WPCH 7]3\u Ov;Z姥Q Nm mil"`WZÄ(2PʗiBOγҬA0tz`:tM_hw@])oJ vb#7k6j54~G|tƜJXag6O}Eco)w9:DLjf(~gD P._ȥA(|H KVl7>.k]KQ9~!xö>96?;n;&c5P}.e:lC-CQ)k+Y2K/5e~]@ɨQ_\,(B_*O)b[!>L1WŞ+TLARLK{khk&=f-%v 1wx7y{MAZڼZ;& ;3h,6Ī’^5)uDϑB[,(۶9LSx[WVvgb %\UNb 0U"N8  z^    ^ b 0Dnx>$Nw4E  m#2b-b;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 0CCCC B.. 0K D5 D-$ 0KQQ AS 0 0DY A(9 Z6Times New Roman Regular(`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular  R$      1  X#X  _ԀTheCityofDyersburg,theCityBoard,theMayor,andtheCityAldermanwillbe  collectivelyreferredtoastheDefendant. R$      3  X#X  _ԀThesigningoftheapplicationonlydenotedthatthepropertywasincompliancewithall  applicablecodes. R$      4  X#X  _ԀThiszoningclassificationisreferredtoasR3. C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt R$      5  X#X  _ԀTherezoningappearstohavecompliedwithallapplicablerulesandregulations. R$      2  X#X  _ԀTheB1classificationisreferredtoasa LimitedTradingServicesDistrict.b(L (#$  0  Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  R$      6  X#X  _ԀThetimelimitationof100dayswasaspecificprovisionofthelocalChattanoogaordinance  andhasnoapplicationinthepresentcase.L-(ޣ3|xUHP LaserJet 4,,,,,,0     ##mXd#- -(|G2$ !.8\dd8         0  X;X d(|39$ !.8\dd8     VVVV)!dxdx)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|39$ !.8\dd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8Ddd8     _Dv@ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @''%ATJACKSON  X#XD #DXX#J#  WILLIETOLES&IDAMAYTOLESv.CITYOFDYERSBURG,etal.X#XD    @s s  ADirectAppealfromtheCircuitCourtforDyerCounty  ( @J J No.98243;TheHonorableLeeMoore,Judge   @*AV) ` dE< ` A߈    @ No.W199901238COAR3CVDecidedJuly14,_2000_Ԁ   AV) ` dE<v` A w   XHXXX#ThepresentappealarisesoutofazoningdisputebetweentheplaintiffpropertyownerandtheCity v  of_Dyersburg_,Tennessee.Thepropertyinquestionhadbeenoperatedasatavernsince1960.In b  1998,theareainwhichthepropertywaslocatedwasrezonedasaresidentialarea.Atthatpoint, N thetavernbecameanonconforminguse.Priortotherezoning,thetavernsbusinesslicensehad : expiredandthebeerlicensehadalsolapsed.Theoperatoroftheclubappliedforabeerpermitbut &v wasdeniedbaseduponthefactthatatthetimeoftherezoningtherewasnobusinessinoperation b onthepremises.Therefore,theCitydeterminedthatthepremisescouldnotbe _grandfathered_into N thenewzoningclassification.ThePlaintiffsfiledaStatutoryWritofCertiorarichallengingthe : Citysactions.ThetrialcourtheldatrialdenovoafterwhichtheCitysactionswereupheld.#X#XXXH##DXX##X#XD &  Tenn.R.App.P.3;AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheCircuitCourtAffirmed   #DX##X#X.DHighers,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichFarmer,J.,andLillard,J.,joined.  MartinL._Howie_,_Dyersburg_,forAppellants r FredCollins,_Dyersburg_;JohnM._Lannom_,_Dyersburg_,forAppellees R  @55' OPINION #DXX# #X#XDԈ 2"! #DXX# #X#XDXHXXX#TheplaintiffsinthiscaseappealfromthedecisionoftheDyerCountyCircuitCourt,whichupheld $b# theDefendantsdenialofplaintiffsapplicationforabeerpermit.Forthereasonsstatedherein,we $N $ affirmthetrialcourtdecision. %:!%    I.FactsandProceduralHistory  '#'      Theplaintiff,WillieToles,istheownerofapieceofpropertylocatedin_Dyersburg_, )$)  v . 8#XXdd8   Tennessee.  #  1      ׀Since1960,thebuildingonthatpropertyhadbeenoperatedastheAvalonClub( The   Club).TheClubsoldbeerforonpremisesconsumptionatalltimespriortotheeventsgivingrise  tothepresentappeal.Since1989,theClubhadbeenrentedbyLindaWard.TheClubwasoperated  underabusinesslicenseandbeerlicenseheldbyMs.Ward.ThebusinesslicenseexpiredonMarch t 31,1998,andWardsurrenderedthebeerlicenseonJuly1,1998.Duringthistime,theClubwas ` locatedwithinaB1zoneandwasapermissibleuseofthelandunderthatzoningplan. p  #  2      ׀ L     `    InAprilorMayof1998,WillieTolesbeganmakingimprovementstotheClubwiththe $ t intentofrentingthepropertytoanotherindividualtocontinueitsoperationasatavern.Inoraround  ` Julyof1998,IdaMaeToles,alsoaplaintiffinthecase,agreedtooperatethebusiness.OnJuly21,  L  1998,Ms.Tolesappliedforabeerpermit.OnJuly30,1998,thebuildinginspectorandamember  8  ofthe_Dyersburg_ԀFireDepartmentconductedaninspectionofthebuilding.OnJuly31,1998,aletter $  wassenttoMs.Tolesadvisingherthatcertainrepairworkwouldberequiredbeforeherapplication   forabeerpermitcouldbeprocessed.Threereinspectionswereconductedbeforethepropertywas   foundtobeincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesonOctober1,1998.Onthatdate,Ms.Toles   applicationforabeerpermitwassignedbythenecessaryauthorities.(  #  3      ׀     Duringthetimethattheapplicationforabeerpermitwaspending,propertyownersinthe \ areapetitionedthe_Dyersburg_ԀPlanningCommissiontorezonetheareaasresidential.  #  4      ׀OnAugust H 13,1998,the_Dyersburg_ԀMunicipalRegionalPlanningCommissionmetandconsideredthe 4 applicationtorezonetheareainwhichtheAvalonClubwaslocated.ThePlanningCommission  p recommendedtotheCityBoardthatthepropertyberezoned.TheDefendantheldapublichearing  \ onSeptember8,1998,andvotedtorezonetheareafromB1toR3.   #  5      ׀ H   OnOctober19,1998,aftertherezoninghadtakenplace,thePlaintiffsapplicationforabeer   permitwasdenied.Thebasisforthedenialwasthatthepropertycouldnotbe _grandfathered_into   theR3zonebecauseatthetimeoftherezoning,therewasnooperatingbusinessonthepremises.  ThePlaintiffsthenfiledforaStatutoryWritofCertiorari,challengingtheDefendantsactionsin  denyingtheapplicationforabeerpermit.AtrialdenovowasconductedintheDyerCountyCircuit  Court,andthedenialwasupheld.Thepresentappealfollowed. l  X    II.LawandAnalysis       TheissueinthiscaseiswhetherthePlaintiffspropertyshouldhavebeen_grandfathered_Ԁinto  thenewzoningclassificationasanonconformingprioruse.Thereappearstobenodoubtthat, t underthenewzoningclassification,theoperationofatavernonthepropertyisnotallowed. ` Additionally,thereappearstobenodoubtthatthePlaintiffshadeveryintentionofcontinuingto L  operatetheAvalonClubasatavern.Thedispositivequestioniswhetherthelapseofthebusiness 8  licenseandbeerlicenseoperatedtopreventthebusinessfrombeing_grandfathered_Ԁintothenew $ t zoningclassification.  `   Itisimportanttonotethetimingofthecriticaleventsinthiscase.Thebusinesslicenseheld  8  byLindaWardexpiredonMarch31,1998.Ms.Wardsubsequentlysurrenderedherbeerpermiton $  July1,1998.Ms.Toles,thenewoperatoroftheclub,appliedforabeerpermitonJuly21,1998.   However,duetostructuraldeficienciesinthebuilding,herapplicationwasnotapproveduntil   October1,1998.Intheinterim,onSeptember8,1998,theareawasformallyrezonedfromB1to   R3.     Itisclearthatatthetimetheareawasrezoned,novalidbusinesslicenseexistedforthe \ property,norwasthereavalidbeerpermit.TheDefendantarguesthatthislackofavalidbusiness H licenseandbeerpermitmeansthatnobusinesswasinoperation.TheDefendantfurtherarguesthat 4 sincenobusinesswasinoperationatthetimeoftherezoning,therewasnothingcapableofbeing  p _grandfathered_Ԁintothenewclassification.ThePlaintiffs,however,arguethattheirintenttocontinue  \ operatingthebusiness,exemplifiedbytheapplicationforabeerpermitandrepairwork,issufficient. H Hereinliesthepointofdisagreementbetweentheparties.ThePlaintiffsarguethattheintentto 4 continueoperatingabusinessissufficienttoallowthepropertytobe_grandfathered_,whilethe   Defendantarguesthatthebusinessmustbeinoperation,whichwouldincludeallapplicablelicenses   andpermits.    ThePlaintiffsrelyonthecaseofBolesv.CityofChattanooga,892S.W.2d416(Tenn.Ct.  App.1994),tosupporttheirposition.InBoles,theownersandoperatorsofanadult-oriented l establishmentsoughtadeclarationthattheiruseofthepropertywasallowedunderthezoning X  ordinanceasapriornonconforminguse.Thepropertyinquestionhadbeenoperatedasanadult D! book/videostoresincetheearly1970's.Boles,892S.W.2dat418.In1977,theCityofChattanooga 0"  amendeditszoninglawsinsuchawaythattheplaintiffspropertywasnolongerapermissibleuse. #l! However,thebusinesswasallowedtocontinueitsoperationsasapriornonconforminguse.In $X" 1987,theHamiltonCountyDistrictAttorneyfiledsuitagainsttheownersandoperatorsofthestore $D # seekingto abateapublicnuisance.Aninjunctionwassubsequentlyenteredwhichprecludedthe %0!$ operationofthebusiness.ThebusinesswasnotinoperationwhiletheCriminalCourtactionwas &"% pendinginthetrialandappellatecourts.InearlyOctober,1989,thePlaintiffsleasedthesubject '#& premisestoanotherindividualfortheoperationofanadult-orientedestablishment.OnOctober13, (#' 1989,aCityofChattanoogaBuildingInspectorissuedacorrectionnoticetothebusinessbecause )$( thepremisesdidnotconformtotheapplicableprovisionsoftheZoningOrdinance.TheCitytook |*%) thepositionthatthepropertywasnotzonedforanadult-orientedestablishmentandthatthePlaintiffs h+&* hadlosttheirrighttothisnon-conformingusebecausetheyhaddiscontinuedthatuseformorethan  100consecutivedays.  #  6      ׀ThePlaintiffsarguedthatanon-conforminguseisnotdiscontinuedwithin  themeaningofthe"grandfather"clauseoftheChattanoogaZoningOrdinance unlessanduntilthe  owneroroccupierofthepropertythroughthatperson'svoluntaryandaffirmativeactionsmanifests t anintentiontoabandonthenon-conforminguse. `   Inresolvingtheissue,theCourtofAppealsfocusedonthemeaningoftheword 8   discontinued.Thecourtstatedthattheword shouldbeconstruedtoincludeanelementofintent, $ t combinedwithsomeact--orfailuretoact--indicativeofabandonment.Thecourtultimatelyheld  `  thatthetermdiscontinuedasfoundinArticleVII,Section100oftheChattanoogaZoning  L  Ordinancedoesnotapplyifthediscontinuanceofthenon-conforminguseispurelyinvoluntaryin  8  nature.(emphasisadded).SincethePlaintiffscouldnothaveoperatedthebusinessduetothe $  injunction,thecourtfoundthatthepropertydidnotloseitscharacterasanonconformingprioruse.     WeundertooktheextensivereviewofthefactsintheBolescasebecausethePlaintiffs   argumentseemstoriseorfallonitsapplicabilitytothepresentfacts.Inthatregard,wedonot   believethatBoleshasanybearingonthepresentcase.UnliketheinjunctioninBoles,nothing p preventedtheoperationoftheAvalonClubasatavernpriortothezoningchange.AfterLindaWard \ stoppedoperatingtheclub,therewasnoextrinsicforcewhichpreventedtheclubfromcontinuing H itsoperations.Theownerofthepropertyhadtofindsomeoneelsetooperatetheclub.Thatprocess 4 apparentlytooksometime.ThisiscertainlynottheconcernoftheDefendant.TheDefendantdid  p notpreventtheclubsoperationduringthistime.AfterIdaMaeTolesagreedtooperatetheclub,  \ thestructuraldeficiencieswhichwerefoundintheclubdidstalltheapprovaloftheapplicationfor H abeerpermit.However,therehasbeennoassertionthatthesedeficiencieswereunfoundedorthat 4 theinspectionswereundertakenasastalltechnique.Thebuildingdidnotconformtotheapplicable   codes,andtheapplicationforthebeerpermitcouldnotbeapproveduntilthenecessaryrepairswere   made.ThetimingoftherepairswastotallyincontrolofthePlaintiffs.Hadtherepairsbeenmade  morequickly,then,presumably,theapplicationcouldhavebeenapprovedpriortotherezoning.    Inshort,therewasnothing involuntaryaboutthecessationoftheoperationoftheAvalon l Clubasatavern.WereadBolestosupportthepropositionthat intentisonlyimportantwhere X  someforceoutsidethecontrolofthepropertyownerpreventsthecontinueduseofthelandina D! particularmanner.SincenosuchforcepreventedthePlaintiffsfromoperatingtheAvalonClubas 0"  atavern,theirintentisnotimportantandtheBolesdecisionisthusdistinguishablefromthepresent #l! case.Therefore,sincethebuildingwasnotbeingoperatedasabusinessatthetimeoftherezoning, $X" thereisnothingtograndfatherintothenewzoningclassification.Accordingly,theCitywaswithin $D # itsrightstodenythePlaintiffsapplicationforabeerpermit. %0!$    (#' Conclusion      Fortheforegoingreasons,thedecisionofthetrialcourtwhichupheldtheDefendants  denialofabeerpermitisaffirmed.CostsofthisappealaretaxedtotheAppellants,WillieToles t andIdaMaeToles,forwhichexecutionmayissueifnecessary.󀀀 ` ̀ 8      #X#XXXHR ##DXX#3 #X#XD#DXX#B#X#XD