ÿWPC» 9Ëñå›ñ;ÌÉµÏØWaɦ{ t[ÉHÔøÊ0°)²Æ|ÏÀ¢ á®DqÃϤÖRf®âr&n;+é|4‚ÓתÂa¶¼ª¯3)VuN®XÂs¢rld¤M‹Hðæ)ÅwÚ7ñ´uÙw#?E%â4Úõ"íQPšf#“ÙWò7]{? b•E=Œõÿ¯Ad´'AÞEd¦°”¤Æ¢F{¹>‚¬@ËäWŸA5 ®RÔüÓÍ?ß$FóMé–‘¤+}WCŸ£Ë!öΛßÐ-°F$¾zœ¶oÃj#&çI]`á"Z¼c[ª¬|~yÉÆhÉqjž—~A1ðwãj Ï’jš™HÄZ'œÐÜÑÐa4ãeôIš§ o¿y¶¶Rƒ@1„{ÈÏ”‚ÒÄW—N{0áĜӄr¡ÙÇš·ñ !<ï 8f¨7ê[4"ŸÑÀ¨\é$à­õMIªÁcC¹·š+ÔIÃ-v„©Ç›+·¥å{ Þ,Dš<•¸–Ç…ZŸÉn,Kº¦³7³ý¬_ úåKb %\^ b 0ˆnUDNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ ‘ Æ Ææ ƬÆrf8Nžf fElfnfÔf:f f 0Dllllllllllllllllllb°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°° 0븸¸¸ B££ 0¤À D3d D-— 0KÄÄ ASÆb 0¤( 0DÌ A«»lžž-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¬|&-ê:i¢×+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0 …Ý ƒRÁ<$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§•ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOral€argument€was€heard€in€this€case€on€November€15,€2002,€at€Knoxville€Fulton€High€School,€as€part€of€theÐ ° ÐCourtððs€Ô_ÔC.A.S.E.Ô_Ô€(ò òCó óourt€of€Appeals€ò òAó óffecting€ò òSó ótudent€ò òEó óducation)€project.€€€€€Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ \Ñ\R3Ø'Letter\Ñ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-(|G2Á<$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§•ò»»Ô d(|3¿u$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¿u$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ý»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Ý»»»ÔÑ8€CIXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑÑ€²ÏÑà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îTÝÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼Ý»îîT”#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓNovember€15,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÌò òÔ#†¼Ý»XXCI~#ÔDENVER€J.€€WADDELL€v.€€LAWRENCE€M.€Ô_ÔOGLEDZINKSKIÔ_ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€€1„411„00€€€€€€Dale€Workman,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌFILED€DECEMBER€30,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€€E2001„03131„COA„R3„CVÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓIn€this€appeal€from€the€Knox€County€Circuit€Court€the€Appellant,€Denver€J.€€Waddell,€contends€thatÐ xÈ  Ðthe€Trial€Court€erred€in€dismissing€his€case€by€grant€of€summary€judgment€upon€grounds€that€theÐ d´ Ðcause€of€action€against€the€Appellee,€Lawrence€M.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô,€is€precluded€by€T.C.A.€50„6„Ð P  Ð108(a).€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court.Ô_Ô׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€€€Ð <Œ ÐÓBÓÌò òTenn.€€R.€€App.€€P.€€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed;€CauseÐ d ÐRemandedó ó€Ð P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Ý»àXCI#ÔÔ‡XCIX.¼ÝÔHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ôóó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòCharles€D.€€Susano,€Jr.óó,Ð Ü, Ðand€òòD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ôóó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð È ÐÌApril€Carroll€Ô_ÔMeldrumÔ_Ô,€Clinton,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€Denver€J.€WaddellÐ  ð ÐÌJames€S.€MacDonald,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee,€Lawrence€M.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_ԀРxÈ ÐÌÌÓ/ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Ý»XXCI^#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ ("x! ÐÌÓ  Óà  àIn€March€of€2000,€Mr.€Waddell,€an€employee€of€Pro„Temp€Staffing€(hereinafter€ð ðPro„Ð $P# ÐTempðð)€assigned€to€work€at€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„€Line,€Inc.€(hereinafter€ð ðÔ_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Lineðð),€was€walking€in€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Ð ì$< $ ÐLineððs€parking€lot€just€after€completing€his€work€shift.€€At€the€same€time€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô,€anÐ Ø%(!% Ðemployee€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Line€who€had€also€just€completed€his€work€shift,€was€driving€his€pickup€truckÐ Ä&"& Ðin€the€parking€lot€and€struck€Mr.€Waddell.€€Thereafter,€Mr.€Waddell€filed€a€complaint€in€the€KnoxÐ °'#' ÐCounty€Circuit€Court€in€which€he€alleges€that€he€suffered€permanent€injury€as€a€result€of€the€accidentÐ œ(ì#( Ðand€that€the€accident€occurred€because€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€failed€to€keep€a€proper€lookout€and€wasÐ ˆ)Ø$) Ðspeeding€and€driving€recklessly.€€In€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_ÔÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIë #ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔððs€answer€to€the€complaint€he€alleges€that€theÐ t*Ä%*ýÏ ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterXà3Ø' Letter 3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑâ âÑ  Ñsole€cause€of€the€accident€was€Mr.€Waddellððs€failure€to€maintain€a€proper€lookout,€failure€to€yieldÐ ° Ðthe€right€of€way€and€failure€to€exercise€due€care€for€his€own€safety.Ð œì ÐÌà  àAt€approximately€the€same€time€he€filed€suit€against€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô,€Mr.€Waddell€€filedÐ tÄ Ða€workerððs€compensation€action€against€Pro„Temp€Staffing€which€was€settled€prior€to€trial.Ð `° ÐÌà  àOn€September€25,€2001,€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€seekingÐ 8 ˆ Ðdismissal€of€Mr.€Waddellððs€tort€claim€against€him€upon€grounds€that,€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€50„6„Ð $ t Ð108(a),€the€remedies€available€to€Mr.€Waddell€under€the€Tennessee€Workersðð€Compensation€LawÐ  ` Ðare€exclusive€and€a€common€law€negligence€action,€such€as€Mr.€Waddellððs,€is,€therefore,€precluded.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCIª#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI…#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ ü L  ÐThe€Trial€Court€granted€this€motion€by€order€entered€November€15,€2001,€and,€thereafter,€Mr.Ð è 8  ÐWaddell€filed€the€present€appeal.Ð Ô$  Ðà  àÌà  àIn€òòStaples€v.€Ô_ÔCBLÔ_Ô€&€Associates,€Incóó.,€15€S.W.3d€83,€89€(Tenn.€2000),€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ ¬ü  ÐCourt€stated€as€follows€with€respect€to€the€standard€of€review€specifically€applicable€to€summaryÐ ˜è  Ðjudgments:Ð „Ô  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒThe€standards€governing€the€assessment€of€evidence€in€the€summary€judgmentÐ \¬ Ðcontext€are€also€well€established.€€Courts€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÐ H˜ Ðfavorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€must€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€inÐ 4„ Ðthe€nonmoving€party's€favor.€€òòSeeóó€òòRobinson€v.€Ô_ÔOmerÔ_Ô,€óó952€S.W.2d€at€426;€òòByrd€v.Ð  p ÐHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€Courts€should€grant€a€summary€judgment€only€whenÐ  \ Ðboth€the€facts€and€the€inferences€to€be€drawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonableÐ øH Ðperson€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€See€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153Ð ä4 Ð(Tenn.€1995);€òòÔ_ÔCarvellÔ_Ô€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).Ð Ð  ÐÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIÈ#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àIn€reviewing€a€trial€court's€decision€to€grant€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€our€sole€taskÐ ¨ø Ðis€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56€have€been€met.€€òòMason€v.€Ô_ÔSeatonÔ_Ôóó,Ð ”ä Ð942€S.W.2d€470€(Tenn.€1997).Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI”#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€€In€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993)€at€page€214€theÐ €Ð ÐSupreme€Court€recognized€those€factors€which€must€be€addressed€under€Rule€56:Ð l¼ ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒRule€56€comes€into€play€only€when€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€materialÐ D!” Ðfact€and€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Thus,€theÐ 0"€  Ðissues€that€lie€at€the€heart€of€evaluating€a€summary€judgment€motion€are:€(1)Ð #l! Ðwhether€a€òòfactual€óódispute€exists;€(2)€whether€the€disputed€fact€is€òòmaterialóó€to€theÐ $X" Ðoutcome€of€the€case;€and€(3)€whether€the€disputed€fact€creates€a€òògenuine€óóissue€forÐ ô$D # Ðtrial.€€(emphasis€in€original)Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI%#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ à%0!$ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  àThe€issues€presented€for€our€review€in€this€appeal€are€restated€as€follows:Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  à1.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€improperly€granted€summary€judgment€in€this€case?Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  Ñà  à2.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€properly€dismissed€Mr.€Waddellððs€lawsuit€upon€grounds€that€itÐ ° Ðâ âwas€barred€by€the€exclusivity€statute€at€T.C.A.€50„6„108(a)?Ð œì ÐÌà  à€Mr.€Waddell€also€requests€that€we€address€the€issue€of€whether€the€Trial€Courtððs€decisionÐ tÄ Ðto€dismiss€his€complaint€violates€his€rights€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution;€however,€we€declineÐ `° Ðto€address€this€issue€because€it€was€not€raised€prior€to€this€appeal.€€òòSutton€v.€Ô_ÔBledsoeÔ_Ôóó,€635€S.W.2dÐ L œ Ð379€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1981).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àMr.€Waddell€correctly€asserts€that,€though€not€specifically€stated€in€its€judgment,€the€TrialÐ  ` ÐCourt€must€necessarily€have€found€that€both€he€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€were€co„employees€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Ð ü L  ÐLine€when€the€accident€occurred€and€that€the€accident€arose€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€theirÐ è 8  ÐemploymentÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIi #ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ.€T.C.A.