ÿWPCD$ O±ÏYFÃüšªÜi¨ß‹¬œ$®üÛׯPx"fr,DÆàòFªKAvH^{Å‚¸uvÐz‹s"…ß¿~ΰZ¿¿Xõ½Å²U‚›ÈŽÁ\/ÓÌ4Öñp¤é7à!.”|!!&¶²›#ùñê/ÃôLÝß¼+?³ã2›è['6;¼óÜL:Æc>Ó0¥ú’ÝŠ½ ÐgCZ¼*F¦÷Æñ•èøŽ\…ÚÐé«!Ô¼ÒÐ/c÷¬"køƒGÚU0öô&WýÝjJç]PÚ# Ú?ŠAòñA²Æ¸^®úõ·Ø©x²–ž²Y·‘hs{j¿°ƒÊÃrƒ – —¦^™n¸;ó ‚ƒ²íí/~_@¡|—C¯CÔûœy]útÚÑtLÏêæÑÌYª÷¼FXPbö´¤¯©˜®˜_Þ!¸KjWþŒ~×Y¼½‘OÇ÷nÑã&§5"…üqêÀ@SÇžy#}ŒgwáñãoRéºÝï‰ QÐÂBè@çĬCI%õ’¬v¹å÷Œí}†K+sÉß›pŠ“-mšjÁƒ=M±Nˆ£ÞABÆö—ôyø“‘Ü̧eDôÒ–XÄNß„ s¬)fùÿíºs›wÈ.V‰åi`ÏŽ‰OQÁO{b#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UBN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz z Æ‘ ÆW Æ Æã 0D©NíïïE9@HHž^ü~™>U NUUN£U>ñU@/©ooooooooob 0      B* * 0¤G D5ë D- ! 0KM!M! AS˜!Æë! 0¤±" 0DU# A«™#˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»t-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular9‚±,ing¤Ã¥ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ñ ° Ñ /Ý ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€ð ðhearingðð€or€ð ðmediation€sessionðð€was€held€April€23,€1998,€well€before€revisions€to€Tenn.€R.€S.€Ct.€31€inÐ ° Ð2001.  Ý ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€òòKingóó€case€involved€the€same€trial€court€and€at€least€one€of€the€same€attorneys€as€the€case€before€us. ”Ý ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAmendments€to€Rule€31,€by€order€filed€September€4,€2001,€give€additional€specific€authority€to€trial€judgesÐ ° Ðin€alternative€dispute€resolution€proceedings€and€allow€some€procedures€to€be€developed€ð ðby€Local€Rule,€by€StandingÐ tÄ ÐOrder€or€in€consultation€with€the€parties.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðððð€20„24€(2001).€€The€cases€cited€in€this€opinion,€as€wellÐ 8ˆ Ðas€the€case€before€us,€involve€proceedings€occurring€prior€to€the€2001€amendments. “Ý ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€2001€amendments€to€Rule€31€provide,€ð ðwithout€the€consent€of€the€parties,€no€judge€presiding€over€a€matterÐ ° Ðmay€preside€over€a€Judicial€Settlement€Conference€respecting€that€matter.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€S.€Ct.€31€ðð€20€(2001). tÝ ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWifeððs€brief€states€that€the€parties€and€their€counsel€signed€an€agreed€order,€which€was€then€entered€by€theÐ ° Ðcourt,€outlining€the€procedure.€€The€appellate€record€does€not€include€that€order.€ 4Ý ƒRÇ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAccording€to€the€trial€courtððs€order€overruling€or€denying€the€Motion€for€Findings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€ofÐ ° ÐLaw,€Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àPlaintiff€[Husband]€was€given€until€October€10,€1999,€to€submit€proposed€findings€of€fact€andÐ üL Ðconclusions€of€law€and€none€were€submitted.×Ã%×× C ×€€No€further€communication€with€the€Plaintiff€[Husband]Ð À Ðconcerning€this€issue€was€had€until€the€filing€of€the€Motion€to€Set€filed€by€Defendant€[Wife]€onÐ „Ô ÐJanuary€25,€2001.€€ÐH ˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àNo€order€granting€this€opportunity€appears€in€the€record€before€us.€€However,€Husband€does€not€deny€he€wasÐ Ð  Ðgiven€the€opportunity€to€submit€proposed€findings€and€conclusions,€but€instead€argues€that€it€is€inappropriate€for€a€trialÐ ” ä  Ðcourt€to€shift€this€duty€to€a€party.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman Regularô\  `‹&Times New Roman(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman  ŸÝ ƒRNK$ÝÓ  ÓÔ‡ôè™ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ‡ôè™òòôè™ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThere€is€not€an€order€from€the€trial€court€in€the€technical€record€that€indicates€that€Husband€had€until€OctoberÐ ° Ð10,€1999,€to€file€proposed€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€Since€we€have€no€transcript€of€any€of€the€proceedingsÐ tÄ Ðbefore€the€trial€court,€we€do€not€know€if€this€procedure€was€agreed€upon€by€the€parties€in€open€court.€€However,€theÐ 8ˆ Ðmatter€is€referenced€in€the€courtððs€order€of€April€11,€2001,€and€is€not€disputed€by€either€party.€- ù-(›G2Ç$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€]5»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€ôç­ò»»Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­òòôç­Ô d(|3IW$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€]5»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3IW$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€]5»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€]5»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼]5»»»ÔÑ8€IXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÑ€OYÑà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îXD]5ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼]5»îîXD#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAssigned€on€Briefs€December€11,€2001Ð üL ÐÔ‡XIX»¼]5ÔÌò òÔ#†¼]5»XXI#ÔROGER€DALE€THOMAS€v.€GAIL€THOMASÔ‡XIX»¼]5Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Giles€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€9631€€€€€€Jim€T.€Hamilton,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2001„01226„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€August€2,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€appeal€involves€a€husbandððs€objection€to€the€classification,€valuation,€and€distribution€of€theÐ xÈ  Ðpartiesðð€property€made€by€the€trial€court€as€part€of€the€divorce.€€The€parties€agreed€to€and€participatedÐ d´ Ðin€a€procedurally€unconventional€process€for€submitting€the€property€issues€to€the€court.€€Each€partyÐ P  Ðmet€separately€with€the€trial€court,€submitted€her€and€his€respective€positions€regarding€theÐ <Œ Ðclassification€and€valuation€of€the€partiesðð€property,€and€submitted€proposed€distribution€plans€andÐ (x Ðother€ð ðexhibitsðð€and€documentation.€€After€meeting€with€each€party€separately€in€chambers,€the€trialÐ d Ðcourt€ordered€the€property€to€be€divided€according€to€the€wifeððs€proposal.€€Because€neither€a€Ð P Ðtranscript€nor€a€statement€of€the€evidence€taken€by€the€trial€court€was€filed,€we€must€affirm€the€trialÐ ì< Ðcourtððs€judgment€on€the€very€fact„specific€issues€raised€by€the€husband.€€Ð Ø( ÐÓ±ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ ° ÐAffirmed€and€Remandedó óÐ œì ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼]5»àXIx#ÔÔ‡XIX.¼]5ÔPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòBen€H.€Cantrell,€P.J.,€M.S.,€óóÐ tÄ Ðjoined.€€òòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,€J.óó,€filed€a€concurring€opinion.Ð `° ÐÌÌRobert€L.€Marlow,€Shelbyville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Roger€Dale€Thomas.Ð $"t! ÐÌJoseph€Ward€Henry,€Jr.,€Pulaski,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Gail€C.€Thomas.Ð ü#L# ÐÓ” ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÐ Ô%$!% Ðò òÓ  Óó óÔ#†¼]5»XXIà #ÔÔ€XIX»¼]5ÔÌà  àThe€record€before€us€does€not€include€either€a€transcript€of€the€proceedings€or€a€statementÐ ¬'ü"' Ðof€the€evidence€pursuant€to€Rule€24(c),€and€therefore€our€ability€to€review€the€decision€of€the€trialÐ ˜(è#( Ðcourt€on€appeal€is€very€limited.€€However,€from€the€contents€of€the€technical€record,€we€ascertain€theÐ „)Ô$) Ðfollowing€to€be€the€factual€background€of€the€dispute€and€the€procedural€history€leading€to€thisÐ p*À%* Ðappeal.Ð \+¬&+ ÐÌÐ 4-„(-ý ÐÓ  ÓI.€€Facts€and€HistoryÐ ° ÐÓ*ÓÌà  àThe€parties€were€married€on€April€20,€1972,€and€have€no€minor€children.€€They€separated€inÐ ˆØ ÐAugust€of€1996,€and€on€July€15,€1997,€Husband€sued€Wife€for€a€divorce€based€on€irreconcilableÐ tÄ Ðdifferences.€€Wife€answered,€agreeing€there€were€irreconcilable€differences€and€attaching€a€MaritalÐ `° ÐDissolution€Agreement€that€outlined€the€distribution€of€all€the€partiesðð€property.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àWife€later€repudiated€the€previously€submitted€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement.€€She€re„Ð $ t Ðanswered€and€counter„claimed€for€divorce€from€Husband€based€on€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€Ð  ` ÐShortly€thereafter,€Husbandððs€attorney€withdrew€from€representation.€€Wife€received€a€defaultÐ ü L  Ðjudgment€against€Husband€that€granted€a€divorce€to€Wife€and€divided€the€marital€property€inÐ è 8  Ðaccordance€with€the€proposal€she€submitted€to€the€court.€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àFour€months€later,€Wife€filed€a€petition€for€contempt€against€Husband€for€failure€to€complyÐ ¬ü  Ðwith€the€marital€property€division€as€previously€ordered€by€the€court.€€Husband€filed€a€Motion€toÐ ˜è  ÐVacate€and€Set€Aside€Judgment€by€Default€based€on€the€fact€that€there€was€no€notice€given€toÐ „Ô  ÐHusband€or€his€attorney€and€that€the€property€division€was€inequitable.€€The€trial€court€issued€anÐ pÀ Ðorder€vacating€and€setting€aside€the€division€of€marital€property€in€the€final€order€of€divorce.€€TheÐ \¬ Ðtrial€court,€however,€ordered€the€absolute€divorce€granted€to€the€wife€to€remain€in€full€force.€€TheÐ H˜ Ðtrial€of€the€matter€for€the€purposes€of€distribution€of€the€marital€estate€was€set,€but€was€continuedÐ 4„ Ðupon€the€agreement€of€the€parties.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àDuring€the€continuance€or€on€the€trial€date,€the€parties€apparently€entered€into€an€agreementÐ øH Ðwith€the€trial€court€for€a€method€of€deciding€the€property€distribution€issues.€€They€referred€to€it€asÐ ä4 Ða€form€of€alternative€dispute€resolution€or€mediation.€€At€this€ð ðsession,ðð€each€party€submitted€aÐ Ð  Ðproposed€division€of€marital€assets€as€well€as€his€or€her€own€valuation€of€those€assets.€€After€hearingÐ ¼  Ðfrom€each€party€separately,€and€considering€the€exhibits€presented€by€each,€the€trial€court€issued€aÐ ¨ø Ðletter€to€counsel€stating€that€the€Wifeððs€proposal€was€being€accepted€by€the€court€and€that€her€counselÐ ”ä Ðwas€to€draft€an€order€to€that€effect.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€issued€an€order€that€memorialized€the€division€of€the€coupleððs€property€andÐ X ¨ Ðdirected€the€parties€to€comply€with€the€order.€€Earlier€on€the€same€day,€Husband€filed€a€Request€forÐ D!” ÐFindings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Law€as€well€as€a€Motion€to€Reconsider€the€Property€Division.€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àNo€additional€documents€appear€in€the€technical€record€until€eighteen€months€later€whenÐ $X" ÐWife€filed€a€Motion€to€Set€Husbandððs€Motion€to€Reconsider€and€Request€for€Findings€of€Fact€andÐ ô$D # ÐConclusions€of€Law.€€The€trial€court€issued€two€orders€denying€both€of€Husbandððs€motions.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àHusband€appealed€presenting€the€following€issues€for€our€review:€(1)€whether€the€trial€courtÐ ¸'#& Ðerred€by€failing€to€make€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€even€after€a€request€by€one€of€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðparties;€(2)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€classifying€the€real€property€titled€in€Wifeððs€sole€name€asÐ )à$( Ðseparate€property€not€subject€to€distribution;€and€(3)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€the€valuation€andÐ |*Ì%) Ðdistribution€of€the€marital€estate€with€regard€to€certain€specifically€enumerated€items.Ð h+¸&* ЇÓ  ÓII.€The€Procedure€Used€BelowÐ ° ÐÓ9ÓÌà  àThe€dispute€in€this€matter€is€over€the€classification,€valuation€and€distribution€of€the€partiesððÐ ˆØ Ðproperty.€€A€trial€on€those€issues€had€been€set.€€On€the€trial€date,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€the€trial€court€conducted€what€isÐ tÄ Ðvariously€called€by€the€parties€as€a€ð ðmediation€process,ðð€an€ð ðalternative€dispute€resolution€session,ððÐ `° Ðand€a€ð ðhearing.ðð€€The€trial€courtððs€final€order€explains€the€basis€for€the€procedure€used:Ð L œ ÐÌà8  àThe€parties€entered€into€a€mediation€procedure€which€was€agreed€to€by€both€partiesÐ $ t Ðand€their€counsel€and€acknowledged€in€open€Court€whereby€each€party€would€meetÐ  ` Ðprivately€in€chambers€with€the€Court€to€offer€testimony€concerning€the€distributionÐ ü L  Ðof€the€estate€of€the€parties,€present€exhibits,€and€other€documentation.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€the€trial€courtððs€letter€to€counsel€informing€them€of€its€holding,€the€court€referred€to€theseÐ À  Ðappearances€as€a€ð ðmediation€hearing.ðð€€Neither€party€disputes€that€the€agreement€referred€to€in€theÐ ¬ü  Ðtrial€courtððs€order€was€made€or€that€this€was€the€procedure€agreed€to.€€Husband€does€not€object€onÐ ˜è  Ðappeal€to€the€procedure,€merely€to€the€result.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àRegardless€of€the€terminology€used,€the€procedure€followed€by€the€court€at€the€request€or€withÐ \¬ Ðthe€agreement€of€the€parties€and€their€counsel€was€not€a€mediation€nor€any€other€form€of€alternativeÐ H˜ Ðdispute€resolution€recognized€by€Rule€31€of€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court.€€The€Supreme€Court€ofÐ 4„ ÐTennessee,€in€the€exercise€of€its€responsibility€to€supervise€the€administration€of€justice€in€our€courts,Ð  p Ðhas€established€ð ða€system€of€court„annexed€alternative€dispute€resolution€methodsðð€whose€purposeÐ  \ Ðis€to€ð ðmake€the€process€of€dispute€resolution€more€efficient,€more€economical,€and€equally€fair.ðð€Ð øH ÐTenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€Ô_ÔpmblÔ_Ô.€€The€procedures€comprising€this€system€have€been€promulgated€as€RuleÐ ä4 Ð31€of€the€Rules€of€the€Supreme€Court.€€Rule€31€governs€all€court„annexed€alternative€disputeÐ Ð  Ðresolution.€€This€court€has€previously€determined€that€all€court„annexed€alternative€dispute€resolutionÐ ¼  Ðproceedings€must€be€consistent€with€Rule€31€and€that€courts€have€no€authority€to€participate€in€anyÐ ¨ø Ðother€type€of€dispute€resolution€process€or€in€any€manner€inconsistent€with€Rule€31.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòEnvironmentalÐ ”ä ÐAbatement,€Inc.€v.€Astrum€R.E.€Corpóó.,€27€S.W.3d€530,€540€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);òò€Team€Design€v.Ð €Ð ÐÔ_ÔGottliebÔ_Ôóó,€No.€M1999„00911„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€508€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€18,Ð l¼ Ð2002)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application);€òòHarris€v.€Hallóó,€M2000„00784„COA„R3„CV,€2001€Tenn.Ð X ¨ ÐApp.€LEXIS€856€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Nov.€28,€2001)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed)òòóó.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThe€proceedings€authorized€by€Rule€31€include,€among€others,€mediation€and€judicialÐ #l! Ðsettlement€conference.€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€2.€€Mediation€is€ð ðan€informal€process€in€which€aÐ $X" Ðneutral€person,€called€a€mediator,€conducts€discussions€among€the€disputing€parties€designed€toÐ ô$D # Ðenable€them€to€reach€a€mutually€acceptable€agreement€among€themselves€on€all€or€any€part€of€theÐ ° Ðissues€in€dispute.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€2(f).€€A€ð ðjudicial€settlement€conferenceðð€is€ð ða€mediationÐ œì Ðconducted€by€a€judicial€officer€other€than€the€judge€before€whom€the€case€will€be€tried.ðð€€Tenn.€R.Ð ˆØ ÐSup.€Ct.€31€ðð€2(e).׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€As€the€definitions€make€clear,€a€mediation,€including€one€conducted€by€a€judicialÐ tÄ Ðofficer,€is€a€settlement€procedure;€its€purpose€is€to€help€the€parties€resolve€their€dispute€by€agreement,Ð `° Ðas€an€alternative€to€resolution€through€the€well„established€procedures€governing€litigation.€€NothingÐ L œ Ðin€the€definition€of€mediation€or€elsewhere€in€Rule€31€authorizes€a€mediator,€including€a€judge€actingÐ 8 ˆ Ðas€a€mediator,€to€resolve€the€dispute€by€imposing€his€or€her€judgment€as€to€the€correct€resolution.€Ð $ t ÐòòTeam€Designóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€508,€at€*19„*20;€òòHarrisóó,€2001€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€856,€atÐ  ` Ð*13„*15.òòóó€€If€the€parties€are€unable€in€mediation€to€reach€an€agreeable€solution,€they€retain€their€rightsÐ ü L  Ðto€have€the€courts€resolve€their€dispute€through€litigation.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àIf,€in€fact,€the€parties€herein€agreed€to€ð ðmediationðð€or€to€some€other€alternative€disputeÐ À  Ðresolution€procedure,€they€could€not€give€the€trial€court€the€authority€to€resolve€the€mediation€byÐ ¬ü  Ðorder€rather€than€agreement€of€the€parties€and€could€not€authorize€the€trial€judge€before€whom€theÐ ˜è  Ðlitigation€was€pending€to€conduct€the€mediation.€€Tenn.€R.€S.€Ct.€31€(1995);€òòEnvironmentalÐ „Ô  ÐAbatementóó,€27€S.W.3d€at€540„41;€òòTeam€Designóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€508,€at€*19„*20;€òòHarrisóó,Ð pÀ Ð2001€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€856,€at€*11„*13òòóó.€€Consequently,€if€the€order€appealed€from€is€the€productÐ \¬ Ðof€a€procedure€agreed€to€by€the€parties€as€an€alternative€to€litigation,€the€order€must€be€vacated€asÐ H˜ Ðbeyond€the€authority€of€the€trial€court.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIn€òòKing€v.€Kingóó,€M2001„00275„C0A„R3„CV,€2001€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€913,€at€*11€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð  \ ÐApp.€Dec.€13,€2001)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed),€this€court€considered€a€procedureÐ øH Ðvery€similar€to€the€one€used€herein.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€We€determined€that€the€procedure€was€not€a€mediation,€but,Ð ä4 Ðinstead,€was€ð ðan€agreed„upon€method€of€presenting€evidence€to€the€trial€court.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€*10„*11.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIf,€in€fact,€the€parties€below€simply€agreed€to€an€alternative€method€for€getting€evidenceÐ ¨ø Ðbefore€the€trial€court€upon€which€the€court€was€to€base€its€ruling,€the€result€of€that€agreement€wasÐ ”ä Ða€waiver€of€the€right€to€present€additional€relevant€testimony€through€other€witnesses€with€knowledgeÐ €Ð Ðof€the€facts,€the€right€to€be€present€when€the€other€party€testified,€and€the€right€to€cross„examination,Ð l¼ Ðall€of€which€are€Ô_ÔwaivableÔ_Ô.€€Although€the€trial€court€apparently€authorized€court€reporters€to€beÐ X ¨ Ðpresent€at€the€separate€presentation€of€each€party,€neither€party€took€advantage€of€this€offer.€€TheÐ D!” Ðcombination€of€this€decision€and€the€waiver€of€the€right€to€be€present€during€the€other€partyððsÐ 0"€  Ðtestimony€resulted€in€neither€party€knowing€the€details€of€the€otherððs€testimony,€even€after„the€fact,Ð #l! Ðand€the€subsequent€inability€to€preserve€that€testimony€for€appellate€review€either€through€aÐ $X" Ðtranscript€or€a€statement€of€the€evidence.Ð ô$D # Ðâ âÐ à%0!$ Ðà  àThe€pivotal€question,€then,€is€whether€the€parties,€through€counsel,€agreed:€(1)€to€aÐ ° Ðâ âð ðmediationðð€process€with€the€expectation€that€agreement€of€the€parties€was€necessary€to€resolution;Ð œì Ðor€(2)€to€an€unusual€method€of€presenting€evidence,€while€still€operating€in€the€litigation€model,€withÐ ˆØ Ðthe€expectation€the€court€would€resolve€the€dispute€based€upon€the€evidence€presented€in€thisÐ tÄ Ðunusual€procedure.Ð `° ÐÌà  àThe€record€does€not€include€a€formal€written€agreement€or€agreed€order€outlining€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðspecifics€of€the€partiesðð€agreement.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€trial€courtððs€final€order€sets€out€all€we€know€about€theÐ $ t Ðagreement.€€That€order€is€silent€on€the€question€of€whether€the€parties€agreed€to€resolution€byÐ  ` Ðagreement€through€mediation€or€whether€they€agreed€that€the€court€would€resolve€their€dispute,€butÐ ü L  Ðcertain€alterations€in€presentation€of€evidence€would€be€made.€€However,€the€language€used€by€theÐ è 8  Ðtrial€court€suggests€that€the€parties,€through€their€counsel,€were€aware€that€the€separate€hearings€withÐ Ô$  Ðthe€trial€court€were€ð ðto€offer€testimony€.€.€.€present€exhibits,€and€other€documentation.ððÐ À  ÐÌà  àMost€determinative,€however,€is€the€fact€that€neither€party€has€objected,€at€the€trial€level€orÐ ˜è  Ðon€appeal,€to€the€procedure€used.€€Neither€has€claimed€that€the€procedure€as€described€in€the€trialÐ „Ô  Ðcourtððs€final€order€was€not€what€he€or€she€agreed€to;€neither€has€claimed€a€different€understandingÐ pÀ Ðof€the€procedure€he€or€she€agreed€to€follow.€€Husband€has€not€claimed€that€he€thought€the€procedureÐ \¬ Ðwas€a€true€mediation,€which€would€resolve€the€dispute€only€if€the€parties€reached€agreement.€Ð H˜ ÐTherefore,€we€must€conclude€that€the€procedure€used€below€was€simply€an€unusual€or€alternativeÐ 4„ Ðmethod€for€presenting€evidence€to€the€trial€court,€entered€into€by€informed€agreement.€Ð  p ÐÌÓ  ÓIII.€€Distribution€of€Property€Upon€DivorceÐ øH ÐÓ_FÓÌà  àIn€this€appeal,€Husband€asserts€that€the€trial€court€improperly€classified€as€Wifeððs€separateÐ Ð  Ðproperty€a€specified€parcel€of€real€estate€and€her€interest€in€real€property€owned€jointly€with€a€thirdÐ ¼  Ðparty.€€In€addition,€Husband€objects€to€the€trial€courtððs€valuation€of€specific€items€of€marital€property,Ð ¨ø Ðand€also€asserts€that€the€division€of€property€was€inequitable.€€Ð ”ä ÐÔ‡"XIXXXIÔÌà  àUpon€the€dissolution€of€a€marriage,€courts€are€called€upon€to€divide€the€assets€the€partiesÐ l¼ Ðaccumulated€during€the€marriage.€€Such€decisions€are€very€fact„specific,€and€many€circumstancesÐ X ¨ Ðsurrounding€the€property,€the€parties,€and€the€marriage€itself€play€a€role.€The€task€involves€severalÐ D!” Ðsteps,€the€first€being€to€determine€whether€an€asset€is€subject€to€division€at€all.Ð 0"€  ÐÌÔ#†XIXX"XI‘H#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔà  àTennessee,€being€a€ð ðdual€propertyðð€state,€recognizes€two€distinct€classes€of€property:€Ð $X" Ðð ðmarital€propertyððand€ð ðseparate€property.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€856€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ô$D # Ð1988).€€The€distinction€is€important€because,€in€an€action€for€divorce,€only€marital€property€is€dividedÐ à%0!$ Ðbetween€the€parties.€€òòóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ò òó óðð€36„4„121(a)(1);€òòBrock€v.€Brockóó,€941€S.W.2d€896,€900Ð Ì&"% Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Separate€property€is€not€part€of€the€marital€estate€subject€to€division.òòÐ ¸'#& ÐÔ_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ôóó,€917€S.W.2d€238,€241€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Accordingly,€when€it€comesÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÑOYÑâ âѰ°Ñâ âÑ  Ñto€dividing€a€divorcing€coupleððs€property,€the€court€should€initially€identify€the€separate€property,Ð ° Ðif€any,€belonging€to€each€party.€òò€Ô_ÔAndertonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔAndertonÔ_Ôóó,€988€S.W.2d€675,€679€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).Ô#†XIXX!XI§J#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIԀРœì ÐÌà  àThe€general€rules€for€determining€whether€property€is€separate€or€marital€are€found€in€statute.€Ð tÄ ÐÔ#†XIXX"XIÉO#ÔÔ‡#XIXXXIÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€36„4„121(b)(1Ô#†XIXX#XI£P#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ)€and€Ô#†XIXX"XI Q#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ„121(b)(2)Ô#†XIXX!XISQ#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ.€€Of€course,€the€courts€must€apply€these€rules€toÐ `° Ðthe€specific€facts€of€each€case.€€In€addition,€conduct€Ô#†XIXX"XIŸQ#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔbetween€the€parties€can€affect€the€classificationÐ L œ Ðof€the€property,€and€certain€conduct€can€create€presumptions€as€to€separate€or€joint€ownership.€€òòSee,Ð 8 ˆ Ðe.g.óó,€€òòÔ_ÔKincaidÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKincaidÔ_Ôóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€142€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995)Ô#†XIXX!XI_R#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ;òò€McClellan€v.€McClellanóó,€873Ð $ t ÐS.W.2d€350,€351€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòÔ_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ôóó,€826€S.W.2d€443,€452€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð  ` Ð1991)Ô#†XIXX!XIñS#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ;€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€858òòóó.€Any€such€presumption,€however,€can€be€rebutted€with€evidenceÐ ü L  Ðof€circumstances€or€communications€clearly€indicating€an€intent€contrary€to€the€presumption.€òòSeeóóÐ è 8  ÐòòMcClellanóó,€873€S.W.2d€at€351;€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€858.Ô#†XIXX!XI+U#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ€€Ô#†XIXX"XIæV#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ€Ô#†XIXX!XI*W#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔÐ Ô$  ÐÌÔ#†XIXX"XImW#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔà  àTherefore,€the€determination€of€whether€property€is€jointly€or€separately€held€depends€uponÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€circumstances.€€Ô#†XIXX!XIÅW#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔòòÔ_ÔLangfordÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔLangfordÔ_Ôóó,€421€S.W.2d€632,€634€(Tenn.€1967).Ô#†XIXX"XI—X#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ€Whether€an€asset€isÐ ˜è  Ðseparate€property€or€marital€property€is€a€question€of€fact.€òò€Ô_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ôóó,€917€S.W.2d€at€241;€òòÔ_ÔSherrillÔ_ÔÐ „Ô  Ðv.€Ô_ÔSherrillÔ_Ôóó,€831€S.W.2d€293,€295€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€Thus,€a€trial€courtððs€classification€decisionsÐ pÀ Ðare€entitled€to€great€weight€on€appeal.€€òòWilson€v.€Mooreóó,€929€S.W.2d€367,€372€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð \¬ Ð1996).€€These€decisions€will€be€presumed€to€be€correct€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise,òòÐ H˜ ÐÔ_ÔHardinÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHardinÔ_Ôóó,€689€S.W.2d€152,€154€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983),€or€unless€they€are€based€on€an€errorÐ 4„ Ðof€law.€€òòÔ_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ôóó,€775€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).Ô#†XIXX!XIVY#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔÐ  p ÐÌÔ#†XIXX"XI`]#ÔòòóóÔ‡"XIXXXIÔà  àAfter€classification€of€the€partiesðð€property€as€either€marital€or€separate,€Ô#†XIXX"XI¾]#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔthe€trial€court€isÐ øH Ðcharged€with€equitably€dividing,€distributing,€or€assigning€the€marital€property€in€ð ðproportions€as€theÐ ä4 Ðcourt€deems€just.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððò ò€ó ó36„4„121(a)(1).€€òòóóThe€court€is€to€consider€several€factors€inÐ Ð  Ðits€distribution.ò ò€òòó ó€óóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€(listing€the€factors€to€be€considered).€€The€court€mayÐ À Ðconsider€any€other€factors€necessary€in€determining€the€equities€between€the€parties,€Tenn.€CodeÐ ° ÐAnn.€ðð€36„4„121(c)(11),€except€that€division€of€the€marital€property€is€to€be€made€without€regard€toÐ œì Ðmarital€fault.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1).€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€courtððs€distribution€of€property€ð ðis€not€achieved€by€a€mechanical€application€of€theÐ ` ° Ðstatutory€factors,€but€rather€by€considering€and€weighing€the€most€relevant€factors€in€light€of€theÐ L!œ Ðunique€facts€of€the€case.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€859.€€An€equitable€distribution€is€not€necessarilyÐ 8"ˆ  Ðan€equal€one.òòóó€òò€Word€v.€Word,€óó937€S.W.2d€931,€933€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€òòóóÔ#†XIXX"XI\^#ÔÔ‡$XIXXXIÔThus,€a€Ô#†XIXX$XI‰c#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔdivision€is€notÐ $#t! Ðrendered€inequitable€simply€because€it€is€not€precisely€equal,€òòCohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€832Ð $`" Ð(Tenn.€1996)Ô#†XIXX"XIÓc#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ;òò€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôóó,€986€S.W.2d€220,€230€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998)òòóóÔ#†XIXX"XIÂd#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ.€€Similarly,€equity€doesÐ ü$L # Ðnot€require€that€each€party€receive€a€share€of€every€piece€of€marital€property.€òò€King€v.€King,€óó986Ð è%8!$ ÐS.W.2d€216,€219€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);òò€Brown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163,€168€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð Ô&$"% Ð1994).Ô#†XIXX"XIe#ÔÔ‡$XIXXXIÔÐ À'#& ÐÔ#†XIXX$XIõf#ÔÔ‡$XIXXXIÔÌÔ#†XIXX$XILg#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔò òà  àó óThe€trial€courtððs€goal€in€a€divorce€case€is€to€divide€the€marital€property€in€an€essentiallyÐ ˜)è$( Ðequitable€manner,€and€equity€in€such€cases€is€dependent€on€the€facts€of€each€case.€€The€fairness€ofÐ „*Ô%) Ða€particular€division€of€property€between€two€divorcing€parties€is€judged€upon€its€final€results.€Ð p+À&* ÐòòÔ_ÔWattersÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWattersÔ_Ôóó,€959€S.W.2d€585,€591€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).Ô#†XIXX"XIg#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔ€€Ô#†XIXX"XIÊi#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔBecause€dividing€a€marital€estateÐ ° Ðis€a€process€guided€by€considering€all€relevant€factors,€including€those€listed€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ œì Ð36„4„121(c),€in€light€of€the€facts€of€a€particular€case,€Ô#†XIXX!XIj#ÔÔ‡"XIXXXIÔa€trial€court€has€a€great€deal€of€discretionÐ ˆØ Ðconcerning€the€manner€in€which€it€divides€marital€property.€òò€Smith€v.€Smithóó,€984€S.W.2d€606,€609Ð tÄ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€òò€Wallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).€€AppellateÐ `° Ðcourts€Ô#†XIXX"XI;k#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔordinarily€defer€to€the€trial€judgeððs€decision€unless€it€is€inconsistent€with€the€factors€in€Tenn.Ð L œ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c),€or€is€not€supported€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.òòÔ#†XIXX!XI¼l#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔ€€Wilsonóó,€929Ð 8 ˆ ÐS.W.2d€at€372;€òòBrownóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€168Ô#†XIXX!XIÎm#ÔÔ‡$XIXXXIÔ.Ð $ t ÐÔ#†XIXX$XIbn#ÔÔ‡!XIXXXIÔÌà  àAs€part€of€its€responsibility€to€divide€the€martial€estate€equitably,€the€trial€court€mustÐ ü L  Ðdetermine€the€value€of€the€property€included.€€The€value€to€be€placed€on€an€asset€is€a€question€of€fact.€Ð è 8  ÐòòÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôóó,€986€S.W.2d€at€231.€€Parties€and€their€witnesses€often€do€not€agree€on€the€value€of€specificÐ Ô$  Ðitems€in€the€marital€estate,€and,€in€that€situation,€trial€courts€may€place€a€value€on€the€property€thatÐ À  Ðis€within€the€range€of€the€values€presented€by€the€evidence.€€òòWallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€at€107.€€AppellateÐ ¬ü  Ðcourts€review€valuation€findings€as€other€findings€of€fact,€and€a€trial€courtððs€determination€of€valueÐ ˜è  Ðwill€be€upheld€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€it.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).Ô#†XIXX!XIºn#ÔÐ „Ô  ÐÌÓ  ÓIV.€€Standard€of€Review€Without€Evidentiary€RecordÐ \¬ ÐÓyrÓÌà  àAs€set€out€above,€every€issue€raised€by€Husband€is€fact„dependent.€€In€essence,€he€asks€us€toÐ 4„ Ðfind€the€evidence€preponderated€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding.€€However,€the€record€before€us€isÐ  p Ðvery€limited.€€The€technical€record€includes€a€designation€of€separate€property€and€a€proposal€forÐ  \ Ðdistribution€of€marital€property€for€each€party,€with€attachments,€which€apparently€were€presentedÐ øH Ðto€the€trial€court€as€part€of€each€partyððs€testimony.€€We€have€no€record€of€any€testimony€explainingÐ ä4 Ðthe€filings€or€establishing€other€facts€relevant€to€a€courtððs€distribution€of€assets€upon€divorce.€€WhereÐ Ð  Ðthe€issue€on€appeal€is€one€of€fact,€this€court€must€be€presented€with€a€record€that€allows€us€to€makeÐ ¼  Ðthe€review€necessary€under€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13.€€Because€our€jurisdiction€is€appellate€only,€ourÐ ¨ø Ðreview€power€is€limited€to€those€factual€and€legal€issues€for€which€an€adequate€legal€record€has€beenÐ ”ä Ðpreserved.€€òòóóTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(c);òò€Ô_ÔDorrierÔ_Ô€v.€Darkóó,€537€S.W.2d€888,€890€(Tenn.€1976).Ð €Ð ÐÌ€à  àIt€is€the€duty€of€the€appellant€to€prepare€an€adequate€record€in€order€to€allow€meaningfulÐ X ¨ Ðreview€on€appeal.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€24(b);€òòState€v.€Bunchóó,€646€S.W.2d€158,€160€(Tenn.€1983);Ð D!” ÐòòMcDonald€v.€Ô_ÔOnohÔ_Ôóó,€772€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989)òòóó.€€Allegations€contained€in€pleadingsÐ 0"€  Ðare€not€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Robertsóó,€755€S.W.2d€833,€836€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1988).€€Recitations€ofÐ #l! Ðthe€facts€contained€in€a€brief,€or€arguments€of€counsel,€also€are€not€evidence.€€òòIdóó.€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àWhen€a€trial€court€decides€a€case€without€a€jury,€its€findings€of€fact€are€presumed€to€beÐ à%0!$ Ðcorrect€unless€the€evidence€in€the€record€preponderates€against€them.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€Ð Ì&"% ÐWhere€factual€issues€are€raised,€without€an€appellate€record€containing€the€facts,€this€court€cannotÐ ¸'#& Ðperform€a€òòde€novoóó€review€or€determine€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòÔ_ÔSherrodÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWixÔ_Ôóó,€849Ð ¤(ô#' ÐS.W.2d€780,€783€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€Therefore,€in€such€cases,€we€must€assume€that€the€record,Ð )à$( Ðâ âhad€it€been€preserved,€would€have€contained€sufficient€evidence€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€factualÐ |*Ì%) Ðfindings.€òò€Idóó.,€òòMcDonaldóó,€772€S.W.2d€at€914;òò€Gotten€v.€Gottenóó,€748€S.W.2d€430,€432€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ° ÐApp.€1988);òò€Irvin€v.€City€of€Clarksvilleóó,€767€S.W.2d€649,€653€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987)òòóó.€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€issues€raised€by€Husband€involve€the€weight,€sufficiency€and€preponderance€of€theÐ tÄ Ðevidence€underlying€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€€We€must€conclusively€presume€that€there€wasÐ `° Ðsufficient€evidence€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€òò€Ô_ÔCoakleyÔ_Ô€v.€Danielóó,€840€S.W.2d€367,€370Ð L œ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).òò€óóAccordingly,€we€must€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@ÿ ÿ ìàV.€€Request€for€Findings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€LawˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€Husband€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€providing,€upon€his€request,€Ð è 8  ÐFindings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Law.€€Rule€52.01€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€ProcedureÐ Ô$  Ðprovides,€in€pertinent€part:Ð À  ÐÌà8  àIn€all€actions€tried€upon€the€facts€without€a€jury,€and€upon€request€made€by€any€partyÐ ˜è  Ðprior€to€the€entry€of€judgment,€the€court€shall€find€the€facts€specially€and€shall€stateÐ „Ô  Ðseparately€its€conclusions€of€law€thereon.ÐpÀÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àHusband€requested€more€specific€findings€hours€before€the€trial€court€entered€judgment.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€courtððs€Final€Order€incorporated€the€Wifeððs€proposed€property€division.€€By€doingÐ  p Ðso,€the€trial€court€made€findings€of€fact€with€regard€to€the€identification,€value,€classification€andÐ  \ Ðdistribution€of€the€property.€€Husband€wants€us€to€require€the€trial€court€to€explain€the€reasons€itÐ øH Ðchose€Wifeððs€valuation€over€his€in€various€instances€and€why€the€court€decided€that€some€propertyÐ ä4 Ðwas€separate€rather€than€marital.€€We€are€not€convinced€that€the€court€must€justify€its€factualÐ Ð  Ðdeterminations€in€response€to€a€request€for€findings€of€fact.€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€any€event,€we€cannot€say€that€more€specific€findings€would€have€any€effect€on€our€decisionÐ ”ä Ðbecause€of€the€record€presented€to€us€on€fact„specific€issues.€€We€have€no€evidentiary€basis€toÐ €Ð Ðdetermine:€(1)€whether€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€courtððs€valuation€of€any€specific€asset;Ð l¼ Ð(2)€whether€the€trial€court€Ô_ÔmisclassifiedÔ_Ô€any€particular€asset;€or€(3)€whether€the€ultimate€division€wasÐ X ¨ Ðequitable.€€In€this€situation,€we€cannot€say€that€the€degree€of€specificity€of€the€trial€courtððs€factualÐ D!” Ðfindings€has€any€effect€on€the€outcome€of€the€appeal.€€Consequently,€the€judgment€would€not€be€setÐ 0"€  Ðaside€even€if€we€found€the€trial€court€should€have€made€additional€or€more€specific€findings.€€Tenn.Ð ° ÐR.€App.€P.€36(b).Ð œì ÐÌà@rr#ìàVI.€€ConclusionˆÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àIn€conclusion,€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€assessed€toÐ L œ ÐRoger€Dale€Thomas,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trialÐ 8 ˆ Ðcourt€for€any€further€proceedings€which€may€be€necessary€and€are€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Ð $ t ÐòòóóÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð À  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE