ÿWPC„ Ã%›ÃóÓOS¹NS¹ªÚÄ!~û.Я£ö9¾uš€U­0Ößs¶-Ct¡RS•­N­ê$ݧ0l JM·„'|1B e‚ëÂÒ =H‰VKp9úš~Ì+å8Á°r\ž¾¥ÈœŽŠr2S3ôLjñeV翦êÛ^¾ü£:_ÙfmEœAˆ“jî}]®Ý°Y!¿uS‚©ÀI^ ùü?g}¾|õ ¤ŽÏijBïUÊ‹ãú>¡‘h˜Bļ›–=hN—è1„002ÓVŽ6Ñ.ÛæÀ:+¦é‚k0ù˜ù´L¯{¡È'•#ç¤r¬­Æâ4üÖ„"áv!|kÕvÔ°¬6qñ¦šxž'dI“ä;·±ÿœ›•­VÎ1‹v÷§HÃg©ÜÛ9\Û6ƒÊÐô¸ ¸ âaÁ“+…óã!½¤‰–·›œº»s¼[€ Ì@‚~^ª! Á[7wp“ælOÔÖám{%M5Zè/‘zÚ]4¨&œé¦ÂÒ3Õñ›‰ãìõÚ0SzI„`V]:æb8xŠÉßÚÊÉhs麭ùn>ìîêÖV0ØjR?Sq²ô“†™ V ü/-xßâ}KU ÜÀñŸ ’Ïb %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÉÐ Ð Æ™ Æ_ Æ%Æë 0D±NõõõE÷.ùùP'''''''''''''''''''''bwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 0ë Bjj 0¤‡ D5+ D-` 0K ASØÆ+ 0¤ñ 0D• A«Ù»7zŽ1Þ (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÖƒF1dll¸^3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜\\IB01S08\KNOXCLERK4ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó $Ý ƒRIÍ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç= ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€The€actual€sale€price€was€$175,000,€but€Wife€was€permitted€by€the€contract€to€collect€approximately€$8,000Ð ° Ðin€outstanding€accounts€receivable.€€ StaniferTazewellMiddlesboroSebring I]nLoudonBarnhillRoseberrylymphedemar]eally T]heiCrabtreeGilliamKincaidt]hat S]he- ù-(|G2IÍ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R½»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôó¥ò»»Ô d(|3?†$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R½»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3?†$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R½»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R½»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼R½»»»ÔÑ8€iXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îU4R½ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼R½»îîU4 #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓSeptember€23,€2004€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XiX»¼R½ÔÌò òÔ#†¼R½»XXi÷#ÔLYDIA€ANN€BISHOP€WATKINS€v.€WILLIAM€C.€WATKINS,€JR.Ô‡XiX»¼R½Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌÔ#†¼R½»XXip#ÔÔ€XiX»¼R½Ôà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Claiborne€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€€14,113€€€€€€John€McAfee,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2003„03050„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€FILED€DECEMBER€14,€2004Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÓ  ÓÌÌLydia€Ann€Bishop€Watkins€(ð ðWifeðð)€filed€for€divorce€from€William€C.€Watkins,€Jr.,€(ð ðHusbandðð)Ð d´ Ðafter€thirty„five€years€of€marriage.€€The€Trial€Court€awarded€Wife€a€divorce€and€distributed€theÐ P  Ðmarital€property.€€The€Trial€Court€also€concluded€that€Wife€was€not€economically€disadvantaged€andÐ <Œ Ðrefused€to€award€her€any€alimony.€€The€Trial€Court€ordered€each€party€to€be€responsible€for€his€orÐ (x Ðher€attorney€fees.€€Wife€appeals€claiming€the€Trial€Courtððs€distribution€of€the€marital€property€wasÐ d Ðinequitable,€the€Trial€Court€erred€by€not€awarding€her€alimony€in€futuro,€and€the€Trial€Court€erredÐ P Ðby€not€requiring€Husband€to€pay€her€attorneyððs€fees.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court.€€Ð ì< ÐÌò òÌà@µ µ ìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€theˆÐ ° Ðà@¥ ¥ ìàChancery€à@@« « ìàCourt€Affirmed;€Case€RemandedˆÐ œì Ðòòó óÌÌD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.,€óódelivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,óó€andÐ `° ÐòòSharon€G.€Lee,€JJ.,€óójoined.Ð L œ ÐÌÌRebecca€A.€Bell,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant€Lydia€Ann€Bishop€Watkins.Ð #`" ÐÌÌDavid€H.€Stanifer,€Tazewell,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee€William€C.€Watkins,€Jr.Ð Ô%$!% ÐÐ  À&"&ý ÐÔ_Ôà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà@ÛÛ%ìàò òòòBackgroundóóó óˆÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àThis€litigation€began€in€March€of€2003€when€Wife€filed€a€complaint€seeking€a€divorceÐ `° Ðfrom€Husband€on€the€ground€of€adultery.€€In€the€alternative,€Wife€claimed€that€irreconcilableÐ L œ Ðdifferences€had€arisen€between€the€parties,€who€had€been€married€for€over€thirty„five€years.€€TheÐ 8 ˆ Ðparties€had€no€minor€children€when€the€case€was€tried.€€Wife€sought€a€divorce,€an€equitable€divisionÐ $ t Ðof€the€marital€property,€alimony,€and€payment€of€her€attorney€fees.€€Husband€filed€an€answer€andÐ  ` Ðcounterclaim.€€Husband€denied€committing€adultery€and€claimed€he€was€entitled€to€a€divorce€basedÐ ü L  Ðon€Wifeððs€alleged€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€In€the€alternative,€Husband€also€claimed€thatÐ è 8  Ðirreconcilable€differences€had€arisen.€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€trial€was€held€in€late€October€and€early€November€of€2003.€€When€the€divorceÐ ¬ü  Ðwas€granted,€both€parties€were€fifty„five€years€old€and€in€relatively€good€health.€€Husband€has€beenÐ ˜è  Ðemployed€with€the€United€States€Department€of€Agriculture€(ð ðUSDAðð)€since€1970.€€Husband€hasÐ „Ô  Ða€high€school€education€and€thirty€to€forty€hours€of€college€classes€that€he€ð ðtook€through€my€work.ðð€Ð pÀ ÐHusbandððs€base€salary€was€$53,000,€although€with€overtime€he€earned€in€excess€of€$80,000€in€2002.