ÿWPCd ÄZLûxŒž„&‡ÔŠòžÍà[Éæ}µ(þ©Ï”„$‡Þ× fŸ,9Ú‹Þ¼_—Màðìü ƒ’l po]YêÈ–^NFÿÀn˜`ð_ùÀŠÁ¹[/¿•ŸqM„O†ÏNV1?úID\G÷¦žŠ^¹—ºpÏ ê-úO®-×pí0ÕtÝg%¯œ“‘?VÀ5[‡áÈeýA1¤O‘³‚ì¿Ä5Æ^]ûAØ;Ó¢%±{¨ö§§«7"!ù¶¯>e‚vâ'±n|ëÓad·Ãð~6[éP<‚‚,~þž>Åìb¶Ñ*VÖnä÷ >x% ^ËêŠï‹Æ'pBbÈÈ"&âX °ÆŒ«~Ú›Ül-1|{z6Á¡à= rÖnðÕ°…tÎ2m¿s¿†üš®œ{’ÍÀ\ IqêU;­³åÓ…1ïw Oc!n0„£vä#ö;‹´UþM•8WÑ@Sc/Ào €±Q¢Î›Þøõ ½ˆx@2Ö˜f„²j¹Â@ù†Æ6)'Õ«FT$e­ÃÝÎfÇ[™TmÚì"{#hꤗd"2#ï¢âÚ©Õ4ŒúC-¶ç/֘ѓ…• öÌL<Îq˜~ÛJß– ¤´ë*i¬IÈ&Yä8Mb#É\ %% UN+ 0ˆy UN ^ O w[ z_ ÒÙ 4« ¿ Î mÐ Æç Æ­ ÆsÆ9·ÿN¶ 0D¸¸Eüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüübþþþþþþþþ 0Y 0ë____ BJJ 0¤g D5  D-@ 0Kmm AS¸Æ  0¤Ñ 0Du A«¹˜\\IB01S01\CLERK1NASÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularž/Ï  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptqdj/ê:i¢×+003|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 ­Ý ƒRûm$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôæò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔRule€10€(Court€of€Appeals).€€òòMemorandum€Opinionóó.€ð!ð€(b)€The€Court€with€the€concurrence€of€all€judgesÐ ° Ðparticipating€in€the€case,€may€affirm,€reverse€or€modify€the€actions€of€the€trial€court€by€memorandum€opinion€when€aÐ tÄ Ðformal€opinion€would€have€no€precedential€value.€€When€a€case€is€decided€by€memorandum€opinion€€it€shall€beÐ 8ˆ Ðdesignated€ð ðMEMORANDUM€OPINION,ðð€shall€not€be€published,€and€shall€not€be€cited€or€relied€on€for€any€reason€inÐ üL Ða€subsequent€unrelated€case.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-6ÿÿ4HyperlinkóóòòÔ ÿ ÔóóÔ  Ô(|G2ûm$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€I‰»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôæò»»Ô d(|3G‰$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€I‰»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3G‰$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€..ÑÑ8€I‰»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€I‰»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼I‰»»»ÔÑ8€XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î]øî»¼I‰ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼I‰»îî]ø#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAUGUST€6,€2003€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XX»¼I‰ÔÌò òÔ#†¼I‰»XX#ÔMARY€CATHERINE€WATKINSòòóó€v.€BRYAN€KEITH€WATKINSòòóóÔ‡XX»¼I‰Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Rutherford€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€01„1958DR€€€€€€Royce€Taylor,€ChancellorÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2002„01777„COA„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€30,€2003ó óÔ#†¼I‰»XX‚#ÔÔ‡XX»¼I‰Ôò òÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ‡XXXXÔThis€is€an€appeal€from€an€order€denying€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€a€defaultÐ xÈ  Ðjudgment€entered€in€favor€of€Wife€in€her€divorce€from€Husband.€€For€the€following€reasons,€weÐ d´ Ðvacate€the€order€of€the€trial€court€and€remand€for€further€proceedings.Ð P  ÐÔ#†XXXXå#ÔÔ#†¼I‰»XXG#ÔÔ‡XX»¼I‰ÔÌÓÙÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3;€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Vacated€andÐ d ÐRemandedó óÐ P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼I‰»àX‹#ÔÔ‡XX.¼I‰ÔAlan€E.€Ô_ÔHighersÔ_Ô,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòW.€Frank€Crawford,€P.J.,€W.S.,óóÐ Ø( Ðand€òòHolly€M.€Kirby,€J.