€€STANDARD€OF€REVIEWÌÌÓÓà Ø àReview€in€this€case€is€by€common€law€writ€of€certiorari€which€is€embodiedÏin€the€Tennessee€Code€as€follows:ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àThe€writ€of€certiorari€may€be€granted€whenever€authorized€by€law,Ïand€also€in€all€cases€where€an€inferior€tribunal,€board,€or€officerÏexercising€judicial€functions€has€exceeded€the€jurisdiction€conferred,Ïor€is€acting€illegally,€when,€in€the€judgment€of€the€court,€there€is€noÏother€plain,€speedy,€or€adequate€remedy.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌÓ€¾ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€œðð›€27-8-101€(Supp.€1997).€€As€the€supreme€court€hasÏsummarized,€"[r]eview€under€the€common€law€writ€is€limited€to€whether€'theÏinferior€board€or€tribunal€(1)€has€exceeded€its€jurisdiction,€or€(2)€has€actedÏillegally,€arbitrarily,€or€fraudulently.'€"€€òòò òMcCallen€v.€City€of€Memphisó óóó,€786Ð 8ˆ ÐS.W.2d€633,€638€(Tenn.€1990)€(quoting€òòò òHoover€Motor€Exp.€Co.€v.€Railroad€andÐ Ó# ÐPub.€Util.€Comm'nó óóó,€261€S.W.2d€233,€238€(Tenn.€1953));€òòò òsee€also€Hoover,€Inc.Ð n¾ Ðv.€Metropolitan€Bd.€of€Zoning€Appealsó óóó,€924€S.W.2d€900,€904€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð  Y Ð1996).€€"An€illegal,€arbitrary,€or€fraudulent€action€could€be€any€number€of€things.€ÏExamples€include€the€following:€€1)€the€failure€'to€follow€minimum€standards€ofÏdue€process';€€2)€'the€misrepresentation€or€misapplication€of€a€legal€standard';€€3)Ïthe€making€of€a€decision€for€'ulterior€motives';€€or€4)€the€violation€of€aÏconstitutional€œstandard."›€òòò òHoover,€Inc.ó óóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€905€(quoting€Ben€H.Ð #T$ ÐCantrell,€òòò òReview€of€Administrative€Decisions€by€Writ€of€Certiorari€in€Tennesseeó óóó,Ð Ÿ$ï& Ð4€Mem.St.U.L.Rev.€19,€28-29€(1973)).€€ÌÌà Ø à"The€reviewing€court€is€required€to€determine€whether€there€is€any€materialÏevidence€that€supports€the€action€of€the€administrative€agency."€€òòò òLaidlaw€Envtl.Ð +R&. ÐServs.€v.€Metropolitan€Bd.€of€Healthó óóó,€934€S.W.2d€40,€49€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996)Ð ,í'0 Ð(citing€òòò òLansden€v.€Tuckeró óóó,€321€S.W.2d€795€(Tenn.€1959)).€€While€judicial€reviewÐ 8.ˆ)2 Ðof€the€issue€of€whether€there€is€any€material€evidence€is€limited€to€the€record,€"newÏevidence€is€admissible€on€the€issue€of€whether€the€administrative€body€exceededÏits€jurisdiction€or€acted€illegally,€capriciously€or€arbitrarily."€€òòò òDavison€v.€Carró óóó,€659Ð 3S.8 ÐS.W.2d€361,€363€(Tenn.€1983)€(citing€ò òñ™ñòòñ™ñWatts€v.€Civil€Serv.€Bdñ™ñóóñ™ñ.ó ó,€606€S.W.2d€274,Ð ž4î/: Ð276-77€(Tenn.1980)).€ÌÓ  Ó̜Рl9¼4@ ÐIII.›€€PROCEDURAL€DUE€PROCESSÌÓk'ÓÌà Ø àMs.€Stromatt€has€presented€two€issues€on€appeal.€€First,€she€raises€aÏconstitutional€challenge€involving€the€Fourteenth€Amendment's€guarantee€thatÏproperty€interests,€once€given,€will€not€be€taken€away€without€the€due€process€ofÏlaw.€€òòò òSeeó óóó€U.S.€Const.€amend.€€XIV,€ðð€1.€€Ms.€Stromatt€submits€that€she€wasÐ ¨ ø  Ðdeprived€of€procedural€due€process€when€she€was€denied€the€opportunity€to€beÏheard€with€respect€to€eligibility€for€an€IOD€disability€pension.€€€It€is€Ms.€Stromatt'sÏposition€that€her€property€right€vested€when€the€Benefit€Board€determined€that€sheÏmet€the€requirements€for€a€disability€pension€at€its€September€11,€1995€meeting.