ÿWPC6 {EÞà ˆS ìÛ]ÍEU! .yœÙ æ]Q@¾@ Eö׉O-“}ÒYé¯}ôë„um°° à\TSV T•‹B Óá€JáÈF³\.žN•C8-=7d MÕ€ŒÑÊ ºñ‘¸ÔÜ«Ž¶Î3q1¹ Æ<±Ô‡„& AIÑ–«a>2 tb×…yÌíñî$ æUÆ“ðº:C­#ÇRS8–x6 X,j`OŒák5ÛÙ¬ÞÉîê3áv,¥áºăo84?²8J/›_:?Ú3'Kõ¼‘”G Ð~;†ï‚æád/™ã+Ø×(§9)}…Ìvâ8uÝÒë9fF¦5Bˆ½2‚r0[¥múëu×uúÔ˜ä¤íÑc¶+"ƒ¬S¬5øº°ý-æ¸GoÖ „išÒ­›¢—ØûÃ8\7/®zìG†ëD•\OÀÆcŒ¿b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÉÐ ]™ Æö ƼÆ‚ÆH 0DNRÓTTE''''''''''''''''''''''''b)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 0ë1111 B 0¤9 D5Ý D- 0K?? ASŠÆÝ 0¤£ 0DG A«‹»È“N1Þ (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÖƒF1ê:i¢×+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜\\IB01S08\KNOXCLERK4ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 SÝ ƒRŒ•$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôþ­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€complaint€was€still€pending€on€November€29,€2001,€when€we€rendered€our€decision€in€òòÔ_ÔVarnerÔ_Ô€v.€City€ofÐ ° ÐKnoxvilleóó,€2001€WL€1560530€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÉÝ ƒRŒ•$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôþ­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€record€shows€that€this€is€the€file€number€of€the€Church€use€on€review.€- ù-(|G2Œ•$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Jý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôþ­ò»»Ô d(|3?Œ$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Jý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3?Œ$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Jý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Jý»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Jý»»»ÔÑ8€9XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@¦ ¦ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@””$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÐ  ÐÓ  ÓAugust€11,€2004€SessionÐ Ô$ ÐÌò òWILLIAM€€R.€VARNER€d/b/a€FOUNTAIN€CITY€AUTO€SALES€v.€THEÐ øH ÐCITY€OF€KNOXVILLE,€TENNESSEEÔ‡X9X»¼JýÔó óÐ  \ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ  \ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€1„60„01€€€€€€Dale€Workman,€JudgeÐ ø H ÐÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<Ï` AßÐ Ð  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2003„02650„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€FILED€OCTOBER€14,€2004Ð Ë  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¢` AßÐ £ó  Ðó óÌÒe°ÒÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Jý»XX9#ÔÔ‡X9X»¼JýÔThis€appeal€arises€from€an€inverse€condemnation€suit€filed€by€a€landowner€against€the€City€ofÐ žî  ÐKnoxville.€€When€the€landowner€purchased€the€property€at€issue€from€a€church,€it€was€zoned€forÐ ŠÚ Ðresidential€use€and€was€subject€to€restrictions€set€forth€in€a€development€plan€previously€approved€byÐ vÆ Ðthe€Knoxville/Knox€County€Metropolitan€Planning€Commission.€The€landowner€filed€a€motion€forÐ b² Ðpartial€summary€judgment€which€asserted€that€the€City's€refusal€to€remove€the€property€from€theÐ Nž Ðdevelopment€plan€precluded€use€of€the€property€for€any€economically€feasible€purpose€and,€therefore,Ð :Š Ðconstituted€a€taking€for€which€he€was€entitled€to€be€compensated.€€The€trial€court€granted€theÐ &v Ðlandownerððs€motion€for€partial€summary€judgment€and€decreed€the€City€liable€for€a€taking.€€A€juryÐ b Ðsubsequently€returned€a€verdict€awarding€the€landowner€damages€in€the€amount€of€$125,500.00€whichÐ þN Ðthe€trial€court€remitted€to€$40,000.00.€€€We€conclude€that€a€genuine€factual€issue€exists€as€to€whetherÐ ê: Ðthere€is€any€economically€beneficial€use€of€the€property€consistent€with€its€current€zoning€and,Ð Ö& Ðtherefore,€we€vacate€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€remand.Ð Â ÐÓFÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Vacated;€CauseÐ šê ÐRemandedó óÐ †Ö ÐÌòòÓ  ÓSharon€G.€Lee,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHerschel€P.€Franks,€P.J.,€óó€and€òòD.Ð ^!®  ÐMichael€Swiney,€J.óó,€joined.Ð J"š! ÐÌSharon€E.€Boyce,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€The€City€of€Knoxville,€TennesseeÐ "$r# ÐÌDavid€Lee€Bacon,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee,€William€R.€VarnerÐ ú%J!% ÐÓš ÓÌÌò òOPINIONó óÐ ¾($( ÐÌòòóóÓ  Óà ½ àThe€property€involved€in€this€appeal€consists€of€a€vacant€.46€acre€lot€located€at€5531€NorthÐ –*æ%* ÐBroadway€in€Knoxville.€€This€lot€was€part€of€a€3.2€acre€tract€(hereinafter€ð ðthe€tractðð)€which€wasÐ ‚+Ò&+ Ðpurchased€by€the€Knoxville€Primitive€Baptist€Church€(hereinafter€ð ðthe€Churchðð).€€At€the€time€of€itsÐ n,¾', Ðpurchase€by€the€Church€the€entire€tract€was€zoned€as€R„1,€a€residential€zoning€designation.Ð Z-ª(-ýö Їà ½ àIn€March€of€1995,€the€Knoxville/Knox€County€Metropolitan€Planning€CommissionÐ ° Ð(hereinafter€ð ðMPCðð)€approved€the€Churchððs€development€plan€to€locate€a€church€on€the€tract€as€a€useÐ œì Ðon€review€under€the€Zoning€Regulations€of€the€City€of€Knoxville€as€codified€at€Article€IV€ofÐ ˆØ ÐAppendix€B€in€the€Knoxville€City€Code.€The€approved€development€plan€includes€a€note€with€respectÐ tÄ Ðto€that€portion€of€the€tract€constituting€the€.46€acre€lot€at€issue€which€states€ð ðEXISTING€GROWTHÐ `° ÐOF€VARIOUS€LARGE€DECIDUOUS€TREES€TO€REMAIN.ððÐ L œ ÐÌà ½ àIn€October€of€1995,€the€Church€requested€that€the€.46€acre€lot€be€re„zoned€to€C„1Ð $ t Ð(Neighborhood€Commercial€District),€however,€the€MPC€denied€this€request.Ð  ` ÐÌà ½ àIn€June€of€1997,€the€Appellee,€William€R.€Varner,€purchased€the€.46€acre€lot€from€the€ChurchÐ è 8  Ðand€subsequently€filed€an€application€with€the€MPC€to€amend€the€One€Year€Plan€with€respect€to€theÐ Ô$  Ðlot€to€change€its€land€use€designation€from€residential€to€commercial.€€In€this€application,€Mr.€VarnerÐ À  Ðindicated€that€he€proposes€to€use€the€lot€for€expansion€of€a€used€automobile€business€which€heÐ ¬ü  Ðoperates€on€adjacent€leased€property.€€Although€the€MPC€denied€the€application€on€September€11,Ð ˜è  Ð1997,€on€appeal€to€the€Knoxville€City€Council€(hereinafter€ð ðthe€City€Councilðð)€Mr.€VarnerððsÐ „Ô  Ðrequested€amendment€to€the€Plan€was€approved.€€Thereafter,€in€January€of€1998,€Mr.€Varner€presentedÐ pÀ Ða€request€to€the€MPC€to€re„zone€the€lot€to€C„4,€Highway€and€Arterial€Commercial€District,€a€zoningÐ \¬ Ðwhich€allows€a€used€automobile€business.Ð H˜ ÐÌà ½ àIn€March€of€1998,€the€City€Council,€upon€reconsideration,€withdrew€its€prior€approval€of€Mr.Ð  p ÐVarnerððs€application€to€amend€the€One€Year€Plan;€whereupon,€Mr.€Varner€withdrew€his€re„zoningÐ  \ Ðrequest€previously€submitted€to€the€MPC.Ð øH ÐÌà ½ àIn€February€of€1999,€Mr.€Varner€€submitted€a€request€to€erect€a€double„wide€manufacturedÐ Ð  Ðhome€on€the€lot;€however,€this€request€was€refused€by€the€City€with€the€accompanying€notationÐ ¼  Ðð ðApproval€can€not€be€given€at€this€time€until€the€use€on€review€3„C„95€UR׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€has€been€amended€byÐ ¨ø ÐM.P.C.€per€Doug€Berry€and€Mark€Hartsoe€with€the€City€Law€Dept.ðð€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà ½ àIn€March€of€1999,€the€Church€requested€approval€of€a€revised€use€on€review€plan€whichÐ l¼ Ðdeleted€the€.46€acre€lot€from€the€1995€development€plan.€Although€approved€by€the€MPC,€this€requestÐ X ¨ Ðwas€subsequently€denied€by€the€City€Council.Ð D!” ÐÌà ½ àIn€May€of€1999,€Mr.€Varner€once€again€applied€to€the€MPC€to€re„€zone€the€lot€and€amend€theÐ #l! ÐOne€Year€Plan€from€residential€to€commercial.€€These€applications€were€denied€by€the€MPC€and€Mr.Ð $X" ÐVarner€appealed€to€the€City€Council€which€also€denied€the€applications€on€July€11,€2000.€€Thereupon,Ð ô$D # ÐMr.€Varner€appealed€to€the€Knox€County€Chancery€Court€which€dismissed€Mr.€Varnerððs€complaintÐ à%0!$ Ðupon€€findings€that€the€City€had€a€rational€basis€for€denying€the€re„zoning€request€and€that€Mr.€VarnerÐ Ì&"% Ðhad€not€shown€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€he€was€denied€beneficial€use€of€the€lot.€UponÐ ¸'#& Ðfurther€appeal€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€we€concluded€that€the€City€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€inÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdenying€Mr.€Varnerððs€zoning€request.€€We€further€determined€that€Mr.€Varnerððs€assertion€on€appealÐ )à$( Ðthat€the€Cityððs€decision€to€deny€his€re„zoning€application€deprived€him€of€the€beneficial€use€of€the€lotÐ ° Ðconstituted€a€claim€that€the€City€had€taken€his€property€and€that€ð ðsuch€a€claim€is€properly€pursued€byÐ œì Ðway€of€a€complaint€for€inverse€condemnation.ðð€€òòVarner€v.€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€2001€WL€1560530Ð ˆØ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).€€Accordingly,€we€held€that€the€taking€issue€was€not€properly€before€us€and€didÐ tÄ Ðnot€address€it.Ð `° ÐÌà ½ àOn€January€30,€2001׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×,€Mr.€Varner€filed€a€complaint€in€the€Knox€County€Circuit€Court€seekingÐ 8 ˆ Ðdamages€for€the€inverse€condemnation€of€the€subject€lot.€€The€complaint€names€the€City€as€defendantÐ $ t Ðand€òòinter€alia,€óóprovides€as€follows:Ð  ` ÐÌÒ€eÒÒ€°Òà Ø à3.€€Defendant€has€zoned€the€property€identified€as€5531€N.€Broadway,Ð è 8  ÐKnoxville,€Tennessee,€as€LDR/R„1,€the€most€restrictive€residential€zoningÐ Ô$  Ðregulation€contained€in€the€ordinances€of€the€City€of€Knoxville,€Tennessee.Ð À  ÐÌ....Ð ˜è  ÐÌà Ø à5.€€Plaintiff€duly€applied€through€the€various€administrative€procedures€forÐ pÀ Ðrelief€from€the€zoning€ordinance,€but€on€July€11,€2000,€the€City€Council€of€theÐ \¬ ÐCity€of€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€by€final€decree€refused€to€change€the€zoning€fromÐ H˜ Ðits€current€state€of€LDR/R„1.Ð 4„ ÐÌà Ø à6.€€Because€of€the€use€of€the€surrounding€property,€and€the€long„Ð  \ Ðestablished€business€adjacent€to€the€property,€said€property€is€entirely€unsuited€forÐ øH Ðuse€for€residential€or€any€other€purposes€permitted€in€an€LDR/R„1€zone,€and€hasÐ ä4 Ðzero€market€value€for€such€purposes.Ð Ð  ÐÌà Ø à7.€€Because€of€the€refusal€of€the€City€Council€of€the€City€of€Knoxville,Ð ¨ø ÐTennessee,€to€change€the€zoning€of€this€property,€the€City€of€Knoxville,€Tennessee€Ð ”ä Ðhas€deprived€the€Plaintiff€of€any€beneficial€use€whatsoever€of€his€property.Ð €Ð ÐÌà Ø à8.€€Said€deprivation€of€the€use€of€his€property€constitutes€a€taking€of€theÐ X ¨ ÐPlaintiffððs€property€contrary€to€the€Fifth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€theÐ D!” ÐUnited€States€Constitution,€and€contrary€to€the€provisions€of€Article€I,€Section€21Ð 0"€  Ðof€the€Tennessee€State€Constitution.Ð #l! ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àUpon€assertion€by€the€City€that€Mr.€Varner€had€failed€to€exhaust€his€administrative€remediesÐ ô$D # Ðby€filing€a€request€with€the€MPC€to€amend€the€Churchððs€1995€plan€to€delete€the€subject€lot,€theÐ à%0!$ ÐCircuit€Court€entered€an€order€directing€Mr.€Varner€to€file€such€request.€€In€compliance€with€thisÐ Ì&"% Ðâ âorder,€on€June€14,€2002,€Mr.€Varner€filed€a€request€with€the€MPC€to€delete€the€.46€acre€lot€from€theÐ ¸'#& Ðdevelopment€plan;€however,€this€request€was€denied€by€the€MPC€and,€on€appeal,€by€the€CityÐ ° ÐCouncil.€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àOn€November€6,€2002,€Mr.€Varner€filed€a€motion€for€partial€summary€judgment€asserting€thatÐ tÄ Ðthe€City€is€liable€for€taking€his€property.€€This€motion€was€granted€by€order€of€the€Circuit€CourtÐ `° Ðentered€January€15,€2003,€and€damages€were€subsequently€set€by€a€jury€at€$125,500.00,€although€theÐ L œ ÐCircuit€Court€later€reduced€this€amount€to€$40,000.00.€€Thereafter,€the€City€filed€the€instant€appeal.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€following€three€issues€are€raised€in€this€appeal:Ð  ` ÐÌà  à1)€Whether€the€Circuit€Court€erred€in€granting€Mr.€Varnerððs€motion€for€partial€summaryÐ è 8  Ðjudgment€on€grounds€that€the€City€has€deprived€Mr.€Varner€of€all€economically€beneficial€use€of€theÐ Ô$  Ðsubject€lot.Ð À  ÐÌà  à2)€Whether€the€Circuit€Court€erred€in€remitting€the€jury€verdict€awarding€damages€in€theÐ ˜è  Ðamount€of€$125,500.00€to€$40,000.00.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  à3)€Whether€the€Circuit€Court€erred€in€denying€Mr.€Varnerððs€motion€for€discretionary€costs,Ð \¬ Ðexpenses,€and€disbursements.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€first€issue€we€address€is€whether€the€Circuit€Court€erred€in€granting€Mr.€Varnerððs€motionÐ  p Ðfor€partial€Ô_ÔsummaryÔ_Ô€judgment€which€asserts€that€the€City€is€liable€for€a€taking€upon€grounds€that€theÐ  \ ÐCity€denied€Mr.€Varner€all€economically€beneficial€use€of€the€property€in€question.Ð øH ÐÌà  àSummary€judgment€proceedings€are€efficient€and€effective€vehicles€for€concluding€cases€thatÐ Ð  Ðcan€and€should€be€decided€on€legal€issues€alone.€€However,€these€proceedings€€should€not€serve€asÐ ¼  Ða€substitute€for€a€trial€of€genuine€and€material€factual€matters.€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210„Ð ¨ø Ð211€(Tenn.€1997);€òò€Bellamy€v.€Federal€Express€Corp.óó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33€(Tenn.€1988).€€SummaryÐ ”ä Ðjudgments€should€be€awarded€only€when€the€moving€party€has€demonstrated€that€there€is€no€genuineÐ €Ð Ðissue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€Ð l¼ ÐTenn.€R.Civ.P.€56.04;€òòBain€v.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997);€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900Ð X ¨ ÐS.W.€2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àNo€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€the€lower€courtððs€judgment€and€our€task€isÐ #l! Ðconfined€to€reviewing€the€record€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56€haveÐ $X" Ðbeen€met.€We€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party,€which€inÐ ô$D # Ðthis€case€is€the€City,€and€must€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party.€Ð à%0!$ ÐòòStaples€v.€CBL€&€Associates,€Incóó.,€15€S.W.3d€83,€89€(Tenn.€2000).Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThe€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€requires€that€the€federal€governmentÐ ¤(ô#' Ðshall€compensate€one€whose€property€is€taken€for€use€of€the€public€and€the€Fourteenth€AmendmentÐ )à$( Ðmakes€this€requirement€applicable€to€state€governments.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  à€A€taking€may€be€found€to€exist€not€only€when€the€government€actually€takes€possession€ofÐ ° Ðproperty€but€also€when€a€regulation€is€promulgated€which€results€in€a€sufficient€extent€of€diminutionÐ œì Ðto€€property.€€òòPennsylvania€Coal€Co.€v.€Mahonóó,€260€U.S.€393€(1922).€€€A€property€owner€is€notÐ ˆØ Ðprohibited€from€raising€a€regulatory€taking€claim€even€though€the€€regulation€complained€of€predatesÐ tÄ Ðsuch€property€ownerððs€acquisition€of€the€regulated€property,€as€occurred€in€the€matter€òòsub€judiceóó.€òòÐ `° ÐPalazzolo€v.€Rhode€Islandóó,€533€U.S.€606€(2001).€òò€óóÐ L œ ÐÌà  àFrequently,€in€order€to€determine€whether€a€taking€has€occurred,€the€court€must€engage€in€anÐ $ t Ðòòad€hoc€óófactual€inquiry€with€primary€focus€upon€three€factors€„€the€economic€impact€of€the€regulation,€Ð  ` Ðthe€character€of€the€government€action€and€the€regulationððs€interference€with€reasonable€investmentÐ ü L  Ðbacked€expectations.€€òòPenn€Central€Transportation€Co.€v.€City€of€New€Yorkóó,€438€U.S.€104,€124Ð è 8  Ð(1978)€and€òòKaiser€Aetna€v.€United€Statesóó,€444€U.S.€164,€175€(1979).€€However,€as€the€United€StatesÐ Ô$  ÐSupreme€Court€recognized€in€òòLucas€v.€South€Carolina€Coastal€Councilóó,€505€U.S.€1003,€1015€(1992),Ð À  Ðtwo€categories€of€regulatory€action€do€not€require€an€òòad€hoc€óófactual€inquiry€before€compensation€willÐ ¬ü  Ðbe€allowed:Ð ˜è  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒThe€first€[of€these€categories]€encompasses€regulations€that€compel€the€propertyÐ pÀ Ðowner€to€suffer€a€physical€ð ðinvasionðð€of€his€property.€€In€general€(at€least€withÐ \¬ Ðregard€to€permanent€invasions),€no€matter€how€minute€the€intrusion,€and€no€matterÐ H˜ Ðhow€weighty€the€public€purpose€behind€it,€we€have€required€compensation.€...Ð 4„ ÐÌòòThe€second€situation€in€which€we€have€found€categorical€treatment€appropriateÐ  \ Ðis€where€regulation€denies€all€economically€beneficial€or€productive€use€of€land.€Ð øH Ðóó(Emphasisòò€óóadded.)òòÐ ä4 ÐóóÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àBased€upon€the€record€before€us,€it€is€not€possible€to€determine€the€precise€grounds€uponÐ ¼  Ðwhich€the€Circuit€Court€concluded€that€this€was€a€proper€case€for€partial€summary€judgment.€€TheÐ ¨ø ÐCircuit€Courtððs€order€merely€grants€Mr.€Varnerððs€motion,€finds€the€City€liable€for€a€taking€of€Mr.Ð ”ä ÐVarnerððs€property€and€sets€a€date€for€the€jury€to€determine€the€amount€of€damages.€€Mr.€VarnerððsÐ €Ð Ðmotion€for€partial€summary€judgment€recites€in€pertinent€part€that€the€City€has€placed€the€propertyÐ l¼ Ðin€question€in€a€development€plan€that€requires€that€the€property€ð ðremain,€in€perpetuity,€a€bufferððÐ X ¨ Ðbetween€highly€developed€commercial€property€and€the€Churchððs€property€which€is€zoned€forÐ D!” Ðresidential€use.€€The€motion€further€recites€that€on€June€14,€2002,€Mr.€Varner€complied€with€theÐ 0"€  ÐCircuit€Courtððs€order€that€he€file€a€request€with€the€MPC€to€have€the€property€removed€from€the€1995Ð #l! Ðdevelopment€plan€and€that,€although€the€MPC€approved€the€request,€the€request€was,€thereafter,Ð $X" Ðdenied€by€City€Council.€€The€motion€asserts€that€Mr.€Varner€ð ðhas€now€completely€exhausted€hisÐ ô$D # Ðadministrative€remedies,€€but€is€still€precluded€from€any€use€at€all€of€his€propertyðð€and€that€the€CityÐ à%0!$ Ðð ðhas€thus€taken€[his]€property€for€use€of€the€common€good€of€the€people.ðð€€The€motion€finally€assertsÐ Ì&"% Ðthat,€under€òòLucasóó,€ð ðthe€regulatory€taking€of€property€which€precludes€its€use€for€any€economicallyÐ ¸'#& Ðfeasible€purpose€is€also€a€taking€under€the€United€States€Constitution.ððÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àIn€support€of€his€argument€for€affirmation€of€the€Circuit€Courtððs€summary€judgment,€Mr.Ð |*Ì%) ÐVarner€asserts€that€the€City€engaged€in€a€taking€under€the€facts€in€this€case€because€the€City€indicatedÐ h+¸&* Ðby€its€actions€that€it€ð ðintends€for€this€property€to€remain€vacant€in€perpetuityðð€and€that€by€thisÐ ° Ðrequirement€the€City€ð ðdeprives€[him]€of€any€economically€feasible€use€of€the€property.ðð€€The€actionsÐ œì Ðof€the€City€to€which€Mr.€Varner€makes€reference€are€the€Cityððs€refusal€to€change€the€zoning€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðproperty€from€residential€to€commercial€and€its€refusal€to€delete€the€lot€from€the€ChurchððsÐ tÄ Ðdevelopment€€plan€€approved€in€1995.€€Mr.€Varner€also€references€the€Cityððs€denial€of€his€applicationÐ `° Ðto€install€a€double„wide€manufactured€home€on€the€lot€in€1999€which,€he€maintains,€was€a€permittedÐ L œ Ðuse€of€the€lot€under€the€residential€zoning.€€Mr.€Varner€argues€that€the€Cityððs€refusal€to€allowÐ 8 ˆ Ðcommercial€use€of€€the€property€coupled€with€the€its€refusal€to€allow€the€lot€to€be€used€for€a€purposeÐ $ t Ðin€conformity€with€its€residential€zoning€indicate€that€the€City€does€not€intend€for€the€lot€to€be€usedÐ  ` Ðfor€any€purpose€whatsoever.€€Mr.€Varner€argues€that€under€these€conditions€the€lot€is€effectivelyÐ ü L  Ðbeing€pressed€into€public€service€as€a€buffer€between€adjacent€residential€and€commercial€propertyÐ è 8  Ðand€this€constitutes€a€taking€for€which€he€should€be€compensated.€€As€in€his€motion€for€partialÐ Ô$  Ðsummary€judgment,€Mr.€Varner€relies€upon€òòLucas€óóas€authority€for€his€argument€that€he€has€sufferedÐ À  Ða€taking€in€this€case€and€articulates€the€issue€on€appeal€as€being,€ð ðDoes€the€fact€that€the€City€ofÐ ¬ü  ÐKnoxville€has€restricted€the€use€of€property€to€the€extent€that€it€cannot€be€used€for€any€economicÐ ˜è  Ðpurpose€constitute€a€taking€of€the€property€from€its€owner?ðð€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€acreage€at€issue,€as€we€have€noted,€is€zoned€as€an€R„1€residential€district.€€The€City€hasÐ \¬ Ðasserted€that€the€denial€of€commercial€zoning€was€not€a€taking€and€that€Mr.€Varner€has€beneficialÐ H˜ Ðuse€of€his€property€for€residential€uses.€€Article€IV,€ðð2€€of€the€Knoxville€City€Code€provides€that€theÐ 4„ Ðfollowing€are€permitted€uses€under€R„1€zoning:Ð  p ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà0 Ø àB.€òòPermitted€principal€and€accessory€uses€and€structures.€€óóProperty€andÐ øH Ðbuildings€in€an€R„1€single„family€residential€district€shall€be€used€only€forÐ ä4 Ðthe€following€purposes:ÐÐ Ø X Ø X  Ðà0 Ø à1.€Detached€single„family€dwellings,€but€not€including€trailer€houses€orÐ ¼  Ðmobile€homes.ШøØ X Ø X  Ðà0 Ø à2.€Utility€substations,€easements,€alleys€and€rights„of€way,€andÐ ”ä Ðtransportation€easements,€alleys€and€rights€of€way.ЀÐØ X Ø X  Ðà0 Ø à3.€€Accessory€uses,€subject€to€the€provisions€of€article€5,€section€4.Ðl¼Ø X Ø X  Ðà0 Ø à4.€€Accessory€buildings€and€structures,€subject€to€the€provisions€of€articleÐ X ¨ Ð5,€section€4.€...ÐD!”Ø X Ø X  Ðà Ø à5.€€Signs,€as€regulated€in€article€V,€section€10.Ð 0"€  Ðà0 Ø à6.€Agricultural€crops,€but€not€the€raising€of€farm€animals€or€poultry.Ð#l!Ø X Ø X  ÐÌÒ°€RÒÒ°€‚RÒà  à€As€Mr.€Varner€notes,€we€have€hitherto€acknowledged€that€under€Tennessee€law€a€cityÐ ô$D # Ðordinance€may€not€exclude€a€double„wide€manufactured€home€from€property€zoned€residential.€Ð à%0!$ ÐòòTennessee€Manufactured€Housing€Association€v.€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashvilleóó,€798Ð Ì&"% ÐS.W.2d€254€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Based€upon€the€Cityððs€denial€of€his€request€to€locate€a€double„Ð ¸'#& Ðwide€manufactured€home€on€the€subject€property,€a€use€consistent€with€R„1€zoning,€Mr.€VarnerÐ ¤(ô#' Ðconcludes€that€the€City€will€not€allow€any€economically€feasible€use€of€the€property.€€We€do€notÐ )à$( Ðagree€that€this€conclusion€follows€based€upon€the€available€record.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àThe€only€proof€before€us€showing€why€the€City€rejected€Mr.€Varnerððs€request€to€locate€theÐ ° Ðmanufactured€home€on€his€property€is€a€notation€which€states€ð ðApproval€can€not€be€given€at€this€timeÐ œì Ðuntil€the€use€on€review€3„C„95€UR€has€been€amended€by€M.P.C.€per€Doug€Berry€and€Mark€HartsoeÐ ˆØ Ðwith€the€City€Law€Dept.ðð€€As€Mr.€Varner€points€out,€this€notation€is€ð ðrather€crypticðð€and€the€groundsÐ tÄ Ðfor€the€Cityððs€refusal€of€Mr.€Varnerððs€application€are€not€precisely€clear.€€However,€even€though€theÐ `° ÐCity€denied€Mr.€Varner€one€permitted€use€under€R„1€zoning,€it€does€not€follow€that€the€City€wouldÐ L œ Ðdisallow€all€of€the€uses€allowed€under€Article€IV,€ðð2.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àDespite€the€restrictions€placed€upon€the€property€by€the€development€plan€and€R„1€zoning,Ð  ` Ðremaining€uses€which€might€be€permitted€by€the€City€include€for€example,€use€of€the€property€forÐ ü L  Ðsign€placement€or€for€the€location€of€agricultural€crops.€€As€previously€noted,€we€are€required€to€viewÐ è 8  Ðall€evidence€in€favor€of€the€City€and€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€the€City.€€Given€thisÐ Ô$  Ðstandard,€we€must€conclude€that€a€genuine€factual€issue€remains€as€to€whether€the€City€would€allowÐ À  Ðany€economically€beneficial€use€of€the€property€consistent€with€its€current€zoning,€and€accordingly,Ð ¬ü  Ðit€is€our€determination€that€the€Circuit€Court€erred€in€granting€Mr.€Varnerððs€motion€for€summaryÐ ˜è  Ðjudgment.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àGiven€our€decision€as€to€the€first€issue€addressed€herein,€we€find€that€it€is€not€necessary€thatÐ \¬ Ðwe€address€the€two€additional€issues€presented€for€our€review.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons€the€judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€granting€the€motion€for€partialÐ  p Ðsummary€judgment€is€vacated€and€the€cause€is€remanded€for€trial€on€the€merits.€€Costs€of€appeal€areÐ  \ Ðadjudged€against€William€R.€Varner.Ð øH ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð ¨ø Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò òSHARON€G.€LEE,€€JUDGEó óÐ ”ä ÐÌÌÌÔ#†¼Jý»XX9u#Ô