ÿWPCf( @UB %Ò®Ø 0t† 0Åú 0\¿ 0 0r¨ 0 D+§ ÆÒ 0˜ 0=% 0b AQï 0¶@ 0Dö# :EnU 0 rXU:Êw@4DLX¤ B¬ 0JÉ 0T 0^g 0hÅ D3- 0r` 0|Ò 0†N 0Ô 1ud 0dÙ=U *EB)oDC˜ AKÛ&Ö(þv~!vÓ“"ô\  `*Times New RomanTTô' Í The Plaintiffs appeal the trial courts final judgment which up (Authorized User(0Authorized User .   h††ÿÿ:Default ParaDefault Paragraph FontÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔ<5Tÿÿ.footerfooterÓ  ÓÓ ÜÜü!ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÓ>4°X°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#>ÓP††ÿÿ8page numberpage numberÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔV!ÿÿ:footnote texfootnote textÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ô`‰‰ÿÿ:footnote reffootnote referenceÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔòòóóÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔ(e2Œ‰$©©Ý ƒä!ÝÔ€ôNUôôôÔÔ€ôNUôôôNUÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ý'ÈÈÈÈdxdƒ Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5(e2Œ‰$££Ý ƒä!ÝÔ€ôNUôôôÔÔ€ôNUôôôNUÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ý(ÿÿ$””Ú  ÚÚ  Ú(e2Œ‰$¢¢Ý ƒä!ÝÔ€ôNUôôôÔÔ€ôNUôôôNUÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ý   Cþÿ<< cÿÿ(f(3[â$¤¤Ý ƒä!ÝÔ€ôNUôôôÔÔ€ôNUôôôNUÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ3|x7«ô\  `*Times New RomanTTôôCô\  PŽ6QôPô\  `*Times New RomanTTXXPô\  PŽ6QXP%ä2¼A`ArialTTomanTTXXXä2¼P±ŠQXP(Jä$¡¡Ô€ô~4ôôôÔÔ€ô~4ôôô~4ÔÓ  Ó+ÄâK AZ"Arial Regular %&U'(U)E*+D,-Ó€7zƒ=#`C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT d2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$$$$'ÿÿdxd2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô%&'(*+,- ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d88887Border 1dd 9Cþÿ << Gÿÿ øÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€7ÔÔ€7ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€7XÔÌÌOctober€31,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÌÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€7ÔIn€the€trial€court,€VBI€challenged€this€assertion€by€filing€the€affidavit€of€MaryE.€Costner,€theÏmanager€of€the€Statutory€Filing€Department€at€the€Secretary€of€Stateððs€office€in€Nashville.€€In€her€affidavit,ÏCostner€asserted€that€ÌÌà8 àà8 àIt€is€the€policy€of€our€Department€not€to€give€legal€advice€or€to€interpret€theÏmeaning€or€requirements€of€the€application€for€potential€registrants.€€OurÏpolicy€is€to€advise€a€registrant€to€consult€with€an€attorney€as€to€anyÏquestions€they€may€have.€€We€do€not€give€legal€advice€or€suggest€how€toÏcomplete€trademark€applications.ÌÌCostner,€however,€did€not€work€at€the€Secretary€of€Stateððs€office€in€August€1989,€when€JohnsonÏcompleted€his€trademark€application.€€Costner€began€working€at€that€office€in€October€1990.€Ô€ÔÌ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€7ÔUnder€the€Model€Trademark€Act,€a€trademark€is€deemed€to€be€ð ðusedðð€on€goods€ð ðwhen€it€is€placedÏin€any€manner€on€the€goods€or€their€containers€or€the€displays€associated€therewith€or€on€the€tags€or€labelsÏaffixed€thereto€and€such€goods€are€sold€or€otherwise€distributed€in€the€state.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð47„25„501(b)(1)Ï(1988).Ô€ÔÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÓ ` Ü›XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€7ÔÔ€7XÔÑ7€~KXXdðXXdð7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌVOLUNTEER€BEER,€INC.,à àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àò ò)€€Davidson€Chancery€No.€96„13„IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€01A01„9703„CH„00126Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌRALPH€W.€JOHNSON,€JR.