WPC9K =+(v*g(i5>ܐxIH(,@^p+NYY-^r5 O!L<{@A8u 0eW !c nlk oH<.R )ڱfKՙܩSRܭw̆w p~)hxW .]،$)4+ty&ELqN ЖSuvem 4^|#vDt|q4#lY#},Xasmu Q65QZETXd:*s=: BFq ?TjuLk4롭a X`"!=:o$ޔ"LVFA}\]c7oPҖe\R4|]+NLVGswӋ4<4^8DQ< lUK4s7o*(EAT i*,^m# 0D % 0 U-N ^ w z a 43 G V mX o 5  rNE U@ 0U" 0w 0Z 0 0 0 0J 0 0 0? 0 0 0 05! 0! 0}" 0# 0# 0:$ 0$ 0%bz& 0& 0,' 0' 0n( 0) 0) 1U"*U>w* 1u* 72*+*+[\+W,.y234Q8:=Ta@IAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 0BBBB BCC 0D D3D D-D 0K E E ASUEE 0nF 0DG AVGVGVGVGVGVGVGVGVGVGVG8HHP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6,,,,0(#$  0  (`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular,s  C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt9,J\'3|xULevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 ZunigaAlemenSwettsspousalAndertonHobbsBurlewCrabtreeMcBee S.W.UmstotNicholsRogeroAdelsperger t]heno noMetcalfHoeflerRebuttableWm Jahn DixVaccarellaKirshnerWinfield s]obickeringsDunavantBurkhart COARowles AabyGorskiRagainsDeskbookContrerasHerreraKinnardGarfinkelCutsingerDinettepartnerhsipi]nterestPertewInmanWhitesideBeatys]tatutoryKinardBookoutMahaffeyHardinVooysBonjornoStinnettBedwellSwettDunlap  R$      1    __Noordersofprotectionwereeverissued.Mr.Swettresolvedthecriminalchargesagainsthimbyagreeing  to_pretrialdiversion_Ԁwhichwasnotconditionedonobtaininganysortoftreatmentorparticipatinginanysortofdomestic t violenceprogram.  R$      2    __BecausethiscasewastriedbeforeJanuary1,2001,theeffectivedateofTenn.CodeAnn.366401,414  (2001),thestatutesrequiringtheuseofparentingplansincustodyproceedings,thedispositionofthecustodyissuesis t governedbythestatutesapplicabletoproceedingsthatpredatedtheparentingplanstatutes.(9 Z(Times New Roman *+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  - -(55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   $359=AEIMQ111111111\  `&Times New Roman3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)7i) Q R$      3    __ElizaB.Hutchinson,Note,ImprovingCustodyLawinVirginiaWithoutCreatingaRebuttablePresumption  ofJointCustody,4Wm.&MaryJ.ofWomen&L.523,525(1998). M R$      5    __Inaddition,Mr.Swettisalsospecificallyenjoinedfrom physicallyabusingorthreateningMrs.Swettand  frommakinganyderogatoryremarksregardingMrs.Swett.  R$      4    __Ourstatutesdonotdefinewhata sharedparentingarrangementis.Thetermisgenerallytracedtothe  parentingstatutesenactedbytheStateofWashingtonin1987thatwereoutgrowthsofthepushduringthe1980sforlaws t favoringjointcustody.Inthesestatutes,theterm jointcustodywasreplacedwiththeterm sharedparenting. 8 Accordingly,incommonparlance,theterm jointcustodyand sharedparentingareinterchangeable,eventhough L theterm sharedparentingisnowmorecloselyassociatedwiththeparentingplansrequiredbyTenn.CodeAnn.  366401,414.Pragmatically, sharedparentingmeansthattheparentssharealloraportionofthelegalandphysical  careoftheirchildren. o R$      6    __Therecordindicatesthatthepartieschildraisingphilosophiesmaydiffer.Accordingly,theparentscould  makedifferentdecisionsregardingthechildsreligiousupbringingorchoiceoffriends.  R$      7    __Garner_v._ԀGarner,773S.W.2d245,247(Tenn.Ct.App.1989)(Koch,J.,dissenting).  R$      8    __Bailey_v._ԀBailey,No.M200000325COAR3CV,2001WL310642,at*1(Tenn.Ct.App.Apr.2,2001)(No  Tenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled);Burkhart_v._ԀBurkhart,No.M199902332COAR3CV,2000WL1231371,at t *7(Tenn.Ct.App.Aug.31,2000)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled).Thefirstparentingplanlegislationalso 8 conditionedthechildsalternatingresidencesontheparentsagreement.Tenn.CodeAnn.366411(e)(2)(B)(repealed L 2000).However,therequirementofparentalagreementwasremovedfromthecurrentversionoftheparentingplan  statutesenactedin2000. G R$      9    __Burke_v._ԀBurke,No.M200001111COAR3CV,2001WL921770,at*3(Tenn.Ct.App.Aug.7,2001)(No  Tenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled)(parentshomesweremorethanfiftymilesapart);Rowles_v._ԀReynolds,29Tenn. t App.224,234,196S.W.2d76,80(1946)(parentslivedindifferentstates).  R$      10    __Stateexrel.French_v._ԀFrench,182Tenn.606,615,188S.W.2d603,606(1945);Garner_v._ԀGarner,773  S.W.2dat246(permittingadividedcustodyarrangementforachildwhowasnotyetoldenoughtoattendschool); t Rowles_v._ԀReynolds,29Tenn.App.at23335,196S.W.2dat8081(observingthatdividedcustodycouldbeappropriate 8 forchildrenwhoweretooyoungtoexpressapreference).  R$      12    __ThestipulatedvalueofSwettsRestaurant,Inc.atthetimeoftrialwas$255,000.Itwillbeunnecessaryfor  ustoresolvethepartiesdisputeregardingthevalueofMr.Swettsinterestinthiscorporationfortworeasons.First, t thereisnoevidenceintherecordthatthevalueofthebusinessincreasedduringthemarriage.Second,wehave 8 determinedthatthetrialcourtproperlyclassifiedMr.Swettsinterestintherestaurantbusinessasseparateproperty. J R$      11    __ThestipulatedvalueofSwettsProperties,Inc.attimeoftrialwas$355,300.Therefore,Mr.Swettsonehalf  interestinthiscorporationwasworth$177,650. ? R$      14    __Duringoralargument,Ms.Swettscounselcandidlyconcededthatthelackofevidenceoftherestaurants  valuepriortothemarriagewasproblematic.