ÿWPCØ$ ³œûʾbÂ8mÕì&ü‡Î‡šç6Zèþ"•9)T9“ƒåáTgJw(loEOk\£4¬ X’®jÛW\´H‘‘Ûµt¦¤AëŒDAzѦ­T‡UŽ/o¦íáWæZdkÊžy(—Ð$S\Z‰Rò”9ÇìÃ$Gÿ_Ι25åÑ'oÏm¯Í-SÚÔšKW`JU®—Œ‰,¿c0ÿo¬4‰ Bò»aÌ%ÄCò¼RÕ2v¹½Þ!Á°Æ`l²“úFÀCª¢±aC‰å+ÞrŽ{^œ9?>)mj·Ý©Õ9 €œá1ãŽKñ‡†%Ûã»íÅò†ë=2cº50g£>¾×7Êÿœ(x³ŸäL]£·PÒ\ç´«6ÞîØB"s[D¡˜¢ÝkãÙŽ›ˆ:Eý<‡sêXÅ ºHí ç‰î”„ Lˆ6ôì*Z·•Cf‘å½I÷‰³¹Úwë›ÞÇP%ÓLRÒAÀÎç …uÿ‹ˆz) [g(ý´ixB¦è‚«X×f¶Q|ฑݲµ•¥æ2eì&ž4ù±¶bój¿KUÀÒ¸U`©)¿±ïýŽÛžm4šï<ݯZu8Z– På®…ù亦wµø%Ôâ‹€b %\U$@b 0ˆ¢U N*^ xw„4ˆ zœÒ è ÷ mù #Á ÆÑ Æ— Æ] Æ#n­éN–N˜ 1‡šE! 72# 1uU 72Ê 0cü_Ng 0Di z­Ò'NùË û zÆÒ@@»bÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ 0ëÕÕÕÕ BÀ À 0¤Ý D3! D-´! 0Ká!á! AS,"Æ" 0¤E# 0Dé# A«-$»(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular›|+s 8n_+" ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1a:a:a:a:a:a:a:a:a:3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à (#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt Á Ý ƒR6{$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô½mò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThere€is€a€difference€of€opinion€as€to€what€constitutes€ð ðother€propertyðð€to€which,€when€injury€incurs,€can€beÐ ° Ðthe€basis€of€a€negligence€cause€of€action.€€We€think€that€the€interpretation€of€ð ðother€propertyðð€which€is€most€true€to€theÐ tÄ Ðpolicy€behind€the€rule€does€not€include€the€type€of€property€that€one€would€reasonably€expect€to€be€injured€as€a€directÐ 8ˆ Ðconsequence€of€the€failure€of€the€defective€product,€as€these€losses€are€essentially€damages€for€failed€commercialÐ üL Ðexpectations,€or€loss€of€the€benefit€of€the€bargain.€€òòSee€Dakota€Gasification€Co.€v.€Ô_ÔPascoeÔ_Ô€Bldg.€Ô_ÔSysÔ_Ô.óó,€91€F.3d€1094,€1099Ð À Ð(8th€Cir.€1996)(predicting€that€North€Dakota€would€follow€the€ð ðthe€modern€trend€in€many€jurisdictions€[which]€holdsÐ „Ô Ðthat€tort€remedies€are€unavailable€for€property€damage€experienced€by€the€owner€where€the€damage€was€a€foreseeableÐ H ˜ Ðresult€of€a€defect€at€the€time€the€parties€contractually€determined€their€respective€exposure€to€risk,€regardless€whetherÐ  \ Ðthe€damage€was€to€the€ððgoodsðð€themselves€or€to€ððother€propertyðððð);€òòÔ_ÔNeibargerÔ_Ô€v.€Universal€Cooperatives,€Inc.óó,€486Ð Ð  ÐN.W.2d€612,€618„20€(Mich.€1992)(stating€that,€under€Michigan€law,€economic€loss€doctrine€bars€claims€in€tort€for€injuryÐ ” ä  Ðto€ð ðother€property€if€this€damage€was€within€the€contemplation€of€the€parties€to€the€agreement€such€that€it€could€haveÐ X ¨  Ðbeen€the€subject€of€negotiations€between€the€parties).€€òòBut€see€2„J€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔTiceÔ_Ôóó,€126€F.3d€539,€544€n.€4€(3d€Cir.Ð  l  Ð1997)(refusing€to€expand€the€economic€loss€doctrine€to€preclude€recovery€for€damage€to€the€contents€of€a€warehouseÐ à 0  Ðwhen€the€warehouse€collapsed.)€€White€and€Summers€would€include€in€the€term€economic€loss€all€losses€except€ð ðinjuriesÐ ¤ô  Ðto€third€parties€that€arise€out€of€conventional€Ô_ÔtortiousÔ_Ô€behaviorðð€and€ð ðpersonal€injury€to€the€buyer.ðð€€James€J.€White€andÐ h¸  ÐRobert€S.€Summers,€òòUniform€Commercial€Codeóó,€ðð€10„5,€583€(4th€ed.€1995).#˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ±Ý ƒR6{$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô½mò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€dismissed€the€third€party€beneficiary€claim€on€June€7,€1996€at€about€the€same€time€it€allowedÐ ° ÐMcKinnon€to€amend€its€complaint€to€state€a€claim€of€negligent€misrepresentation.€€McKinnon€did€not€appeal€the€dismissalÐ tÄ Ðof€the€third€party€beneficiary€claim.- ù-(|G26{$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€%»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô½mò»»Ô d(|3¿_$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€%»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¿_$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€%»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€%»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼%»»»ÔÑ8€Y)XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼%»»¼%Ô€à@ü ü ìàÔ‡î߅%ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼%»îîß…,#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓApril€3,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌò òÔ#†¼%»XXY)#ÔTRINITY€INDUSTRIES,€INC.òòóó€v.€MCKINNON€BRIDGE€COMPANY,€INC.,Ð úJ Ðòòet€alóó.Ô‡XY)X»¼%Ôó óÐ  ^ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€95„3587„III(II)€€€€€Carol€L.€McCoy,€ChancellorÐ ú J ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½` AßÐ ¾  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2000„00510„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€November€28,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ ¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<` AßÐ ‘á  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓAn€uncompleted€highway€bridge€over€the€Tennessee€River€collapsed,€triggering€a€lengthy€andÐ ŒÜ Ðconvoluted€course€of€€litigation€between€the€parties€involved€in€its€construction.€€Litigation€beganÐ xÈ Ðwhen€the€company€that€fabricated€the€bridgeððs€structural€steel€components€sued€the€generalÐ d´ Ðcontractor€for€non„payment€on€the€contract.€€The€general€contractor€filed€a€counter„claim€whichÐ P  Ðalleged€that€the€fabricator€had€breached€the€contract€by€producing€defective€steel€components€thatÐ <Œ Ðcaused€the€collapse.€€The€contractor€named€some€of€its€other€subcontractors€as€third€party€defendants,Ð (x Ðclaiming€that€they€also€bore€some€responsibility€for€the€collapse€of€the€bridge.€€In€a€series€of€orders,Ð d Ðthe€trial€court€dismissed€the€counterclaim€and€third€party€claims,€and€declared€that€its€judgmentsÐ P Ðwere€final€for€purposes€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€Rule€54.02.€€After€this€court€heard€oral€argument€on€theÐ ì< Ðfirst€of€the€Rule€54.02€appeals,€but€before€it€could€issue€an€opinion,€the€trial€court€conducted€aÐ Ø( Ðhearing€on€the€merits€of€the€steel€fabricatorððs€claim,€and€rendered€a€judgment€in€its€favor.€€We€affirmÐ Ä Ðthe€judgment€for€the€price€of€the€steel€and€the€judgment€for€the€fabricator€on€the€general€contractorððsÐ ° Ðcounterclaim.€€We€reverse€the€judgment€dismissing€the€third€party€claims.€€€€Ô#†¼%»XXY)¹#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÐ œì ÐÓÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ t Ä ÐReversed€in€Part;€Affirmed€in€Part;€and€Remandedó óÐ `!°  ÐÌòòÔ#†¼%»àXY)% #ÔÔ‡XY)X.¼%ÔÓ  ÓBen€H.€Ô_ÔCantrellÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,€M.S.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€B.€Cain,€J.,óó€andÐ 8#ˆ" ÐòòJ.€S.€Daniel,€Sp.€J.óó,€joined.Ð $$t# ÐÌDon€L.€Smith,€Donald€N.€Ô_ÔCapparellaÔ_Ô,€John€W.€Ô_ÔHeacockÔ_Ô,€and€Kenneth€S.€Ô_ÔSchruppÔ_Ô,€Nashville,Ð ü%L!% ÐTennessee,€for€the€appellant,€McKinnon€Bridge€Company,€Inc.Ð è&8"& ÐÌKenneth€S.€Ô_ÔSchruppÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Ô_ÔSafecoÔ_Ô€Insurance€Companies.Ð À($( ÐÌDavid€L.€Johnson,€Hugh€C.€Ô_ÔHowserÔ_Ô,€Jr.€and€Mary€Ellen€Morris,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€theÐ ˜*è%* Ðappellee,€Trinity€Industries,€Inc.Ð „+Ô&+ Ðâ âÐ p,À',ýÿ ÐMary€G.€Moody,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€defendants/appellees,€Bruce€J.€Ô_ÔSaltsmanÔ_Ô,€Sr.€andÐ ° Ðâ âTennessee€Department€of€Transportation,€and€defendant,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð œì ÐÌDavid€Key€Taylor,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€defendant/appellee,€E.€L.€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€&€Company.Ð tÄ ÐÌStephen€A.€Cobb,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€defendant,€Tensor€Company.Ð L œ ÐÌJohn€Ô_ÔWingoÔ_Ô€and€M.€Clark€Ô_ÔSpodenÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€and€Vincent€G.€Ô_ÔTorpyÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€Melbourne,Ð $ t ÐFlorida,€for€the€defendant/appellee,€Tensor€Engineering€Company.Ð  ` ÐÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ Ô$  ÐÌò òà@““)ìàI.€òòˆÐ ¬ü  Ðà@CCìàCollapse€of€a€Highway€BridgeóóˆÐ ˜è  ÐÌó óà  àAppellant€McKinnon€Bridge€Company€(McKinnon€Bridge)€is€a€general€contractor€primarilyÐ pÀ Ðinvolved€in€heavy€construction€and€bridge€construction.€€Appellee€Trinity€Industries,€Inc.€is€a€steelÐ \¬ Ðfabricator€and€was€the€supplier€of€structural€steel€to€McKinnon€Bridge€for€use€in€building€the€bridgeÐ H˜ Ðat€issue€in€this€case.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThe€relationship€between€the€parties€began€in€the€fall€of€1993€after€the€state€of€TennesseeÐ  \ Ðentered€into€a€contract€with€McKinnon€Bridge€as€its€general€contractor€to€build€a€bridge€in€WestÐ øH ÐTennessee€over€the€Tennessee€River€at€State€Highway€69.€€Soon€thereafter,€on€September€3,€1993,Ð ä4 ÐTrinity€submitted€a€four„page€proposal€to€McKinnon€Bridge€to€supply€fabricated€steel€for€the€bridge.Ð Ð  ÐBen€McKinnon,€as€president€of€McKinnon€Bridge,€accepted€the€"Bid€Proposal"€with€certainÐ ¼  Ðadjustments€by€signature€dated€April€11,€1994.€€On€that€same€day,€the€parties€executed€a€"SupplyÐ ¨ø ÐContract"€wherein€Trinity€agreed€to€furnish€steel€for€the€bridge€in€consideration€of€$2,535,000.00.Ð ”ä ÐThus€the€contractual€agreement€between€Trinity€and€McKinnon€Bridge€consists€of€these€twoÐ €Ð Ðdocuments,€the€Supply€Contract€and€the€Bid€Proposal.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àDuring€construction,€McKinnon€Bridge€discovered€that€several€of€the€girders€and€cross„frameÐ D!” Ðstiffeners€supplied€by€Trinity€contained€misaligned€holes,€which€prevented€proper€erection€andÐ 0"€  Ðassembly€of€the€bridge.€€€After€the€general€contractor€notified€Trinity€of€the€problem,€the€partiesÐ #l! Ðagreed€on€a€remedial€plan€which€was€approved€by€the€State.€€Trinity's€representatives€went€to€the€jobÐ $X" Ðsite€and€re„drilled€the€holes.€€The€re„drilled€holes€were€approved€by€McKinnon€Bridge.€€The€generalÐ ô$D # Ðcontractor€claims€that€it€subsequently€encountered€other€problems€with€the€steel€such€as€wrongÐ à%0!$ Ðlength,€lack€of€proper€curvature,€dimensional€and€fitting€errors,€and€poor€quality.€€It€is€clear€from€BenÐ Ì&"% ÐMcKinnon's€testimony,€however,€that€none€of€the€steel€received€from€Trinity€was€ever€rejected€priorÐ ¸'#& Ðto€the€collapse.€€On€May€16,€1995,€the€partially€erected€bridge€collapsed.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àAfter€the€collapse€of€the€bridge,€McKinnon€Bridge€retained€experts,€some€of€whomÐ |*Ì%) Ðconcluded€that€the€steel€provided€by€Trinity€was€defective€and€caused€the€structure's€collapse.Ð h+¸&* ÐTherefore,€the€general€contractor€ceased€payment€on€the€contract€for€that€steel.€€Around€this€time,Ð ° Ðthe€State€informed€Mr.€McKinnon€that€McKinnon€Bridge€could€reconstruct€the€bridge€with€steelÐ œì Ðfrom€Trinity€that€it€had€in€storage,€as€long€as€certain€modifications€were€made€to€this€steel.€€The€StateÐ ˆØ Ðagreed€to€pay€for€the€changes.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àIt€is€undisputed€that€McKinnon€Bridge€ordered€replacement€steel€from€another€supplierÐ L œ Ðwithout€ever€requesting€Trinity€to€repair€or€replace€the€allegedly€defective€steel.€€When€asked€whyÐ 8 ˆ Ðhis€company€did€not€use€the€steel€from€Trinity,€Mr.€McKinnon€stated€that€it€would€have€beenÐ $ t Ðnecessary€for€the€steelÐ  ` ÐÌà8  à"to€have€been€picked€up€[and]€taken€to€Carolina€.€.€.€where€it€was€fabricated€„„€and€allÐ è 8  Ðthat€freight€and€allowance,€and€I€made€a€decision€not€to€use€it€.€.€.€.€€Cost€was€someÐ Ô$  Ðconsideration.€€It€just€wasn't€worth€it,€to€get€in€all€of€the€trouble€you€could€have€if€itÐ À  Ðdidn't€work.€€I€would€be€responsible.€€They€have€already€put€the€responsibility€onÐ ¬ü  ÐMcKinnon€Bridge€Company's€back€for€that€to€work,€and€I€didn't€want€theÐ ˜è  Ðresponsibility."Ð„Ô Ð Ð  ÐÌà@……)ìàò òII.ˆÐ \¬ Ðà@ó ó ìàòòProceedings€in€the€Trial€Courtóó€ó óˆÐ H˜ ÐÌà  àTrinity€filed€suit€against€McKinnon€Bridge€seeking€payment€for€the€steel€in€federal€court.€Ð  p ÐTrinity€also€filed€this€state€action€against€McKinnon€Bridge,€its€surety€Ô_ÔSafecoÔ_Ô€Insurance€CompanyÐ  \ Ðand€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Transportation€(Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô),€the€owner€of€the€bridge,€seeking€the€sumsÐ øH Ðdue€under€its€subcontract.€€Trinity's€complaint€alleged€that€it€had€provided€all€the€material€pursuantÐ ä4 Ðto€the€contract€and€that€McKinnon€Bridge€had€only€made€partial€payment,€leaving€a€contract€balanceÐ Ð  Ðof€$1,582,432.26.€€The€federal€suit€has€been€stayed€pending€resolution€of€this€action.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€Bridge€answered€and€counter„claimed€against€Trinity,€alleging€both€negligenceÐ ”ä Ðand€breach€of€contract€in€furnishing€steel€that€did€not€conform€to€the€contract€terms€andÐ €Ð Ðspecifications.€€McKinnon€also€added€third€party€claims€against€ABC€Contractors,€Inc.,€whichÐ l¼ Ðconstructed€the€bridge,€and€against€quality€assurance€inspectors€Ô_ÔE.L.Ô_Ô€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€&€Co.€€McKinnonÐ X ¨ Ðsubsequently€amended€its€answer,€adding€the€State€as€a€third€party€defendant,€based€in€part€on€aÐ D!” Ðtheory€of€vicarious€liability€for€the€actions€of€Ô_ÔE.L.Ô_Ô€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€&€Co.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àTrinity€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€McKinnon€Bridge's€counter„claim€on€two€grounds:€Ð $X" Ð(1)€that€in€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€goods€the€buyer€is€limited€to€the€Ô_ÔU.C.C.Ô_Ô€contract€remedies€andÐ ô$D # Ðcannot€maintain€a€cause€of€action€for€negligently€performing€the€contract€of€sale;€and€(2)€that€theÐ à%0!$ Ðcontract€of€sale€limited€McKinnonððs€remedies€to€repair€or€replacement€of€any€defective€goods.€€ABCÐ Ì&"% ÐContractors€also€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€McKinnonððs€third€party€claim€against€it.€€After€a€hearing,Ð ¸'#& Ðthe€trial€court€granted€both€motions€by€an€order€filed€July€28,€1997.€€McKinnon€moved€the€court€toÐ ¤(ô#' Ðamend€the€judgment€against€it,€and€the€trial€court€reaffirmed€its€decision€"to€grant€Trinity€summaryÐ )à$( Ðâ âjudgment€on€all€of€McKinnon€Bridge's€counterclaims,€both€in€tort€and€in€contract."€€€The€court€addedÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat,€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€54.02,€it€"expressly€directs€and€accordingly€enters€final€judgmentÐ ° Ðin€favor€of€Trinity€upon€McKinnon's€counterclaim€and€causes."Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àMcKinnon€appealed€to€this€court.€€The€appeal€was€docketed€as€No.€M1997„00026„COA„R3„Ð tÄ ÐCV.€€McKinnon€Bridge€moved€the€trial€court€to€continue€the€trial€of€the€case€until€after€our€decisionÐ `° Ðon€the€Rule€54.02€appeal.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€motion€over€Trinityððs€opposition,€andÐ L œ Ðrescheduled€the€trial€for€September€13,€1999.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àOn€September€10,€1998,€McKinnon€amended€its€complaint€again€to€add€Tensor€EngineeringÐ  ` ÐCompany€as€a€third€party€defendant.€€McKinnon€claimed€that€the€shop€drawings€supplied€by€TensorÐ ü L  Ðfor€the€steel€to€be€fabricated€by€Trinity€were€incorrect.€€The€trial€court€subsequently€dismissed€theÐ è 8  Ðclaim€against€Tensor,€and€certified€this€order€as€a€final€judgment€as€well.€€McKinnon€filed€its€secondÐ Ô$  Ðnotice€of€appeal,€and€this€appeal€was€docketed€as€No.€M1999„00904„COA„R3„CV.Ð À  Ðò òÌà  àó óOral€argument€on€the€dismissal€of€McKinnonððs€counterclaims€was€conducted€in€this€Court€Ð ˜è  Ðon€January€6,€1999.€€While€the€appeal€was€still€pending€in€this€court,€ò òó óMcKinnon€filed€its€secondÐ „Ô  Ðmotion€to€continue€in€the€trial€court.€€This€time€the€trial€court€denied€the€motion,€stating€thatÐ pÀ ÐMcKinnon€would€not€be€prejudiced€if€the€case€went€forward€on€the€remaining€claims€while€theÐ \¬ Ðappeals€were€pending.€€The€trial€court€denied€McKinnonððs€request€for€an€interlocutory€appeal€of€theÐ H˜ Ðdenial€of€a€continuance.€€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€subsequently€ò òó ógranted€summary€judgment€to€Conwell,€and€dismissedÐ  \ ÐMcKinnonððs€claims€against€the€State.€€The€court€certified€its€judgment€as€final€for€purposes€of€appealÐ øH Ðfor€the€third€time,€and€this€court€issued€an€order€consolidating€the€second€and€third€Rule€54.02Ð ä4 Ðappeals€under€No.€M1999„00904„COA„R3„CV.€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€filed€a€motion€in€limine€to€exclude€any€evidence€related€to€what€caused€the€bridgeÐ ¨ø Ðto€collapse.€€The€chancellor€overruled€the€motion€and€held€that€the€cause€of€the€collapse€was€relevantÐ ”ä Ðto€whether€€McKinnon€could€revoke€its€acceptance€after€the€collapse.€€Trial€began€on€September€13,Ð €Ð Ð1999.€€On€the€last€day€of€trial,€the€chancellor€ruled€from€the€bench€in€favor€of€Trinity€specificallyÐ l¼ Ðfinding€that€none€of€the€nonconformities€and/or€defects€in€the€steel€caused€or€contributed€to€theÐ X ¨ Ðcollapse€of€the€bridge.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àOn€October€27,€1999,€the€trial€courtððs€order€was€filed,€awarding€Trinity€judgment€for€theÐ #l! Ðunpaid€balance€on€the€contract,€$1,582,432.26,€as€well€as€prejudgment€interest€and€discretionaryÐ $X" Ðcosts€in€the€amount€of€$475,137.11.€€The€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€wereÐ ô$D # Ðfiled€on€the€same€day.€€McKinnon€subsequently€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment,€whichÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€court€denied.€€The€latest€appeal€followed.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌò òó óÔ#†¼%»XXY)6 #ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@^^(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà@€ € ìàò òòòThe€First€Appeal€„€McKinnonððs€CounterclaimóóˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àó óAs€we€have€noted,€Trinityððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€was€based€on€two€grounds:€thatÐ tÄ Ð(1)€McKinnon€could€not€sue€Trinity€for€negligently€performing€the€contract;€and€(2)€that€McKinnonððsÐ `° Ðremedies€for€breach€of€the€contract€were€limited€to€repair€and/or€replacement€of€the€steel.€€TheÐ L œ Ðsecond€defense€requires€us€to€review€the€contract€between€the€parties€and€the€circumstances€underÐ 8 ˆ Ðwhich€it€was€executed.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àThe€contract€consists€of€two€documents.€€The€first€is€a€Bid€Proposal€dated€September€3,€1993Ð ü L  Ðin€which€Trinity€offered€to€supply€the€steel€for€a€lump€sum€price€of€$2,535,000.€€The€limited€remedyÐ è 8  Ðof€repair€or€replacement€appeared€in€bold€print€in€Paragraph€19:Ð Ô$  ÐÌà8  à19.€€GUARANTY€&€LIMITATION€OF€WARRANTY:€THERE€ARE€NOÐ ¬ü  ÐWARRANTIES€Ô_ÔOFÔ_Ô€MERCHANTABILITY€OR€FITNESS€OF€THE€MATERIALSÐ ˜è  ÐTO€BE€FURNISHED€PURSUANT€HERETO€WHICH€EXTEND€BEYOND€AÐ „Ô  ÐPERIOD€OF€ONE€YEAR€FROM€THE€DATE€OF€COMPLETION€OF€OUR€WORKÐ pÀ ÐUNDER€THIS€CONTRACT.€€YOU€SHALL€GIVE€US€PROMPT€NOTICE€UPONÐ \¬ ÐDISCOVERY€OF€ANY€SUCH€CONDITIONS.€€OUR€LIABILITY€FOR€ANY€ANDÐ H˜ ÐALL€LOSSES€AND€DAMAGES€DIRECT€AND€CONSEQUENTIAL€SUSTAINEDÐ 4„ ÐBY€YOU€AND€OTHERS€ARISING€OUT€OF€THE€PERFORMANCE€OF€THISÐ  p ÐCONTRACT€SHALL€BE€LIMITED€TO€THE€FURNISHING,€FABRICATING€ANDÐ  \ ÐDELIVERY€OF€MATERIAL€ONLY€OR€REPLACEMENT€OR€CORRECTION€OFÐ øH ÐDEFECTIVE€OR€NON„CONFORMITY€OF€MATERIALS€WITHIN€THE€TIMEÐ ä4 ÐABOVE€STATED.ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€Bid€Proposal€also€contained€a€list€of€other€exclusions,€one€of€which€was€ð ðLiquidated€andÐ ¨ø ÐConsequential€Damages.ððÐ ”ä ÐÌà  àOn€April€11,€1994,€Ben€McKinnon€on€behalf€of€McKinnon€Bridge€Company€accepted€theÐ l¼ ÐBid€Proposal€by€signing€it€and€also€signing€an€ð ðAgreementðð€which€accepted€the€Bid€Proposal€andÐ X ¨ Ðmade€it€prevail€over€any€conflicts€between€the€two€documents€ð ðexcept€as€noted.ðð€€Mr.€McKinnonÐ D!” Ðhad€crossed€out€and€initialed€the€exclusion€of€liquidated€and€consequential€damages€in€the€BidÐ 0"€  ÐProposal,€but€he€did€not€change€Paragraph€19.€€Section€Eight€of€the€ð ðAgreementðð€accepting€the€BidÐ #l! ÐProposal€contained€a€requirement€that€Trinity€indemnify€McKinnon€against€ð ðall€claims€for€damagesÐ $X" Ðarising€from€accidents€to€persons€or€property€occasioned€by€[Trinity]ðð,€and€Section€Three€providesÐ ô$D # Ðthat€Trinity€will€be€liable€for€any€damages,€costs,€or€expenses€to€McKinnon€which€arise€from€delaysÐ à%0!$ Ðwhich€Trinity€causes€or€to€which€it€contributes.€€Finally,€Section€Three€states€that€the€rights€grantedÐ Ì&"% Ðto€McKinnon€under€the€Agreement€are€cumulative€and€are€not€intended€to€be€in€lieu€of€any€legalÐ ¸'#& Ðright€or€remedy€afforded€by€state€or€federal€laws.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@‹‹)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àIn€order€to€escape€the€provisions€of€Paragraph€19€of€the€Bid€Proposal,€McKinnon€argues€thatÐ ˆØ Ðthe€contract€is€ambiguous€and€should€be€interpreted€against€Trinity€as€the€party€who€drafted€it.€€òòSeeÐ tÄ ÐÔ_ÔWeatherlyÔ_Ô€v.€American€Agricultural€Chemical€Co.óó,€65€S.W.2d€592€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1933).€€We€think,Ð `° Ðhowever,€that€this€familiar€rule€of€construction€has€little€application€here.€€The€Bid€Proposal,€the€partÐ L œ Ðof€the€contract€Trinity€drafted,€contains€very€few€of€the€claimed€ambiguities,€some€of€which€we€willÐ 8 ˆ Ðdiscuss€later.€€The€ambiguities€stressed€most€heavily€by€McKinnon€are€contained€in€the€ð ðAgreementððÐ $ t Ðwhich€McKinnon€drew€and€had€Trinity€sign.€€But€that€same€document€made€the€Bid€Proposal€controlÐ  ` Ðany€conflicts€between€the€two€documents€ð ðexcept€as€noted.ðð€€As€we€have€seen,€Mr.€McKinnon€didÐ ü L  Ðnote€some€changes€in€the€Bid€Proposal,€but€the€exclusive€remedy€contained€in€Paragraph€19€was€notÐ è 8  Ðchanged.€€Therefore,€to€the€extent€that€McKinnon€claims€rights€and€remedies€that€are€greater€thanÐ Ô$  Ðthose€contained€in€Paragraph€19,€the€contract€itself€resolves€any€ambiguities€in€favor€of€theÐ À  Ðprovisions€in€the€Bid€Proposal.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà@)ìàò òòòB.ó óóóˆÐ „Ô  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€makes€two€other€arguments€focused€solely€on€perceived€ambiguities€in€the€BidÐ \¬ ÐProposal.€€The€first€is€that€Paragraph€19€is€in€and€of€itself€ambiguous€because€the€first€sentence€ofÐ H˜ Ðthe€paragraph€recognizes€that€there€are€warranties€of€fitness€and€merchantability€that€are€attached€toÐ 4„ Ðthis€sale,€while€the€last€sentence€disclaims€these€warranties.€€But€this€is€not€an€accurate€reading€ofÐ  p Ðthe€paragraph.€€Paragraph€19€is€not€a€disclaimer€of€warranties.€€Rather,€it€limits€the€duration€of€theÐ  \ Ðwarranties€of€fitness€and€merchantability€to€one€year€(the€first€sentence)€and€limits€the€remedy€forÐ øH Ða€breach€of€these€warranties€to€repair€or€replacement€of€the€goods€(the€last€sentence).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€second€argument€about€the€terms€included€in€the€Bid€Proposal€concerns€Mr.€McKinnonððsÐ ¼  Ðaction€in€crossing€out€the€general€exclusion€of€incidental€and€consequential€damages€while€leavingÐ ¨ø Ðin€the€specific€exclusion€in€Paragraph€19.€€Arguably€this€act€created€a€conflict€between€ParagraphÐ ”ä Ð19€and€the€provisions€in€Section€3€of€the€ð ðAgreementðð€which€allows€McKinnon€to€recover€for€anyÐ €Ð Ðdamages,€costs,€or€expenses€for€delays€caused€or€contributed€to€by€Trinity.€€But,€in€addition€to€ourÐ l¼ Ðbelief€that€the€contract€taken€as€a€whole€makes€Paragraph€19€prevail,€a€close€reading€of€the€contractÐ X ¨ Ðreveals€that€there€really€is€no€conflict€between€the€two€provisions.€€They€deal€with€different€things.€Ð D!” ÐParagraph€19€limits€remedies€for€furnishing€òòdefective€steelóó;€Section€3€allows€McKinnon€to€recoverÐ 0"€  Ðdamages€for€excessive€òòdelaysóó.€€ð ðAll€provisions€of€a€contract€should€be€construed€as€in€harmony€withÐ #l! Ðeach€other,€if€such€construction€can€be€reasonably€made,€so€as€to€avoid€repugnancy€between€theÐ $X" Ðseveral€provisions€of€a€single€contract.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔRaineyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔStansellÔ_Ôóó,€836€S.W.2d€117€at€118„119€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ô$D # ÐApp.€1992).€€The€removal€of€the€general€limitation€on€incidental€and€consequential€damages€in€theÐ à%0!$ ÐBid€Proposal€removed€any€ambiguity€with€regard€to€McKinnonððs€ability€to€recover€consequentialÐ Ì&"% Ðdamages€for€Trinityððs€delay,€but€the€limitation€on€the€remedy€for€furnishing€defective€steel€survivedÐ ¸'#& Ðunder€Paragraph€19.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@dd)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà@PPìàòòò òIs€Paragraph€19€Enforceable?ó óóóˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àThe€same€section€of€the€Ô_ÔU.C.C.Ô_Ô€that€allows€the€parties€to€limit€their€remedies€in€case€of€aÐ tÄ Ðbreach€also€provides€that€the€limitation€is€unenforceable€(1)€if€it€fails€of€its€essential€purpose,€Tenn.Ð `° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€47„2„719(2),€or€(2)€if€a€limitation€on€consequential€damages€is€unconscionable,€Tenn.Ð L œ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€47„2„719(3).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òòòA.ó óóóˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àWhen€does€the€repair€or€replace€remedy€fail€of€its€essential€purpose?€€As€a€general€rule€theÐ è 8  Ðrepair„and„replace€remedy€fails€of€its€essential€purpose€when€seller€is€unable€or€unwilling€to€repairÐ Ô$  Ðor€replace€in€a€reasonable€time.€€òòBoard€of€Directors€v.€Southwestern€Petroleum€Corp.óó,€757€S.W.2dÐ À  Ð669€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988);€òòKearney€&€Ô_ÔTreakerÔ_Ô€Corp.€v.€Master€Engr.€Co.óó,€527€A.2d€429€(N.J.Ð ¬ü  Ð1987);€òòCoastal€Modular€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔLaminatorsÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€635€F.2d€1102€(4th€Cir.€1980);€òòÔ_ÔStuttsÔ_Ô€v.€GreenÐ ˜è  ÐFord,€Inc.óó,€267€S.E.2d€919€(N.C.€App.€1980).€€When€the€seller€is€unable€or€unwilling€to€putÐ „Ô  Ðconforming€goods€in€the€buyerððs€hands€within€a€reasonable€time,€it€is€a€repudiation€of€the€obligationsÐ pÀ Ðof€the€warranty€and€leaves€the€buyer€without€a€remedy.€€òòRiley€v.€Ford€Motor€Co.óó,€442€F.2d€670€(5thÐ \¬ ÐCir.€1971).Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àIn€this€case€the€undisputed€proof€shows€that€after€the€bridge€collapsed€McKinnon€did€notÐ  p Ðattempt€to€obtain€repair€or€replacement€from€Trinity.€€A€fair€and€adequate€remedy€not€invoked€by€theÐ  \ Ðbuyer€cannot€be€said€to€fail€of€its€essential€purpose.€€òòÔ_ÔArcataÔ_Ô€Graphics€Co.€v.€Heidelberg€Harris,€Inc.óó,Ð øH Ð874€S.W.2d€15€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€In€òòMoore€v.€Howard€Pontiac€Americanóó,€492€S.W.2d€227Ð ä4 Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1972),€we€held€that€the€buyers€were€obligated€to€notify€the€seller€of€defects€in€theÐ Ð  Ðgoods€and€to€give€the€seller€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€remedy€the€defects€before€the€buyers€wereÐ ¼  Ðentitled€to€other€relief.€€We€are€not€prepared€to€say€that€in€every€case€the€seller€must€be€allowed€toÐ ¨ø Ðrepair€or€replace€the€goods€before€the€buyer€can€assert€that€the€limited€remedy€failed€of€its€essentialÐ ”ä Ðpurpose.€€But€the€burden€is€on€the€buyer€to€show€why€he€did€not€avail€himself€of€the€limited€remedy.€Ð €Ð ÐIn€this€case€Mr.€McKinnon€stated€in€his€discovery€deposition€that€he€decided€not€to€demand€thatÐ l¼ ÐTrinity€replace€the€steel€because€it€was€too€much€trouble€to€deal€with€them.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@)ìàò òòòB.ó óóóˆÐ 0"€  ÐÌà  àIs€the€limitation€on€consequential€damages€unconscionable?€€This€is€a€question€of€law€for€theÐ $X" Ðcourt€in€light€of€the€commercial€setting,€purpose€and€effect€of€the€provision.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„Ð ô$D # Ð2„301.€€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àÔ_ÔUnconscionabilityÔ_Ô€may€arise€from€a€lack€of€a€meaningful€choice€on€the€part€of€one€partyÐ ¸'#& Ð(procedural€Ô_ÔunconscionabilityÔ_Ô)€or€from€contract€terms€that€are€unreasonably€harsh€(substantiveÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÔ_ÔunconscionabilityÔ_Ô).€€òòWilliams€v.€Walker„Thomas€Furniture€Co.óó,€350€F.2d€445€(D.C.€Cir.€1965).€€InÐ )à$( ÐTennessee€we€have€tended€to€lump€the€two€together€and€speak€of€Ô_ÔunconscionabilityÔ_Ô€resultingÐ |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà8  àwhen€the€inequality€of€the€bargain€is€so€manifest€as€to€shock€the€judgment€of€a€personÐ ° Ðof€common€sense,€and€where€the€terms€are€so€oppressive€that€no€reasonable€personÐ œì Ðwould€make€them€on€one€hand,€and€no€honest€and€fair€person€would€accept€them€onÐ ˆØ Ðthe€other.ÐtÄÐ Ð  ÐÌòòÔ_ÔHaunÔ_Ô€v.€Kingóó,€690€S.W.2d€869€at€872€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Where€the€parties€possess€equalÐ L œ Ðbargaining€power€the€courts€are€unlikely€to€find€that€their€negotiations€resulted€in€an€unconscionableÐ 8 ˆ Ðbargain,€òòRoyal€Indemnity€Co.€v.€Westinghouse€Electric€Corp.óó,€385€F.€Supp.€520€(S.D.€N.Y.€1974),Ð $ t Ðand€terms€that€are€common€in€the€industry€are€generally€not€unconscionable.€€òòÔ_ÔPosttapeÔ_Ô€AssociatesÐ  ` Ðv.€Eastman€Kodak€Co.óó,€450€F.€Supp.€407€(E.D.€Pa.€1978);€òòÔ_ÔD.O.V.Ô_Ô€Graphics,€Inc.€v.€Eastman€KodakÐ ü L  ÐCo.óó,€347€N.E.2d€561€(Ohio€Ct.€of€Common€Pleas€1976).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThere€is€nothing€in€this€record€on€which€to€base€a€claim€that€the€limitation€on€consequentialÐ À  Ðdamages€for€any€failure€of€the€steel€itself€is€unconscionable.€€Both€parties€were€large,€successful,€andÐ ¬ü  Ðsophisticated€businesses€possessing€equal€bargaining€power;€and€there€is€no€claim€that€an€exclusionÐ ˜è  Ðof€consequential€damages€is€uncommon€in€the€steel€furnishing€business.€€Therefore,€we€do€not€thinkÐ „Ô  Ðthe€provision€of€the€contract€providing€for€a€limited€repair€or€replace€remedy€is€unconscionable.€Ð pÀ ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òV.ˆÐ H˜ Ðà@] ] ìàòòDoes€€McKinnon€Have€a€Negligence€Counterclaim?óóó óˆÐ 4„ ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€Paragraph€19,€even€if€it€is€enforceable,€does€not€apply€to€its€tort„basedÐ  \ Ðcounterclaim.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔSainÔ_Ô€v.€ARA€Mfg.€Co.óó,€660€S.W.2d€499€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€But€we€think€thatÐ øH Ðunder€the€circumstances€of€this€case€McKinnon€does€not€have€a€negligence€claim€against€Trinity.€Ð ä4 ÐThe€counterclaim€does€not€allege€a€claim€for€personal€injury€and€the€only€reference€to€propertyÐ Ð  Ðdamages€is€in€one€sentence:€ð ðSuch€damage€includes€but€is€not€limited€to€property€damage.ðð€€In€allÐ ¼  Ðof€its€filings€in€opposition€to€Trinityððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€McKinnon€includes€a€vagueÐ ¨ø Ðallusion€to€damages€to€ð ðpersonal€property,ðð€but€the€damage€to€the€steel€itself€and€the€attendant€costsÐ ”ä Ðof€salvage,€storage,€and€testing€comprise€the€bulk€of€the€specific€items€of€damage.€€These€damagesÐ €Ð Ðare€ð ðproperty€damageðð€in€one€sense,€but€they€are€more€accurately€classified€as€ð ðeconomic€losses.ðð€Ð l¼ ÐIn€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€goods€where€the€only€damages€alleged€come€under€the€heading€ofÐ X ¨ Ðeconomic€losses,€the€rights€and€obligations€of€the€buyer€and€seller€are€governed€exclusively€by€theÐ D!” Ðcontract.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àThis€doctrine€was€created€by€courts€to€avoid€the€ð ðcoming€collision€between€warranty€andÐ $X" Ðcontract€on€the€one€hand€and€the€torts€of€strict€liability,€negligence,€fraud€and€misrepresentation€onÐ ô$D # Ðthe€other.ðð€€James€J.€White€&€Robert€S.€Summers,€òòUniform€Commercial€Codeóó€ðð€10„5,€580€(4th€ed.Ð à%0!$ Ð1995).€€The€economic€loss€doctrine€draws€the€line€between€tort€and€warranty€by€barring€recovery€forÐ Ì&"% Ðeconomic€losses€in€tort€actions.€€òòId.óó€€The€policy€behind€this€doctrine€has€been€articulated€as€follows:Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€general€we€indorse€the€idea€that€these€losses€should€not€be€recovered€inÐ )à$( Ðtort.€€For€tort€to€intrude€willy€nilly€into€the€system€of€liability€that€has€been€quiteÐ |*Ì%) Ðcarefully€constructed€in€Part€3€of€Article€2€is€to€upset€that€balance.€€Tort€permitsÐ h+¸&* Ðrecoveries€in€circumstances€where€the€legislature€ð!ð€by€indorsing€disclaimers,Ð ° Ðparticular€statutes€of€limitations,€rules€on€privity,€and€lack€of€notice€ð!ð€has€concludedÐ œì Ðthat€none€should€be€permitted.€€We€accept€the€economic€loss€doctrine€as€a€crudeÐ ˆØ Ðproxy€for€the€dividing€line€between€what€is€tort€and€what€is€not€.€.€.€.ÐtÄÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àPutting€aside€injury€to€third€parties€that€arises€out€of€conventional€Ô_ÔtortiousÔ_ÔÐ L œ Ðbehavior€and€ignoring€personal€injury€to€the€buyer,€we€see€no€reason€why€all€otherÐ 8 ˆ Ðliability€arising€out€of€defective€goods€ought€not€be€under€Article€2.€€By€hypothesisÐ $ t Ðthe€parties€to€these€suits€negotiate€with€one€another.€€If€the€buyer€does€not€protect€itsÐ  ` Ðown€interest€adequately,€adequate€backup€protection€is€given€by€Article€2€doctrinesÐ ü L  Ðsuch€as€Ô_ÔunconscionabilityÔ_Ô€in€2„302,€restriction€of€disclaimers€under€2„316,€andÐ è 8  Ðlimitation€on€disclaimer€of€remedy€under€2„719.€€Courts€should€be€particularlyÐ Ô$  Ðskeptical€of€business€plaintiffs€who€ð!ð€having€negotiated€an€elaborate€contract€orÐ À  Ðhaving€signed€a€form€when€they€wish€they€had€not€ð!ð€claim€to€have€a€right€in€tortÐ ¬ü  Ðwhether€the€tort€theory€is€negligent€misrepresentation,€strict€tort,€or€negligence.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌòòId.óó€at€582„3.Ð pÀ ÐÔ#†¼%»XXY))<#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌà  àOur€Supreme€Court€in€òòMid„South€Milling€Co.€v.€Ô_ÔLoretÔ_Ô€Farms,€Inc.óó,€521€S.W.2d€586€(Tenn.Ð H˜ Ð1975)€recognized€the€differences€between€tort€and€contract€in€deciding€the€proper€venue€for€a€causeÐ 4„ Ðof€action€involving€the€sale€of€goods.€€Quoting€from€the€Court€of€Appeals€opinion€the€Court€said:Ð  p ÐÌà8  àà ` àA€contract€may€be€negligently€or€fraudulently€breached€and€the€cause€ofÐ øH Ðaction€remain€in€contract€rather€than€in€tort.€€In€the€case€at€bar€it€was€not€activeÐ ä4 Ðnegligent€performance€by€the€defendants€that€resulted€in€damage€to€the€plaintiffs.€Ð Ð  ÐRather€it€was€the€negligent€breach€of€warranty€of€sale,€which€in€effect€forestalled€anyÐ ¼  Ðperformance.€€The€cases€and€text€writers€deal€with€the€issue€with€varying€degrees€ofÐ ¨ø Ðemphasis€placed€on€the€two€aspects€of€the€question.€€We€conclude,€however,€thatÐ ”ä Ðsince€the€adoption€of€the€Uniform€Commercial€Code,€there€is€a€vast€differenceÐ €Ð Ðbetween€a€cause€of€action€based€upon€negligent€breach€of€warranty€of€sale€of€chickenÐ l¼ Ðfeed,€as€distinguished,€for€example,€from€a€cause€of€action€based€upon€negligentÐ X ¨ Ðperformance€of€a€contract€to€construct€a€building;€the€first€is€governed€by€the€Code,Ð D!” Ðthe€latter€may€be€brought€in€tort.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€plaintiffs€do€not€sue€for€the€price€of€the€poultry€meal.€€The€plaintiffs€sueÐ $X" Ðfor€damages€resulting€from€injury€to€personal€property€ð!ð€their€chicks€which€fed€onÐ ô$D # Ðthe€feed.€€Whatever€may€have€been€the€former€law,€an€action€for€such€damage€liesÐ à%0!$ Ðunder€the€Uniform€Commercial€Code,€particularly€Ô_ÔT.C.A.Ô_Ô€Sec.€47„2„715€where€theÐ Ì&"% Ðbuyer€is€allowed€his€consequential€damages€as€a€result€of€the€sellerððs€breach€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðwarranty€of€sale,€which€consequential€damage€is€defined€ðð(2)€Consequential€damagesÐ ¤(ô#' Ðresulting€from€the€sellers€breach€include€*€*€*€(c)€injury€to€the€person€or€propertyÐ )à$( Ðâ âproximately€resulting€from€any€breach€of€warranty.ðð€€The€plaintiffs€allege€damagesÐ |*Ì%) Ðin€the€form€of€money€expended€due€to€the€fact€their€chicks€did€not€achieve€normalÐ ° Ðgrowth;€the€injury€to€the€chicks€resulted€in€the€damages€sustained.МìÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌòòId.óó€at€588„89.€€Many€of€the€cases€that€follow€the€economic€loss€rule€rely€onòò€East€River€S.S.€Corp.€v.Ð tÄ ÐÔ_ÔTransamericaÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔDelavalÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€476€U.S.€858€(1986),€in€which€the€Court€said:Ð `° ÐÌà8  àContract€law,€and€the€law€of€warranty€in€particular,€is€well€suited€to€commercialÐ 8 ˆ Ðcontroversies€of€the€sort€involved€in€this€case€because€the€parties€may€set€the€termsÐ $ t Ðof€their€own€agreements.€€The€manufacturer€can€restrict€its€liability,€within€limits,€byÐ  ` Ðdisclaiming€warranties€or€limiting€remedies.€€òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔU.C.C.Ô_Ô€ðð€ðð€2„316,€2„719.€€InÐ ü L  Ðexchange,€the€purchaser€pays€less€for€the€product.€€Since€a€commercial€situationÐ è 8  Ðgenerally€does€not€involve€large€disparities€in€bargaining€power,€.€.€.€we€see€no€reasonÐ Ô$  Ðto€intrude€into€the€partiesðð€allocation€of€the€risk.€€ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌ476€U.S.€at€872„73.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àThough€Tennessee€does€not€have€a€definitive€body€of€law€on€the€economic€loss€doctrine,€ourÐ pÀ ÐSupreme€Court€expressed€its€agreement€with€the€policy€behind€the€doctrine€in€òòRitter€v.€CustomÐ \¬ ÐÔ_ÔChemicidesÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€912€S.W.2d€128€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€òòRitteróó,€the€court€stated€that€ð ðTennessee€hasÐ H˜ Ðjoined€those€jurisdictions€which€hold€that€product€liability€claims€resulting€in€pure€economic€lossÐ 4„ Ðcan€be€better€resolved€on€theories€other€than€negligence.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€133.€€In€other€jurisdictions,€theÐ  p Ðdoctrine€has€been€well€developed.€€Most€courts€hold€that€there€is€tort€liability€for€the€sale€of€goodsÐ  \ Ðonly€when€there€is€either€personal€injury€or€damage€to€ð ðother€propertyððÔ_Ô׃!×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€which€was€not€a€part€of€theÐ øH Ðcontract€for€sale.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€City€of€Lennox€v.€Ô_ÔMitekÔ_Ô€Indus.óó,€519€N.W.2d€330€(S.D.€1994).€€WeÐ ä4 Ðinterpret€òòMid„South€Millingóó€and€òòRitter€v.€Custom€Ô_ÔChemicidesÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó€as€standing€for€the€principle€thatÐ Ð  Ða€breach€of€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€goods€resulting€in€consequential€damages€is€governed€by€theÐ ¼  Ðâ âÔ_ÔU.C.C.Ô_Ô€despite€the€fact€that€the€pleadings€allege€the€seller€negligently€performed€the€contract.Ð ¨ø Ðà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€Trinity€did€not€raise€the€economic€harm€issue€in€the€trial€court€whenÐ ° Ðâ âit€made€its€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€But,€we€think€the€substance€of€the€argument€on€appealÐ œì Ðis€exactly€the€same€that€Trinity€made€in€the€trial€court.€€Indeed,€the€policies€behind€òòMid€South€MillingóóÐ ˆØ Ðand€òòRitteróó€are€the€same€as€those€which€inspired€the€economic€loss€doctrine.€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€relies€on€òòÔ_ÔSainÔ_Ô€v.€ARAóó,€660€S.W.2d€499€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983)€as€authority€for€theÐ L œ Ðproposition€that€a€plaintiff€may€elect€to€sue€a€seller€of€goods€in€tort€or€contract€even€where€the€goodsÐ 8 ˆ Ðharmed€only€themselves.€€But€McKinnon€fails€to€appreciate€that€the€seller€in€that€case€was€not€suedÐ $ t Ðfor€the€defective€goods€but€for€the€harm€caused€by€the€sellerððs€agent€in€negligently€repairing€theÐ  ` Ðgoods.€€McKinnon€also€cites€the€example€given€in€òòÔ_ÔLoretÔ_Ô€Farmsóó:€the€negligent€construction€of€aÐ ü L  Ðbuilding€which€would€allow€the€plaintiff€to€sue€the€contractor€in€tort€or€contract.€€That€example,Ð è 8  Ðhowever,€actually€supports€Trinityððs€argument€by€drawing€a€distinction€between€a€contract€for€theÐ Ô$  Ðconstruction€of€a€€building€and€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€goods.€€€The€Supreme€Court€said€the€latterÐ À  Ðis€governed€by€the€provisions€of€the€Uniform€Commercial€Code,€including€its€risk„allocatingÐ ¬ü  Ðprovisions.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òVI.ˆÐ pÀ Ðà@Ø Ø ìàòòDoes€Paragraph€19€Violate€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„6„123?óóó óˆÐ \¬ ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€Paragraph€19€violates€a€state€statute€that€prohibits€hold€harmless€orÐ 4„ Ðindemnity€agreements€in€construction€contracts.€€The€statute€in€question€reads€as€follows:Ð  p ÐÌà8  àA€covenant,€promise,€agreement€or€understanding€in€or€in€connection€with€orÐ øH Ðcollateral€to€a€contract€or€agreement€relative€to€a€construction,€alteration,€repair€orÐ ä4 Ðmaintenance€of€a€building,€structure,€appurtenance€and€appliance,€including€moving,Ð Ð  Ðdemolition€and€excavating€connected€therewith,€purporting€to€indemnify€or€holdÐ ¼  Ðharmless€a€Ô_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô€against€liability€for€damages€arising€out€of€bodily€injury€toÐ ¨ø Ðpersons€or€damage€to€property€caused€by€or€resulting€from€the€sole€negligence€of€theÐ ”ä ÐÔ_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô,€his€agents€or€employees,€or€Ô_ÔindemniteeÔ_Ô,€is€against€public€policy€and€is€voidÐ €Ð Ðand€unenforceable.Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„6„123.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àWe€do€not€believe,€however,€that€in€enacting€this€statute€the€legislature€intended€to€repeal€theÐ #l! Ðrisk„allocating€provisions€of€the€Uniform€Commercial€Code.€€In€the€two€cases€that€have€upheld€theÐ $X" Ðapplication€of€the€statute,€the€facts€have€involved€personal€injuries€and€claims€against€a€partyÐ ô$D # Ðinvolved€in€some€aspect€of€a€construction€project.€€The€negligent€parties€attempted€to€avoid€liabilityÐ à%0!$ Ðby€relying€on€an€indemnity€agreement€with€another€party.€€In€both€cases,€this€court€held€that€theÐ Ì&"% Ðstatute€rendered€the€indemnity€agreement€unenforceable.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔCarroumÔ_Ô€v.€Dover€Elevator€Co.óó,€806Ð ¸'#& ÐS.W.2d€777€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990);€òòElliott€Crane€Service€v.€H.G.€Hill€Stores,€Inc.óó,€840€S.W.2d€376Ð ¤(ô#' Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€facts€of€these€two€cases€fit€the€statute€exactly.€€A€negligent€party€involved€in€aÐ ° Ðâ âconstruction€contract€cannot€insulate€itself€by€having€an€indemnity€or€hold€harmless€agreement€withÐ œì Ða€third€party.€€But€the€parties€to€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€goods€are€still€free€to€allocate€the€risksÐ ˆØ Ðbetween€themselves€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„719.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€courts€have€a€duty€to€construe€statutes€so€that€they€do€not€conflict.€€òòHolder€v.€JudicialÐ L œ ÐSelection€Commissionóó,€937€S.W.2d€877€(Tenn.€1996).€€ð ð[Ô_ÔT]heÔ_Ô€Court€should€resolve€any€possibleÐ 8 ˆ Ðconflict€between€the€statutes€in€favor€of€each€other,€whenever€possible,€so€as€to€provide€aÐ $ t Ðharmonious€operation€of€the€laws.ðð€€òòState€ex€rel.€Boone€v.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó,€884€S.W.2d€438€at€444€(Tenn.Ð  ` Ð1994).€€Our€construction€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„6„123€avoids€a€conflict€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ð ü L  Ððð€47„2„719.Ð è 8  ÐÌà@==(ìàò òVII.ˆÐ À  Ðà@, , ìàòòThe€September€1999€Trial:€Trinity€v.€McKinnonó óóóˆÐ ¬ü  ÐÌà  àThe€court€in€September€of€1999€proceeded€to€trial€on€Trinityððs€claim€for€payment€andÐ „Ô  ÐMcKinnonððs€affirmative€defenses.€€As€we€have€seen,€the€court€rendered€a€judgment€in€favor€ofÐ pÀ ÐTrinity€for€the€unpaid€balance€on€its€contract,€plus€pre„judgment€interest€and€discretionary€costs.€ForÐ \¬ Ða€host€of€reasons,€both€procedural€and€substantive,€McKinnon€appeals€that€judgmentÔ#†¼%»XXY)Í€#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÐ H˜ ÐÌà@  ìàò òòòA.€€The€Refusal€to€Grant€a€Continuanceó óóóˆÐ  p ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€refusing€to€continue€the€caseÐ øH Ðagain€after€making€the€judgments€dismissing€Tensor,€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô,€and€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€final€pursuant€to€RuleÐ ä4 Ð54.02,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThis€argument€includes€two€separate€propositions:€(1)€that€proceeding€to€trial€while€the€otherÐ ¨ø Ðappeals€were€pending€is€contrary€to€the€purpose€of€Rule€54.02;€and€(2)€that€the€same€conditionsÐ ”ä Ðmaking€the€prior€continuance€appropriate€were€still€in€effect.€€We€think,€however,€that€bothÐ €Ð Ðpropositions€address€themselves€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€judge,€and€that€the€trial€judgeððsÐ l¼ Ðdiscretion€should€be€respected€ð ðabsent€clear€prejudicial€error€under€the€circumstances.ðð€€òòTurtle€CreekÐ X ¨ ÐApts.€v.€Polkóó,€958€S.W.2d€789€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àWith€respect€to€Rule€54.02,€McKinnon€argues€that€the€basic€purpose€of€Rule€54.02€is€to€avoidÐ #l! Ðthe€possible€injustice€of€a€delay€in€entering€judgment€on€a€distinctly€separate€claim€until€the€wholeÐ $X" Ðcase€has€been€tried.€€òòSeeóó€Wright€and€Miller,€òòCivil€Procedureóó,€ðð€2654.€€In€this€case€the€whole€case€willÐ ô$D # Ðhave€to€be€tried€again€if€the€court€reverses€the€dismissal€of€McKinnonððs€counterclaim€or€theÐ à%0!$ Ðjudgments€in€favor€of€the€cross„defendants.€€We€agree€that€by€proceeding€to€trial€while€the€otherÐ Ì&"% Ðappeals€were€pending€posed€some€risk€to€the€trial€court€of€a€duplication€of€effort.€€But,€the€other€sideÐ ¸'#& Ðof€that€coin€is€a€consideration€by€the€trial€judge€of€a€multi„million€dollar€claim€that€is€ready€for€trialÐ ¤(ô#' Ðon€several€of€the€basic€issues,€but€lingers€on€her€trial€docket€while€memories€fade€and€expensesÐ )à$( Ðmount.€€All€of€those€considerations€address€themselves€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€judge€and€weÐ |*Ì%) Ðcannot€find€that€she€abused€her€discretion€in€this€case.Ð h+¸&* Ðà  àWith€respect€to€the€argument€that€nothing€had€changed€since€the€prior€continuance,€inÐ ° Ðaddition€to€this€being€a€shaky€legal€proposition,€the€fact€is€that€circumstances€had€changed.€€The€caseÐ œì Ðwas€not€ready€for€trial€when€the€prior€continuance€was€granted€in€July€of€1998€because€TensorÐ ˆØ Ðobtained€an€extension€until€September€15,€1998€to€disclose€its€expert€witnesses.€€The€parties€agreedÐ tÄ Ðin€March€of€1999€to€set€the€case€for€September€of€that€year,€and€by€July,€Tensor,€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_ÔÐ `° Ðhad€all€been€granted€summary€judgment.€€So,€the€circumstances€had€changed,€and€the€trial€judge€wasÐ L œ Ðwell€within€her€discretion€in€proceeding€to€trial.Ô#†¼%»XXY)¬#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÐ 8 ˆ ÐÌà@ÇÇìàò òB.ó ó€€òòò òAcceptance€of€the€Steeló óóóˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€it€had€accepted€the€steel.€Ð ì <  Ðð ðAcceptanceðð€of€goods€under€the€Uniform€Commercial€Code€is€a€term€of€art;€it€does€not€flow€fromÐ Ø(  Ðthe€passage€of€title€or€possession.€€òòSeeóó€J.€White€and€R.€Summers,€òòUniform€Commercial€Codeóó,€8„2Ð Ä  Ðat€p.€429€(4th€Ed.€1995).€€But€since€the€consequences€of€acceptance€are€significant,€if€not€deadly,€òòseeóóÐ °  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„607,€the€drafters€of€the€Code€took€some€pains€to€define€how€it€occurs.Ð œì  ÐÌà8  àà ` à(1)€Acceptance€of€goods€occurs€when€the€buyer:ÐtÄÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(a)€after€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€inspect€the€goods€signifies€to€theÐ Lœ Ðseller€that€the€goods€are€conforming€or€that€he€will€take€or€retain€themÐ 8ˆ Ðin€spite€of€their€nonconformity;€orÐ$t` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(b)€fails€to€make€an€effective€rejection€(ðð€47„2„602(1)),€but€suchÐ üL Ðacceptance€does€not€occur€until€the€buyer€has€had€a€reasonableÐ è8 Ðopportunity€to€inspect€them;€orÐÔ$` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(c)€does€any€act€inconsistent€with€the€sellerððs€ownership;€but€if€suchÐ ¬ü Ðact€is€wrongful€as€against€the€seller€it€is€an€acceptance€only€if€ratifiedÐ ˜è Ðby€him.ЄÔ` x` x ÐÌà  àà8 ` à(2)€Acceptance€of€a€part€of€any€commercial€unit€is€acceptance€of€thatÐ \ ¬ Ðentire€unit.ÐH!˜` x` x ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„606.Ð  #p! ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€asserts€that€what€it€ordered€was€not€goods€but€a€bridge,€and€a€ð ðbridge€is€not€aÐ ø$H # Ðbridge€until€it€is€completed.ðð€€The€contract,€however,€reveals€that€McKinnon€ordered€from€TrinityÐ ä%4!$ Ðthe€steel€parts€required€to€construct€the€bridge€according€to€the€design€furnished€by€the€State.€€TrinityÐ Ð& "% Ðagreed€to€furnish€ð ðPlate€Girders;€Stringer€Beams;€Lateral€Bracing;€Diaphragm€Channels;€Cross„Ð ¼' #& ÐFrames;€Shop„Attached€Shear€Studs;€High„Strength€Bolts€for€Permanent€Field€Connections;€ThreeÐ ¨(ø#' ÐShop€Coats€of€Paint;€and€Rail€Freight€to€Yellow€Creek€Port€on€the€Tennessee€River€near€Iuka,Ð ”)ä$( ÐMississippi.ðð€€These€items€were€to€be€fabricated€according€to€plans€ð ðissued€by€the€TennesseeÐ €*Ð%) ÐDepartment€of€Transportation.ðð€€The€individual€pieces€were€fabricated€according€to€shop€drawingsÐ l+¼&* Ðprepared€for€Trinity€by€Tensor€and€submitted€to€and€approved€by€the€State.€€For€some€of€the€smallÐ ° Ðmembers€the€drawings€specified€that€they€were€to€be€partially€assembled€but€shipped€folded€togetherÐ œì Ðas€if€to€save€room.€€We€do€not€think€one€could€argue€that€the€individual€pieces€of€steel€were€notÐ ˆØ Ðgoods€under€the€statutory€definition€contained€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„105(1):€ð ðall€things€.€.€.Ð tÄ Ðwhich€are€moveable€at€the€time€of€identification€to€the€contract.ððÔ#†¼%»XXY)¸¸#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÐ `° ÐÌà  àSubsections€606(a)€and€(b)€give€the€buyer€a€reasonable€time€to€inspect€the€goods,€a€timeÐ 8 ˆ Ðperiod€that€varies€with€the€type€of€goods€involved.€€òòMoses€v.€Newmanóó,€658€S.W.2d€119€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð $ t ÐApp.€1983).€€Subsection€606(c)€seems€to€draw€a€bright€line,€but€even€the€simple€test€of€ð ðdoing€anyÐ  ` Ðact€inconsistent€with€the€sellerððs€ownershipðð€is€subject€to€interpretation.€€Our€courts€have€attemptedÐ ü L  Ðto€balance€a€reasonable€time€to€inspect€against€use€by€the€buyer€holding€that€the€statute€gives€theÐ è 8  Ðbuyer€a€right€to€possession€and€some€possible€use€of€the€goods€without€having€accepted€them.€€òòId.óóÐ Ô$  Ðat€121.Ð À  ÐÌà  àWe€have€also€held€that€acceptance€does€not€occur€when€the€buyerððs€inspection€can€only€takeÐ ˜è  Ðplace€after€the€goods€have€been€used€or€installed.€€òòHenley€Supply€Co.€v.€Universal€Constructors,€Inc.óó,€Ð „Ô  ÐNo.€88„238„II,€Nashville,€April€7,€1989,€1989€WL€31620,€at€*8€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989),€but€if€theÐ pÀ Ðbuyer€does€have€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€inspect€the€goods€acceptance€occurs€at€the€outside€whenÐ \¬ Ðthe€goods€are€used€in€the€construction€of€a€building.€€òòId.óó,€at€*7.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€the€only€time€the€steel€could€be€inspected€was€when€ð ðthe€steel€partsÐ  p Ðwere€actually€joined€together€in€the€air€over€the€river.€€We€think,€however,€that€the€major€defectsÐ  \ ÐMcKinnon€discovered€in€building€the€bridge€could€reasonably€have€been€discovered€before€theÐ øH Ðbridge€was€constructed.€€McKinnon€identified€the€following€defects€at€the€trial:€kinks€or€doglegs€inÐ ä4 Ðone€of€the€girder€segments;€a€lack€of€camber€in€one€150€foot€girder€segment;€one€lateral€brace€wasÐ Ð  Ðtoo€short;€many€bolt€holes€were€too€small;€many€bolt€holes€did€not€line€up€correctly;€and€one€majorÐ ¼  Ðsteel€member€was€too€long€to€fit.€€With€respect€to€the€girder€with€kinks€in€it€the€tugboat€captainÐ ¨ø Ðpointed€it€out€while€the€steel€was€being€barged€to€the€job€site.€€The€lack€of€camber€in€the€other€girderÐ ”ä Ðwas€noted€while€it€was€on€the€barge€at€the€job€site.€€Admittedly,€it€might€not€be€practical€to€checkÐ €Ð Ðall€the€bolt€holes,€but€the€record€shows€that€Trinity€sent€workers€to€the€site€to€ream€out€the€holes€thatÐ l¼ Ðwere€too€small€and€to€redrill€the€holes€that€were€in€the€wrong€place.€€It€turns€out€that€with€theÐ X ¨ Ðexception€of€the€short€lateral€brace,€none€of€the€steel€was€so€defective€that€it€had€to€be€replaced.€Ð D!” ÐTherefore,€we€think€it€is€inescapable€that€McKinnon€accepted€the€steel.€€The€buyer€must€pay€at€theÐ 0"€  Ðcontract€rate€for€any€goods€accepted.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„607(1).Ð #l! ÐÔ#†¼%»XXY)Æ#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌà@‹‹)ìàò òòòC.óóó óˆÐ ô$D # ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€asserts€that€the€lower€courtððs€finding€with€respect€to€the€cause€of€the€collapse€mustÐ Ì&"% Ðbe€reversed€because€the€ð ðentire€controversy€doctrineðð€requires€all€comparative€fault€tortfeasors€to€beÐ ¸'#& Ðjoined€in€the€same€action.€€òòSee€Samuelson€v.€McMurtryóó,€962€S.W.2d€473€(Tenn.€1998).€€SinceÐ ¤(ô#' ÐTensor,€Conwell,€and€the€State€had€been€dismissed,€McKinnon€argues€that€the€reason€for€the€bridgeððsÐ )à$( Ðcollapse€could€not€be€determined€in€a€hearing€involving€only€itself€and€Trinity.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àWe€disagree.€€This€action€started€as€a€simple€contract€claim€by€Trinity€against€McKinnon.€Ð ° ÐMcKinnon€alleged€as€an€affirmative€defense€that€the€defective€steel€furnished€by€Trinity€caused€theÐ œì Ðbridge€to€collapse.€€McKinnon€also€filed€a€counterclaim€against€Trinity€for€breach€of€contract€andÐ ˆØ Ðfor€negligently€fabricating€the€steel,€as€well€as€third€party€actions€against€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔE.L.ConwellÔ_Ô€&€Co.,Ð tÄ Ðand€Tensor€alleging€that€their€negligence€contributed€to€the€problems€with€the€steel.€€By€the€time€ofÐ `° Ðthe€trial€in€September€of€1999,€McKinnonððs€counterclaim€and€its€third€party€claims€had€beenÐ L œ Ðdismissed,€but€the€trial€went€forward€on€the€original€claim€by€Trinity€and€McKinnonððs€affirmativeÐ 8 ˆ Ðdefenses.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àAs€we€have€noted€McKinnon€does€not€have€a€negligence€claim€against€Trinity.€€Therefore,Ð ü L  Ðas€it€stood€on€the€eve€of€the€trial,€this€was€not€a€comparative€fault€case.€€Whatever€application€theÐ è 8  Ðð ðentire€controversy€doctrineðð€in€òòSamuelson€v.€Ô_ÔMcMurtryÔ_Ôóó€has€in€a€specific€comparative€fault€setting,Ð Ô$  Ðit€does€not€apply€here.Ð À  Ðò òÔ#†¼%»XXY):Ò#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌà@Œ Œ ìàòòD.€Ô_ÔWhatÔ_Ô€Caused€the€Bridge€to€Collapseó óóóˆÐ ˜è  Ðà@¡¡)ìàò ò1.ó óˆÐ „Ô  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€the€issue€of€the€bridgeððs€collapse€was€not€triable€and€was€not€actuallyÐ \¬ Ðtried€in€the€court€below.€€With€the€trial€set€for€September€13,€1999€and€the€third€parties€to€whomÐ H˜ ÐMcKinnon€sought€to€assign€the€fault€for€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€now€dismissed,€McKinnon€filedÐ 4„ Ða€motion€in€Ô_ÔlimineÔ_Ô€to€exclude€any€proof€at€the€trial€regarding€the€cause€of€the€collapse.€€On€the€firstÐ  p Ðday€of€trial€the€court€said€in€refusing€to€grant€the€motion€in€Ô_ÔlimineÔ_Ô:Ð  \ ÐÌà8  àà ` àAs€I€reflect€on€what€I€know€thus€far,€the€collapse€may€be€material€to€the€issueÐ ä4 Ðof€whether€or€not€there€was€proper€revocation€of€the€acceptance.€€If€what€has€beenÐ Ð  Ðsuggested€to€me€in€the€pretrial€conference€was€that€acceptance€was€not€complete€untilÐ ¼  Ðall€of€the€pieces€of€the€puzzle€had€been€assembled,€that€the€bridge€was€up,€and€thatÐ ¨ø Ðwould€demonstrate€acceptance,€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€prior€to€that,€quote,€totalÐ ”ä Ðacceptance,€would€be€a€defense€that€McKinnon€might€be€entitled€to€raise€as€toÐ €Ð Ðwhether€or€not€the€bridge€was€properly€fabricated.Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àAnd€I€still€am€taking€the€position€that€I€have€consistently€throughout,€that€theÐ D!” Ðissue€of€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€is€relevant€and€material€to€this€contract€dispute,€andÐ 0"€  Ðrespectfully€decline€to€exclude€evidence€of€the€cause€of€the€Highway€69€bridgeÐ #l! Ðcollapse.Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌÔ#†¼%»XXY)Ú#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%Ôà  àTrinity€did€not€put€on€any€proof€of€causation€in€its€case€in€chief.€€McKinnon€did€not€offer€anyÐ à%0!$ Ðexpert€proof€about€causation€as€a€defense,€but€the€court€allowed€Trinity€to€cross„examineÐ Ì&"% ÐMcKinnonððs€fact€witnesses€on€the€causation€issue.€€When€McKinnon€continued€to€object€the€courtÐ ¸'#& Ðoverruled€the€objection€with€the€following€comment:Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà8  àà ` àI€understand€the€objection,€and€I€am€going€to€overrule€it.€€There€is€the€primaryÐ ° Ðissue€of€whether€or€not€the€fabrication€met€the€specifications,€and€that€was€the€thrustÐ œì Ðof€the€examination„in„chief€with€regards€to€this€witness.ЈØÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌà8  àà ` àThe€Ô_ÔsubissuesÔ_Ô€are€having€to€do€with€substantial€compliance€or€specificÐ `° Ðcompliance.€€A€second€issue€would€be€whether€the€material€was€accepted.€€And€theÐ L œ Ðthird€issue€is€whether€or€not,€if€accepted,€there€was€proper€revocation.Ð8 ˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àNow,€I€canððt€control€the€way€that€the€proof€is€going€to€come€in€or€what€itððsÐ  ` Ðgoing€to€show,€but€Mr.€Ô_ÔHowserÔ_Ô€has€submitted€ð!ð€and€Iððve€already€determined€that€ifÐ ü L  Ðhe€is€inclined€to€put€on€proof€as€to€how€the€bridge€collapsed,€Iððm€going€to€take€thatÐ è 8  Ðinto€the€entire€factual€determination€that€I€have€to€make€in€order€to€judge€those€threeÐ Ô$  Ðissues.€€So€I€respectfully€overrule€your€motion.ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àMR.€SMITH:€May€I€ð!ð€may€I€be€allowed€to€make€one€further€comment?Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àTHE€COURT:€I€usually€donððt€let€anybody€make€a€comment€after€Iððve€ruled.€Ð pÀ ÐAre€you€going€to€critique€it?Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àMR.€SMITH:€No,€Iððm€not€questioning€it.€€No,€Iððm€not€questioning€the€ruling.€Ð 4„ ÐI€want€to€make€something€clear€that€Your€Honor€hit.Ð pÐ Ð  Ðà  àà ` à.€.€.Ð  \ ÐÌà8  àà ` àTHE€COURT:€Iððm€not€going€to€revisit€this€ruling,€but€I€will€note€that€in€theÐ ä4 Ðpretrial€brief€of€McKinnon,€the€issues€that€were€presented€to€the€Court€was€thatÐ Ð  ÐTrinity€ð!ð€the€steel€furnished€by€Trinity€did€not€conform€to€the€contract€documents;Ð ¼  Ðtwo,€that€McKinnon€could€not€and€did€not€accept€the€steel;€and€three,€if€McKinnonÐ ¨ø Ðis€found€to€have€accepted€nonconforming€steel,€McKinnon€properly€revoked€thatÐ ”ä Ðacceptance.€€And€it€is€on€that€basis€that€this€Court€has€made€its€rulings,€and€weððll€goÐ €Ð Ðforward.Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWhen€McKinnon€closed€its€proof€without€offering€any€evidence€as€to€causation€TrinityÐ D!” Ðmoved€for€a€ð ðdirected€verdictðð€under€Rule€50,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€€The€substance€of€the€motion€was€thatÐ 0"€  ÐMcKinnon€had€accepted€the€steel,€and€because€the€condition€of€the€steel€had€substantially€changedÐ #l! Ð(because€of€the€collapse),€McKinnon€could€not€revoke€its€acceptance.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„Ð $X" Ð608(2).€€Therefore,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„607(1)€obligated€McKinnon€to€pay€for€the€steel.€€TheÐ ô$D # Ðtrial€judge€treated€the€motion€as€one€for€an€involuntary€dismissal€under€Rule€41,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,Ð à%0!$ Ðthe€dismissal,€obviously,€relating€to€McKinnonððs€revocation€defense.€€The€court€said:Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà8  àà ` àI€decline€to€render€a€judgment€at€this€time€for€the€sole€purpose€of€TrinityÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdemonstrating€to€me€that€the€substantial€change€in€the€condition€of€the€goods€was€notÐ )à$( Ðcaused€by€their€own€defects,€and€that€is€the€failure€of€the€bridge.Ð|*Ì%)Ð Ð  ÐÐ h+¸&* ÐTrinity€then€argued€that€McKinnon€had€the€burden€of€proof€on€its€affirmative€defense€and€if€theyÐ ° Ðwere€waiving€their€defense€the€revocation€issue€should€be€decided€in€Trinityððs€favor.€€McKinnonÐ œì Ðdisavowed€the€waiver€of€any€of€its€defenses€and€the€trial€judge€said:Ð ˆØ ÐÌà8  àà ` àThere€is€an€objection€to€the€testimony€of€this€witness€to€the€extent€that€itÐ `° Ðrelates€to€the€cause€of€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€as€being€immaterial€or€irrelevant.ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àMy€understanding€of€the€UCC€states€that€ð ðRevocation€of€acceptance€mustÐ $ t Ðoccur€within€a€reasonable€time€after€the€buyer€discovers€or€should€have€discoveredÐ  ` Ðthe€ground€for€revocation€and€before€any€substantial€change€in€condition€of€the€goodsÐ ü L  Ðwhich€is€not€caused€by€their€own€defects.€€It€is€not€effective€until€the€buyer€notifiesÐ è 8  Ðthe€seller€of€it.ððÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àI€believe€that€throughout€this€lawsuit,€I€have€tried€to€make€myself€very€clearÐ ¬ü  Ðas€to€the€status€of€this€lawsuit,€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔHowserÔ_Ô€seems€to€understand€and€Mr.€SmithÐ ˜è  Ðdoes€not€seem€to€understand,€and€I€think€that€has€been€a€concern€of€mine€that€theÐ „Ô  Ðlegal€theories€and€principles€upon€which€I€have€made€my€rulings€do€not€seem€to€beÐ pÀ Ðunderstood.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àMr.€Ô_ÔHowserÔ_Ô,€what€you€said€is€totally€appropriate.€€I€do€believe€that€it€is€veryÐ 4„ Ðrelevant€and€material€as€to€what€caused€the€substantial€change€in€the€condition€of€theÐ  p Ðgoods.€€I€have€said€that€from€almost€the€inception€of€my€understanding€of€this€caseÐ  \ Ðseveral€years€ago,€and€I€intend€to€proceed€in€that€light.ÐøHÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àTrinity€then€proceeded€to€offer€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Howard€Hill€who€gave€his€opinion€thatÐ Ð  Ðthe€bridge€collapsed,€not€because€of€any€fabrication€defects€in€the€steel,€but€because€a€cross€brace€Ð ¼  Ðhad€been€removed€by€the€erection€contractor.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àBased€on€these€facts,€we€conclude€that€what€caused€the€bridge€to€collapse€was€triable€and€wasÐ €Ð Ðactually€tried€in€the€September€1999€trial.Ð l¼ ÐÌà@¡¡)ìàò ò2.ó óˆÐ D!” ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€also€argues€that€the€properly€introduced€evidence€at€the€trial€does€not€support€theÐ #l! Ðtrial€judgeððs€finding€that€the€bridge€collapsed€because€the€cross€brace€had€been€removed.€€ThisÐ $X" Ðargument€requires€us€to€conclude€that€Dr.€Hillððs€testimony€was€not€ð ðproperly€introduced,ðð€because,Ð ô$D # Ðotherwise,€the€evidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€the€finding.€€òòSeeóó€Rule€13(d),€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€Ð à%0!$ ÐMcKinnon€repeats€its€argument€that€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€was€not€relevant€to€anything€and€theÐ Ì&"% Ðtestimony€about€the€cause€was€not€ð ðproperðð€since€it€was€introduced€on€rebuttal€and€over€theÐ ¸'#& Ðcontention€by€both€McKinnon€and€Trinity€that€proof€of€causation€was€not€necessary.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àOf€course,€this€argument€overlooks€Trinityððs€reason€for€its€argument,€but€the€fact€remains€thatÐ |*Ì%) Ðthe€cause€of€the€collapse€was€relevant€to€McKinnonððs€revocation€of€acceptance€defense.€€AlthoughÐ h+¸&* ÐMcKinnon€steadfastly€disclaims€that€its€ability€to€revoke€its€acceptance€depends€on€the€cause€of€theÐ ° Ðcollapse,€we€can€see€no€other€evidence€of€a€revocation€of€acceptance€prior€to€the€collapse.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð œì ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€47„2„608(2).€€Therefore,€the€only€hope€McKinnon€had€to€sustain€its€revocation€defenseÐ ˆØ Ðwas€a€finding€that€the€defects€in€the€steel€caused€the€bridge€to€collapse.€€Only€by€establishing€the€factÐ tÄ Ðthat€the€defects€in€the€steel€caused€the€substantial€change€in€condition€could€McKinnon€sustain€itsÐ `° Ðright€to€revoke€its€acceptance.€€The€trial€judge€had€announced€that€requirement€months€in€advanceÐ L œ Ðof€the€trial,€again€in€ruling€in€McKinnonððs€motion€in€Ô_ÔlimineÔ_Ô,€and€at€several€places€in€the€lengthy€trialÐ 8 ˆ Ðitself.€€We€think€Dr.€Hillððs€evidence€was€proper€and€sustains€the€trial€judgeððs€finding€on€why€theÐ $ t Ðbridge€collapsed.Ð  ` ÐÔ#†¼%»XXY)Iâ#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌà@¡¡)ìàò ò3.ó óˆÐ è 8  ÐÔ#†¼%»XXY)#Ôòòò òó óóóÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÌà  àIn€its€third€party€complaint€against€ABC€McKinnon€alleged€that€ABC€caused€the€bridge€toÐ À  Ðcollapse.€€Trinity€introduced€the€ABC€complaint€at€the€trial€below.€€McKinnon€alleges€that€inÐ ¬ü  Ðallowing€the€complaint€to€be€introduced€the€chancellor€committed€reversible€error.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€bases€its€argument€on€an€unreported€case€from€this€court€holding€that€the€modernÐ pÀ Ðtrend€is€to€disallow€the€introduction€of€pleadings€containing€claims€of€comparative€fault€againstÐ \¬ Ðdefendants€who€have€been€dismissed€or€who€have€settled.€€òòSee€Patterson€v.€Dunnóó,€No.€02A01„9710„Ð H˜ ÐCV„00256,€Jackson,€June€6,€1999,€1999€WL€398083€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWe€think,€however,€that€the€error€was€harmless.€€òòSeeóó€Rule€36(b),€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€€This€wasÐ  \ Ðnot€a€jury€trial.€€The€factual€allegations€against€ABC€were€already€known€by€the€chancellor.€Ð øH ÐReminding€the€chancellor€of€those€allegations,€in€our€opinion,€did€not€affect€the€outcome€of€the€trialÐ ä4 Ðbelow.Ð Ð  ÐÌà@(ìàò òVIII.ó óˆÐ ¨ø ÐÔ#†¼%»XXY)#ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%Ôà@!ìàò òà@@!ìàòòDiscretionary€Costsóóó óˆÐ ”ä ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€awarded€Trinity€$55,907.11€in€discretionary€costs.€€Rule€54.04(2)€of€theÐ l¼ ÐTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€provides€in€pertinent€part:Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àà ` àCosts€not€included€in€the€bill€of€costs€prepared€by€the€clerk€are€allowable€onlyÐ 0"€  Ðin€the€courtððs€discretion.€€Discretionary€costs€allowable€are:€reasonable€and€necessaryÐ #l! Ðcourt€reporter€expenses€for€depositions€or€trials,€reasonable€and€necessary€expertÐ $X" Ðwitness€fees€for€depositions€or€trials,€and€guardian€ad€litem€fees;€travel€expenses€areÐ ô$D # Ðnot€allowable€discretionary€costs.€€Subject€to€Rule€41.04,€a€party€requestingÐ à%0!$ Ðdiscretionary€costs€shall€file€and€serve€a€motion€within€thirty€(30)€days€after€entry€ofÐ Ì&"% Ðjudgment.€€The€trial€court€retains€jurisdiction€over€a€motion€for€discretionary€costsÐ ¸'#& Ðeven€though€a€party€has€filed€a€notice€of€appeal.€€The€court€may€tax€discretionaryÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcosts€at€the€time€of€voluntary€dismissal.Ð)à$(Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€rule€specifies€that€the€costs€are€allowed€ð ðin€the€courtððs€discretion,ðð€and€the€appellateÐ ° Ðâ âcourts€have€refused€to€alter€a€trial€courtððs€ruling€absent€a€clear€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòMix€v.€Milleróó,€27Ð œì ÐS.W.3d€508€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999);€òòPerdue€v.€Green€Branch€Mining€Co.óó,€837€S.W.2d€56€(Tenn.Ð ˆØ Ð1992).€€An€abuse€of€discretion€has€been€found€where€the€losing€party€was€not€allowed€to€present€aÐ tÄ Ðdefense€to€the€motion€for€discretionary€costs,€òòÔ_ÔOsterÔ_Ô€Div.€of€Sunbeam€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔYatesÔ_Ôóó,€845€S.W.2d€215Ð `° Ð(Tenn.€1992),€where€expert€witnesses€were€not€ð ðnecessaryðð€expert€witnesses,€òòDuncan€v.€Ô_ÔDeMossÔ_Ôóó,Ð L œ Ð880€S.W.2d€388€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994),€and€where€the€request€for€discretionary€costs€was€notÐ 8 ˆ Ðsupported€by€an€affidavit€or€otherwise.€€òòÔ_ÔDePriestÔ_Ô€v.€1717„19€West€End€Associatesóó,€951€S.W.2d€769Ð $ t Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).Ð  ` ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€argues€that€some€of€the€expert€witness€fees€awarded€were€not€ð ðnecessaryðð€costsÐ è 8  Ðbecause€the€witnesses€were€also€employed€for€testimony€in€another€action€that€arose€out€of€theÐ Ô$  Ðcollapse€of€the€bridge.€€But€the€record€reflects€that€the€chancellor€adjusted€the€award€of€discretionaryÐ À  Ðcosts€to€take€that€action€into€account.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€also€asserts€that€the€chancellor€should€not€have€awarded€Trinity€its€costs€inÐ „Ô  Ðdeposing€McKinnonððs€experts€who€had€opinions€about€the€defects€in€the€steel.€€This€objection€isÐ pÀ Ðbased€in€part€on€McKinnonððs€position€that€as€the€case€went€to€trial€the€reason€for€the€bridgeððsÐ \¬ Ðcollapse€was€no€longer€relevant€and€in€part€on€the€fact€that€McKinnon€is€the€prevailing€party€on€theÐ H˜ Ðquestion€of€the€defects€in€the€steel.€€As€to€the€first€point,€we€have€already€ruled€that€the€reason€theÐ 4„ Ðbridge€collapsed€was€triable€and€was€in€fact€tried.€€As€to€the€prevailing€party€argument,€theÐ  p Ðchancellor€did€find€that€the€steel€was€nonconforming€in€many€respects,€but€McKinnon€accepted€itÐ  \ Ðand€was€obligated€to€pay€for€it.Ð øH ÐÌà  àBoth€sides€blame€the€other€for€making€the€trial€longer€than€necessary,€thus€inflating€the€courtÐ Ð  Ðreporter€fees€and€the€fees€for€experts€who€attended€the€trial.€€The€trial€judge€is€in€the€best€positionÐ ¼  Ðto€assess€the€blame€for€dilatory€tactics,€and€when€this€argument€was€addressed€to€her,€the€chancellorÐ ¨ø Ðfailed€to€penalize€either€party.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àWe€conclude€that€the€chancellor€did€not€abuse€her€discretion€in€awarding€TrinityÐ l¼ Ðdiscretionary€costs.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òIX.ó óˆÐ 0"€  Ðò òòòà@ÝÝ ìàTrinityððs€Attorneysðð€Fees€Under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€66„34„101ó óóóˆÐ #l! ÐÌà  àTrinity€sought€to€recover€its€attorneyððs€fees€under€the€ð ðPrompt€Pay€Act€of€1991",€Tenn.€CodeÐ ô$D # ÐAnn.€ðð€66„34„101,€et€seq.€€In€addition€to€providing€what€we€thought€was€already€obvious€ð!ð€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðcertain€contractors€were€entitled€to€be€paid€when€they€had€performed€their€contracts€ð!ð€the€Act€allowsÐ Ì&"% Ða€contractor€to€seek€equitable€relief€if€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€does€not€pay€within€ten€days€after€receiving€noticeÐ ¸'#& Ðthat€payment€is€due.€€Tenn€Code€Ann.€ðð€66„34„602(3).€€The€prevailing€party€in€that€action€mayÐ ¤(ô#' Ðrecover€its€reasonable€attorneyððs€fees€if€the€Ô_ÔnonprevailingÔ_Ô€party€has€acted€in€bad€faith.€€Tenn.€CodeÐ )à$( Ðâ âAnn.€ðð€66„34„602(4)(b).Ð |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€chancellor€denied€Trinityððs€request€for€attorneyððs€fees,€finding€that€McKinnon€had€notÐ ° Ðâ âacted€in€bad€faith.€€Trinity€asserts€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€that€finding.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð œì ÐR.€App.€P.€13(d).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€Act€does€not€define€bad€faith.€€There€are,€however,€cases€defining€bad€faith€in€other€areasÐ `° Ðof€the€law.€€òòSee€Glazer€v.€First€American€Ô_ÔNatððlÔ_Ô€Bankóó,€930€S.W.2d€546€(Tenn.€1996);€òòState€v.€Goldenóó,Ð L œ Ð941€S.W.2d€905€(Tenn.€Cr.€App.€1996).€€There€are€more€cases€interpreting€what€amounts€to€goodÐ 8 ˆ Ðfaith€under€the€Uniform€Commercial€Codeððs€definition€as€ð ðhonesty€in€fact€in€the€conduct€orÐ $ t Ðtransaction€concerned.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„1„201(19).€€òòBank€of€Ô_ÔCrockettÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCullipherÔ_Ôóó,€752Ð  ` ÐS.W.2d€84€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988);€òòHuntington€Ô_ÔNatððlÔ_Ô€Bank€v.€Hookeróó,€840€S.W.2d€916€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ü L  ÐApp.€1991);€òòLocke€v.€Woodsóó,€25€Ô_ÔBankrÔ_Ô.€924€(Bank.€E.D.€Tenn.€1982).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àIn€òòGlazeróó€the€Court€explored€the€various€meanings€of€honesty€and€concluded€that€bad€faithÐ À  Ðshould€be€construed€as€ð ðactions€in€knowing€or€reckless€disregard€of€.€.€.€contractual€rights.ðð€€930Ð ¬ü  ÐS.W.2d€at€549.€€We€would€add€that€the€definition€should€include€rights€òòor€dutiesóó€under€the€contract.€Ð ˜è  ÐIn€òòHuntington€Ô_ÔNatððlÔ_Ô€Bankóó,€we€said€that€good€faith€imposesòòóó€an€honest€intention€to€abstain€from€takingÐ „Ô  Ðany€unconscientious€advantage€of€another,€even€through€the€forms€and€technicalities€of€the€law.€€840Ð pÀ ÐS.W.2d€at€926€(citing€òòLane€v.€John€Deere€Co.óó,€767€S.W.2d€138€(Tenn.€1989)).Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àIn€reviewing€this€record€we€have€no€doubt€that€McKinnonððs€principals€honestly€believed€thatÐ 4„ Ðtheir€company€did€not€owe€the€money€claimed€by€Trinity.€€In€resisting€the€claim€they€were€not€usingÐ  p Ðthe€technicalities€of€the€law€to€take€unconscientious€advantage€of€Trinity.€€Therefore,€we€concludeÐ  \ Ðthat€the€chancellor€made€the€correct€decision€on€the€Prompt€Pay€Act.Ô#†¼%»XXY)· #ÔÔ‡XY)X»¼%ÔÐ øH ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òX.ó óˆÐ Ð  Ðò òòòà@++ìàThe€Complaint€Against€Tensoróóó óòòóóˆÐ ¼  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€sued€Tensor€Engineering€Company€for€its€negligence€in€preparing€the€shopÐ ”ä Ðdrawings€for€Trinity€and€as€a€third€party€beneficiary€of€a€contract€for€the€preparation€of€the€shopÐ €Ð Ðdrawings.€€The€chancellor€granted€Tensorððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€the€following€grounds:Ð l¼ ÐÌà8  àà ` àA.€€That€no€material€issue€of€fact€is€in€dispute€and€that€as€a€matter€of€law,Ð D!” ÐMcKinnon€Bridge€Co.,€Inc.€may€not€bring€an€action€directly€against€[Tensor]€forÐ 0"€  Ðnegligence€or€breach€of€Third€Party€Beneficiary€Contract€in€the€absence€of€privity€ofÐ #l! Ðcontract€between€the€parties€based€upon€the€record€presented€to€the€Court;€andÐ$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àB.€€That€McKinnon€Bridge€Company,€Inc.€may€not€prevail€upon€its€claim€ofÐ à%0!$ Ðð ðnegligent€misrepresentationðð€pursuant€to€òòJohn€Martin€Co.€v.€Morse/Diesel,€Inc.,óó€819Ð Ì&"% ÐS.W.2d€428€(Tenn.€1991)€because€the€record€before€the€court,€including€theÐ ¸'#& Ðpleadings,€affidavits,€depositions,€and€undisputed€statement€of€fact€filed€by€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðparties€fails€to€establish€any€disputed,€material€fact€on€the€issue€of€ð ðnegligentÐ )à$( Ðmisrepresentation.ðð€€òòSee,€Ritter€v.€Custom€Chemicides,€Inc.óó,€912€S.W.2d€128€(Tenn.Ð |*Ì%) Ð1995).Ðh+¸&*Ð Ð  Їà  àOn€McKinnonððs€motion€to€reconsider€the€chancellor€held:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àà ` àBy€way€of€explanation,€the€Court€finds€that€its€previous€ruling€granting€theÐ ˆØ Ðmotion€for€summary€judgment€filed€by€third€party€defendant€Tensor€was€correctÐ tÄ Ðwhether€the€original€third€party€complaint€is€interpreted€to€include€an€allegation€ofÐ `° Ðnegligent€misrepresentation€or€whether€McKinnon€relies€upon€its€newly€filedÐ L œ Ðallegations€of€negligent€misrepresentation.€€The€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðdecisions€of€òòRitter€v.€Custom€Ô_ÔChemicidesÔ_Ô,€Inc.,óó€912€S.W.2d€128,€133€(Tenn.€1995),Ð $ t ÐòòJohn€Martin€Co.€v.€Morse/Diesel,€Inc.óó,€819€S.W.2d€428€(Tenn.€1991),€and€òòÔ_ÔMcCraryÔ_ÔÐ  ` Ðv.€Kelly€Technical€Coatings,€Inc.,óó€1985€WL€75663€(Tenn.€App.€1985),€compel€theÐ ü L  Ðre„affirmation€of€this€Courtððs€ruling€that€based€upon€the€pleadings,€affidavits,Ð è 8  Ðdepositions€and€undisputed€facts€filed€by€the€parties€fails€to€establish€any€disputedÐ Ô$  Ðmaterial€fact€on€the€issue€of€ð ðnegligent€misrepresentationðð€or€the€Economic€LossÐ À  ÐRule.€òòóóЬü Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€has€not€appealed€the€chancellorððs€action€in€dismissing€the€third€party€beneficiaryÐ „Ô  Ðclaim.€€Therefore€we€will€address€only€the€negligence/negligent€misrepresentation€claim.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àMuch€of€the€argument€in€the€trial€court€and€in€this€court€has€been€focused€on€the€assertionÐ H˜ Ðthat€McKinnon€could€not€recover€economic€losses€absent€privity€with€Tensor.€€We€think€thatÐ 4„ Ðargument€is€erroneous€and€the€chancellor€erred€in€sustaining€it.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àMcKinnonððs€relationship€to€Tensor€is€not€one€of€a€buyer€and€seller€of€goods.€€Therefore,€theirÐ øH Ðrelationship€is€fundamentally€different€from€McKinnonððs€relationship€to€Trinity€where€the€law€hasÐ ä4 Ðsaid€that€recoveries€for€purely€economic€losses€are€better€addressed€under€contract€rather€thanÐ Ð  Ðnegligence.€€It€may€be€true€that€the€economic€harm€rule€would€still€defeat€McKinnonððs€claim€forÐ ¼  Ðð ðindirectðð€economic€losses.€€òòSee€United€Textile€Workers€v.€Lear€Ô_ÔSieglerÔ_Ôóó,€825€S.W.2d€83€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ¨ø ÐApp.€1990);€òòLocal€Joint€Executive€Bd.€of€Las€Vegas€v.€Sternóó,€651€P.2d€637€(Nev.€1982).€€But€theÐ ”ä Ðlosses€McKinnon€alleges€are€far€more€direct€than€the€lost€wages€suffered€by€the€employees€of€theÐ €Ð Ðindustrial€park€shut€down€by€the€defendantððs€negligence€in€òòLear€Ô_ÔSieglerÔ_Ôóó.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThis€case€is€governed€by€the€Supreme€Courtððs€decision€in€òòJohn€Martin€Co.€v.€Morse/Diesel,Ð D!” ÐInc.óó,€819€S.W.2d€428€(Tenn.€1991).€€The€main€part€of€that€opinion€starts€out€with€a€criticalÐ 0"€  Ðobservation:€ð ðThis€is€not€a€products€liability€case.ðð€€819€S.W.2d€at€431.€€The€court€goes€on€to€holdÐ #l! Ðthat€in€a€case€of€negligent€supervision€or€negligent€misrepresentation€privity€was€not€a€requiredÐ $X" Ðelement€of€a€claim€for€purely€economic€losses.€€òòId.óó€at€435.€€In€adopting€Section€552€of€theÐ ô$D # ÐòòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,€the€Court€explained€the€consequences€of€its€decision€in€this€way:Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà8  àà ` àBy€the€use€of€this€standard,€liability€in€tort€would€result€when,€despite€lack€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðcontractual€privity€between€the€plaintiff€and€the€defendant,Ф(ô#'Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà8  àà ` à(1)€the€defendant€is€acting€in€the€course€of€his€business,€profession,€orÐ ° Ðemployment,€or€in€a€transaction€in€which€he€has€a€pecuniary€(as€opposed€toÐ œì Ðgratuitous)€interest;€òòandóóЈØÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌà8  àà ` à(2)€the€defendant€supplies€faulty€information€meant€to€guide€others€in€theirÐ `° Ðbusiness€transaction;€òòandóóÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à(3)€the€defendant€fails€to€exercise€reasonable€care€in€obtaining€orÐ $ t Ðcommunicating€the€information;€òòandóóÐ `Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à(4)€the€plaintiff€justifiably€relies€upon€the€information.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌòòId.óó€at€431.Ð À  ÐÌà  àWe€are€hampered€in€our€review€of€this€issue€because€of€the€way€it€was€presented€to€the€trialÐ ˜è  Ðcourt.€€McKinnonððs€original€complaint€against€Tensor€did€not€allege€a€cause€of€action€based€onÐ „Ô  Ðnegligent€misrepresentation.€€In€its€response€to€Tensorððs€motion€for€summary€judgment,€however,Ð pÀ ÐMcKinnon€argued€that€it€had€a€cause€of€action€based€on€negligent€misrepresentation,€and€theÐ \¬ Ðchancellorððs€order€dismissing€the€case€addressed€McKinnonððs€arguments.€€Apparently€McKinnonÐ H˜ Ðmoved€to€amend€its€complaint€against€Tensor€to€include€the€necessary€allegations€but€the€amendedÐ 4„ Ðcomplaint€is€not€in€the€record.€€Nevertheless,€negligent€misrepresentation€is€the€only€negligenceÐ  p Ðcause€of€action€briefed€by€McKinnon€on€appeal.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àIt€appears€to€us€that,€despite€the€absence€of€pleadings,€the€negligent€misrepresentation€claimÐ ä4 Ðwas€actually€addressed€in€the€trial€court.€€òòSeeóó€Rule€15.02,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€€Therefore€it€may€beÐ Ð  Ðreviewed€here,€and€on€the€merits€of€the€claim,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€chancellor€erred€inÐ ¼  Ðgranting€summary€judgment€to€Tensor.€€We€cannot€say€that€the€undisputed€facts€show€(1)€that€TensorÐ ¨ø Ðdid€not€supply€faulty€shop€drawings€knowing€that€they€would€be€used€by€McKinnon€in€the€erectionÐ ”ä Ðof€the€bridge,€or€(2)€that€Tensor€exercised€reasonable€care€in€preparing€the€drawings,€or€(3)€thatÐ €Ð ÐMcKinnon€did€not€justifiably€rely€on€the€shop€drawings€or€did€not€suffer€any€damages€from€itsÐ l¼ Ðreliance.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àWhether€Tensor€knew€or€should€have€known€that€its€drawings€would€be€used€by€McKinnonÐ 0"€  Ðis€a€question€of€fact€and€requires€an€interpretation€of€the€various€contracts,€most€of€which€incorporateÐ #l! Ðby€reference€other€contracts€or€the€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€standards.€€At€this€point€we€do€not€know€if€the€drawingsÐ $X" Ðwere€incorrect,€nor€do€we€know€what€part,€if€any,€they€played€in€the€actual€work€of€erecting€theÐ ô$D # Ðbridge.€€Therefore€Tensor€was€not€entitled€to€summary€judgment€on€the€negligent€misrepresentationÐ à%0!$ Ðclaim.Ô#†¼%»XXY)¾)#ÔÐ Ì&"% ÐÔ€XY)X»¼%ÔÌÌÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@dd)ìàò òXI.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà0  àà ° àà@Y Y ì(#(#àòòò òMcKinnonððs€Complaint€Against€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ôó óóóˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àMcKinnonððs€third€party€claim€against€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€and€vicariously€against€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€is€also€basedÐ tÄ Ðon€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ôððs€breach€of€its€contact€with€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô,€of€which€McKinnon€claims€to€be€a€third€partyÐ `° Ðbeneficiary,׃%×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ôððs€negligent€misrepresentations.€€In€the€trial€court,€after€the€chancellorÐ L œ Ðgranted€Tensorððs€motion€for€summary€judgment,€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€filed€its€own€motion,€supported€by€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðstatement€of€undisputed€facts€and€the€affidavit€of€Mr.€McKinnon.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àUnder€the€prime€contract€between€McKinnon€and€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€reserved€to€itself€the€rightÐ ü L  Ðto€have€an€independent€inspector€go€to€the€site€of€the€steel€fabrication€and€inspect€the€steel€as€it€wasÐ è 8  Ðbeing€fabricated.€€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€contracted€with€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€for€these€services.€€The€contract€between€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_ÔÐ Ô$  Ðand€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€ð!ð€stripped€of€its€boilerplate€provisions€ð!ð€provided€for€a€certified€welding€inspector,€toÐ À  Ðbe€paid€$19.95€per€hour,€who€would,€for€a€total€price€not€to€exceed€$25,935.00,€confirm€that€theÐ ¬ü  Ðfabrication€procedures€met€state€standards.€€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ôððs€representative€furnished€the€inspection€reportsÐ ˜è  Ðto€the€state€and€stamped€the€steel€as€it€left€the€fabrication€plant.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àMcKinnon€did€plead€a€cause€of€action€against€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€for€negligent€misrepresentations.€€InÐ \¬ Ða€complaint€filed€on€November€12,€1996€these€allegations€appear:Ð H˜ ÐÌà8  àà ` à25.€€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€misrepresented€material€facts€concerning€the€fabrication€of€theÐ  p Ðstructural€steel.€€Such€misrepresentations€included€but€are€not€limited€to€theÐ  \ Ðfollowing:ÐøHÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` à€€1.€€Ô_ÔMislocationÔ_Ô€of€the€lateral€stiffener(s);Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` à€€2.€€Improper€changes€and€alterations€from€design€drawings;Ð ¼  Ðà  àà ` à€€3.€€Improper€variations€in€horizontal€stiffeners;Ð ¨ø Ðà  àà ` à€€4.€€Improper€variations€in€bearing€stiffeners;€andÐ ”ä Ðà  àà ` à€€5.€€The€failure€to€correct€or€inspect€shop€errors.Ð €Ð ÐÌà8  àà ` à26.€€The€Ô_ÔtortiousÔ_Ô€negligent€misrepresentations€were€made€by€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô,€in€theÐ X ¨ Ðcourse€of€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ôððs€business,€profession€and€employment.ÐD!”Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à27.€The€misrepresentations€were€made€during€the€transaction€in€whichÐ #l! ÐÔ_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€has€a€pecuniary€interest.Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à28.€The€false€information€or€omitted€information€supplied€by€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€toÐ à%0!$ ÐÔ_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô€was€relied€upon€by€McKinnon€during€the€construction€process€of€the€bridgeÐ Ì&"% Ðand/or€Project.и'#&Ð Ð  Їà8  àà ` à29.€€As€a€result€of€the€negligent€misrepresentations€of€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô,€McKinnonÐ ° Ðhas€suffered€a€pecuniary€loss€and€physical€harm€caused€by€McKinnonððs€justifiableÐ œì Ðreliance€upon€the€information€supplied€by€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€to€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô.ЈØÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à30.€€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€failed€to€exercise€reasonable€care€or€competence€in€performingÐ `° Ðshop€Ô_ÔinspectionalÔ_Ô€services.ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à31.€€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€knew€that€the€shop€Ô_ÔinspectionalÔ_Ô€services€it€provided€to€Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_ÔÐ $ t Ðwere€being€relied€upon€by€McKinnon.Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à32.€€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€knew€or€should€have€known€that€McKinnon€intended€to€relyÐ è 8  Ðupon€the€fabricated€steel€to€construct€the€bridge€for€the€project.ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌThe€allegations€were€substantially€repeated€in€later€pleadings.€€Although€the€parties€extensivelyÐ ¬ü  Ðbriefed€and€argued€the€question,€McKinnon€essentially€conceded€that€the€result€should€be€the€sameÐ ˜è  Ðas€the€result€reached€in€Tensorððs€motion.€€So,€without€waiving€its€right€to€appeal,€McKinnonÐ „Ô  Ðacquiesced€in€the€entry€of€the€order€granting€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€summary€judgment.à  àÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€for€the€same€reasons€we€reversed€the€summary€judgment€in€favorÐ H˜ Ðof€Tensor,€the€judgment€in€favor€of€Conwell/TDOT€must€also€be€reversed.€€The€economic€harm€ruleÐ 4„ Ðdoes€not€bar€McKinnonððs€claim€for€negligent€misrepresentations€against€Conwell,€and€the€recordÐ  p Ðdoes€not€conclusively€show€that€McKinnon€cannot€prove€the€necessary€elements€of€a€negligentÐ  \ Ðmisrepresentation€cause€of€action.€€Although€the€necessary€finding€that€Conwellððs€work€would€beÐ øH Ðor€was€relied€on€by€McKinnon€seems€remote,€the€record€does€not€conclusively€negate€that€finding.Ð ä4 ÐWe,€therefore,€reverse€the€summary€judgment€rendered€in€favor€of€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô/Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô.Ð Ð  ÐÌà@==(ìàò òXII.ˆÐ ¨ø Ðà@ïï!ìàòòCollateral€Estoppeló óóóˆÐ ”ä ÐÌà  àOur€decision€with€respect€to€Tensor€and€Conwell/TDOT€requires€us€to€address€the€questionÐ l¼ Ðof€whether€McKinnonððs€claim€against€them€for€the€collapse€of€the€bridge€is€barred€by€collateralÐ X ¨ Ðestoppel.€€We€conclude€that€the€issues€actually€decided€in€the€trial€below€are€not€dispositive€ofÐ D!” ÐMcKinnonððs€third€party€claim.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àCollateral€estoppel,€an€issue€preclusion€doctrine,€was€devised€by€the€courts€to€ð ðconserveÐ $X" Ðjudicial€resources,€to€relieve€litigants€from€the€cost€and€vexation€of€multiple€lawsuits,€and€toÐ ô$D # Ðencourage€reliance€on€judicial€decisions€by€preventing€inconsistent€decisions.ðð€€òòBeaty€v.€McGrawóó,Ð à%0!$ Ð15€S.W.3d€819€at€824€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€The€doctrine€bars€the€parties€or€their€privies€fromÐ Ì&"% Ðrelitigating€issues€that€were€actually€raised€and€determined€in€an€earlier€suit.€òòId.óóÐ ¸'#& ÐÌà  àCollateral€estoppel€may€be€used€by€a€defendant€in€the€second€suit€(defensive€collateralÐ )à$( Ðestoppel),€or€it€may€be€used€by€a€plaintiff€in€a€second€suit€(offensive€collateral€estoppel).€€InÐ |*Ì%) ÐTennessee€the€offensive€use€of€collateral€estoppel€requires€that€the€parties€be€identical€in€bothÐ h+¸&* Ðactions.€€òòBeaty€v.€McGrawóó,€15€S.W.3d€819€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòAlgood€v.€Nashville€Machine€Co.óó,Ð ° Ð648€S.W.2d€260€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€Without€saying€so€specifically,€however,€Tennessee€has€notÐ œì Ðrequired€party€mutuality€in€applying€defensive€collateral€estoppel.€€In€òòPhillips€v.€General€Motorsóó,Ð ˆØ Ð669€S.W.2d€665€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984),€the€court€said€that€different€parties€are€in€privity€if€they€standÐ tÄ Ðin€the€same€relationship€to€the€subject€matter€of€the€litigation.€€òòId.óó€at€669.€€òòSee€also€Shelley€v.€Ô_ÔGipsonÔ_Ôóó,Ð `° Ð400€S.W.2d€709€(Tenn.€1966).€€Thus,€a€plaintiff€who€sued€an€automobile€dealer€for€a€defective€carÐ L œ Ðand€lost€could€not€then€sue€the€manufacturer€on€an€identical€claim.€€òòCantrell€v.€Burnett€&€HendersonÐ 8 ˆ ÐCo.óó,€216€S.W.2d€307€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1948).€€The€judgment€in€the€first€case€that€the€car€was€notÐ $ t Ðdefective€precluded€the€plaintiff€from€asserting€that€the€car€was€defective€in€an€action€against€theÐ  ` Ðmanufacturer.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àEven€if€the€parties€do€not€have€to€be€identical€for€the€application€of€defensive€collateralÐ Ô$  Ðestoppel,€the€issue€sought€to€be€precluded€must€be€identical€in€both€cases.€€òòÔ_ÔBeatyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔMcGrawÔ_Ôóó,€15Ð À  ÐS.W.2d€819€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòTennessee€Farmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.€v.€Mooreóó,€958€S.W.2d€759Ð ¬ü  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€òòScales€v.€Scalesóó,€564€S.W.2d€667€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1977).€€In€McKinnonððsÐ ˜è  Ðcounterclaim€against€Trinity€the€court€decided€that€the€sole€cause€of€the€collapse€was€the€removalÐ „Ô  Ðof€a€lateral€brace€during€the€erection€process.€€That€decision€conclusively€ruled€out€the€defective€steelÐ pÀ Ðas€a€cause,€but€it€does€not€decide€what€part,€if€any,€the€negligently„supplied€information€from€TensorÐ \¬ Ðor€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô€played€in€the€removal€of€the€brace.€€Since€the€parties€did€not€narrow€their€focus€to€thatÐ H˜ Ðpoint€in€the€trial€court,€we€would€have€to€say€that€the€facts€are€still€in€dispute€on€that€issue.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWe€reverse€the€judgments€in€favor€of€Tensor€and€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô/Ô_ÔTDOTÔ_Ô.€€In€all€other€respects€theÐ  \ Ðjudgments€of€the€court€below€are€affirmed€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Chancery€Court€ofÐ øH ÐDavidson€County.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€equally€to€McKinnon,€Tensor,€and€Ô_ÔConwellÔ_Ô.Ð ä4 ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à________________________________________Ð ”ä Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.