’WPCŪ $ŚDįEÉ5VĄęVĄL‘ŅFėņ#…·é­SJŠPD?—ŪóŽRŠāÆų½Ņ?ümŽ=ģo“>C+Q“f»°vķD„-e`’­łĢucœ®÷žźCŚmÜDX„mõ•‹ąŹ®a†zćT”j”ˆyO²+kš‹+š”īńģNh½z?8Ö>ą'Ū©;¬™[Ū­ģD‰“ ¦RчčCS…©ŖŸ©.sņŒßØu&G’6¹˜Fžf¤E]ē¹Mß8ÉĪQąuyµEA4 'äH‡ƒżö]ą±Ö=ąßHżÜ4Ä„Ė#ßµlčI{±čŗ .@øéŽüPj—ō½Ł&BDWŠ.š)vĶ“Ą”1r¬c„Źoż¬B Že‹`J7ÆÖÖā;ƒÖg“k‘ Ķē²T%„D-“”•jČJ]•2DoɁśŁī8‘P:s ķƒüz”Ƴ$„8IFĄŒĮŠ”,HsUÕ”yČšK°'½$א±…ł.}wŃ+ļіöĮŅ+Ą!ś1ŁrŻaYœ”ąģ.ű“]ćöń½]O„Aµ™a—YéĪ{"wĒqųŗĢP€YC÷3ŽŚż’*Ō°P3³V©ŃtEX—…“ Fū¦ĻĻσ‹ ;:3 }°b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkŅå· m¹ #ÉŠ UN™ Ęē Ę­ ĘsĘ99N’ 0D‰EEĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪbŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ 0ėŲŲŲŲ BĆĆ 0¤ą D3„ D-· 0Kää AS/ʂ 0¤H 0Dģ A«0»]1Ž (`£Ŗ$””Ń€.ŃŃ8€½­»»d»»d8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  Ó(ķ€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularփF1ź:i¢×+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt’U‹’ĄĄĄ˜\\IB01S08\KNOXCLERK4ČČ,,,,ČČ0(@ųŠ Z‹6Times New Roman RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ć$ņņŚ  Ś0Ś  Śóó Ż ƒR†Ö$ŻÓ  Óą  ąņņŚ  Ś1Ś  ŚóóŌ€ōžµņ»»ŌŻ  ŻŌ_ŌWhile€this€court€has€previously€noted€in€another€case€that€the€issue€of€after„acquired€evidence€was€a€matterŠ ° Šof€first€impression€in€this€state,€the€court€in€that€case€never€reached€the€issue€and,€thus,€the€issue€remains€one€of€firstŠ tÄ Šimpression.€€ņņSee€ņ ņBooth€v.€Fredššs,€Inc.ó óóó,€No.€W2002„01414„Ō_ŌCOAŌ_Ō„R3„CV,€2003€WL€21998410,€at€*15„*16€(Tenn.€Ct.Š 8ˆ ŠApp.€Ō_ŌW.S.Ō_Ō,€filed€August€19,€2003).- ł-(|G2†Ö$¤¤Ż ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€H„»»dd8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Żą  ąņņŚ  Ś0Ś  ŚóóŌ€ōžµņ»»Ō d(|3æ€$££Ż ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€H„»»dd8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  ŻVVVV'’’dxd)!ČČČČdxdx( ±ž$’’ņ ņFigure€Ś  Ś1Ś  Śó ó^_X`YEž’<<C’’ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3æ€$¢¢Ż ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€H„»»dd8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  Ż($$””ņ ņŚ  Ś1Ś  Śó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8’’’’’’’’’’C’’ HKKKKŻ ƒ£Ŗ!ŻŃ€.ŃŃ8€H„»»ddČ8ŃŃ ż ŃÓ  ÓŻ  ŻŌ_ŌŃ  ŃŌ€¼H„»»»ŌŃ8€ XXdģ»»d8ŃŃ  Ńą@ü ü ģąŌ‡īKģH„ŌIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆŠ ° Šą@WW$ģąAT€KNOXVILLEŌ#†¼H„»īīKģ #ԈŠ Ö& ŠÓ  ÓMay€11,€2004€SessionŠ üL ŠŌ‡X X»¼H„ŌĢņ ņŌ#†¼H„»XX ń#ŌERIC€Ō_ŌTETERŌ_Ōņņóó€v.€REPUBLIC€PARKING€SYSTEM,€INC.ņņóóŌ‡X X»¼H„Ōó óŠ śJ ŠĢą@@½½ģąņ ņ€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Hamilton€CountyŠ ś J Šą@@ųųģąNo.€01„1311€€€€€€W.€Frank€Brown,€III,€ChancellorŠ ę 6 ŠĢĢą@@ģģ*ģąßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` Aߊ Ŗś  ŠĢą@@TTģąNo.€E2003„02735„Ō_ŌCOAŌ_Ō„R3„CV€€„€FILED€OCTOBER€29,€Ō_Ō2004Ō_ŌŠ „õ  ŠĢßA€V) °°` dE<|` Aߊ }Ķ  Šó óĢÓ  ÓIn€this€employment€law€matter,€Eric€Ō_ŌTeterŌ_Ō€brought€suit€against€his€former€employer,€RepublicŠ xČ  ŠParking€System,€Inc.€(š šRPSšš),€alleging€that€it€had€breached€Ō_ŌTeterŌ_Ōššs€employment€contract€when€itŠ d“ Šrefused€to€honor€the€severance€pay€provisions€alluded€to€in€the€contract.€€RPS€denied€that€it€hadŠ P  Šbreached€the€contract,€instead€contending,€ņņinter€aliaóó,€that€the€plaintiff€was€guilty€of€š šgrossŠ <Œ Šmisconductšš€which€barred€his€claim.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€plaintiffššs€motion€for€summaryŠ (x Šjudgment,€holding€that€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€$795,037.35€under€the€severance€pay€provisions.€Š d ŠIn€addition,€the€trial€court€awarded€the€plaintiff€prejudgment€interest€at€the€rate€of€10%€per€annum.€Š P ŠRPS€appeals,€arguing€(1)€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€the€plaintiff€was€discharged€byŠ ģ< ŠRPS;€(2)€that€the€subject€severance€pay€provisions€are€not€implicated€by€the€facts€of€this€case;€(3)€thatŠ Ų( Šthe€severance€pay€provisions€constitute€an€illegal€penalty;€(4)€that€RPS€should€be€permitted€to€relyŠ Ä Šupon€after„acquired€evidence€of€Ō_ŌTeterŌ_Ōššs€misconduct€to€deny€him€severance€pay;€and€(5)€that,€in€anyŠ ° Ševent,€the€plaintiff€was€only€entitled€to€receive€2€times€his€annual€salary€and€bonus€under€theŠ œģ Šseverance€pay€provisions.€€In€addition,€RPS€contends€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€whenŠ ˆŲ Šit€awarded€prejudgment€interest€to€the€plaintiff.€€We€affirm.Š tÄ ŠÓŚÓĢĢņ ņTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtŠ 8!ˆ  ŠAffirmed;€Case€Remandedó óŠ $"t! ŠĢņņÓ  ÓŌ#†¼H„»ąX Ž#ŌŌ‡X X.¼H„ŌCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€ņņHerschel€P.€Franks,€Ō_ŌP.J.Ō_Ō,óóŠ ü#L# Šand€ņņWilliam€H.€Ō_ŌInmanŌ_Ō,€Ō_ŌSr.J.Ō_Ōóó,€joined.Š č$8 $ ŠĢJohn€C.€Harrison€and€William€H.€Horton,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€RepublicŠ Ą&"& ŠParking€System,€Inc.Š ¬'ü"' ŠĢB.€Stewart€Jenkins,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Eric€Ō_ŌTeterŌ_Ō.Š „)Ō$) ŠÓ^ ÓĢņ ņOPINIONó óŌ#†¼H„»XX  #ŌŌ‡X X»¼H„ŌŠ \+¬&+ ŠĢņņóóŌ#†¼H„»XX %#ŌŌ‡X X»¼H„ŌÓ  ÓŠ  4-„(-ż ŠŌ_ŌÓ  ÓI.Ō#†¼H„»XX ƒ#ŌŌ€X X»¼H„ŌŠ ° ŠĢÓ×Óą  ąRPS€is€a€Tennessee€corporation.€€Its€principal€place€of€business€is€located€in€Chattanooga.€Š ˆŲ ŠThe€companyššs€chief€executive€officer€is€James€Berry.€€Sometime€prior€to€November€27,€1995,€theŠ tÄ Šplaintiff€entered€into€discussions€with€Mr.€Berry€regarding€the€plaintiffššs€potential€employment€withŠ `° ŠRPS.€€At€that€time,€the€plaintiff€was€employed€as€the€general€manager€and€vice€president€of€EuropeanŠ L œ Šoperations€for€Central€Parking€System,€a€competitor€of€RPS.€€During€the€course€of€their€discussions,Š 8 ˆ Šthe€plaintiff€indicated€to€Mr.€Berry€that€he€desired€some€sort€of€protection€in€the€event€hisŠ $ t Šemployment€with€RPS€was€terminated.€€It€appears€that€the€two€agreed€on€a€severance€package€as€anŠ  ` Šinducement€for€the€plaintiff€to€leave€his€then„present€employment,€where€he€was€making€a€higherŠ ü L  Šsalary.Š č 8  ŠĢą  ąOn€or€about€November€27,€1995,€the€plaintiff€signed€an€employment€agreement€(š šthe€1995Š Ą  Šagreementšš)€with€RPS,€under€the€terms€of€which€the€plaintiff€became€the€regional€vice€president€ofŠ ¬ü  ŠRPS.€€The€1995€agreement€includes€the€following€severance€pay€provisions:Š ˜č  ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąIn€the€event€Employee€is€discharged€for€any€reason€other€than€grossŠ pĄ Šmisconduct,€fraud,€neglect€of€job€responsibilities€or€voluntaryŠ \¬ Štermination,€he/she€will€receive€the€following€as€severance€pay.ŠH˜` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąAn€amount€equal€to€twelve€(12)€monthššs€[sic]€base€salary,€plus€anŠ  p Šamount€equal€to€Employeeššs€prior€twelve€month€bonus/commissionŠ  \ Špayments.€€ŠųH` x` x ŠĢą  ąIn€January,€1997,€the€plaintiff€signed€a€new€employment€agreement€with€RPS€(š šthe€1997Š Š  Šagreementšš),€with€an€effective€date€of€January€1,€1997.€€In€the€1997€agreement,€the€plaintiff€becameŠ ¼  Šthe€vice€president€of€urban€parking€operations,€with€an€annual€salary€of€$100,000,€€plus€15%€of€theŠ Øų Šmonthly€profits€over€$12,500€generated€from€certain€cities€in€the€plaintiffššs€region;€these€cities€wereŠ ”ä Šlocated€both€east€and€west€of€the€Mississippi€River.€€The€1997€agreement,€which€was€signedŠ €Š Šsometime€after€April€1,€1997,€contained€the€following€additional€pertinent€provisions:Š l¼ ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąEMPLOYEE€agrees€to€serve€in€such€capacity,€to€perform€all€theŠ D!” Šduties€required€thereof,€including€but€not€limited€to,€handlingŠ 0"€  Špersonnel,€directing€operations,€maintaining€true€and€correct€records,Š #l! Šreporting€same€to€EMPLOYER€as€required,€and€to€give€his€full€timeŠ $X" Šand€best€efforts€thereto;Šō$D #` x` x ŠĢÓ  Ó*€*€*Š Ģ&"% ŠÓÓĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąThis€contract€may€be€terminated€by€either€party€upon€One€HundredŠ ¤(ō#' ŠTwenty€(120)€days€written€notice€unless€EMPLOYEE€is€dischargedŠ )ą$( Šor€resigns€as€a€result€of€the€commission€by€him€or€her€of€an€actŠ |*Ģ%) Šinvolving€theft,€embezzlement,€fraud€or€intentional€mishandling€ofŠ h+ø&* ŠCompany€funds,€in€which€event€such€termination€will€be€effectiveŠ ° Šimmediately.€€ņņIn€the€event€EMPLOYEE€is€discharged€for€any€reasonŠ œģ Šother€than€gross€misconduct,€fraud,€embezzlement,€theft€or€voluntaryŠ ˆŲ Štermination,€EMPLOYEE€will€be€entitled€to€severance€pay€under€theŠ tÄ Šterms€of€the€š šEmployment€Protection€Plan€š!š€Change€in€OwnershipŠ `° ŠStructurešš€provision€attached.ŠL œ` x` x ŠóóĢ(Numbering€of€paragraphs€in€original€omitted;€capitalization€in€original)€(emphasis€added).Š $ t ŠĢą  ąBefore€the€1997€agreement€was€signed,€on€March€10,€1997,€the€plaintiff€sent€a€memorandumŠ ü L  Što€Mr.€Berry,€in€which€the€plaintiff€submitted€a€proposed€š šarrangement€to€protect€our€key€executivesŠ č 8  Šin€the€event€of€a€sale€or€change€in€ownership.šš€€Attached€to€the€memorandum€was€a€documentŠ Ō$  Šentitled€š šEmployment€Protection€Plan,šš€which€provides€as€follows:Š Ą  ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąņ ņA.€ó ó€In€the€event€that€James€C.€Berry€is€no€longer€the€active€ChairmanŠ ˜č  Šand€CEO€of€EMPLOYER€or€EMPLOYER€is€sold€to€an€outsideŠ ˆŲ  Šinterest,€then€in€such€event€EMPLOYEE€has€the€option€of€voluntarilyŠ tÄ Šresigning,€provided€such€resignation€becomes€effective€within€oneŠ `° Šhundred€eighty€(180)€days€from€date€of€change€or€sale€with€said€lumpŠ Lœ Šsum€payment€as€provided€below€being€made€on€the€date€that€suchŠ 8ˆ Švoluntary€resignation€becomes€effective.Š$t` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąņņņ ņChange€in€Ownership€Structureó óą0` x` xąņ ņEmployment€Protection€Planó óóóŠüLxx ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąYears€1€š!š€2€of€Employmentą0Ą` x` xąą0ĄxĄxą1.0€times€previous€years€salaryŠ Ō$ Šand€bonusŠĄxx ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąYears€3€š!š€4€of€Employmentą0Ą` x` xąą0ĄxĄxą2.0€times€previous€years€salaryŠ ˜č Šand€bonusŠ„Ōxx ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąYear€5+€of€Employmentą0Ą` x` xąą0ĄxĄxą3.0€times€previous€years€salaryŠ \ ¬ Šand€bonusŠH!˜xx ŠĢĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąņ ņB.€€ó óFurthermore,€in€the€event€that€EMPLOYER€goes€public€the€valueŠ  $\" Šof€EMPLOYEEššS€previous€yearššs€bonus€payment€multiplied€by€aŠ ü$L # Šmultiple€of€seven€during€the€first€two€years€of€employment€and€by€aŠ č%8!$ Šmultiple€of€four€and€one€half€in€years€three€and€beyond,€to€be€paid€inŠ Ō&$"% Šstock€or€cash€as€determined€by€the€Chairman€and€CEO€ofŠ Ą'#& ŠEMPLOYER.€€Said€payment€to€be€made€within€ninety€days€(90)€ofŠ ¬(ü#' Špublic€listing.Š˜)č$(` x` x Šā āŠ „*Ō%) Šą8  ąą8` Š Š ąNo€payments€under€either€of€the€above€will€be€made€shouldŠ ° Šā āEMPLOYEEššS€employment€with€EMPLOYER€voluntarily€cease€orŠ œģ Šbe€terminated€for€gross€misconduct,€fraud,€embezzlement€or€theft.ŠˆŲ` x` x ŠĢ(Bold€type,€underling,€and€capitalization€in€original).Š `° ŠĢą  ąMr.€Berry€agreed€to€the€plaintiffššs€suggestion€and,€on€April€16,€1997,€Mr.€Berry,€on€behalfŠ 8 ˆ Šof€RPS,€and€the€plaintiff,€on€his€behalf,€signed€the€š šEmployment€Protection€Planšš€with€the€terms€setŠ $ t Šforth€above.Š  ` ŠĢą  ąThe€plaintiff€continued€his€employment€under€the€1997€agreement€for€the€next€four€years,Š č 8  Šand€in€each€of€those€four€years,€the€urban€division€had€increased€profits.€€In€March,€2001,€Mark€HuthŠ Ō$  Šbecame€president€and€chief€operating€officer€of€RPS.€€Mr.€Berry€continued€as€the€CEO€of€RPS.Š Ą  ŠBetween€March,€2001,€and€August,€2001,€Mr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€determined€that€the€urban€divisionŠ ¬ü  Šneeded€to€be€restructured,€which€restructuring€would€include€a€change€in€the€plaintiffššs€jobŠ ˜č  Šresponsibilities.€€The€executives€decided€to€split€the€urban€division€into€two€regions:€one€east€of€theŠ „Ō  ŠMississippi€River€and€one€west€of€the€Mississippi€River.€€The€plaintiff,€it€was€determined,€would€beŠ pĄ Šin€charge€of€the€division€east€of€the€Mississippi€River,€with€the€exception€of€Charleston,€SouthŠ \¬ ŠCarolina€and€Ann€Arbor,€Michigan.Š H˜ ŠĢą  ąOn€August€10,€2001,€Mr.€Huth€met€with€the€plaintiff€and€informed€him€of€this€proposedŠ  p Šchange.€€The€proposed€contract€provided€for€an€increase€in€the€plaintiffššs€base€salary€from€$100,000Š  \ Šper€year€to€$160,000€per€year,€but€the€plaintiffššs€bonus€structure€was€changed€to€only€12.5%€of€theŠ ųH Šprofits€over€and€above€those€generated€in€the€year€2000,€which€had€been€the€divisionššs€mostŠ ä4 Šprofitable€year€to€date.€€In€addition,€the€proposal€stated€that€the€plaintiffššs€division€was€to€be€cut€inŠ Š  Šhalf,€to€include€only€those€cities€east€of€the€Mississippi€River,€save€Charleston€and€Ann€Arbor.Š ¼  ŠUnlike€the€1997€agreement,€the€proposed€contract€did€not€contain€a€severance€package.Š Øų ŠĢą  ąAt€a€meeting€with€Mr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€on€August€13,€2001,€the€plaintiff€rejected€theŠ €Š Šproposed€contract.€€Mr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€then€made€a€second€proposal€to€the€plaintiff,€offeringŠ l¼ Ša€base€salary€of€$125,000,€but€a€bonus€based€upon€12.5%€of€all€profits€generated€from€the€urbanŠ X Ø Šdivision€cities€east€of€the€Mississippi€River,€including€Charleston€and€Ann€Arbor.€€In€addition,€theŠ D!” Šexecutives€presented€two€other€options€to€the€plaintiff.€€He€could€accept€an€immediate€payment€ofŠ 0"€  Š$265,000€as€severance€pay,€or€he€could€agree€to€a€one„year€trial€period€under€the€new€proposal,€withŠ #l! Šeither€party€having€the€option€to€terminate€the€contract.€€If€either€party€terminated€the€contract€afterŠ $X" Šthe€one„year€period,€the€plaintiff€would€still€receive€the€$265,000€severance€pay.Š ō$D # ŠĢą  ąThe€plaintiff€rejected€all€of€these€proposals€and€made€it€clear€that€he€only€wished€to€continueŠ Ģ&"% Šworking€for€RPS€under€the€terms€of€the€1997€agreement,€indicating€that,€without€a€severanceŠ ø'#& Špackage€in€a€new€proposed€contract,€he€was€not€interested€in€what€the€base€salary€would€be.Š ¤(ō#' ŠĢą  ąOn€September€5,€2001,€Mr.€Berry€told€the€plaintiff€to€take€the€next€two€days€off€from€work,Š |*Ģ%) Šas€other€urban€executives€were€coming€to€Chattanooga€for€a€meeting€and€Mr.€Berry€believed€it€wouldŠ h+ø&* Šbe€best€if€the€plaintiff€was€not€present€since€his€contract€issue€had€not€been€resolved.€€BetweenŠ ° ŠSeptember€5,€2001,€and€September€10,€2001,€when€the€plaintiff€returned€to€work,€the€locks€to€theŠ œģ ŠRPS€executive€offices€were€changed€and€the€plaintiff€was€unable€to€use€his€key€to€access€the€offices.Š ˆŲ ŠĢą  ąOn€September€11,€2001,€Mr.€Berry€sent€the€plaintiff€a€memorandum€outlining€the€offers€thatŠ `° Šhad€been€made€to€him€in€August,€2001.€€Following€the€outline€of€the€proposals,€the€letter€stated,€inŠ L œ Špertinent€part,€as€follows:Š 8 ˆ ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąIn€conclusion,€I€want€to€emphasize€again,€that€I€feel€that€we€made€youŠ  ` Ša€good€and€honorable€proposal,€and€it€was€a€mistake€for€you€not€toŠ ü L  Šhave€given€it€the€serious€consideration€it€deserved.€€From€what€IŠ č 8  Šdetected€in€our€conversation€yesterday,€you€are€taking€the€positionŠ Ō$  Šand€made€your€decision€based€upon€š šitššs€just€the€principlešš€withoutŠ Ą  Šgiving€credit€to€the€overall€fairness€and€merits€of€the€offer.Ьü ` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąHaving€said€all€of€the€above,€since€you€have€no€desire€to€continueŠ „Ō  Šwith€RPS€which€you€indicated,€I€guess€we€should€part€company€andŠ pĄ Šget€on€with€life.€€Although€under€the€circumstances€we€do€not€feelŠ \¬ Šthat€we€are€required€to€provide€any€severance€pay,€we€will€pay€you€upŠ H˜ Što€six€(6)€months€the€same€as€we€paid€Mark€Pratt.€€This€will€be€paidŠ 4„ Što€you€in€the€same€manner€in€which€you€are€being€paid€presently,Š  p Štwice€monthly,€including€50%€of€your€estimated€monthly€bonus.Š \` x` x ŠĢThe€memorandum€was€signed€by€Mr.€Berry.€€After€receiving€the€memorandum,€the€plaintiff€beganŠ ä4 Šcleaning€out€his€office.Š Š  ŠĢą  ąOn€September€12,€2001,€an€RPS€employee€noticed€that€the€central€processing€unit€(š šCPUšš)Š Øų Šof€the€plaintiffššs€office€computer€was€missing.€€After€being€notified€of€the€missing€CPU,€Mr.€HuthŠ ”ä Šbecame€concerned€that€the€plaintiff€was€attempting€to€download€proprietary€information€of€RPS,€andŠ €Š ŠRPS€made€several€attempts€to€retrieve€the€CPU€from€the€plaintiff.€€The€plaintiff€returned€the€CPUŠ l¼ Šthe€following€day,€explaining€that€he€had€been€attempting€to€delete€some€personal€files.€€An€RPSŠ X Ø Šemployee€deleted€the€files€for€the€plaintiff€after€the€plaintiff€had€identified€the€files€that€he€deemedŠ D!” Špersonal.Š 0"€  ŠĢą  ąRPS€then€sent€the€CPU€to€a€data€company€for€analysis.€€The€analysis€revealed€that€theŠ $X" Šplaintiff€had€used€the€computer€to€access€numerous€pornography€web€sites€during€regular€businessŠ ō$D # Šhours.€€Upon€receipt€of€this€information,€Mr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€determined€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ ą%0!$ Šguilty€of€gross€misconduct€and€had€breached€his€duties€as€an€RPS€executive.€€Accordingly,€Mr.€BerryŠ Ģ&"% Šsent€a€letter€to€the€plaintiff€dated€October€24,€2001,€in€which€Mr.€Berry€indicated€that€RPS€wasŠ ø'#& Šterminating€all€future€severance€payments€on€the€basis€of€his€gross€misconduct.Š ¤(ō#' ŠĢą  ąOn€November€13,€2001,€the€plaintiff€filed€suit€against€RPS€for€breach€of€contract.€€RPSŠ |*Ģ%) Šanswered,€denying€the€plaintiffššs€allegations€and€raising€numerous€affirmative€defenses.€€FollowingŠ h+ø&* Šdiscovery,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€plaintiffššsŠ ° Šmotion€in€a€memorandum€opinion€and€order,€entered€July€31,€2003,€finding€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ œģ Šentitled€to€$795,037.35,€less€the€thirty€days€severance€pay€that€had€previously€been€paid€to€him.€€TheŠ ˆŲ Šamount€awarded€represented€three€times€the€plaintiffššs€annual€salary€and€bonus,€as€provided€in€the€Š tÄ ŠEmployment€Protection€Plan€referred€to€in€the€1997€agreement.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€awardedŠ `° Šthe€plaintiff€prejudgment€interest€at€the€rate€of€10%€per€annum€from€November€13,€2001,€which€wasŠ L œ Šthe€date€when€the€complaint€was€filed.€€Š 8 ˆ ŠĢą  ąRPS€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend,€in€which€it€contended€that,€if€the€plaintiff€was€entitledŠ  ` Što€recover€under€the€severance€pay€provision,€he€should€only€be€awarded€an€amount€equal€to€twiceŠ ü L  Šhis€annual€salary€and€bonus.€€RPS€premised€its€argument€on€the€ground€that€the€plaintiff€had€onlyŠ č 8  Šbeen€employed€under€the€1997€agreement€for€four€years,€thus€entitling€him€to€receive€his€salary€andŠ Ō$  Šbonus€at€a€multiple€of€two,€rather€than€a€multiple€of€three.Š Ą  ŠĢą  ąThe€trial€court€denied€RPSššs€motion,€finding€that€the€phrase€š šyears€of€employmentšš€as€usedŠ ˜č  Šin€the€Employment€Protection€Plan€clearly€and€unambiguously€meant€ņņtotalóó€years€of€employment,€andŠ „Ō  Šnot€simply€years€of€employment€ņņsince€the€1997€agreement€was€signedóó.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtŠ pĄ Šheld€that€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€$786,704.02€(which€represents€$795,037.35,€less€the€$8,333,33Š \¬ Š30„day€severance€pay),€plus€$134,928.04€in€prejudgment€interest,€for€a€total€payment€of€$921,632.06.Š H˜ ŠĢą  ąFrom€this€judgment,€RPS€appeals.Š  p ŠĢÓ  ÓII.Š ųH ŠĢÓöOÓą  ąIn€deciding€whether€a€grant€of€summary€judgment€is€appropriate,€courts€are€to€determine€Ō‡ XĮ XXX Ōš šifŠ Š  Šthe€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€theŠ ¼  Šaffidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€partyŠ Øų Šis€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.šš€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€Courts€š šmust€take€the€strongestŠ ”ä Šlegitimate€view€of€the€evidenceŌ#†X X X XĮP#Ō€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€inŠ €Š Šfavor€of€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.šš€€ņ ņņņByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210„11Š l¼ Š(Tenn.€1993)€(citations€omitted).Š X Ø ŠĢą  ąSince€summary€judgment€presents€a€pure€question€of€law,€our€review€is€ņņde€novoóó€with€noŠ 0"€  Špresumption€of€correctness€as€to€the€trial€courtššs€judgment.€€ņņņ ņGonzales€v.€Alman€Constr.€Co.ó óóó,€857Š #l! ŠS.W.2d€42,€44„45€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).Š $X" ŠĢÓ  ÓIII.Š ą%0!$ ŠĢÓ×TÓą  ąRPS€raises€several€issues€on€appeal,€which€can€be€succinctly€stated€as€follows:Š ø'#& ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ą1.€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€its€determination€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ )ą$( Šdischarged€by€RPS?Š|*Ģ%)` x` x ŠŠ h+ø&* Šą8  ąą8` Š Š ą2.€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€its€determination€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ ° Šentitled€to€severance€pay€under€the€terms€of€the€1997€agreement?Šœģ` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ą3.€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€its€determination€that€the€severance€payŠ tÄ Šprovision€is€a€penalty€and€is€therefore€unenforceable?Š`°` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ą4.€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€finding€that€RPS€could€not€rely€on€after„Š 8 ˆ Šacquired€evidence€in€its€decision€to€deny€severance€pay€to€theŠ $ t Šplaintiff?Š `` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ą5.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€awarding€the€plaintiff€three€times,€ratherŠ č 8  Šthan€two€times,€his€annual€salary€and€bonus?ŠŌ$ ` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ą6.€€Did€the€trial€court€abuse€its€discretion€in€awarding€the€plaintiffŠ ¬ü  Šprejudgment€interest?Š˜č ` x` x ŠĢWe€will€address€each€of€these€issues€in€turn.€€Š pĄ ŠĢÓ  ÓIV.Š H˜ ŠĢA.Š  p ŠĢÓ£ZÓą  ąRPS€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€determination€that€the€plaintiff€was€dischargedŠ ųH Šby€RPS.€€RPS€asserts€that€it€did€not€discharge€the€plaintiff€š!š€it€merely€š šattempted€to€renegotiate€hisŠ ä4 Šcontractšš€by€offering€him€employment€under€such€terms€š šthat€he€could€reasonably€anticipate€earningŠ Š  Šover€a€quarter€of€a€million€dollars€per€year.šš€€Instead,€according€to€RPS,€the€plaintiff€š šrefused€toŠ ¼  Šcontinue€to€work€for€[RPS]€under€any€terms€other€than€those€in€[the€1997€agreement].šš€€As€such,Š Øų ŠRPS€contends€that€the€plaintiff€voluntarily€terminated€his€employment.€€We€disagree€with€RPSššsŠ ”ä Šposition.Š €Š ŠĢą  ąIn€August,€2001,€the€plaintiff€was€working€for€RPS€under€the€terms€of€the€1997€agreement.Š X Ø ŠMr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€then€approached€him€and€insisted€that€he€sign€a€new€contract€ofŠ D!” Šemployment.€€While€the€new€contract€included€a€higher€base€salary,€the€territory€under€hisŠ 0"€  Šsupervision€was€reduced,€his€bonus€structure€was€changed,€potentially€to€the€plaintiffššs€detriment,Š #l! Šand€the€severance€pay€provisions€that€had€been€so€important€to€the€plaintiff€was€omitted.€€When€theŠ $X" Šplaintiff€would€not€agree€to€this€contract,€Mr.€Berry€and€Mr.€Huth€made€three€other€options€availableŠ ō$D # Što€the€plaintiff;€significantly,€none€of€these€options€included€the€possibility€of€continuing€under€hisŠ ą%0!$ Šcurrent€contract€of€employment€š!š€the€1997€agreement.€€While€the€plaintiff€made€it€clear€that€he€onlyŠ Ģ&"% Šwished€to€remain€at€RPS€under€the€terms€of€the€1997€agreement,€he€continued€to€come€to€work€eachŠ ø'#& Šday,€as€is€evinced€by€Mr.€Berry€telling€the€plaintiff€to€take€two€days€off€from€work€when€the€urbanŠ ¤(ō#' Šexecutives€came€into€town.€€The€plaintiff€even€returned€to€work€the€following€week.€€He€did€notŠ )ą$( Šbegin€to€clear€out€his€office€until€he€received€the€memorandum€from€Mr.€Berry€informing€him€thatŠ |*Ģ%) Šthe€two€should€š špart€company€and€get€on€with€life.ššŠ h+ø&* Їą  ąWe€find€that€RPSššs€unwillingness€to€abide€by€the€plaintiffššs€1997€agreement,€which€was,Š ° Šwithout€dispute,€a€binding€existing€employment€contract€between€the€parties,€was€tantamount€toŠ œģ Šdischarging€him.€€The€plaintiff€had€an€employment€contract€with€RPS,€and€RPS€terminated€thatŠ ˆŲ Šcontract€by€attempting€to€force€the€plaintiff€to€agree€to€a€new€contract€under€new€terms.€€The€factsŠ tÄ Šof€the€instant€case€simply€do€not€bear€out€the€position€advanced€by€RPS€that€the€plaintiff€voluntarilyŠ `° Šterminated€his€employment.€€The€plaintiffššs€employment€cannot€be€separated€from€the€terms€of€hisŠ L œ Šemployment€contract.€€They€are€one€and€the€same€as€far€as€the€issue€of€termination€is€concerned.Š 8 ˆ ŠĢą  ąThe€trial€court€found€that€RPS€had€constructively€discharged€the€plaintiff€based€upon€itsŠ  ` Šconduct€and€treatment€of€the€plaintiff.€€However,€as€we€find€that€the€facts€indicate€that€RPS€actuallyŠ ü L  Šdischarged€the€plaintiff,€we€need€not€reach€the€issue€of€constructive€discharge.Š č 8  ŠĢą  ąRPS€argues,€in€the€alternative,€that€there€are€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€bearing€on€theŠ Ą  Šissue€of€whether€the€plaintiff€was€discharged€or€voluntarily€terminated€his€employment.€€ViewingŠ ¬ü  Šall€of€the€evidence€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€RPS,€as€we€are€constrained€to€do€under€a€summaryŠ ˜č  Šjudgment€standard,€we€cannot€say€that€reasonable€minds€could€differ€as€to€whether€the€plaintiff€wasŠ „Ō  Šdischarged.€€ņņSee€ņ ņByrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.€€The€facts€before€us€clearly€show€a€discharge€of€theŠ pĄ Šplaintiff€by€RPS.€€The€company€told€the€plaintiff,€without€equivocation,€that€his€employment,€ņņasŠ \¬ Šmemorialized€by€his€contractóó,€was€to€be€no€more.Š H˜ ŠĢÓ  ÓB.Š  p ŠĢÓ  Óą  ąRPS€next€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€that€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€toŠ ųH Šreceive€severance€pay€under€the€terms€of€the€1997€agreement.€€RPS€argues€that€the€severance€pay€Š ä4 Šprovision€was€never€triggered€š šbecause€none€of€the€threshold€events,€i.e.,€a€change€in€ownership€ofŠ Š  Š[RPS],€ever€occurred.šš€€In€support€of€this€argument,€RPS€directs€us€to€the€1997€agreement,€whichŠ ¼  Šcontains€the€provision€that,€in€the€event€the€plaintiff€is€discharged€for€reasons€other€than€grossŠ Øų Šmisconduct,€fraud,€embezzlement,€theft,€or€voluntary€termination,€he€will€be€entitled€to€receiveŠ ”ä Šseverance€pay€š šunder€the€terms€of€the€ššEmployment€Protection€Plan€š!š€Change€in€OwnershipŠ €Š ŠStructurešš€provision.šš€€Thus,€so€the€argument€goes,€š šthe€severance€pay€provision€is€triggered€onlyŠ l¼ Šby€a€ššchange€in€ownership€structure.šššš€In€further€support€of€its€contention,€RPS€notes€that€theŠ X Ø ŠEmployment€Protection€Plan€centers€around€the€sale€of€RPS€or€a€change€in€RPSššs€CEO.€€BecauseŠ D!” ŠRPS€was€never€sold€and€because€Mr.€Berry€remains€the€CEO€of€RPS,€the€severance€pay€provisions,Š 0"€  Šaccording€to€RPS,€never€came€into€play.€€The€plaintiff,€on€the€other€hand,€asserts€that€the€1997Š #l! Šagreement,€by€its€terms,€only€intended€to€incorporate€the€ņņpayment€schedule€óófound€in€the€EmploymentŠ $X" ŠProtection€Plan,€rather€than€the€triggering€events€contained€therein.Š ō$D # ŠĢą  ąIt€is€important€to€note€that€š š[t]he€interpretation€of€a€written€agreement€is€a€matter€of€law€andŠ Ģ&"% Šnot€of€fact.šš€€ņ ņņņRainey€v.€Stanselló óóó,€836€S.W.2d€117,€118€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992)€(citations€omitted);€ņņseeŠ ø'#& Šalsoóó€ņ ņņņEyring€v.€E.€Tenn.€Baptist€Hosp.ó óóó,€950€S.W.2d€354,€358€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€š šThe€cardinalŠ ¤(ō#' Šrule€for€interpretation€of€contracts€is€to€ascertain€the€intention€of€the€parties€and€to€give€effect€to€thatŠ )ą$( Šintention€consistent€with€legal€principles.šš€€ņ ņņņRaineyó óóó,€836€S.W.2d€at€118€(citation€omitted).€€The€courtŠ |*Ģ%) Šwill€look€to€the€material€contained€within€the€four€corners€of€the€instrument€to€ascertain€its€meaningŠ h+ø&* Šas€an€expression€of€the€partiesšš€intent.€€ņ ņņņSimonton€v.€Huffó óóó,€60€S.W.3d€820,€825€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Š ° Š2000).€€The€words€of€the€contract€should€be€given€their€usual,€natural€and€ordinary€meaning.€€ņ ņņņId.€Š œģ Šó óóóš šAll€provisions€of€a€contract€should€be€construed€as€in€harmony€with€each€other,€if€such€constructionŠ ˆŲ Šcan€be€reasonably€made,€so€as€to€avoid€repugnancy€between€the€several€provisions€of€a€singleŠ tÄ Šcontract.šš€€ņ ņņņRaineyó óóó,€836€S.W.2d€at€119€(citation€omitted).€Š `° ŠĢą  ąApplying€the€above€principles€to€the€severance€pay€provisions€at€issue,€we€conclude,€as€didŠ 8 ˆ Šthe€trial€court,€that€the€only€reasonable€interpretation€of€the€1997€agreement€is€that€the€partiesŠ $ t Šintended€to€incorporate€only€the€ņņpay€schedule€óófrom€the€Employment€Protection€Plan€into€the€1997Š  ` Šagreement.€€It€is€clear€that€the€parties€intended€that€the€plaintiff€be€provided€severance€pay,€providedŠ ü L  Šhe€was€not€discharged€for€gross€misconduct,€fraud,€embezzlement€or€theft,€or€voluntarily€terminatedŠ č 8  Šhis€employment.€€The€position€advanced€by€RPS€š!š€that€the€plaintiff€was€only€entitled€to€severanceŠ Ō$  Špay€in€the€event€the€company€was€sold€or€Mr.€Berry€was€replaced€š!š€is€simply€untenable.€€TheŠ Ą  Štriggering€event€in€the€plaintiffššs€employment€contract€was€clearly€intended€to€be€wrongfulŠ ¬ü  Štermination€and€wrongful€termination€only.€€While€severance€pay€was€ņņalsoóó€to€be€available€in€theŠ ˜č  Ševent€of€a€sale€of€the€company€or€a€change€in€the€companyššs€leadership,€these€triggering€events€wereŠ „Ō  Šin€addition€to,€rather€than€in€place€of,€the€event€of€wrongful€termination.Š pĄ ŠĢą  ąAccordingly,€we€find€that€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€receive€severance€pay€under€the€termsŠ H˜ Šof€the€1997€agreementņņóó.€€Moreover,€we€find€that€RPSššs€alternative€argument€that€there€is€a€genuineŠ 4„ Šissue€of€material€fact€with€respect€to€the€severance€pay€provision€is€not€well„taken.€€All€of€theŠ  p Šrelevant€facts€are€before€us.€€Those€facts,€when€viewed€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€RPS,€still€showŠ  \ Šthat€the€plaintiff€is€entitled€to€the€severance€pay€awarded€by€the€trial€court.Š ųH ŠĢÓ  ÓC.Š Š  ŠĢÓÓą  ąNext,€RPS€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€determination€that€the€severance€payŠ Øų Šprovisions€do€not€constitute€an€illegal€penalty.€€We€disagree.Š ”ä ŠĢą  ąIn€ņ ņņņGuiliano€v.€Cleo,€Inc.óóó ó,€the€Supreme€Court€differentiated€between€liquidated€damages€asŠ l¼ Šcompensation€and€liquidated€damages€as€a€penalty€as€follows:Š X Ø ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąThe€fundamental€purpose€of€liquidated€damages€is€to€provide€a€meansŠ 0"€  Šof€compensation€in€the€event€of€a€breach€where€damages€would€beŠ #l! Šindeterminable€or€otherwise€difficult€to€prove.€€By€stipulating€in€theŠ $X" Šcontract€to€the€damages€that€might€reasonably€arise€from€a€breach,€theŠ ō$D # Šparties€essentially€estimate€the€amount€of€potential€damages€likely€toŠ ą%0!$ Šbe€sustained€by€the€nonbreaching€party.€€š šIf€the€[contract]€provisionŠ Ģ&"% Šis€a€reasonable€estimate€of€the€damages€that€would€occur€from€aŠ ø'#& Šbreach,€then€the€provision€is€normally€construed€as€an€enforceableŠ ¤(ō#' Šstipulation€for€liquidated€damages.šš€€However,€if€the€stipulatedŠ )ą$( Šamount€is€unreasonable€in€relation€to€those€potential€or€estimatedŠ |*Ģ%) Šdamages,€then€it€will€be€treated€as€a€penalty.€Šh+ø&*` x` x Їņ ņņņGuiliano€v.€Cleo,€Inc.ó óóó,€995€S.W.2d€88,€98€(Tenn.€1999)€(quoting€ņ ņņņV.L.€Nicholson€Co.€v.€TransonŠ ° ŠInv.€&€Fin.€Ltd.,€Inc.ó óóó,€595€S.W.2d€474,€484€(Tenn.€1980)€(internal€citations€omitted).€€The€SupremeŠ œģ ŠCourt€also€set€out€the€difference€between€liquidated€damages€and€severance€pay€as€follows:Š ˆŲ ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąThe€term€š šliquidated€damagesšš€is€defined€by€case€law€as€a€š šsumŠ `° Šstipulated€and€agreed€upon€by€the€parties€at€the€time€they€enter€theirŠ L œ Šcontract,€to€be€paid€to€compensate€for€injuries€should€a€breach€occur.šš€Š 8 ˆ ŠThe€stipulated€amount€represents€an€estimate€of€potential€damages€inŠ $ t Šthe€event€of€a€contractual€breach€where€damages€are€likely€to€beŠ  ` Šuncertain€and€not€easily€proven.Šü L ` x` x ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąIn€contrast,€the€recovery€of€severance€pay€is€not€conditioned€upon€aŠ Ō$  Šbreach€of€contract€or€a€reasonable€estimation€of€damages.€€Generally,Š Ą  Šseverance€pay€is€a€form€of€compensation€paid€by€an€employer€to€anŠ ¬ü  Šemployee€at€a€time€when€the€employment€relationship€is€terminatedŠ ˜č  Šthrough€no€fault€of€the€employee.€€The€reason€for€severance€pay€is€toŠ „Ō  Šoffset€the€employeeššs€monetary€losses€attributable€to€the€dismissalŠ pĄ Šfrom€employment€and€to€recompense€the€employee€for€any€period€ofŠ \¬ Štime€when€he€or€she€is€out€of€work.€€The€amount€of€payment€isŠ H˜ Šgenerally€based€upon€the€types€of€services€and€the€number€of€serviceŠ 4„ Šyears€performed€by€the€employee€on€behalf€of€the€employer.Š p` x` x ŠĢņ ņņņGuilianoó óóó,€995€S.W.2d€at€96„97€(internal€citations€omitted).Š ųH ŠĢą  ąApplying€these€definitions€to€the€instant€case,€it€is€clear€that€the€severance€pay€provisions€areŠ Š  Šnot€a€penalty.€€The€1997€agreement€states€that€the€plaintiff€will€be€entitled€to€severance€pay€if€he€isŠ ¼  Šdischarged€for€reasons€other€than€gross€misconduct,€fraud,€etc.€š!š€in€other€words,€the€plaintiff€willŠ Øų Šreceive€the€severance€pay€if€he€is€š šterminated€through€no€faultšš€of€his€own.€€ņņSee€ņ ņid.ó óóó€at€97.€€TheŠ ”ä Šamount€of€severance€pay€as€set€forth€in€the€Employment€Protection€Plan€is€based€upon€the€plaintiffššsŠ €Š Šsalary€and€bonuses,€commensurate€with€š šthe€number€of€service€years€performed€byšš€the€plaintiff.€Š l¼ ŠņņSee€ņ ņid.ó óóó€€Accordingly,€we€find€no€error€in€the€trial€courtššs€determination€that€the€severance€payŠ X Ø Šprovisions€do€not€constitute€an€illegal€penalty.€€Furthermore,€we€reject€RPSššs€suggestion€that€theŠ D!” Šissue€of€whether€the€severance€pay€provisions€amount€to€an€illegal€penalty€is€a€question€of€fact€thatŠ 0"€  Šwould€preclude€summary€judgment.€€The€material€facts€on€this€issue€are€not€in€dispute.€€Those€factsŠ #l! Šsupport€only€one€conclusion€š!š€the€one€reached€by€the€trial€court.€€This€is€a€question€of€law€and€it€wasŠ $X" Šcorrectly€resolved€by€the€trial€court.Š ō$D # ŠĢÓ  ÓD.Š Ģ&"% Šą @ ąą @ ąą @ ąĢÓ÷‘Óą  ąRPS€next€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€RPS€could€not€rely€on€after„Š ¤(ō#' Šacquired€evidence€in€its€decision€to€deny€severance€pay€to€the€plaintiff.€€ņņAfter€the€plaintiff€wasŠ )ą$( Šdischargedóó,€RPS€learned€that€he€had€been€using€the€companyššs€computer€during€regular€businessŠ |*Ģ%) Šhours€to€access€pornographic€web€sites.€€RPS€argues€that,€had€it€known€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ h+ø&* Šaccessing€these€web€sites,€it€would€have€discharged€him€for€engaging€in€gross€misconduct,€inŠ ° Šviolation€of€company€policy.€€Therefore,€RPS€asserts€that€the€plaintiff€is€not€entitled€to€received€anyŠ œģ Šseverance€pay,€as€š šgross€misconductšš€is€excepted€from€the€provision.Š ˆŲ ŠĢą  ąThe€issue€of€the€use€of€š šafter„acquired€evidenceššin€employment€matters€is€a€matter€of€firstŠ `° Šimpression€in€Tennessee.׃ׯ ƒ#ĆŻņņŚ  Ś1Ś  ŚóóŻ  Ż×  ׀€The€trial€court€noted€the€following€with€respect€to€this€doctrine:Š L œ ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąThe€š šafter„acquired€evidencešš€doctrine€has€been€used€in€wrongfulŠ $ t Šdischarge€and€employment€discrimination€cases€in€an€effort€to€limitŠ  ` Šor€bar€recovery€by€plaintiffs.€€There€are€no€Tennessee€cases€thatŠ ü L  Šaddress€the€š šafter„acquired€evidencešš€doctrine.€€Various€state€courtsŠ č 8  Šand€federal€circuits€have€a€wide€array€of€opinions€regarding€theŠ Ō$  Šadmissibility€and€effect€of€š šafter„acquired€evidence.šš€€SomeŠ Ą  Šjurisdictions€will€not€admit€š šafter„acquired€evidence,šš€others€haveŠ ¬ü  Šheld€that€it€can€serve€as€a€complete€bar€to€recovery,€while€others€haveŠ ˜č  Šheld€that€it€can€only€be€used€to€limit€damages.€€The€case€of€ņ ņņņLewis€v.Š „Ō  ŠFisher€Service€Co.ó óóó,€495€S.E.2d€440€(S.C.€1998),€provides€a€goodŠ pĄ Šoverview€of€the€history€and€varied€views€of€the€š šafter„acquiredŠ \¬ Ševidencešš€issue:€.€.€.€ŠH˜` x` x ŠĢThereupon,€the€trial€court€quoted€extensively€from€the€ņ ņņņLewisó óóó€opinion,€in€which€the€South€CarolinaŠ  p ŠSupreme€Court,€after€reviewing€the€status€of€the€law€of€after„acquired€evidence,€found€as€follows:Š  \ ŠĢą8  ąą8` Š Š ąAlthough€we€find€that€after„acquired€evidence€should€be€admissibleŠ ä4 Šon€the€issue€of€liability,€we€recognize€the€potential€dangers€ofŠ Š  Šallowing€employers€unrestricted€use€of€such€evidence.€€If€free€reignŠ ¼  Šwere€given,€then€in€defending€breach€of€employment€contract€actions,Š Øų Šless„than„principled€employers€(or€their€attorneys)€may€be€tempted€to€Š ”ä Šš šrummage€the€filešš€in€order€to€š šdiscoveršš€any€and€all€evidence€thatŠ €Š Šwould€permit€them€to€escape€liability.€€For€example,€an€employer€thatŠ l¼ Šhas€been€inclined€to€overlook€his€employeesšš€peccadillos€(e.g.Š X Ø Šoccasional€tardiness),€might€suddenly€claim,€in€response€to€a€breachŠ D!” Šof€contract€action,€that€the€employee€would€have€been€fired€had€theŠ 0"€  Šemployer€been€aware€of€the€tardiness.€€Thus,€we€conclude€thatŠ #l! Šalthough€after„acquired€evidence€should€be€allowed€on€the€issue€ofŠ $X" Šliability,€certain€limitations€must€be€put€into€place€so€as€to€preventŠ ō$D # Šabuse€by€employers.€€This€can€be€achieved€by€restricting€use€of€after„Š ą%0!$ Šacquired€evidence€in€two€ways.€€First,€the€employer€must€prove€thatŠ Ģ&"% Šthe€wrongdoing€was€significant,€that€it€was€of€š šsuch€severity€that€theŠ ° Šemployee€in€fact€would€have€been€terminated€on€those€grounds€aloneŠ œģ Šif€the€employer€had€known€of€it€at€the€time€of€the€discharge.šš€€ņņSeeŠ ˆŲ Šņ ņBaber€[v.€Greenville€County]ó óóó,€327€S.C.€[31],€488€S.E.2d€[314,]€320Š tÄ Š(quoting€ņ ņņņMcKennon€[v.€Nashville€Banner€Publššg€Co.ó óóó,€513€U.S.€352,Š `° Š115€S.€Ct.€879,€130€L.€Ed.€2d€852€(1995)]).€€Thus,€evidence€ofŠ L œ Šemployee€wrongdoing€that€would€not€have€resulted€in€terminationŠ 8 ˆ Šwould€not€be€admissible.€€Second,€this€proof€must€be€established,€notŠ $ t Šby€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€but€by€clear€and€convincingŠ  ` Ševidence.€€We€believe€that€these€two€limitations€will€serve€to€excludeŠ ü L  Šdoubtful€or€insignificant€evidence€of€employee€wrongdoing,€whileŠ č 8  Šallowing€evidence€of€very€severe€wrongdoing€that€should€properly€beŠ Ō$  Šconsidered.€€ŠĄ ` x` x ŠĢņ ņņņLewisó óóó,€495€S.E.2d€at€445.Š ˜č  ŠĢą  ąThe€trial€court,€in€determining€that€the€approach€taken€in€ņ ņņņLewisóó€ó ówas€well„reasoned,€decidedŠ pĄ Što€follow€it€and€apply€the€clear€and€convincing€standard€to€the€evidence€of€the€plaintiffššsŠ `° Šwrongdoing.€€The€trial€court€noted€that€Mr.€Berry,€in€his€deposition,€admitted€that€he€would€still€likeŠ Lœ Što€have€the€plaintiff€back€at€RPS.€€The€court€found€that€this€admission€š šcast[]€deep€doubts€in€theŠ 8ˆ Šcourtššs€mind€regarding€Mr.€Berryššs€statements€that€he€would€have€fired€[the€plaintiff]€for€viewingŠ $t Šthe€pornographic€images€on€his€company€computer.šš€€The€trial€court€was€further€persuaded€by€RPSššsŠ ` Šfailure€to€take€additional€steps€to€notify€other€RPS€employees€š šthat€such€use€of€RPS€computers€isŠ üL Šinappropriate€and€will€result€in€immediate€termination.šš€€Finally,€the€trial€court€noted€that€š šit€isŠ č8 Šundisputed€that€the€year€ending€on€December€31,€2000,€was€the€highest€record€of€profit€that€theŠ Ō$ Šurban€division€of€RPS€had€ever€experiencedšš€and€that€the€urban€division€š šshowed€steady€growthŠ Ą Šfrom€the€time€the€[p]laintiff€took€over€through€the€first€seven€months€of€2001.šš€€The€trial€court€thenŠ ¬ü Šconcluded€that,€based€on€these€facts,€š šreasonable€minds€could€not€differ€that€RPS€cannot€prove€byŠ ˜č Šclear€and€convincing€evidence€that€[the€plaintiff]€would€have€been€fired€from€RPS,šš€and€the€courtŠ „Ō Šheld€that€the€after„acquired€evidence€was€thus€inadmissible.Š pĄ ŠĢą  ąWe€agree€wholeheartedly€with€the€approach€taken€by€the€trial€court.€€We€believe€that€theŠ H!˜ Šadoption€of€the€ņ ņņņLewis€óóó óstandard,€while€stringent,€is€necessary€to€prevent€employers€from€inventingŠ 4"„  Šreasons€to€justify€a€discharge€after„the„fact€of€termination.€€We€therefore€hold€that,€when€anŠ  #p! Šemployer€wishes€to€use€after„acquired€evidence€to€prove€grounds€for€dismissalņ ņņņó óóó,€the€employer€mustŠ  $\" Šshow,€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence,€that€the€wrongdoing€was€so€severe€that€the€employee€wouldŠ ų$H # Šhave€been€discharged€on€that€ground€alone€if€€it€had€been€known€to€the€employer€at€the€time€of€theŠ ä%4!$ Štermination.Š Š& "% ŠĢą  ąApplying€this€standard€to€the€instant€case,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€reasonable€mindsŠ Ø(ų#' Šcould€only€agree€that€there€was€no€clear€and€convincing€evidence€that€the€plaintiff€would€have€beenŠ ”)ä$( Šdischarged€solely€for€viewing€pornography€on€his€computer.€€Accordingly,€RPS€is€not€entitled€to€useŠ €*Š%) Šthis€after„acquired€evidence€in€its€attempt€to€show€that€the€plaintiff€engaged€in€gross€misconduct.Š l+¼&* ЇÓ  ÓE.Š ° ŠĢÓW±Óą  ąNext,€RPS€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€the€plaintiff€three€times€his€annualŠ ˆŲ Šsalary€and€bonus€under€the€severance€pay€provision.€€Instead,€RPS€contends€that€the€plaintiff€wasŠ tÄ Šonly€entitled€to€receive€twice€his€annual€salary€and€bonus.€€RPS€arrives€at€this€position€by€pointingŠ `° Šout€that€the€effective€date€of€the€1997€agreement€was€January€1,€1997€and€that€the€š šyears€ofŠ L œ Šemploymentšš€mentioned€in€the€severance€pay€provisions€of€the€Employment€Protection€Plan,Š 8 ˆ Šaccording€to€RPS,€refer€only€to€the€years€of€service€beginning€with€January€1,€1997.€€Under€thisŠ $ t Šinterpretation,€the€plaintiff€would€only€be€entitled€to€twice€his€annual€salary€and€bonus€because,€asŠ  ` Šof€September,€2001,€the€plaintiff€had€only€been€operating€under€the€1997€agreement€for€four€years.Š ü L  ŠĢą  ąWe€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€the€phrase€š šyears€of€employmentšš€is€not€ambiguous.€€ItŠ Ō$  Šrefers€to€the€ņņtotal€number€of€yearsóó€the€plaintiff€has€been€employed€by€RPS,€which,€at€the€time€of€hisŠ Ą  Šdischarge,€amounted€to€over€five€years.€€The€position€advanced€by€RPS€is€without€merit.€Š ¬ü  ŠAccordingly,€we€find€no€error€in€the€trial€courtššs€decision€to€award€the€plaintiff€three€times€his€annualŠ ˜č  Šsalary€and€bonus€under€the€terms€of€the€severance€pay€provisions.Š „Ō  ŠĢÓ  ÓF.Š \¬ ŠĢÓ‰·Óą  ąFinally,€RPS€argues€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€awarding€the€plaintiffŠ 4„ Šprejudgment€interest.€€We€disagree.Š  p ŠĢą  ąThe€decision€of€whether€to€award€prejudgment€interest€is€within€the€sound€discretion€of€theŠ ųH Štrial€court€and€will€not€be€disturbed€by€an€appellate€court€absent€š ša€manifest€and€palpable€abuse€ofŠ ä4 Šdiscretion.šš€€ņņņ ņMyint€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€970€S.W.2d€920,€927€(Tenn.€1998).€€š šA€trial€court€actsŠ Š  Šwithin€its€discretion€when€it€applies€the€correct€legal€standard€and€reaches€a€decision€that€is€notŠ ¼  Šclearly€unreasonable.šš€€ņ ņņņBogan€v.€Boganó óóó,€60€S.W.3d€721,€733€(Tenn.€2001).€€€An€award€ofŠ Øų Šprejudgment€interest€is€proper€š šwhen€the€amount€of€the€obligation€is€certain,€or€can€be€ascertainedŠ ”ä Šby€a€proper€accounting,€and€the€amount€is€not€disputed€on€reasonable€grounds.šš€€ņ ņņņMyintó óóó,€970€S.W.2dŠ €Š Šat€927€(citation€omitted).€€In€the€instant€case,€the€trial€court,€relying€upon€the€authority€of€ņ ņņņMyintó óóó,Š l¼ Šdetermined€that€an€award€of€prejudgment€interest€was€proper€because€š šthe€amount€owed€to€[theŠ X Ø Šplaintiff]€under€[the€1997€agreement]€was€easily€ascertained€by€a€proper€accounting.šš€€We€cannotŠ D!” Šsay€that€this€decision€was€š šclearly€unreasonable.šš€€ņņSee€ņ ņBoganó óóó,€60€S.W.3d€at€733.€€We€find€no€abuseŠ 0"€  Šof€discretion€in€the€trial€courtššs€award€of€prejudgment€interest.€Š #l! ŠĢÓ  ÓV.Š ō$D # ŠĢÓ7¾Óą  ąThe€material€facts€in€this€case€are€not€in€dispute.€€Put€another€way,€there€are€no€genuine€issuesŠ Ģ&"% Šof€material€fact.€€The€material€facts€before€us€fully€support€the€trial€courtššs€grant€of€summaryŠ ø'#& Šjudgment.ÓÓŠ ¤(ō#' ŠŠ  |*Ģ%) Šą@ll)ģąVI.ˆŠ ° ŠÓnæÓą  ąThe€judgment€of€the€chancery€court€is€affirmed.€€This€case€is€remanded€for€the€enforcementŠ ˆŲ Šof€the€chancery€courtššs€judgment€and€for€the€collection€of€costs€assessed€below,€all€pursuant€toŠ tÄ Šapplicable€law.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellant,€Republic€Parking€System,€Inc.Š `° ŠĢĢĢą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąą h ąą Ą ąą  ą_______________________________Š  ` Šą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąą h ąą Ą ąą  ąCHARLES€D.€SUSANO,€JR.,€JUDGE