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BGH <þ6X9`("Courier NewTTX3|xA8«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@(°“'$¡¡ÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€XÆXXXÔÔ€XC\XXXÆÔô\  `(Times NewRomanTTê‚_#“'$¡¡(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular -8D.8/808Ó18D28I3848D58Ó€?8,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular((2Ô$¤¤Ý ƒ“'!ÝÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€XªXXXÔÔ€XHÝXXXªÔÝ  ÝÓÓÔ€XHÝXXXHÝÔÔ€XÚXXXHÝÔà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(A2`$Ô€X:¨XXX +ÔÔ€X:¨XXX:¨ÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular(Ø3Ó}$««Ý ƒ“'!ÝÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€XªXXXÔÔ€XHÝXXXªÔÝ  ÝÔ d Ô2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô!"T$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(('÷ÿ dxd2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔüÿP Pd####'ÿÿdxd2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô%'*+, ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ% Line 7 d55557Border 1dd!T6Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ©Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€8ÔÔ€8ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€8XÔÌÌAugust€24,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒT^yúÿ  <<= 8ÀÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ____3 TripledxdCTriple 1+| d d dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ Ú XXdædÈ7ÑÓÓÑ  ÑÓ` ˆ‡X ’XÓÞ ÞÌVIOLET›€œVOSS,à àà àà àà à)à à›Ìà àà àœà àà àà àà à)›ÌÓ#` Ü‚XŽôx‘X#Óà àœPlaintiff/Appellee,›à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à àœ01„A„01„9706„CV00255›Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àœMaury€Circuit›ÌÙ€!ÙœßR€796A1-j|Á` z `€€@ÿRßLOWE'S€HOME€CENTERS,€INC.,›à à)à àœNo.€6840›Ìœà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.›à à)Ìà àà à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€¼ÔœCOURT›€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€œCIRCUIT›€COURT€FOR€œMAURY›€COUNTYÌÌœAT›€œCOLUMBIA,›€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€œWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÓ ` Ü‚XœÈ“X ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÔ€XÔRICHARD€T.€MATTHEWSÌMatthews,€Tisher€&€FreeÌ33€Public€SquareÌP.€O.€Box€1952ÌColumbia,€Tennessee€€38402„1952Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLEEÌÌÌÌFRANK€THOMASÌWILLIAM€L.€ABERNATHY,€JR.ÌLeitner,€Williams,€DooleyÌà àand€NapolitanÌ2300€First€American€CenterÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37238„2300Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€¼ÔAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÑ7€ }N XXdì XXdæ7ÑÌÓ  ÓòòÔ€°ÔOPINIONóóÔ€XÔÔ€8ÔÌÌà@ à›ÌÓ  ÓÓ€ÓÔ€Ôà àÔ€¼ÔThis€is€a€premises€liability€suit€in€which€the€plaintiff€recovered€in€theÏtrial€court€for€injuries€sustained€after€falling€on€the€grounds€of€one€of€theÏdefendant's€stores.€€The€jury€awarded€the€plaintiff€damages€for€medicalÏexpenses€as€well€as€for€pain€and€suffering.€€The€defendant€has€appealedÏchallenging,€among€other€things,€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€regardingÏnegligence€and€the€actions€of€the€trial€judge€in€his€function€as€thirteenthÏjuror.€€After€a€careful€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€decision€below.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.€Standard€of€ReviewÌÌÓ  Óà àð ðWhere€there€has€been€a€verdict€for€the€plaintiff€approved€by€the€œTrial›ÏJudge,€in€considering€a€defendantððs€€motion€for€a€directed€verdict€the€CourtÏof€Appeals€must€look€at€all€the€evidence,€construe€it€most€favorably€to€theÏplaintiff,€take€the€plaintiffððs€evidence€which€supports€his€theory€as€true,Ïdiscard€all€countervailing€evidence€and€indulge€all€reasonable€inferences€toÏuphold€the€verdict.ðð€€€òòò òTennessee€Liquefied€Gas€Corp.€v.€Ross,ó óóó€450ÏS.W.2d€587,€588€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1968).€€Pursuant€to€Rule€13(d)€of€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure,€the€duty€of€this€court€is€toÏdetermine€whether€there€is€any€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict.ÌÌÓ  Ó€II.€€FactsÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€proof€in€its€most€favorable€light€to€the€plaintiff€shows€that€on€MayÏ26,€1995,€Violet€Voss€severely€fractured€her€right€wrist€when€she€fell€at€aÏcurb€ramp€while€shopping€in€the€garden€center€at€Lowe's€Home€Centers€inÏColumbia,€Tennessee.€€Ms.€Voss€testified€that€she€never€saw€the€curb€ramp€asÏit€was€not€marked.€€She€was€wearing€glasses€and€"thought"€she€would€haveÏseen€it€had€it€been€marked.€€She€testified€that€there€were€many€flowers€allÏaround€the€area€and€that€she€fell€while€trying€to€go€from€one€side€of€the€curbÏcut€to€the€other€to€reach€certain€of€these€flowers.€€She€testified€that,€thoughÏshe€was€looking€at€the€flowers€as€she€walked,€she€would€have€noticed€theÏcurb€cut€had€it€been€marked.ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€the€accident,€Ms.€Voss€was€eighty„one€years€old.€€TheÏproof€was€that€she€suffered€from€bilateral€cataracts.€€The€optometry€recordÏof€Dr.€James€Felch€reflected€that€Ms.€Voss's€best€corrected€vision€was€20/50Ïin€one€eye€and€20/60€in€the€other.€€While€she€had€quit€driving€a€few€yearsÏbefore,€the€proof€was€that,€before€the€accident,€œMs.›€Voss€lived€in€and€kept€upÏa€house€on€her€own.€€She€planted€flowers,€shopped€for€groceries€and€wentÏout€to€restaurants€with€her€daughter.€€She€testified€that€though€age€andÏarthritis€slowed€her€down,€she€made€an€effort€to€do€these€things.ÌÌà àTestimony€as€well€as€exhibits€revealed€that€the€ramp€where€PlaintiffÏfell€was€cut€into€the€sidewalk€and€that€there€were€potted€plants€and€shrubsÏplaced€€around€the€ramp€area.€€Ms.€Voss's€daughter,€Billie€Jean€Lovett,Ïtestified€that€there€was€no€way€to€get€to€where€certain€wares€were€being€soldÍfrom€the€sidewalk€part€of€the€garden€department€without€going€across€theÏcurb€ramp.€€Ms.€Lovett€was€walking€three€feet€behind€her€mother€when€herÏmother€fell.€€She€testified€that€she€did€not€notice€the€drop„off€at€the€curbÏramp€as€there€was€no€visible€indicator€of€the€drop„off.€€On€cross„examination,€Ms.€Lovett€agreed€that€she€and€her€mother€had€been€to€theÏgarden€center€at€Lowe's€on€six€or€seven€prior€occasions.€€She€said€thatÏœneither›€of€them€had€ever€fallen€over€the€curb€cut€nor€even€noticed€it€before.€ÏMs.€Lovett€also€agreed€that€the€flower€displays€were€four€or€five€feet€fromÏwhere€Plaintiff€fell€on€the€curb.€€ÌÌà àRegarding€Plaintiffððs€health,€Ms.€Lovett€testified€that€her€motherÏsuffered€from€osteoporosis€and€arthritis€of€the€hips.€€However,€she€said€thatÏher€mother€had€no€difficulty€walking.€€Ms.€Lovett€did€state€that€her€motherÏhad€difficulty€reacting€to€sensory€information€or€surroundings€such€that€Ms.ÏLovett€would€often€help€her€mother€with€steps.ÌÌà àDavid€Cox€was€also€shopping€at€Lowe's€when€Ms.€Voss€fell.€€A€formerÏemployee€at€Lowe's,€Mr.€Cox€described€the€curb€ramp€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àIt's€like€a€handicapped€curb€coming€„„€like€going€across€theÏstreet.€€It's€got€a€little€off€ramp,€and€it's€concrete.€€€And€the€curbÏis€the€same€color€as€the€concrete,€and€it€had€all€the€flower€pots,Ïthe€concrete€flower€pots,€and€everything€was€more€or€lessÏblocking€the€curb.€€And€if€you€don't€watch€what€you're€doing,Ïyou€will€step€off€of€it.Ì€€ÌÓ€ÓHe€said€that€he€had€"caught€[him]self€a€few€times€stepping€off€.€.€.€looking€atÏthe€flowers€and€.€.€.€getting€into€looking€at€them."€€Mr.€Cox€testified€that€theÏcurb€was€about€four€or€five€inches€tall€and€that€it€was€the€same€color€as€theÏconcrete.€€In€addition,€Mr.€Cox's€wife,€Pamela,€testified€that€the€concrete€onÏthe€sidewalk€and€on€the€ramp€was€all€the€same€color€such€that€"[y]ou€couldn'tÍtell€from€the€walkway€to€the€ramp€the€difference€in€it."ÌÌà àPlaintiff€put€on€the€expert€proof€of€an€engineer€Robert€Warren€whoÏhad€inspected€the€curb€cut€where€Ms.€Voss€fell.€€It€was€his€opinion€that€theÏtype€of€ramp€placed€persons€"at€risk,€because€as€they€walk€along€theÏsidewalk,€parallel€to€the€curb€and€perpendicular€to€the€ramp,€they€couldÏinjure€themselves€by€stepping€off€this€unprotected€edge."€€In€addition,€Mr.ÏWarren€testified€that€when€there€is€a€change€of€grade€of€greater€than€half€anÏinch€in€the€sidewalk,€there€should€be€some€indicator€to€persons€walking€andÏhere€there€was€none.€€He€stated€that€Defendantððs€ramp€did€not€comply€withÏthe€1991€version€of€òòAn€Illustrated€Handbook€of€the€Handicapped€œSection›€ofÏthe€North€Carolina€œState›€œBuilding›€œCodeóó›€("the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó"€or€"theÏNorth€Carolina€code")€which€was€essentially€the€same€as€the€1986€version€ofÏthe€same€code.€€The€parties€had€stipulated€that€the€1986€version€of€the€NorthÏCarolina€code€was€"the€law€that€the€[parties]€and€the€Court€are€bound€to€lookÏto€determine€whether€or€not€Lowe's€was€in€compliance€or€not€in€complianceÏor€whether€it€should€have€been€in€compliance€with€the€building€code."€€TheÏproblem€with€the€sidewalk€is€that€it€allowed€movement€over€the€section€withÏthe€grade€differential€without€any€indicator€of€that€grade€differential.€€€InÏorder€to€comply,€Mr.€Warren€opined€that€there€should€have€been€a€hand„railÏor€a€non„walking€surface€to€prevent€perpendicular€travel€over€the€curb.€€Mr.ÏWarren€explained€the€danger€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àSomeone€walking€down€the€sidewalk€could€have€stepped€off€theÏ„„€there's€a€reason€that's€important.€€When€you're€walking€thisÏway,€coming€in€and€out€of€a€building,€you€would€anticipateÏstepping€off€the€curb€onto€a€drive€or€a€street€or€something€likeÏthat.€€This€is€something€that€you€wouldn't€anticipate€unless€youÏhappened€to€be€looking€right€down€at€your€feet€as€you€wereÏwalking.ÌÌÓ€Ӝ̛à àOn€cross„examination,€it€was€pointed€out€to€Mr.€Warren€that€ððÏ3.2(a)(2)€of€the€North€Carolina€code€required€"at€least€one€accessible€routeÏthat€connects€accessible€buildings,€common€facilities€elements€and€functionalÏspaces€that€are€on€the€same€site."€€Mr.€Warren€agreed€therefore€that€if€oneÏroute€did€provide€access€to€this€œarea,›€then€it€would€not€be€necessary€that€theÏramp€in€question€comply.€€Mr.€Warren€testified€that,€at€the€time€of€hisÏinspection,€there€was€a€gate€and€chain„link€fence€blocking€the€route€whichÏdid€comply€with€the€North€Carolina€code;€œhowever,›€he€admitted€that€he€didÏnot€know€whether€the€route€was€accessible€on€the€day€that€Plaintiff€fell.