€50„6„103(a)€provides€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôe]veryÔ_Ô€employer€and€employee€subject€to€the€Ð Ô$  ÐWorkersðð€Compensation€Law€shall,€respectively,€pay€and€accept€compensation€for€personal€injuryÐ À  Ðor€deathòò€óóby€accident€òòarising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employmentóó€without€regard€to€fault€as€a€causeÐ ¬ü  Ðof€the€injury€or€death.ðð€€(emphasis€supplied).€€Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI®'#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔMr.€Waddell€further€asserts€that€the€Court€mustÐ ˜è  Ðnecessarily€have€found€that€the€conduct€for€which€€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_ÔÔ#†¼Ý»XXCI©)#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€€seeks€immunity€under€T.C.A.Ð „Ô  Ð50„6„108(a)€arose€out€of€his€employment.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àAs€we€noted€in€òòÔ_ÔTedderÔ_Ô€v.€Union€Planters€Corporationóó,€an€unreported€opinion€of€this€CourtÐ H˜ Ðfiled€in€Jackson€on€May€29,€2001,€a€temporary€employee,€such€as€Mr.€Waddell,€becomes€a€co„Ð 4„ Ðemployee€for€purposes€of€workersðð€compensation€if:Ð  p ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Ò(a)€the€employee€has€made€a€contract€of€hire,€express€or€implied,€with€the€specialÐ øH Ðemployer;Ð ä4 ÐÌ(b)€the€work€being€done€is€essentially€that€of€the€special€employer;€andÐ ¼  ÐÌ(c)€the€special€employer€has€the€right€to€control€the€details€of€the€work.Ð ”ä ÐÌSee€òòWinchester€v.€Ô_ÔSeayÔ_Ôóó,€219€Tenn.€321,€409€S.W.2d€378,€381€(Tenn.€1966).Ð l¼ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  àGiven€these€criteria€and€the€undisputed€facts€in€the€present€matter,€there€is€no€doubt€that€Mr.Ð 0"€  ÐWaddell€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€were€co„employees€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Line.€€Although€Mr.€Waddell€assertsÐ #l! Ðthat€he€was€an€employee€of€Pro€Temp€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€he€does€not€deny€that€he€was€alsoÐ $X" Ðan€employee€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Line.€€Whether€Mr.€Waddell€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€were€co„employees€atÐ ô$D # ÐÔ_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„Line€is€not€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact€such€as€would€preclude€summary€judgment.€Ð à%0!$ ÐÔ#†¼Ý»XXCI’*#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÌÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIˆ1#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔà  àMr.€Waddell€contends€that€the€Courtððs€determination€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€acting€withinÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€scope,€or€course,€of€his€employment€when€the€accident€occurred€was€a€determination€of€fact€notÐ ¤(ô#' Ðappropriate€to€summary€judgment.€€In€support€of€this€argument€Mr.€Waddell€cites€òòTaylor€v.€Ô_ÔLinvilleÔ_Ôóó,Ð )à$( Ð656€S.W.2d€368€(Tenn.€1983).Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  Ñà  àIn€òòTayloróó€the€plaintiff€employee€was€injured€when€the€defendant€co„employee€shot€her€in€theÐ ° Ðfoot€with€a€pistol€which€he€mistakenly€believed€was€loaded€with€blanks.€€The€plaintiff€receivedÐ œì Ðworkersðð€compensation€benefits€from€the€employer€and€also€sought€to€collect€damages€in€a€commonÐ ˆØ Ðlaw€tort€action€against€the€co„employee€who€had€inflicted€her€injury.€€The€trial€court€granted€theÐ tÄ Ðdefendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€upon€grounds€that€the€plaintiffððs€tort€action€was€barredÐ `° Ðby€T.C.A.€50„6„108.€€Upon€appeal€we€reversed€and€remanded€pursuant€to€our€finding€that€theÐ L œ Ðdefendant€was€not€immune€under€the€statute€because€his€actions€were€outside€the€course€of€hisÐ 8 ˆ Ðemployment.€€Upon€further€appeal,€the€Supreme€Court€agreed€that€ð ða€co„employee€who€causes€injuryÐ $ t Ðòòoutsideóó€the€course€of€his€employment€is€not€protected€from€liability€in€common€law€tort€actionsÐ  ` Ðarising€out€of€the€injury.ðð€(emphasis€in€original)€€However,€the€Court€further€determined€that€theÐ ü L  Ðquestion€of€whether€the€defendant€was€acting€outside€the€course€of€his€employment€when€heÐ è 8  Ðdischarged€the€pistol€was€a€contested€question€of€fact€properly€answered€only€after€a€full€hearing€and,Ð Ô$  Ðaccordingly,€remanded€the€case€to€the€Trial€Court.€It€is€our€conclusion€that€the€òòTaylor€óócase€isÐ À  Ðdistinguishable€from€the€case€now€before€us.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCIË1#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝԀР¬ü  ÐÌà  à€In€òòTaylor€óótheòò€óóevidence€in€the€record€indicated€that€the€defendant€carried€the€pistol€with€whichÐ „Ô  Ðhe€shot€the€plaintiff€in€order€to€protect€his€employerððs€money€when€making€night€deposits;€however,Ð pÀ Ðother€evidence€in€the€record€indicated€that€the€employer€was€unaware€that€the€defendant€was€carryingÐ \¬ Ða€weapon€and€there€was€no€indication€in€the€record€that€the€employer€had€requested€that€theÐ H˜ Ðdefendant€carry€a€weapon.€€Whether€the€defendant€was€carrying€a€weapon€with€his€employerððsÐ 4„ Ðknowledge€and/or€at€his€employerððs€request€was€a€contested€factual€issue.€€Resolution€of€this€issueÐ  p Ðwas€a€prerequisite€to€finding€whether€the€defendant€was€acting€within€the€course€of€his€employment.€Ð  \ ÐIn€the€present€case€the€facts€necessary€to€a€determination€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€acting€in€theÐ øH Ðcourse€of€his€employment€are€undisputed.€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àIt€is€undisputed€that,€when€he€struck€Mr.€Waddell,€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€an€employee€ofÐ ¼  ÐÔ_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô€Line€and€was€driving€out€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô€Lineððs€parking€lot€after€completing€his€work€shift.€€In€theÐ ¨ø Ðcase€of€òòÔ_ÔLollarÔ_Ô€v.€€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Incóó.,€767€S.W.2d€143€(Tenn.€1989),€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ ”ä ÐCourt€stated€as€follows€at€page150:Ð €Ð ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒWe€hold€today€that€a€worker€who€is€on€the€employerððs€premises€coming€to€orÐ X ¨ Ðgoing€from€the€actual€work€place€is€acting€in€the€course€of€employment.€€WeÐ D!” Ðfurther€hold€that€if€the€employer€has€provided€a€parking€area€for€its€employees,Ð 0"€  Ðthat€parking€area€is€part€of€the€employerððs€premises€regardless€of€whether€the€lotÐ #l! Ðis€also€available€to€customers€or€the€general€public.€€We€agree€with€the€statementÐ $X" Ðof€the€New€Mexico€Supreme€Court€when€it€overruled€its€narrow€ð ðgoing€andÐ ô$D # Ðcomingðð€rule,€that€€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌÒp€ÒÒp€Ò[Ô_Ôi]nÔ_Ô€aligning€ourselves€with€every€other€jurisdiction€by€adoption€of€theÐ ¸'#& Ðpremises€rule,€we€simply€recognize€that€the€ð ðcourse€of€employmentððÐ ¤(ô#' Ðincludes€not€only€the€time€for€which€the€employee€is€actually€paid€but€alsoÐ )à$( Ðâ âa€reasonable€time€during€which€the€employee€is€necessarily€on€theÐ |*Ì%) ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  Ñemployerððs€premises€while€passing€to€or€from€the€place€where€the€work€isÐ ° Ðactually€done.Ð œì Ðâ âÌÒ€pÒÒ€pÒòòÔ_ÔDupperÔ_Ô€v.€Liberty€Mutual€Ins.€Co.óó,€105€N.M.€503,€734€P.2d€743€(1987).Ð tÄ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  à€€In€light€of€the€òòÔ_ÔLollarÔ_Ôóó€case,€given€the€undisputed€facts€in€the€present€matterÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIÎ;#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€there€is€noÐ L œ Ðquestion€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔOledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€acting€within€the€course€of€his€employment€when€he€struck€Mr.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐWaddell.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI"J#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€€€€€€à ` à€€€€Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI"K#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ $ t Ðà  àÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIzK#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÌà  àMr.€Waddell€argues€that,€even€if€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€acting€in€the€course€of€hisÐ ü L  Ðemployment€when€the€accident€occurred,€before€the€€Trial€Court€could€properly€dismiss€the€case€itÐ è 8  Ðwas€also€required€to€find€that€the€conduct€for€which€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€seeks€immunity€òòarose€out€ofóóÐ Ô$  Ðhis€employment.€€Mr.€Waddell€indicates€that€such€a€finding€would€have€entailed€a€determination€byÐ À  Ðthe€Court€that€negligent€and€reckless€driving€was€a€ð ðhazard€incident€to€[Ô_ÔMr.OgledzinkskiÔ_Ôððs]Ð ¬ü  Ðemploymentðð.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  à€In€the€case€of€òòÔ_ÔShubertÔ_Ô€v.€€Steelmanóó,€377€S.W.2d€940,€942€€(Tenn.€1964)€we€noted€theÐ pÀ Ðdistinction€between€the€phrases€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€and€ð ðin€the€course€ofðð€as€they€appear€in€the€contextÐ \¬ Ðof€workersðð€compensation€law:Ð H˜ ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òð ð[Ô_ÔI]nÔ_Ô€the€course€ofðð€refers€to€time€and€place,€and€ð ðarising€out€of,ðð€to€cause€orÐ  p Ðorigin;€and€an€injury€by€accident€to€an€employee€is€ð ðin€the€course€of€ð ð€employment€Ð  \ Ðif€it€happened€while€he€was€doing€a€duty€he€was€employed€to€do;€and€it€is€anÐ øH Ðinjury€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€employment€if€caused€by€a€hazard€incident€to€suchÐ ä4 Ðemployment.€€€€€€€€Ð Ð  ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌÒ€°ARÒÒ°€Òà  àIn€his€memorandum€of€law€filed€in€the€case€below€Mr.€Waddell€concedes€that€at€the€time€ofÐ ¨ø Ðthe€accident€both€parties€had€exited€to€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô€Lineððs€parking€lot€after€clocking€out€from€work€and€thatÐ ”ä Ðhe€was€struck€as€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€driving€out€of€the€parking€lot.€€It€is€not€asserted€€that€Mr.Ð €Ð ÐÔ_ÔOgeldzinkskiÔ_Ô€was€driving€in€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô„€Lineððs€parking€lot€for€any€reason€other€than€that€was€where€heÐ l¼ Ðparked€when€performing€work€in€furtherance€of€Ô_ÔPlastiÔ_Ô€Lineððs€business.€€One€hazard€incident€toÐ X ¨ Ðdriving€in€the€parking€lot€was€the€hazard€of€colliding€with€a€pedestrian.€€Contrary€to€Mr.€WaddellððsÐ D!” Ðcontention,€the€Trial€Court€did€not€have€to€determine€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ôððs€ð ðown€negligent€andÐ 0"€  Ðreckless€drivingðð€was€a€hazard€incident€to€his€employment.€€Rather,€the€€Court€need€only€have€foundÐ #l! Ðthat€colliding€with€a€pedestrian€under€the€undisputed€facts€in€this€case€was€a€hazard€incident€to€Mr.Ð $X" ÐÔ_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ôððs€employment.€€Under€the€facts€presented,€it€is€our€determination€that€reasonable€minds€Ð ô$D # Ðmust€conclude€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ôððs€conduct€did€arise€out€of€his€employmentÐ à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€other€€issue€we€address€in€this€appeal€is€whether€Mr.€Waddellððs€lawsuit€was€properlyÐ ¸'#& Ðdismissed€upon€grounds€that€it€is€barred€by€the€exclusivity€rule€which€is€set€forth€at€T.C.A.€50„6„Ð ¤(ô#' Ð108(a)€and€provides€as€follows:€à h àÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIÝK#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ )à$( ÐÌÐ h+¸&* ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  ÑÒ€°3RÒÒ€°Òà Ø à(a)€The€rights€and€remedies€herein€granted€to€an€employee€subject€to€theÐ ° ÐWorkersðð€Compensation€Law€on€account€of€personal€injury€or€death€by€accident,Ð œì Ðincluding€a€minor€whether€lawfully€or€unlawfully€employed,€shall€exclude€allÐ ˆØ Ðother€rights€and€remedies€of€such€employee,€such€employeeððs€personalÐ tÄ Ðrepresentative,€dependents€or€next€of€kin,€at€common€law€or€otherwise,€on€accountÐ `° Ðof€such€injury€or€death.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCIâY#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝԀРL œ ÐÌà Ø àÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àMr.€Waddell€argues€that€T.C.A.€50„6„108€does€not€specifically€preclude€a€common€lawÐ  ` Ðnegligence€action€against€a€co„employee€and€that€such€an€action€is€allowed€under€T.C.A.€50„6„112(a)€Ð ü L  Ðwhich€states:Ð è 8  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Ò(a)€When€the€injury€or€death€for€which€compensation€is€payable€under€theÐ À  ÐWorkerððs€Compensation€Law€was€caused€under€circumstances€creating€a€legalÐ ¬ü  Ðliability€against€some€person€other€than€the€employer€to€pay€damages,€the€injuredÐ ˜è  Ðworker,€or€such€injured€workerððs€dependents,€shall€have€the€right€to€takeÐ „Ô  Ðcompensation€under€such€law,€and€such€injured€worker,€or€those€to€whom€suchÐ pÀ Ðinjured€workerððs€right€of€action€survives€at€law,€may€pursue€such€injured€workerððsÐ \¬ Ðor€their€remedy€by€proper€action€in€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€against€suchÐ H˜ Ðother€person.Ð 4„ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àMr.€Waddell€maintains€that€the€exclusivity€rule€is€exclusive€only€as€to€the€employer€andÐ  \ Ðanyone€whose€negligence€might€be€imputed€back€to€the€employer.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI^#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€€In€support€of€this€argument,€Mr.Ð øH ÐWaddell€cites€the€case€of€òò€Majors€v.€Moneymakeróó,€270€S.W.2d€328€(Tenn.€1954),€and€asserts€thatÐ ä4 Ðthe€facts€in€that€case€are€exemplary€of€the€facts€which€compelled€the€courts€to€create€co„employeeÐ Ð  Ðimmunity.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€òòMajorsóó€the€plaintiffs,€Elsie€Majors€and€her€husband,€filed€a€common€law€negligence€actionÐ ”ä Ðagainst€€Elizabeth€Moneymaker,€for€damages€arising€out€of€an€automobile€accident€Ms.€MoneymakerÐ €Ð Ðwas€driving€the€automobile€involved€in€the€accident€and€Ms.€Majors€was€€riding€as€a€passenger.€Ð l¼ ÐBoth€Ms.€Majors€and€Ms.€Moneymaker€were€employed€by€the€same€employer€and€were€performingÐ X ¨ Ðduties€on€behalf€of€the€employer€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€Both€parties€were€injured€in€the€accidentÐ D!” Ðand€in€consequence€of€their€injuries€they€sought€and€received€workersðð€compensation€benefits€fromÐ 0"€  Ðthe€employerððs€insurance€carrier.€€Our€Supreme€Court€was€called€upon€to€construe€€Code€SectionsÐ #l! Ð6859€and€6865€which€correspond€in€all€pertinent€aspects€to€T.C.A.€50„6„108€and€T.C.A.€50„6„112Ð $X" Ðrespectively.€€The€sole€issue€before€the€Court€was€whether€Ms.€Majorsðð€tort€suit€against€Ms.Ð ô$D # ÐMoneymaker€was€precluded€by€the€exclusivity€rule€then€set€forth€at€Code€Section€6859,€as€assertedÐ à%0!$ Ðby€Ms.€Moneymaker€by€plea€in€abatement,€or€whether€such€suit€was€allowed€by€Code€Section€6865Ð Ì&"% Ðupon€the€ground€that€Ms.€Moneymaker€€was€ð ðsome€person€other€than€the€employer.ðð€€The€CourtÐ ¸'#& Ðdetermined€that€Ms.€Majorððs€suit€was€properly€dismissed€under€the€exclusivity€rule€and€that€CodeÐ ¤(ô#' ÐSection€6865€did€not€allow€suit€by€her€against€her€co„employee€as€some€person€other€than€herÐ )à$( Ðemployer.Ô#†¼Ý»XXCI`c#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔÐ |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  Ñ€€Ð ° ÐÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIdk#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔà  àMr.€Waddell€contends€that€the€Courtððs€decision€in€òòMajors€óówas€determined€by€the€fact€thatÐ œì Ðthe€employer€would€have€been€vicariously€liable€for€the€negligence€of€Ms.€Moneymaker.€Ô#†¼Ý»XXCIrm#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€Mr.Ð ˆØ ÐWaddellððs€argument€appears€to€be€that€the€Court€disallowed€Ms.€Majorsðð€common€law€negligenceÐ tÄ Ðaction€against€Ms.€Moneymaker€because€allowance€of€such€action€would€have,€in€effect,€constitutedÐ `° Ðallowance€of€a€common€law€negligence€action€against€the€employer€in€violation€of€the€exclusivityÐ L œ Ðrule€and€the€language€of€T.C.A.€6865€limiting€negligence€actions€to€third€parties€other€than€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðemployer.€€We€disagree€with€Mr.€Waddellððs€analysis€of€òòMajorsóó.€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àIn€òòMajorsóó€the€Court€acknowledged€that€Ms.€Moneymakerððs€alleged€negligence€wasÐ ü L  Ðchargeable€to,€and€created€legal€liability€for,€the€partiesðð€employer,€in€the€context€of€noting€that€anÐ è 8  Ðaction€for€negligence€against€the€employer€was€precluded€under€T.C.A.€6865€because€of€that€portionÐ Ô$  Ðof€the€statute€which€limits€the€action€to€ð ðsome€person€other€than€the€employer.ððÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIŒn#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€However,€as€Mr.Ð À  ÐÔ_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€asserts€in€his€brief,€the€employer€was€not€a€defendant€in€the€tort€litigation€andòò€óóthe€tortÐ ¬ü  Ðlitigation€would€not€have€created€or€increased€the€employerððs€liability€for€workersðð€compensationÐ ˜è  Ðbenefits.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àWe€do€not€agree€that€the€Courtððs€decision€in€òòMajors€óówas€based€upon€its€concern€that€theÐ \¬ Ðemployer€avoid€vicarious€liability,€but€rather€upon€its€concern€for€the€rights€and€expectations€of€aÐ H˜ Ðdefendant€co„employee€with€respect€to€benefits€allowed€such€co„employee€under€the€workersÐ 4„ Ðcompensation€law€and€its€concern€that€there€not€be€a€disparity€between€the€rights€and€remediesÐ  p Ðavailable€to€parties€subject€to€that€law.Ð  \ ЀÌà  àIn€reaching€its€decision€the€Court€noted€that€if€Ms.€Majorsðð€suit€against€Ms.€MoneymakerÐ ä4 Ðwere€allowed€€the€insurance€carrier€which€paid€workersðð€compensation€to€both€employees€on€behalfÐ Ð  Ðof€the€employer€could€recover€all€funds€paid€to€Ms.€Majors€by€means€of€a€Ô_ÔsubrogationÔ_Ô€suit€againstÐ ¼  ÐMs.€Moneymaker€as€allowed€by€T.C.A.€6865.€€The€Court€observed€that€under€this€scenario,€whileÐ ¨ø ÐMs.€Moneymaker€would€be€limited€in€her€recovery€to€the€amount€available€to€her€in€workersððÐ ”ä Ðcompensation€benefits,€Ms.€Majors€and€the€€employer/insurance€carrier€Ô_ÔsubrogatedÔ_Ô€to€her€under€theÐ €Ð Ðstatute,€could€collect€unlimited€damages€at€common€law.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€Court€further€stated€as€follows€at€page€331:Ð D!” ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒThe€statute€was€never€designed€to€permit€the€employer€and€his€insurance€carrierÐ #l! Ðto€sue€employees€for€damages€for€negligent€injuries€arising€out€of€and€in€theÐ $X" Ðcourse€of€the€employment.€€In€all€such€cases€the€injured€defendant€employeeÐ ô$D # Ðsometimes€suffering€either€death€or€total€and€permanent€injuries€would,€by€forceÐ à%0!$ Ðof€the€statute,€be€required€to€surrender€all€his€compensation€benefits€to€theÐ Ì&"% Ðinsurance€carrier,€and€in€many€cases€a€sizeable€amount€in€addition€thereto€by€wayÐ ¸'#& Ðof€damages.€€This€is€certainly€contrary€to€the€spirit,€if€not€the€letter€of€the€statute,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðin€that€the€right€of€every€employee€to€compensation€is€made€to€depend€uponÐ )à$( Ðwhether€or€not€he€is€free€from€some€proximate€negligent€act€committed€during€hisÐ |*Ì%) Ðemployment.€Ð h+¸&* ÐѲÏÑâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  ÑÌÒ°€Òà  àAs€set€forth€at€T.C.A.€50„6„108(a),€a€participating€employee€is€precluded€fromÐ œì Ðpursuing€rights€and€remedies€against€the€employer€beyond€those€allowed€under€theÐ ˆØ Ðworkersðð€compensation€law.€€In€return€for€relinquishment€of€€rights€and€remedies€whichÐ tÄ Ðwould€otherwise€be€available,€the€employee€has€the€right€to€expect€that€he€or€she€will€notÐ `° Ðbe€subject€to€a€common€law€negligence€action€by€a€co„employee€for€activity€arising€out€ofÐ L œ Ðand€in€the€course€of€employment.€€As€our€Supreme€Court€noted€in€the€òòTaylor€v.€Ô_ÔLinvilleÔ_Ôóó,Ð 8 ˆ Ðòòsupra€óóat€page€370:Ð $ t ÐÌÒ€°ÒIf€the€employer€is€granted€immunity€from€suit€for€injuries€resulting€from€accidentsÐ ü L  Ðin€the€workplace,€the€employee€who€accidently€or€negligently€injures€a€fellowÐ è 8  Ðemployee€while€carrying€on€the€duties€of€his€employer€ought€to€be,€and€expectsÐ Ô$  Ðto€be,€shielded€from€liability€in€a€common€law€action.€€€€€à @ àÐ À  ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àÌà  àBy€the€same€token,€the€co„employee€seeking€to€pursue€such€an€action€must€realize€that,€inÐ ˜è  Ðagreeing€to€participate€in€the€workersðð€compensation€system,€under€which€he€is€allowed€benefitsÐ „Ô  Ðfrom€the€employer€without€proving€fault,€he€has€agreed€to€accept€those€benefits€as€the€limits€of€hisÐ pÀ Ðcompensation€and€should€not€expect€to€add€to€such€benefits€by€suing€a€co„employee€in€a€commonÐ \¬ Ðlaw€negligence€action€for€injuries€and€conduct€arising€out€of€their€employment.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àà ` àAlthough€Mr.€Waddell€asserts€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôi]nÔ_Ô€many€cases,€the€Courts€have€refused€to€allowÐ  p Ðimmunityðð€the€only€case€he€cites€in€support€of€this€assertion€€òòGarrison€v.€Ô_ÔGraybeelÔ_Ôóó,€308€S.W.2d€375Ð  \ Ð(Tenn.€1957).€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àIn€òòGarrisonóó€the€plaintiff€employee,€a€carpenter,€was€treated€by€the€defendant€€physician€forÐ Ð  Ða€work€related€injury.€The€plaintiff€alleged€that,€as€a€result€of€the€defendantððs€negligence,€he€was€leftÐ ¼  Ðin€a€condition€of€partial€paralysis.€€In€response€to€the€plaintiffððs€common€law€negligence€action€theÐ ¨ø Ðdefendant€filed€a€plea€in€abatement€in€which€he€asserted€that€the€plaintiff€was€estopped€fromÐ ”ä Ðmaintaining€the€lawsuit€because€the€plaintiff€was€already€receiving€workersðð€compensation€benefitsÐ €Ð Ðfor€his€injuries€and€such€benefits€were€exclusive€under€the€law.€€Relying€upon€stipulations€by€theÐ l¼ Ðplaintiff€that€the€defendant€was€retained€by€the€plaintiffððs€employer€to€render€medical€services,€theÐ X ¨ Ðdefendant€asserted€that€he€and€the€plaintiff€were€co„employees€when€the€alleged€negligence€treatmentÐ D!” Ðoccurred.Ð 0"€  Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð #l! Ðà  àThe€Court€designated€the€sole€issue€as€being€whether€the€defendant€physician€was€ð ða€ððthirdÐ $X" Ðpartyðð€wrongdoer,€or€ððsome€person€other€than€the€employerðð,€and€for€whose€negligence€there€is€legalÐ ô$D # Ðliability€for€damages€in€favor€of€the€injured€employee.ðð€The€Court€determined€that€the€plaintiffððsÐ à%0!$ Ðlawsuit€should€be€allowed€even€though€the€parties€were€co„employees€and€that€the€plaintiff€and€hisÐ Ì&"% Ðemployer€were€bound€by€the€workersðð€compensation€law,€including€the€exclusivity€rule€and€theÐ ¸'#& Ðrequirement€that€common€law€negligence€actions€against€a€third€party€be€limited€to€actions€againstÐ ¤(ô#' Ðsome€person€other€than€the€employer.€€However,€the€Court€ended€its€opinion€by€distinguishing€theÐ )à$( Ðfacts€in€the€case€from€the€facts€in€òòMajors€v.€Moneymakeróó,€òòsupraóó,€at€page€381:Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* ÐÑ²Ï Ñâ âÑTRY,3Ø'LetterY,3Ø'Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑâ âÑ  ÑÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒIn€that€case€[òòMajorsóó]€the€plaintiff€and€the€defendant€were€servants€of€the€sameÐ ° Ðcorporation,€engaged€in€the€same€or€similar€duties€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€In€Ð œì Ðthe€case€at€bar€the€plaintiff€was€a€carpenter,€while€the€defendant€was€a€skilledÐ ˆØ Ðphysician,€or€supposed€to€be,€and€his€services€had€no€relation€to€the€employerððsÐ tÄ Ðbusiness.€It€was€wholly€foreign€to€any€work€that€was€being€performed€by€theÐ `° Ðplaintiff€or€any€other€employee.€€It€does€not€control€the€question€underÐ L œ Ðconsideration.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  à€Later,€in€the€case€of€òòÔ_ÔMcAlisterÔ_Ô€v.€Methodist€Hospital€of€Memphisóó,€550€S.W.2d€240€(Tenn.Ð  ` Ð1977)€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€assessed€the€òòGarrison€óócase€as€follows€at€page€242:Ð ü L  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒThe€Court€[in€òòGarrisonóó]€permitted€the€suit€against€Dr.€Ô_ÔGraybeelÔ_Ô€and€distinguishedÐ Ô$  Ðthis€case€from€òòMajors€v.€Moneymaker,€supra,€óóon€the€basis€that€in€the€latter€caseÐ À  Ðthe€employees€were€engaged€in€the€same€or€similar€duties€at€the€time€of€theÐ ¬ü  Ðaccident,€whereas€in€òòGarrison€óóthe€physicianððs€services€ð ðhad€no€relation€to€theÐ ˜è  Ðemployerððs€business.ðð€€This€case€stands€for€the€proposition€that€an€injuredÐ „Ô  Ðworkman€may€receive€compensation€under€the€act€òòand€óósue€the€physician€forÐ pÀ Ðnegligent€treatment€of€the€compensable€injury.€€It€is,€however,€out€of€harmonyÐ \¬ Ðwith€the€general€rule€and€must€be€confined€to€its€own€facts.(emphasis€in€original)Ð H˜ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àThe€òòGarrison€óócase€is€an€anomaly€and€applies€only€under€certain€specific€circumstances.€Ð  p ÐThere€is€no€indication€that€those€circumstances€are€present€in€the€case€now€before€us.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àMr.€Waddell€also€argues€that€the€Trial€Courtððs€interpretation€of€T.C.A.€50„6„108€whichÐ ä4 Ðprevents€him€from€suing€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€for€negligence€ð ðdestroys€the€plain€language€and€intentÐ Ð  Ðof€[Ô_ÔT.C.AÔ_Ô€50„6„112],€€to€provide€relief€to€the€injured€employee€and€his€employer.ðð€€In€support€of€thisÐ ¼  Ðargument€Mr.€Waddell€cites€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ô€v.€Home€Stores,€Inc.óó,€270€S.W.2d€372€(Tenn.€1954)€and€òòPloughÐ ¨ø Ðv.€Premier€Pneumatics,€Inc.óó,€660€S.W.2d€495€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àThe€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ôóó€case€dealt€with€the€interpretation€of€€the€then€recently€reenacted€Code€SectionÐ l¼ Ð6865.€€In€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ô,€óóthe€plaintiff€was€a€widow€whose€husband€had€died€in€an€automobile€accidentÐ X ¨ Ðwhile€acting€pursuant€to€his€employment.€€Without€consent€or€knowledge€of€the€employer,€theÐ D!” Ðplaintiff€received€settlement€funds€in€the€amount€of€$1,600.00€from€two€of€several€third€parties€whoÐ 0"€  Ðwere€potentially€liable€for€the€accident.€€The€employer€contended€that€the€plaintiffððs€settlementsÐ #l! Ðdestroyed€its€right€to€reimbursement€from€those€third€parties€under€Code€Section€6865€and€that€itÐ $X" Ðwas,€therefore,€discharged€from€its€obligations€under€the€workersðð€compensation€laws€for€the€deathÐ ô$D # Ðof€its€employee.€Our€Supreme€Court€disagreed€and€determined€that€under€Code€Section€6865,€asÐ à%0!$ Ðreenacted,€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€compromise€third€party€claims€without€jeopardizing€her€rightÐ Ì&"% Ðto€maintain€a€workersðð€compensation€action€against€the€employer.€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ô€óóCourt€noted€that,€€although€in€many€instances€where€a€third€party€is€involvedÐ )à$( Ðin€an€employeeððs€injury€the€employeeððs€damages€exceed€the€limits€of€compensation€allowed€underÐ |*Ì%) Ðthe€workersðð€compensation€law,€under€prior€law€such€employee€was€precluded€from€recovering€allÐ h+¸&* Ðdamages€suffered€if€he€or€she€had€accepted€workersðð€compensation€benefits.€€The€Court€determinedÐ ° Ðthat€the€purpose€of€the€re„enactment€of€Code€Section€6865€was€to€remedy€this€problem€by€allowingÐ œì Ðthe€injured€employee€to€receive€from€the€employer€the€amount€allowed€under€workersðð€compensationÐ ˆØ Ðlaw€and€to€also€assert€a€claim€against€an€allegedly€negligent€third€party€for€the€full€measure€ofÐ tÄ Ðdamages€suffered,€subject€to€the€employerððs€lien€for€workers€compensation€benefits€paid.€€Mr.Ð `° ÐWaddell€appears€to€argue€that€granting€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€immunity€is€contrary€to€the€purpose€of€theÐ L œ Ðstatute€as€determined€by€the€Court€in€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ô.€óóÐ 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àMr.€Waddell€also€cites€the€more€recent€case€of€òòPlough€v.€Premier€Pneumatics,€Inc.,€supraóó.€Ð  ` ÐIn€òòPlough€óóan€injured€employee€filed€tort€actions€against€some,€but€not€all,€of€several€allegedlyÐ ü L  Ðnegligent€third€parties€within€the€one€year€limitation€period€and€his€employer€sought€to€bring€actionsÐ è 8  Ðagainst€the€remaining€third€parties€within€six€months€of€the€expiration€of€that€one€year.€€This€CourtÐ Ô$  Ðdisagreed€with€the€appelleesðð€argument€that€an€employer€may€only€sue€third€parties€when€the€injuredÐ À  Ðemployee€has€failed€to€sue€òòanyóó€third€party€within€one€year€of€the€injury€and€determined€that€theÐ ¬ü  Ðemployerððs€lawsuits€were€permitted€under€the€statute.€€Mr.€Waddell€references€the€CourtððsÐ ˜è  Ðdetermination€that€in€enacting€the€statute€the€Legislature€intended€ð ðto€place€the€pecuniary€loss€on€theÐ „Ô  Ðauthor€of€the€misfortune,€thus€allowing€both€employer€and€employee€to€benefit.ðð€€€Mr.€WaddellÐ pÀ Ðasserts€that€€allowance€of€€his€negligence€action€against€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô€will€place€the€pecuniaryÐ \¬ Ðloss€in€this€case€upon€the€author€of€the€misfortune€in€accord€with€legislative€intent.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àWe€disagree€that€the€Courtsðð€analyses€of€legislative€intent€set€forth€in€€òòÔ_ÔMillicanÔ_Ôóó€and€òòPloughóóÐ  p Ðrequire€that€we€allow€Mr.€Waddellððs€present€tort€suit€against€Mr.€Ô_ÔOgledzinkskiÔ_Ô.€€Neither€of€these€caseÐ  \ Ðsanction€€a€common€law€negligence€action€by€one€employee€against€another€for€injuries€arising€outÐ øH Ðof€and€in€the€course€of€their€common€employment.€While€recognizing€the€legislative€intent€that€anÐ ä4 Ðinjured€employee€receive€full€recovery€of€damages€and€that€the€pecuniary€loss€incurred€by€suchÐ Ð  Ðemployee€be€placed€on€the€author€of€his€misfortune,€we€must€at€the€same€time€recognize€theÐ ¼  Ðcompeting€rights€and€expectations€acquired€by€a€co„employee€subject€to€the€workersðð€compensationÐ ¨ø Ðlaw.€As€recognized€by€the€courts€of€this€state,€one€of€these€rights€and€expectations€is€that€such€co„Ð ”ä Ðemployee€not€be€subject€to€a€tort€suit€by€another€employee€for€actions€taken€in€furtherance€of€theÐ €Ð Ðemployerððs€business.€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€and€remand€forÐ D!” Ðcollection€of€costs€below.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€adjudged€against€Denver€J.€Waddell€and€his€surety.Ð 0"€  ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð à%0!$ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ Ì&"% ÐÔ#†¼Ý»XXCIÞr#ÔÔ‡XCIX»¼ÝÔ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òò€óó€€€€€€òòóó€€€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÔ#†¼Ý»XXCI²#Ô