ÿWPC8 8çOOɼ[_K ^F˶Jô;^ž•‘ºZZu‡:cmZ`>œ;ÀtL$#æîzÚÀ8Zæ­£7W=Ë™BýMÐ!N:z3¸@qÉq­®jÙI]°£ëGÅõ­©‹ó8SÖ<·ù¿T¬æCåLøncCÛ-¶ÜÜÄéú5ù^ß¼H]i+PlÃ"è[:ŠãÓÝôŽ_06(.õ9lIù¬Ú_&B~ZBoƒŸòn™‘ïDœO™õ¶,$ ¸BÂúZ…ÎŒuNΛ£jg¾Zwý߀¯¡+ïW&ÅFäì¿»µÜ‘ןm\ÙÂÚŽøn¦PÙá¶Å#Z¡õ™î1ô¸*zèÜ€Q=É-v>ÐâºCs”AëÑwyÉÍ0-lRÁv'à¤×Z6¾»4J5ŽÚ‹èÕŽI1IÂÀb]¬Ž4ØÁ×ÒDð˜\µîú®î¥ŸóL*•H¹Ð_‡KÑ6bµa7‘ÜMÇü™IaTÚ Ï9&ŠéôkU­¤Þöú*ÕÔáåb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ U9N· w 4 z Ò— i x mz U N‘ Æß Æ¥ Æk Æ1U@÷N7Ä9 0 DýEAA CCNCSè––›~8óQ'Q'D(D(ïL(ö;+;+;+a1111111111b’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3’3 0 ëš3š3š3š3 B…4…4 0¤¢4 D3F5 D-y5 0K¦5¦5 ASñ5ÆD6 0¤ 7 0D®7 A«ò7˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0».p…-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularš‚,-𦠘C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(ÈhH  Z‹6Times New Roman RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(âx-  Z‹(Times New Roman  ºÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhile€this€letter€does€not€appear€in€the€record,€it€is€referenced€in€the€affidavit€of€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô.€€In€addition,Ð ° Ðat€the€hearing€on€the€motion€to€alter€or€amend,€both€counsel€and€the€trial€court€acknowledged€the€ð ðrequest€forÐ tÄ Ðcontinuance.ðð(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ý ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ ôìòòôìÔAccording€to€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ôððs€affidavit,€she€called€the€Clerk€and€Masterððs€office€that€morning€to€notify€the€judgeÐ ° Ðthat€the€Ô_ÔHarakasesÔ_Ô€would€be€running€late€for€the€hearing.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€arrived€at€the€courthouse€atÐ tÄ Ðapproximately€9:15€a.m.€and€filed€a€their€motion€to€set€aside€default€judgment.€€They€remained€at€the€courthouse€untilÐ 8ˆ Ðaround€9:45€a.m.€before€discovering€that€the€hearing€for€damages€had€already€been€held.€€They€left€after€being€notifiedÐ üL Ðthat€the€hearing€had€already€concluded€and€learning€that€their€motion€to€set€aside€default€would€be€heard€on€June€20,Ð À Ð2000.€€The€hearing€was€later€moved€to€July€18,€2000.Ô#†ôìòò ôì~#Ô ûÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ôìòòôìÔIn€fact,€the€rule€on€default€judgment€was€amended€in€1996€to€require€notice€to€those€parties€who€had€not€yetÐ ° Ðappeared€in€the€lawsuit.€€The€Advisory€Committee€comments€indicate€that€one€reason€for€this€change€was€ð ðthe€liberalÐ tÄ ÐTennessee€caselaw€allowing€Rule€60€relief.ðð€Ô#†ôìòòôì~#Ô 9Ý ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.01€provided€at€the€time€relevant€herein€that€the€notice€of€the€motion€for€default€judgmentÐ ° Ðbe€served€on€the€party€against€whom€default€judgment€is€sought€thirty€(30)€days€prior€to€the€hearing€on€the€motion.€€Tenn.Ð tÄ ÐR.€Civ.€P.€6.05€provides€that€three€(3)€days€shall€be€added€when€service€is€made€upon€an€opposing€party€by€mail€inÐ 8ˆ Ðcertain€specified€circumstances.€€ ÞÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAmong€other€assertions,€the€Harakases€denied€that€problems€with€the€house€were€related€to€constructionÐ ° Ðdefects,€stated€that€the€house€had€remained€unoccupied,€unheated,€and€uncooled€for€three€years€before€the€suit,€and€thatÐ tÄ ÐMr.€Vanleer€and€his€fiance€had€been€pleased€with€the€house€and€had€no€problems€with€it. ‘Ý ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Harakasesðð€original€motion€to€set€aside€stated€it€was€filed€under€Rule€55€and€was€filed€within€thirty€(30)Ð ° Ðdays€of€the€entry€of€the€default€judgment€and€is,€consequently,€properly€considered€a€motion€made€pursuant€to€Rule€59.€Ð tÄ ÐThe€later€motion€was€a€timely„filed€Rule€59€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€declining€to€set€aside,€combined€withÐ 8ˆ Ða€Rule€60€motion€for€relief€by€setting€aside€the€default€judgment.€€òòSee€Campbell€v.€Archeróó,€555€S.W.2d€110,€112€(Tenn.Ð üL Ð1977)€for€an€explanation€of€the€distinction€between€the€two€rules.€Whether€the€motion€was€made€pursuant€to€Rule€59€orÐ À  ÐRule€60,€the€standard€to€be€applied€is€the€same€because€of€the€language€of€Rule€55.02. .Ý ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSome€cases€indicate€that€a€default€judgment€entered€without€proof€of€proper€notice€is€void.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€Mayesóó,Ð ° Ð1995€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€10,€at€*3.€€In€òòMayesóó,€there€was€nothing€in€the€record€to€ð ðremotely€suggestðð€the€requisite€noticeÐ tÄ  Ðhad€been€served.€€Other€cases,€such€as€those€cited€herein,€state€that€failure€of€notice€is€justification€for€excusable€neglect,Ð ° Ðimplying€that€the€default€judgment€is€merely€voidable,€not€void.€€We€think€the€distinction€may€lie€in€the€proof€of€serviceÐ tÄ Ðpresented€to€the€trial€court€when€default€judgment€is€requested.€€Where,€as€in€this€case,€the€default€judgment€was€grantedÐ 8ˆ Ðon€the€basis€of€counselððs€certificate€of€service,€which€constitutes€proof€of€service,€the€judgment€was€validly€entered€atÐ üL Ðthe€time,€and€the€question€is€whether€it€should€have€been€set€aside€based€upon€equitable€principles.€€Thus,€the€judgmentÐ À Ðwas€not€void.€€The€question€of€whether€a€default€judgment€entered€without€notice€or€compliance€with€other€proceduralÐ „Ô Ðrequirements€is€primarily€relevant€herein€to€the€question€of€whether,€to€obtain€relief€from€the€judgment,€the€defendantÐ H ˜ Ðis€required€to€demonstrate€a€meritorious€defense.€€Generally,€a€party€seeking€to€set€aside€a€default€judgment€must€showÐ  \ Ðthat€he€or€she€has€a€meritorious€defense€to€the€suit,€but€that€requirement€does€not€apply€where€the€default€judgment€isÐ Ð  Ðvoid.€€òòPattersonóó,€665€S.W.2d€at€100„01.€€The€Ô_ÔHarakasesÔ_Ô€filed€an€answer€and€counterclaim€with€supporting€affidavitsÐ ” ä  Ðdemonstrating€a€meritorious€defense,€and€the€Estate€has€not€argued€they€failed€in€that€regard.€€Therefore,€we€will€considerÐ X ¨  Ðthe€issues€as€raised€by€the€parties€and€apply€the€meritorious€defense€requirement. éÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhere€the€judgment€is€void,€the€defendants€are€not€required€to€show€a€meritorious€defense.€€òòSee€óón.6.  åÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55€has€undergone€several€revisions.€€The€Advisory€Commission€Comments€state€that€theÐ ° Ðð ðformer€five„day€rule€has€been€expanded€to€thirty€days.€€Consequently,€the€defendant€must€be€served€with€written€noticeÐ tÄ Ðof€the€application€at€least€thirty€days€before€the€default€hearing.ðð€€On€July€1,€2000,€the€thirty€(30)€day€notice€requirementÐ 8ˆ Ðwas€changed€back€to€five€days.€€Because€the€default€judgment€in€this€case€was€sought€after€July€1,€1998,€but€prior€to€JulyÐ üL Ð1,€2000,€the€thirty€(30)€day€notice€requirement€applies.€€ ìÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ôìòòôìÔIn€the€case€herein,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€not€only€argue€that€they€were€not€notified€regarding€the€hearing€onÐ ° Ðthe€motion,€they€also€challenge€the€date€on€which€the€hearing€was€held.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€argue€that€had€they€beenÐ tÄ Ðproperly€served€with€the€motion€for€default€judgment€that€was€filed€on€April€7,€2000,€the€trial€court€was€still€precludedÐ 8ˆ Ðfrom€entering€default€judgment€on€May€9,€2000,€because€only€thirty„two€(32)€days€had€expired€from€the€date€appearingÐ üL Ðon€the€certificate€of€service,€and,€according€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€6.05€(allowing€for€the€addition€of€three„days€to€theÐ À Ðcomputation€of€time€when€a€notice€is€served€by€mail)€and€Tenn.€P.€Civ.€P.€55.01€(providing€that€the€party€against€whomÐ „Ô Ðdefault€judgment€is€sought€must€have€thirty€(30)€days€notice€of€the€hearing),€the€hearing€could€be€held€by€the€trial€courtÐ H ˜ Ðno€earlier€than€thirty„three€(33)€days€after€the€date€on€the€certificate€of€service.€€In€view€of€our€decision,€it€is€not€necessaryÐ  \ Ðto€address€this€argument.€€We€also€note€that€the€Ô_ÔHarakasesÔ_Ô€claim€they€received€no€notice;€thus,€they€were€not€prejudicedÐ Ð  Ðby€the€date€set€for€the€hearing.Ô#†ôìòòôì~#Ô WÝ ƒRè‚$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€note€that€the€Harakasesðð€actions€after€they€received€notice€of€entry€of€the€default€judgment€are€consistentÐ ° Ðwith€their€sworn€testimony€that€they€did€not€receive€notice€prior€to€the€hearing.€€They€filed€a€motion€to€set€aside€in€whichÐ tÄ Ðthey€also€requested€permission€to€file€an€answer.€€They€later€filed€a€detailed€answer€supported€by€affidavits€and€exhibits.€Ð 8ˆ ÐThey€have€since€diligently€pursued€their€rights.- ù-(|G2è‚$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R­»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôìò»»Ô d(|3‰c$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R­»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‰c$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R­»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R­»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼R­»»»ÔÑ8€±XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îJ¬î»¼R­ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼R­»îîJ¬ #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓJanuary€10,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X±X»¼R­ÔÌò òÔ#†¼R­»XX±õ#ÔESTATE€OF€ANTHONY€D.€Ô_ÔVANLEERÔ_Ô€V.€SARA€Ô_ÔHARAKASÔ_Ô,€ET€AL.Ô‡X±X»¼R­Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Ô_ÔHickmanÔ_Ô€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€991524€€€€€€Donald€P.€Harris,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2001„00687„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€5,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓA€default€judgment€was€entered€against€Sara€and€Andre€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô,€the€Appellants€herein,€€in€a€disputeÐ xÈ  Ðover€defects€in€the€construction€of€a€residence.€€At€the€time€the€default€judgment€was€entered,€Mr.Ð d´ Ðand€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€had€not€answered€the€complaint.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€filed€a€òòpro€seóó€motion€toÐ P  Ðset€aside€the€default€judgment,€arguing€that€they€did€not€receive€the€notice€of€the€motion€for€defaultÐ <Œ Ðjudgment,€which€the€trial€court€denied€after€a€hearing€that€included€testimony€from€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô.€Ð (x ÐMr.€and€Mrs.€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€then€retained€an€attorney€who€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€refusal€toÐ d Ðset€aside€the€default€judgment€and€a€second€motion€to€set€aside€the€judgment€taken€by€default.€€TheÐ P Ðtrial€court€denied€these€motions.€€Because€there€was€reasonable€doubt€as€to€whether€the€defaultÐ ì< Ðjudgment€should€have€been€set€aside,€we€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€refusal€to€set€aside.Ð Ø( ÐÓÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ ° ÐReversed€and€Remandedó óÐ œì ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼R­»àX±¯#ÔÔ‡X±X.¼R­ÔPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€B.€Cain,€J.,óó€andÐ tÄ ÐòòIrvin€H.€Ô_ÔKilcreaseÔ_Ô,€Sp.€J.óó,€joined.Ð `° ÐÌÔ_ÔKarlaÔ_Ô€C.€Ô_ÔHewittÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Sara€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€and€Andre€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô.Ð 8!ˆ  ÐÌRonald€Ô_ÔKilgoreÔ_Ô,€Kirk€Ô_ÔVandivortÔ_Ô,€Charlotte,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€The€Estate€of€AnthonyÐ #`" ÐDouglas€Ô_ÔVanleerÔ_Ô.Ð ü#L# ÐÓˆ ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼R­»XX±· #ÔÔ‡X±X»¼R­ÔÐ Ô%$!% ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼R­»XX±Ú #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X±X»¼R­ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±Ôà  àThis€case€involves€a€dispute€over€defects€in€the€construction€of€a€residence€owned€by€ò òó óMr.Ð ¬'ü"' ÐAnthony€Ô_ÔVanleeÔ_Ô,€now€deceased,€and€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€a€default€judgment€for€his€Estate.€€Mr.Ð ˜(è#( ÐÔ_ÔVanleerÔ_Ô€entered€into€a€contract€with€Sara€and€Andre€Ô_ÔHarakasÔ_Ô€in€March€of€1996€for€the€constructionÐ „)Ô$) Ðof€a€home.€€The€house€was€completed€in€April€of€1996,€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔVanleerÔ_Ô€took€possession€of€theÐ p*À%* Ðresidence€in€May.€€Tragically,€on€October€27,€1996,€Mr.€Ô_ÔVanleerÔ_Ô€was€murdered.€€His€mother,€Mrs.Ð \+¬&+ ÐMartha€A.€Ô_ÔVanleerÔ_Ô,€was€appointed€Ô_ÔadministratrixÔ_Ô€of€the€Estate€and€assumed€the€role€of€owner€of€theÐ H,˜', Ðproperty.€€Ð 4-„(-ý÷ ÐÔ_Ô‡à  àAccording€to€Mrs.€Vanleer,€in€late€1996€problems€began€to€arise€with€workmanship€and€the€Ð ° Ðfailure€of€Mr.€Harakas€to€fulfill€certain€terms€of€the€contract.€€Although€discussions€took€placeÐ œì Ðbetween€the€parties€and,€apparently,€some€work€was€performed,€the€dispute€continued€until€Mrs.Ð ˆØ ÐVanleer€filed€suit€on€behalf€of€the€Estate€on€December€22,€1999,€alleging€breach€of€warranty,Ð tÄ Ðequitable€estoppel,€and€breach€of€contract.€€Due€to€the€nature€of€this€appeal,€the€procedural€historyÐ `° Ðof€the€case€at€the€trial€court€level€is€of€paramount€importance.€€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àOn€December€24,€1999,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€were€served€with€the€complaint.€€On€JanuaryÐ $ t Ð20,€2000,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas,€appearing€òòpro€seóó,€wrote€a€letter€to€opposing€counsel€and€sent€a€copyÐ  ` Ðof€the€letter€to€the€trial€court€asking€for€thirty€(30)€additional€days€to€answer€the€complaint.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Mr.€andÐ ü L  ÐMrs.€Harakas€claimed€that€health€problems€prevented€them€from€filing€an€answer.€Ô#†X±XX X±c#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±ÔÐ è 8  ÐÌà  àOn€April€7,€2000,€the€Estate€filed€a€motion€for€default€judgment.€€The€motion€contained€aÐ À  Ðcertificate€of€service,€signed€by€counsel€for€the€Estate€and€certifying€that€it€was€mailed€to€Mr.€andÐ ¬ü  ÐMrs.€Harakas€that€day€at€the€same€address.€€Ô#†X±XX X±F#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±ÔThe€trial€court€granted€the€motion€for€default€judgmentÐ ˜è  Ðon€May€9,€2000,€at€which€time€the€Harakases€still€had€not€filed€an€answer.€€Ô#†X±XX X±¾#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±ÔMr.€and€Mrs.€HarakasÐ „Ô  Ðdid€not€appear€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€default€judgment.€€The€trial€court€mailed€a€copy€ofÐ pÀ Ðthe€default€judgment€to€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas,€notifying€them€of€the€judgment€and€the€date€on€whichÐ \¬ Ðthe€hearing€for€damages€would€be€held€in€the€trial€court,€June€5,€2000.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€cameÐ H˜ Ðto€the€courthouse€that€day€but€missed€the€hearing€on€damages€because€they€were€late€for€the€docketÐ 4„ Ðcall.€€The€same€day,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€filed€a€motion€to€set€aside€default€judgment.׃Ü×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€Ô#†X±XX X±˜#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±ÔÐ  p ÐÌà  àOn€July,€18,€2000,€Mrs.€Vanleer,€her€counsel,€and€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€appeared€at€theÐ øH Ðhearing€on€the€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment.€€Mrs.€Harakas€testified€that€she€and€herÐ ä4 Ðhusband€did€not€receive€notice€of€the€motion€for€default€judgment.€€The€judge€appointed€to€hear€theÐ Ð  Ðarguments€on€the€motion€was€different€from€the€judge€who€had€heard€all€previous€issues€regardingÐ ¼  Ðthe€Estateððs€complaint.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€filed€an€answer׃< ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€cross„complaint€on€the€same€day,Ð ¨ø Ðagain€appearing€òòpro€seóó.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€motion€to€set€aside€default€judgment€and€enteredÐ ”ä Ðan€order€on€July€20,€2000,€to€that€effect,€stating:Ð €Ð ÐÐ l¼ Ðà8  à.€.€.€after€hearing€sworn€testimony€of€the€Defendant,€Sara€Harakas,€argument€ofÐ ° ÐCounsel€for€the€Plaintiff,€and€the€entire€record,€and€the€Court€having€considered€saidÐ œì ÐMotion€and€the€Court€being€fully€advised€is€of€the€opinion€that€the€Defendants€haveÐ ˆØ Ðnot€provided€sufficient€grounds€to€set€aside€the€Default€Judgment€pursuant€to€RuleÐ tÄ Ð55€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€and€the€Court€finds€that€the€Motion€toÐ `° ÐSet€Aside€the€Default€Judgment€is€not€well€taken€and€should€not€be€granted.€€ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àOn€August€14,€2000,€the€Order€for€Damages€was€entered€in€accordance€with€the€events€thatÐ $ t Ðtranspired€at€the€hearing€on€that€issue,€granting€a€judgment€for€the€Estate€in€the€amount€of€TwelveÐ  ` ÐThousand€Three€Hundred€Twenty€Dollars€($12,320.00).€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àMr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€then€retained€counsel€who€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend€theÐ Ô$  Ðjudgment€of€the€court,€for€a€new€trial,€and€to€set€aside€default€judgment€pursuant€to€Rules€55,€59,€andÐ À  Ð60,€again€arguing€that€the€Harakases€did€not€receive€notice€of€the€motion€for€default€judgment.€€Mr.Ð ¬ü  Ðand€Mrs.€Harakas€later€amended€this€motion,€asserting€that€ð ðalthough€they€were€served€with€theÐ ˜è  Ðinitial€process,€they€were€not€served€with€the€motion€for€default€judgment,€though€the€certificate€ofÐ „Ô  Ðservice€appears€proper€in€all€respectsðð€and€that€once€the€default€judgment€was€entered€against€them,Ð pÀ Ðthey€appeared€at€the€hearing€on€damages€and€filed€a€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment.€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àArgument€on€the€amended€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€of€the€court,€for€a€new€trial,Ð 4„ Ðand€to€set€aside€default€judgment€pursuant€to€Rules€55,€59,€and€60€was€heard€by€a€third€trial€judge.€Ð  p ÐMr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€argued€for€the€first€time€at€this€hearing€that€the€hearing€on€the€motion€forÐ  \ Ðdefault€judgment€was€held€prior€to€the€expiration€of€the€thirty„three€(33)€days€provided€for€in€Tenn.Ð øH ÐR.€Civ.€P.€55.01€and€6.05.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€order€resulting€from€that€hearing€reflects€that€the€judge€hearing€the€motions:Ð ¼  ÐÌà8  àannounced€that€the€matter€should€be€submitted€to€Judge€Timothy€L.€Easter€in€that€heÐ ”ä Ðheard€and€denied€the€original€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment€filed€by€theÐ €Ð Ðdefendants.€€Since€that€hearing€Judge€Easter€has€declined€to€hear€the€matter€and€sinceÐ l¼ Ðthe€judge€who€initially€entered€the€judgment,€Judge€Jeffrey€S.€Bivens,€is€no€longerÐ X ¨ Ðan€active€trial€judge,€the€court€will€proceed€to€determine€the€case€upon€the€briefs€and€Ð D!” Ðarguments€previously€heard.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€court€denied€the€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€of€the€court,€for€a€new€trial,€andÐ $X" Ðto€set€aside€the€default€judgment€pursuant€to€Rules€55,€59,€and€60€stating:Ð ô$D # Ðâ âÐ à%0!$ Ðà8  àDefendants€[Mr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas]€argue€they€were€only€given€32€days€notice€[of€theÐ ° Ðâ âmotion€for€default€judgment]€and,€therefore,€the€hearing€was€premature.€€This€defect,Ð œì Ðif€it€be€one,€was€not,€however,€raised€before€the€court€in€the€defendantððs€initialÐ ˆØ Ðmotion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment€filed€and€heard€by€.€.€.€[the€second€judge]Ð tÄ Ðand,€therefore,€was€waived.€€Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àOther€than€the€argument€based€upon€Rule€6.05,€T.R.C.P.,€no€new€grounds€have€beenÐ 8 ˆ Ðpresented€in€this€amended€motion€for€relief.€€On€July€18,€2000,€.€.€.€[the€second€judge]Ð $ t Ðwas€faced€with€defendants€who€had€failed€to€answer€the€original€complaint€for€almostÐ  ` Ðseven€(7)€months.€€He€determined€that€the€defendants€should€not€be€granted€reliefÐ ü L  Ðafter€such€a€period€of€time.€€This€court€cannot€disagree€with€his€ruling.€€The€amendedÐ è 8  Ðmotion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€of€the€court,€for€a€new€trial€and€to€set€aside€aÐ Ô$  Ðdefault€judgment€should€therefore€be€denied.€€€ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMr.€and€Mrs.€Harakas€have€appealed€the€denial€of€their€motions.€€The€question€before€us€isÐ ˜è  Ðwhether€the€trial€court€should€have€granted€the€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment,€entered€byÐ „Ô  Ðanother€judge,€denying€the€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment.€€In€essence,€the€question€isÐ pÀ Ðwhether€the€default€judgment€should€have€been€set€aside.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àWe€have€a€transcript€of€the€hearing€on€the€motion€to€alter€or€amend€which€consisted€only€ofÐ 4„ Ðargument€by€counsel.€€The€Harakases€have€provided€a€Statement€of€the€Evidence,€pursuant€to€Tenn.Ð  p ÐR.€App.€P.€24(c),€from€the€hearing€held€July€18€on€their€òòpro€seóó€motion€to€set€aside€default€judgment.Ð  \ ÐÔ#†X±XX X±‹#ÔÌà@´´)ìàI.ˆÐ ä4 ÐÔ‡X±XXX±ÔÌÔ#†X±XXX±¹5#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±Ôà  àThe€decision€by€a€trial€court€to€enter€a€default€judgment€or€to€refuse€to€set€aside€a€defaultÐ ¼  Ðjudgment€is€reviewed€for€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòPatterson€v.€Rockwell€Intððlóó,€665€S.W.2d€96,€100Ð ¨ø Ð(Tenn.€1984);€òòTennessee€State€Bank€v.€Layóó,€609€S.W.2d€525,€527€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980).€€Ô#†X±XXX±ü5#ÔTheÐ ”ä Ðburden€of€establishing€abuse€of€discretion€is€on€the€party€seeking€to€overturn€the€trial€courtððs€rulingÐ €Ð Ðon€appeal.€€òòBallard€v.€Herzkeóó,€924€S.W.2d€652,€659€(Tenn.€1996).Ð l¼ ÐÌà8  àUnder€the€abuse€of€discretion€standard,€a€trial€courtððs€ruling€ð ðwill€be€upheld€so€longÐ D!” Ðas€reasonable€minds€can€disagree€as€to€the€propriety€of€the€decision€made.ðð€€A€trialÐ 0"€  Ðcourt€abuses€its€discretion€only€when€it€ð ðapplies€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€orÐ #l! Ðreaches€a€decision€which€is€against€logic€or€reasoning€or€that€causes€an€injustice€toÐ $X" Ðthe€party€complaining.ðð€€The€abuse€of€discretion€standard€does€not€permit€theÐ ô$D # Ðappellate€court€to€substitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€trial€court.Ðà%0!$Ð Ð  ÐÌòòEldridge€v.€Eldridgeóó,€42€S.W.3d€82,€85€(Tenn.€2001)€(citations€omitted).Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€party€seeking€to€set€aside€a€default€judgment€has€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€it€isÐ )à$( Ðentitled€to€relief€based€on€one€of€the€applicable€grounds€and€that€it€has€a€meritorious€defense€to€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðclaims€against€it.€€òòNelson€v.€Simpsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€483,€485€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Nonetheless,€ifÐ h+¸&* Ðany€reasonable€doubt€exists€as€to€whether€the€default€judgment€should€be€set€aside,€the€court€shouldÐ ° Ðgrant€relief.€€òòIdóó.€826€S.W.2d€at€486;€òòKeck€v.€Nationwide€Sys.,€Incóó.,€499€S.W.2d€266,€267€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð œì ÐApp.€1973).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà8  àOne€can€find€numerous€decisions€where€the€courts€make€it€clear€they€are€anxious€toÐ `° Ðsee€cases€determined€on€the€merits€whenever€such€is€possible.€€It€seems€to€be€aÐ L œ Ðuniversal€rule€that€when€there€is€a€reasonable€doubt€as€to€whether€a€default€judgmentÐ 8 ˆ Ðshould€be€set€aside€upon€a€proper€application,€the€court€should€exercise€its€discretionÐ $ t Ðin€favor€of€granting€the€application€so€as€to€permit€a€determination€of€the€cause€uponÐ  ` Ðits€merits.Ðü L Ð Ð  ÐÌòòKeckóó,€499€S.W.2d€at€267.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThus,€although€the€trial€court€has€discretion€to€deny€a€motion€to€set€aside€a€default€judgment,Ð ¬ü  Ðthat€discretion€should€be€exercised€in€favor€of€setting€aside€the€judgment€if€there€is€a€reasonableÐ ˜è  Ðquestion€as€to€the€grounds€for€such€relief,€because€of€the€well„settled€preference€for€giving€everyÐ „Ô  Ðperson€a€day€in€court€to€make€his€or€her€defense.€€òòIdóó.€499€S.W.2d€at€266„67€(citing€òòBrown€v.€Brownóó,Ð pÀ Ð86€Tenn.€277,€7€S.€W.€640€(1887);€òòRoberts€v.€Stewartóó,€9€Tenn.€(1€Yer.)€390€(1830);òòóó€òòFidelity„PhoenixÐ \¬ ÐFire€Ins.€Co.€v.€Oliveróó,€25€Tenn.€App.€114,€152€S.W.2d€254€(1941)).Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àIn€fact,€in€òòTennessee€State€Bank€v.€Layóó,€609€S.W.2d€525€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980),€this€courtÐ  p Ðheld€that€the€trial€court€applied€the€wrong€standard€in€denying€a€motion€to€set€aside€a€defaultÐ  \ Ðjudgment€where€the€court€had€applied€a€stringent€standard€for€altering€or€setting€aside€a€finalÐ øH Ðjudgment€under€Rule€60.€€Instead,€the€trial€court€should€have€applied€the€standard€favoring€the€settingÐ ä4 Ðaside€of€default€judgments€so€that€the€dispute€could€be€determined€on€its€merits.€€òòIdóó.€609€S.W.2d€atÐ Ð  Ð525.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àThus,€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€must€be€exercised€by€applying€the€standard€applicable€toÐ ”ä Ðdefault€judgments€and€set€aside€such€a€judgment€if€there€is€a€reasonable€question€as€to€the€groundsÐ €Ð Ðfor€relief.€€The€relevant€criteria€are€whether€the€failure€to€respond€or€answer€was€willful,€whether€theÐ l¼ Ðdefendant€has€a€meritorious€defense,€and€the€extent€of€any€prejudice€to€the€plaintiff€if€relief€isÐ X ¨ Ðgranted.€€òòTennessee€Depððt€of€Human€Servs.€v.€Barbeeóó,€689€S.W.2d€863,€867€(Tenn.€1985);€òòNelsonóó,Ð D!” Ð826€S.W.2d€at€485.€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àA€party€against€whom€a€default€judgment€has€been€entered€may€Ô‡ X±XXX±Ôseek€relief€from€thatÐ $X" Ðjudgment€by€filing€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59€or€a€motionÐ ô$D # Ðfor€relief€from€judgment€under€Rule€60.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†X±XX X±±H#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±ÔTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.02€allows€a€trial€court€to€grant€reliefÐ à%0!$ Ðfrom€a€default€judgment€for€good€cause€shown€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€whichÐ ° Ðprovides€relief€ð ðon€such€terms€as€are€justðð:Ô#†X±XXX±J#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±ÔÐ œì ÐÌà8  àfrom€a€final€judgment,€order,€or€proceeding€for€the€following€reasons:€(1)€mistake,Ð tÄ Ðinadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect;€(2)€fraud€(whether€heretoforeÐ `° Ðdenominated€intrinsic€or€extrinsic),€misrepresentation,€or€other€misconduct€of€anÐ L œ Ðadverse€party;€(3)€the€judgment€is€void;€(4)€the€judgment€has€been€satisfied€releasedÐ 8 ˆ Ðor€discharged,€or€a€prior€judgment€upon€which€it€is€based€has€been€reversed€orÐ $ t Ðotherwise€vacated€or€it€is€no€longer€equitable€that€a€judgment€should€haveÐ  ` Ðprospective€application;€or€(5)€any€other€reason€justifying€relief€from€the€operationÐ ü L  Ðof€the€judgment.€€Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌÔ#†X±XXX±DK#Ôà  àAs€suggested€above,€ð ðRule€60€is€construed€with€liberality€to€afford€relief€from€a€defaultÐ À  Ðjudgment.ðð€€òòBarbeeóó,€689€S.W.2d€at€867;€òòNelsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€485.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà@••)ìàII.ˆÐ „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€Harakasesðð€basic€claim€is€that€they€never€received€notice€that€default€judgment€was€beingÐ \¬ Ðsought€against€them€or€notice€of€the€hearing.€€As€the€plain€language€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.01€makesÐ H˜ Ðclear,€such€notice€is€a€prerequisite€to€entry€of€a€default€judgment.€€At€the€time€of€the€filing€of€theÐ 4„ Ðmotion€for€default€judgment€in€the€case€herein,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.01€read:׃%×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  p ÐÌà8  àò òEntry.ó ó„€When€a€party€against€whom€a€judgment€for€affirmative€relief€is€sought€hasÐ øH Ðfailed€to€plead€or€otherwise€defend€as€provided€by€these€rules€and€that€fact€is€madeÐ è8 Ðto€appear€by€affidavit€or€otherwise,€judgment€by€default€may€be€entered€as€follows:ÐÔ$Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€party€entitled€to€a€judgment€by€default€shall€apply€to€the€court.€€All€partiesÐ ¬ü Ðagainst€whom€a€default€judgment€is€sought€shall€be€served€with€a€written€notice€ofÐ ˜è Ðthe€application€for€judgment€at€least€thirty€days€before€the€hearing€on€the€application,Ð „Ô Ðregardless€of€whether€the€party€has€made€an€appearance€in€the€action.€.€.€.ÐpÀÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àIt€is€well€settled€that€courts€should€grant€relief€from€default€judgment€where€the€plaintiff€hasÐ H!˜ Ðfailed€to€comply€with€required€procedural€safeguards.€€òòNelsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€486.€€Accordingly,Ð 4"„  Ðappellate€courts€have€set€aside€default€judgments€where€the€plaintiff€or€plaintiffððs€counsel€wasÐ  #p! Ðresponsible€for€the€lack€of€notice€or€inadequate€notice.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòJohnson€v.€Wadeóó,€No.€W1999„Ð  $\" Ð01651„COA„R3„CV,€2000€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€609€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Sept.€6,€2000)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.Ð ° ÐP.€11€application€filed)€(setting€aside€judgment€where€motion€for€default€judgment,€with€certificateÐ œì Ðof€service,€did€not€include€a€date€for€the€default€judgment€hearing);€òòFirst€Tenn.€Bank€Natððl€Assððn€v.Ð ˆØ ÐMcClureóó,€No.€169,€1990€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€48€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Jan.€31,€1990)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.Ð tÄ ÐP.€11€application€filedò òó ó)€(holding€that€where€neither€defendant€nor€his€counsel€had€been€served€withÐ `° Ðnotice€of€the€motion€for€default€judgment€or€the€hearing€thereon,€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€defaultÐ L œ Ðjudgment€with€no€proof€of€service€in€the€record€was€error,€and€the€default€judgment€was€set€aside).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àIf€the€notice€requirement€is€intended€to€assure€the€defendants€are€aware€of€the€impendingÐ  ` Ðjudgment,€the€principles€and€goals€underlying€the€notice€requirement€apply€with€equal€force€whenÐ ü L  Ðthe€defendant€does€not€actually€receive€notice€even€though€that€failure€may€not€be€directly€causedÐ è 8  Ðby€the€plaintiff.€€òòóóÔ‡ X±XXX±Ôð ðNotice€to€the€defendant€is€crucial€in€obtaining€a€default€judgment.ðð€€òòNancy€FraasÐ Ô$  ÐMacLean,€et€alóó.,€4€òòTennessee€Practiceóó€ðð€55.2€(3d€ed.€2000).Ô#†X±XX X±¡[#Ô€€In€òòMayes€v.€Mayesóó,€No.€03A01„Ð À  Ð9404„CV„00121,€1995€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€10,€at€*5€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Jan.€11,€1995)€(no€Tenn.€R.Ð ¬ü  ÐApp.€P.€11€application€filed),€this€court€held€unequivocally€that€ð ðno€judgment€by€default€could€beÐ ˜è  Ðentered€unless€and€until€the€requisite€application€to€the€court€for€a€default€judgment€had€beenÐ „Ô  Ðproperly€served€on€the€[defendant].€€òòIdóó.€1995€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€10,€at€*5.€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àWhere€a€party€has€no€actual€notice€of€a€critical€date€in€a€court€proceeding,€the€circumstancesÐ H˜ Ðmake€out€a€case€of€mistake,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect€under€Rule€60.02.€€òòCampbell€v.€Archeróó,Ð 4„ Ð555€S.W.2d€110,€113€(Tenn.€1977).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòBok€v.€State€of€Tennóó.,€No.€03A01„9812„BC„00426,Ð  p Ð1999€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€515,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€28,€1999)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11Ð  \ Ðapplication€filed)€(applying€that€principle€to€failure€of€plaintiffððs€counsel€to€receive€defendantððsÐ øH Ðmotion€to€dismiss€and€setting€aside€dismissal).€€Inòò€Campbellóó,€notice€of€the€trial€date€had€been€sentÐ ä4 Ðto€the€office€of€defendantsðð€counsel,€but€the€attorney€denied€that€he€was€personally€aware€of€the€trialÐ Ð  Ðdate.€€Four€days€before€the€trial€date,€the€defendants€changed€attorneys,€and€neither€the€new€attorneyÐ ¼  Ðnor€the€defendants€were€informed€of€the€impending€trial€date.€€The€trial€proceeded€withoutÐ ¨ø Ðdefendantsðð€participation,€a€verdict€was€rendered,€and€the€trial€court€refused€to€grant€a€new€trial.€Ð ”ä ÐBecause€the€defendants€had€no€actual€notice€of€the€trial€date,€the€Supreme€Court€found€theseÐ €Ð Ðcircumstances€made€out€a€case€of€mistake,€inadvertence,€or€excusable€neglect,€rather€than€one€ofÐ l¼ Ðwillful€failure€to€appear.€€555€S.W.2d€at€112„13.€€The€Court€found€the€trial€court€had€erred€inÐ X ¨ Ðrefusing€to€set€aside€the€judgment.€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThus,€generally,€failure€of€notice€of€a€critical€step€in€a€lawsuit€can€constitute€justification€forÐ #l! Ðexcusable€neglect€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60,€òòTate€v.€County€of€Monroeóó,€578€S.€W.€642,€644€(Tenn.Ð $X" ÐCt.€App.€1978)€(holding€that€failure€to€notify€defendant€of€entry€of€order€overruling€motion€for€newÐ ô$D # Ðtrial€was€the€type€of€error€set€out€in€Rule€60.02€and€justified€relief),€and€failure€of€notice€hasÐ à%0!$ Ðspecifically€been€found€to€constitute€excusable€neglect€justifying€relief€from€default€judgment€whereÐ Ì&"% Ðcombined€with€other€requirements€for€such€relief.€òò€Barbeeóó,€689€S.W.2d€at€867.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð ¸'#& Їà  àIn€òòBarbeeóó,€the€trial€date€had€been€set€before€defendantððs€counsel€made€an€appearance€in€theÐ ° Ðcase,€and€neither€the€defendant€nor€defendantððs€counsel€were€served€with€notice€of€the€trial€date,Ð œì Ðalthough€plaintiffððs€counsel€had€included€that€information€in€a€letter€to€defendantððs€counsel€enclosingÐ ˆØ Ðdiscovery€requests.€€Neither€the€defendant€nor€counsel€appeared€at€the€trial,€and€default€judgmentÐ tÄ Ðwas€entered.€€In€moving€to€set€aside€the€judgment,€defendant€furnished€an€affidavit€from€his€lawyerÐ `° Ðstating€the€lawyer€was€out€of€the€country€on€the€day€of€trial€and€that€the€clerkððs€office€had€not€servedÐ L œ Ðnotice€of€the€trial€date.€€Our€Supreme€Court€determined€that€the€trial€court€had€properly€set€aside€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðjudgment.€€In€reaching€that€conclusion,€the€Court€relied€heavily€on€the€distinction€in€the€applicationÐ $ t Ðof€Rule€60€to€default€judgments€as€opposed€to€other€types€of€judgments,òò€Id.óó€689€S.W.2d€at€866„67,Ð  ` Ðand€cited€with€approval€the€approach€taken€by€the€federal€courts€in€liberally€construing€Rule€60Ð ü L  Ðwhere€relief€is€sought€from€default€judgments€because€the€interests€of€justice€are€best€served€by€aÐ è 8  Ðtrial€on€the€merits.€òò€Id.€óóat€866.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àA€default€judgment€hearing€is€a€critical€proceeding€in€a€lawsuit,€subjecting€the€defendant€to€Ð ¬ü  Ðjudgment€against€him€and€disposing€of€the€case€as€completely€as€judgment€after€trial.€€òòÔ‡X±XXX±ÔSee€Pattersonóó,Ð ˜è  Ð665€S.W.2d€at€101Ô#†X±XXX±€n#Ô€(stating€that€Ô‡X±XXX±Ôdefault€judgment€disposes€of€a€case€on€its€merits€and€is€a€final€order).€Ð „Ô  ÐòòóóWe€must€presume€that€the€notice€requirement€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.01€exists€for€a€purpose:€toÐ pÀ Ðactually€provide€notice€to€a€party€of€a€critical€step€in€the€lawsuit,€with€the€potential€for€significantÐ \¬ Ðconsequences.׃„ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†X±XXX±o#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±ÔWhen€a€defendant€is€notified€of€a€potential€default,€he€or€she€may€make€a€Tenn.€R.Ð H˜ ÐCiv.€P.€6.02€motion€for€an€extension€of€time€to€plead.€€òòMacLean€et€alóó.,€4€òòTennesseeóó€òòPractice€óóÐ 4„ Ððð€55.2.€€Whether€or€not€to€grant€an€extension€and€allow€a€late€filed€answer€is,€of€course,€within€theÐ  p Ðdiscretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Jones€v.€Looperóó,€86€S.W.3d€194„95€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€Ð  \ ÐHowever,€a€party€who€does€not€receive€notice€that€judgment€may€be€taken€against€him€by€defaultÐ øH Ðloses€the€opportunity€to€avoid€that€result€by€whatever€available€procedural€steps.òòóóÔ#†X±XX X±q#ÔÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àUsing€a€similar€analysis€in€òòMasters€by€Masters€v.€Rishtonóó,€863€S.W.2d€702€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ¼  Ð1992),€this€court€determined€that€the€purpose€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€58,€regarding€entry€of€orders,€wasÐ ¨ø Ðð ðto€insure€that€a€party€was€aware€of€the€existence€of€a€final,€appealable€judgment€in€a€lawsuit€inÐ ”ä Ðwhich€he€was€involved.ðð€€Under€that€rationale,€the€court€held,€a€judgment€which€was€not€actuallyÐ ° Ðserved€on€a€party€is€not€final.€€We€think€the€same€reasoning€applies€herein.Ð œì ÐÌà  àFor€all€of€the€above€reasons,€we€conclude€that€if€the€Harakases€did€not€actually€receive€noticeÐ tÄ Ðof€the€motion€for€default€judgment€and€the€hearing€thereon,€they€demonstrated€excusable€neglectÐ `° Ðand,€if€they€meet€the€other€requirements,€are€entitled€to€have€the€default€judgment€set€aside.׃&×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð L œ ÐÌÓ  ÓIII.Ð $ t ÐÓxÓÌà  àThe€order€granting€default€judgment€states€that€ð ðDefendants€did€not€appear€in€Court€afterÐ ü L  Ðbeing€given€notice€of€the€Motion€for€Default.ðð€€Apparently€that€statement€is€based€upon€theÐ è 8  Ðcertificate€of€service€appearing€on€the€motion,€wherein€counsel€for€the€Estate€certified€that€a€copyÐ Ô$  Ðof€the€motion€had€been€mailed€to€the€Harakases.Ð À  ÐÌà  àIn€their€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment,€the€Harakases€alleged€they€had€not€receivedÐ ˜è  Ðnotice€of€the€motion€or€the€hearing.€€At€the€hearing€on€that€motion,€Mrs.€Harakas€testified€that€neitherÐ „Ô  Ðshe€nor€her€husband€had€received€the€motion€for€default€judgement€and€that€they€only€learned€aboutÐ pÀ Ðthe€motion€when€they€received€the€order€granting€judgment€and€setting€the€date€for€the€hearing€onÐ \¬ Ðdamages.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€Estate€has€provided€no€further€evidence,€by€affidavit€or€testimony€at€the€hearing,Ð  p Ðregarding€service€of€the€notice€or€its€handling€after€counsel€signed€the€certificate.€€The€order€denyingÐ  \ Ðthe€original€motion€to€set€aside€does€not€address€the€issue€of€whether€the€Harakases€actually€receivedÐ øH Ðnotice.€€It€merely€recites€that€ð ðDefendants€have€not€provided€sufficient€grounds€to€set€aside€theÐ ä4 ÐDefault€Judgment.ððÐ Ð  ÐÌÔ‡ X±XXX±Ôà  àHaving€accomplished€service€of€the€initial€complaint€and€summons€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.Ð ¨ø ÐP.€4,€a€party€may€serve€subsequent€papers€under€the€less€stringent€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ð ”ä Ð5.€€òòMacLean€et€al.óó,€3€òòTennessee€Practiceóó€ðð€5.01.€Ô#†X±XX X±~#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±Ô€According€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.02,Ô#†X±XXX±Š#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±Ô€serviceÐ €Ð Ðmay€be€accomplished€by€delivering€a€copy€of€the€document€to€be€served€(or€leaving€it€as€describedÐ l¼ Ðin€the€rule)€or€by€mailing€it€to€the€last€known€address,€or€if€no€address€is€known,€by€leaving€a€copyÐ X ¨ Ðwith€the€clerk€of€the€court.€Ð D!” ÐÐ 0"€  Ðà  àService€by€personal€delivery€permits€the€opportunity€for€evidence€of€that€actual€delivery.€Ð ° ÐSimilarly,€using€certain€types€of€mail€also€will€produce€evidence€of€delivery,€such€as€a€signed€returnÐ œì Ðreceipt.€€Thus,€the€most€preferable€methods€for€service€are€personal€service€and€certified€or€returnÐ ˆØ Ðreceipt€requested€mail,€since€the€party€making€service€will€have€little€or€no€doubt€that€the€papersÐ tÄ Ðactually€reached€their€destination.€€In€fact,€Ô#†X±XXX±ð#Ôthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€prohibit€entry€ofÐ `° Ða€default€judgment€where€the€summons€and€complaint€were€served€by€mail€unless€the€recordÐ L œ Ðcontains€a€return€receipt€showing€personal€acceptance€by€the€defendant€or€designated€persons.€€Tenn.Ð 8 ˆ ÐR.€Civ.€P.€4.04(10).€€The€rule€requiring€notice€prior€to€entry€of€a€default€judgment€does€not€containÐ $ t Ðthe€same€requirement.€€However,€we€note€that€using€a€return€receipt€requested€or€similar€procedureÐ  ` Ðrequiring€signature€by€the€recipient€would€eliminate€or€lessen€the€opportunity€for€a€defendant€toÐ ü L  Ðclaim€nonreceipt€of€the€notice.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àEven€in€the€absence€of€such€procedures,€as€when€regular€mail€is€used,€service€may€be€proved,Ð À  Ðand€the€applicable€rule€provides:Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà8  àWhenever€any€pleading€or€other€paper€is€served€under€5.01€and€5.02,€proof€of€theÐ „Ô  Ðtime€and€manner€of€such€service€shall€be€filed€before€action€is€taken€thereon€by€theÐ pÀ Ðcourt€or€the€parties.€€Proof€may€be€by€certificate€of€a€member€of€the€Bar€of€the€CourtÐ \¬ Ðor€by€affidavit€of€the€person€who€served€the€papers,€or€by€any€other€proof€satisfactoryÐ H˜ Ðto€the€court.€€Ð4„Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.03Ô‡X±XXX±Ô.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àThus,€the€certificate€of€service€was€sufficient€proof€of€notice€for€the€court€to€enter€defaultÐ ä4 Ðjudgment.€€However,€the€later€testimony€of€the€defendants€that€they€never€received€notice€wasÐ Ð  Ðotherwise€unrebutted,€the€court€made€no€finding€this€testimony€was€not€credible,€and€the€EstateÐ ¼  Ðapparently€rests€solely€on€the€certificate€of€service.€Ð ¨ø ÐÌÔ#†X±XXX±‰#ÔÔ‡ X±XXX±Ôà  àThe€certificate€of€service€required€by€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.03€is€òòprima€faciaóó€evidence€that€theÐ €Ð Ðdocument€was€served€in€the€manner€described€in€the€certificate€and€raises€a€rebuttable€presumptionÐ l¼ Ðthat€it€was€received€by€the€person€to€whom€it€was€sent.€€òòOrr€v.€Orróó,€No.€01„A01„9012„CH„00464,Ð X ¨ Ð1991€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€877,€at€*11€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Nov.€6,€1991),€later€proceeding€at€No.€01„A„01„Ð D!” Ð9109„CH„00322,€1992€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€174€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.€19,€1992)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ð 0"€  Ð11€application€filed).€€That€presumption€can€be€rebutted.€€òòIdóó.€€While€òòóóthe€details€set€out€in€Rule€5.02Ð #l! Ðð ðare€designed€to€give€every€reasonable€assurance€that€a€copy€of€the€pertinent€papers€in€the€suitÐ $X" Ðactually€reach€adversary€parties€.€.€.€,ðð€Advisory€Commission€Comments€to€Rule€5,€there€obviouslyÐ ô$D # Ðexists€the€possibility€of€proof€that€Ô#†X±XX X±‹#ÔÔ‡X±XXX±Ôa€document€was€not€received€even€though€a€certificate€of€serviceÐ à%0!$ Ðappears€on€it.€€òòSee€Rishtonóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€705€(finding€that€although€an€order€included€a€certificateÐ Ì&"% Ðof€service,€it€was€in€fact€never€served).Ð ¸'#& ÐÌÔ#†X±XXX±Y#Ôà  àIn€òòBok€v.€State€of€Tennóó.,€No.€03A01„9812„BC„00426,€1999€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€515€(Tenn.Ð )à$( ÐCt.€App.€July€28,€1999)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed),€this€court€reversed€the€judgmentÐ |*Ì%) Ðof€the€Claims€Commission€refusing€to€set€aside€a€dismissal€which€had€been€granted€because€theÐ h+¸&* Ðplaintiff€failed€to€timely€answer€the€Stateððs€motion€to€dismiss.€€The€claimantððs€attorney€filed€anÐ ° Ðaffidavit€that€he€did€not€receive€a€copy€of€the€motion€to€dismiss,€which€was€unrefuted€in€the€record.€Ð œì ÐThe€court€found€that€lack€of€actual€notice€constituted€excusable€neglect,€that€these€circumstancesÐ ˆØ Ðcreated€a€reasonable€question€of€whether€default€judgement€should€be€set€aside,€and,€òòóórelying€uponÐ tÄ ÐòòTennessee€State€Bank€v.€Layóó,€held€such€question€mandated€that€the€judgment€be€set€aside.Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€òòTennessee€State€Bank€v.€Layóó,€609€S.W.2d€525,€527„28€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980),€this€courtÐ 8 ˆ Ðfound€that€from€the€evidence€it€could€reasonably€be€concluded€that€the€defendant€was€not€informedÐ $ t Ðof€the€lawsuit€against€her€until€after€the€default€judgment€was€entered€and€that€she€had€actedÐ  ` Ðdiligently€to€protect€her€rights€thereafter.€€The€evidence€showed€that€process€was€issued€and€wasÐ ü L  Ðreturned€with€a€return€receipt€signed€with€defendantððs€name.€€The€plaintiff€provided€the€affidavit€ofÐ è 8  Ða€handwriting€expert€who€stated€the€signature€on€the€return€receipt€was€the€defendantððs.€€On€the€otherÐ Ô$  Ðside,€the€defendant€testified€by€affidavit€that€she€did€not€receive€the€complaint€and€summons€andÐ À  Ðfiled€the€affidavit€of€a€friend€to€the€effect€the€defendant€was€out€of€her€home€state€on€vacation€withÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€friend€on€the€date€of€the€alleged€service.€òò€óóConsidering€this€conflicting€evidence,€in€light€of€theÐ ˜è  Ðstandard€favoring€setting€aside€default€judgments€where€there€is€any€reasonable€doubt,€this€courtÐ „Ô  Ðreversed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment.€€Ð pÀ ÐÔ‡X±XXX±ÔÌÔ#†X±XXX± ™#Ôà  àIn€òòKeck€v.€Nationwide€Sys.,€Inc.óó,€499€S.W.2d€266€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973),€this€court€held€thatÐ H˜ Ðthe€trial€court€should€have€set€aside€a€default€judgment€where€the€complaint€and€summons€wereÐ 4„ Ðserved€on€the€defendantððs€local€office€and€mailed€to€the€national€office€but,€through€mistake€orÐ  p Ðinadvertence,€were€apparently€lost.€€In€so€ruling,€this€court€relied€upon€the€preference€for€settingÐ  \ Ðaside€a€default€judgment€where€there€is€any€doubt.Ð øH ÐÔ‡X±XXX±ÔÌà  àWe€conclude€that€the€evidence€created,€at€the€least,€a€reasonable€doubt€as€to€whether€theÐ Ð  ÐHarakases€received€actual€notice€of€the€motion€for€default€judgment€and€the€hearing€thereon.׃)×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ¼  ÐConsequently,€in€accordance€with€the€principles€set€out€above,€we€conclude€that€the€default€judgmentÐ ¨ø Ðshould€have€been€set€aside€if€the€Harakases€demonstrated€the€existence€of€a€meritorious€defense€andÐ ”ä Ðif€the€setting€aside€would€not€present€unacceptable€prejudice€to€the€Estate.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àÔ#†X±XXX±œ#ÔAlthough€the€requirement€of€a€meritorious€defense€does€not€appear€in€the€rules,€it€has€beenÐ X ¨ Ðapplied,€almost€invariably,€because€the€request€for€relief€is€based€upon€equitable€principles.׃! ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòóóÐ D!” ÐòòYearwood,€Johnson,€Stanton€&€Crabtree,€Inc.€v.€Foxland€Dev.€Ventureóó,€828€S.W.2d€412€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð 0"€  ÐApp.€1991);€òòNelsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€485.€€Ô‡X±XXX±ÔThe€Harakases€filed€an€answer€and€counterclaim€withÐ #l! Ðattachments,€including€affidavits,€which€set€forth€a€meritorious€defense.€€Although€the€originalÐ $X" Ðmotion€to€set€aside€did€not€include€an€assertion€that€the€defendants€had€a€meritorious€defense€to€theÐ ô$D # Ðlawsuit,€the€plaintiffððs€response€to€the€motion€did€not€raise€that€omission€as€a€ground€for€denial.€€TheÐ à%0!$ Ðanswer€and€counterclaim€were€filed€on€the€date€of€the€hearing.€€The€order€resulting€from€that€hearingÐ ° Ðstates€that€the€decision€was€based€on€the€entire€record€and€that€the€court€was€ð ðfully€advised.ðð€€OnÐ œì Ðappeal,€the€Estate€asserts€that€the€Harakases€failed€to€allege€the€existence€of€a€meritorious€defenseÐ ˆØ Ðin€their€initial€òòpro€seóó€motion€and€that€at€the€hearing€Mrs.€Harakas€gave€testimony€ð ðas€to€any€and€allÐ tÄ Ðmeritorious€defenses.ðð€€The€statement€of€the€evidence€does€not€include€any€reference€to€defenses€toÐ `° Ðthe€action.€€Based€on€the€record€before€us,€we€find€that€the€Harakases€established€that€they€have€aÐ L œ Ðmeritorious€defense.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€final€consideration€is€whether€setting€aside€the€default€judgment,€and€requiring€theÐ  ` Ðparties€to€proceed€to€trial,€would€result€in€unacceptable€prejudice€to€the€Estate.€€òòBarbeeóó,€689€S.W.2dÐ ü L  Ðat€866.€€€Simply€having€to€proceed€to€trial,€even€a€second€trial,€does€not€constitute€prejudice.€òò€Idóó.€689Ð è 8  ÐS.W.2d€at€868;€òòCampbellóó,€555€S.W.2d€at€113.€€Neither€does€the€mere€passage€of€time.€€òòNelsonóó,€826Ð Ô$  ÐS.W.2d€at€486.€€The€Estate€has€not€asserted€any€specific€prejudice€which€would€support€decliningÐ À  Ðto€set€aside€the€default€judgment.€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àIn€òòCampbellóó,€the€Supreme€Court€noted€that,€although€being€required€to€participate€in€a€secondÐ „Ô  Ðtrial€did€not€constitute€the€type€of€prejudice€justifying€denial€of€a€motion€to€set€aside€a€judgment,€theÐ pÀ Ðplaintiffs€would€be€subjected€to€additional€costs€and€ordered€that€defendants€pay€those€costs.€€555Ð \¬ ÐS.W.2d€at€113.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€authorizes€relief€from€a€judgment€ð ðon€such€terms€as€are€just.ðð€Ð H˜ ÐIn€the€case€herein,€we€find€it€equitable€and€just€that€the€Harakases€reimburse€the€Estate€for€its€costsÐ 4„ Ðassociated€with€the€filing€of€the€motion€for€default€judgment€and€the€hearing€on€that€motion.€€OnÐ  p Ðremand,€the€trial€court€shall€determine€those€costs.Ð  \ ÐÌÔ#†X±XXX±× #ÔÓ  ÓIV.€€ConclusionÐ ä4 ÐÓÆ«ÓÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court,€set€aside€the€defaultÐ ¼  Ðjudgment,€and€remand€the€case€for€any€further€proceedings€which€may€be€necessary.€€Costs€of€theÐ ¨ø Ðappeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellee,€the€Estate€of€Anthony€D.€Vanleer,€for€which€execution€may€issueÐ ”ä Ðif€necessary.Ð €Ð Ðòòò òó óóóÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð 0"€  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE