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($$   1  ''' dxd dP Pd&&&&'dxd>$"Small Circle"0  !  &7XXdd7ћ&TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T&&''XΥXX X  &&&&&7IXXdXXd7ќ&(&&(+|+--((--((9-r(<,(j 8` `@E` ttx$ r-9999--9((999((999((999((999((999((999(@m m  INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE(99(@hh%ATJACKSON(99((99((9t(>.*jx` `@E` ttx$ i tߛ9(((HARTER.THOMAS,JR.,   h ) `    `     h   )((   ` Plaintiff/Appellee, h   )ShelbyChanceryNo.1060672R.D. 8  ((   `     h   )((VS.   `     h   )AppealNo.02A019711CH00289  `    `     h   )SHAIRLABORATORIES,INC. h   )  8  andDAVIDSELF,    h   ) $     `     h   )   ` Defendants/Appellants.  )    @bbAPPEALFROMTHECHANCERYCOURTOFSHELBYCOUNTY@ ATMEMPHIS,TENNESSEE@  THEHONORABLEFLOYDPEETE,JR.,CHANCELLOR ALANBRYANTCHAMBERS  `  CHAMBERS&DURHAM,P.C. L  Memphis,Tennessee 8 AttorneyforAppellants JOHND.HORNE  "! Memphis,TennesseeAttorneyforAppellee REVERSEDANDVACATED +'+     `     h      p   ALANE.HIGHERS,J. 3h.3 CONCUR:W.FRANKCRAWFORD,P.J.,W.S.HERSCHELP.FRANKS,J. ( h ) x:5; )-)|7XXdXXd7  |#iXd#  )-**)  )ShairLaboratories,Inc.andDavidSelfappealthetrialcourtsjudgmentawarding d;6< |7XXdXXd7  9|7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  9-|7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  |7XXdXXd7  -HarteThomasdamages,includingtrebledamagesandattorneyfees,pursuanttothe  TennesseeConsumerProtectionAct.Forthereasonshereinafterstated,wereversethetrialcourtsjudgment.@I.FactualandProceduralHistory  0   TheindividualsandcorporationsmostrelevanttothefactsofthiscaseincludeShairLaboratories,Inc.(ShairLabs),DavidSelf(Self),CorporateMarketingGroup,Inc.(CMG),RickKilbourne(Kilbourne),DonMcCroam(McCroam),andHarteR.Thomas,Jr.(Thomas).ShairLabsisacloselyheldKentuckycorporationandisamanufacturerof,amongotherthings,haircareproductsthataremarketedunderthetradename ShairNaturals.ShairLabsoperatesitsbusinessoutofLouisville,Kentucky.Selfisanofficerand35%shareholderofShairLabsandresidesinLouisville,Kentucky.CMGwasaseparateGeorgiacorporationoperatingoutofDuluth,Georgia.CMGcontractedwithShairLabsunderamasterdistributorshipagreement,whichestablishedCMGasbeingShairLabssexclusivedistributorforaddedfuturedistributionofShairNaturalsproductsfromShairLabs.CMGwasneitheradivisionnorasubsidiaryofShairLabs.&&NeitherShairLabsnorSelfcontrolledorownedanypartofCMGandneitherreceivedanyshareofCMGsearnings.KilbournewasthepresidentofCMG.McCroamwasthevicepresidentofsalesforCMG.ThomasisaTennesseeresidentwhocontractedwithCMGtobecomeasecondtierdistributorandtodistributeShairNaturalsproductspurchasedfromCMGtohairsalons.  AtsomepointpriortoanycommercialdealingswithCMG,ShairLabsintendedtomarketShairNaturalsproductsbysellingtonumerousdistributors.&&Infurtheranceofthisgoal,itcreateditsownmarketingbrochure,whichoutlinedvariouspackagesfromwhichadistributorcouldinitiallychoose.