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B+J 0_level4  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2;+J 0_level5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  28+J 0_level6    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  25+J 0_level7  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  ӁLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 522+J 0_level8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2/+J 0_level9    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levsl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levsl2   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levsl3   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levsl4  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levsl5   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levsl6    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levsl7  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levsl8   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levsl9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levnl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23   2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levnl2   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levnl3   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levnl4  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levnl5   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levnl6    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levnl7  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levnl8   L23   2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levnl9    L23   2( 4 <DL2  <:Default Para\  `&Times New RomanWy<) ;)bk1 3|x- - U0;;.footer   !XXX   !XXX({2lt$ !.8W%dd8      S R $      1  ]  _X)X]Ataboutthesametime,Husbandsoldsomefirearms,bringinginadditionalcashwithwhich  tocompletesubsequenttransactions.#]XX)~#<6X9`(Courier New(#$  0   q R $      2  ]  _X)X]Approximately$17,000ofthisamountwascollectedatarateofapproximately$1,200per  month.Husbandtestifiedthattheremaindercouldnotbecollected.#]XX)~# R $      3  ]  _X)X]This$32,000hasnotbeenpaidback.#]XX)~#<SS@:QuickFormat19XXX  cb  9XXX  cb  <4 9Z+ Courier New <SS@:QuickFormat2XXX  cb  XXX  cb  <ll@+ :QuickFormat3XXcb  XXcb  (|G2 $ !.8W%dd8         0  ] d(|3z$ !.8W%dd8     VVVV'dxd)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3z$ !.8W%dd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8W%dd8     _  W%8)XXdd8  @ V4W%INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @kk$ATNASHVILLE#W%V4 #Ԉ &   March2000Session L X)XW% #W%XX)#JOSEPH_BLOUNT_ԀTURNERv.GLORIAJEANWEISSTURNERX)XW%  J @@ AppealfromtheCircuitCourtforDavidsonCounty  J @@No.97D2292MariettaM._Shipley_,Judge  6 @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.M199900482_COA_ԄR3CVFiledSeptember28,_2000_   AV) ` dE<|` A }     #W%XX)#X)XW%)X)XXX)Thisisadivorcecase.Followingabenchtrial,thecourtbelow(1)grantedadivorcetowife;(2) x  dividedthemaritalproperty;(3)awardedwifealimonyintheformofa$1,640.55monthlypayment d outofhusbandsretirementaccount;and(4)declaredthatthealimonyawardwastobesecuredby P thehusbandsretirementaccount.Husbandappealsthealimonyaward,theuseoftheretirement < accountassecurityforthepaymentofalimony,andthetrialcourtsdivisionofthemaritalproperty. (x Wifetakesissuewiththedivisionofthepartiesmaritalproperty.Weaffirm.#X)XX)X)G##W%XX)(#X)XW% d  Tenn.R.App.P.3AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheCircuitCourt < Affirmed;CaseRemanded  (   #W%X)^#X)X.W%CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichHoustonM._Goddard_,  _P.J._,joined.D.Michael_Swiney_,J.,filedadissentingopinion.  