ÌÌà Ø àEvaluation€of€a€due€process€claim€entails€a€two„step€analysis€of€which€€theÏfirst€step€is€to€determine€whether€the€plaintiff€was€deprived€of€a€protected€interest.€Ïòòò òBoard€of€Regents€of€State€Colleges€v.€Rothó óóó,€408€U.S.€564,€569-70,€92€S.Ct.€2701,Ð k» Ð2705,€33€L.Ed.2d€548€(1972).€€Only€after€a€court€has€decided€that€a€plaintiff€hadÏa€property€or€liberty€interest€does€it€address€the€second€issue€of€what€process€wasÏdue€the€plaintiff.€€As€Ms.€Stromatt's€case€hinges€on€the€existence€of€a€propertyÏinterest,€we€turn€to€our€supreme€court's€articulation€of€the€legal€principles€ofÏprotected€property€interests:ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àThe€Fourteenth€Amendment's€procedural€protection€of€propertyÏsafeguards€the€security€of€interests€that€a€person€has€already€acquiredÏin€specific€benefits.€€òòò òRothó óóó,€408€U.S.€at€576,€92€S.Ct.€at€2708.€€Ð %n ( ÐProperty€interests€are€not€created€by€the€federal€constitution.€ÏInstead,€they€are€created€and€defined€"by€existing€rules€orÏunderstandings€that€stem€from€an€independent€source€such€as€stateÏlaw."€€òòò òRothó óóó,€408€U.S.€at€577,€92€S.Ct.€at€2709.€€€To€be€entitled€toÐ `)°$, Ðprocedural€due€process€protection,€a€property€interest€must€be€moreÏthan€a€"unilateral€expectation"€or€an€"abstract€need€or€desire."€€ItÏmust€be€a€"legitimate€claim€of€entitlement"€to€a€specific€benefit.€€òòò òId.ó óóóÐ ’,â'/ ÐIndeed€it€is€the€purpose€of€the€ancient€institution€of€property€toÏprotect€those€expectations€upon€which€people€rely€in€their€dailyÏlives.€€òòò òId.ó óóóÐÄ/+2Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌñšñÓ€þ,ÓñšññšñÓ€í,Óñšñòòò òñšñÓ€ÓñšñRowe€v.€Board€of€Educ.ó óóó,€938€S.W.2d€351,€354€(Tenn.€1996)€(citing€òòò òRothó óóó,€408Ð æ16-4 ÐU.S.€at€569-70,€92€S.Ct.€at€œ2705).ñœñÌñœñ›ÌœÌ›ñ›ñÓ€Óñ›ñà Ø àIn€the€instant€case,€the€"independent€source"€from€which€an€allegedÏproperty€interest€must€be€derived€is€Chapter€3.28€of€the€Metropolitan€Code€whichÏœaddresses›€œdisability›€œpensions.›€€In€the€section€entitled€"disability€defined,"€the€CodeÐ X9¨4< Ðdeems€that€an€employee€such€as€Ms.€Stromatt€is€"'disabled'€if€he€œ[or€she]€becomes›Ïpermanently€disabled€as€a€result€of€a€medically€determinable€bodily€injury€orÏdisease€or€mental€disorder€so€that€during€the€continuation€of€his€œ[or€her]€disability›Ïœhe€[or€she]›€is€incapable€of€engaging€in€any€business€or€occupation€or€to€performÏany€work€or€compensation,€gain€or€profit,€so€that€the€sum€of€his€œ[or€her]€earnings›Ïwhile€disabled€and€his€œ[or€her]€gross›€disability€pension€does€not€exceed€oneÏhundred€percent€of€his€œ[or€her]€frozen›€earnings."€€Metro.€Code€ðð€3.28.010(B).€€ForÏthose€employees€who€are€disabled€not€in€the€line€of€duty,€the€code€provides€theÏfollowing:ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àA€member€who€is€covered€for€a€disability€pension,€who€hasÏcompleted€ten€years€of€credited€service€and€who€becomes€disabledÏas€defined€in€Section€3.28.010,€shall€be€eligible€to€receive€a€disabilityÏpension,€subject€to€all€applicable€requirements€of€this€chapter.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌÓ€™5ÓMetro.€Code€ðð€3.28.030.