&&Thesevariouspricedpackageswerebasedupontheinitialquantityof unitsthatthedistributorwouldpurchase.Eachunitincluded,amongotherthings,adisplaytobeplacedinahairsalonandthehaircareproductsnecessarytoinitiallystockthedisplays.ShairLabssmarketingbrochurealsoincludedastatement 84: explainingthatitmustscreenitsdistributorapplicantscarefullytoensure thattheyhavethedesire,motivationandcapitalnecessarytofulfilltheprofitpotentialthatShairLabsoffered.OnJune22,1994,however,ShairLabsandCMGenteredintoacontractwhichallowedCMGtomarketShairNaturalsproductsbybeingShairLabssexclusivedistributorand,thereby,themasterdistributorofShairNaturalsproducts.''TheagreementpermittedCMGtousetheShairNaturalstrademarkinconnectionwithproductidentificationandpromotionofShairNaturalsproducts.''  InAugust1994,ThomassawaMemphisnewspaperclassifiedadvertisementforadistributorshipbusinessopportunitydealingwithhaircareproducts.TheadvertisementprovidedCMGstelephonenumberandaddressinDuluth,Georgia,butusedtheShairNaturalstradenamewithoutlistingitsowncorporatename.Theadvertisementfurtherstated, Noselling.Wesecuresalonlocations;yourestockdisplaysandcollectforproductssoldtosaloncustomers.Usingthetelephonenumberlisted,ThomascontactedandspokewithMcCroam,thevicepresidentofsalesforCMG.McCroamsentThomassomeliterature,whichincludedthemarketingbrochurethathadbeenproducedbyShairLabsin1993,andalsosentabusinesscard.AttheendoftheShairLabsmarketingbrochure,CMGhadaddeditsown CorporateMarketingGroup,Inc.stamp.McCroamsbusinesscarddisplayedtheShairNaturalstrademark,inadditiontolistingCMGscorporatenameanddisplayingtheCMGtrademark.Also,McCroamsbusinesscardhadprinted asubsidiaryofShairLaboratories,Inc.nexttotheShairNaturalstrademark.''  AfterinitiallyspeakingwithMcCroamandreviewingtheShairLabsbrochure,ThomaslaterspokewithSelfonatleasttwooccasionsbeforeenteringintoanycontractdealingwithShairNaturalsproducts.ThoughThomascontendsthatSelfcontactedhimatsomepointtoscreenhiminaccordancewithShairLabssprocedures(assetforthinShairLabssformermarketingbrochure),Selfdeniesthiscontentionandassertsthateither 0948 ThomascontactedhimorthathesimplyreturnedThomasscalls.SelfexplainsthatThomaswasinitiatingcontactandinquiringabouttheproductsandthebusiness.ThomasalsocontactedShairLabssaccountant,inquiringaboutwhetherShairLabswouldbeavailabletosupplyShairNaturalsproductsifCMGwentoutofbusiness.++TheaccountantassuredThomasthatifCMGwasnolongeraroundatsomepointandwasunabletosupplyproducts,thenShairLabswouldbeabletosupplytheproduct.++ShairLabssaccountantalsomentionedtoThomas,amongotherthings,thatShairLabsandCMGweretwoentirelyseparatecorporations,eventhoughCMGhadtheauthoritytomarkettheproductsmanufacturedbyShairLabs.ThomasalsocontactedanotherShairNaturalsdistributor,whosenamewasprovidedbyCMG,inquiringabouttheShairNaturalsdistributorshipbusiness.Amongotherthings,thispersonexplainedthatCMGwasaseparatecorporationfromShairLabsandthatCMGwasmerelyaprimarydistributorthatsetupothernewdistributors.̛  InSeptember1994,McCroamandKilbournesentThomasaproposeddistributorshipagreement.Thecontractprovided,inpart,thefollowing:8  CMGagreestosellto[Thomas]aDistributorshipforSHAIRProductsfortheamountof$21,689.00....CMGagreesuponreceivingthesemonies...toestablish30accountlocationsforDistributoronaconsignmentbasis.CMGagreestoplacethemerchandise...ineachlocation.Distributoragreestoserviceandmaintaineachlocationonaweeklybasis.    /!ӜThepurchasepriceof$21,689.00wasessentiallyequivalenttothecostfor30displaysplusafortypercentmarkuponthepriceofmerchandisetobepurchasedbyCMGfromShairLabs.Afterreviewingtheproposedcontract,ThomasinitiallydecidednottoenterintoitandnotifiedMcCroam,whowashandlingthenegotiations,ofhisrefusal.However,CMGofferedandagreedtoaddarepurchaseagreementtotheproposedcontract,whichprovidedThomaswithanoptiontosellbackthedistributorship,includingalldisplaysandmerchandisethatwerepurchased.ThisrepurchaseaddendumwassenttoThomasandthedistributorshipagreementbetweenCMGandThomaswassignedbyThomasonNovember7,1994.++ 0948   AllShairNaturalsproductsthatCMGprovidedtoThomaswereorderedbyCMGfromShairLabs,weresoldtoCMGbyShairLabs,andwereshippeddirectlyfromShairLabstoThomas.TheoriginalshipmentofgoodsorderedbyCMGincludedthe30displaysandrelatedmerchandisetoaccommodatethe 30accountlocationsthatCMGwasobligatedtoestablishundertheCMG/Thomasagreement.ThoughThomaspaidCMG$21,689.00fortheinitial30displaysandforthemerchandisetostockthedisplays,CMGscostwasbetween$11,000and$12,000forthepurchaseofthemerchandise,plusanadditional$5,340forthedisplays(totalingapproximately$17,000).++    InJanuary1995,CMGarrangedtohaveShairLabssendsomeonetoassistϜThomasforacoupledays.BecauseCMGhadthusfarfailedtoestablish30accountlocationsforThomas,ThomascontactedanddealtwithKilbourneregardingthe30accountlocationsprovision.Kilbournethereafterarrangedfortwomorepersons(onefromAlabamaandonefromTexas)toworkwithThomasonestablishingaccountlocations.Ultimately,23accountlocationswereestablished.  Atsomepoint,businessrelationsbetweenShairLabsandCMGendedbecause,amongotherreasons,CMGdefaultedonpaymentfortheproductsitpurchased.OnMarch3,1995,ShairLabssentCMGaletternotifyingthemofthecontracttermination.OnMarch31,1995,ThomascontactedSelfbecausehehadbeenunabletoreacheitherKilbourneorMcCroam.Atthispoint,SelfnotifiedThomasthatShairLabssbusinessrelationswithCMGhadended.ThomasinformedSelfoftherepurchaseprovision,inquiringastowhetherShairLabswouldhonorthetermsoftheCMG/Thomasagreement.ThoughSelfdidnotbelievethatShairLabswascontractuallyobligatedtohonortheCMG/Thomasagreementanditsrepurchaseaddendum,ShairLabsdidbegintoselldirectlytoThomasandtosupplyThomaswithShairNaturalsproducts.OnApril26,1995,ThomascontactedSelfaboutthe30accountlocationsprovision.Atthispoint,SelfinformedThomasthathewouldletThomasknowaboutsendingsomeonetohelp.Thereafter,SelfinformedThomasthat,asbetweenShairLabsandThomas,someofthe 0948 CMG/ThomasagreementtermswouldneedtobechangedtoformanewcontractbetweenShairLabsandThomasandthatSelfwouldprepareanothercontract.Subsequently,ThomasmadeaformaldemandagainstShairLabsinanattempttoexercisetherepurchaseprovisionoftheCMG/Thomasagreement.  OnJuly20,1995,ThomasfiledsuitagainstCMG,Kilbourne,ShairLabs,andSelf.InThomassComplaint,heallegedthatallDefendants engagedinunfairanddeceptive @  actsforpurposesofinducing[Thomas]toinvestintheirbusinessopportunity,andthereforesoughtactualdamages,trebledamages,andattorneyfeesundertheTennesseeConsumerProtectionAct.Alternatively,ThomasallegedthatallDefendantscommittedfraudorintentionaland/ornegligentmisrepresentationandthatallDefendantswereliableforbreachofcontractunderthetermsoftheCMG/Thomasagreement.ShairLabsandSelffiledamotionseekingdismissalbaseduponlackofpersonaljurisdiction,whichwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.Additionally,ThomaswasunabletoserveprocessuponeitherCMGorKilbourne.Therefore,CMGandKilbournewerenonsuitedandthecasewastriedwithoutajuryagainstonlyShairLabsandSelf.  