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àà ` àWife€graduated€from€high€school€and€attended€two€years€of€business€college.€€PriorÐ 4„ Ðto€moving€to€Tennessee€in€1986,€Wife€worked€approximately€thirteen€years€for€a€grain€elevatorÐ  p Ðcompany€as€a€bookkeeper€and€accountant.€€In€1986,€Husbandððs€employment€required€the€parties€toÐ  \ Ðmove€to€Tennessee.€€Approximately€six€to€eight€months€after€moving€to€Tennessee,€the€partiesÐ øH Ðopened€a€business€in€Middlesboro,€Kentucky,€known€as€First€Place€Trophies€which€sold€trophies€andÐ ä4 Ðprovided€engraving€and€screen€printing€services€and€the€like.€€Wife€worked€only€at€First€PlaceÐ Ð  ÐTrophies€for€the€next€seventeen€years€and€continued€to€work€there€at€the€time€of€trial.€€Wife€wasÐ ¼  Ðalmost€exclusively€responsible€for€running€this€business€on€a€day€to€day€basis,€including€hiring€andÐ ¨ø Ðtraining€new€employees,€etc.€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€awarded€Wife€a€divorce€based€on€Husbandððs€admitted€adultery.€€TheÐ l¼ ÐTrial€Court€concluded€that€the€contributions€of€each€of€the€parties€to€the€marriage€and€acquisitionÐ X ¨ Ðof€assets€had€been€relatively€equal.€€With€regard€to€the€property€distribution,€the€Trial€Court€awardedÐ D!” ÐWife€the€marital€residence€and€all€of€the€equity€in€the€residence,€but€also€held€her€responsible€for€theÐ 0"€  Ðmortgage.€€The€residence€was€valued€at€$130,000€with€an€outstanding€mortgage€of€53,972.34,Ð #l! Ðresulting€in€a€net€award€to€Wife€as€to€the€house€of€$76,027.66.€€Wife€was€awarded€the€householdÐ $X" Ðfurnishings€which€the€Trial€Court€valued€at€$20,000.€€The€Trial€Court€also€awarded€Wife€ð ð$11,000Ð ô$D # Ðthat€is€in€The€Farmers€and€Miners€Bank€account€or€which€is€held€in€a€cashierððs€check.ðð€€Wife€wasÐ à%0!$ Ðawarded€her€pension€plan€from€a€previous€employer€which€would€entitle€her€to€receive€$125€perÐ Ì&"% Ðmonth€at€retirement.€€With€regard€to€the€partiesðð€business,€the€Trial€Court€determined€the€businessÐ ¸'#& Ðwas€worth€$425,000,€but€had€debt€totaling€$200,000,€thereby€resulting€in€a€net€value€of€$225,000.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐThe€Trial€Court€determined€the€businessðð€liquidated€value€to€be€between€$125,000€and€$150,000.€Ð )à$( ÐWife€was€awarded€the€entire€interest€in€the€business€and€likewise€was€held€responsible€for€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðbusiness€debts.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àà ` àHusband€was€awarded€the€entire€$50,975€contained€in€his€thrift€savings€plan€and€aÐ ° ÐChrysler€Sebring€valued€at€$7,500.€€While€Husband€is€not€eligible€for€social€security€retirementÐ œì Ðbenefits,€he€is€eligible€when€he€retires€for€federal€civil€service€retirement€benefits€in€lieu€of€socialÐ ˆØ Ðsecurity.€€The€amount€of€Husbandððs€projected€future€monthly€retirement€benefit€from€his€civil€serviceÐ tÄ Ðplan€is€approximately€$3,000.€€The€Trial€Court€determined€that€the€combined€present€value€ofÐ `° ÐHusbandððs€thrift€account€and€his€civil€service€retirement€was€$117,604.€€Husband€was€awarded€allÐ L œ Ðof€his€retirement€benefits€with€one€exception.€€More€specifically,€the€Trial€Court€stated:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à[I]n€order€to€insure€that€[Wife]€can€continue€the€same€insuranceÐ  ` Ðcoverage€through€[Husbandððs]€federal€employer€[Wife]€shall€beÐ ü L  Ðawarded€only€the€necessary€portion€of€this€retirement€plan€to€insureÐ è 8  Ð[Wife]€will€continue€to€have€insurance€coverage.€ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àAfter€distributing€the€marital€property,€the€Trial€Court€concluded€that€Wife€was€notÐ ¬ü  Ðeconomically€disadvantaged€or€otherwise€entitled€to€any€alimony.€€The€Trial€Court€also€held€thatÐ ˜è  Ðeach€party€was€responsible€for€his€or€her€own€attorney€fees.€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àà ` àWife€appeals€raising€three€issues.€€First,€Wife€claims€the€Trial€Court€failed€toÐ \¬ Ðequitably€distribute€the€marital€property.€€Wifeððs€second€issue€is€her€claim€that€the€Trial€Court€erredÐ H˜ Ðwhen€it€refused€to€award€her€alimony.€€Wife€asks€this€Court€to€award€her€alimony€in€futuro€in€theÐ 4„ Ðamount€of€$2,500€per€month.€€Finally,€Wife€claims€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€held€her€responsibleÐ  p Ðfor€her€own€attorney€fees.€Ð  \ ÐÌà@))%ìàò òòòDiscussionó óóóˆÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€factual€findings€of€the€Trial€Court€are€accorded€a€presumption€of€correctness,€andÐ ¼  Ðwe€will€not€overturn€those€factual€findings€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€them.€€òòSeeóóÐ ¨ø ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòBogan€v.€Boganóó,€60€S.W.3d€721,€727€(Tenn.€2001).€€With€respect€to€legalÐ ”ä Ðissues,€our€review€is€conducted€ð ðunder€a€pure€òòde€novoóó€standard€of€review,€according€no€deferenceÐ €Ð Ðto€the€conclusions€of€law€made€by€the€lower€courts.ðð€€òòSouthern€Constructors,€Inc.€v.€Loudon€CountyÐ l¼ ÐBd.€Of€Educ.óó,€58€S.W.3d€706,€710€(Tenn.€2001).€€Ð X ¨ Ðà  àà ` àÌà  àà ` àWe€first€discuss€the€Trial€Courtððs€division€of€the€marital€property.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð 0"€  Ððð€36-4-121(c)€requires€a€trial€court€to€consider€all€relevant€factors€when€making€an€equitableÐ #l! Ðdistribution€of€marital€property,€including:€Ð $X" ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€€The€duration€of€the€marriage;Ðà%0!$` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€The€age,€physical€and€mental€health,€vocational€skills,Ð ¸'#& Ðemployability,€earning€capacity,€estate,€financial€liabilities€andÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfinancial€needs€of€each€of€the€parties;Ð)à$(` x` x Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(3)€€The€tangible€or€intangible€contribution€by€one€(1)€party€to€theÐ ° Ðâ âeducation,€training€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;Мì` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(4)€€The€relative€ability€of€each€party€for€future€acquisitions€of€capitalÐ tÄ Ðassets€and€income;Ð`°` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(5)€€The€contribution€of€each€party€to€the€acquisition,€preservation,Ð 8 ˆ Ðappreciation,€depreciation€or€dissipation€of€the€marital€or€separateÐ $ t Ðproperty,€including€the€contribution€of€a€party€to€the€marriage€asÐ  ` Ðhomemaker,€wage€earner€or€parent,€with€the€contribution€of€a€partyÐ ü L  Ðas€homemaker€or€wage€earner€to€be€given€the€same€weight€if€eachÐ è 8  Ðparty€has€fulfilled€its€role;ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(6)€€The€value€of€the€separate€property€of€each€party;Ьü ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(7)€€The€estate€of€each€party€at€the€time€of€the€marriage;Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(8)€€The€economic€circumstances€of€each€party€at€the€time€theÐ \¬ Ðdivision€of€property€is€to€become€effective;ÐH˜` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(9)€€The€tax€consequences€to€each€party,€costs€associated€with€theÐ  p Ðreasonably€foreseeable€sale€of€the€asset,€and€other€reasonablyÐ  \ Ðforeseeable€expenses€associated€with€the€asset;ÐøH` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(10)€€The€amount€of€social€security€benefits€available€to€each€spouse;€Ð Ð  Ðandм ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(11)€€Such€other€factors€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equitiesÐ ”ä Ðbetween€the€parties.ЀÐ` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àA€trial€court€has€wide€discretion€in€dividing€the€interest€of€the€parties€in€maritalÐ X ¨ Ðproperty.€€òòBarnhill€v.€Barnhillóó,€826€S.W.2d€443,€449€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€As€noted€by€this€CourtÐ D!” Ðin€òòKing€v.€Kingóó,€when€dividing€marital€property:Ð 0"€  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€trial€courtððs€goal€in€every€divorce€case€is€to€divide€the€partiesððÐ $X" Ðmarital€estate€in€a€just€and€equitable€manner.€€The€division€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðestate€is€not€rendered€inequitable€simply€because€it€is€notÐ à%0!$ Ðmathematically€equal,€òòCohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€832€(Tenn.Ð Ì&"% Ð1996);€òòEllis€v.€Ellisóó,€748€S.W.2d€424,€427€(Tenn.€1988),€or€becauseÐ ¸'#& Ðeach€party€did€not€receive€a€share€of€every€item€of€marital€property.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€[163]€at€168.€.€.€.€In€the€final€analysis,Ð )à$( Ðâ âthe€justness€of€a€particular€division€of€the€marital€property€andÐ |*Ì%) Ðallocation€of€marital€debt€depends€on€its€final€results.€òòSee€ThompsonÐ ° Ðv.€Thompsonóó,€797€S.W.2d€599,€604€(Tenn.€App.€1990).Мì` x` x Ðâ âòòÌKing€v.€Kingóó,€986€S.W.2d€216,€219€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998)€(quoting€òòRoseberry€v.€Roseberryóó,€No.Ð tÄ Ð03A01„9706„CH„00237,€1998€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€100,€at€*11„12€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.€9,€1998),€òònoÐ `° Ðappl.€perm.€appeal€filedóó).€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àà ` àAs€noted€previously,€the€Trial€Court€found€the€business€to€have€a€net€value€ofÐ $ t Ð$225,000,€and€a€liquidated€value€between€$125,000€and€$150,000.€€The€primary€disagreementÐ  ` Ðbetween€the€parties€is€whether€these€values€assigned€by€the€Trial€Court€included€the€$200,000€debtÐ ü L  Ðof€the€business.€€Husband€claims€that€these€values€encompassed€the€debt,€so€the€business€was€a€netÐ è 8  Ðasset€to€Wife€in€the€stated€amounts.€€Wife,€however,€claims€that€the€values€assigned€by€the€TrialÐ Ô$  ÐCourt€do€not€take€into€account€the€debt.€€Wife€claims€the€$200,000€in€debt€should€be€subtracted€fromÐ À  Ðthe€values€assigned€by€the€Trial€Court,€resulting€in€the€net€value€of€the€business€being€only€$25,000,Ð ¬ü  Ðand€its€liquidated€value€being€a€net€liability€of€between€$50,000€to€$75,000.€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€current€value€of€the€marital€property€awarded€to€Husband€is€$125,104.€€ThisÐ pÀ Ðfigure€is€arrived€at€simply€by€adding€the€current€value€of€his€retirement€plans€($117,604)€and€the€carÐ \¬ Ð($7,500).€€If€Husband€is€correct€that€the€Trial€Court€included€the€business€debt€when€assigning€valuesÐ H˜ Ðto€the€business,€Wifeððs€property€award€would€include:€the€net€value€of€the€business€($225,000),€theÐ 4„ Ðnet€value€of€the€marital€residence€($76,027.66),€the€household€furnishings€($20,000),€and€theÐ  p Ð$11,000,€all€of€which€totals€$332,027.66.€€If€we€accept€Husbandððs€argument€that€the€Trial€CourtÐ  \ Ðconsidered€the€debt€when€valuing€the€business,€and€we€consider€the€liquidated€value€of€the€businessÐ øH Ðas€opposed€to€its€net€value,€then€Wifeððs€property€award€would€be€between€$232,027.66€andÐ ä4 Ð$257,027.66.€€We€note€that€these€totals€do€not€include€two€items.€€First,€they€do€not€include€a€currentÐ Ð  Ðvalue€for€Wifeððs€pension€from€her€previous€employer€as€no€such€value€was€assigned€to€that€asset€byÐ ¼  Ðthe€Trial€Court.€€Second,€they€do€not€take€into€account€any€social€security€retirement€that€Wife€mayÐ ¨ø Ðreceive.€€For€the€past€two€years€Wife€paid€into€the€social€security€retirement€system€via€withholdingsÐ ”ä Ðfrom€her€paychecks€from€the€business.€€There€was€no€testimony€at€trial€regarding€the€current€valueÐ €Ð Ðof€Wifeððs€social€security€retirement€benefits,€if€any,€or€the€amount€Wife€could€expect€to€receive€atÐ l¼ Ðretirement.€€We€emphasize€this€point€because€Husbandððs€civil€service€retirement€is€a€benefit€he€willÐ X ¨ Ðreceive€in€lieu€of€social€security€retirement€and€was€the€largest€component€of€his€property€award.€Ð D!” ÐAs€Husbandððs€civil€service€retirement€is€properly€considered€in€determining€his€overall€propertyÐ 0"€  Ðaward,€it€is€only€fair€to€consider€Wifeððs€social€security€retirement€as€well.€Ð #l! ÐÌà  àà ` àIf€Wife€is€correct€in€her€argument€that€the€Trial€Court€did€not€take€into€account€theÐ ô$D # Ðbusiness€debt€when€assigning€the€values€to€the€business,€then€the€overall€property€distribution€isÐ à%0!$ Ðdramatically€different.€€While€Husbandððs€overall€award€would€remain€the€same,€i.e.,€$125,104,Ð Ì&"% ÐWifeððs€total€award€would€be€reduced€by€$200,000.€€Thus,€if€Wifeððs€argument€is€correct,€whenÐ ¸'#& Ðconsidering€the€overall€net€value€of€the€business,€her€award€would€total€$132,027.66.€€WhenÐ ¤(ô#' Ðconsidering€the€liquidated€value€of€the€business,€Wifeððs€total€would€be€reduced€further€to€betweenÐ )à$( Ð$32,027.66€and€$57,027.66.€€Relying€on€these€figures,€Wife€claims€the€overall€property€distributionÐ |*Ì%) Ðwas€inequitable.€€Ð h+¸&* Їà  àà ` àIn€support€of€her€argument€that€the€Trial€Court€did€not€take€into€account€the€businessÐ ° Ðdebt,€Wife€filed€a€Motion€to€Consider€Post€Judgment€Facts€with€this€Court.€€In€this€motion,€WifeÐ œì Ðclaims€that€on€April€22,€2004,€she€sold€the€business€for€$183,000,€but€the€purchaser€did€not€assumeÐ ˆØ Ðany€of€the€$200,000€debt€for€which€Wife€remains€responsible.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€other€words,€Wife€claims€to€haveÐ tÄ Ðsold€the€business€for€a€net€loss€of€$17,000.€€Based€on€this€sale€price,€Wife€argues€that€the€Trial€CourtÐ `° Ðsimply€could€not€have€included€the€business€debt€when€it€was€assigning€values€to€the€business.€€WeÐ L œ Ðreject€this€argument€for€two€primary€reasons.€€First,€Wife€has€offered€no€evidence€that€the€sale€wasÐ 8 ˆ Ðcommercially€reasonable.€€Second,€at€trial€Wife€testified€that€the€gross€sales€for€the€business€in€2002Ð $ t Ðwere€$425,721,€and€Wife€entered€into€evidence€the€business€tax€return€verifying€this€amount.€€TheÐ  ` Ðsales€in€2002,€therefore,€averaged€a€little€over€$35,475€per€month.€€Wife€was€running€the€businessÐ ü L  Ðat€the€time€of€trial€on€November€3,€2003,€when€she€was€awarded€the€entire€interest€in€the€business.Ð è 8  ÐWife€testified€at€trial€that€the€inventory€in€the€store€as€of€three€weeks€prior€to€the€trial€wasÐ Ô$  Ð$282,717.48,€which€represented€the€cost€of€the€inventory,€as€opposed€to€its€retail€value.€€At€that€sameÐ À  Ðtime€there€was€$200,000€in€debt.€€Wife€sold€the€business€5€ðð€months€after€the€trial.€€If€business€salesÐ ¬ü  Ðin€late€2003€and€early€2004€were€roughly€the€same€as€they€were€in€2002,€Wife€would€have€had€grossÐ ˜è  Ðsales€totaling€over€$195,000€in€those€five€and€one„half€months€after€the€trial€and€before€the€sale.€€InÐ „Ô  Ðher€Motion€to€Consider€Post€Judgment€Facts,€Wife€makes€absolutely€no€mention€of€what€happenedÐ pÀ Ðto€the€money,€if€any,€generated€from€post„trial€sales€up€until€the€time€the€business€was€sold.€€We€doÐ \¬ Ðnot€know€if€Wife€kept€these€funds€or€what€happened€to€this€money.€€Since€Wife€claims€the€businessÐ H˜ Ðdebt€remained€the€same€throughout€this€5€ðð€month€period,€all€we€do€know€is€that€Wife€did€not€useÐ 4„ Ðthese€funds€to€pay€off€any€of€the€$200,000€debt.€€As€these€ð ðfactsðð€are€not€of€the€type€appropriate€toÐ  p Ðbe€considered€as€post€judgment€facts,€we€deny€Wifeððs€Motion€to€Consider€Post€Judgment€Facts.€€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€now€undertake€to€determine€whether€the€values€assigned€to€the€business€by€theÐ ä4 ÐTrial€Court€included€the€$200,000€debt.€€As€mentioned€above,€Wife€testified€at€trial,€before€she€knewÐ Ð  Ðwho€would€receive€the€business€in€the€property€division,€that€the€cost€of€the€inventory€in€the€businessÐ ¼  Ðwas€$282,717.48.€€Wife€also€testified€that€the€equipment€in€the€business€was€worth€over€$70,000,Ð ¨ø Ðand€she€believed€the€value€of€the€goodwill€to€be€$50,000.€€This€information€was€relied€upon€byÐ ”ä ÐRalph€Carter€(ð ðCarterðð),€a€certified€public€accountant€and€the€only€expert€witness€to€testify€at€trial.€Ð €Ð ÐAccording€to€Carter,€the€business€had€$282,717€in€inventory,€$70,770€in€equipment€and€fixtures,Ð l¼ Ð$14,500€in€accounts€receivable,€goodwill€worth€$50,000,€cash€in€the€amount€of€$4,000,€and€a€pick„upÐ X ¨ Ðtruck€worth€$4,000,€thereby€resulting€in€gross€assets€totaling€$425,987.€€According€to€Carter,€theÐ D!” Ðbusiness€also€had€$200,000€in€corresponding€debt,€resulting€in€a€net€value€of€$225,987,€ð ðto€be€exact.ðð€Ð 0"€  ÐBased€on€Wifeððs€testimony€and€that€of€Carter,€it€is€abundantly€clear€to€this€Court€that€the€Trial€CourtÐ #l! Ðconsidered€the€business€debt€when€it€determined€that€the€business€had€a€net€value€of€$225,000,€andÐ $X" Ða€liquidated€value€of€$125,000€to€$150,000.€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àà ` àBecause€we€conclude€that€the€business€debt€clearly€was€considered€by€the€Trial€Court,Ð Ì&"% Ðit€necessarily€follows€that€when€using€the€net€value€of€the€business,€the€Trial€Courtððs€overall€propertyÐ ¸'#& Ðdistribution€to€Wife€totaled€$332,027.66,€and€the€overall€property€distribution€to€Husband€totaledÐ ¤(ô#' Ð$125,104.€€From€a€percentage€standpoint,€Wife€was€awarded€72.6%€of€the€marital€property,€andÐ ° ÐHusband€was€awarded€the€remaining€27.4%.€€If€we€utilize€the€liquidated€value€of€the€business€insteadÐ œì Ðof€the€net€value,€Wifeððs€total€award€is€between€$232,027.66€and€$257,027.66,€which€equates€toÐ ˆØ Ðbetween€65%€and€67.3%€of€the€total€property.€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àà ` àWhen€making€the€property€distribution,€the€Trial€Court€discussed€all€of€the€relevantÐ L œ Ðfactors€contained€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð36„4„121(c).€€One€of€the€many€factors€to€be€considered€isÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€overall€health€of€the€parties.€€At€trial,€Wife€claimed€that€due€to€her€age€(55)€and€her€health,€sheÐ $ t Ðno€longer€was€able€to€run€the€business€and€intended€to€sell€it.€€It€is€for€this€reason€that€the€parties€andÐ  ` Ðthe€Trial€Court€discussed€both€the€businessðð€net€value€as€well€as€its€liquidated€value.€€Wife€testifiedÐ ü L  Ðthat€she€has€lymphedema,€a€condition€which€affects€her€lower€extremities.€€Wife€sought€to€admit€intoÐ è 8  Ðevidence€a€letter€by€a€physical€therapist€discussing€Wifeððs€current€condition.€€Husbandððs€counsel€didÐ Ô$  Ðnot€object€to€the€admission€of€this€document,€stating€ð ð[r]eally€the€letter€helps€our€position.ðð€€BecauseÐ À  Ðthere€was€no€objection,€the€Trial€Court€allowed€the€letter€to€be€admitted,€notwithstanding€the€TrialÐ ¬ü  ÐCourtððs€concern€over€its€admissibility€under€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€In€any€event,€whenÐ ˜è  Ðdiscussing€Wifeððs€medical€condition,€the€Trial€Court€stated€as€follows:Ð „Ô  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à[T]he€Court€is€not€going€to€give€a€tremendous€amount€of€weight€toÐ \¬ Ðthat€document.€[It€would€be]€different€if€you€had€a€doctor€or€theÐ H˜ Ðdeposition€of€a€doctor€or€something€along€those€lines.€€ApparentlyÐ 4„ Ð[Wife]€has€some€difficulties,€obviously€sheððs€testified€to€that,€butÐ  p Ðsheððs€had€those€difficulties€prior,€way€before€she€even€got€into€thisÐ  \ Ðbusiness.€€I€did€make€a€note€at€least€during€the€operation€of€theÐ øH Ðbusiness€she€can€find€time€to€sit€down€.ð8ðÐä4` x` x ÐÌIn€short,€the€Trial€Court€found€that€Wifeððs€health€was€not€such€that€she€could€not€continue€to€operateÐ ¼  Ðthe€business€successfully,€and€we€hold€that€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€does€not€weigh€againstÐ ¨ø Ðthis€finding.€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àà ` àAfter€considering€the€Trial€Courtððs€overall€property€distribution€in€light€of€the€variousÐ l¼ Ðfactors€set€forth€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð36„4„121(c),€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€the€propertyÐ X ¨ Ðdistribution€was€inequitable€or€that€the€Trial€Court€otherwise€abused€its€discretion€when€distributingÐ D!” Ðthe€partiesðð€marital€property.€€We€affirm€the€Trial€Courtððs€distribution€of€the€marital€property.€€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€next€address€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€refused€to€award€WifeÐ $X" Ðalimony.€€Because€the€amount€of€alimony€to€be€awarded,€if€any,€is€within€the€sound€discretion€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðtrial€court€in€light€of€the€particular€circumstances€of€the€case,€appellate€courts€will€not€alter€suchÐ à%0!$ Ðawards€absent€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòLindsey€v.€Lindseyóó,€976€S.W.2d€175,€180€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð Ì&"% Ð1997).€€The€factors€to€be€considered€in€deciding€whether€to€award€alimony€are€contained€in€Tenn.Ð ¸'#& ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(E)€and€include:Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(i)€€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€and€financialÐ ° Ðresources€of€each€party€including€income€from€pension,€profit€sharingÐ œì Ðor€retirement€plans€and€all€other€sources;ЈØ` x` x Ðâ âÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(ii)€€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€the€ability€andÐ `° Ðopportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€such€education€and€training,€andÐ L œ Ðthe€necessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€education€and€training€toÐ 8 ˆ Ðimprove€such€party's€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level;Ð$ t` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(iii)€€The€duration€of€the€marriage;Ðü L ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(iv)€€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(v)€€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€not€limitedÐ ¬ü  Ðto,€physical€disability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronic€debilitatingÐ ˜è  Ðdisease;Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(vi)€€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€to€seekÐ \¬ Ðemployment€outside€the€home€because€such€party€will€be€custodianÐ H˜ Ðof€a€minor€child€of€the€marriage;Ð4„` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(vii)€€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€and€personal,Ð  \ Ðtangible€and€intangible;ÐøH` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(viii)€€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€property€asÐ Ð  Ðdefined€in€ðð€36-4-121;м ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(ix)€€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€during€theÐ ”ä Ðmarriage;ЀÐ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(x)€€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangible€andÐ X ¨ Ðintangible€contributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetary€and€homemakerÐ D!” Ðcontributions,€and€tangible€and€intangible€contributions€by€a€party€toÐ 0"€  Ðthe€education,€training€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;Ð#l!` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(xi)€€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,€in€itsÐ ô$D # Ðdiscretion,€deems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€€andÐà%0!$` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(xii)€€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€to€eachÐ ¸'#& Ðparty,€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€the€parties.Ф(ô#'` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€addition€to€the€foregoing,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(B)€&€(C)(Supp.€2004)Ð |*Ì%) Ðrecently€was€amended€and€now€provides€as€follows:€€Ð h+¸&* Їà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ à(B)€€The€general€assembly€finds€that€the€contributions€to€theÐ ° Ðmarriage€as€homemaker€or€parent€are€of€equal€dignity€and€importanceÐ œì Ðas€economic€contributions€to€the€marriage.€€Further,€where€one€(1)Ð ˆØ Ðspouse€suffers€economic€detriment€for€the€benefit€of€the€marriage,€theÐ tÄ Ðgeneral€assembly€finds€that€the€economically€disadvantaged€spouse'sÐ `° Ðstandard€of€living€after€the€divorce€should€be€reasonably€comparableÐ L œ Ðto€the€standard€of€living€enjoyed€during€the€marriage€or€to€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðpost-divorce€standard€of€living€expected€to€be€available€to€the€otherÐ $ t Ðspouse,€considering€the€relevant€statutory€factors€and€the€equitiesÐ  ` Ðbetween€the€parties.Ðü L ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ à(C)€€It€is€the€intent€of€the€general€assembly€that€a€spouse€whoÐ Ô$  Ðis€economically€disadvantaged€relative€to€the€other€spouse,€beÐ À  Ðrehabilitated€whenever€possible€by€the€granting€of€an€order€forÐ ¬ü  Ðpayment€of€rehabilitative,€temporary€support€and€maintenance.€€To€beÐ ˜è  Ðrehabilitated€means€to€achieve,€with€reasonable€effort,€an€earningÐ „Ô  Ðcapacity€that€will€permit€the€economically€disadvantaged€spouse'sÐ pÀ Ðstandard€of€living€after€the€divorce€to€be€reasonably€comparable€to€theÐ \¬ Ðstandard€of€living€enjoyed€during€the€marriage,€or€to€the€post-divorceÐ H˜ Ðstandard€of€living€expected€to€be€available€to€the€other€spouse,Ð 4„ Ðconsidering€the€relevant€statutory€factors€and€the€equities€between€theÐ  p Ðparties.€€Where€there€is€relative€economic€disadvantage€andÐ  \ Ðrehabilitation€is€not€feasible€in€consideration€of€all€relevant€factors,Ð øH Ðincluding€those€set€out€in€this€subsection€(d),€the€court€may€grant€anÐ ä4 Ðorder€for€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long-term€basisÐ Ð  Ðor€until€the€death€or€remarriage€of€the€recipient€except€as€otherwiseÐ ¼  Ðprovided€in€subdivision€(a)(3).€€An€award€of€periodic€alimony€may€beÐ ¨ø Ðmade€either€in€addition€to€a€rehabilitation€award,€where€a€spouse€mayÐ ”ä Ðbe€partially€rehabilitated€as€defined€in€this€subdivision€(d)(1)(C),€orÐ €Ð Ðinstead€of€a€rehabilitation€award,€where€rehabilitation€is€not€feasible.€Ð l¼ ÐWhen€appropriate,€the€court€may€also€award€transitional€alimony€asÐ X ¨ Ðprovided€in€subdivision€(d)(1)(D).ÐD!”` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àWhen€reviewing€a€trial€courtððs€decision€regarding€alimony,€we€usually€begin€byÐ #l! Ðexamining€the€income€and€expenses€of€the€parties.€€As€noted€previously,€Husbandððs€base€annualÐ $X" Ðincome€was€$53,000,€but€with€overtime€he€has€earned€as€much€as€$80,000.€€At€trial,€Wife€filed€anÐ ô$D # Ðð ðAffidavit€of€Lydia€Ann€Bishop€Watkinsðð€Monthly€Expenses€and€Salary€as€Evidence€in€Demand€forÐ à%0!$ ÐAlimony.ðð€€This€affidavit€shows€monthly€expenses€of€approximately€$3,200,€not€including€WifeððsÐ Ì&"% Ðattorney€fees.€€Wife€admitted,€however,€that€some€portion€of€the€expenses€in€the€affidavit€wereÐ ¸'#& Ðrelated€to€the€business€and€were€not€her€personal€expenses.€€Oddly€enough,€and€notwithstanding€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðtitle€of€the€affidavit,€Wife€did€not€include€the€amount€of€her€monthly€income€in€this€affidavit.€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àà ` àWifeððs€2002€income€tax€return€showed€gross€income€of€$37,000.€€Wife€testified€thatÐ ° Ðâ âshe€learned€in€July€of€2001€that€Husband€was€having€an€affair.€€Approximately€one€month€later,€WifeÐ œì Ðbegan€drawing€paychecks€from€the€business€in€the€weekly€amount€of€$1,200,€ð ðbefore€taxes.ðð€€TheÐ ˆØ Ðfollowing€is€a€small€portion€of€Wifeððs€cross„examination€at€trial:€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àQ.à ¸ àSo€for€2002€the€entire€year€at€$1,200€a€week€is€$66,400€forÐ L œ Ðthat€year,€is€that€correct?Ð8 ˆ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA.à ¸ àIf€you€says€it€is.€€I€donððt€have€my€calculator,€but€I€am€going€toÐ  ` Ðsay€that€is.€€Ðü L ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àQ.à ¸ àAnd€you€have€represented€to€the€Court€in€2002€ð8ð€[t]hat€youÐ Ô$  Ðpaid€yourself€$37,000;€is€that€correct?ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA.à ¸ àWhatever€my€W„2€is€what€I€am€basing€that€on,€but€youÐ ˜è  Ðremember€I€did€not€always€write€myself€a€paycheck€every€week.ð8ðÐ „Ô  ÐAll€I€would€be€able€to€do€and€tell€you€the€truth€is€look€at€my€ledgersÐ pÀ Ðthat€my€bookkeeper€has€and€tell€you€the€exact€dates€that€I€wrote€thoseÐ \¬ Ðchecks.€€I€mean,€I€canððt€ð!ð€how€do€you€expect€me€to€remember€twoÐ H˜ Ðyears€ago?€€Ð4„` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àAfter€this€discussion,€the€Trial€Court€understandably€was€confused€as€to€how€muchÐ  \ ÐWife€actually€was€earning€and€instructed€the€attorneys€to€clear€this€matter€up.€€When€Wife€was€askedÐ øH Ðto€be€more€detailed,€she€testified€that€she€wrote€herself€checks€in€the€amount€of€$1,200€per€weekÐ ä4 Ð75%€of€the€time,€or€39€weeks€out€of€the€year.€€Thus,€based€on€Wifeððs€own€testimony,€the€Trial€CourtÐ Ð  Ðspecifically€found€that€Wifeððs€annual€income€for€the€past€two€years€actually€was€ð ð$46,800€beforeÐ ¼  Ðtaxes.ððÐ ¨ø ÐÌà  àà ` àDuring€closing€arguments,€Wifeððs€counsel€indicated€that€Wife€wanted€to€sell€theÐ €Ð Ðbusiness€and€that€she€also€wanted€alimony€in€the€amount€of€$2,500€per€month€because€she€wasÐ l¼ Ðeconomically€disadvantaged.€€The€following€€discussion€then€took€place:Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àTHE€COURT:€Sheððs€pulled€$1,200€a€week€for€75€percent€of€the€timeÐ 0"€  Ðjust€based€on€her€testimony€alone€which€equated€to€[almost]€$50,000€Ð #l! Ðlast€year.€€Now€how€is€it€that€sheððs€economically€disadvantaged?€€Ð$X"` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMS.€BELL:€Well,€if€Your€Honor€does€[order€the€parties€to]€sell€theÐ à%0!$ Ðbusiness€sheððs€not€going€to€have€any€employment€ð8ð.ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àTHE€COURT:€That€makes€no€sense€to€me.ð8ð€€Ð¤(ô#'` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMS.€BELL:€[S]heððs€55€years€old,€this€is€the€time€she€should€beÐ |*Ì%) Ðretiring,€should€be€kicking€back€and€living€the€good€life€basically.ð8ð€Ðh+¸&*` x` x Їà8  àà8` Ð Ð àTHE€COURT:€[S]heððs€been€in€this€business€for€17€years.ð8ð€€SheÐ ° Ðappears€to€be€a€very€savvy€lady,€your€client.€€Sheððs€very€bright.€€SheððsÐ œì Ðvery€intelligent€and€a€very€good€business€woman.ð8ð€€I€think€sheððs€aÐ ˆØ Ðvery€good€business€woman€and€I€donððt€understand€the€theory€behindÐ tÄ Ðliquidating€the€business.€Ð`°` x` x ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€clearly€was€troubled€by€Wifeððs€position€that€she€wanted€the€businessÐ 8 ˆ Ðsold,€which€would€eliminate€her€$46,800€in€annual€income,€and€at€the€same€time€be€awarded€$2,500Ð $ t Ðper€month€in€alimony€so€she€could€pay€her€basic€bills.€€According€to€the€Trial€Court,€ð ðItððs€sort€of€likeÐ  ` Ðyou€want€your€cake€and€[to]€eat€it€too,€saying,€Well,€letððs€just€liquidate€it€and€letððs€knock€him€in€theÐ ü L  Ðhead€and€take€half€his€retirement€and€everything€else.ðð€€The€Trial€Court€specifically€found€thatÐ è 8  ÐWifeððs€current€income€from€the€business€was€sufficient€to€pay€her€monthly€expenses.€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àà ` àCounsel€for€Husband€phrased€this€issue€before€the€Trial€Court€as€follows:€ð ðCan€youÐ ¬ü  Ðquit€a€job€to€draw€alimony?ðð€€Certainly,€no€one€would€argue€that€Husband€could€quit€his€job€whereÐ ˜è  Ðhe€has€worked€for€over€30€years€and€demand€Wife€pay€him€alimony.€€Wife€and€Husband€both€hadÐ „Ô  Ðjobs.€€While€we€understand€Wifeððs€wish€to€retire€from€her€job€and€have€Husband€fund€her€retirementÐ pÀ Ðby€paying€her€alimony€while€he€continues€to€work€at€his€job,€this€Court,€as€did€the€Trial€Court,€findsÐ \¬ Ðno€reason€under€the€statute€or€case€law€to€grant€this€wish.€€The€reality€of€the€situation€is€that€neitherÐ H˜ Ðparty€will€be€retiring€or€ð ðkicking€back€and€living€the€good€life.ðð€Because€the€Trial€Court€concludedÐ 4„ Ðthat€Wifeððs€physical€condition€did€not€prevent€her€from€operating€the€business,€a€conclusion€we€haveÐ  p Ðaffirmed,€the€Trial€Court€acted€well€within€its€discretion€when€it€considered€Wife€to€have€an€annualÐ  \ Ðincome€of€$46,800€when€it€was€in€the€process€of€determining€whether€alimony€should€be€awardedÐ øH Ðto€Wife.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€can€summarize€the€basic€facts€after€the€property€distribution€as€follows:€€HusbandÐ ¼  Ðis€55,€has€an€annual€income€of€$53,000€to€$80,000,€and€property€valued€at€$125,104,€most€of€whichÐ ¨ø Ðis€his€federal€civil€service€retirement€and€cannot€be€liquidated.€€Wife€is€55,€has€a€business€with€a€netÐ ”ä Ðvalue€of€$225,000€which€enables€her€to€earn€an€annual€income€of€$46,800,€other€assets€totalingÐ €Ð Ð$107,027.66,€a€pension€from€her€previous€employer€worth€$125€per€month€at€retirement,€and€socialÐ l¼ Ðsecurity€retirement€valued€at€some€unknown€amount.€€It€is€likely€that€neither€of€these€parties€willÐ X ¨ Ðenjoy€the€standard€of€living€that€they€enjoyed€while€married,€which€is€often€what€happens€after€aÐ D!” Ðdivorce.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€Robertson€v.€Robertsonóó,€76€S.W.3d€337,€340€(Tenn.€2002)€(ð ðThe€parties'€incomesÐ 0"€  Ðand€assets€will€not€always€be€sufficient€for€them€to€achieve€the€same€standard€of€living€after€divorceÐ #l! Ðthat€they€enjoyed€during€the€marriage.€òòSee€Crabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€at€359-60.ðð).€€In€light€of€these€facts,Ð $X" Ðwe€cannot€conclude€that€the€Trial€Court€abused€its€discretion€when€it€found€Wife€was€notÐ ô$D # Ðeconomically€disadvantaged€as€compared€to€Husband.€€We€do€not€believe€Wife€is€economicallyÐ à%0!$ Ðdisadvantaged€as€compared€to€Husband€simply€because€he€earns€somewhat€more€money€than€sheÐ Ì&"% Ðdoes.€€The€income€disparity€is€not€so€significant€that€he€can€be€expected€to€enjoy€a€higher€standardÐ ¸'#& Ðof€living€than€she€will.€€This€is€even€more€apparent€when€considering€that€Wife€was€awarded€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðmarital€residence€and€all€of€the€equity€in€that€property,€as€well€as€the€vast€majority€of€the€householdÐ )à$( Ðfurnishings.€€Husband€had€no€cash€from€the€sale€of€the€marital€residence€to€use€in€purchasing€a€newÐ |*Ì%) Ðhome,€and€very€little,€if€any,€of€the€partiesðð€household€furnishings€to€put€in€a€home€should€heÐ h+¸&* Ðpurchase€one.€€Husband€would€have€to€incur€a€significant€amount€of€debt€just€to€be€able€to€live€inÐ ° Ða€house€equivalent€to€the€house€Wife€was€awarded,€and€he€then€would€have€to€incur€additionalÐ œì Ðexpense€to€have€it€furnished.€€Wife,€obviously,€will€not€have€to€do€this.€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àAfter€considering€all€of€the€relevant€factors€and€reviewing€the€finding€and€reasoningÐ `° Ðof€the€Trial€Court€in€detail,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€TrialÐ L œ ÐCourtððs€relevant€findings€and€that€the€Trial€Court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€when€it€refused€toÐ 8 ˆ Ðaward€Wife€any€alimony.€€Having€found€no€abuse€of€discretion€or€other€error€by€the€Trial€Court,€weÐ $ t Ðaffirm€the€Trial€Courtððs€refusal€to€award€Wife€alimony.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€final€issue€is€Wifeððs€claim€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€required€her€to€payÐ è 8  Ðher€own€attorney€fees.€€Attorney€fee€awards€are€treated€as€alimony.€€òòGilliam€v.€Gilliamóó,€776€S.W.2dÐ Ô$  Ð81,€86€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€In€determining€whether€to€award€attorney€fees,€a€trial€court€shouldÐ À  Ðconsider€the€relevant€factors€set€forth€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(E),€òòsupraóó.€€Awards€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðattorney€fees€are€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court,€and€will€not€be€disturbed€on€appealÐ ˜è  Ðunless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€award.€€òòKincaid€v.€Kincaidóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144Ð „Ô  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€After€considering€all€of€the€relevant€factors,€including€Wifeððs€need€andÐ pÀ ÐHusbandððs€ability€to€pay,€we€conclude€the€Trial€Court€did€not€err€in€requiring€each€party€to€pay€hisÐ \¬ Ðor€her€own€attorney€fees.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà@  %ìàò òòòConclusionó óóóˆÐ  p ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€and€this€cause€is€remanded€to€the€TrialÐ øH ÐCourt€for€collection€of€the€costs€below.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€assessed€against€the€Appellant,€LydiaÐ ä4 ÐAnn€Bishop€Watkins,€and€her€surety.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð 0"€  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àD.€MICHAEL€SWINEY,€JUDGEÐ #l! Ð