€€Regarding€the€employees€who€are€disabled€in€the€lineÏof€duty,€Section€3.38.040€of€the€Metropolitan€Code€provides€in€pertinent€part€asÏfollows:ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àA€member€who€is€covered€for€a€disability€pension,€who€becomesÏdisabled,€as€defined€in€Section€3.28.010,€in€the€line€of€duty,€shall€beÏeligible€to€receive€a€disability€pension,€provided€his€disability€is€aÏresult,€directly€or€indirectly,€of€an€act€occurring€or€a€thing€done€or€aÏrisk€taken€which,€as€determined€in€the€discretion€of€the€Board,€wasÏrequired€of€him€in€the€performance€of€his€duty€as€a€metropolitanÏemployee.€.€.€.€Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌÓ€•7ÓIn€other€words,€for€either€type€of€pension,€the€Benefit€Board€must€make€a€findingÏthat€the€employee€is€disabled€pursuant€to€the€definition€in€Section€3.28.010(B).€ÏWhile€such€a€finding,€plus€ten€years€of€service,€is€all€that€is€needed€for€a€medicalÏdisability€pension,€the€IOD€pension€requires€an€additional€finding€that€theÏemployee€became€disabled€as€"a€result,€directly€or€indirectly,€or€an€act€occurringÏor€a€thing€done€or€a€risk€taken€which,€as€determined€in€the€discretion€of€the€Board,Ïwas€required€of€him€in€the€performance€of€his€duty€as€a€metropolitan€employee."ÌÌà Ø àUnder€the€language€of€the€Metropolitan€Code,€an€employee€can€have€noÏ"legitimate€claim€of€entitlement"€to€an€IOD€pension€until€the€Benefit€Board€hasÏfound€both€that€the€employee€is€disabled€pursuant€to€Section€3.28.010(B)€and€thatÏthe€employee€became€disabled€in€the€line€of€duty€as€defined€in€Section€3.38.040.€ÏœAt›€the€September€11,€1995€meeting,€the€Benefit€Board€found€only€that€Ms.Ð À84= ÐStromatt€qualified€for€a€medical€disability€pension€referring€the€issue€of€whetherÏher€injury€was€in€the€line€of€duty€to€the€IOD€œCommittee.›€€Therefore,€at€that€pointÏin€time,€Ms.€Stromatt€had€a€property€interest€in€a€non„IOD€pension€that€could€notÏbe€deprived€absent€constitutionally€adequate€due€process.€€However,€she€did€notÏhave€a€"legitimate€claim€of€entitlement"€to€an€IOD€medical€disability€pension.€ÏRather,€her€claim€to€an€IOD€pension€following€the€September€meeting€could€haveÏbeen€well€characterized€as€a€"unilateral€expectation"€or€an€"abstract€need€orÏdesire."€€òòò òSee€Roweó óóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€354.€Ð Ø(  ÐÌà Ø àOur€opinion€is€consistent€with€the€holding€of€the€unreported€opinion€fromÏthis€court€that€a€metropolitan€employee's€"pension€vested€at€the€time€it€wasÏgranted."€€œòòò òWilburn€P.€Jones›€v.€Metropolitan€Gov'tó óóó,€œslip›€op.€at€8€(M.D.€Tenn.Ð ;‹ МCt.App.›€Nov.€30,€1979).€€In€òòò òJonesó óóó,€Justice€Drowota,€then€of€the€Court€of€Appeals,Ð Ö& Ðreasoned€that€"[f]or€a€disability€pension€a€finding€by€the€appropriate€board,€in€thisÏcase€the€Employee€Benefit€Board,€that€the€applicant€is€indeed€disabled€andÏtherefore€entitled€to€benefits€is€the€criterion€for€eligibility€to€receive€payments."€Ïòòò òId.ó óóó€slip€op.€at€8.€€Vested€is€defined€as€"[f]ixed;€accrued;€settled;€absolute.€€HavingÐ 9‰  Ðthe€character€or€given€the€rights€of€absolute€ownership;€not€contingent;€not€subjectÏto€be€defeated€by€a€condition€precedent."€€Blacks€Law€Dictionary€1401€(5th€ed.Ï1979).€€Before€Ms.€Stromatt's€IOD€pension€was€granted,€it€could€not€have€beenÏ"vested"€as€it€was€contingent€upon€the€IOD€œCommittee›€of€the€Benefit€BoardÏmaking€the€requisite€finding€that€Ms.€Stromatt€met€the€criterion€for€eligibility.€ÏBecause€Ms.€Stromatt€has€failed€to€prove€the€existence€of€a€constitutionallyÏprotected€property€interest€in€an€IOD€pension€prior€to€such€finding,€the€BenefitÏBoard€did€not€violate€the€Constitution€in€its€refusal€to€hear€Ms.€Stromatt€at€thisÏmeeting.ÌÓ  ÓÌIV.€€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEÌÌÓpEÓò òà Ø àó óIn€her€second€and€final€issue,€Ms.€Stromatt€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erredÐ ô2D.: Ðin€holding€that€the€Benefit€Board's€determination€to€deny€her€an€IOD€disabilityÏpension€was€supported€by€substantial€and€material€evidence.€€Initially,€we€pointÏout€that,€though€the€lower€court€stated€that€the€verdict€must€be€supported€by€"ò òanyÐ ¼7 3@ Ðó ómaterial€evidence,"€it€ultimately€found€that€the€Benefit€Board's€decision€wasÐ Z9ª4B Ðsupported€by€"ò òsubstantial€ó óand€material€œevidence."€€The€substantial€and€materialÐ ° Ðevidence€standard€is€taken€from€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€4„5„322€andÏdoes€not€apply€to€proceedings€before€local€boards€and€commissions.›€€As€set€outÏabove,€"[u]nder€common€law€certiorari,€the€agency€decision€need€only€beÏsupported€by€'any'€[material]€evidence."€€òòò òLaidlaw€Envtl.€Servs.€v.€MetropolitanÐ  f ÐBd.€of€Healthó óóó,€934€S.W.2d€40,€49€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996)€(citing€òòò òTennesseeÐ ±   ÐCartage€Co.€v.€Pharró óóó,€199€S.W.2d€119,€120-21€(Tenn.€1947)).€€In€òòò òLaidlawó óóó,€theÐ Lœ  Ðcourt€noted€that€"[t]he€difference€between€the€two€standards,€though€subtle,€canÏbe€important€when€there€is€a€dispute€over€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€Ð Ï  ÐTherefore,€we€must€conduct€our€œreview›€of€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€lookingÏfor€"any€material€evidence."ÌÌà Ø àTo€answer€the€"material€evidence"€question,€we€must€determine€theÏapplicable€law.€€As€stated€in€the€Executive€Secretary's€Staff€Report,€whenÏconsidering€IOD€disability€applications€for€stress€or€post„traumatic€stressÏdisorders,€the€Benefit€Board€uses€analogous€legal€standards€from€workers'Ïcompensation€law.€€For€purposes€of€workers'€compensation€cases,€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated,€section€50-6-102(a)(4)€provides€that€"'[i]njury'€and€'personal€injury'Ïmeans€an€injury€by€accident€arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employment€whichÏcauses€either€disablement€or€death€of€the€employee."€€While€the€courts€haveÏinterpreted€stress€to€be€a€compensable€"accidental€injury"€under€this€law,€thereÏmust€"be€a€specific€incident€of€stress€which€constitutes€the€accident."€òòò òSexton€v.Ð :&Š!* ÐScott€Countyó óóó,€785€S.W.2d€814,€816€(Tenn.€1990).€Ð Õ'%#, ÐÌà Ø à€In€òòò òCabe€v.€Carbide€Corp.ó óóó,€644€S.W.2d€397€(Tenn.1983),€the€court€foundÐ +X&0 Ðthat€there€had€been€an€accident€€within€the€meaning€of€workers'€compensationÏlaws€where€a€worker€suffered€a€heart€attack€and€died€after€a€heated€argument€withÏa€co-worker€concerning€the€use€of€safety€goggles.€€The€court€stated€the€law€"thatÏthe€term€'injury€by€accident'€should€not€be€limited€to€cases€where€some€physicalÏor€traumatic€injury€is€shown;€€but€'some€acute,€sudden€or€unexpected€emotionalÏstress€directly€attributable€to€employment'€and€precipitating€a€heart€attack€wouldÏconstitute€a€compensable€accidental€injury."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€399€(citing€òòò òAllied€ChemicalÐ 36ƒ1> ÐCorp.€v.€Wellsó óóó,€578€S.W.2d€369,€372€(Tenn.€1979)).€€œHowever,›€the€court€"limitedÐ Î73@ Ðthe€interpretation€of€that€term,€holding€that€'worry,€anxiety€or€emotional€stress€ofÐ i9¹4B Ða€general€nature'€are€not,€in€and€of€themselves,€sufficient€to€establish€an€accident."€Ïòòò òId.€€ó óóóIn€òòò òJose€v.€Equifaxó óóó,€556€S.W.2d€82€(Tenn.€1977),€the€court€upheld€theÐ H˜ Ðemployer's€motion€to€dismiss€a€claim€in€which€the€employee€alleged€he€wasÏexposed€to€a€tremendous€amount€of€pressure€and€tension€in€his€job€which€resultedÏin€a€severe€psychiatric€illness€and€later€an€habitual€alcoholic€problem.€€The€courtÏheld€that€though€"[a]€liberal€interpretation€has€been€given€to€the€statutory€criterionÏof€'injury€by€accident,'€.€.€.€this€still€does€not€embrace€every€stress€or€strain€of€dailyÏliving€or€every€undesirable€experience€encountered€in€carrying€out€the€duties€ofÏa€contract€of€employment."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€84.€Ð sà  Ѐ€òòò òÐ ^ Ðà Ø àó óóóAs€in€the€foregoing€cases,€the€Benefit€Board€has€interpreted€theÐ ¦ö ÐMetropolitan€Code€to€require€that€a€"specific€incident€of€stress"€be€shown€in€orderÏto€prove€that€an€injury€was€in€the€line€of€duty€when€that€injury€involves€stress.€ÏUnder€the€worker's€compensation€body€of€law,€the€"specific€incident"€requirementÏis€based€upon€the€statutory€language,€"injury€by€accident."€€òòò òSee€ó óóóTenn.€Code€Ann.Ð V Ððð50-6-102(a)(4)€(1991).€€As€stated€above,€in€the€case€of€disability€pensions€forÏmetropolitan€employees,€the€governing€law€is€the€Metropolitan€Code€whichÏdefines€an€IOD€injury€as€one€which€is€the€"result,€directly€or€indirectly,€of€an€actÏoccurring€or€a€thing€done€or€a€risk€taken€which,€as€determined€in€the€discretion€ofÏthe€Board,€was€required€of€him€in€the€performance€of€his€duty€as€a€metropolitanÏemployee."€€Metro.€Code€ðð€3.38.040.€€We€find€that€the€language,€"an€act€occurringÏor€a€thing€done€or€a€risk€taken,"€contemplates€a€specific€incident€much€like€theÏterm€"accident"€does€in€the€œworkers'›€compensation€cases.€€As€such,€it€is€helpful€toÏlook€to€this€well„developed€worker's€compensation€law€to€guide€us€in€theÏdetermination€of€the€often€difficult€question€of€whether€one's€stress„relatedÏdisability€resulted€from€a€specific€incident.€ÌÔ% € ÔÌà Ø àœThus,›€in€light€of€the€foregoing,€the€question€for€the€lower€court€as€well€asÏfor€this€court€is€whether€œthe€record€contains›€material€evidence€œsupporting€theÏBenefit€Board's›€œconclusion›€that€œMs.›€Stromatt's€disability€œdid€not€result›€from€"anÏact€occurring€or€a€thing€done€or€a€risk€œtaken"€in€the€performance€of€her€duty€as€aÏmetropolitan€employee.›€€The€Benefit€Board€adopted€the€finding€of€the€IODÏCommittee€which€was€"that€there€are€no€facts€that€would€indicate€.€.€.€that€theÏapplication€should€be€granted€as€an€in„line„of„duty€injury.€€.€.€.€[T]he€factsÐ Q9¡4B Ðsubmitted€by€Edith€Stromatt€would€be€categorized€as€nothing€more€than€the€stressÏor€strain€of€daily€living€encountered€in€carrying€out€the€duties€of€employment€andÏthat€this€pension€should,€in€fact,€remain€a€medical€disability€pension€and€not€beÏconverted€to€an€in„line„of„duty€disability€pension."€ÌÌà Ø àIn€the€Executive€Secretary's€Staff€Report€to€the€IOD€Committee,€theÏExecutive€Secretary,€Mr.€Luther€states€that€he€reviewed€the€allegations€submittedÏby€Ms.€Stromatt€and€then€interviewed€Mr.€Covington€as€well€as€almost€every€otherÏindividual€named€in€Ms.€Stromatt's€statement.€€He€summarized€all€the€informationÏby€dividing€it€into€nine€general€categories€of€allegations.€€The€first€and€second€ofÏthese€alleged€incidents€involved€Ms.€Stromatt's€being€accused€of€going€throughÏMr.€Covington's€desk€and€then€new€locks€being€placed€on€Mr.€Covington's€officeÏdoors€"in€an€effort€to€deliberately€intimidate€and€cause€additional€emotionalÏstress."€€When€interviewed€about€this,€Mr.€Covington€stated€that€after€the€janitorÏadvised€him€that€Ms.€Stromatt€was€going€through€his€desk,€he€did€approach€herÏabout€this.€€When€confronted,€Ms.€Stromatt€said€that€she€had€been€looking€for€aÏpencil.€€Two€other€employees,€Ms.€Abbott€and€Ms.€Norman,€stated€that€they€neverÏheard€Mr.€Covington€make€such€accusations€and€that€this€must€have€occurred€inÏœa€private›€œconversation.›€€As€for€changing€the€locks,€Mr.€Covington€confirmed€thatÏnew€locks€were€put€on€his€door€to€secure€his€office€at€night€and€that€there€had€beenÏtalk€of€this€for€some€time.€€Ms.€Abbott€testified€similarly€that€the€old€locks€had€notÏworked€and€that€new€locks€had€been€requested€for€a€while.Ì€Ìà Ø àThirdly,€Ms.€Stromatt€claimed€that€her€co„workers€were€instructed€not€toÏtalk€to€her.€€Mr.€Covington€disputed€this€saying€that€he€had,€in€fact,€encouragedÏother€employees€to€talk€to€Ms.€Stromatt€when€she€seemed€depressed.€€Six€co„¼workers€were€interviewed€and€they€gave€consistent€testimony€that€Mr.€CovingtonÏhad€never€asked€them€not€to€talk€to€Ms.€Stromatt.€€Indeed,€they€all€stated,€as€Mr.ÏCovington€had,€that€he€had€encouraged€them€to€talk€to€her.€€One€employee€evenÏcharacterized€Mr.€Covington's€request€as€"begging€and€pleading"€to€get€along€withÏMs.€Stromatt.€€The€employees€said€that€they€felt€free€to€talk€to€Ms.€Stromatt€andÏdid€talk€to€her€about€her€family€issues.€€One€employee€stated€œthat,›€for€a€period€ofÏabout€two€and€a€half€months,€Ms.€Stromatt€would€not€talk€to€him€so€he€asked€Mr.ÏCovington€to€speak€with€her€in€an€attempt€to€restore€communication.€€Ms.Ð H9˜4B ÐStromatt€had€specifically€mentioned€that€a€Mr.€Dozier€was€asked€not€to€talk€to€her;€Ïhowever,€when€interviewed,€Mr.€Dozier€said€that€Mr.€Covington€had€neverÏdiscouraged€him€from€talking€to€Ms.€Stromatt.€ÌÌà Ø àThe€fourth€category€involves€Ms.€Stromatt's€intimations€that€Mr.€CovingtonÏhad€helped€individuals€who€had€embezzled€funds€from€the€office.€€€She€stated€thatÏ"the€thieves€in€the€office€were€treated€with€more€respect€than"€she€was.€€WhenÏinterviewed,€Mr.€Covington€stated€that€there€had€been€three€incidents€ofÏembezzlement€over€the€past€eight€and€a€half€years.€€In€two€of€these,€the€mattersÏwere€turned€over€to€the€district€attorney.€€The€other€resulted€in€the€perpetratorÏbeing€imprisoned,€and€when€Mr.€Covington€testified€in€that€case,€he€recommendedÏthat€the€individual€not€be€placed€on€probation.ÌÌà Ø àNext,€Ms.€Stromatt€made€several€references€to€Mr.€Covington'sÏconsumption€of€alcohol€in€the€office€after€hours€as€well€as€€to€her€concern€that€heÏwas€going€to€be€arrested€for€a€DUI€and€thereby€expose€the€office€to€negativeÏpublicity.€€Mr.€Covington€stated€that€these€statements€were€absolutely€not€true€andÏthat€the€conversations€alleged€by€Ms.€Stromatt€did€not€occur.€€Two€employees,ÏMs.€Abbott€and€Ms.€Norman,€stated€that€there€had€never€been€any€evidence€thatÏMr.€Covington€had€been€drinking€in€the€office.€€Ms.€Stromatt€claimed€there€hadÏbeen€conversations€between€her€and€the€janitor,€Mr.€Patton,€in€which€she€asked€theÏjanitor€to€protect€Mr.€Covington€by€not€discussing€the€beer€cans€with€anyone€else.€ÏHowever,€Mr.€Patton€denied€that€this€conversation€took€place€and€said€that€theÏonly€time€he€noticed€any€beer€cans€in€the€office€was€after€a€Christmas€Party€duringÏwhich€three€friends€of€Mr.€Covington€brought€beer€to€the€office.€€ÌÌà Ø àThe€sixth€category,€as€summarized€by€the€Executive€Secretary's€StaffÏReport,€involves€Mr.€Covington's€socializing€with€an€unnamed€female.€€Both€Mr.ÏCovington€and€Ms.€Abbott€and€Ms.€Norman€were€asked€about€this€and€all€threeÏindicated€that€nothing€of€this€nature€had€occurred.€€œLikewise,›€two€otherÏemployees,€Mr.€Brasser€and€Mr.€McKinnon,€denied€that€there€was€any€truth€to€theÏseventh€class€of€allegations,€that€Mr.€Covington€had€directed€metropolitanÏemployees€to€purchase€beer€and€snacks€for€his€personal€consumption.€€Mr.€BrasserÏsaid€that€he€had€been€employed€in€that€office€for€eight€years€and€had€never€seenÐ H9˜4B ÐMr.€Covington€take€a€drink.ÌÌà Ø àThe€eighth€classification€involves€Ms.€Stromatt's€references€to€Mr.ÏCovington's€assigning€busy€work€to€the€employees.€€Again,€Mr.€Covington€andÏanother€employee,€Mr.€McClure,€denied€such€allegations.€€Mr.€McClure€assertedÏthat€"busy€work"€was€never€generated€for€the€employees.€€Though€he€had€givenÏwork€to€Ms.€Stromatt€to€do,€he€did€so€on€his€own€and€not€at€the€insistence€of€Mr.ÏCovington.€€He€was€emphatic€that€the€only€reason€he€did€so€was€because€Ms.ÏStromatt€had€requested€that€she€be€allowed€to€help€if€there€was€a€need.€€Finally,ÏMs.€Stromatt€made€a€reference€to€Mr.€Covington's€failure€to€set€the€night€alarm.€ÏWhen€interviewed,€Mr.€Covington€stated€that€this€area€had€always€been€hisÏresponsibility€and€not€Ms.€Stromatt's.€€He€€stated€that€€there€had€been€a€fewÏproblems€with€the€alarm€over€the€years€but€that€he€had€dealt€with€the€alarmÏcompany€when€such€problems€arose.ÌÌà Ø àThe€Staff€Report€concluded€its€section€on€the€non„medical€facts€with€someÏgeneral€comments.€€The€employees€who€were€interviewed€expressed€their€opinionÏthat€Mr.€Covington€had€treated€Ms.€Stromatt€well€and€exhibited€much€toleranceÏfor€her€situation.€€It€was€the€conclusion€of€the€Executive€Secretary€in€the€StaffÏReport€that,€"[w]hile€there€may€have€been€a€perception€by€Edith€Stromatt€that€sheÏwas€being€singled€out€and€treated€differently,€the€overwhelming€evidence€fromÏother€employees€is€that,€from€a€factual€standpoint,€this€was€not€happening."ÌÌà Ø àThe€Staff€Report€also€included€a€section€on€the€medical€facts€in€which€theÏExecutive€Secretary€summarized€the€information€from€the€doctors€who€had€treatedÏMs.€Stromatt.€€The€summaries€indicate€that€Ms.€Stromatt's€medical€conditionsÏwere€diagnosed€as€having€originated€with€stress€and€anxiety€that€she€was€placedÏunder€at€work.€€In€a€separate€report€received€by€the€Benefit€Board€from€Dr.ÏBottari,€a€clinical€psychologist,€Ms.