óó,€joined.Ð Ä ÐÌÔ_ÔTuscaÔ_Ô€R.S.€Alexis,€Ô_ÔLuvellÔ_Ô€L.€Ô_ÔGlantonÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€TN,€for€AppellantÐ œì ÐÌDonald€M.€Ô_ÔBullorchÔ_Ô,€Murfreesboro,€TN,€for€AppelleeÐ tÄ ÐÓJÓÌò òMEMORANDUM€OPINIONó óÔ#†¼I‰»XXy#ÔÔ‡XX»¼I‰Ô׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð L œ ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼I‰»XXÜ #ÔÔ‡XX»¼I‰ÔÓ  Óò òÔ‡XXXXÔà@ÿÿìàFacts€and€Procedural€Historyó óˆÐ $"t! ÐÌà  àMary€Catherine€Watkins€(ð ðWifeðð)€filed€her€petition€for€divorce€from€Bryan€Keith€WatkinsÐ ü#L# Ð(ð ðHusbandðð)€on€January€23,€2001€in€the€Rutherford€County€Chancery€Court.€€On€January€28,Ð è$8 $ ÐHusband€was€served€with€the€complaint€at€the€coupleððs€marital€residence,€where€both€parties€wereÐ Ô%$!% Ðstill€living€at€the€time.€€The€complaint€set€a€date€of€January€31,€2001€for€a€hearing€to€determine€theÐ À&"& Ðtemporary€custody€of€the€marital€residence.€€This€hearing€was€subsequently€continued€to€FebruaryÐ ¬'ü"'ýV ÐÔ_Ô12,€2001.€€Husband€did€not€appear€at€the€hearing,€nor€did€he€file€an€answer.€€On€March€3,€2001,€WifeÐ ° Ðfiled€a€motion€for€default€judgment,€and€a€hearing€was€conducted€on€April€6,€2001,€at€which€timeÐ œì Ðthe€lower€court€granted€default€judgment€in€favor€of€Wife.€€As€part€of€its€judgment,€the€trial€courtÐ ˆØ Ðawarded€Wife€the€partiesðð€marital€residence,€their€time€share€in€Gatlinburg,€Tennessee,€a€twenty„fiveÐ tÄ Ðacre€parcel€of€land€in€Normandy,€Tennessee,€all€household€goods€and€furnishings,€a€PlymouthÐ `° Ðautomobile,€all€assets€and€income€from€her€hair€salon,€as€well€as€a€one„half€interest€in€HusbandððsÐ L œ Ðpension€plan.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àOn€May€25,€2001,€Husband€filed€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€the€defaultÐ  ` Ðjudgment.€€Husband€alleged€that€he€took€no€action€in€the€divorce€proceeding€because€Wife€deceivedÐ ü L  Ðhim€into€believing€that€she€would€not€pursue€the€matter.€€Husband€gave€several€bases€for€thisÐ è 8  Ðallegation.€€First,€he€noted€that€Wife€had€previously€filed€for€divorce€multiple€times€and€had€failedÐ Ô$  Ðto€pursue€any€of€the€actions€to€a€conclusion.€€He€maintained€that€Wife€gave€him€assurances€that€sheÐ À  Ðwould€follow€this€pattern€again€by€declining€to€follow€up€on€her€complaint€for€divorce.€€HusbandÐ ¬ü  Ðthen€argued€that€he€was€convinced€by€her€assurances€because€the€couple€continued€to€live€togetherÐ ˜è  Ðand€share€marital€relations€in€the€weeks€following€the€filing€of€the€complaint.€€Finally,€HusbandÐ „Ô  Ðmaintained€that€he€was€unaware€of€any€hearings€or€motions€in€the€divorce€proceedings€because€heÐ pÀ Ðnever€received€any€notice€of€these€developments.€€Husband€did€not€dispute€that€he€received€theÐ \¬ Ðcomplaint€for€divorce€at€3509€Coleman€Hill€Road,€Rockvale,€TN€37153,€the€address€of€the€partiesððÐ H˜ Ðmarital€residence.€€The€record€indicates€that€it€was€served€on€his€person€by€a€sheriffððs€deputy.€Ð 4„ ÐHusband€did€contend,€however,€that€he€received€no€further€correspondence€regarding€the€divorce€andÐ  p Ðthat€Wife€was€responsible€for€this€lack€of€notice€throughout€the€proceedings.€€Specifically,€HusbandÐ  \ Ðargued€that€Wife€hid€any€correspondence€relating€to€the€divorce€so€that€he€would€remain€ignorant.€Ð øH ÐHusband€explained€that€Wife€was€in€a€unique€position€to€control€his€receipt€of€mail€because€she€wasÐ ä4 Ðthe€only€one€to€retrieve€the€coupleððs€mail.€€This€was€because,€beginning€sometime€in€2000,€theÐ Ð  Ðparties€had€all€mail€sent€to€the€Coleman€Hill€address€forwarded€to€a€post€office€box€in€CollegeÐ ¼  ÐGrove,€Tennessee.€€The€post€office€box€was€near€Wifeððs€place€of€work,€so,€for€the€sake€ofÐ ¨ø Ðconvenience,€she€assumed€the€duty€of€picking€up€the€coupleððs€mail€each€day.€€Husband€argued€thatÐ ”ä ÐWife€withheld€or€hid€any€correspondence€relating€to€the€divorce,€effectively€ensuring€that€HusbandÐ €Ð Ðwould€remain€uninvolved€in€the€litigation.€Ð l¼ ЀÌà  àWife€denied€all€of€Husbandððs€allegations,€maintaining€that€she€clearly€indicated€to€HusbandÐ D!” Ðher€intent€to€go€through€with€the€instant€divorce.€€She€also€argued€that€she€dutifully€delivered€allÐ 0"€  Ðmailings€pertaining€to€the€litigation€to€Husband.€€The€trial€court€allowed€the€parties€to€conductÐ #l! Ðdiscovery,€including€depositions,€on€the€limited€issues€raised€in€Husbandððs€rule€60.02€motion.€€AfterÐ $X" Ðconsidering€the€arguments€and€proof€marshaled€by€each€party,€the€lower€court€denied€HusbandððsÐ ô$D # Ðmotion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment€on€July€5,€2002.€€Upon€Wifeððs€motion,€the€trial€court€alsoÐ à%0!$ Ðdirected€Husband€to€pay€the€$6,825€in€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€by€Wife€in€defending€the€rule€60.02Ð Ì&"% Ðmotion.€€Husband€then€timely€filed€the€instant€appeal€challenging€the€judgment€of€the€lower€court.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌ€€à@ìì'ìàò òIssuesó óˆÐ )à$( ÐÌà  àHusband€raises€the€following€issues€for€our€consideration:Ð l+¼&* Їà  àI.à0 ` àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Husbandððs€motion€to€set€aside€the€finalÐ ° Ðdecree€of€divorce€entered€by€default.Мì` (#` (# ÐÌà  àII.à0 ` àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€Wife€for€the€defenseÐ tÄ Ðof€the€rule€60.02€motion.Ð`°` (#` (# ÐÌà  àWife€raises€an€additional€issue€on€appeal:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àIII.à0 ` àWhether€the€instant€appeal€is€frivolous.Ð `` (#` (# ЀÌà@žž!ìàò òStandard€of€Reviewó óˆÐ è 8  ÐÌà  àWe€employ€an€abuse€of€discretion€standard€when€reviewing€a€trial€courtððs€entry€of€defaultÐ À  Ðjudgment€and€its€refusal€to€set€aside€the€judgment€pursuant€to€a€rule€60.02€motion.€€òòReynolds€v.Ð ¬ü  ÐBattlesóó,€108€S.W.3d€249,€251€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2003).€€We€note,€however,€that€courts€have€expressedÐ ˜è  Ða€clear€preference€for€a€trial€on€the€merits.€€òòIdóó.€€As€such,€rule€60.02€should€be€construed€liberally€inÐ „Ô  Ðthe€context€of€default€judgment.€€òòIdóó.€€There€are€three€criteria€for€courts€to€consider€when€determiningÐ pÀ Ðwhether€to€grant€a€rule€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€a€default€judgment:€(1)€whether€the€default€wasÐ \¬ Ðwillful;€(2)€whether€the€defendant€has€asserted€a€meritorious€defense;€(3)€the€amount€of€prejudiceÐ H˜ Ðwhich€may€result€to€the€non„defaulting€party€if€the€motion€is€granted.€€òòIdóó.€€ð ðIf€there€is€any€reasonableÐ 4„ Ðdoubt€about€whether€the€judgment€should€be€set€aside,€the€court€should€grant€relief.ðð€€òòIdóó.€(citingÐ  p ÐòòNelson€v.€Simpsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€483,€486€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991)).€In€our€review€of€the€lower€courtððsÐ  \ Ðaward€of€attorneyððs€fees,€we€again€employ€the€abuse€of€discretion€standard.€€òòAaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909Ð øH ÐS.W.2d€408,€411€(Tenn.€1995);€òòKnox€County€ex€rel.€Schumpert€v.€Union€Livestock€Yard,€Inc.óó,€59Ð ä4 ÐS.W.3d€158,€166€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).Ð Ð  ÐÌà@ÚÚ"ìàò òRule€60.02€Motionó óˆÐ ¨ø ÐÌà  àWe€begin€our€analysis€with€Husbandððs€first€issue€on€appeal,€which€challenges€the€trial€courtððsÐ €Ð Ðdenial€of€the€rule€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment€granting€Wife€a€divorce.€€HusbandÐ l¼ Ðmaintains€that€he€is€entitled€to€have€the€default€judgment€set€aside€for€one€of€two€reasons:€eitherÐ X ¨ Ðbecause€Wife€misrepresented€her€intent€to€seek€a€final€divorce€or,€at€the€least,€because€HusbandÐ D!” Ðcommitted€an€excusable€mistake€in€misinterpreting€Wifeððs€intent.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€55.02€states€thatÐ 0"€  Ða€default€judgment€may€be€set€aside€for€ð ðgood€cause€shown€.€.€.€in€accordance€with€Rule€60.02."€Ð #l! ÐRule€60.02€then€provides,€in€part,€that€a€party€may€be€relieved€from€a€judgment€in€the€event€ofÐ $X" Ðð ðmistake,€inadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglectðð€or€ð ðfraud€.€.€.€misrepresentation,€or€otherÐ ô$D # Ðmisconduct€of€an€adverse€party.ðð€€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€movant€bears€the€burden€of€setting€forth€facts€which€establish€the€basis€for€relief.€€òòTenn.Ð ¸'#& ÐDept.€of€Human€Services€v.€Barbeeóó,€689€S.W.2d€863€(Tenn.€1985);€òòPirkle€v.€Parkeróó,€No.€E2002„Ð ¤(ô#' Ð01751„COA„R3„CV,€2003WL€104662,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2003).€€However,€courts€shouldÐ )à$( Ðconstrue€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€liberally€when€a€party€seeks€relief€from€defaultÐ |*Ì%) Ðjudgment.€€òòNelson€v.€Simpsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€483,€485€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Specifically,€courtsÐ h+¸&* Ðshould€examine€the€moving€partyððs€proof€to€determine€whether€the€default€was€willful,€whether€theÐ ° Ðmovant€has€asserted€a€meritorious€defense,€and€the€amount€of€prejudice€which€may€result€to€the€non„Ð œì Ðdefaulting€party.€€òòReynolds€v.€Battlesóó,€108€S.W.3d€249,€251€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2003);€òòNelsonóó,€826Ð ˆØ ÐS.W.2d€at€485.€€Although€a€rule€60.02€motion€is€addressed€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court,€suchÐ tÄ Ða€motion€should€be€granted€whenever€any€reasonable€doubt€exists€concerning€whether€the€defaultÐ `° Ðjudgment€should€be€set€aside.€€òòReynoldsóó,€108€S.W.3d€at€251.€€In€the€present€matter,€the€lower€courtÐ L œ Ðdenied€Husbandððs€rule€60.02€motion,€finding€that:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌÓ XÓÓ XÓThe€proof€offered€under€Rule€60.02€to€set€aside€the€judgment€even€when€taken€in€theÐ  ` Ðbest€light€for€the€defendant,€does€not€show€that€the€judgment€should€be€set€aside€forÐ ü L  Ða€mistake,€inadvertence,€surprise,€excusable€neglect€or€fraud.€€Rather,€it€shows€aÐ è 8  Ðdefendant€who€sat€on€his€hands€after€being€served€with€a€divorce€complaint€andÐ Ô$  Ðcontinued€to€sit€on€his€hands€and€take€no€action€within€30€days€from€the€entry€of€theÐ À  Ðdivorce€during€which€time€he€admittedly€was€fully€aware€of€the€final€decree.Ð ¬ü  ÐÓ X>1ÓÓ X01ÓÌHaving€reviewed€the€record,€and€in€light€of€the€strong€preference€for€a€trial€on€the€merits,€we€mustÐ „Ô  Ðrespectfully€disagree€with€the€conclusion€of€the€trial€court.€€In€his€affidavit,€Husband€swore€both€thatÐ pÀ ÐWife€reassured€him€she€would€not€pursue€the€divorce€and€that€he€never€received€any€notice€of€theÐ \¬ Ðdivorce€proceedings€beyond€the€initial€complaint.€€Wife€countered€with€her€own€affidavit,€and€thatÐ H˜ Ðof€her€housekeeper,€to€contradict€Husbandððs€version€of€events.€€The€result€is,€admittedly,€a€muddledÐ 4„ Ðscenario,€but€questions€of€fairness€and€equity€are€unquestionably€raised€by€the€testimony.€€We€cannotÐ  p Ðignore€the€preference€for€a€trial€on€the€merits€and€the€admonition€to€grant€relief€should€anyÐ  \ Ðreasonable€doubt€exist€as€to€whether€the€default€judgment€should€be€set€aside.€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àIn€this€case€there€is€insufficient€evidence€that€Husbandððs€default€was€willful,€rather€than€theÐ Ð  Ðresult€of€mistake€or€possible€misrepresentation€by€Wife.€€In€addition,€we€note€that€Husband€hasÐ ¼  Ðraised€a€meritorious€defense€in€his€affidavit,€challenging€the€distribution€of€property€set€forth€in€theÐ ¨ø Ðfinal€divorce€decree.€€Finally,€there€is€no€showing€that€Husbandððs€failure€to€timely€file€an€answer€orÐ ”ä Ðenter€an€appearance€has€resulted€in€prejudice€to€Wife.€€There€has€been€no€loss€of€evidence€nor€anyÐ €Ð Ðincrease€in€the€difficulty€of€discovery,€and€ð ð[t]he€mere€passage€of€time€is€not€the€sort€of€prejudiceÐ l¼ Ðthat€supports€declining€to€set€a€default€judgment€aside.ðð€€òòNelsonóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€486.€€Accordingly,Ð X ¨ Ðwe€vacate€the€default€judgment€entered€by€the€lower€court€and€remand€the€case€for€a€trial€on€theÐ D!” Ðmerits.€€In€addition,€we€vacate€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€Wife€for€her€defense€of€the€rule€60.02Ð 0"€  Ðmotion.€€The€award€of€attorneyððs€fees,€which€was€predicated€upon€the€underlying€failure€ofÐ #l! ÐHusbandððs€motion,€cannot€stand€where€Husbandððs€motion€is€successful.Ð $X" ÐÌà@  "ìàò òFrivolous€Appealó óˆÐ à%0!$ ÐÌà  àWife€raises€the€issue€of€whether€Husband€should€be€held€liable€for€damages,€pursuant€toÐ ¸'#& ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€27„1„122€(2003),€€for€instituting€a€frivolous€suit.€€In€light€of€our€holding€in€favorÐ ¤(ô#' Ðof€Husband€on€the€previous€two€issues,€we€clearly€do€not€consider€his€appeal€to€be€frivolous.€€AsÐ )à$( Ðsuch,€we€decline€to€award€attorneyððs€fees€for€this€appeal€to€Wife.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà@  %ìàà@@  %ìàò òConclusionó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€vacate€the€default€judgment€of€the€lower€court,€as€well€as€itsÐ ˆØ Ðaward€of€attorneyððs€fees,€and€remand€for€further€proceedings.€€We€instruct€the€lower€court€to€allowÐ tÄ ÐHusband€thirty€days€to€file€an€answer€and€to€then€conduct€a€trial€on€the€merits.€€Costs€of€this€appealÐ `° Ðare€taxed€to€the€Appellee,€Mary€Catherine€Watkins,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ð L œ ÐÔ#†XXXX» #ÔÔ#†¼I‰»XX #ÔÔ€XX»¼I‰ÔÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð è 8  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGE