ÿWPC’ ,# xUNƒ %Ñ 0(×w@ÿ4?S 0Jb 0T¬ 0^ 0h^ 0rÆ 0|8 0†´ 0: 1uÊ 0d?U>£B)áDC AMM AQš Æë 0D± 0@õ 0D5 U*y D/£ BÒ Bï D3 ? v~A vÓ¿˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ >U? @ A B C£DEFÓ€Rn~<$3|xR2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd "Cþÿ << Gÿÿ !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó< Œ 9p`(Arial'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxd øÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌò òJune€8,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€$ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÓ` Ü` p”XÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€Ìà@ àAT€JACKSONó óÌÌà@ à_______________________________________________________ÌÙ€ ÙßR€)A1-j|x]` Å `€€@ÿRßÌà à)Ìò òJUDITH€ANN€WARREN€TAYLORó ó,à à)à àShelby€Law€No.Ìà à)à à1050984€R.D.Ì€€€€€Plaintiff/Appellee.à à)Ìà à)ÌVS.à à)à àC.A.€No.€02A01„9706„CV„00112Ìà à)Ìò òMICHAEL€RAYMOND€TAYLORó ó,à à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Defendant/Appellant.à à)Ìà à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis.Ìò òHonorable€Janice€M.€Holder,€Judge€ó óÌÌÌÌò òMarti€L.€Kaufmanó ó,€MONROE,€KAUFMAN€&€McGHEE,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellant.ÌÌÌò òStevan€L.€Blackó ó,Ìò òKimberly€Harris€Jordanó ó,ÌBLACK,€BOBANGO€&€MORGAN,€P.C.,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Plaintiff/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌÌà àò òFARMER,€J.ó óÌÌò òCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ó ó:€(Concurs)Ìò òHIGHERS,€J.ó ó:€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ` Ü` ˜XÓÓÓà àJudith€Ann€Taylor€(ð ðWifeðð)€filed€a€complaint€for€divorce€against€Michael€RaymondÏTaylor€(ð ðHusbandðð)€and€also€sought€an€injunction€prohibiting€Husband€from€dissipating€maritalÏassets.€€Husband€filed€an€answer€and€counter„complaint€for€divorce.€€The€trial€court€granted€WifeÏthe€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€awarded€her€rehabilitative€alimony,Ïpartial€attorney€fees,€and€60%€of€the€marital€assets.€€Husband€appeals€and€raises€the€followingÏissues:€whether€the€trial€court€erred€(1)€in€awarding€Wife€rehabilitative€alimony€of€$1,300€perÏmonth€for€60€months;€(2)€in€ordering€Husband€to€pay€$20,000€as€alimony€òòò òin€solidoóó€ó ófor€WifeððsÏattorney€fees;€(3)€in€ordering€Husband€to€pay€a€portion€of€Wifeððs€health€insurance€coverage;€(4)€inÏrequiring€Husband€to€maintain€a€life€insurance€policy€which€exceeds€the€total€amount€of€childÏsupport€owed;€and€(5)€in€dividing€the€marital€property€of€the€parties.€€Wife€submits€the€additionalÏissue€of€whether€she€is€due€attorney€fees€on€appeal.€€For€the€reasons€stated€below,€we€find€no€errorÏand€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€in€all€respects.ÌÌà àThe€parties€were€married€in€July,€1978€and€separated€in€January,€1996.€€At€the€timeÏof€the€trial€below,€Husband€was€approximately€41€years€old€and€Wife€was€approximately€38€yearsÏold.€€€The€parties€have€two€children€who€are€now€approximately€16€and€13€years€of€age.€€The€trialÏcourt€awarded€custody€of€both€children€to€Wife.€€ÌÌà àHusband€has€a€Bachelorððs€Degree€in€Business€Administration€from€Oklahoma€StateÏUniversity.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€Husband€was€the€Regional€Director€of€BusinessÏDevelopment€for€APS€with€a€salary€of€Seventy„Seven€Thousand€Six€Hundred€Dollars€($77,600)Ïper€year.€€Husband€had€earned€more€substantial€compensation€in€recent€years,€includingÏapproximately€$160,000€in€1989,€$100,506€in€1993,€and€$133,685€in€1994.€€Much€of€HusbandððsÍcompensation€was€in€the€form€of€bonuses,€the€last€of€which€was€in€March,€1996€for€$17,500.€ÏHusband€testified€the€company€he€worked€for€was€bought€out€and€that€he€had€to€change€positionsÏto€keep€his€job.€€As€a€result€of€the€change€of€position,€Husband€claims€he€is€no€longer€entitled€toÏany€bonuses.€ÌÌà àWife€attended€Oklahoma€State€University€for€a€year€and€a€half,€but€does€not€have€aÏcollege€degree.€€Wifeððs€work€experience€during€the€partiesðð€marriage€is€varied.€€Before€the€birth€ofÏthe€partiesðð€first€child,€Wife€worked€full„time€as€a€receptionist.€€After€the€birth€of€the€children,€WifeÏworked€as€a€fill„in€receptionist€for€a€medical€clinic€where€she€earned€$10€per€hour.€€After€theÏpartiesðð€separation,€Wife€took€a€job€working€16€hours€a€week€at€$6.00€per€hour€as€a€file€clerk€atÏFederated€Insurance€Company.€€Wife€testified€that€she€did€not€seek€a€full„time€position€because€sheÏfelt€it€was€necessary€to€keep€the€childrenððs€lives€as€stable€as€possible€during€the€divorce.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.€Rehabilitative€Alimonyó óÌÌÓ  Óà àHusband€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€$1,300€per€month€in€rehabilitativeÏalimony€to€Wife.€€It€is€well€established€that€the€appellate€courts€should€give€much€deference€to€theÏtrial€courtððs€award€of€alimony.€ò òòòJones€v.€Jones,€ó óóó784€S.W.2d€349,€352€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€ÏNevertheless,€our€review€is€òòò òde€novoóó€ó ówith€a€presumption€of€correctness€for€the€factual€findings€ofÏthe€trial€court.€€Tenn.R.App.P.€Rule€13(d).ÌÌà àOur€legislature€has€clearly€established€a€preference€for€rehabilitative€alimony.€ÏT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€(Supp.€1997).€€Our€courts€have€affirmed€this€legislative€policy€byÏawarding€rehabilitative€alimony€whenever€feasible.€ò òòòAaron€v.€Aaron,€óóó ó909€S.W.2d€408,€410Ï(Tenn.€1995),€ò òòòSelf€v.€Self,€óóó ó861€S.W.2d€360,€361€(Tenn.€1993),€ò òòòStorey€v.€Storey,€óóó ó835ÏS.W.2d€593,€597€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€The€factors€the€court€uses€to€determine€whetherÏrehabilitative€alimony€is€proper€in€a€given€set€of€circumstances€are€expounded€in€the€statute€asÍfollows:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€andÏfinancial€resources€of€each€party,€including€income€from€pension,Ïprofit€sharing€or€retirement€plans€and€all€other€sources;Ìà8 àà à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€theÏability€and€opportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€such€education€andÏtraining,€and€the€necessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€education€andÏtraining€to€improve€such€party's€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonableÏlevel;Ìà8 àà à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;Ìà8 àà à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;Ìà8 àà à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€notÏlimited€to,€physical€disability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronicÏdebilitating€disease;Ìà8 àà à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€toÏseek€employment€outside€the€home€because€such€party€will€beÏcustodian€of€a€minor€child€of€the€marriage;Ìà8 à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€and€personal,Ïtangible€and€intangible;Ìà8 àà à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€propertyÏas€defined€in€ðð€36„4„121;Ìà8 àà à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€duringÏthe€marriage;Ìà8 àà à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangibleÏand€intangible€contributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetary€andÏhomemaker€contributions,€and€tangible€and€intangible€contributionsÏby€a€party€to€the€education,€training€or€increased€earning€power€ofÏthe€other€party;Ìà8 àà à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,Ïin€its€discretion,€deems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€€andÌà8 àà à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€toÏeach€party,€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€theÏparties.ÌÌÌÌÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(A)„(L)€(Supp.€1997).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àOur€review€of€the€record€convinces€us€the€trial€court€properly€considered€theseÏfactors€in€its€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony.€€Husbandððs€main€contention€with€the€trial€courtððsÏaward€is€that€the€monthly€amount€he€must€pay€is€too€high€given€the€relative€financial€position€of€theÏtwo€parties.€€However,€it€is€clear€that€Husbandððs€current€earning€capacity€and€overall€financialÏposition€is€much€better€than€that€of€Wife.€€Even€after€furthering€her€education€and€increasing€herÍmarketable€skills,€Wife€will€be€at€a€significant€economic€disadvantage€compared€to€Husband.€ÏWeighing€this€factor€with€the€other€factors€to€be€considered,€we€cannot€say€the€trial€court€erred€inÏawarding€rehabilitative€alimony€in€the€amount€of€$1,300€per€month€for€60€months.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.€Attorney€Feesó óÌÌÓ  Óà àHusband€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€$20,000€alimony€òòò òin€solidoóó€ó óto€wifeÏfor€attorney€fees.€€The€decision€to€award€attorney€fees€to€a€party€in€a€divorce€proceeding€is€withinÏthe€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€and€will€not€be€disturbed€on€appeal€except€upon€a€clearÏshowing€of€abuse€of€that€discretion.€ò òòò€Aaron,€óóó ó909€S.W.2d€at€411,€ò òòòaccord€Storey,€óóó ó835€S.W.2dÏat€597.€ÌÌà à€Husband€primarily€contends€that€Wife€was€awarded€sufficient€assets€to€pay€herÏown€attorney€fees.€€The€trial€court€awarded€Wife€60%€of€the€marital€assets€totaling€approximatelyÏ$132,000.€€The€trial€court€awarded€Husband€40%€of€the€assets€totaling€approximately€$88,000.€ÏThe€trial€court€also€allocated€to€Husband€all€of€the€marital€debts€which€totaled€up€to€$31,000,€notÏincluding€Wifeððs€attorney€fee€award.€€The€most€significant€debt€was€a€note€to€HusbandððsÏgrandfather€which€Husband€valued€at€$21,200€and€Wife€valued€at€$10,000.€The€difference€in€theirÏrespective€valuations€is€due€to€a€dispute€as€to€whether€Husbandððs€grandfather€had€agreed€to€reduceÏthe€note€to€include€principal€only.€ÌÌà àIn€her€ruling,€the€trial€judge€said,€ð ðI€am€not€one€to€award€attorneyððs€feesÏunnecessarily;€Iððm€not€one€to€award€large€amounts€of€attorneyððs€fees€generally€.€.€.€.€€In€this€case,Ïhowever,€I€canððt€subscribe€to€that€theory,€.€.€.ðð€€We€further€note€that€the€trial€judge€also€consideredÏthe€fact€that€Husband€had€used€some€of€the€marital€assets€to€pay€his€individual€attorney€fees.€€ThisÏissue€will€be€more€fully€developed€later€in€this€opinion.€€Given€the€circumstances€whichÏprecipitated€the€award€of€attorney€fees,€we€cannot€say€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€inÍawarding€Wife€$20,000€in€attorney€fees.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òIII.€Health€Insurance€Coverageó óÌÌÓ  Óà àHusbandððs€third€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€Husband€to€pay€aÏportion€of€Wifeððs€health€insurance€coverage.€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(f)(1)€reads€as€follows:€ÌÌà8 àà àÓÓThe€court€may€direct€the€acquisition€or€maintenance€of€healthÏinsurance€covering€each€child€of€the€marriage€and€may€order€eitherÏparty€to€pay€all,€or€each€party€to€pay€a€pro€rata€share€of,€the€healthÏcare€costs€not€paid€by€insurance€proceeds.€€The€court€may€also€directÏa€party€to€pay€the€premiums€for€insurance€insuring€the€health€careÏcosts€of€the€other€party.ÌÌÌÌÓÓThe€statute€gives€the€trial€court€broad€discretion€in€determining€whether€to€require€one€party€to€payÏthe€ò òòòentire€óóó óhealth€insurance€premiums€of€the€other€party.€€In€this€particular€case,€the€trial€judge€onlyÏrequired€Husband€to€pay€one€half€of€Wifeððs€insurance€premium.€€We€find€no€error.ÌÌÓ  Óò òÌIV.€€Life€Insurance€Coverageó óÌÌÓ  Óà àHusband€alleges€the€trial€court€erred€in€requiring€Husband€to€maintain€a€lifeÏinsurance€policy€which€exceeds€the€total€amount€of€child€support€owed.€€Husband€was€ordered€toÏpay€$1,481€per€month€in€child€support€until€the€youngest€child,€age€11€at€the€time€of€trial,€reachesÏthe€age€of€18.€Husband€argues€that€the€total€amount€of€child€support€due,€i.e.,€$124,404,€is€wellÏbelow€the€$300,000€amount€of€life€insurance€the€trial€court€forced€him€to€maintain€to€insure€theÏpayment€of€his€child€support€obligation.ÌÌà àThe€applicable€statute€is€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(g)€which€reads:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€court€may€direct€either€or€both€parties€to€designate€theÏother€party€and€the€children€of€the€marriage€as€beneficiaries€underÏany€existing€policies€insuring€the€life€of€either€party€and€maintenanceÏof€existing€policies€insuring€the€life€of€either€party,€or€the€purchaseÏand€maintenance€of€life€insurance€and€designation€of€beneficiaries.ÌÌÌÌÓÓHusband€does€not€cite€us€to€any€supporting€authority€for€his€contention.€€We€read€nothing€in€theÏstatute€and€find€nothing€in€the€case€law€which€forces€the€trial€court€to€limit€the€amount€ofÏHusbandððs€life€insurance€to€the€amount€of€child€support€ordered€by€the€court.€€The€court€directedÏthat€the€children€were€to€be€the€irrevocable€beneficiaries€of€this€policy.€€Therefore,€contrary€toÏHusbandððs€assertions,€the€death€of€Husband€before€the€expiration€of€this€policy€would€result€in€noÏwindfall€to€Wife.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òV.€€The€Division€of€Marital€Propertyó óÌÌÓ  Óà àð ðTrial€courts€have€broad€discretion€in€dividing€the€marital€estate€in€a€divorce€case.€ÏAccordingly,€their€decisions€are€entitled€to€great€weight€on€appeal,€and€are€presumed€to€be€correctÏunless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.ðð€€ò òòòMondelli€v.€Howard,€óóó ó780€S.W.2d€769,€772Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989)€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àHusband€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€60/40€division€of€assets.€€Husbandððs€firstÏsubissue€under€this€category€is€that€he€alleges€the€trial€courtððs€division€was€in€reality€64.22%€toÏWife€and€35.77%€to€him.€€Husbandððs€calculation€is€incorrect€because€it€fails€to€account€forÏapproximately€$30,000€he€received€from€one„half€of€the€sale€of€the€marital€residence.€€Once€thatÏamount€is€added€to€both€Husbandððs€and€Wifeððs€total€assets,€the€percentage€is€very€close€to€a€60/40Ïdivision.€€Our€courts€have€clearly€stated€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121€(1996),€the€statuteÏwhich€authorizes€the€division€of€marital€assets,€does€not€require€the€division€of€property€to€be€equalÏin€order€to€be€equitable.€ò òòò€Ellis€v.€Ellis,€óóó ó748€S.W.2d€424,€427€(Tenn.€1988).€€This€first€subissueÏis€without€merit.€ÌÌà àHusbandððs€second€subissue€involves€the€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€100%€of€theÏmarital€debt€to€Husband.€€Our€court€in€òòò òMondelli,€supraóóó ó,€spoke€at€length€about€the€factors€whichÏaid€the€trial€court€in€the€allocation€of€marital€debt.€€The€court€said:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àCourts€should€apportion€marital€debts€equitably€in€much€theÏsame€way€that€they€divide€marital€assets.€€When€practicable,€theÏdebts€should€follow€the€assets€they€purchased.€ÌÌà8 àà àCourts€should€consider€the€following€factors€when€theyÏdivide€marital€debts:€(1)€which€party€incurred€the€debt€and€the€debtððsÏpurpose,€(2)€which€party€benefitted€from€incurring€the€debt,€and€(3)Ïwhich€party€is€best€able€to€assume€and€repay€the€debt.ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòò òMondellióóó ó,€780€S.W.2d€at€773€(citations€omitted).€€Furthermore,€the€ò òòòMondelli€óóó ócourt€refused€toÏadopt€a€ð ðmechanical€approachðð€which€would€require€the€trial€courtððs€distribution€of€debt€to€mirrorÏthe€same€percentage€the€court€used€in€the€distribution€of€assets.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.ÌÌà àThe€record€reveals€that€the€trial€court€was€thoroughly€familiar€with€the€principlesÏwhich€guide€the€allocation€of€marital€debts.€€From€our€review,€it€appears€the€trial€court€properlyÏallocated€the€debts€to€Husband.€€The€largest€marital€debt,€a€note€to€Husbandððs€grandfather,€was€forÏthe€benefit€of€both€parties.€€However,€given€the€dispute€over€the€value€of€the€note€and€HusbandððsÏhigher€earning€capacity,€it€was€proper€for€the€trial€court€to€assign€this€debt€to€Husband.€€ÌÌà àHusband€also€raises€the€issue€that€the€trial€court€primarily€used€Wifeððs€valuation€ofÏmarital€assets€instead€of€utilizing€his€valuation.€€The€underlying€issue€here€is€one€of€credibility.€ÏThe€trial€court€obviously€found€Wife€to€be€the€more€credible€witness€and€we€think€the€recordÏsupports€this€finding.€€Furthermore,€the€trial€court€has€broad€discretion€in€matters€of€credibilityÏwith€which€appellate€courts€are€hesitant€to€interfere.€ò òòò€Randolph€v.€Randolph,€óóó ó937€S.W.2dÏ815,€819€(Tenn.€1996).ÌÌà àHusbandððs€third€subissue€charges€the€trial€judge€with€improperly€consideringÏHusbandððs€use€of€a€marital€asset€to€pay€personal€debts.€€The€asset€at€issue€is€an€investment€accountÏwhich€held€approximately€$63,000€at€one€time.€€The€trial€court€ordered€these€funds€to€be€depositedÏby€Husband€into€a€joint€checking€account€to€ensure€that€the€funds€would€not€be€dissipated€prior€toÏtrial.€€€Instead,€Husband€deposited€the€funds€into€an€individual€checking€account€in€his€name€only.ÏWith€the€courtððs€permission,€Husband€spent€a€portion€of€these€funds€to€retire€a€second€mortgageÏon€the€marital€residence€and€to€pay€joint€credit€card€debt.€€However,€approximately€$4,000€of€theÏfunds€were€used€to€pay€Husbandððs€individual€attorney€fees€and€the€remaining€balance€was€alsoÏdepleted€prior€to€trial.€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€heard€testimony€from€Husband€as€to€why€he€had€disobeyed€theÏcourtððs€order€by€placing€the€funds€into€an€individual€account€rather€than€a€joint€account.€€Part€ofÏHusbandððs€justification€related€to€his€compliance€with€conflicting€or€confusing€instructions€fromÏthe€court„appointed€Divorce€Referee.€€After€weighing€all€the€evidence,€the€trial€judge€elected€not€toÏfind€Husband€in€contempt.€€However,€the€trial€judge€did€consider€the€dissipation€of€this€maritalÏasset€when€allocating€the€marital€assets€and€the€marital€debt.€€In€our€view,€this€was€within€the€trialÏcourtððs€discretion€and€the€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òVI.€€Attorney€Fees€on€Appealó óÌÌÓ  Óà àWife€requests€the€court€award€her€reasonable€attorney€fees€on€appeal.€€While€WifeÏwas€successful€in€defending€each€issue€Husband€raised€on€appeal,€we€do€not€feel€that€an€award€ofÏattorney€fees€is€warranted€under€the€circumstances.€€Costs€in€this€cause€on€appeal€are€taxed€toÏHusband€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌHIGHERS,€J.€(Concurs)