€Stromatt€was€diagnosed€with€an€adjustmentÏdisorder€which€had€the€possibility€of€developing€into€more€prolonged€depression.€ÏHe€made€reference€to€the€fact€that€there€were€many€stresses€at€Ms.€Stromatt's€jobÏincluding€conflict€with€her€boss€and€upsetting€job€interactions€and€policies.€€HeÏreported€that€Ms.€Stromatt€was€particularly€fearful€of€retribution€from€Mr.ÏCovington.€€In€a€letter€dated€August€4,€1995,€Ms.€Stromatt's€physician,€Dr.Ð H9˜4B ÐCochran,€informed€the€Benefit€Board€that€she€was€suffering€from€depression€andÏconnective€tissue€disorder€dating€the€illness€to€January€26,€1995.€€This€letter€didÏnot€refer€specifically€to€work€anxiety;€however,€some€œphysician's›€notes€from€Dr.ÏCochran€reflect€that€Ms.€Stromatt€was€under€stress€at€work€on€May€18,€1993.€ÏAgain€on€March€22,€1995,€€Dr.€Cochran€made€the€following€notation:€"ManyÏstresses€at€her€job.€€She's€coming€apart.€€She's€out€of€control€and€this€lady's€beenÏin€control€most€of€her€life."€€Dr.€Cochran's€records€failed€to€recount€any€specificÏincidents€giving€rise€to€the€stress.€€Finally,€an€October€17,€1995€letter€from€Dr.ÏJacobi€mentioned€only€"an€exceptional€amount€of€situational€stress€with€resultantÏanxiety€and€depression."ÌÌà Ø àMs.€Stromatt€submits€that€there€is€not€any€material€evidence€to€support€aÏfinding€that€there€was€no€specific€incident€of€stress€which€caused€the€disability.€ÏWe€respectfully€disagree.€€While€Ms.€Stromatt€has€certainly€alleged€specificÏincidents€of€stress,€the€fact€is€that€all€such€allegations€were€contradicted€quiteÏconsistently€by€her€superior€at€work€as€well€as€her€co„workers.€€We€acknowledgeÏthat€one€of€the€doctors€who€treated€Ms.€Stromatt€referred€to€her€experiencingÏconflict€with€her€boss€and€to€her€being€upset€by€certain€work€policies.€€However,Ïeven€if€these€rise€to€the€level€of€"specific€incidents€of€stress,"€this€information€wasÏbased€on€Ms.€Stromatt's€report€of€the€facts€to€the€œdoctor,€facts€which€are€inÏdispute.›€€To€reiterate,€the€question€for€this€court€is€not€whether€there€is€any€recordÏevidence€to€support€€a€finding€of€a€specific€incident€of€stress.€€Rather,€it€is€whetherÏthere€is€any€material€evidence€to€support€a€converse€finding.€€We€conclude€thatÏthere€is€material€evidence€to€support€the€Benefit€Board's€determination€that€"theÏfacts€submitted€by€Edith€Stromatt€would€be€categorized€as€nothing€more€than€theÏstress€of€daily€living€encountered€in€carrying€out€the€duties€of€employment."ÌÌÓ  ÓV.€€CONCLUSIONÌÌÓ¹Óà Ø à€We€affirm€the€trial€œcourt€and€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€court.›€€There€canÏbe€no€property€interest€in€an€IOD€pension€before€it€is€granted.€Therefore,€theÏBenefit€Board€did€not€violate€the€Fourteenth€Amendment's€guarantee€ofÏprocedural€due€process€when€it€œdenied›€Ms.€Stromatt€a€chance€to€be€heard€on€theÏmatter€of€her€qualification€for€an€IOD€pension.€€Finally,€we€find€that€there€wasÐ H9˜4B Ðmaterial€evidence€to€support€the€Benefit€Board's€determination€that€it€must€denyÏMs.€Stromatt€an€IOD€disability€pension€based€on€the€record€before€it.€€œÌññÌññà Ø àThe›€cost€of€this€appeal€should€be€taxed€to€œEdith€Stromatt.›€ÌÌÌÓ€Óà Ø àà ¼ à________________________________Ìà Ø àà ¼ àWALTER€W.€BUSSART,Ìà Ø àà ¼ àSPECIAL€JUDGE€ÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€€€à ¼ àÐ 0€ Ðà8 Ø àà ¼ àÔ#† ¼n¼¼¼n:#Ô