€€AÏcertificate€of€occupancy€was€signed€by€the€Building€Commission€and€Mr.ÏWarren€acknowledged€œthat›€this€indicated€œthat,›€at€least€according€to€theÏCommission,€the€building€met€the€minimum€building€code€specifications.€€HeÏtestified€that€the€building€was€occupied€in€1986.€€He€testified€that€the€buildingÏviolated€the€1982€version€of€the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó€œwhich,›€according€toÏœPlaintiff,›€shows€that€the€curb€violated€the€many€versions€of€the€code.€€Ìà àIn€response€to€cross„examination,€David€Stanfill,€an€employee€atÏLowe's€and€a€defense€witness,€stated€that€it€would€have€been€feasible€to€paintÏthe€curb€bright€yellow€or€orange.€€He€also€said€that€it€would€have€beenÏfeasible€to€place€plants€or€planters€or€some€other€non„walking€surface€backÏalong€the€sidewalk€where€the€curb€extends€into€the€walking€path.€€œAnother›ÏLowe's€employee,€Michael€Cook,€agreed€that€painting€the€curb€yellow€wouldÏhave€made€it€more€visible.€€Mr.€Cook€testified€that€there€were€two€ramps€atÏthe€front€of€the€Lowe's€through€which€many€handicapped€people€entered€theÏstore.€€When€asked€what€kind€of€handicapped€persons€had€used€this€area€toÏenter€the€store,€Mr.€Cook€replied€that€"there€[had]€been€people€inÏwheelchairs€and€people€with€walkers€and€canes."€€€He€said€that€the€placeÍwhere€Ms.€Voss€fell€was€used€primarily€to€bring€products€into€the€gardenÏcenter€area€though€he€figured€that€it€could€be€used€as€a€handicap€ramp.€€Ìà àAt€the€close€of€all€the€proof,€the€jury€returned€a€general€verdict€ofÏ$18,000€for€medical€expenses€and€of€$100,000€for€pain€and€suffering.€€TheÏjury€apportioned€100%€of€the€fault€to€Defendant.€€In€the€trial€court's€orderÏdenying€Defendantððs€Motion€for€New€Trial€and€J.N.O.V.,€the€court€stated€œits›Ïapproval€of€the€verdict€as€the€thirteenth€juror.€€However,€it€"note[d]€that€ifÏthe€court€had€authority€to€impose€its€own€assessment€of€comparative€fault€onÏthe€part€of€the€Plaintiff,€œ.€.€.›€the€court€would€find€the€Plaintiff€to€have€been€atÏfault€in€the€percentage€amount€of€25%,€however,€absent€that€authority€theÏcourt€approves€the€verdict€of€the€jury."ÌÌÓ  ÓIII.€€IssuesÌÌÓ  Óà àIn€this€appeal,€we€address€the€following€issues:ÌÓÓà8 à1.€€Whether€there€exists€legally€sufficient€evidence€thatÏDefendant€was€negligent?ÌÌà8 à2.€€Whether€the€court€erred€in€its€function€as€a€thirteenth€jurorÏwhen€it€failed€to€grant€a€new€trial€after€expressing€dissatisfactionÏwith€the€apportionment€of€fault€to€Defendant?ÌœÌÓ€ÓÌÓ  Ó›IV.€€NegligenceÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€its€first€issue,€Defendant€contends€that€Plaintiff€failed€to€presentÏlegally€sufficient€evidence€as€to€the€duty€element€of€her€negligence€claim.€ÏThe€gist€of€Defendantððs€argument€on€appeal€is€that€the€curb€cut€whereÏPlaintiff€fell€was€open€and€obvious€to€the€reasonable€observer.€€As€such,ÏDefendant€possessed€no€duty€to€warn€of€this€condition.€€In€making€itsÍargument,€Defendant€focuses€on€the€specific€duty€to€warn€which€is€a€part€ofÏthe€more€general€"duty€to€maintain€the€premises€in€a€reasonably€safe€andÏsuitable€condition."€€òòò òEaton€v.€McLainó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€593„94€(Tenn.Ï1994).€ÌÌà àMuch€of€the€evidence€in€the€record€regarding€negligence€related€to€theÏcurb's€non„compliance€with€the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó.€€The€trial€courtÏinstructed€the€jury€that€non„compliance€of€a€duty€imposed€by€a€statute€is€inÏand€of€itself€negligence€or,€in€other€words,€negligence€per€se.€€The€courtÏcharged€that€ðð€68„120„204€of€the€Tennessee€code€was€in€effect€in€1986,€whenÏDefendantððs€building€was€first€occupied.€€That€statute€provides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àAny€public€building€which€is€constructed,€enlarged,€orÏsubstantially€altered€or€repaired€after€July€1,€1983,€shall€beÏdesigned€and€constructed€pursuant€to€specifications,€approved€byÏthe€responsible€authority,€making€such€building€accessible€to€andÏusable€by€physically€handicapped€persons.€€The€minimumÏspecifications,€except€as€provided€in€ðð€68„120„205,€shall€beÏeither€the€CABO/ANSI€Handicap€Code€or€the€1976€edition€ofÏAn€Illustrated€Handbook€of€the€Handicapped€section€of€theÏNorth€Carolina€state€building€code,€any€amendments€orÏsupplement€thereto€or€any€edition€which€supersedes€the€1976Ïedition€as€such€edition,€amendments€or€supplements€are€in€effectÏas€the€state€architect€determines€by€rule.Ì€€€ÌÓ€ÓœTenn.›€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„120„204(a)(1)(1996).€€The€court€then€gave€the€juryÏthe€Tennessee€code's€definition€of€"physically€handicapped"€which€œisÏ"handicapped€on€account€of€sight€disabilities,€hearing€disabilities,€disabilitiesÏof€incoordination,€disabilities€of€aging,€and€any€other€disability€thatÏsignificantly€reduces€mobility,€flexibility€or€perceptiveness."€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€68„120„203(1996).ÌÌà àNext,€the€trial€court€read€to€the€jury€portions€of€the€North€CarolinaÍcode€stating€that€"it€was€the€duty€of€the€Defendant€.€.€.€to€maintain€itsÏbuilding€in€compliance€with€the€following€provisions€of€the€North€CarolinaÏcode."