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìœ›à àà àó óDefendant/Appellee.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,€CHANCELLOR̜ـ ÙßR€:;9A1-j|Yø` ç `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òG.€KLINE€PRESTON,€IVó óÌNashville,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌÌò òLAURENCE€M.€McMILLAN,€JR.ó óÌò òCUNNINGHAM,€MITCHELL,€HICKS€&€McMILLANÌó óClarksville,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó óà àœÌÑ7€~KXXdðXXdð7ÑÓÓà àPlaintiff›€Volunteer€Beer,€Inc.€(VBI),€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€final€judgmentÏdismissing€its€claim€for€fraudulent€registration€of€trademark€againstÏDefendant/Appellee€RalphW.€Johnson,€Jr.€€The€trial€court€granted€summary€judgmentÏto€Johnson€based€on€the€courtððs€conclusion€that€Johnson€did€not€intend€to€deceiveÏanyone€when€he€made€a€false€statement€on€his€trademark€application.€€We€reverseÏbecause€we€conclude€that€Johnsonððs€affidavit€regarding€his€state€of€mind€at€the€timeÏhe€completed€the€trademark€application€was€an€insufficient€basis€upon€which€to€grantÏsummary€judgment.ÌÌà àThis€lawsuit€began€in€January€1996,€when€VBI€filed€a€complaint€againstÏJohnson€seeking€declaratory€and€other€relief.€€œSpecifically,›€VBIððs€complaint€allegedÏthat€Johnson€submitted€an€application€to€register€the€trademark€Volunteer€Beer€to€theÏTennessee€Secretary€of€Stateððs€office€in€August€1989;€that€Johnson€falselyÏrepresented€on€his€application€that€the€mark€was€first€used€in€Tennessee€onÏAugust18,€1989,€the€date€of€application;€that€the€trademark€Volunteer€Beer,€in€fact,Ïnever€was€used€in€Tennessee€by€Johnson;€that€Johnson€fraudulently€procuredÍregistration€of€such€trademark;€and€that€VBI€was€the€rightful€owner€of€the€VolunteerÏBeer€mark.€€œThe›€complaint€sought€cancellation€of€Johnsonððs€registration€of€theÏtrademark,€a€declaration€that€VBI€was€the€lawful€registrant€of€the€mark,€and€an€award€ofÏdamages€pursuant€to€section€47„25„510€of€Tennesseeððs€Model€Trademark€Act.€ÌÌà àJohnson€filed€an€answer€and€counterclaim€in€which€he€sought€damages€forÏtrademark€infringement,€an€injunction€against€VBIððs€further€use€of€the€Volunteer€BeerÏmark,€and€other€relief.€ÌÌà àVBI€subsequently€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€contending,€òòinter€aliaóó,Ïthat€the€undisputed€facts€showed€that€Johnson€fraudulently€obtained€registration€of€theÏtrademark€Volunteer€Beer.€ÌÌà àJohnson€also€moved€for€summary€judgment.€€œJohnsonððs›€answers€toÏinterrogatories€indicated€that€he€had€neither€brewed€Volunteer€Beer€nor€made€anyÏsales€of€Volunteer€Beer€in€Tennessee.€€œAccordingly,›€in€opposing€VBIððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment,€Johnson€conceded€that€his€registration€of€the€Volunteer€Beer€markÏwas€subject€to€cancellation€because€Johnson€never€had€sold€goods€under€the€mark.€ÏœTo›€rebut€VBIððs€claim€that€he€had€fraudulently€registered€the€Volunteer€Beer€trademark,Ïhowever,€Johnson€filed€a€sworn€affidavit€in€which€he€explained€why€he€wroteÏAugust18,€1989,€as€the€date€of€first€use€on€his€trademark€application:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà à2.à àIn€1989,€I€submitted€an€application€to€theÏTennessee€Secretary€of€State€for€registration€of€the€markÏVOLUNTEER€BEER€for€use€on€Class48€goods,€maltÍbeverages€and€liquors.€€Originally,€when€I€completed€theÏblanks€on€the€application€form,€I€left€blank€the€date€of€firstÏuse€on€the€application....ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à3.à àUpon€my€inquiry€regarding€what€was€meant€byÏthe€date€of€first€use€of€the€VOLUNTEER€BEER€mark,€aÏfemale€employee€of€the€Tennessee€Secretary€of€StateððsÏoffice€instructed€me€to€fill€in€the€application€date€ofÏAugust18,€1989,€this€being€the€date€I€made€this€inquiryÏ(which€was€in€person€at€the€Tennessee€Secretary€of€StateððsÏoffice).€€Based€on€this€instruction,€I€wrote€August18,€1989,Ïon€the€application€as€the€date€of€first€use....ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à....ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à5.à àI€am€not€an€attorney,€œno›œr›€was€I€represented€byÏan€attorney€during€the€application€and€registration€of€theÏmark€VOLUNTEER€BEER.€€I€was€unfamiliar€with€theÏprovisions€of€Tennesseeððs€trademark€law€and€statutes€at€theÏtime€that€I€submitted€my€application.€€In€connection€with€theÏapplication€process,€I€made€no€representations€orÏdeclarations,€verbally€or€in€writing,€that€were€false€orÏfraudulent,€nor€was€it€my€intention€to€mislead€anyone€in€anyÏway.€€To€the€contrary,€in€stating€the€date€of€my€first€use€of€theÏmark€VOLUNTEER€BEER,€I€acted€upon€the€advice€of€theÏrepresentative€of€the€Tennessee€Secretary€of€Stateððs€office.€ÌÌÓÓÌà àBased€on€the€undisputed€evidence€that€Johnson€never€used€the€trademarkÏwithin€the€meaning€of€section€47„25„501(b)(1)€of€the€Model€Trademark€Act,€the€trialÏcourt€entered€a€judgment€canceling€Johnsonððs€registration€of€the€mark€Volunteer€Beer.€ÏœThe›€trial€court€further€ruled€that€VBI€had€priority€in€all€of€its€trademarks€bearing€theÏVolunteer€Beer€mark€by€virtue€of€VBIððs€prior€use€of€such€mark.€€œLastly,›€the€trial€courtÏdismissed€all€of€Johnsonððs€counterclaims.€ÌÌà àIn€its€final€judgment,€the€trial€court€dismissed€VBIððs€remaining€claim€for€damagesÏunder€section€47„25„510€of€the€Model€Trademark€Act€based€on€VBIððs€failure€to€submitÏany€proof€that€Johnson€made€a€false€or€fraudulent€misrepresentation€in€his€AugustÏ1989€trademark€application.€€œThe›€trial€court€reasoned:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThe€Model€Trademark€Act€establishes€liabilityÏagainst€one€who€procures€the€filing€or€registration€of€aÏ[trademark]€ð ðby€knowingly€making€any€false€or€fraudulentÏ[representation].ðð€€[T.C.A.]€ðð47„25„510.€€The€assertedÏmisrepresentation€is€the€insertion€of€ð ð8„18„89"€on€the€formÏwhere€it€asks€for€the€date€the€applicant€first€used€the€mark.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àJohnsonððs€version€of€how€that€happened€isÏundisputed.€€He€typed€in€the€information€requested€by€theÏfill„in„the„blank€form€and€took€it€to€the€Secretary€of€StateððsÏoffice.€€He€did€not€fill€out€the€ð ðfirst€usedðð€blank€as€he€wasÏunsure€what€ð ðusedðð€meant.€€When€he€asked€someone€in€theÏSecretary€of€Stateððs€office€what€was€meant€by€ð ðfirst€used,ððÏJohnson€was€instructed€to€insert€the€then€current€date.€€HeÏdid€so.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àUse,€according€to€the€Act,€means€that€the€goods€wereÏsold€or€otherwise€distributed.€€[T.C.A.]€ðð47„25„501(b)(1).€ÏJohnsonððs€version€of€the€beer€had€never€been€sold€orÏdistributed,€so€when€he€filled€in€the€blank€with€a€date,€heÏmade€a€false€statement.€€The€question€is...€whether€theÏfalse€statement€[was]€made€ð ðknowingly.ððÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€Model€Trademark€Act€does€not€describeÏð ðknowingly.ðð€€Courts€defining€the€term€have€usually€done€soÏin€the€context€of€criminal€statutes€that€require€that€acts€beÏcommitted€ð ðknowinglyðð€before€they€constitute€crimes.€€In€thatÏcontext,€knowingly€means€that€the€person€chargedÏpossessed€facts€which€made€him€aware€he€could€notÏlawfully€do€the€act€charged.€€òòStatev.€Summersóó,€692€S.W.2dÏ439,€446€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985).ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€damage€section€of€the€Model€Trademark€Act€isÏcaptioned€ð ðfraudulent€registrationðð€and€refers€to€ð ðany€otherÏfraudulent€means.ðð€€This€implies€that€for€a€false€statement€toÍhave€been€made€knowingly,€it€must€have€been€done€withÏsome€intent€to€deceive€someone.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThere€is€no€evidence€that€JohnsonððsÏmisrepresentation€that€he€had€used€the€[trademark]€wasÏdone€with€any€intent€to€deceive€anyone.€€To€the€contrary,€heÏdid€not€know€what€to€put€down€and€only€followed€theÏinstruction€or€suggestion€of€someone€in€the€Secretary€ofÏStateððs€office.€€Johnson€was€obviously€uncertain€whatÏð ðusedðð€meant.€€His€misrepresentation€made€out€ofÏignorance€was€not€made€knowingly.€ÌÌÓÓÌà àOn€appeal,€the€sole€issue€for€this€courtððs€consideration€is€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€dismissing€VBIððs€claim€for€fraudulent€registration€of€trademark€under€sectionÏ47„25„510€of€the€Model€Trademark€Act.ÌÌà àWe€first€address€the€trial€courtððs€interpretation€of€the€statutory€requirements€ofÏsection€47„25„510.€€That€section€provides€thatÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àAny€person€who,€on€behalf€of€such€person€or€anyÏother€person,€procures€the€filing€or€registration€of€any€markÏin€the€office€of€the€secretary€of€state€under€the€provisionsÏhereof,€by€knowingly€making€any€false€or€fraudulentÏrepresentation€or€declaration,€verbally€or€in€writing,€or€byÏany€other€fraudulent€means,€shall€be€liable€to€pay€allÏdamages€sustained€in€consequence€of€such€filing€orÏregistration,€to€be€recovered€by€or€on€behalf€of€the€partyÏinjured€thereby€in€any€court€of€Ô&  Ôcompetent€jurisdiction.ÌÌÓÓœT.C.A.›€ðð47„25„510€(1988).Ô'  ÔÌÌà àOther€states€have€adopted€virtually€the€identical€provision€from€the€ModelÏTrademark€Act.€€òòSeeóó€òòGraggv.€Rhoneyóó,€884€P.2d€443,€446„47€(Kan.€Ct.€App.€1994)Í(citing€K.S.A.€81„120);€òòVancev.€Huffóó,€568€So.€2d€745,€750„51€(Ala.€1990)€(citing€Ala.ÏCode€1975,€ðð8„12„15);€òòBrewerv.€Egyptian€Sports,€Inc.óó,€462€N.E.2d€520,€525€(Ill.€App.ÏCt.€1984)€(citing€Ill.€Rev.€Stat.€1981,€ch.€40,€par.€18).€€Our€research,€however,€hasÏrevealed€only€one€decision€in€which€a€state€court€interpreted€the€statuteððs€requirementÏof€ð ðknowingly€making€any€false€or€fraudulent€representation€or€declaration.ðð€€InÏòòGraggv.€Rhoneyóó,€884€P.2d€443,€449€(Kan.€Ct.€App.€1994),€the€court€indicated€that,€inÏorder€to€be€fraudulent€within€the€meaning€of€the€statute,€ð ðan€untrue€statement€of€factÏmust€be€known€to€have€been€untrue€by€the€party€making€it€and€must€have€been€madeÏwith€the€intent€to€deceive€or€recklessly€made€with€disregard€for€the€truth.ðð€€InÏaccordance€with€this€construction,€we€hold€that€the€imposition€of€liability€under€sectionÏ47„25„510€requires€proof€of€three€elements:€€(1)that€the€applicantððs€representation€orÏdeclaration€was€false;€(2)that€the€applicant€knew€the€representation€or€declarationÏwas€false;€and€(3)that€the€applicant€made€the€representation€or€declaration€either€withÏthe€intent€to€deceive€or€with€reckless€disregard€for€the€truth.ÌÌà àIn€interpreting€the€statute,€the€trial€court€ruled€that,€in€order€for€a€false€orÏfraudulent€representation€to€be€actionable,€the€representation€must€have€been€madeÏwith€intent€to€deceive.€€œWe›€conclude€that€this€ruling€was€not€entirely€correct€because,Ïunder€the€foregoing€standard,€the€imposition€of€liability€under€section€47„25„510€doesÏnot€depend€upon€a€showing€of€intent€to€deceive;€it€is€sufficient€if€the€representation€orÏdeclaration€was€made€with€reckless€disregard€for€the€truth,€a€lesser€standard€than€thatÏapplied€by€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àOur€delineation€of€the€proper€standard€to€be€applied€under€section€47„25„510,Ïhowever,€does€not€end€our€inquiry€because€we€still€must€determine,€in€light€of€theÏappropriate€standard,€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€Johnsonððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment.€€We€begin€our€analysis€of€this€issue€with€the€premise€thatÌÓÓà8 àà8 àœ[W]here›€a€claim€of€fraud€is€presented,€ordinarily€only€upon€aÏfull€trial€of€the€action€can€the€issue€properly€be€developed.€ÏAs€a€general€rule,€summary€judgment€is€not€an€appropriateÏprocedure€for€the€disposition€of€such€an€issue.ÌÌÓÓœòòFowler›v.€Happy€Goodman€Familyóó,€575€S.W.2d€496,€49€(Tenn.€1978).€€This€is€becauseÏð ð[t]he€issue€of€fraud,€by€its€nature,€is€one€which€requires€for€determination€the€actualÏhearing€and€viewing€of€witnesses€whose€credibility€is€of€paramount€concern€for€theÏtrier€of€facts.ðð€€òòLongv.€State€Farm€Fire€&€Cas.€Co.óó,€510€S.W.2d€517,€519€(Tenn.€App.Ï1974).ÌÌà àFor€similar€reasons,€summary€judgment€also€is€inappropriate€ð ðin€cases€whereÏthe€outcome€hinges€squarely€upon€the€state€of€mind,€intent,€or€credibility€of€theÏwitnesses.ðð€€òòKnappv.€Holiday€Inns,€Inc.óó,€682€S.W.2d€936,€941„42€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€ÏAs€one€court€explained,ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€court€should€be€cautious€in€granting€a€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€when€resolution€of€the€dispositive€issueÏrequires€a€determination€of€state€of€mind.€€Much€dependsÏupon€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses€testifying€as€to€theirÏown€state€of€mind.€€In€these€circumstances€the€jury€shouldÏbe€given€an€opportunity€to€observe€the€demeanor,€duringÏdirect€and€cross„examination,€of€the€witnesses€whose€statesÏof€mind€are€at€issue.ÌÌÓÓœòòCroley›v.€Matson€Navigation€Co.óó,€434€F.2d€73,€77€(5th€Cir.€1970),€òòquoted€inóóÏòòMcDowellv.€Mooreóó,€863€S.W.2d€418,€421€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòKnappv.€Holiday€Inns,ÍInc.óó,€682€S.W.2d€936,€942€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€In€particular,€summary€judgment€shouldÏnot€be€granted€based€upon€the€affidavit€of€an€interested€witness€if€the€finder€of€factÏwould€be€at€liberty€to€disbelieve€the€assertions€contained€in€the€affidavit.€€òòKnappóó,€682ÏS.W.2d€at€942.ÌÌà àIn€òòMcDowellv.€Mooreóó,€863€S.W.2d€418€(Tenn.€App.€1992),€for€example,€theÏdefendant€was€sued€for€defamation.€€The€defendant€filed€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€citing€evidence€which,€he€argued,€conclusively€established€that€the€plaintiffÏwas€a€public€figure€and€that€the€matters€complained€of€were€published€without€malice.€ÏòòIdóó.€at€419.€€In€support€of€his€motion,€the€defendant€attached€an€affidavit€in€which€heÏasserted€that€he€believed€the€incidents€described€by€him€to€be€true.€€òòIdóó.€at€420.€€TheÏtrial€court€granted€the€motion,€but€this€court€reversed.€€Citing€òòKnappóó€and€òòCroleyóó,€òòsupraóó,Ïthis€court€reasoned:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[W]e€are€called€upon€to€determine€whether€the€affidavit€ofÏthe€defendant,...€wherein€he€deposed€that€he€believedÏand€continues€to€believe€that€the€incidents€described€by€himÏwere€true,€is€sufficient€to€establish€a€lack€of€malice.€€WhileÏsuch€testimony,€if€accredited€by€a€trier€of€fact,€would€beÏsufficient€to€support€such€a€finding,€we€cannot€agree€that,Ïwithout€more,€such€a€finding€is€appropriate€on€motion€forÏsummary€judgment.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à....ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àIn€this€case,€the€credibility€of€the€affiant,...€is€clearlyÏin€issue....[H]e€is€a€party€and€his€testimony€must€beÏweighed€in€the€balance€against€his€natural€bias,€prejudiceÏor€interest€in€Ô&  Ôthe€outcome€of€the€case....ÌÌÓÓœòòMcDowellóó,›€863€S.W.2d€at€420„21.Ô'  ÔÌÌà àAlthough€this€case€presents€a€close€question,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€granting€summary€judgment€based€on€Johnsonððs€affidavit.€€In€his€affidavit,ÏJohnson€swore€that€he€was€unfamiliar€with€the€provisions€of€Tennesseeððs€trademarkÏstatutes€at€the€time€he€submitted€his€application;€that€he€was€acting€upon€the€advice€ofÏan€employee€of€the€Secretary€of€Stateððs€office€when€he€wrote€August18,€1989,€on€theÏapplication€as€the€date€of€first€use;€and€that€he€did€not€intend€to€mislead€anyone€in€anyÏway.€€œIf›€ultimately€believed€by€the€finder€of€fact,€these€assertions€well€might€establish€aÏdefense€to€VBIððs€claim€for€fraudulent€registration€of€trademark€under€section€47„25„510Ïof€the€Model€Trademark€Act.€€Nevertheless,€we€conclude€that€these€assertions€did€notÏentitle€Johnson€to€summary€judgment.ÌÌà à€€As€we€explained€previously,€in€order€to€succeed€on€its€claim€for€fraudulentÏregistration€of€trademark,€VBI€ultimately€must€prove€that€Johnson€acted€either€with€theÏintent€to€deceive€or€with€reckless€disregard€for€the€truth.€€The€foregoing€authoritiesÏreveal€that€summary€judgment€is€particularly€inappropriate€in€fraud€cases€such€as€thisÏwhere€the€outcome€hinges€upon€the€defendantððs€state€of€mind,€intent,€or€credibility.€ÏThe€critical€assertions€contained€in€Johnsonððs€affidavit€all€relate€to€JohnsonððsÏsubjective€state€of€mind€or€intent€at€the€time€he€made€the€false€representation€on€hisÏtrademark€application.€€Moreover,€Johnson,€as€the€defendant€to€this€action,€is€byÏdefinition€an€interested€witness€whose€testimony€the€finder€of€fact€would€be€entitled€toÏdisbelieve.€€The€fact„finder,€for€example,€might€reject€Johnsonððs€testimony€that€he€wasÏunfamiliar€with€Tennessee€trademark€law,€as€well€as€his€testimony€that€he€wasÏunaware€that€he€had€made€a€false€statement€on€the€trademark€application.€€ÌÌà àFor€purposes€of€these€summary€judgment€proceedings,€we€accept€as€trueÏJohnsonððs€sworn€factual€assertion€that€an€employee€of€the€Secretary€of€Stateððs€officeÏinstructed€him€to€fill€in€August18,€1989,€as€the€date€of€first€use€on€the€trademarkÏapplication.œ× ƒ< ××  ×›€€Even€if€accepted€as€true,€however,€this€fact€is€not€determinative€ofÏJohnsonððs€state€of€mind€or€intent€when€he€completed€the€application.€€The€evidenceÏwas€undisputed€that€Johnson€never€sold€goods€under€the€Volunteer€Beer€mark.€€€It€isÏpossible,€therefore,€that€Johnson€initially€left€blank€the€date€of€first€use€on€theÏapplication€because€he€knew€he€never€had€used€the€mark.× ƒ= ××  ×€€Issues€regardingÏJohnsonððs€state€of€mind€and€credibility€should€be€resolved€by€the€finder€of€fact€in€anÏevidentiary€hearing€and€not€by€summary€disposition.€ÌÌà àIn€conclusion,€we€reiterate€that,€if€believed€by€the€fact„finder,€the€assertionsÏcontained€in€Johnsonððs€affidavit€well€might€provide€a€defense€to€VBIððs€claim€forÍfraudulent€registration€of€trademark.€€At€this€point€in€the€proceedings,€however,€it€wasÏpremature€to€grant€summary€judgment€based€on€Johnsonððs€sworn€assertions€as€to€hisÏstate€of€mind€at€the€time€he€completed€the€trademark€application.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€hereby€reversed,€and€this€cause€is€remandedÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€toÏAppellee,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€œnecessary.Ô€7ôÔÔ€ÔÌ›œÌ›ÓÓœÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÔ€7ÔÔ€7XÔHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.›