(|G2$ !.8BdXXd8         0   d(|3g$ !.8BdXXd8     VVVV'dxd)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3g$ !.8BdXXd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK . R$      13    __ThereisnoevidenceintherecordthatMr.Swettevertreatedhisinterestintherealpropertyasmarital  property.Likewise,thereisnoevidencethatMs.Swettsubstantiallycontributedtotheacquisitionorpreservationof t thisrealproperty.Basedonthisrecord,thereislittlefactualbasistoarguethatMs.Swettsnonmonetaryandmodest 8 monetarycontributionstothemarriageweresignificantenoughtobeconsideredassubstantialcontributionstothe L acquisitionorpreservationofeithertherestaurantbusinessortherealpropertyonwhichtherestaurantwaslocated. !.8Bdd8     _H  B8XXdd8  @ YBINTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @kk$ATNASHVILLE#BY#Ԉ &   June15,1999Session L XXB #BXX#DAVIDSWETT,SR.v.GRACEZ.ALEMANSWETTXXB  J @@ AppealfromtheCircuitCourtforDavidsonCounty  J @@No.96D2516MurielRobinson,Judge  6 @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.M199800961COAR3CV_ԄFiledJune27,_2002__   AV) ` dE<|` A }     #BXX{#XXBThisappealinvolvesthedissolutionofanineyearmarriage.FollowingabenchtrialintheCircuit x  CourtforDavidsonCounty,thetrialcourtfoundbothpartiestobeatfaultbutawardedthedivorce d tothewife.Thecourtalsograntedthepartiesjointcustodyoftheirsonanddividedtheirproperty. P Onthisappeal,thewifeassertsthatthetrialcourterredbyconcludingthatherconductcontributed < tothedivorceandbyrefusingtogivehersolecustodyofthepartiesson.Bothpartiestakeissue (x withthemannerinwhichthetrialcourtdividedtheirproperty.Thewifeassertsthatthetrialcourt d erredbyclassifyingthehusbandsinterestintherealpropertyonwhichhisfamilysrestaurantis P locatedasseparatepropertyandbyfailingtoawardheraportionoftheappreciationinthevalueof < hisfamilyrestaurantbusiness.Thehusbandtakesissuewiththetrialcourtsrefusaltoawardhim ( certainitemsofhouseholdfurnishings.Finally,thewifeassertsthatsheisentitledtopostjudgment  interestonthejudgmentusedtoequalizethedistributionofthemaritalestate,aswellasherlegal  expensesincurredonappeal.Wehavedeterminedthatthetrialcourtsfaultdetermination,joint  custodyarrangement,anddivisionofmaritalpropertyaresupportedbytherecord.Accordingly,we  affirmthejudgmentanddenythewifesrequestforappellatelegalexpenses. t  Tenn.R.App.P.3AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheCircuitCourtAffirmed  L    WilliamC.Koch,Jr.,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichBenH.Cantrell,P.J.,M.S., $"t! andWilliamB.Cain,J.,joined. #`" JoeP.Binkley,Jr.,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellant,GraceZunigaAlemanSwett. $8 $ LucindaE.Smith,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellee,DavidSwett,Sr. &"& .  OPINION  (#(  I.  p*%*     DavidSwettmetGraceZ.AlemanSwettin1984whilevacationinginCostaRica.Ms.Swett H,', wasworkinginthebeautysaloninthehotelwhereMr.Swettwasstaying.Thepartiesweremarried 4-(- inNovember1985inCostaRicaandmadetheirhomeinNashvillewhereMr.Swettandhisfamily  .p). operatedapopularrestaurant.InJanuary1986,Ms.Swettstwosonsfromanearliermarriagecame  /\*/ tolivewiththepartiesinNashville.TheironlysonwasborninNovember1987.Theparties  relationshipbegantodeterioratesoonaftertheirwedding.AccordingtoMs.Swett,Mr.Swett  becameverballyandphysicallyabusivetowardher,refusedtohelpherobtainadriverslicense,and  discouragedherfromobtainingworkoutsidethehome.Forhispart,Mr.SwettassertedthatMs. t Swettnaggedhimandviewedhimonlyasasourceofincomeandthatthepartiesarguedfrequently ` aboutoneofMs.Swettssonsfromherearliermarriage. L    Oneoftheeventsthatprecipitatedtheeventualunravelingofthismarriageoccurredinlate $ t 1992whenMr.SwettdiscoveredthatoneofMs.Swettssonshadtaken$300fromhiswallet.The  ` boyassertedthatthemoneyrepresentedunpaidwagesforworkinginMr.Swettsrestaurantand  L  declaredthathewouldstealmoneyagainifgiventhechance.Mr.Swettinsistedthattheboyleave  8  thehouseandpaidtoflyhimbacktoCostaRicatolivewithhisgrandmother.Theboyeventually $  returnedtoNashvillein1993butnolongerlivedwiththeSwetts.Ms.Swettremaineddistressed   andangrythatMr.Swettwouldnotpermithersontolivewiththem.     ThepartiesbegansleepinginseparatebedroomsinJune1996.Followingaparticularly   contentiousargumentinJuly1996,Mr.SwettthreatenedMs.Swettandtoldherthatheintendedto p leavewiththeirchild.Ms.Swettpetitionedforanorderofprotectionandfiledcriminalcharges \ againstMr.Swettfollowingthisincident.Thereafter,onAugust30,1996,Mr.Swettfileda H complaintintheCircuitCourtforDavidsonCounty,seekingadivorceonthegroundsof 4 irreconcilabledifferencesandinappropriatemaritalconduct.  p   ThepartiesapparentlycontinuedtoresideinthesamehouseafterMr.Swettfiledfordivorce. H Theirrelationshipdidnotimprove,andinNovember1996,Ms.Swettfiledanamendedpetitionfor 4 anorderofprotectionclaimingthatMr.Swetthadverballyandphysicallyabusedherinfrontoftheir   child. #  1      ׀Ms.Swettalsofiledacounterclaimfordivorceassertingthatthepartiescouldnolongerlive   togetherashusbandandwifeandthatthesolecauseofthedeteriorationofthemarriagewasMr.  Swettscontinuousverbalandphysicalabuse.Duringthesamemonth,Ms.Swettsurreptitiously  tooktwoofMr.Swettschecksandcashedthemfor$20,700.Sheused$17,000topurchasean  automobileforoneofheroldersonsandtheremaining$3,700forherlivingexpenses. l   Followingabenchtrial,thetrialcourtdeterminedthatbothpartieshaddemonstratedthat D! theyhadgroundsfordivorce.However,despiteitsconcernaboutMs.Swettsevasivenessandthe 0"  lackofcorroborationformanyofherallegationsofmisconductbyMr.Swett,thetrialcourtalso #l! foundthatMs.Swettwaslessatfaultandawardedheradivorceonthegroundofinappropriate $X" maritalconduct.Thecourtgrantedthepartiesjointcustodyoftheirsonanddeterminedthathe $D # wouldresidewithMr.SwettduringthefirstsixmonthsofeachyearandwithMs.Swettduringthe %0!$ secondsixmonths.AfterconcludingthatMr.Swettsinterestinthefamilyrestaurantbusinesswas &"% separateproperty,thetrialcourtawardedmaritalpropertyvaluedat$254,889.60toMr.Swettand '#& maritalpropertyvaluedat$7,500toMs.Swett.Toequalizethedistribution,thetrialcourtdirected (#' Mr.SwetttopayMs.Swett$140,000withinsixtydaysoftheentryofthejudgment.Thecourtalso )$( directedMr.SwetttopayMs.Swett$1,300inchildsupportduringthesixmonthsthatthechildwas  livingwithherandawardedMs.Swett$600permonthinrehabilitativespousalsupportforsixty  months.    Whilethepartiesdonottakeissuewiththechildsupportawardortheawardofrehabilitative ` alimony,theytakeissuewithotherportionsofthejudgment.Becausetheissuesinadivorce L  proceedingdovetailwitheachother,thecourtshouldfollowaconsistent,logicalsequencein 8  disentanglingthepartiesaffairs.Formostdivorceproceedings,thissequence_is_:(1)_determining_ $ t whethereitherorbothpartiesareentitledtoadivorce;(2)_fashioning_Ԁcustodyandvisitation  ` arrangements;(3)_allocating_Ԁthepartiesseparatepropertyanddebts;(4)_equitably_Ԁdividingthe  L  maritalpropertyanddebts;(5)_awarding_Ԁchildsupport;(6)_awarding_Ԁspousalsupport;_and(_7)  8  consideringwhethertoawardattorneysfeesifeitherpartyhasrequestedthem.Anderton_v._ $  Anderton,988S.W.2d675,679(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Wewillconsidertheissuesraisedbythe   Swettsinthisorder.   @) II.    @nn! ThePartiesFault  p   Despitethefactthatshewasawardedthedivorceonthegroundofinappropriatemarital H conduct,Ms.Swettinsiststhatthetrialcourterredbyfindingthatherconductduringthemarriage 4 gaveMr.Swettgroundsfordivorce.Sheassertsthatsheisblameless.Wedisagree.  p ̀  AppellatecourtsemploythefamiliarstandardinTenn.R.App.P.13(d)toreviewatrial H courtsfindingsoffactregardingthegroundsfordivorce.Earls_v._ԀEarls,42S.W.3d877,911(Tenn. 4 Ct.App.2000);Hobbs_v._ԀHobbs,987S.W.2d844,846(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Thisstandard   requiresustodefertothetrialcourtsfindingsoffact,Fell_v._ԀRambo,36S.W.3d837,846(Tenn.   Ct.App.2000),andtopresumethatthesefindingsarecorrect unlessthepreponderanceofthe  evidenceisotherwise.Thispresumption,however,doesnotcomeintoplaywhenthetrialcourt  hasnotmadespecificfindingsoffactonaparticularmatter.Burlew_v._ԀBurlew,40S.W.3d465,470  (Tenn.2001);Crabtree_v._ԀCrabtree,16S.W.3d356,360(Tenn.2000). l   ReviewingfindingsoffactunderTenn.R.App.P.13(d)necessarilyrequiresanappellate D! courttoweightheevidencetodetermineinwhichpartysfavortheaggregateweightoftheevidence 0"  falls.Theprevailingpartyistheoneinwhosefavortheevidentiaryscaletips,nomatterhow #l! slightly.McBee_v._ԀBowman,89Tenn.132,140,14S.W.481,483(1890).Accordingly,the $X" presumptionofcorrectnessinTenn.R.App.P.13(d)requiresustoleaveatrialcourtsfindingof $D # factundisturbedunlesswedeterminethattheaggregateweightoftheevidencedemonstratesthata %0!$ factualfindingotherthantheonefoundbythetrialcourtismoreprobablytrue.RealtyShop,Inc. &"% _v._ԀRRWestminsterHolding,Inc.,7S.W.3d581,596(Tenn.Ct.App.1999). '#& __  Ourreviewofatrialcourtsfindingsoffactisconstrainedbythepracticalrecognitionthat )$( thetrialjudge,asthetrieroffact,hasabetteropportunitytoobservethemanneranddemeanorof |*%) allthewitnesseswhentheytestify.6XXXXWhitaker_v._ԀWhitaker#XXX6X73#6XXXX,957S.W.2d834,837(Tenn.Ct.App. h+&* 1997);#XXX6X3#6XXXXLindsey_v._ԀLindsey#XXX6X64#6XXXX,930S.W.2d553,556(Tenn.Ct.App.1996).Accordingly,wegivegreat T,'+ weighttoatrialcourtsfactualfindingswhentheyrestonthetrialcourtsdeterminationofthe @-(, credibilityofthewitnesses.#XXX6X4#6XXXXRandolph_v._ԀRandolph#XXX6X5#6XXXX,937S.W.2d815,819(Tenn.1996);#XXX6Xe6#6XXXXHobbs_v._  Hobbs#XXX6X6#6XXXX,987S.W.2dat847;#XXX6XU7#6XXXXUmstot_v._ԀUmstot#XXX6X7#6XXXX,968S.W.2d819,825(Tenn.Ct.App.1997).  #XXX6X$8#  TherecordcontainsadequateevidencetosupportafindingthatMs.Swettsconductwas, t atleasttosomedegree,responsibleforthedissolutionofthismarriage.Mr.Swetttestifiedthatshe ` wasconstantlyargumentative,thatshenevertrulycaredforhim,andthatsheonlymarriedhimfor L  hismoney.Moreover,Ms.Swettdidnotappropriatelydisciplinehersonwhenhestole$300from 8  Mr.Swett,andsheherselftooktwochecksfromMr.Swettandcashedthemfor$20,700.After $ t reviewingtherecordasawhole,wedeclinetoconcludethattheevidencepreponderatesagainstthe  ` trialcourtsfactualconclusionthatMs.Swettsconductcontributedtothedissolutionofthis  L  marriage.  8  @^^( III.    @  TheJointCustodyArrangement      Ms.Swettalsoassertsthatthetrialcourterredbygrantingthepartiesjointcustodyoftheir   son.SheassertsthatsheshouldhavebeenawardedsolecustodybecauseofMr.Swettspropensity p forverbalandphysicalabuseandbecauseitisunsettlingtoachildtobephysicallyshuttledbetween \ twoparents.Wehavedeterminedthattherecorddoesnotunderminethetrialcourtscustody H arrangement. 4 @) A.   \ XXXX  Custodyandvisitationarrangementsareamongthemostimportantdecisionsconfrontinga 4 trialcourtinadivorcecase.Steen_v._ԀSteen,61S.W.3d324,327(Tenn.Ct.App.2001).Courtsmust   strivetodevisecustodyarrangementsthatpromotethedevelopmentofthechildrensrelationship   withbothparentsandinterfereaslittleaspossiblewithpostdivorcefamilydecisionmaking.Aaby  v.Strange,924S.W.2d623,629(Tenn.1996);Taylorv.Taylor,849S.W.2d319,33132(Tenn.  1993).Theneedsofthechildrenareparamount,whilethedesiresoftheparentsaresecondary.  _Lentz_Ԁv._Lentz_,717S.W.2d876,877(Tenn.1986).Custodyshouldneverbeusedtopunishor l rewardtheparents,Turnerv.Turner,919S.W.2d340,346(Tenn.Ct.App.1995);Longv.Long, X  488S.W.2d729,733(Tenn.Ct.App.1972),butrathershouldbeusedtopromotethechildrensbest D! interestsbyplacingtheminanenvironmentthatwillbestservetheirphysicalandemotionalneeds. 0"  Lukev.Luke,651S.W.2d219,221(Tenn.1983). #l!   Therearenohardandfastrulesfordeterminingwhichcustodyandvisitationarrangement $D # willbestserveachildsneeds.Taylorv.Taylor,849S.W.2dat327;_Dantzler_Ԁv._Dantzler_,665 %0!$ S.W.2d385,387(Tenn.Ct.App.1983).Theinquiryisfactuallydrivenandrequiresthecourtsto &"% carefullyweighnumerousconsiderations.Nichols_v._ԀNichols,792S.W.2d713,716(Tenn.1990); '#& Rogero_v._ԀPitt,759S.W.2d109,112(Tenn.1988).TheTennesseeGeneralAssemblyandthecourts (#' haveidentifiedthefactorsthatthetrialcourtsshouldconsider.Tenn.CodeAnn.366106(a) )$( (2001);Bah_v._ԀBah,668S.W.2d663,666(Tenn.Ct.App.1983). |*%)   Courtscustomarilydeviseinitialcustodyandvisitationarrangementsbyengagingina T,'+ comparativefitnessanalysisthatrequiresthemtodeterminewhichoftheavailablecustodiansis @-(, comparativelymorefitthantheother.InreParsons,914S.W.2d889,893(Tenn.Ct.App.1995);  Bah_v._ԀBah,668S.W.2dat666.Thisanalysisdoesnotmeasuretheparentsagainstthestandardof  perfectionbecausethecourtsarepragmaticenoughtounderstandthatperfectioninmarriageand  parentingisasevanescentasitisinlife'sotherpursuits.Earls_v._ԀEarls,42S.W.3d877,885(Tenn. t Ct.App.2000);Rice_v._ԀRice,983S.W.2d680,68283(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Rather,theanalysis ` requiresthecourtstodeterminewhichoftheparents,inlightoftheirpresentcircumstances,is L  comparativelymorefittoassumeanddischargetheresponsibilitiesofbeingacustodialparent. 8    Custodyandvisitationdecisionsoftenhingeonsubtlefactors,includingtheparents  ` demeanorandcredibilityduringthedivorceproceedingsthemselves.Adelsperger_v._ԀAdelsperger,  L  970S.W.2d482,485(Tenn.Ct.App.1997).Accordingly,appellatecourts_arereluctanttosecond  8  guessatrialcourtsdecisions_.Trialcourtsmustbeabletoexercisebroaddiscretioninthesematters, $  buttheystillmustbasetheirdecisionsontheproofandupontheappropriateapplicationofthe   relevantprinciplesoflaw.D_v._ԀK,917S.W.2d682,685(Tenn.Ct.App.1995).Thus,wereview   thesedecisionsdenovoontherecordwithapresumptionthatthetrialcourtsfindingsoffactare   correctunlesstheevidencepreponderatesotherwise.Nichols_v._ԀNichols,792S.W.2dat716;Doles   _v._ԀDoles,848S.W.2d656,661(Tenn.Ct.App.1992). p @) B.  H @t t  Mr.SwettsFitnessToBeaCustodialParent  4   TheprimaryissueregardingcustodystemsfromMs.Swettsassertionthatthetrialcourt  \ erredbydeterminingthatMr.Swettwasfittohavecustodyofthepartiesson.Sheargues H dramaticallythat [t]he_record_Ԁinthiscasein[sic]repletewithevidencethatHusbandisaviolent, 4 irrationalpersonwho,foraperiodoftenyears,hasphysicallyandverballyabusedWife,hersons,   andhischildrenfromapriormarriage.Mr.Swettrespondsthatheandthepartiessonhavea   normal,lovingfathersonrelationshipandthathewasthesoleandwillingproviderofessential  medicalanddentalcareandprivateschoolingandtutoringforthechild.Inthiscase,asinmost  custodydisputes,therearetwosidestothestory,andthetruthliessomewhereinbetween.    Itwouldservelittle_purpose_Ԁinthiscasetorecitethelengthylitanyofthefactorslistedin X  Tenn.CodeAnn.366106(a) #  2      ׀_that_Ԁguideatrialcourtsdiscretionwhenassessingparentalfitness. D! Ourreviewoftherecordsatisfiesusthatmanyofthesefactorsdonotfavoreitherparent,andsome 0"  actuallyfavorMr.Swett.Ms.SwettstestimonythatthechildfearsMr.Swettisnotborneoutby #l! theevidence.Thereis,infact,noevidencethattheloveandaffectionbetweenthechildandMs. $X" SwettaregreaterthanbetweenthechildandMr.Swett.Mr.Swettsabilityandwillingnessto $D # providethepartiessonwithfood,clothing,medicalcare,privateeducation,andothernecessities %0!$ exceedsMs.Swetts.Inaddition,Mr.Swetthasinvolvedhimselfwiththechildsschoolactivities &"% andhastakenadirectinterestinsupervisinghiseducation.Heisalsopartofalarge,_stable_Ԁfamily '#&  thatsupportsbothhimandthepartiesson.Accordingly,wehavenobasisforconcludingthatthe (#' evidencepreponderatesagainstthetrialcourtsconclusionthatMr.Swettisqualifiedtobea  custodialparent.   @) C.  t @  TheJointandDividedCustodyArrangement `   Ms.Swettalsotakesissuewiththetrialcourtsdecisiontoestablisha jointcustody 8  arrangement.SheassertsthatjointcustodycannotworkbecauseofMr.Swetts strongdesireto $ t control,his refusal...tocompromise,andthe utterlackofcommunicationbetweenthe  ` parties.TherecanbenodoubtthattherelationshipbetweentheSwettshasdeterioratedtothepoint  L  wheretheyfinditdifficulttobeciviltoeachother.However,thedividedcustodyarrangement  8  devisedbythetrialcourt,minimizesthepossibilityoffrictionanddisagreementsbetweentheSwetts $  withregardtotheirson.   @) 1.      Theconceptofjointcustodywasevolvingwhenthiscasewastriedandcontinuestoevolve p today.Itconnotesanarrangementinwhichbothparentsretainlegalresponsibilityandauthorityfor \ thecareandcontrolofthechild.Muchasinanintactfamily,bothparentshaveequalrightsand H responsibilitiesregardingmajordecisions,and_neitherparents_Ԁrightsaresuperior.Thus,both 4 parentshaveanequalvoiceinthechildseducation,upbringing,religioustraining,nonemergency  p healthcare,andgeneralwelfare.Anderson_v._ԀAnderson,56S.W.3d5,8(Tenn.Ct.App.1999);  \ Shepherd_v._ԀMetcalf,794S.W.2d348,351(Tenn.1990);Hoefler_v._ԀHoefler,No.M199800966 H COAR3CV,2001WL327897,at*5(Tenn.Ct.App.Apr.5,2001)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11 4 _application_Ԁfiled).Theparentwithwhomthechildisresidingatthetimemustmakeimmediateand   daytodaydecisionsregardingdiscipline,grooming,diet,activities,schedulingsocialcontacts,and   emergencycare.: #  3          Tenn.CodeAnn.366101(a)(1)(2001)specificallyrecognizesthattrialcourtsmayaward  custodytoeitherparty,tobothparties intheinstanceofjointcustodyorsharedparenting,< #  4      ׀orto l athirdparty.Unlikeotherstates,Tennesseehasnotenacted_astatutory onesizefits_Ԁallpreference X  foronetypeofcustodyarrangementoveranotherexceptincircumstanceswheretheparentshave D! agreedtoajointcustodyarrangement.Inthisregard,Tenn.CodeAnn.366101(a)(2)statesthat 0"   trialcourtshavethe widestdiscretiontoorderacustodyarrangementthatisinthebestinterestof #l! achildandthatthereexists neitherapreferencenorapresumptionfororagainstjointlegal  custody,jointphysicalcustodyorsolecustody.     Jointcustodyismostappropriatewhenthejointdecisionmakersarepredisposedto,orat t leastcapableof,amicablyresolvingpotentialdisagreementsoverraisingtheirchildorchildren. ` Jahn_v._ԀJahn,932S.W.2d939,942(Tenn.Ct.App.1996)(_emphasizing_Ԁthata cooperativespirit L  isessentialtoanyjointcustodyarrangement);Jones_v._ԀJones,No.01A019601CV00038,1996WL 8  512030,at*5(Tenn.Ct.App.Sept.11,1996)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled);Dix_v._ $ t Carson,No.02A019704CV00093,1998WL886555,at*11(Tenn.Ct.App.Dec.17,1998),  ` perm.app._denied_Ԁ(Tenn.June21,1999).Thechancesthatjointcustodywill_succeedimprove_Ԁwhen  L  theparentshavesomepreexistingrelationshipandaproventrackrecordofeffectivelysharing  8  parentalobligationsandresponsibilities.Thechanceofsuccessdiminisheswhentheparentshave $  turnedchildraisingintoabattleground.Accordingly,thecourtshavebeenforcedtorecognizethat,   asapracticalmatter,ajointcustodyarrangementrequiresalevelofcooperationthatnotallparents   canprovide.     Thecourtshavefrequentlybeencalledupontoreworkjointcustodyarrangementsthathave p faileddespitetheparentsbestintentions.Jointcustodyisnolongerinachildsbestinterestswhen \ theparentsarenolongerabletocooperate.Gray_v._ԀGray,885S.W.2d353,355(Tenn.Ct.App. H 1994);Malone_v._ԀMalone,842S.W.2d621,623(Tenn.Ct.App.1992);Dodd_v._ԀDodd,737S.W.2d 4 286,28990(Tenn.Ct.App.1987).Accordingly,notwithstandingthe_parents_Ԁinitialagreementto  p ajointcustodyarrangement,theinabilityofparentstocooperatewithregardtotheirchildren  \ constitutesasignificantenoughchangeinthechildscircumstancestotriggerareconsiderationof H theexistingcustodyarrangement.Vaccarella_v._ԀVaccarella,49S.W.3d307,31516(Tenn.Ct.App. 4 2001);Rubin_v._ԀKirshner,948S.W.2d742,74546(Tenn.Ct.App.1997);Dalton_v._ԀDalton,858   S.W.2d324,326(Tenn.Ct.App.1993);Cheek_v._ԀCheek,No.03A019503CV00092,1995WL   507793,at*2(Tenn.Ct.App.Aug.29,1995),perm.app._denied_Ԁ(Tenn.Jan.8,1996).  @) 2.     InlightoftheoverwhelmingevidenceofthevitriolicrelationshipbetweentheSwetts,itmust X  havebeenapparenttothetrialcourtthatforcingthemtocollaborateinajointcustodyarrangement D! wouldhavelittlechanceoflongtermsuccess.Atypicaljointcustodyarrangementcould,infact, 0"  nothavebeenintheirsonsbestinterestsbecauseitcouldhaveunderminedthepsychologicalwell #l! beingofhisparentsandcouldalsohaveexposedhimtohighlevelsofparentalconflict.Thetrial $X" courtmusthavesensedtheseproblemsbecausethecustodyarrangementitdevised,whilecalled $D #  jointcustody,bearsfewsimilaritieswiththeconceptofjointcustodyasitiscustomarily %0!$ understood. &"%   ThetrialcourtsorderminimizestheneedfortheSwettstocollaboratetomakemajor (#' decisionsregardingtheirchild.Itdividesphysicalcustodybetweentheparents.Mr.Swetthas )$( custodyoftheboyforthefirstsixmonthsoftheyear,andMs.Swetthascustodyforthesecondsix |*%) months.Duringthetimethateachparenthasphysicalcustody,theordergivestheparent final h+&* decisionmakingauthorityregardingthechild,exceptforeducationaland,perhaps,medicalmatters. T,'+ Mr.Swetthassoleauthorityovertheselectionofthechildsprivateschool.Healsoplaysthe @-(, primaryroleinmeetingthechildsmedicalanddentalneedsbecauseheissolelyresponsiblefor  obtainingmedicalanddentalinsuranceandforpayingforanyofthechildsmedicalanddental  expensesthatarenotcoveredbyinsurance.    Asweunderstandthecustodyarrangementinthiscase,Mr.SwettandMs.Swetteffectively ` havesolecustodywhilethechildisresidingwiththem.Exceptforeducationandmedicalcare,Ms. L  Swetthasthesoleprerogativetoraisetheboyasshepleasesduringthetimeheislivingwithher, 8  andMr.Swetthasthesoleprerogativetoraisetheboyashepleasesduringthetimeheislivingwith $ t him.Theonlyexplicitlimitationsontheseprerogatives_are_:(1)_mandated_Ԁadherencetotherights  ` ofthenoncustodialparentinTenn.CodeAnn.366101(a)(3),(2)noninterferencewith the  L  otherscustodialperiodwiththechild,and(3)restrictionagainst alienatingtheaffectionofthe  8  minorchildfromtheotherparent.; #  5      ׀ $    Thedividedcustodyarrangementdevisedbythetrialcourtdoesnotcompletelyeliminatethe   potentialfordisputesordisagreementsbetweentheparents.= #  6      ׀However,inmostmatters,itavoids   requiringtheparentstobejointdecisionmakers.Itdoesnot,asweseeit,requirealevelof   cooperationbetweentheSwettsthattheyareunabletoprovide.Accordingly,wehavenobasisto p unravelthetrialcourtscustodyarrangementinthiscasesimplybecausethetrialcourtcalledit \  jointcustody. H @) 3.   p   Ms.Swettalsotakesissuewiththetrialcourtsdecisiontodividethecustodyoftheparties H son,therebyrequiringtheboytochangehisresidenceeverysixmonths.Shecharacterizesthis 4 arrangementasa revolvingdoor_>h #  7      _Ԁ_and_Ԁassertsthatitistoodisruptiveforthechild.Tennessees   appellatecourtshaveneverheldthatdividingphysicalcustodybetweenparentsandthereby   requiringachildtoperiodicallychangehisorherresidenceisperseimproper.Theproprietyofthis  sortofarrangementdependsonthefactsofeachcase.    Almostsixtyyearsago,thiscourtfoundthatalternatingcustodyofa5yearoldchildevery l twoweekswas veryunwise...becauseitishardlypossibleforachildtogrowupandlivea X  normal,happylifeundersuchcircumstances.Logan_v._ԀLogan,26Tenn.App.667,674,176 D! S.W.2d601,603(1943).Sixyearslater,JudgeWinfieldHaleobservedthat [s]olongasthereis 0"  _adividedcustody_Ԁtherewillprobablybebickeringsanddisputesandanaturaltendencyonthepart #l! ofthechildtoplayoneagainsttheother,aswellasfortheclaimantstoseekbyindulgencestocurry $X" favorwiththechild,ifnottoprejudiceitagainsttheother.Dunavant_v._ԀDunavant,31Tenn.App. $D # 634,64748,219S.W.2d910,915(1949).Reflectingtheseconcerns,thecourthasusedthe %0!$ followingthreecriteriainothercasestodeterminewhetheradividedcustodyarrangementis  appropriate:(1)whethertheparentsagreedtothearrangement,? #  8      ׀(2)whethertheparentslivedin  sufficientlycloseproximitytomakethearrangementfeasible,@( #  9      ׀_and_Ԁ(3)whetherthechildwasold  enoughtoexpressapreferenceaboutwithwhichparentheorshewouldprefertolive.A<  #  10      ׀Asa t generalmatter,thecourthaslet_stand_Ԁdividedcustodyarrangementsinvolvingyoungchildren,even ` intheabsenceofparentalagreement,wherethereisnoevidencethatdividingcustodywillbeunduly L  disruptiveforthechild.Garner_v._ԀGarner,773S.W.2dat246. 8    Theproprietyofadividedcustodyarrangementshouldbeanalyzedbyfocusingontheeffect  ` itwillhaveonthechild.Theanalysisshouldproceedfromtherecognitionthatchildrenthrivein  L  stableenvironments,#XXXX>#6XXXXAaby_v._ԀStrange,924S.W.2dat627;Gorski_v._ԀRagains,No.01A019710GS  8  00597,1999WL511451,at*45(Tenn.Ct.App.July21,1999)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11 $  _application_Ԁfiled);#XXX6X#6XXXX_NationalInterdisciplinaryColloquiumonChildCustody,#XXX6Xၔ#6XXXXLegalandMental   HealthPerspectivesonChildCustodyLaw:_ԀADeskbookforJudges#XXX6X#6XXXX5:1,at51(1998),and,   therefore,thatstabilityandcontinuityofplacementareimportantconsiderationsincustodycases.   #XXX6Xȕ#Taylor_v._ԀTaylor,849S.W.2dat328;Contreras_v._ԀWard,831S.W.2d288,290(Tenn.Ct.App.   1991).Thus,thefactorsthatshouldbeconsideredwheneveradividedcustodyarrangementis p contemplatedinclude:(1)thedurationofeachparentsphysicalcustodyandthefrequencyofthe \ requiredchangesinthechildsresidence,(2)theeffectofthearrangementonthechildsrelationship H withhisorherparentsandotherfamilymembers,(3)theeffectofthearrangementonthechilds 4 education,(4)theeffectofthearrangementonthechildsreligiousupbringing,(5)theeffectofthe  p arrangementonthechildssocialrelationships,(6)theeffectofthearrangementonthecontinuity  \ ofthechildsmedicalanddentalcare,andinappropriatecircumstances,(7)thechildspreference. H   Thisrecordcontainssurprisinglylittleinformationregardingtheeffectthatadividedcustody   arrangementwillhaveontheSwettsson.Becauseheisenrolledinprivateschool,wepresumethat   itwillhavelittle,ifany,effectonhiseducation.Becausehisparentswillapparentlycontinuetolive  inthesamecommunity,dividedcustodyshouldhavelittlepracticaleffectonthechildsmedicaland  dentalcare,hisreligiousupbringing,hisrelationshipwithotherfamilymembers,orhisabilityto  developandmaintainfriendshipwithhispeers.Accordingly,wefindthattherecorddoesnot l containsufficientfactstowarrantsecondguessingthetrialcourtsdecision!atleastasthe X  circumstancesstoodatthetimeoftrial.However,aswenotedinGarner_v._ԀGarner,childrens  circumstanceschangeastheymature.TheSwettssonisapproachingtheagewhenhisdesireswith  regardtohislivingarrangementsmeritseriousconsideration.Accordingly,thetrialcourtshould  revisittheissueofdividedcustodyshouldtheboystateunequivocallythathedesirestostop t alternatinghislivingarrangements. ` @dd) IV.  8  @  TheDivisionoftheMaritalProperty  $ t   Bothparties_take_Ԁissuewiththemannerinwhichthetrialcourtclassifiedanddividedthe  L  partiesproperty.Ms.Swettassertsthatthetrialcourterredbyclassifyingtherealpropertyonwhich  8  thefamilyrestaurantislocatedasMr.Swettsseparatepropertyandbyfailingtoawardherpartof $  theincreaseinthevalueoftherestaurantbusinessduringthemarriage.Forhispart,Mr.Swett   arguesthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveawardedhimseveralitemsofpersonalpropertythatheleft   behindwhenheleftthemaritalresidence.Wehavedeterminedthatthetrialcourtcorrectly   classifiedthepartiespropertyandthatthemannerinwhichitdividedthepartiesmaritalproperty   wasessentiallyequitable. p @) A.  H   Dividingamaritalestatenecessarilybeginswiththeclassificationofthepropertyaseither  p separateormaritalproperty.Anderton_v._ԀAnderton,988S.W.2dat679;Herrera_v._ԀHerrera,944  \ S.W.2d379,389(Tenn.Ct.App.1996).Thedefinitionsof separatepropertyand marital H propertyinTenn.CodeAnn.364121(b)(2001)providethegroundrulesforthetask.Oncethe 4 propertyhasbeenclassified,thetrialcourtsgoalistodividethemaritalpropertyinanessentially   equitablemanner.Kinard_v._ԀKinard,986S.W.2d220,230(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Adivisionisnot   renderedinequitablesimplybecauseitisnotpreciselyequal,Cohen_v._ԀCohen,937S.W.2d823,832  (Tenn.1996);Bookout_v._ԀBookout,954S.W.2d730,732(Tenn.Ct.App.1997),orbecauseeach  partydidnotreceiveashareofeverypieceofmaritalproperty.King_v._ԀKing,986S.W.2d216,219  (Tenn.Ct.App.1998);Brown_v._ԀBrown,913S.W.2d163,168(Tenn.Ct.App.1994). l   Dividingamaritalestateisnotamechanicalprocessbutratherisguidedbyconsideringthe D! factorsinTenn.CodeAnn.364121(c).Kinard_v._ԀKinard,986S.W.2dat230.Trialjudgeshave 0"  widelatitudeinfashioninganequitabledivisionofmaritalproperty,Fisher_v._ԀFisher,648S.W.2d #l! 244,246(Tenn.1983);Brown_v._ԀBrown,913S.W.2dat168,andappellatecourtsaccordgreat $X" weighttoatrialcourtsdivisionofmaritalproperty.Wilson_v._ԀMoore,929S.W.2d367,372(Tenn. $D # Ct.App.1996);Edwards_v._ԀEdwards,501S.W.2d283,288(Tenn.Ct.App.1973).Thus,wewill %0!$ ordinarilydefertothetrialcourtsdecisionunlessitisinconsistentwiththefactorsinTenn.Code &"% Ann.364121(c)orisnotsupportedbyapreponderanceoftheevidence.Brown_v._ԀBrown,913 '#& S.W.2dat168;Mahaffey_v._ԀMahaffey,775S.W.2d618,622(Tenn.Ct.App.1989);Hardin_v._ (#' Hardin,689S.W.2d152,154(Tenn.Ct.App.1983). )$( ______ @-(, @) B.   @  ThePropertyandIncomeRelatingtoMr.SwettsFamilyBusiness     Ms.SwettassertsthatthetrialcourterredbyclassifyingMr.Swettsinterestinthereal t propertyownedbySwettProperties,Inc.asseparateproperty.Shealsoinsiststhatthetrialcourt ` erredbydecliningtoawardheranyoftheincomefromSwettsRestaurant,Inc.andanyofthe L  increaseinthevalueofSwettsRestaurant,Inc.duringthemarriage.Wehavedeterminedthatthe 8  trialcourtproperlyclassifiedtherealpropertyasMr.SwettsseparatepropertyandthatMs.Swett $ t didnotestablishthatshewasentitledtoanyoftherestaurantincomeortheincreaseinthevalueof  ` therestaurantbusinessduringthemarriage.  L  @) 1.  $    Separatepropertycannotbeincludedinamaritalestate.Dunlap_v._ԀDunlap,996S.W.2d803,   814(Tenn.Ct.App.1998);Brock_v._ԀBrock,941S.W.2d896,900(Tenn.Ct.App.1996).Thus,a   partyseekingtoincludeinthemaritalestatepropertyclaimedtobeseparatepropertybytheother   partyhastheburdenofprovingthatthepropertyfitswithinthestatutorydefinitionofmarital p property.Kinnard_v._ԀKinnard,916S.W.2dat232.Becausepropertyclassificationissuesare \ questionsoffact,Mitts_v._ԀMitts,39S.W.3d142,145(Tenn.Ct.App.2000);Brown_v._ԀBrown,913 H S.W.2dat167,appellatecourtswillreviewatrialcourtsclassificationdecisionsusingthefamiliar 4 standardofreviewinTenn.R.App.P.13(d).  p   Property,otherwiseclassifiableasseparateproperty,mayproperlybetreatedasmarital H propertyinseveralcircumstances.First,separatepropertycanbetransmutedintomaritalproperty 4 ifthepartiestreatitasmaritalpropertyandifthereisnoevidencethatthespouseowningthe   propertyintendedittoremainseparate.WrightMiller_v._ԀMiller,984S.W.2d936,941(Tenn.Ct.   App.1998);McClellan_v._ԀMcClellan,873S.W.2d350,351(Tenn.Ct.App.1993).Second,the  increaseinvalueofseparatepropertyandtheincomederivedfromseparatepropertycanbetreated  asmaritalpropertyifthenonownerspousehasmadesubstantialcontributionstothepreservation  orappreciationoftheseparatepropertyitself.Tenn.CodeAnn.364121(b)(1)(B);Cohen_v._ l Cohen,937S.W.2dat832;Harrison_v._ԀHarrison,912S.W.2d124,126(Tenn.1995).Fora X  nonownerspousescontributiontobedeemed substantial,itmustberealandsignificant.Mitts D! _v._ԀMitts,39S.W.3dat145;Denton_v._ԀDenton,33S.W.3d229,236(Tenn.Ct.App.2000).In 0"  addition,anonownerspouseclaimingtheincreaseinthevalueofseparatepropertyasmarital #l! propertymustprovethatthevalueoftheseparatepropertyactuallyincreasedduringthemarriage. $X" Thisnecessarilyinvolvesprovingthevalueofthepropertyimmediatelypriortothemarriageand $D # itsvalueatthetimeofthedivorce.Garfinkel_v._ԀGarfinkel,945S.W.2d744,747(Tenn.Ct.App. %0!$ 1996);Cutsinger_v._ԀCutsinger,917S.W.2d238,241(Tenn.Ct.App.1995). &"% @) 2.  (#'   Mr.SwettsparentsopenedSwettsRestaurantin1954at2725CliftonAvenueinNorth |*%) Nashville.In1979,Mr.SwettandhisbrotherformedapartnershipcalledSwettEnterprisesto h+&* acquiretherestaurantbusinessfromtheirfather.Mr.Swettsfatherretainedownershipofthereal T,'+ propertyonwhichthebusinesswaslocated.InApril1987,afterMr.SwettmarriedMs.Swett,his @-(, fathersoldtherealpropertytoMr.Swettandhisbrother.Mr.Swettandhisbrotherusedthe  proceedsfromtherestauranttopaytheirfatherfortherealproperty.In1988,theSwettbrothers  formedSwettProperties,Inc.toholdtherealestateat2725CliftonAvenue.C #  11      ׀Theyalsoexecuted  aformalpartnershipagreementproviding,amongotherthings,forthecontinuationoftheexisting t partnershipunderthenameofSwettsDinette. `   SwettsDinetteoperatedasapartnershipuntilMr.SwettsbrotherdiedinApril1995.At 8  thattime,Mr.Swettbecamethesoleownerofthebusinessbyoperationofthepartnership $ t agreement.AfterMr.Swettdecidedthathecouldnotoperatethebusinessbyhimself,histwoadult  ` sonsbyanearliermarriageassumedrolesinthebusiness.Mr.Swettincorporatedthebusinessin  L  January1996underthenameofSwettsRestaurant,Inc.B #  12      ׀Heretainedsixtypercentofthebusiness  8  andconveyedatwentypercentinteresttoeachofhistwosons. $  @) 3.      Ms.SwettacceptsthattherestaurantbusinessisMr.Swettsseparateproperty.However,   sheinsiststhattherealpropertyonwhichSwettsRestaurantislocatedismaritalpropertysolely p becauseMr.Swettandhisbrotheracquireditafterthepartiesweremarried.l #  13      ׀Thisargumentis \ withoutmerit.Therealpropertywaspurchasedusingincomefromtherestaurantbusinesswhich H _itself_ԀwasseparatepropertybecausethereisnoevidencethatMs.Swettcontributedsignificantlyto 4 therestaurantsoperation.Tenn.CodeAnn.364121(b)(2)(C).Separatepropertyincludes  p propertyacquiredinexchangeforseparateproperty.Tenn.CodeAnn.364121(b)(2)(B).  \ Therefore,anyrealpropertyacquiredinexchangeforincomefromtherestaurantisseparate H property.Thetrialcourtcorrectlyexcludedtherealpropertyat2725CliftonAvenuefromthe 4 maritalestate.   @) 4.     Ms.Swettalsoassertsthatthetrialcourterredbydecliningtoincludetheappreciationin  valueoftherestaurantbusinessinthemaritalestate.Wefindtwoproblemswiththisassertion. l First,thereislittleevidenceintherecordtosupport_finding_ԀthatMs.Swettsmonetaryandnon X  monetarycontributionstothemarriagesubstantiallybenefittedtherestaurant.Second,Ms.Swett D! presentednoevidenceregardingthevalueoftherestaurantbusinessimmediatelybeforetheparties  marriage.Accordingly,shehasfailedtoprovethatthevalueoftherestaurantbusinessappreciated  duringthemarriage.D #  14      ׀Intheabsenceofthisevidence,wecannotfaultthetrialcourtfordeclining  toincludetheincreaseinthevalueoftherestaurantbusinessduringthemarriageinthemarital t estate. ` @) C.  8  @  TheAwardofPersonalProperty  $ t   Mr.Swettarguesthatthetrialcourterredbyfailingtoawardhimthelivingroomandsun  L  roomfurniture.WhilethetrialcourtawardedMs.Swettallthepersonaltyinthemaritalhome,it  8  awardedMr.Swett(1)agrandfatherclockpurchasedinmemoryofhisbrother,(2)onehalfofthe $  outdoorfurniture,(3)furniture,collectibles,andentertainmentequipmentfromthefamilyroom,(4)   ahalltree,and(5)someHaitiancarvingsandsculptures.Wehavereviewedthemannerinwhich   thetrialcourtdividedthepersonaltyinthemaritalhomeinlightoftheneteffectofthedivisionof   theentiremaritalestateandhavenobasistoconcludethatthetrialcourtsdecisiondidnotdivide   thepartiesmaritalestateequitably.Theevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthemannerin p whichthetrialcourtdividedthemaritalestateinthiscase. \ @) V.  4 @< <  Ms.SwettsClaimforPostJudgmentInterest   p   Ms.Swettalsoarguesthatthetrialcourterredbyorderingthattheinterestontheawardof H $140,000shouldbegintoaccruethirtydaysafterthedatethetrialcourtannounceditsruling.She 4 contendsthatsheisstatutorilyentitledtointerestfromthedatethetrialcourtannounceditsruling.   Wedisagree.     Apartysrighttopostjudgmentinterestisbasedonitsentitlementtotheuseoftheproceeds  ofajudgment.WestAm.Ins.Co.v.Montgomery,861S.W.2d230,232(Tenn.1993);Vooys_v._  Turner,49S.W.3d318,322(Tenn.Ct.App.2001).Thepurposeofpostjudgmentinterestisto l compensateasuccessfulplaintiffforbeingdeprivedofthecompensationforitslossbetweenthe X  timeoftheentryofthejudgmentawardingthecompensationuntilthepaymentofthejudgmentby D! thedefendant.KaiserAluminum&Chem.Corp.v.Bonjorno,494U.S.827,83536,110S.Ct. 0"  1570,1576(1990).Accordingly,apartywhoenjoystheuseoffundsthatshouldhavebeenpaid #l! overtoanotherpartyshouldpayinterestontheretainedfunds.Lucius_v._ԀCityofMemphis,925 $X" S.W.2d522,526(Tenn.1996);Stinnett_v._ԀStinnett,No.E2000001210COAR3CV,2000WL $D # 1273880,at*4(Tenn.Ct.App.Sept.7,2000)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled). %0!$   Therighttopostjudgmentinterestisentirelystatutory.Owens_v._ԀState,710S.W.2d518, '#& 51819(Tenn.1986);Bedwell_v._ԀBedwell,774S.W.2d953,956(Tenn.Ct.App.1989).Tenn.Code (#' Ann.4714122(2001)succinctlyprovidesthat [i]nterestshallbecomputedoneveryjudgment )$( fromthedayonwhichthejuryorthecourt,sittingwithoutajury,returnedtheverdictwithoutregard |*%) toamotionforanewtrial.Becausethisstatuteisplainlymandatory,Vooys_v._ԀTurner,49S.W.3d  at322;Inman_v._ԀInman,840S.W.2d927,932(Tenn.Ct.App.1992);Bedwell_v._ԀBedwell,774  S.W.2dat956,wehaveheldthattrialcourtsarenotfreetoignoreit.Stinnett_v._ԀStinnett,2000WL  1273880,at*4. t   Normally,postjudgmentinterestbeginstoaccruefromthedateoftheentryofthejudgment, L  Pertew_v._ԀPertew,No.03A019711CH00505,1999WL486917,at*10(Tenn.Ct.App.July13, 8  1999)(NoTenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled);Inman_v._ԀInman,840S.W.2dat932,unlessthe $ t decreeprovidesotherwise.WestAmericanIns.Co._v._ԀMontgomery,861S.W.2d230,232(Tenn.  ` 1993);Inman_v._ԀAlexander,871S.W.2d153,154(Tenn.Ct.App.1993).Whenadecreeprovides  L  foroneormorepaymentstobemadeinthefuture,theobligationtopaypostjudgmentinterestdoes  8  notbegintoaccrueuntiltheobligationtopaythejudgmentactuallymatures.Price_v._ԀPrice,225 $  Tenn.539,544,472S.W.2d732,734(1971);Whiteside_v._ԀWhiteside,No.03A01-9707-CV-00272,   1998WL237715,at*11(Tenn.Ct.App.May7,1998)(NoTenn.R.App.P._application_Ԁfiled);   Beaty_v._ԀBeaty,No.01A01-9507-CH-00325,1996WL99784,at*3(Tenn.Ct.App.March8,1996)   (NoTenn.R.App.P.11_application_Ԁfiled).     ThetrialcourtawardedMs.Swett$140,000asanequitabledivisionofthemaritalproperty. \ Undertheorder,Mr.SwettwastopayMs.Swettwithinsixtydays,and [s]tatutoryinterestonthe H $140,000willrunafterthirtydays.Thus,Mr.Swettcouldhaveavoidedpayinganyinterestby 4 payingMs.Swettthe$140,000withinthirtydaysfollowingtheentryofthejudgment.However,  p byfailingtopaythe$140,000withinthirtydays,interestbeganaccruingontheunpaidamount  \ beginningonthethirtyfirstdayandbecamedueandpayableonthesixtyfirstdayfollowingthe H entryofthejudgment.Accordingly,wefindMs.Swettsclaimforpostjudgmentinteresttobe 4 withoutmerit.   @dd) VI.   @q q  Ms.SwettsRequestforAppellateLegalExpenses     Asafinalmatter,Ms.Swettrequestsanawardfromthiscourttodefrayherlegalexpenses l onappeal.WhileTenn.CodeAnn.365103(c)(2001)authorizestheawardofappellatelegal X  expensesincertaincircumstances,noneofthesecircumstances_exist_Ԁinthiscase.Ms.Swetthasnot D! beensuccessfulonanyoftheissuesshehasraisedonappeal.Accordingly,wedeclinetoawardher 0"  anyportionofherlegal_expenses_. #l! @==( VII.  $D #   Weaffirmthejudgmentandremandthecasetothetrialcourtforwhateverfurther &"% proceedingsmayberequired.WealsotaxthecostsofthisappealtoGraceZ.AlemanSwettandher '#& suretyforwhichexecution,ifnecessary,mayissue. (#'    `     h     _____________________________ T,'+    `     h     WILLIAMC.KOCH,JR.,JUDGE