JosephL.Lackey,Jr.,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellant,Joseph_Blount_ԀTurner. t PamelaA.Taylor,Nashville,Tennessee,fortheappellee,GloriaJeanWeissTurner. L  3  OPINION #W%XX)b # $"t! X)XW%    I.Facts "$r# -   Inthisdivorceaction,thetrialcourtdissolvedthemarriageofGloriaJeanWeissTurner %J!% ( Wife)andJoseph_Blount_ԀTurner( Husband).Thepartieshadbeenmarriedfor26years.Atthe &6"& timeofthehearing,Wifewas54andHusbandwas56.Wifehasanadultdaughterfromaprior '"#' marriage,andHusbandhastwoadultsonsfromanearliermarriage. ($(   Themarriagebegantofalterintheearly1990s.Accordingtothedivorcecomplaint, *%* HusbandassaultedWifewithagunonFebruary22,1996.Subsequenttothisincident,Wifesought +&+  anorderofprotectioninGeneralSessionsCourt.Inthatproceeding,thecourtenteredanagreed n,', _orderwherebythepartiesagreednottodissipatemaritalassetsandto continuetohandletheir  householdfinancesandpaytheirbillsexactlyasthey[had]doneinthepast.     HusbandsubsequentlyfiledfordivorceonMay24,1996.Anotheragreedorderwasentered t onJanuary16,1997.ThisorderrequiredHusbandtopayWife$2,250.00permonthaspendente ` litesupport.Approximatelyfivemonthslater,Husbandfiledavoluntarynonsuitofthedivorce L  actionandceasedmakingthemonthlypaymentstoWife.WifefiledthisdivorceactiononAugust 8  1,1997. $ t   Upontheinstitutionofthisaction,variousrestrainingordersissued,andWifebeganto  L  receivemonthlypaymentsintheamountof$1,640.55fromHusbandsretirementaccountwithJ.C.  8  Bradford,astockbrokeragefirm.Meanwhile,HusbandhadappliedforandreceivedSocialSecurity $  disabilitybenefits,baseduponadiagnosisofchronicdepression,agoraphobia,panicattacks,and   anxiety.HereceivedonelumpsumfromSocialSecurityfor$13,000 orsoandwasdrawing   $1,170monthlyatthetimeoftrial.     AdivorcehearingwasheldonJune23and24,1998,andOctober27,1998.Testimonyat p thehearingfocusedonthefollowingareas:(1)theoverallfinancialconditionoftheparties;(2)the \ J.C.Bradfordretirementaccount;(3)the Sugartreeresidence;(4)alifeinsurancepolicyagainst H whichHusbandhadborrowedfunds;(5)alakefrontcabinlocatedinCenterHill;(6)$80,000 4 allegedlystoredinasafeonthepartiesproperty;and(7)Husbandscarbusiness.  p   Husbandtestifiedthathedeveloped,beginningin1994,severementalhealthproblems,i.e., H chronicdepression,agoraphobia,panicattacks,andanxiety.Itwasforthisreasonthathehadbeen 4 collectingmonthlySocialSecuritybenefits.Wifetestifiedthattheseconditionsweredueto   Husbandsheavydrinkingandthathedidnotexperiencethosesymptomswhenhedidnotdrink.     ThoughHusbanddoesnothaveacollegedegree,heenjoyedsuccessinvariousfacetsofthe  automobileindustry.Hetestifiedthathebegantoliquidatehiscarbusinessin1997andthathewas  notemployedatthetimeoftrial.WifetestifiedthatHusbandsexpensesastheyrelatedtothecar l businessindicatedhewasstilloperatingthebusinessatthetimeoftrial. X    Husbandstatedthathisonlyincomeatthetimeoftrialwashismonthly$1,170disability 0"  checkandthemonthly$1,640.55checkheshouldhavebeenreceivingfromhisJ.C.Bradford #l! retirementaccount,butwhichwasatthattimegoingdirectlytoWife.Healsotestifiedthathehad $X" beenreceivingapproximately$1,200permonthintheformofaccountsreceivablemoniesfrom $D # variouscarlots,butthathewouldceasetoreceivethatmoneyinJune,1998.Threeexhibitsinthe %0!$ recordrelatingtoHusbandsmonthlylivingexpensesshowthoseexpensestobe$2,050.60, &"% $1,501.90,or$1,022.02. '#&   Wifehasworkedasacomanagerofherfamilysliquorstore,asanassistantmanagerata )$( cardealershipinwhichHusbandwasinvolved,andasanassistantinHusbandsowncarbusiness. |*%) Shealsoassists,asavolunteer,intheoperationofasororityhouse.Wifereceivedabachelors h+&* degreeinpoliticalsciencein1967;sheminoredinSpanish.Anexpertwitnesstestifiedthatunder  thecircumstances,Wifecouldonlyexpecttoearnbetween$15,000and$18,000peryear,asalary  whichwouldnotenablehertoapproximatethestandardoflivingsheenjoyedduringthemarriage.  TheonlyincomeWifewasreceivingatthetimeofthehearingwasthemonthly$1,640.55check t fromHusbandsJ.C.Bradfordretirementaccountand$400permonthfromaroommatewhowas ` tomoveoutinDecemberof1997.Wifesmonthlyexpensesare$3,328.88. L    Duringthemarriage,Husbandenteredintoanagreementwithhisemployer,FrankDavis $ t Buick,tobuyacertainamountofstockinthedealership.Thedealwentsour,however,andthe  ` partiessettled.Aportionofthesettlementproceeds,approximately$176,000,wentintoHusbands  L  J.C.Bradfordretirementaccount.Wifewasoriginallydesignatedasthesolebeneficiary.Atsome  8  pointHusbandchangedthebeneficiarydesignationtohisgirlfriend,andhewassubsequentlyforced $  bycourtordertochangeitbacktoWife.Withrespecttothefundspaidoutoftheaccountmonthly,   thecourtorderedJ.C.Bradfordtomakethemonthlypaymentsof$1,640.55directlytoWife.The   valueoftheaccountatthetimeoftrialwasover$273,750.     Another$275,000HusbandreceivedfromFrankDavisBuickaspartofthesettlement p agreementwasusedtopayoffthebalanceofthepartiesSugartreeresidence.Thepropertywas \ originallytitledjointly.OnOctober16,1990,thepropertywasplacedinWifesnameonly.Wife H testifiedthatthiswasdonebecauseHusbandwantedtomakesurethatWifewastakencareofincase 4 ofhisdeath.HusbandtestifiedthatthereasonfortitlingthepropertyinWifesnamealonewasto  p shieldtheassetfromthethreatofalawsuitagainstalimitedpartnershipinwhichheheldaninterest.  \ InJanuaryorFebruary,1996,HusbandattemptedtopersuadeWifetoretitlethepropertyintohis H namealone.WifetestifiedthatsheinitiallysignedthedocumentHusbandprofferedtoher,under 4 thebeliefthatitwasbeingretitledbackintobothoftheirnamesjointly.Whenshediscoveredthat   thedocumentshehadsignedplacedthepropertyintoHusbandsnamealone,shevoidedthe   document,removeditfromthehouse,andrefusedtogiveitbacktoHusband.    Thetestimonyconcerningthelifeinsurancepolicyandtheuseoffundsborrowedagainstthe  policyisvexing.Atsomepoint,Husbandborrowedapproximately$74,000againstthislife l insurancepolicy.3 5#  1      ׀Husbandspentapproximately$19,000oftheloanproceedsonvariousbills, X  includingattorneysfees,livingexpenses,andsupportpaymentstoWife.Husbandalsoloaned D! approximately$24,000oftheloanproceedstoNashvilleMotors.6h 5#  2      ׀Husbandsentanother$32,000 0"  tohisson,tobeusedforthelakefrontcabin.7 5#  3      ׀Attrial,theloanbalanceagainstthelifeinsurance #l! policywasapproximately$80,000. $X" Ї  ThelakefrontcabinwasoriginallytitledinthenamesofHusbandandWifejointly.On  April14,1983,theyquitclaimedthepropertytoHusbandsbusiness.Husbandthenquitclaimedthe  propertytohissononSeptember23,1988.Inadditiontothe$32,000ofthelifeinsuranceloan  proceedsHusbandsenttohisson,Husbandsentanotherapproximately$24,000earnedbyhis t businesstohissontobeusedtowardthelakefrontcabinproperty.Husbandtestifiedthat,intotal, ` hehasinvestedbetween$75,000and$80,000inthelakefrontcabin.Thispropertywasassessed L  fortaxpurposesat$103,800andappraisedatavalueof$120,000. 8    Wifetestifiedthattherewasbetween$80,000and$90,000incashinthesafelocatedinthe  ` residenceasofNovember,1995.Wifesdaughteralsotestifiedthatshehadseenbundlesof$100  L  billsinthesafe.Husbanddeniedthattherewas$80,000inthesafe.Healsotestifiedthat,because  8  thesafeslockmechanismsometimesmalfunctioned,theykeptthesafeunlockedbutinsuchastate $  thatitappearedtobelocked.InJanuary,1996,hefoundthesafeactuallylocked.Becausehecould   notgetitopen,hetransportedittoalocksmithandhaditdrilledopen.Heandthelocksmithboth   testifiedthattherewasnolargeamountofcashinthesafewhenitwasopened.     Withrespecttothecarbusiness,WifeassistedHusband,tosomedegree,indevelopingthe p business.Atsomepoint,thebusinesspaidoffa$75,000loan,andHusbandtoldWifethathewould \ payheranaverageofwhathehadbeenpayingthebankininterest.Wifetestifiedthatshedidnot H receiveanysuchpayment. 4   HusbandtestifiedthatheoperatedhiscarbusinessuntiltheendofJanuary,1997,atwhich  \ pointhebegantoliquidatehisinventory.Hestatedthathewasnotoperatingthecarbusinessatthe H timeoftrial,butthathewasstillincurringexpensesinhisattemptstoliquidatehisremaining 4 inventory.Accordingtohistestimony,hisinventorywasneverworthmorethan$75,000,and,at   thetimeoftrial,hisbusinesshadnovalueatall.Hestatedthathisremaininginventorywas$6,000.   WifetestifiedthatHusbandhadtoldherin1990thatthebusinessinventorywasworth  approximately$300,000.BasedonthisfigureandthefactthatHusbandwasstillincurringexpenses,  WifestatedthatshebelievedHusbandwasstilloperatingthebusiness,andshevaluedthebusiness  at$250,000. l   Followingabenchtrial,thetrialcourt: D! 8  8`   (1)grantedadivorcetoWifeasthepartylessatfault;#l!` x` x 8  8`   (2)awardedtheJ.C.BradfordretirementaccounttoHusband;$D #` x` x 8  8`   (3)foundthattheSugartreeresidencewas clearlymaritalproperty, &"% determineditsvaluetobe$425,000,andawardedittoWife;'#&` x` x 8  8`   (4)foundthatthecashvalueofthelifeinsurancepolicyandthe )$(  amountoftheloanagainstthepolicywereapproximatelyequal,and |*%) awardedthepolicytoHusbandwithhimbeingresponsibleforthe  debtagainstthepolicy;` x` x  8  8`   (5)foundthelakefrontcabintobemaritalpropertyandawardeditto t Husband;`` x` x 8  8`   (6)foundthatHusbandhadtaken$80,000fromthesafeandcounted 8  ittowardshisshareofthemaritalassets;and$ t` x` x 8  8`   (7)foundthattheinventoryofHusbandscarbusinesswas$6,000,  L  declaredthatitbelievedthatHusbandwouldstillcontinueinthe  8  operationofthebusiness,andawardedthevalueoftheinventoryto $  Husband. ` x` x   Thus,thetrialcourtdividedthemaritalpropertyasfollows:   ! X!'V'  򀀀Assets$VTotal0Wife<Husband  p   SugartreeresidencennV$425,000JJ*$425,0004 H   Lakefrontcabin"V114,0004;$114,000  p   Carinventory$V6,0004>6,000 H   Cashinsafe00#V80,0004~~=80,000     Lifeinsurancepolicy  $V04XX>0    J.C.Bradfordaccount"V;+ X)XXX)X)XXX)cb    273,758;+ EifeX)XXX)X)XXX)cb    ݈4<273,758    OtherpersonalpropertyV򀀀146,673||)򀀀99,4788򀀀47,195 X  ;+ X)XXX)X)XXX)cb      ;+ GifeX)XXX)X)XXX)cb    ;+ X)XXX)X)XXX)cb    ;+ 5HifeX)XXX)X)XXX)cb      TotalV $1,045,431 ||+ $524,478 : $520,953  0"  + VA+  Inaddition,thetrialcourtstatedthat [i]fthereisanyinequityinthedistributionofmarital $D # funds,itwillbeawardedto[Wife]asalimonyinsolido. %0!$ ! X!  Finally,thecourtawardedalimonytoWife,statingthat: '#& 8  8`   [f]or[Wife]toevenbegintoapproachherpreviouslifestyle,shewill )$( needsome closinginmoney.Therefore,theCourtwillawardher |*%) periodicalimonyintheamountofSixteenHundredFortyand55/100 h+&* ($1,640.55)Dollars,however[Wife]shallberesponsibleforthetaxes  onsaidperiodicalimony.Thisamountofmoneyissecuredbythe  $273,000(previousamountoffundin1996)retirementfund  presentlyatJ.C.Bradford.J.C.Bradfordwillsendacheckdirectly t to[Wife]inthatamount.Aftertheyear2001,ifthefundhasgrown ` enoughtoallowapaymentgreaterthan[$1,640.55],[Husband]may L  haveadditionalmonthlyfunds,solongasthefundwillsupport 8  [$1,640.55]permonthpayableto[Wife].[Husband]maydesignate $ t thebeneficiariesashewishes,asheistheowneroftheretirement  ` fund. L ` x` x   Husbandnowappeals,raisingasissuesthefollowing:(1)thetrialcourtsawardofperiodic $  alimonytoWifeandtheuseoftheJ.C.Bradfordretirementaccounttosecurepaymentofthe   alimonyaward;and(2)thetrialcourtsdivisionofthemaritalproperty,morespecifically,its   treatmentoftheloanonthelifeinsurancepolicyanditstreatmentoftheJ.C.Bradfordretirement   account.Wifetakesissue(1)withthetrialcourtsfindingthattheSugartreeresidenceismarital   property;and(2)withthetrialcourtsvaluationofthecarbusiness. p   II.StandardofReview H R  Becausethisisanonjurycase,ourreviewisdenovoupontherecordoftheproceedings  p below.Thatrecordcomestouswithapresumptionofcorrectnessastothetrialcourtsfactual  \ findings,apresumptionthatwemusthonorunlesstheevidencepreponderatesagainstthosefindings. H Tenn.R.App.P.13(d).Wereviewthetrialcourtsconclusionsoflawdenovowithnopresumption 4 ofcorrectness. Adamsv.DeanRoofingCo. ,715S.W.2d341,343(Tenn.Ct.App.1986).     Ourdenovoreviewisalsosubjecttothewellestablishedprinciplethatthetrialcourtisin  thebestpositiontoassessthecredibilityofthewitnesses;accordingly,suchdeterminationsare  entitledtogreatweightonappeal. Massengalev.Massengale ,915S.W.2d818,819(Tenn.Ct.  App.1995); Bowmanv.Bowman ,836S.W.2d563,566(Tenn.Ct.App.1991). l   III.Analysis D! !W)X)XXX)  A.DivisionofProperty #l! W  BothHusbandandWifequibblewiththetrialcourtsdivisionofproperty.Husbandargues $D # thatthedivisionwasinequitablebecause(1)hewascreditedwithreceivingtheJ.C.Bradford %0!$ retirementaccountbutnotgivenanycontroloverit;and(2)becausehewasmaderesponsiblefor &"% thedebtagainstthelifeinsurancepolicy.Wifearguesthatthetrialcourterred(1)infindingthe '#& Sugartreeresidencetobemaritalproperty;and(2)initsvaluationofthecarbusiness. (#'   Indivorcecases,Tennesseerecognizestwodistinctclassesofproperty:(1) marital |*%) property,asdefinedinT.C.A.364121(b)(1)(1996);and(2) separateproperty,asdefinedin h+&* T.C.A.364121(b)(2)(1996).Thedistinctionisimportantbecause,inanactionfordivorce,only  maritalpropertyisdivided,distributed,orassignedbetweentheparties.SeeT.C.A.364121(a)(1)  (1996).Implicitinthestatuteistheunderstandingthatseparatepropertyisnotdividedbetweenthe  parties. Brockv.Brock ,941S.W.2d896,900(Tenn.Ct.App.1996). t   Generally,propertythatisacquiredduringthemarriagebyeitherorbothspousesandstill L  ownedbyeitherorbothspouseswhenthedivorcecomplaintisfiledisclassifiedasmaritalproperty 8  andisthussubjecttoequitabledivision.T.C.A.364121(b)(1).However,propertyacquiredby $ t aspousebygift,bequest,deviseordescent,evenifacquiredduringthemarriage,isseparateproperty  ` andnotsubjecttodivision.SeeT.C.A.364121(b)(2)(D).  L        Acourtsdivisionofmaritalpropertymustbedoneinaccordancewiththestatutoryfactors $  foundinT.C.A.364121(c).Maritalfaultcannotbeconsidered.T.C.A.364121(a)(1).     [A]nequitablepropertydivisionisnotnecessarilyanequalone.Itisnotachievedbya   mechanicalapplicationofthestatutoryfactors,butratherbyconsideringandweighingthemost   relevantfactorsinlightoftheuniquefactsofthecase. Batsonv.Batson ,769S.W.2d849,859 p (Tenn.Ct.App.1988).Itisnotnecessarythatbothpartiesreceiveashareofeachpieceofproperty. \  Thompsonv.Thompson ,797S.W.2d599,604(Tenn.Ct.App.1990). H     Maritaldebtistobetreatedsimilarlytomaritalproperty.It  p   8  8`   shouldbedividedequitablyinaccordancewiththefactorsinTenn. H Code.Ann.364121(c)andinlightof(1)whichpartyincurredthe 4 debt,(2)thepurposeofthedebt,(3)whichpartybenefittedfrom   incurringthedebt,and(4)whichpartyisbetterabletorepaythedebt.   Maritaldebtsneednotbedividedinpreciselythesamemannerasthe  maritalassets,althoughtheyfrequentlyfollowtheirrelatedassets.` x` x &c Kinardv.Kinard ,986S.W.2d220,233(Tenn.Ct.App.1998)(citationsomitted). l  X   X   X  Appellatecourtsaretodefertoatrialcourtsdivisionofmaritalpropertyunlessthetrial D! courtsdecisionisinconsistentwiththestatutoryfactorsorisunsupportedbythepreponderanceof 0"  theevidence. Brownv.Brown ,913S.W.2d163,168(Tenn.Ct.App.1994). #l!       Thetrialcourtsdivisionofmaritalpropertygave$524,478toWifeand$520,953to $D # Husband.Husbandargues,however,thatbecausethetrialcourtorderedthattheJ.C.Bradford %0!$ retirementaccountbeutilizedassecurityforthepaymentofalimony,Husbandeffectivelyhasno &"% controlovertheaccount,andthus,sotheargumentgoes,thetrialcourteffectivelyawardedthe '#& accounttoWife,resultinginasplitof$798,236toWifeand$247,195toHusband. (#'   Wefindthisargumenttobewithoutmerit.Husbandsownbehaviorcompelledthetrial |*%) courttoutilizetheretirementaccountassecurityforHusbandspaymentofalimonytoWife. h+&* Thoughitsecuresthepaymentofalimony,theaccountitselfstillbelongstoHusband.Uponthe  deathorremarriageofWife,Husbandwillhavecompletecontrolovertheentirevalueofthe  account.Moreover,T.C.A.365101(a)(1)specificallyallowsacourttoawardsupportoutofa  spousesproperty.Therefore,wefindthisissueadversetoHusband. t   Husbandnextarguesthatitwaserrortomakehimsolelyresponsibleforthedebtagainstthe L  lifeinsurancepolicy.Morespecifically,hearguesthat(1)because$32,000ofthefundsborrowed 8  againsttheinsurancepolicywasusedtobuildthelakefrontcabin;and(2)becausehewasawarded $ t thefullvalueofthecabin,thetrialcourthaseffectivelyassessedthe$32,000againsthimtwice.  `   Wedisagree.Husbandsargumentignoresthefactthatthecashvalueofthelifeinsurance  8  policyatthetimeoftrialwas approximatelyequaltothedebtagainstthepolicy.Thus,thetrial $  courtawardedthelifeinsurancepolicytoHusbandandassigneditavalueofzero.Thedebtagainst   thelifeinsurancepolicyissetoffbythecashvalueofthepolicy.Therefore,wefindthatthetrial   courtdidnoterrinitstreatmentofthelifeinsurancepolicy.     WifearguesthatthetrialcourterredinclassifyingtheSugartreeresidenceasmarital p property.Morespecifically,sheassertsthatwhileshieldingtheresidencefromapotentiallawsuit \ mayhavebeenafactorintransferringtheresidencetoWife,Husbandsprimarymotivationwasto H provideforWifeintheeventofhisdeath. 4   Tobevalid,agiftrequires(1)theintentofthedonortomakeagift;and(2)delivery,  \ wherebythedonorsurrenderscompletedominionandcontrolovertheproperty. Hanselv.Hansel , H 939S.W.2d110,112(Tenn.Ct.App.1996).Althoughaconveyanceofpropertybetweenspouses 4 createsarebuttablepresumptionofagift,itisnotconclusiveevidenceontheissue.See Robbins   v.Robbins, C/ANo.01A019201CV00031,1992WL187637,at*3(Tenn.Ct.App.M.S.,filed   August7,1992);seealso Abneyv.Abney ,C/ANo.181,1991WL16255,at*3(Tenn.Ct.App.  E.S.,filedFebruary12,1991).    Thetrialcourtfound,withoutelaboration,thattherealestateinquestionwasthemarital l propertyoftheparties.ItdidsodespitethefactthatHusbandexecutedaquitclaimdeedtoWife X  ostensiblyconveyinghisinterestinthepropertytoWife.Implicitinthetrialcourtsdecisionto D! classifythepropertyasmaritalpropertyisthecourtsfindingthatthedeed,forwhateverreason,did 0"  nothavetheeffectofconveyingthepropertytoWifeasherseparateproperty.Apparently,thetrial #l! courtaccreditedthetestimonyofHusbandtotheeffectthatthepurposeofthedeedtoWifewasto $X" shieldtheresidencefromthethreatofalawsuit.SincethetrialcourtapparentlybelievedHusbands $D # testimony,thiscredibilitydeterminationeffectivelyprecludesusfromfindingthattheevidence %0!$ preponderatesagainstthetrialcourtsclassificationofthesubjectpropertyasmaritalproperty. &"%   Wifenextarguesthat thetrialcourterredinfailingtogive[Husbands]carbusinessavalue (#' tobedividedequitablybetweenthepartiesgiventhatitfoundthat[Husband]wasstillinthe )$( businessofsellingcars. |*%)  h+&* ?+ ,4 <DLX?  Thevaluetobegivenamaritalassetisaquestionoffact. Kinardv.Kinard ,986S.W.2d  220,231(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Inmakingthisdetermination,thetrialcourtistoconsiderall  relevantevidence,and,iftheevidenceisconflicting,thecourt mayassignavaluethatiswithinthe  rangeofvaluessupportedbytheevidence. Id .Anappellatecourtistopresumeatrialcourts t factualdeterminationsarecorrectunlesstheevidencepreponderatesagainstthem. Id . `   WifetestifiedthatHusbandhadtoldherin1990thatthebusinessinventoryhadan 8  approximatevalueof$300,000.ShealsoopinedthatthefactthatHusbandwasstillincurring $ t expensesatthetimeoftrialindicatesthathewasstilloperatingthebusiness,andshetherefore  ` concludedthatthevalueofthebusinesswas$250,000.Husband,ontheotherhand,testifiedthat  L  hebegantoliquidatehisinventoryin1997andthathewasnotoperatingthecarbusinessatthetime  8  oftrial.Hestatedthathewasstillincurringexpensesinhisattempttoliquidatetheremaining $  inventorywhichhevaluedat$6,000.     Baseduponthisevidence,thetrialcourtstatedthefollowing:   8  8`   TheCourthasrealdifficultydeterminingif[Husband]hasanongoing p businessornot.Forthepurposesofthisdivorce,thecourtwillaccept \ thathehas$6,000ininventoryleft,butitishighlysuspectifthatis H theactualnumberorifheistotallyoutofbusiness.Thecourt 4 believesthat[Husband]willstillcontinueinthecarbusiness. p` x` x   Wefindnoerrorinthetrialcourtstreatmentofthecarbusiness.Thetrialcourtsfindings H withrespecttothisissueareagainbasedonthetrialcourtsfactualfindingsanditsassessmentof 4 thecredibilityofthewitnesses.Thesedeterminationsareentitledtogreatweightonappeal.See    Massengalev.Massengale ,915S.W.2d818,819(Tenn.Ct.App.1995).Aftercarefulreviewof   therecord,wefindandholdthattheevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourts  valuationofthecarbusinessanditsawardofthebusinesstoHusband.  #X)XX)X)gW#  B.Alimony l 9  HusbandfirstarguesthatthetrialcourterredinitsawardofperiodicalimonytoWifeinlight D! ofthelegislativepreferenceforrehabilitativealimony,Husbandsinabilitytopayalimony,and 0"  Wifesabilitytosupportherself. #l!   Theamountanddurationofalimonyareissueswithrespecttowhichthetrialcourtexercises $D # widediscretion. Garfinkelv.Garfinkel ,945S.W.2d744,748(Tenn.Ct.App.1996).Inmaking %0!$ analimonydetermination,acourtshouldbeguidedbythefactorssetforthinT.C.A.365 &"% 101(d)(1)(A)!(L)(Supp.1999).The realneedoftherequestingspouse isthesinglemost '#& importantfactor. Cranfordv.Cranford ,772S.W.2d48,50(Tenn.Ct.App.1989). Inaddition (#' totheneedofthedisadvantagedspouse,thecourtsmostoftenconsidertheabilityoftheobligor )$( spousetoprovidesupport. Id .Thefaultoftheobligorspouseisalsoacommonfactor. Bullv. |*%) Bull ,729S.W.2d673,675(Tenn.Ct.App.1987).Theamountofalimonyshouldbedetermined h+&* so thatthepartyobtainingthedivorce[isnot]leftinaworsefinancialsituationthanheorshehad  beforetheoppositepartysmisconductbroughtaboutthedivorce. Shacklefordv.Shackleford ,611  S.W.2d598,601(Tenn.Ct.App.1980)(citationsomitted).    Therelevantstatute,T.C.A.365101,clearlyreflectsabiasinfavorofrehabilitative ` alimony.SeeT.C.A.365101(d)(1)(Supp.1999). Thepurposeofrehabilitativesupportisto L  enablethedisadvantagedspousetoacquireadditionaljobskills,education,ortrainingthatwill 8  enablehimorhertobemoreselfsufficient. Andertonv.Anderton ,988S.W.2d675,682(Tenn. $ t Ct.App.1998).Whererehabilitationisnotfeasible,however, courtsmaystillawardlongterm  ` supportandmaintenanceuntilremarriageordeathoftherecipient, Isbellv.Isbell ,816S.W.2d  L  735,739(Tenn.1991),becauselongtermspousalsupportisdesigned toprovidesupporttoa  8  disadvantagedspousewhoisunabletoachievesomedegreeofselfsufficiency. Anderton ,988 $  S.W.2dat682.Evenwheredivorcedcoupleslacksufficientresourcestoenablebothofthemto   enjoytheirpredivorcestandardofliving,courtsmayawardalimonyasclosinginmoneytoenable   therecipientspousetomorecloselyapproachhisorherpredivorcestandardofliving.See Aaron   v.Aaron ,909S.W.2d408,411(Tenn.1995).4X XXX)    X#X)X X4Xȍ#)X)XXX)B+ ,4 <DL,XB p Wefindthattheevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsawardofperiodic @ alimonytoWife.ThoughWifehasacollegedegreeandsomedegreeofworkexperience,her ,| earningcapacityisnogreaterthan$18,000peryear,asalaryinsufficienttoallowhertoreacha h reasonablestandardoflivingwhenmeasuredinrelationtothestandardoflivingsheandHusband T enjoyedduringthemarriage.ThoughHusbandhasnocollegedegreeandisreceivingdisability,the @ trialcourtfounditlikelythatHusbandwouldcontinueinthecarbusiness.Inanyevent,wefindthat , hehastheresourcesoutofwhichtopayWife$1,640.55inmonthlyperiodicalimony.    Inarguingthatthealimonyawardshouldhavebeenrehabilitativeratherthanlongterm,  Husbandrelieson Andertonv.Anderton ,988S.W.2d675(Tenn.Ct.App.1998).Inthatcase,we  statedthat x  X?( 4 <DL,X?8  8`   [u]nderthefactsofthiscase,wehavedeterminedthatMs.Anderton P shouldreceiverehabilitativespousalsupport.Sheiscurrentlyforty <  fiveyearsold.SheearnedacollegedegreeinMay1996andfor (!x manyyearsparticipatedinrunningafinanciallysuccessfulAmway "d  distributorship.Herhealthandemotionalcomplaintssimplydonot #P! risetothelevelofseriousnessthattheypreventherfrombecoming #<" gainfullyemployed.Afterhearingtheevidenceonremand,thetrial $( # courtfoundthatMs.Andertons physicallimitationsanddisabilities %!$ donotprecludeeconomicrehabilitation.Accordingly,thetrial &"% courtconcludedthatshe willprobablybecomecapableoffinancial '"& selfsupport,butthereisasubstantialpossibilitythatshewillnot. (#' Wefindthattheevidencepreponderatesinfavorofthetrialcourts t)$( conclusionthatMs.Andertoniscapableoffinancialselfsupport.`*%)` x` x  Id .at683. 8,'+ Ї  Wedeclinetofindsufficientsimilaritiesbetweenthefactsin Anderton andthefactsofthe  instantcasetowarrantareversalofthetrialcourtsawardofperiodicalimony.Wifeintheinstant  caseisolder,hercollegedegreeisstale,andtheevidenceisinsufficienttoconcludethatherwork  experiencerisestothelevelof Andertons  financiallysuccessfulAmwaydistributorship.More t importantly,thetrialcourtintheinstantcasehasnotspecificallyfoundthatWifeiscapableof ` financialselfsupport;nordowe.Therefore,wefindandholdthatthetrialcourtdidnoterrin L  awardingWifeperiodicalimonyintheamountof$1,640.55permonth. 8    C.SecurityfortheAlimonyAward  ` M  Finally,HusbandarguesthatthetrialcourterredinutilizingtheJ.C.Bradfordaccountas  8  securityforHusbandspaymentofalimony.Hereliesagainon Anderton ,inwhichwefoundthat $  thetrialcourterredinleavingatemporaryrestrainingorderonaretirementaccountthathadbeen   awardedtothehusbandinthedivisionofmaritalproperty. Anderton ,988S.W.2dat683.     WefindthatthetrialcourtdidnoterrinutilizingtheJ.C.Bradfordretirementaccountto   secureHusbandspaymentofalimonytoWife.ItwasHusbandsfailure,onseveraloccasions,to p makecourtorderedpaymentstoWifethatpromptedthetrialcourtsdecisiontoorderthatthe \ paymentsbemadedirectlyfromtheretirementaccount.TheaccountstillbelongstoHusband.The H paymentsfromtheaccountarelimitedindurationuntilthedeathorremarriageofWife,atwhich 4 timeHusbandwillhavecompletecontroloverboththefundandthepayments. Anderton is  p distinguishableonitsfactsinthatthereisnoindicationinthatcasethatthehusbanddemonstrated  \ thathecouldnotbetrustedtomakethepayments.Inaddition,wenotethatacourtmayaward H  suitablesupportandmaintenanceofeitherspouse8outof[a]spousesproperty.T.C.A.365 4 101(a)(1)(Supp.1999).Therefore,wefindnoerroronthisissue.#X)XX)X)#)X)XXX)     <( 4 <DLX<  IV.Conclusion    Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.Thecaseisremandedforenforcementofthe  judgmentandcollectionofcostsassessedbelow,allpursuanttoapplicablelaw.Costsonappeal l aretaxedtotheappellant. X  #X)XX)X)D#   `     h     ___________________________________ $D #    `     h     CHARLESD.SUSANO,JR.,JUDGE