Attrial,ThomasscounselassertedthatKilbourneandMcCroamwereagentsactingonbehalfofandforthebenefitofShairLabs.ThisassertionwasbasedprimarilyuponKilbournesandMcCroamsownindependentactions,includingthefollowing: P(#& 6  65"0    ThenewspaperadvertisementplacedbyCMGdidnotnameCMGbut,instead, 0*%( usedtheShairNaturalstradename(eventhoughShairLabsdidnotplacethenewspaperadvertisementandhadnoknowledgeofitsexistence);65-5݌ (#(# Ќ  6  66"0    McCroamsbusinesscardthatwassenttoThomasincludedaShairNaturals -@), trademarkandreferredtoShairNaturalsasasubsidiaryofShairLabs(eventhough,whileCMGwasauthorizedtoutilizetheShairNaturalstrademarkinconnectionwiththepromotionofShairNaturalsproducts,theShairNaturalstrademark(designedtoidentifyaproduct)doesnotincludetheseadditionalwords,eventhoughShairLabsneverauthorizedCMGtorepresentitselfinanyfashionasasubsidiaryofShairLabs,andeventhoughShairLabswasnotawareofCMGsmisuseoftheShairNaturalstrademark);666݌ (#(# Ќ  6  6m9"0    McCroamsentThomastheShairLabsmarketingbrochure(eventhoughSelfhad `615 providedthemarketingbrochuretoCMGforthemtosimplyuseasasampleandformatfortheirownbrochureandeventhoughShairLabsdidnotauthorizeCMGtousetheShairLabsbrochureinitsownpromotion);6m99݌ (#(# Ќ    :p59 6  69;"0    CMGincludedaShairNaturalstrademark,whichreferredtoShairNaturalsasa  subsidiaryofShairLabs,inabottomcorneroftheCMG/Thomasagreement(eventhoughCMGsowncorporatenameandtrademarkisprominentlydisplayedatthetopoftheagreement);69;T;݌ (#(# Ќ  6  6<"0    TheCMG/ThomasagreementreferstoCMGas theExclusiveMarketingDivision `  forShairLabs(eventhoughtheagreementexpresslystatesthatitwas byandbetweenCorporateMarketingGroup,Inc....andHarteR.Thomas,Jr.andeven @  thoughShairLabsneverauthorizedCMGtorefertoitselfasamarketingdivisionforShairLabs);++6<<݌ (#(# Ќ  6  6>"0    AnaddendumtotheCMG/ThomasagreementthatdetailsThomassexclusive P  distributionrightswithinShelbyCounty,Tennesseementions, ShairLaboratorieswillattherequestof[Thomas]setupthenewaccountsforeachunitdisplay(eventhoughtheaddendumwasexpresslysignedbyKilbourneonlyinhiscapacityaspresidentofCMGandeventhoughShairLabsneverevenviewedtheCMG/ThomasagreementbeforeCMGsbusinessrelationswithShairLabswereterminated);6>?݌ (#(# Ќ  ݛ6  6rA"0    Kilbournessignatureontherepurchaseaddendumindicateshimtobethe  presidentof CorporateMarketingGroupShair(eventhoughKilbournes p signatureontheagreementitselfindicatesthathewassigningonlyonbehalfof CorporateMarketingGroup,Inc.andeventhoughthetextoftherepurchaseaddendumprovidesthat CorporateMarketingGroupagreestotherepurchaseoption);++6rAA݌ (#(# Ќ  6  6C"0    Thomasscashierscheckfor$21,689waspayableto CorporateMarketingGroup ` Inc.Shair(eventhoughCMGinstructedThomastoidentifythepayeethatway P andthecheckwasendorsedanddepositedsolelyby CorporateMarketingGroup,Inc.);and++6CC݌ (#(# Ќ  6  6E"0    WhenThomasspokewithKilbourneaboutfulfillmentofthe30accountlocations ! agreement(aftertheCMG/Thomasagreementhadalreadybeenexecuted), "  Kilbournewouldsay, letmetalkto[Self]andIwillcallyoubacktomorrow,whichThomasclaimsledhimtobelievethatKilbournewasrepresentingShairLabs.++6EE݌ (#(# Ќ  5Lastly,inadditiontoCMGsownindependentactions,Thomasassertedthathisconversation(s)withSelfpriortoenteringintotheCMG/ThomasagreementaccordedwithShairLabssownmarketingbrochure,wherebyShairLabsstatedthatitmustscreenits 0*%( applicants.WhenaskedaboutwhatdeceptiveactsThomasclaimsSelfcommitted,Thomastestified, Well,theyjustneverliveduptotheagreement.Theyweresupposedtosetup30locations....Andthenherenegedontherepurchaseagreement,whichIwantedtoexecute.++  Thereafter,thetrialcourtawardedThomasajudgmentagainstbothShairLabsandSelfforviolationoftheTennesseeConsumerProtectionActandawardeddamagestotaling$75,366.38,whichconsistedofassertedactualdamagesof$20,097.70,trebled 0948 totheamountof$60,293.10,plusattorneyfeesof$15,073.28(baseduponacontractual25%contingencyfeeagreementbetweenThomasandhiscounsel).++  ShairLabsandSelfhavepresentedthefollowingissuesforappeal:0  1.WhetherthetrialcourthadinpersonamjurisdictionoverShairLabsandSelf;0 (#(# 0  2.WhetherthetrialcourterredinfindingthatShairLabsandSelfviolatedtheTennesseeConsumerProtectionAct; (#(# 0  3.WhetherthetrialcourterredbyimposingtrebledamagesundertheTennesseeConsumerProtectionAct; (#(# 0  4.WhetherthetrialcourterredinfindingtherewasacontractbetweenShairLabsandSelfononepart,andThomasontheotherpart; (#(# 0  5.WhetherthetrialcourterredinfindingthatShairLabsandSelfbreachedthecontract; (#(# 0  6.Whetherthecontractisunconscionable; (#(# 0  7.WhetherthetrialcourterredinitsawardofdamagesbyfailingtoaccountforThomasspartincreatingfinanciallossestohimself;and (#(# 0  8.WhetherthetrialcourterredinitsawardofdamagesbyfailingtoaccountforproductsanddisplaysretainedbyThomas.K (#(# @II.PersonalJurisdiction "    Asmentionedearlier,ShairLabsandSelfmovedfordismissalbaseduponlackofpersonaljurisdiction,whichwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.Personaljurisdictionreferstothecourtsauthoritytoadjudicateaclaimastoaperson.Landersv.Jones,872S.W.2d674, 0*%( 675(Tenn.1994).TennesseeslongarmstatuterelatingtopersonsunavailabletopersonalserviceinTennesseeprovides:8  (a)PersonswhoarenonresidentsofTennessee...andcannotbepersonallyservedwithprocesswithinthestatearesubjecttothejurisdictionofthecourtsofthisstateastoanyactionorclaimforreliefarisingfrom:    8  (1)Thetransactionofanybusinesswithinthestate;    8  (2)Anytortiousactoromissionwithinthisstate;    @``(...8  (5)Enteringintoacontract...formaterialstobefurnishedinthisstate;    8  (6)AnybasisnotinconsistentwiththeconstitutionofthisstateoroftheUnitedStates;    @(('....8  (b)"Person,"asusedherein,includescorporationsandallotherentitieswhichwouldbesubjecttoserviceofprocessifpresentinthisstate. :p59   М,@((',....RTenn.CodeAnn.202214(1994).InMasadaInvestmentCorp.v.Allen,theTennessee  SupremeCourtnotedthatsubsection(6)expandsthepersonaljurisdictionofTennesseecourtstothefulllimitallowedbydueprocess,wherebysufficientminimumcontactsmaysupportjurisdiction.697S.W.2d332,334(Tenn.1985).TheCourtfurthersetforththreeprimaryfactorsthataretobeconsideredindeterminingwhethersufficientminimumcontactsexist, thequantityofthecontacts,theirnatureandquality,andthesourceandconnectionofthecauseofactionwiththosecontacts.Id.InMasada,theCourtfoundthat   sufficientminimumcontactsmayexistevenwhenadefendantneverenteredTennesseeandeventhoughthedefendanthadnodirectfinancialinterestinaparticulartransaction  underlyingthesuit.Id.at335. [T]heabsenceofphysicalcontactswillnotdefeatin p personamjurisdictionwhereacommercialactorpurposefullydirectshisactivitiestoward P citizensoftheforumStateandlitigationresultsfrominjuriesarisingoutoforrelatingto 0 thoseactivities.Id.at334(emphasisadded)(citingBurgerKingCorp.v.Rudzewicz,471 ` U.S.462(1985)).Insuchcases,dueprocessrequiresthatnonresidentdefendantsbesubjectedtopersonaljurisdictionif,andonlyif,thenonresidenthadsuchminimumcontactswiththisstatethatmaintenanceofthesuitdoesnotoffend"traditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice."InternationalShoeCo.V.Washington,326U.S.310,316 $" (1945).  EventhoughSelfneverenteredTennesseeandeventhoughShairLabshadnodirectfinancialinterestintheoriginalsaleofThomassdistributorship,theywilfullyand ,`'* knowinglyshippedallShairNaturalsproductsdirectlytoThomasinTennesseewithknowledgeoftheexistenceofThomasssecondtierdistributorshipandwithknowledgeoftheirownindirectfinancialinterest.Further,SelfhaddirectdealingswithThomasbeforeexecutionoftheCMG/Thomasagreementand,knowingShairLabssindirectfinancialinterestinThomassdistributorship,relayedinformationandrepresentationsabouttheShairNaturalsbusiness.Therefore,wefindthattheevidenceinthiscasedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsfindingofsufficientminimumcontactstosupport 0948 personaljurisdiction.@r r III.ThomassclaimsagainstShairLabsandSelf p   TheTennesseeConsumerProtectionActof1977(theAct)wasenactedbyTennesseeslegislature toprotectconsumersandlegitimatebusinessenterprisesfromthosewhoengageinunfairordeceptiveactsorpracticesintheconductofanytradeorcommerceinpartorwhollywithinthisstate.Tenn.CodeAnn.4718102(2)(1995).UndertheAct,aconsumerisdefinedsoastoinclude anypersonwhopurchasesortowhomisofferedforsaleafranchiseordistributorshipagreementoranysimilartypeofbusinessopportunity.Id.4718103(2).UndertheAct: p 8  thefollowingunfairordeceptiveactsorpracticesaffectingtheconductofanytradeorcommercearedeclaredtobeunlawfulandinviolationofthispart:    @``(...8  (12)Representingthataconsumertransactionconfersorinvolvesrights,remediesorobligationsthatitdoesnothaveorinvolveorwhichareprohibitedbylaw;    @``(...8  (14)Causingconfusionormisunderstandingwithrespecttotheauthorityofasalesperson,representativeoragenttonegotiatethefinaltermsofaconsumertransaction;    @``(...8  (27)Engaginginanyotheractorpracticewhichisdeceptivetotheconsumerortoanyotherperson;    @(('....++cTenn.CodeAnn.4718104(b)(Supp.1998).  Ourreviewofthetrialcourtsconsumerprotectionfactualfindingisdenovo, 0*%( accompaniedbyapresumptionofcorrectness,unlessthepreponderanceoftheevidenceisotherwise.SeeTenn.R.App.P.13(d).Uponreview,wefindthatthepreponderance -@), oftheevidenceinthiscaseweighsagainstthetrialcourtsfindingofaconsumerprotectionϜviolationbyShairLabsandSelf.First,eventhoughCMGmayhaveunilaterallyrepresentedthattheCMG/ThomasagreementconferredrightsorobligationsasagainstShairLabsbyrepresentingthatCMGwasactingonbehalfoforforthebenefitofShairLabs,neitherShairLabsnorSelfmadeanysuchrepresentation.Second,eventhoughCMGmayhavecausedconfusionormisunderstandingbycreatinganimpressionthat 0948 CMGwasactingasShairLabssagent,neitherShairLabsnorSelfcausedorcreatedsuchconfusionormisunderstanding.Third,wefindnootheractofpracticeengagedinorcommittedbyShairLabsorSelfthatwasdeceptivetoThomas.  Inadditiontootherfactsexplainedearlier,thefollowingfactsweighagainstthetrialcourtsfindingofaconsumerprotectionviolation.First,ShairLabsdidnotplacethenewspaperadvertisement.Infact,SelfhadnoknowledgewhatsoeverofanynewspaperadvertisementsexceptfortheoneplacedintheMemphisnewspaper,whichwasunknowntohimuntilthispendencyofthislawsuit.Second,Selfdidnot,atanypoint,tellThomasthateitherheorShairLabsownedanypartofCMG.Third,ShairLabsneverauthorizedCMGtorepresentitselfasasubsidiaryofShairLabs.Fourth,neitherSelfnoranyoneelseatShairLabseverinformedThomasthateitherSelforShairLabswasobligatedtohelpThomasgetsetupinbusiness.Fifth,ThomasknewthatCMGwasaseparatecorporationfromShairLabs.Sixth,ThomaswasawarethatCMGwashavingitsofficerssignthe ` CMG/Thomasagreement,andwasawarethatShairLabsdidnothaveanyofitsofficers @ signtheCMG/Thomasagreement.++Lastly,ThomasneveraskedSelfwhetherKilbournehadtheauthoritytosignanythingforShairLabsandShairLabsneverrepresentedanysuchauthority.Becausewehavedeterminedthatthepreponderanceoftheevidenceweighsagainstthetrialcourtsfinding,wereverseandvacatethetrialcourtsjudgmentagainstShairLabsandSelfanditsawardofdamages,includingtrebledamages,plusattorneyfees.  ShairLabssandSelfsfourth,fifth,andsixthissues,asstatedabove,relatetotheexistenceofanenforceablecontractbetweenShairLabsandThomas.ThoughThomasassertsthatanapparentagencyrenderstheCMG/ThomasagreementtobeenforceableasagainstShairLabs,theevidencepreponderatesagainstanysuchfinding.InDurham 3.2 v.Waddell&Reed,Inc.,723S.W.2d129(Tenn.Ct.App.1986),thisCourtrecognized, In p504 determiningquestionsofapparentagency,theapparentpoweroftheagentisdeterminedbyactsoftheprincipal,notbyactsoftheagent.723S.W.2dat130(citingKellyv.Cliff 0948 PettitMotors,191Tenn.390,234S.W.2d822,824(1950)).InDurham,thisCourtwent  ontorecognize:8  Theprincipalmusthaveaffirmativelyheldtheagentoutaspossessingsufficientauthoritytoembracetheparticularactinquestionorelsevoluntarily,andindueawareness,actualorcontructive,oftheagentsassumptionofpowerpermittedhimtoactasifhehadtherequisiteauthority.    u723S.W.2dat130(quoting2AC.J.S.,Agency161at798(1972)).Intheinstantcase,  p  theevidencepreponderatesagainstanyfindingthatShairLabsheldeitherCMGorCMGsofficersoutaspossessingsufficientauthoritytobindShairLabstotheuniquetermsoftheCMG/Thomasagreement.Moreover,ShairLabsdidnotvoluntarilypermiteitherCMGorCMGsofficerstoactasiftheyhadsuchauthority.BecausetheevidencepreponderatesagainstafindingthatthetermsoftheCMG/ThomasagreementwereenforceableasagainstShairLabs,furtheranalysisandconsiderationofthefourth,fifth,andsixthissuesϜisunnecessary.Lastly,inlightofourreversalofthetrialcourtwithrespecttoliability,wefinditunnecessarytoaddresstheseventhandeighthissuesonappeal,whichpertaintothetrialcourtsawardofdamages.@TT"III.Conclusion !   Accordingly,thetrialcourtsjudgmentisherebyreversedandvacated.CostsofthisappealaretaxedtoThomas,forwhichexecutionmayissueifnecessary.++++  ++ ` ++ ++  ++   `     h      p   򀀀 ,`'*    `     h      p   HIGHERS,J. -P(+ CONCUR:򀀀 3.2 CRAWFORD,P.J.,W.S.򀀀# @837 #$#H#$%FRANKS,J.%