€€The€court€then€read€the€pertinent€part€of€the€code€to€the€jury€asÏfollows:€ÌÓ ` ܃X² ’X ÓÓÓ›à8 àà àSection€œà à3.1,›€General€Requirements:€Site€access€shall€beÏaccomplished€by€properly€designed€curb€cuts,€ramps,€stairs,€orÏother€site€elements.€€€This€shall€include€access€to€outdoorÏfacilities€subject€to€use€by€the€public.€€Ìà8 àà àSection€œà à3.1D,›€Changes€in€level€up€to€one„fourth€inchÏmay€be€vertical€and€without€edge€treatment.€€Changes€in€levelÏgreater€than€one„half€inch€shall€be€accomplished€by€means€ofÏramps€that€shall€comply€with€the€requirements€of€Chapter€4,ÏPart€1.Ìà8 àà àSection€œà à3.2,›€Site€Access:€.€.€.€Sites€shall€be€œprovided›€withÏat€least€one€accessible€route€that€connects€accessible€buildings,Ïcommon€facilities,€elements€and€functional€spaces€that€are€on€theÏsame€site.€Ìà8 àà àSection€2.1B,€Accessible€route€means€a€continuous,Ïunobstructed€path€connecting€all€€accessible€elements€and€spacesÏin€a€building€or€facility€that€can€be€negotiated€by€a€person€with€aÏsevere€disability€using€a€wheelchair€and€that€is€also€safe€andÏuseable€by€people€with€other€disabilities.Ìà8 àà àœSectionà à2.1E,›€Disability:€Disability€is€a€limitation€or€lossÏof€use€of€a€physical,€mental,€or€sensory€body€part€or€function.€Ìà8 àà à[Section]€3.3.,€Public€walks€shall€have€a€finished€surface,Ïthat€is€fixed,€firm,€and€non„slip.€€The€continuous€commonÏsurface€shall€not€be€interrupted€by€steps€or€abrupt€changes€inÏlevel€greater€than€one„half€inch.€€Where€œwalks€.€.€.›€crossÏdriveways,€or€parking€lots,€they€shall€blend€to€a€common€levelÏby€means€of€curb€cuts€or€sloped€areas€whose€grading€shall€notÏexceed€12€inches€vertical€rise€for€each€12€feet€horizontal€run.ÌÌÓ€ÓœAfter›€reading€the€above€laws€to€the€jury,€the€court€charged€the€jury€that€itÏwas€the€duty€of€Defendant€to€comply€with€these€laws.€€It€stated€that€"if€youÏfind€that€Lowe's€violated€any€of€the€laws€read€to€you,€you€will€find€thatÏviolation€was€negligence"€which€requires€a€finding€against€Defendant€if€thereÏis€also€proximate€cause.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€court€instructed€the€jury€that,€in€order€to€consider€anÏalleged€statutory€violation,€the€jury€"must€first€decide€the€question€ofÏwhether€Ms.€Voss€was€a€person€intended€to€be€protected€by€the€statute€.€.€.€[inÏother€words,€whether€she€was]€a€physically€handicapped€person€as€defined€byÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€[ðð]€68„120„203."€€The€court€stated€that€"[i]f€youÏfind€that€she€was€not€so€physically€handicapped,€the€handicapped€law€does€notÏapply€in€this€case.€€If€you€find€that€Ms.€Voss€was€so€physically€handicapped,Ïyou€must€then€consider€whether€this€Lowe's€store,€at€the€time€the€project€wasÏsubmitted€to€the€responsible€authority€for€final€approval€of€construction,€metÏthe€minimum€standard€of€building€accessibility€set€forth€in€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€[ðð]€68„120„204€and€œòò[A]n›€œ[I]llustrated›€œ[H]andbook›€of€theÏœ[H]andicapped›€œ[S]ection›€of€the€North€Carolina€œ[S]tate›€œ[B]uilding›€œ[C]ode.ó󛀀IfÏyou€find€that€Lowe's€did€not€meet€these€minimum€standards,€you€must€findÏthat€Lowe's€was€negligent."ÌÌà àIt€is€true,€as€the€trial€court€charged,€that€"[t]he€standard€of€conductÏexpected€of€a€reasonable€person€may€be€prescribed€in€a€statute€and,Ïconsequently,€a€violation€of€the€statute€may€be€deemed€to€be€negligence€perÏse."€€€òòò òCook€by€and€through€Uithoven€v.€Spinnaker's€of€Rivergate,ÏInc.ó óóó,€878€S.W.2d€934,€937€(Tenn.€1994).€€Once€a€defendant€is€shown€to€haveÏviolated€such€a€statute,€"the€proof€must€show€that€the€injured€party€wasÏwithin€the€class€of€persons€whom€the€legislative€body€intended€to€benefit€andÏprotect€by€the€enactment€of€that€particular€statute€or€ordinance."€€€òòò òSmith€v.ÏOwenó óóó,€841€S.W.2d€828,€831€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992)€.€€Finally,€afterÏestablishing€negligence€per€se,€"the€plaintiff€must€of€course€show€that€suchÏnegligence€was€the€proximate€cause€of€the€injury."€€€òòò òId.ó óóó;€€òòò òsee€McIntyre€v.ÍBalentineó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€52,€59€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€we€acknowledge€that€the€proof€showed€that€this€particularÏcurb€ramp€violated€certain€of€the€standards€embodied€in€the€òòIllustratedÏHandbookóó€and€made€applicable€to€Tennessee€cases€by€ðð€68„120„204€of€theÏTennessee€code.€€€The€proof€showed€that€a€ramp€was€cut€into€the€sidewalkÏwith€a€vertical€drop€off€on€either€side.€€Expert€testimony€revealed€that€theÏcurb€cut€represented€a€change€in€the€grade€of€the€sidewalk€of€greater€thanÏhalf€an€inch.€€Mr.€Warren,€the€expert,€as€well€as€Plaintiff,€her€daughter€andÏMr.€and€Ms.€œCox›€all€stated€that€there€was€no€indication€of€the€change€inÏgrade.€€Section€3.3€of€the€North€Carolina€state€building€code€provides€thatÏ"[t]he€continuous€common€surface€shall€not€be€interrupted€by€steps€or€abruptÏchanges€in€level€greater€than€one„half€inch."€€Section€3.1D€states€thatÏ"[c]hanges€in€level€up€to€one„fourth€inch€may€be€vertical€and€without€edgeÏtreatment.€€Changes€in€level€greater€than€one„half€inch€shall€be€accomplishedÏby€means€of€ramps."€€ÌÌà àHowever,€despite€this€particular€curb€ramp's€non„compliance,€it€isÏclear€that€the€North€Carolina€code€only€requires€one€accessible€route.€ÏDefendantððs€employee,€€Michael€Cook,€testified€that€there€were€two€ramps€atÏthe€front€of€the€Lowe's€through€which€many€handicapped€people€entered€theÏstore.€€The€ramp€where€Ms.€Voss€fell€was€not€used€as€an€entrance€forÏhandicapped€persons;€rather,€it€was€used€primarily€by€Lowe's€employees€toÏbring€products€into€the€garden€center€area.€€This€evidence€is€uncontroverted.€ÏTherefore,€the€construction€of€this€particular€ramp€has€nothing€to€do€withÏaccess€to€Lowe's€by€handicapped€persons.€€Since€the€applicability€of€theÏNorth€Carolina€code€relates€to€handicapped€access,€it€cannot€be€the€vehicleÍfor€œnegligence›€per€se€under€these€facts.ÌÌà àTherefore,€we€find€that€the€North€Carolina€code€is€irrelevant€to€theÏoutcome€of€this€case.€€Defendant€has€raised€an€issue€regarding€whether€theÏappropriate€edition€of€the€North€Carolina€state€building€code€was€stipulatedÏbelow.€€Due€to€our€conclusion€that€negligence€can€not€be€based€on€a€violationÏof€œTennessee›€Code€œAnnotated€ðð›€68„120„203,€and€thus€non„compliance€withÏthe€North€Carolina€state€building€code,€we€find€that€it€is€unnecessary€toÏaddress€this€issue.€ÌÌà àHowever,€our€finding€with€regard€to€negligence€per€se€does€notÏpreclude€a€finding€that€Defendant€is€liable€to€Plaintiff€under€œa€theory€ofÏcommon›€law€negligence.€€In€addition€to€the€jury€instructions€on€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€ðð€68„120„204€and€the€North€Carolina€code,€the€trial€courtÏalso€charged€the€jury€with€regard€to€the€general€principles€of€negligenceÏconcerning€premises€liability.€€For€clarification€of€the€legal€duties€involvedÏin€premises€liability€under€these€general€principles,€we€œturn€first›€to€theÏsupreme€court's€opinion€in€òòò òEaton€v.€McLainó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€587€(Tenn.Ï1994).€€There,€the€plaintiff€was€an€overnight€guest€in€the€defendantsðð€home.€Ïòòò òId.ó óóó€at€589.€€She€injured€herself€by€falling€down€stairs€when€she€awoke€in€theÏœnight›€and,€without€turning€on€any€lights,€opened€a€closed€door€to€what€sheÏthought€was€a€bathroom€but€what€was€instead€a€stairway€down€to€a€basement.€Ïòòò òId.ó óóó€€The€supreme€court€stated€that€the€plaintiff€was€owed€"a€duty€ofÏreasonable€care€under€all€the€circumstances.€€Therefore,€the€[defendantÏhomeowners]€owed€[the€plaintiff€guest]€a€duty€to€maintain€the€premises€in€aÏreasonably€safe€and€suitable€condition;€€this€general€duty€included€theÏresponsibility€of€either€removing€or€warning€against€any€latent€dangerousÍcondition€on€the€premises€of€which€the€[homeowners]€were€aware€or€shouldÏhave€been€aware€through€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligence."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€593„94.€€ÌÌà àThe€court€began€by€"examin[ing]€the€concept€of€duty€generally€inÏorder€to€determine€whether€the€[homeowners']€duty€to€maintain€reasonablyÏsafe€premises€included€the€specific€responsibility€to€leave€the€lights€on,€lockÏthe€basement€door,€or€warn€of€the€location€of€the€staircase."€€òòò òId.€ó óóóat€594.€ÏThe€court€found€that€there€had€been€no€showing€œthat€the›€defendantsÏreasonably€knew€or€should€have€known€of€the€probability€of€an€occurrenceÏsuch€as€the€one€which€caused€œthe€plaintiff's›€injuries.€€òòò òid;€see€Doe€v.ÏLinder€Constr.€Co.ó óóó,€845€S.W.2d€173€(Tenn.1992).€€"In€order€for€theÏ[homeowners]€to€be€charged€with€the€duty€to€leave€on€the€light€in€the€hall€andÏto€lock€the€basement€door,€they€must€have€been€able€to€reasonably€foreseeÏthat€[the€plaintiff]€would€get€out€of€bed€in€total€darkness,€walk€across€theÏhall,€and€step€into€the€basement€stairwell,€all€without€turning€on€any€lightingÏwhatsoever."€€€òòò òEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€594.€€ÌÌà àThe€court€next€addressed€the€issue€of€whether€there€existed€a€duty€ofÏthe€homeowners€to€warn€the€plaintiff€of€the€location€of€the€stairs.€òòò ò€Id.€ó óóóatÏ595.€€The€court€stated€that€"[a]lthough€Tennessee€law€provides€that€premisesÏowners€owe€invitees€the€duty€to€warn€of€latent€or€hidden€dangers,€this€dutyÏdoes€not€arise€if€the€danger€is€open€and€obvious."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€(citing€òòò òJackson€v.ÏTennessee€Valley€œAuth.ó óóó,›€413€F.€Supp.€1050,€1056€(M.D.€Tenn.1976)€andÏòòò òOdum€v.€Haynesó óóó,€494€S.W.2d€795,€800€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1972)).€€ÏConcluding€that€there€was€no€duty€to€warn,€the€court€cited€a€similar€decisionÏfrom€another€jurisdiction€which€found€no€duty€to€warn€a€plaintiff€of€aÍrelocated€staircase:€€"[W]e€find€no€hidden€or€concealed€defects€or€perils€inÏthe€placement€of€the€stairway.€€Stairs€leading€from€hallways€are€common€inÏhomes€and€even€to€one€temporarily€in€a€strange€home,€an€owner€would€notÏordinarily€realize€an€unknown€stairway€involved€an€unreasonable€risk."€Ïòòò òEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€596€(citing€òòò òSchlicht€v.€Thesingó óóó,€151€N.W.2d€119,Ï121€(Wis.€1967)).ÌÌœà àIn€a€recent€supreme€court€case,€the€court€revisited€the€"open€andÏobvious"€doctrine€in€the€wake€of€comparative€fault.€€òòò òColn€v.€City€ofÏSavannahó óóó,€966€S.W.2d€34€(Tenn.€1998).€€There,€the€court€joined€theÏmajority€of€other€jurisdictions€which€have€limited€the€traditional€"open€andÏobvious"€rule€(where€no€duty€arises€if€a€danger€is€open€and€obvious)€in€favorÏof€the€Restatement€approach.€€The€court€clarified€that€the€"open€and€obvious"Ïanalysis€is€first€upon€duty,€and€only€after€a€duty€is€imposed€are€theÏcircumstances€analyzed€under€principles€of€comparative€fault.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€42.€ÏThe€court€held€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àThat€a€danger€to€the€plaintiff€was€"open€and€obvious"€does€not,Ïòòipso€factoóó,€relieve€a€defendant€of€a€duty€of€care.€€Instead,€theÏduty€issue€must€be€analyzed€with€regard€to€foreseeability€andÏgravity€of€harm,€and€the€feasibility€and€availability€ofÏalternative€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€the€harm.€€TheÏfactors€provided€in€the€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343AÏrelate€directly€to€the€foreseeability€question;€in€short,€if€theÏforeseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€from€a€defendant'sÏconduct,€even€if€"open€and€obvious,"€outweighed€the€burden€onÏthe€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct€to€avoid€the€harm,Ïthere€is€a€duty€to€act€with€reasonable€care.€€The€circumstances€ofÏthe€case€are€then€analyzed€under€comparative€fault.Ìòòò òId.ó óóó€at€43.ÌÌÌÓ€Ó›à àWith€guidance€from€the€court's€œopinions›€in€œòòò òEatonó óóó€and€these€otherÍcases,›€we€must€analyze€the€duty€owed€by€Defendant€Lowe's€to€Plaintiff.€€WeÏreiterate€that€in€all€premises€liability€cases,€the€duty€owed€by€the€premisesÏowner€to€an€invitee€is€"a€duty€of€reasonable€care€under€all€theÏcircumstances."€€òòò òEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€593„94;òòò ò€see€also€Jones€v.€ExxonÏCorp.ó óóó,€940€S.W.2d€69,€72€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€€The€issue€becomesÏwhether€the€general€duty€of€reasonable€care€which€encompasses€the€duty€toÏmaintain€reasonably€safe€premises€included€the€specific€responsibility€ofÏconstructing€this€particular€curb€cut€in€a€different€matter€or€of€warningÏDefendantððs€patrons€of€the€existence€of€the€curb€cut.€ÌÌà àThe€scope€of€a€premises€owner's€duty€is€grounded€upon€theÏforeseeability€of€the€risk€involved.€€In€€òòò òEatonó óóó,€the€Court€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€term€reasonable€care€must€be€given€meaning€in€relation€toÏthe€circumstances....€€Ordinary,€or€reasonable,€care€is€to€beÏestimated€by€the€risk€entailed€through€probable€dangersÏattending€the€particular€situation€and€is€to€be€commensurate€withÏthe€risk€of€injury....€€The€risk€involved€is€that€which€isÏforeseeable;€€a€risk€is€foreseeable€if€a€reasonable€person€couldÏforesee€the€probability€of€its€occurrence€or€if€the€person€was€onÏnotice€that€the€likelihood€of€danger€to€the€party€to€whom€it€owedÏa€duty€is€probable.€€Foreseeability€is€the€test€of€negligence.€€IfÏthe€injury€which€occurred€could€not€have€been€reasonablyÏforeseen,€the€duty€of€care€does€not€arise,€and€even€though€the€actÏof€the€defendant€in€fact€caused€the€injury,€there€is€no€negligenceÏand€no€liability.€€'The€plaintiff€must€show€that€the€injury€was€aÏreasonably€foreseeable€probability,€not€just€a€remote€possibility,Ïand€that€some€action€within€the€[defendant's]€power€moreÏprobably€than€not€would€have€prevented€the€injury.'€€(citationsÏomitted).Ì€€Ìòòò òœEatonó óóó,›€891€S.W.2d€at€594€(quoting€òòò òDoe€v.€Linder€œConstr.›€Co.ó óóó,€845ÏS.W.2d€173,€178€(Tenn.1992)).€€œÌ›ÌÓ€Óà àœÌà àWe›€believe€that€there€was€material€evidence€to€support€a€finding€thatÏDefendant€Lowe's€could€have€reasonably€foreseen€that€one€of€its€patronsÏwould€fall€on€the€curb€ramp€as€it€existed€at€the€time€Plaintiff€fell.€€It€wasÏundisputed€that€the€curb€ramp€was€not€marked€in€any€way€„„€the€concreteÏwas€all€the€same€color€and€there€was€not€in€place€a€non„walking€surface€toÏindicate€the€different€levels.€€Employees€of€Lowe's€agreed€that€it€would€haveÏbeen€feasible€to€paint€the€curb€a€bright€color€and€that€doing€so€would€haveÏmade€it€more€visible.€€A€former€employee€of€Lowe's,€Mr.€Cox,€testified€thatÏif€one€were€not€watching€for€the€drop„off,€he€or€she€would€step€off€it.€€Mr.ÏCox€said€he€had€almost€fallen€a€few€times€while€looking€at€the€flowers.€ÏFurthermore,€according€to€the€testimony€of€Plaintiff€and€her€daughter,€theÏflowers€were€set€up€in€a€manner€which€invited,€even€required,€customers€toÏwalk€in€the€area€of€and€across€the€different€levels€of€sidewalk.€€It€is€certainlyÏreasonable€to€anticipate€that€patrons€would€do€so€while€looking€at€theÏflowers.€€Plaintiff's€own€testimony€was€that€she€was€looking€at€the€flowersÏwhen€she€fell€but€that€she€would€have€noticed€the€curb€cut€had€it€beenÏmarked.€€œÌ›Ìà àFinally,€there€is€the€testimony€of€Plaintiffððs€expert€that€this€type€ofÏramp€placed€persons€at€risk€because€as€they€walk€along€the€sidewalk,€theyÏcould€step€off€the€unprotected€edge.€€Unlike€a€grade€differential€occurring€atÏan€entrance€or€exit€to€a€building€where€people€anticipate€stepping€off€theÏcurb€onto€a€drive€or€street,€persons€€would€not€anticipate€the€location€of€thisÏdrop„off.€€Consequently,€they€would€not€notice€it€unless€they€"happened€to€beÏlooking€right€down€at€[their]€feet€as€[they]€were€walking."€€€ÌÌà àRegardless€of€the€existence€of€the€North€Carolina€code,€the€evidenceÍsupports€a€finding€that€injury€on€this€curb€ramp€was€reasonably€foreseeable.€ÏLowe's€therefore€had€a€duty€to€either€prevent€patrons€from€walking€over€theÏcurb€cut€by€placing€a€rail€or€some€other€object€in€their€way€or€to€warnÏpatrons€of€the€drop€off€by€painting€it€a€different€color€or€otherwise€callingÏpatrons'€attention€to€the€different€levels.€€ÌÌà àœFurthermore,›€we€reject€Defendantððs€contention€that€its€duty€is€removedÏbecause€the€curb€cut€is€open€and€obvious.€€In€light€of€the€evidence€presentedÏbelow,€reasonable€minds€could€certainly€differ€as€to€whether€the€conditionÏwas€open€and€obvious.€Indeed,€it€is€the€evidence€that€the€curb€ramp€was€notÏreadily€noticeable€which€supports€the€existence€of€a€duty€here.€€The€juryÏconsidered€that€evidence€and€could€have€so€œconcluded.€€Moreover,€even€if€theÏcurb€cut€were€an€open€and€obvious€danger,€the€test€for€the€existence€of€aÏduty€is€whether€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€theÏdefendant's€conduct€outweigh€the€burden€upon€the€defendant€to€engage€inÏalternative€conduct.€€òòò òColn€v.€City€of€Savannahó óóó,€966€S.W.2dÔ€8Ô€Ô€Ô34,€43Ï(Tenn.€1998).€€As€stated€above,€the€evidence€supports€that€the€danger€hereÏwas€reasonably€foreseeable€and€that€alternative€conduct€on€the€part€of€Lowe'sÏcould€have€easily€reduced€that€danger.€›ÌÌà àAs€noted€above,€Defendant€has€raised€an€issue€regarding€theÏappropriate€edition€of€the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó€to€have€been€applied€below.€ÏThe€gist€of€Defendantððs€argument€is€that€the€1976€edition€of€the€òòIllustratedÏHandbookóó€controlled€the€1986€construction€of€the€Lowe's€store.€€Therefore,Ïthe€parties'€stipulation€at€trial€that€the€1986€version€of€the€handbook€appliedÏwas€in€error.€€Because€we€conclude€in€this€opinion€that€the€jury€verdict€couldÏbe€upheld€on€a€theory€of€common€law€or€general€œnegligence,›€we€chose€not€toÍaddress€the€issue€of€the€applicable€version€of€the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó.€ÏNonetheless,€Defendant€contends€that€the€jury's€consideration€of€negligenceÏper€se€and€the€standards€embodied€in€the€òòIllustrated€Handbookóó€so€permeatedÏthe€proceedings€that€the€jury's€judgment€was€more€probably€than€notÏaffected.€€€In€other€words,€it€is€the€Defendant's€position€that,€regardless€ofÏthis€court's€decision€to€uphold€the€judgment€on€a€general€negligence€theory,Ïevidence€of€the€1976€version€of€the€handbook€prejudiced€the€verdict.€€œÌ›Ìà àRule€36€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure€gives€theÏfollowing€€guidance€as€to€the€effect€of€errors:€€ÌÓÓà8 àA€final€judgment€from€which€relief€is€available€and€otherwiseÏappropriate€shall€not€be€set€aside€unless,€considering€the€wholeÏrecord,€error€involving€a€substantial€right€more€probably€thanÏnot€affected€the€judgment€or€would€result€in€prejudice€to€theÏjudicial€process.ÌÌÓ€Ó"Under€this€rule€an€error€is€prejudicial€if€it€'more€probably€than€not'Ïaffected€the€judgment."€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€38(b)€advisory€commissionÏcomment.€€€Defendant€alleges€in€its€appellate€brief€that€the€"1976€law€did€notÏrequire€planted,€grassed,€or€gravel„covered€areas€adjacent€to€a€return€curbÏnor€tactile€warning€surfaces€(either€on€the€walking€or€adjacent€surfaces)."€ÏDefendant€asserts€therefore€that€the€jury€considered€significant€immaterialÏevidence€that€"more€probably€than€not"€affected€the€verdict.€€We€disagree.€€ÌÌà àPlaintiff's€proof€of€negligence€was€that€injury€was€reasonablyÏforeseeable€on€this€curb€ramp€which€was€unmarked€in€any€way.€€This€proofÏconsisted€of€testimony€that€the€ramp€was€not€marked€in€any€way€such€that€itÏwas€difficult€to€notice,€that€the€ramp€would€have€been€more€visible€ifÏpainted,€that€a€former€employee€had€nearly€fallen€on€it€a€few€times,€thatÍPlaintiff€specifically€would€have€noticed€the€ramp€had€it€been€marked.€ÏAssuming€arguendo€that€the€court€erred€by€allowing€the€jury€to€know€theÏadditional€requirements€of€the€1986€law,€the€proof€still€supports€that€the€curbÏramp€posed€a€foreseeable€risk€apart€from€these€additional€requirements.€€WeÏcan€not€say€that€this€evidence€more€probably€than€not€affected€the€judgmentÏin€light€of€the€significant€amount€of€material€evidence€supporting€theÏexistence€of€negligence€under€œgeneral›€œprinciples›€of€liability.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓV.€€Thirteenth€Juror€ÌÓ  ÓÌà àFinally,€we€address€œDefendantððs›€contention€that€the€court€erred€in€itsÏfunction€as€thirteenth€juror€when€it€failed€to€grant€a€new€trial€afterÏexpressing€dissatisfaction€with€the€jury's€attributing€100%€of€fault€to€Lowe's.€ÏAt€the€hearing€on€Defendant's€Motion€for€a€New€Trial,€the€trial€court€madeÏthe€following€statement:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€only€problem€that€I've€had€with€the€case€is€the€problem€ofÏthe€allocation€of€percentages€at€100€percent€versus€nothing.€ÏThat€is€a€source€of€bother,€but€I€do€not€know€what€the€authorityÏis.€€In€keeping€with€[Plaintiff's€attorney's]€suggestion,€which€isÏprobably€as€good€as€anything€else,€if€I€have€the€authority€toÏreposition€the€findings€as€to€percentage€allocation,€it€would€beÏ25€percent€for€the€Plaintiff,€75€percent€for€the€Defendant.€€If€IÏdo€not€have€that€authority,€then€the€Court€will€approve€theÏverdict€of€the€jury€as€to€the€allocation€of€percentages.ÌÌÓ€ÓDefendant€concedes€that€the€trial€court€did€not€have€the€authority€toÏreallocate€fault,€since€apportioning€fault€is€a€function€of€the€fact€finder.€€ÏHowever,€it€is€Defendant's€position€that€the€court€should€have€granted€a€newÏtrial€in€light€of€the€dissatisfaction€that€he€expressed€regarding€the€jury'sÏverdict.€€Ì€Ìà àIn€his€or€her€capacity€to€act€as€thirteenth€juror,€"the€trial€judge€isÏunder€a€duty€to€independently€weigh€the€evidence€and€determine€whether€theÏevidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€or€against€the€verdict."€€€òòò òShivers€v.ÏRamseyó óóó,€937€S.W.2d€945,€947€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€If€the€judge€givesÏreasons€for€granting€or€refusing€to€grant€a€new€trial,€"this€court€looks€toÏthem€only€for€the€purpose€of€determining€whether€he€passed€upon€the€issues,Ïand€was€satisfied€or€dissatisfied€with€the€verdict€thereon."€€€òòò òHolden€v.ÏRannickó óóó,€682€S.W.2d€903,€905€(Tenn.€1984)€(quoting€òòò òCumberlandÏTelephone€&€Telegraph€Co.€v.€Smithwickó óóó,€79€S.W.€803,€805€(Tenn.Ï1904)).€€"If€a€trial€judge,€in€discharging€his€duty€as€a€thirteenth€juror,€makesÏcomments€which€indicate€that€he€has€misconceived€his€duty€as€a€thirteenthÏjuror,€an€appellate€court€must€reverse€the€trial€judge€and€remand€for€a€newÏtrial."€€òòò òHoldenó óóó,€682€S.W.2d€at€905.ÌÌà àIn€the€order€overruling€the€motion€for€a€new€trial,€the€trial€courtÏexpressly€stated€that€he€approved€the€verdict.€€After€providing€that€the€courtÏhad€reflected€on€all€the€evidence€presented€at€trial,€the€order€included€theÏfollowing€language:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€court€notes€that€if€the€court€had€authority€to€impose€its€ownÏassessment€of€comparative€fault€on€the€part€of€the€Plaintiff,€thatÏthe€court€would€find€the€Plaintiff€to€have€been€at€fault€in€theÏpercentage€amount€of€25%,€however,€absent€that€authority€theÏcourt€approves€the€verdict€of€the€jury.ÌÌÓ€ÓIn€addition,€the€judge€noted€at€the€hearing€that€if€he€did€not€have€theÏauthority€to€reallocate€fault,€he€approved€the€verdict.€€He€commented,€€"[t]heÏalternative€would€be€to€let€my€worries€about€100€percent€versus€nothingÏcompel€a€new€trial.€€And€I€don't€believe€that€the€law€would€require€me€to€doÏthat,€nor€would€I€if€I€were€given€the€choice."ÌÌà àThe€question€becomes€whether€the€law€does€requires€a€trial€judge€whoÏdisagrees,€not€with€the€verdict,€but€with€the€jury's€allocation€of€fault,€toÏgrant€a€new€trial€in€his€capacity€as€thirteenth€juror.€€We€find€that€it€does€ifÏthe€trial€judge's€disagreement€rises€to€the€level€of€his€finding€that€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€jury's€allocation€of€fault.€€In€the€recentÏcase€of€òòò òTurner€v.€Jordanó óóó,€œ797€S.W.2d€815,€816€(Tenn.›€1997),€the€supremeÏcourt€held€"that€the€trial€court€may€not€reallocate€the€comparative€fault€afterÏweighing€the€evidence€as€the€thirteenth€juror,€ò òbut€must€instead€grant€aÏnew€trialó ó."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€(emphasis€added).€€In€so€doing,€it€cited€the€FloridaÏSupreme€Court€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àSince€liability€is€inextricably€bound€up€with€the€apportionmentÏof€damages€under€the€doctrine€of€comparative€negligence,€thisÏmatter€must€be€left€to€the€jury.€€When€the€percentages€ofÏliability€are€contrary€to€the€manifest€weight€of€the€evidence,€theÏtrial€court€must€treat€this€defect€as€an€error€in€the€finding€ofÏliability€itself.€€The€only€remedy€is€to€order€a€new€trial€on€allÏissues€affected€by€the€error.Ì€€ÌÓ€Óòòò òId.ó óóó€at€œ823›€(citing€òòò òRowlands€v.€Signal€œConstr.›€Co.ó óóó,€549€So.2d€1380€(Fla.Ï1989)).ÌÌà àCommenting€on€the€jury's€allocation€of€100%€fault€to€Defendant,€theÏcourt€below€articulated€this€as€a€"worry"€and€"a€source€of€bother"€to€him.€ÏHe€never€said€that€the€evidence€preponderated€against€the€100%Ïapportionment€of€fault€to€Defendant.€€In€fact,€he€stated€that€he€".€.€.€approvesÏthe€verdict€.€.€."€and€would€not€grant€a€new€trial€œif›€œ"given›€the€œchoice."€€WeÏfind€therefore€that€the€trial€judge€did€not€err€by€not€granting€a€new€trial.€€›ÌÌÓ  ÓVI.€€ConclusionÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€conclusion,€we€hold€that€there€was€material€evidence€supporting€theÏverdict€against€Defendant€Lowe's€on€a€theory€of€common€law/generalÏnegligence.€€Further,€the€trial€court€approved€the€allocation€of€fault€by€theÏjury.€€The€case€is€therefore€affirmed€and€this€appeal€dismissed.€€The€costs€areÏassessed€against€œDefendants€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€forÏenforcement€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.›ÌÌÌÓ#` ܃Xøœx‘X#ÓÓÓà àà àà àœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________›Ìà àà àà àÔ€XÔWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌ̛̜ÌCONCUR:̛̜ÌÌœ_____________________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌ›