ÿWPCNy :ƒðU«i\Ä=÷xj¡)0»ÿùrOP¡i^Ä3;~ç’à/ËÀîäÊ9]÷ÿUâ‡ÕÆ–ãç*¦®Œåââ¹ý©VÖ¿ºY»‘ ã>Sß󴾟HìwB¸ì‹ýE¼>·LI$‚Îõ/áÔÌÁVN¤-DÞ‰ók<¨JJ]–bŸx(´TKçÂs~Äí®•½²tíó<è‚ ©ßXqÔL›ËÅèsÓ¬PC@äÒzòJÄÔ%õe8ƒBã+íÑ$5$áA…%Ó)ÆìH*!kÖçoHqÚ3&o¨î‹fÓñS2µW%•zs\Ä'Ü4¢òêÈ`JêÆ\È .¾ŒŸÈ±éþ‰Æ½È/ø|? s5gt™ª=ld¬u5ô½Ç´ˆþ­ä©CCãùx(µG'ä·yrÂÃ_fTVúWøh(’¨¢}À‡èÒ={¤.kXúŽt¡Gèœëû§0è0¢ÄK Ò´4I³ P›f0™òIWj—lŒ•Ä"ë>4b6‹÷;Ãâ‚8ZÕrf@œ®ÒPU‹Ö¿öý1â·2¡Ãq‹™ä'Yî¡mŠ#ÉŒ %U ^ [ 0ˆg UONï w= 4A zU ÒÏ ¡° m² 1‡ÉÆPÆÆÜÆ¢ 72hNš 1uœ 72EC 0cEæ¨ 0DŽ ÒrÜz 0UV 0é« 0æ” 0ãz 0à] 0Ý= 0Ú 0×ô 0ÔË 0CŸ 0×â 0Ô¹ 0Ñ! 0Î^" 0Ë,# 0È÷# 0Å¿$b„% 0ÀŒ% 0@L& 0ÔŒ& 0Ñ`' 0Î1( 0Ëÿ( 0ÈÊ) 0Å’* 0ÂW+ 0½, 00Ö, 0<- 0¾B- 0>. 0v>. 0`´. 0`/ 0`t/ 0`Ô/ 0`40 08”0 0ÒÌ0 02ž1 0üÐ1 0:Ì2 0Y3 0__3 0 ¾3 0jÈ4 0„26 B*¶7 D/à7 0„8 D/“9 0ÎÂ9 0ë: 06{; 0±; 0:¹< Bó< 0^= 0¤n= D3> D-E> 0Kr> 0<½> ASù>ÆL? 0¤@ 0D¶@ A«ú@ 1e¥AU6 BU>@BU*~B¨BDÄFIˆ MU&N”N£âNp…QôõTbée@KjÀ‹lVKn<¡oíÝp½Êr+‡sš²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²t²tNLy˜\\IB01S01\CLERK1NASÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»×|œ.Ï (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÚk.x5.1:808Ä·¡ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x#ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 I.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à ÜÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔNinety€days€are€required€if€minor€children€are€involved.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„103(c)(1).(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó –Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€four€separate€cases€were€consolidated€by€the€trial€court€into€No.€I„26223.€€Nonetheless,€this€court€wasÐ ° Ðasked€to€consolidate€the€cases€on€appeal€and€did€so€before€the€trial€courtððs€order€of€consolidation€was€brought€to€ourÐ tÄ Ðattention.  ÒÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMany€of€the€facts€cited€by€Ms.€Williams€in€her€brief€are€not€ð ðfacts,ðð€but€merely€allegations.€€Ms.€WilliamsððsÐ ° Ðcitations€to€the€record€are€often€citations€to€her€statements€by€counsel€made€to€the€court€during€the€various€hearingsÐ tÄ Ðherein.€€Statements€by€counsel€are,€of€course,€not€evidence.€€*+ ÿÿ(_26Ô2ÔÔ3  Ôà..à*G+M ÿÿ(_25Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*D+M ÿÿ(_24Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*A+M ÿÿ(_23Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*>+M ÿÿ(_22Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*;+M ÿÿ(_21Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*8+M ÿÿ(_20Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*5+M ÿÿ(_19Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*2+M ÿÿ(_18Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôà..àÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó* ÿÿ(_17Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô€*GM ÿÿ(_16Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*DM ÿÿ(_15Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*AM ÿÿ(_14Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*>M ÿÿ(_13Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*;M ÿÿ(_12Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*8M ÿÿ(_11Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó*5M ÿÿ(_10Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó- ù-(2M ÿÿ&_9Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó( ÿÿ&_8Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô(GM ÿÿ&_7Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(DM ÿÿ&_6Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(AM ÿÿ&_5Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(>M ÿÿ&_4Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(;M ÿÿ&_3Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(8M ÿÿ&_2Ó ¨ý ÓÓ h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó(5M ÿÿ&_1Ó ¨ý ÓÓ À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó&2M ÿÿ$_Ó ¨ý ÓÓ  ÓÓÈÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ ¨ý Ó0ÿÿ.Normal<ÿÿ:Definition T<AAÿÿ:Definition LÓ , ÓÓ5+Ü Ü` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5Ó8ÿÿ6Definitionòòóó(''ÿÿ&H1ò òÔ  ÔÔ‡°°°ÔÔ‡ôôôÔó óÔ  Ô(ÿÿ&H2ò òÔ‡„„„ÔÔ‡ôôôÔó ó(ÿÿ&H3ò òÔ‡¼¼¼ÔÔ‡ôôôÔó ó(ÿÿ&H4ò òÔ‡XXXÔÔ‡ôôôÔó ó(ÿÿ&H5ò òÔ‡ôôôÔó óÔ‡ôôôÔ(ÿÿ&H6ò òÔ‡ÔÔ‡ôôôÔó ó2ÿÿ0Addressòòóó8MMÿÿ6BlockquoteÓ , ÓÓ , ÓÓ5+Ü Ü` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5Ó,ÿÿ*CITEòòóó,dlÿÿ*CODEÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡c<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ4ÿÿ2Emphasisòòóó6ÿÿ4HyperlinkóóòòÔ ÿ ÔóóÔ  Ô<ÿÿ:FollowedHypeóóòòÔ €€ ÔóóÔ  Ô4goÿÿ2Keyboardò òÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡c<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔó ó<“›ÿÿ:PreformattedÓ/%° °Ïî ,KkŠ©È %#/ÓÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡c<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ/%° °Ïî ,KkŠ©È %#/Ó<š®ÿÿ:z©Bottom of Ó7€N(€X7ÓÓ  ÓÔ‡ÔÔ?‡e%ä2¼A`‹Arial?ÔÓ  ÓÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ7€Z(€X7Ó&ÿÿ  d dM)1dxd<š®ÿÿ:z©Top of ForÓ7€P(€X7ÓÓ  ÓÔ‡ÔÔ?‡e%ä2¼A`‹Arial?ÔÓ  ÓÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔÓ7€Z(€X7ÓM)2dxd0KSÿÿ.SampleÔK‡c<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ(|G2Èâ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôïò»»Ô0ÿÿ.Strongò òó ó8dlÿÿ6TypewriterÔ‡ôôôÔÔK‡c<þ6X9`(‹Courier NewKÔÔ‡ôôôÔÔS‡dô\  `‹&Times New RomanSÔ4ÿÿ2Variableòòóó d: ÿÿ8HTML MarkupÔB  ÔÔ ÿ ÔÔ  Ô(|3G„$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2 ÿÿ0CommentÔB  Ô^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3G„$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€R}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKK&'()*+,- ÿÿ35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<þ6X9`(‹Courier Newô\  `‹&Times New Roman%ä2¼A`‹Arial Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€support€of€that€determination,€the€Court€relied€upon€and€quoted€with€approval€the€following€language€fromÐ ° ÐòòHergenratheróó€òòv.€State€Mut.€Life€Assurance€Co.óó,€79€Ohio€App.€116,€68€N.E.2d€833€(1946):Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àð ðThe€right€of€the€wife€to€recover€the€proceeds€of€the€policy€does€not€hinge€on€the€existence€of€aÐ üL Ðrelationship€of€husband€and€wife,€but€rather€on€the€well€established€principles€of€contract€law€.€.€.€.€Ð À ÐHer€right€did€not€arise€out€of€the€relation€of€husband€and€wife.€€True,€she€was€his€wife€at€the€time€theÐ „Ô Ðpolicy€was€issued€and€this€fact€undoubtedly€was€the€reason€why€she€was€named€as€beneficiary,€but€herÐ H ˜ Ðproperty€interest€in€the€policy€did€not€arise€out€of€the€marriage€relation.ððÐ \Ð Ð  ÐÌòòBowersóó,€637€S.W.2d€at€458€(citations€omitted). :Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú19Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡jô÷-òòô÷-ÔEven€if€this€court€does€not€agree€with€the€reason€advanced€by€the€trial€court€to€justify€its€judgment,€we€areÐ ° Ðð ðcalled€upon€to€pass€upon€the€correctness€of€the€result€reached€in€the€trial€court,€not€necessarily€the€reasoning€employedÐ tÄ Ðto€reach€the€result.ðð€€òòShelter€Ins.€Cos.€v.€Hannóó,€921€S.W.2d€194,€202€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ô#†ô÷-òòjô÷-#Ô úÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€explained€its€reasoning:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àThe€Court€feels€like€it€doesnððt€have€any€legal€authority€at€this€point€in€time€to€order€in€essence€Ms.Ð 8ˆ ÐWilliams€to€make€a€decision€as€to€whether€itððs€a€lump€sum€determination€or€not€as€to€how€thoseÐ üL Ðproceeds€would€be€paid€out€to€her.€€The€Courtððs€not€ready€to€rule€upon€the€merits€of€the€issue€of€theÐ À Ðliability€for€taxes€for€the€proceeds€under€the€annuity€contracts.ЄÔÐ Ð  ÐÌThe€trial€courtððs€decision€was€based€in€part€on€the€fact€that€Ms.€Williams€had€not€yet€received€any€funds€from€theÐ  \ Ðannuities€and€that€the€court€had€allowed€her€to€choose€an€option€for€payment€from€among€those€allowed€by€each€contractÐ Ð  Ðsince€there€were€tax€consequences€to€Ms.€Williams€depending€on€that€choice. ~Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMs.€Williams€argues€this€issue€was€raised€for€the€first€time€on€appeal,€but€in€fact€Hartford€sought€to€depositÐ ° Ðthe€amounts€it€held€pursuant€to€the€annuity€contract€into€the€court€in€its€initial€interpleader€petition€in€the€trial€court.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular ™Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú18Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€a€prior€holding€this€court€stated:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àThe€rule€[of€òòres€judicataóó]€requires€that€the€whole€subject€of€the€litigation€be€brought€forward€by€theÐ 8ˆ Ðparties,€and€the€judgment€concludes€all€matters,€whether€of€action€or€defense,€legally€pertaining€to€thatÐ üL Ðsubject€which,€by€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligence,€might€have€been€brought€forward.ÐÀÐ Ð  ÐÐ „Ô  ÐòòMcKinney€v.€Widner,€óó746€S.W.2d€699,€705€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987). fÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔEven€though€the€divorce€decree€granted€the€divorce€on€the€ground€of€irreconcilable€differences,€the€complaintÐ ° Ðalleged€that€ground€and€the€ground€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€The€parties€agreed€to€the€existence€of€the€groundÐ tÄ Ðof€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€that€Mr.€Williams€was€entitled€to€a€divorce€on€that€ground.€€The€statutory€waitingÐ 8ˆ Ðperiod€for€a€divorce€on€the€ground€of€irreconcilable€differences€would€have€no€relevance€to€a€divorce€ò òó óon€another€ground.€Ð üL Ðð ðBills€for€divorce€on€the€ground€of€irreconcilable€differences€must€have€been€on€file€sixty€(60)€days€before€being€heard.ðð€Ð À ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„103(c)(1). êÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAs€mentioned€earlier€in€this€opinion,€Ms.€Williams€gave€testimony€in€a€deposition.€€Some€of€that€testimonyÐ ° Ðdeals€with€the€events€of€May€11.€€However,€on€appeal,€Ms.€Williams€has€taken€the€position€that€this€court€cannot€considerÐ tÄ Ðher€deposition€or€those€David€Ô_ÔGarrettÔ_Ô,€Mr.€Williamsððs€attorney€who€prepared€and€filed€the€divorce€documents,€and€CindyÐ 8ˆ ÐÔ_ÔManiscalcoÔ_Ô,€who€worked€in€Mr.€Ô_ÔGarrettÔ_Ôððs€office€and€testified€regarding€contact€with€Ms.€Williams€prior€to€the€signingÐ üL Ðand€filing€of€the€divorce€papers.€€Ms.€Williams€argues€that€these€depositions€were€part€of€the€record€only€in€one€of€theÐ À ÐInterpleader€cases€and€cannot€be€used€in€any€of€the€other€cases,€including€the€Divorce€Case.€€Ð „Ô ÐÌà  àThis€argument€disregards€the€trial€courtððs€and€this€courtððs€consolidation€of€the€cases.€At€the€hearing€on€theÐ  \ Ðmotion€òòin€Ô_ÔlimineÔ_Ôóó,€the€trial€court€discussed€with€counsel€whether€the€cases€should€be€consolidated.€€At€the€hearing€onÐ Ð  ÐJanuary€31,€the€court€again€discussed€consolidation,€indicating€that€it€would€be€beneficial€to€consolidate€the€matters€soÐ ” ä  Ðissues€could€be€resolved€as€necessary.€€After€arguments€regarding€which€issues€should€be€decided€first€among€the€variousÐ X ¨  Ðcases€and€motions€to€stay€some€rulings€pending€decisions€on€other€issues,€the€court€stated:Ð  l  ÐÌà8  àIððll€go€ahead€and€consolidate€the€matters€as€we€discussed€for€the€purposes€of€handling€everythingÐ ¤ô  Ðtogether€in€that€regard.€€And€we€can€always€address€these€issues€separately€in€the€case.Ðh¸ Ð Ð  ÐÐ ,|   Ðà  àSubsequently,€an€order€was€entered€ordering€that€all€four€enumerated€cases€ð ðbe€consolidated€for€hearing€underÐ ° Ðthe€above„captioned€case€[the€Divorce€Case].ðð€€Although€there€may€some€ambiguity€about€the€meaning€of€consolidationÐ tÄ Ðfor€hearing,€the€court€clearly€consolidated€all€the€cases€into€one€case,€directing€that€the€Divorce€Case€be€the€survivingÐ 8ˆ Ðcase.€€The€parties€appear€to€have€ignored€this€directive,€and€filings€were€made€under€various€case€styles€and€numbers.€Ð üL ÐThis€court€was€also€asked€to€consolidate€the€four€cases,€indicating€the€partiesðð€assumption€there€were€still€four€cases,€andÐ À Ðwe€granted€the€motion,€simply€stating€that€the€cases€ð ðare€hereby€consolidated.ðð€€While€Ms.€Williams€asserts€that€thisÐ „Ô Ðstatement€did€not€result€in€a€consolidation€of€the€records,€we€respectfully€disagree.€€€€€Ð H ˜ ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€we€note€that€the€taking€of€Ms.€Williamsððs€deposition€prompted€her€motion€to€limit€evidence€in€theÐ Ð  ÐRule€60€proceedings,€and€the€deposition€was€discussed€in€the€hearings€on€that€motion.€€We€consider€the€deposition€toÐ ” ä  Ðbe€included€in€the€record€of€the€consolidated€cases.€€Her€deposition€was€filed€after€the€order€of€consolidation€and€beforeÐ X ¨  Ðthe€court€ruled€on€the€Rule€60€motion.€€A€deposition€of€a€party€may€be€used€by€an€adverse€party€for€any€purpose.€€Tenn.Ð  l  ÐR.€Civ.€P.€32.01(2).€€In€addition,€Ms.€Williams€asserts€that€this€court€cannot€consider€the€depositions€because€they€wereÐ à 0  Ðnot€considered€by€the€trial€court€in€making€its€decision.€€The€trial€courtððs€order€makes€no€reference€to€the€depositions,Ð ¤ô  Ðbut€we€cannot€assume€from€that€silence€that€the€court€did€not€consider€them.€€They€were€filed€before€the€courtððs€rulingÐ h¸  Ðon€the€Rule€60€motion€and,€in€our€opinion,€were€available€to€the€court€for€consideration€in€making€its€determination.Ð ,|  Ðà  àÌà  àNonetheless,€we€do€not€find€it€necessary€to€consider€the€deposition€of€Ms.€Williams€and€the€other€depositionsÐ ´  Ðin€order€to€resolve€the€question€before€us. XÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAlthough€not€pursued€in€detail,€the€Estate€asserts€the€particular€applicability€of€the€òòCottenóó€case€because€theÐ ° Ðð ðinstant€case€involves€both€a€dissent€from€the€will€and€a€revocation€of€the€will€by€statute€because€of€the€divorce€of€theÐ tÄ Ðparties.ðð€€However,€the€Estate€does€not€assert€that€Mr.€Williamsððs€will€had€a€provision€similar€to€that€in€òòCotten€óódeprivingÐ 8ˆ Ðthe€widow€of€all€benefits€of€the€will€if€she€dissents.€€Our€review€of€the€will€reveals€no€such€provision.€€In€fact,€Mr.Ð üL ÐWilliams€provided€ð ðIn€addition€to€any€other€method€of€disclaimer€or€release€recognized€by€law,€my€wife€or€her€executorÐ À Ðmay€disclaim€or€release€any€interest€under€this€will€.€.€.€.ðð€€The€differences€in€the€two€wills€and€the€fact€that€Ms.€WilliamsÐ „Ô Ðhas€been€found€to€be€the€ex„wife€and€not€the€widow€make€any€attempted€dissent€on€her€part€irrelevant€to€this€issue. 6Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhen€the€residuary€estate,€or€other€portion€of€the€estate€designated€by€the€testator€for€the€payment€of€estateÐ ° Ðtaxes€is€not€sufficient€for€that€purpose,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„614€applies€to€allow€the€executor€to€recover€aÐ tÄ Ðproportionate€share€of€taxes€from€beneficiaries.€€òòDedmanóó,€86€S.W.3d€at€520.€€No€claim€has€been€made€in€this€case€thatÐ 8ˆ Ðany€such€insufficiency€exists. ¶Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔShe€also€filed€claims€for€funeral€and€burial€expensesÔ‡XXòô÷-Ô.Ô#†ô÷-òXX´#Ô€These€claims€are€not€at€issue€on€appeal€as€the€partiesÐ ° Ðentered€an€agreed€order€on€July€11,€2000,€reimbursing€Ms.€Williams€for€$13,312.80€in€funeral€and€burial€expenses.€€ LÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔShe€does€argue€that€the€suddenness€of€the€situation€put€her€ð ðin€a€frame€of€mind€where€she€was€unable€toÐ ° Ðappreciate€the€significance€.€.€.€and€ramifications€.€.€.ðð€of€the€documents. 2Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú17Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAgain,€the€time€for€filing€an€exception€is€extended€if€the€time€for€filing€the€claim€was€extended.€€òòSeeóó€fn€15.€Ð ° ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„314(a).€€òòóó ãÝ ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhile€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„307(a)(1)€states€that€all€claims€are€barred€unless€filed€within€the€periodÐ ° Ðprescribed€in€the€notice€published€or€posted€in€accordance€with€ðð€30„2„306(c),€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„307(a)(1)(A)Ð tÄ Ð&€(B)€provide€exceptions€to€the€general€four€month€rule€in€situations€not€present€here.€ ³Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€date€is€a€mistake€and€should€read€September€16. !Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€amended€claim€related€only€to€the€$55,000€loan€and€was€supported€by€checks€dated€November€25,€1996Ð ° Ðand€December€6,€1996,€totaling€$55,000. Ý ƒRÈâ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô÷-ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€its€complaint€for€interpleader,€Hartford€asserted€that:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àPursuant€to€the€terms€of€the€Contract,€Hartford€is€obligated€to€either€pay€the€proceeds€into€the€Estate,Ð 8ˆ Ðif€the€Estate€is€designated€as€the€proper€beneficiary,€or,€rather,€Hartford€is€obligated€to€pay€theÐ üL Ðproceeds€to€Ms.€Katherine€Williams,€if€Ms.€Katherine€Williams€is€the€proper€beneficiary€of€payments.€Ð À ÐIf€Ms.€Katherine€Williams€is€determined€to€be€the€proper€beneficiary€under€the€Contract,€then€sheÐ „Ô Ðwould€also€have€the€option€of€requesting€a€ð ðÔ_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€continuation€election€notice,ðð€which€may€allowÐ H ˜ Ðfor€the€deferral€or€payments€until€a€later€date,€or€to€elect€that€Hartford€immediately€pay€her€theÐ  \ Ðguaranteed€death€benefit€pursuant€to€the€contract.€€ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€correctness€of€Hartfordððs€interpretation€of€its€annuity€contract€has€not€been€raised.Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€C•»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼C•»»»ÔÑ8€XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î@TC•ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼C•»îî@T #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓOctober€9,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XX»¼C•ÔÌò òÔ#†¼C•»XXô#Ôà @ àIN€RE:€ESTATE€OF€JAMES€H.€WILLIAMSÔ‡XX»¼C•Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€I„26223;€No.€I„26694;€No.€I„26782€€€€€€Jeffrey€F.€Ô_ÔBivinsÔ_Ô,€Chancellor׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð æ 6 ÐNo.€P992314€€€€€R.€E.€Lee€Davies,€ChancellorÐ Ò " ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<•` AßÐ –æ  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2000„02434„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€April€28,€Ô_Ô2003Ô_ÔÐ ‘á  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<h` AßÐ i¹  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€case€began€as€four€separate€cases€which€were€consolidated.€€All€four€cases€arose€from€theÐ d´ Ðdivorce€of€James€Ô_ÔHollisterÔ_Ô€Williams€and€Ô_ÔKathyrnÔ_Ô€L.€H.€Williams,€his€untimely€death,€and€the€probateÐ P  Ðand€distribution€of€assets€in€his€sizeable€estate.€€The€trial€court€upheld€the€validity€of€the€divorce€byÐ <Œ Ðdenying€Ms.€Williams€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€awarded€several€annuities€to€Ms.Ð (x ÐWilliams€based€on€her€status€as€the€named€beneficiary,€ordered€her€to€pay€the€estate€taxes€resultingÐ d Ðfrom€those€annuities,€and€approved€part€of€a€claim€filed€by€Ms.€Williams€against€the€Estate,€butÐ P Ðdenied€part.€€We€affirm€the€decisions€of€the€trial€court€upholding€the€validity€of€the€divorce€andÐ ì< Ðawarding€the€annuities€to€Ms.€Williams,€but€vacate€the€order€granting€the€Estate€a€judgment€againstÐ Ø( ÐMs.€Williams€for€the€estate€taxes€on€the€annuities.€€We€also€affirm€in€part€and€reverse€in€part€theÐ Ä Ðdecision€of€the€trial€court€with€respect€to€the€claim€against€the€Estate,€and€hold€that€the€entire€claimÐ ° Ðshould€have€been€denied.Ð œì ÐÓ|ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Courtó óÐ tÄ Ðò òAffirmed€in€Part,€Reversed€in€Part€and€Remandedó óÐ `° ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼C•»àXf#ÔÔ‡XX.¼C•ÔPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòBen€H.€Ô_ÔCantrellÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,€M.S.,óóÐ 8!ˆ  Ðand€òòWilliam€B.€Cain,€J.óó,€joined.Ð $"t! ÐÌDana€Ô_ÔMcLendonÔ_Ô,€Ernest€Wilson€Williams,€Franklin,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Jennie€WilliamsÐ ü#L# ÐPerdue,€Executrix.Ð è$8 $ ÐÌEva€C.€Madison,€Peter€T.€Ô_ÔDirksenÔ_Ô,€Stephen€A.€Cobb,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€KathrynÐ À&"& ÐL.€H.€Williams.Ð ¬'ü"' ÐÌÐ „)Ô$)ý ÐÔ_Ô‡David€A.€Thornton,€Memphis,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Hartford€Life€and€Annuity€Ins.€Co.Ô#†¼C•»XX #ÔÔ‡XX»¼C•ÔÐ ° ÐÌChristopher€E.€Thorsen,€George€H.€Nolan,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Lincoln€NationalÐ ˆØ ÐLife€Insurance.Ð tÄ ÐÌGregory€M.€Leitner,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€intervenor,€Guardian€Life€Insurance.Ð L œ ÐÌÓ^ Óò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼C•»XXÈ#ÔÔ€XX»¼C•ÔÐ $ t ÐÌÓ  Óà  àJames€Hollister€Williams€and€Kathryn€Louise€Henderson€Williams€were€divorced€by€orderÐ ü L  Ðentered€May€11,€1999€in€the€Divorce€Case.€€Fifty„four€days€later,€Mr.€Williams€drowned,€leaving€aÐ è 8  Ðwill€and€a€large€estate.€€Shortly€thereafter,€his€daughter,€Ms.€Jennie€Williams€Perdue,€was€appointedÐ Ô$  Ðexecutor€of€his€estate,€and€the€Probate€Case€was€begun€on€July€13,€1999.€€Among€the€assets€wereÐ À  Ðcertain€annuities€which€named€Kathryn€Williams€as€the€beneficiary,€and€the€Estate€filed€a€complaintÐ ¬ü  Ðin€the€Probate€Case€seeking€a€declaratory€judgment€that€those€annuities€belonged€to€the€EstateÐ ˜è  Ðbecause€of€the€language€of€the€partiesðð€marital€dissolution€agreement.€€In€correspondence€precedingÐ „Ô  Ðthe€filing€of€the€Estateððs€complaint,€Ms.€Williams€had€taken€the€position€that€she€was€Mr.€WilliamsððsÐ pÀ Ðwidow,€not€his€former€wife,€and/or€that€no€change€of€beneficiary€had€been€made€as€to€certain€assets.€Ð \¬ ÐThe€Estate€also€sought€to€have€the€final€decree€of€divorce€declared€valid€and€a€declaration€that€theÐ H˜ Ðproperty€awarded€to€Mr.€Williams€in€the€decree€was€the€property€of€the€Estate.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àKathryn€Williams€then€filed€a€motion€to€intervene€in€the€Probate€Case€and€challenged€theÐ  \ Ðprobate€courtððs€jurisdiction€over€the€divorce€decree€and€other€issues€raised€by€Ms.€Perdue.€€InÐ øH Ðaddition,€in€October€of€1999,€Ms.€Williams€filed€a€claim€against€the€Estate€for€a€total€of€$95,000.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àMeanwhile,€Kathryn€Williams€filed€in€September€of€1999€a€motion€for€relief€from€judgmentÐ ¼  Ðpursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€in€the€Divorce€Case€seeking€to€have€the€divorce€set€aside€on€aÐ ¨ø Ðnumber€of€grounds.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àWhile€matters€were€pending€and€proceeding€in€the€Divorce€Case€and€the€Probate€Case,Ð l¼ ÐLincoln€National€Life€Insurance€Company,€Guardian€Life€Insurance€Company,€and€Hartford€Life€andÐ X ¨ ÐAnnuity€Insurance€Company,€all€issuers€of€annuity€contracts€to€James€H.€Williams,€the€deceased,Ð D!” Ðon€which€Kathryn€Williams€was€the€designated€beneficiary,€brought€or€intervened€in€two€interpleaderÐ 0"€  Ðactions€seeking€to€have€determined€the€proper€payee€of€the€annuities,€the€Interpleader€Cases.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àMs.€Perdue€filed€in€the€Probate€Case€an€application€for€injunctive€relief€relating€toÐ ô$D # Ðapportionment€of€tax€liability€for€the€annuities€and€life€insurance€policies€on€which€KathrynÐ à%0!$ ÐWilliams€was€the€named€beneficiary.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThe€issues€raised€in€these€cases€were€decided€in€various€final€orders.€€The€result€was:€(1)€Ms.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐWilliamsððs€motion€to€set€aside€the€divorce€decree€was€denied,€and€the€divorce€was€held€valid;€(2)Ð )à$( ÐMs.€Williams€was€granted€the€annuities€as€the€named€beneficiary€thereof;€(3)€tax€liability€for€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðannuities€was€charged€to€Ms.€Williams,€and€a€judgment€against€her€in€favor€of€the€Estate€for€theÐ h+¸&* Ðamount€of€taxes€was€entered;€and€(4)€Ms.€Williams€was€awarded€judgment€on€a€portion€of€her€claimÐ ° Ðagainst€the€Estate,€in€the€amount€of€$40,000.€€All€these€holdings€are€appealed.Ð œì ÐÌà  àMr.€Williamsððs€will€created€a€marital€trust€at€the€maximum€allowable€marital€deduction€forÐ tÄ Ðthe€benefit€of€ð ðmy€wife,ðð€gave€his€tangible€personal€property€after€specific€bequests€to€ð ðmy€wife,ððÐ `° Ðand€left€the€rest,€residue,€and€remainder€of€his€estate€to€his€daughter.€€Mr.€Williams€also€designatedÐ L œ Ðð ðmy€wifeðð€as€co„executor€and€co„trustee.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àAlthough€Mr.€Williams€did€not€change€his€will€after€the€divorce,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„Ð  ` Ð202(a)€operates€to€make€such€changes€by€revoking€the€bequests€to€and€nomination€of€ð ðmy€wife.ðð€Ð ü L  ÐThat€statute€provides:Ð è 8  ÐÌà8  àIf€after€executing€a€will€the€testator€is€divorced€or€his€marriage€annulled,€the€divorceÐ À  Ðor€annulment€revokes€any€disposition€or€appointment€of€property€made€by€the€willÐ ¬ü  Ðto€the€former€spouse,€any€provision€conferring€a€general€or€special€power€ofÐ ˜è  Ðappointment€on€the€former€spouse,€and€any€nomination€of€the€former€spouse€asÐ „Ô  Ðexecutor,€trustee,€conservator€or€guardian,€unless€the€will€expressly€providesÐ pÀ Ðotherwise.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„202(a).Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThus,€if€the€divorce€was€valid,€the€bequests€to€Kathryn€Williams€were€revoked,€and€Ms.Ð  \ ÐPerdue€inherited€that€property€as€part€of€the€remainder€estate.€€Therefore,€we€begin€with€the€challengeÐ øH Ðto€the€divorce.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà@[[ìàI.€€The€Divorce€DecreeˆÐ ¼  ÐÌà  àMr.€and€Ms.€Williams€lived€together€for€a€period€of€seven€or€eight€years€and€then€marriedÐ ”ä Ðin€February€of€1990.€€Ms.€Williams€worked€at€Mr.€Williamsððs€business€from€early€in€theirÐ €Ð Ðrelationship.€€On€May€11,€1999,€Mr.€Williams€filed€for€a€divorce€based€on€irreconcilable€differencesÐ l¼ Ðand€inappropriate€marital€conduct€by€Ms.€Williams.€€On€that€date,€the€parties€met€at€the€courthouseÐ X ¨ Ðwith€Mr.€Williamsððs€lawyer€and€executed€a€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement€(ð ðMDAðð).€€The€MDAÐ D!” Ðincludes€a€paragraph€in€which€Ms.€Williams€stipulated€that€she€was€guilty€of€inappropriate€maritalÐ 0"€  Ðconduct€and€that€her€husband€was€entitled€to€a€divorce.€€She€also€waived€her€right€to€file€an€answerÐ #l! Ðto€the€complaint.€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àThe€divorce€decree,€granting€a€divorce€on€grounds€of€irreconcilable€differences,€was€signedÐ à%0!$ Ðby€the€trial€court€the€same€day€that€it€was€filed,€without€a€hearing.€The€final€decree€reflects€that€theÐ Ì&"% Ðparties€agreed€ð ðto€allow€Mr.€Williams€to€proceed€to€Court€on€an€uncontested€basisðð€and€that€the€courtÐ ¸'#& Ðapproved€and€incorporated€the€MDA.€€After€the€divorce€decree€was€entered,€Mr.€and€Ms.€WilliamsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcontinued€to€live€together€and€to€work€together.€€Until€Ms.€Williamsððs€filing€of€the€motion€herein,Ð )à$( Ðthe€final€decree€was€not€appealed€or€otherwise€challenged,€and€became€a€final€order€thirty€days€afterÐ |*Ì%) Ðits€entry.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àFour€months€after€the€entry€of€the€decree,€and€two€months€after€the€initiation€of€the€probateÐ ° Ðproceedings,€on€September€8,€1999,€Ms.€Williams€filed€in€the€Divorce€Case€a€Rule€60€motion€forÐ œì Ðrelief€from€the€divorce€decree.€€The€motion€accompanied€requests€for€injunctive€relief€against€theÐ ˆØ ÐEstate€and€the€executrix€and€detailed€efforts€by€the€Estate,€among€other€things,€to€sell€the€residenceÐ tÄ Ðin€which€the€Williamses€had€lived€and€in€which€Ms.€Williams€continued€to€live.€€It€is€apparent€thatÐ `° Ðthe€actions€of€the€executrix€prompted€the€filing€of€the€motion€to€set€aside€the€divorce.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àIn€her€pleadings€in€support€of€the€motion,€Ms.€Williams€acknowledged€that€she€had€an€extra„Ð $ t Ðmarital€affair€in€February€and€March€of€1999€which€her€husband€discovered.€€She€alleges€that€Mr.Ð  ` ÐWilliams€then€began€dating€other€women.€€In€her€affidavit€supporting€the€motion,€Ms.€WilliamsÐ ü L  Ðtestified€that€on€May€10,€1999,€Mr.€Williams€told€her€he€wanted€a€divorce€and€that€they€had€anÐ è 8  Ðappointment€with€his€lawyer€the€next€day.€€She€further€testified,€ð ðPrior€to€the€discussion€of€divorceÐ Ô$  Ðon€May€10,€1999,€Decedent€had€only€once,€in€passing,€mentioned€the€possibility€of€divorce€toÐ À  ÐAffiant.ðð€€Her€affidavit€includes€the€details€of€the€partiesðð€meeting€at€the€courthouse€and€their€signingÐ ¬ü  Ðof€the€documents.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àIn€the€Divorce€Case,€the€parties€entered€an€agreed€order€to€set€the€Rule€60€motion€for€hearing,Ð pÀ Ðwhich€order€also€included€notice€of€the€date€and€time€of€depositions€of€Ms.€Williams€and€of€Ms.Ð \¬ ÐPerdue.€€After€a€portion€of€Ms.€Williamsððs€deposition€was€taken,€and€based€on€questions€she€wasÐ H˜ Ðasked,€she€filed€a€motion€òòin€limineóó€asking€the€court€to€exclude€from€the€hearing€on€the€Rule€60Ð 4„ Ðmotion€any€ð ðevidence€of€the€details€of€her€alleged€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€the€details€ofÐ  p Ðher€personal€life€after€the€purported€divorce€and€after€the€death€of€Plaintiff€James€Williams.ðð€€AfterÐ  \ Ða€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€the€motion€òòin€limineóó.€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àAfter€that€hearing,€the€Estate€filed€a€response€to€the€Rule€60€motion.€€That€response€disputedÐ Ð  ÐMs.€Williamsððs€version€of€the€facts,€as€set€out€in€her€motion,€including€an€averment€that€the€proofÐ ¼  Ðwould€show€ð ðthat€the€parties€discussed,€debated€and€negotiated€a€divorce€beginning€not€later€thanÐ ¨ø Ðseveral€weeks€before€the€plaintiff€was€granted€a€divorce€.€.€.€.ðð€€In€response€to€the€courtððs€expressedÐ ”ä Ðinterest€in€a€ð ðthumbnail€sketchðð€of€the€proof€that€might€be€presented€if€evidence€were€determinedÐ €Ð Ðto€be€necessary,€the€response€summarized€the€testimony€of€Lee€Billen,€a€friend€and€co„worker€of€bothÐ l¼ ÐMr.€and€Ms.€Williams.€€Attached€to€the€response€is€Ms.€Billenððs€affidavit.€€In€that€affidavit,€Ms.Ð X ¨ ÐBillen€testified€that€during€March,€April€and€May€of€1999,€she€and€Kathryn€Williams€discussed€aÐ D!” Ðnumber€of€times€that€the€Williamses€were€having€marital€difficulties.€€ð ðDuring€these€discussions€inÐ 0"€  ÐMarch€and€April€1999,€Kathy€Williams€told€me€that€she€and€James€Hollister€Williams€had€discussedÐ #l! Ðdivorce.€€Subsequently,€Kathy€Williams€told€me€that€their€attempted€reconciliation€had€failed,€thatÐ $X" ÐJames€Hollister€Williams€was€committed€to€being€divorced€from€Kathy€Williams€and€finally€thatÐ ô$D # ÐððJim€is€going€to€divorce€me.ðððð€€Ms.€Billen€recommended€several€times€that€Ms.€Williams€consult€aÐ à%0!$ Ðlawyer.€€In€addition,€the€response€asserts€that€Ms.€Williamsððs€version€of€the€facts€surrounding€theÐ Ì&"% Ðdivorce€was€inconsistent€with€her€deposition€testimony€and€makes€reference€to€specific€depositionÐ ¸'#& Ðtestimony.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àTen€days€after€the€hearing€on€the€motion€òòin€limineóó,€a€hearing€was€held€on€the€Rule€60€motionÐ |*Ì%) Ðwhich€involved€argument€on€the€partiesðð€positions,€discussion€of€discovery€and€other€schedulingÐ h+¸&* Ðissues,€and€similar€procedural€matters.€€The€transcripts€of€that€hearing€and€the€hearing€on€the€motionÐ ° Ðòòin€limineóó€provide€insight€into€the€positions€of€the€parties€and€the€court€that€is€helpful€in€accuratelyÐ œì Ðdefining€the€issue€which€we€must€decide.€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€her€trial€court€filings,€Ms.€Williams€argued€that€her€admission€of€her€extra„marital€affairÐ `° Ðshould€preclude€evidence€concerning€this€relationship.€€She€further€stated,€ð ð.€.€.€€the€Court€is€not€hereÐ L œ Ðto€determine€whether€a€divorce€could€have€been€granted€in€this€case€because€Mrs.€Williams€willÐ 8 ˆ Ðreadily€stipulate€that€both€parties€had€grounds€for€divorce.ðð€€Essentially€the€same€argument€was€madeÐ $ t Ðat€the€hearing€where€she€argued€that€she€was€not€before€the€court€to€get€a€divorce€and,€therefore,Ð  ` Ðrelative€fault€in€the€breakdown€of€the€marriage€was€irrelevant.€€She€acknowledged€that€grounds€forÐ ü L  Ðdivorce€existed€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€She€also€asserted€the€issue€was€not€a€redistribution€of€theÐ è 8  Ðmarital€property€and€she€was€not€trying€to€alter€the€MDA.€€She€argued€that€the€decree€should€be€setÐ Ô$  Ðaside,€with€the€effect€that€she€was€Mr.€Williamsððs€widow,€since€his€death€precluded€a€continuationÐ À  Ðof€the€divorce€case.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àWith€regard€to€the€Rule€60€motion€itself,€essentially€the€Estate€argued€that€the€court€shouldÐ „Ô  Ðdeny€the€motion€and€could€do€so€without€taking€evidence€because€the€divorce€decree€was€valid€onÐ pÀ Ðits€face€and€because€Mr.€Williamsððs€death€precluded€further€action€in€the€Divorce€Case.€€Ms.Ð \¬ ÐWilliams€argued€that€the€decree€should€be€set€aside€because€it€was€entered€in€contravention€of€theÐ H˜ Ðwaiting€periods€required€by€statute€and€local€rule.€€Ms.€Williams€also€argued€that€Mr.€WilliamsððsÐ 4„ Ðdeath€did€not,€as€a€matter€of€law,€prevent€the€relief€she€sought.Ð  p ÐÌà  àMs.€Williamsððs€other€ground€for€setting€aside€the€divorce€was€that€Mr.€Williams€had€coercedÐ øH Ðher€into€signing€the€MDA€and€that€she€had€been€taken€by€surprise€by€his€announcement€that€theyÐ ä4 Ðwere€to€meet€the€next€day€to€sign€the€documents.€€She€argued€that€she€did€not€have€the€opportunityÐ Ð  Ðto€review€the€documents,€to€seek€independent€legal€advice,€or€to€reflect€on€her€options.€€She€alsoÐ ¼  Ðargued€that€the€MDA€resulted€in€an€inequitable€distribution€of€property.€€The€Estate€argued€that€Ms.Ð ¨ø ÐWilliams€should€not€be€allowed€to€present€evidence€that€Mr.€Williams€had€coerced€her€into€signingÐ ”ä Ðthe€MDA€since€his€death€made€it€impossible€for€him€to€dispute€that€allegation.€€The€Estate€alsoÐ €Ð Ðdisputed€her€evidence€of€coercion€and€surprise,€as€discussed€above.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€parties€disagreed€on€which€of€the€pending€issues€in€the€various€cases€should€be€decidedÐ D!” Ðfirst.€€The€Estate€took€the€position€that€the€court€should€decide€the€issue€of€the€validity€of€the€divorceÐ 0"€  Ðdecree€before€deciding€other€issues,€such€as€ownership€of€the€annuities.€€The€Estate€also€argued€thatÐ #l! Ðthe€trial€court€could€and€should€decide€the€validity€of€the€divorce€decree€without€an€evidentiaryÐ $X" Ðhearing.€€Ms.€Williams€asserted€that€the€court€would€need€to€hear€evidence€to€decide€the€issue€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðvalidity€of€the€divorce€decree€if€it€reached€the€coercion€issue.€€The€court€concluded€that€it€would€firstÐ à%0!$ Ðdecide€whether€it€needed€to€hear€evidence€in€order€to€rule€on€the€Rule€60€motion€and€that€anÐ Ì&"% Ðevidentiary€hearing€could€be€held€thereafter€if€it€was€needed.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€denied€the€motion€for€relief€from€judgment,€holding€first€that€Ms.€WilliamsÐ )à$( Ðwas€not€entitled€to€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(3)€because€the€decree€was€not€void.€€The€courtÐ |*Ì%) Ðalso€held€that€she€was€not€entitled€to€relief€under€subsection€(1)€of€the€rule€because€the€mistake€sheÐ h+¸&* Ðalleged€was€one€by€the€court,€not€the€parties,€or€under€subsection€(5)€because€this€situation€did€notÐ ° Ðrise€to€the€level€of€extraordinary€circumstances.€€With€regard€to€Ms.€Williamsððs€claim€underÐ œì Ðsubsection€(2),€that€the€decree€resulted€from€misconduct€by€Mr.€Williams,€the€court€stated:Ð ˆØ ÐÌà8  àThe€issue€is€whether€a€party€to€an€action€can€pursue€relief€from€a€judgment€involvingÐ `° Ðthe€other€party€to€an€action€after€the€death€of€the€party€that€allegedly€committed€theÐ L œ Ðfraud€and/or€misconduct.€.€.€.€€The€Court€is€concerned€about€the€public€policyÐ 8 ˆ Ðimplications€of€allowing€a€party€to€institute€an€attack€upon€a€judgment€after€theÐ $ t Ðopposing€party€has€died€asserting€that€the€deceased€party€committed€fraud€orÐ  ` Ðmisconduct€which€would€entitle€the€moving€party€for€relief€from€a€judgment.€Ð ü L  ÐObviously,€the€deceased€party€cannot€defend€himself€in€such€an€action.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€court€found€that€the€fact€that€Ms.€Williams€waited€until€two€months€after€the€death€ofÐ À  ÐMr.€Williams€to€challenge€the€decree,€along€with€her€failure€to€appeal€the€decree,€constituted€ð ðaÐ ¬ü  Ðseeming€acquiescenceðð€to€the€decree.€€The€court€found€persuasive€language€in€òòOwens€v.€Simsóó,€43Ð ˜è  ÐTenn.€(3€Cold)€544€(1866),€that:Ð „Ô  ÐÌà8  àMuch€mischief€might€be€produced,€if€either€party,€in€cases€where€the€bonds€ofÐ \¬ Ðmatrimony€have€been€dissolved,€were€permitted,€at€any€time€within€two€years€afterÐ H˜ Ðthe€divorce,€to€obtain€reversal€of€the€decree,€after€seeming€acquiescence€for€a€time,Ð 4„ Ðby€declining€to€appeal,€and€possibly€after€the€party€had€again€married.Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÌòòIdóó.€at€550„51.€Ð øH ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€the€court€found€that€Ms.€Williams€was€not€entitled€to€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.Ð Ð  ÐP.€60.02(2).Ð ¼  ÐÌÓ  ÓA.€€Relief€from€Judgment€After€Death€of€PartyÐ ”ä ÐÓSVÓÌà  àIn€the€court€below€and€on€appeal,€the€Estate€has€asserted€that€Ms.€Williams€was€not€entitledÐ l¼ Ðto€the€relief€she€sought€because€the€death€of€Mr.€Williams€abated€the€divorce€action.€€Relying€onÐ X ¨ Ðð ðwell„settledðð€law,€the€Estate€asserted€that€a€divorce€action€becomes€a€nullity€after€the€death€of€aÐ D!” Ðparty€because€divorce€is€a€personal€action€and€the€questions€involved€have€been€ð ðanswered€by€theÐ 0"€  Ðinevitable€decree€of€a€higher€tribunal€than€any€earthly€forum.ðð€€òòSwan€v.€Harrison€&€Morris,€Exððrsóó,Ð #l! Ð42€Tenn.€(3€Cold)€534,€540€(1865).€€Along€with€òòSwanóó,€the€Estate€relies€upon€òòOwens€v.€Simsóó,€43Ð $X" ÐTenn.€(3€Cold)€544€(1866),€òòVessels€v.€Vesselsóó,€530€S.W.2d€71€(Tenn.€1975),€and€òòSteele€v.€Steeleóó,€757Ð ô$D # ÐS.W.2d€340,€343€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988)€(holding€that€a€suit€for€divorce€and€alimony€is€ð ðstrictly€aÐ à%0!$ Ðpersonal€action,€sounding€in€tort,€and€by€all€the€rules€and€maxims€of€law€lies€(dies)€with€the€personðð).Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àOn€the€other€hand,€Ms.€Williams€asserts€that€while€Tennessee€law€is€clear€that€a€deceasedÐ ¤(ô#' Ðperson€cannot€be€divorced€and,€therefore,€a€pending€divorce€action€terminates€upon€the€death€of€aÐ )à$( Ðâ âparty,€this€principle€does€not€apply€after€the€entry€of€a€final€decree€of€divorce.€€Ms.€Williams€alsoÐ |*Ì%) Ðrelies€on€òòSteeleóó,€quoting€a€different€section,€to€the€effect€that€if€a€court€has€entered€a€decree€ð ðthe€deathÐ ° Ðof€the€spouse€does€not€affect€the€matter.ðð€€òòSteeleóó,€757€S.W.2d€at€342.€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€partiesðð€reliance€on€the€cases€cited€implicates€questions€of€abatement€and€revivor€andÐ tÄ Ðthe€subtleties€that€lurk€therein.€€Generally,€Ô‡jXXXXÔactions€which€are€pending€when€a€party€dies€may€continueÐ `° Ðupon€substitution€of€a€proper€party.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„320;€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€25.01;òò€Mid„SouthÐ L œ ÐPavers,€Inc.€v.€Arnco€Constr.,€Inc.óó,€771€S.W.2d€420,€422„23€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€Pending€actionsÐ 8 ˆ Ðð ðwhich€by€law€may€survive€against€the€personal€representativeðð€are€considered€claims€against€theÐ $ t Ðestate.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„320.€€However,€that€statute,€Ô#†XXXjX7^#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔby€its€terms,€does€not€apply€to€claimsÐ  ` Ðalready€reduced€to€judgment.€òò€In€re€Estate€of€Lucasóó,€844€S.W.2d€627,€629„30€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€Ð ü L  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„505€provides€that€judgments€obtained€against€the€deceased€in€the€deceasedððsÐ è 8  Ðlifetime€may€be€revived€without€delay.€Ð Ô$  ЀÔ#†XXXjXz`#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔÐ À  Ðà  àIn€addition,€as€a€general€rule,€the€death€of€either€party€does€not€abate€an€action€ð ðif€the€causeÐ ¬ü  Ðof€action€survives€or€continues.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€20„5„101.€€However,€some€types€of€actions,Ð ˜è  Ðspecifically€ð ðactions€for€wrongs€affecting€the€characterðð€are€abated€by€the€death€of€a€party.€€Tenn.Ð „Ô  ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€20„5„102.€€An€action€for€divorce,€being€purely€personal,€abates€and€cannot€be€revivedÐ pÀ Ðafter€the€death€of€a€party.€€òòSteeleóó,€757€S.W.2d€at€342.Ô#†XXXjX/b#Ô€€The€termination€of€the€divorce€cause€of€actionÐ \¬ Ðabates€all€ancillary€or€interlocutory€decrees;€however,€this€rule€expressly€applies€to€a€pending€suit,Ð H˜ Ðwhere€the€party€dies€before€entry€of€judgment.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWhile€the€application€of€these€general€principles€to€the€case€before€us€may€be€debated,€Ô‡jXXXXÔtheÐ  \ ÐTennessee€Supreme€Court€has€at€least€partially€answered€the€question€disputed€by€the€parties€hereinÐ øH Ðin€òòBaggett€v.€Baggettóó,€541€S.W.2d€407€(Tenn.€1976),€where€a€wife€sought€to€set€aside€a€divorceÐ ä4 Ðdecree€after€the€remarriage€and€death€of€her€husband.€€The€basis€for€her€claim€was€a€lack€of€personalÐ Ð  Ðjurisdiction€over€her€by€the€divorcing€court.€€The€wife€had€no€notice€of€the€divorce€proceedingÐ ¼  Ðagainst€her€until€after€the€husband€died.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€Supreme€Court€determined€that€the€first€issue€to€be€decided€was€whether€the€wife€hadÐ €Ð Ða€justiciable€interest€in€setting€aside€the€divorce€decree€ð ðconsidering€the€fact€that€her€husband€died,Ð l¼ Ðthus€dissolving€the€marriage€relation,€prior€to€the€institution€of€this€suit.ðð€€The€court€acknowledgedÐ X ¨ Ðthat€the€general€rule€was€that,€in€the€absence€of€affected€property€interests,€€ð ðan€application€to€vacateÐ D!” Ða€decree€of€divorce€does€not€lie€after€the€death€of€a€party€.€.€.€since€the€death€itself€severs€the€martialÐ 0"€  Ðrelation€and€the€only€object€to€be€accomplished€by€the€vacation€of€the€decree€would€be€sentimental.ðð€Ð #l! ÐòòIdóó.€541€S.W.2d€at€409€(citing€òòRose€v.€Roseóó,€176€Tenn.€680,€685,€145€S.W.2d€773,€775€(1940)).€€Ð $X" ÐÌà8  àBut,€when€the€decree€of€divorce€adversely€affects€property€interests€of€the€survivingÐ à%0!$ Ðspouse,€the€death€of€the€other€spouse€does€not€defeat€the€right€of€the€surviving€spouseÐ Ì&"% Ðor€his€or€her€representative€to€institute€vacation€proceedings.€€This€is€permitted,€notÐ ¸'#& Ðfor€the€purpose€of€continuing€the€controversy€regarding€the€right€to€a€divorce€itself,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðbut€to€determine€whether€or€not€the€surviving€spouse€has€been€deprived€of€propertyÐ )à$( Ðinterest€by€reason€of€the€change€in€his€or€her€marital€status€brought€about€by€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðdivorce€decree.€€This€action€is€considered€to€involve€only€the€property€interests.Ðh+¸&*Ð Ð  ЇòòBaggettóó,€541€S.W.2d€at€409.Ð ° ÐÌà  àThe€Court€explained€that€those€property€rights€deemed€sufficient€to€come€within€the€rule€wereÐ ˆØ Ðð ðthose€interests€of€which€the€surviving€spouse€has€been€wrongly€deprived€by€the€divorce.€.€.€.ðð€€òòId.€Ð tÄ ÐóóAmong€the€specific€rights€delineated€by€the€Court€were€the€right€to€a€distributive€share€of€theÐ `° Ðdecedentððs€estate,€and€a€surviving€spouseððs€rights€to€pension€or€social€security€benefits.€òò€Id.óó€€€TheÐ L œ ÐCourt€found€that€the€surviving€spouseððs€statutory€right€to€veteranððs€benefits€constituted€a€sufficientÐ 8 ˆ Ðproperty€interest€which€entitled€the€plaintiff€to€maintain€the€action€attacking€the€validity€of€theÐ $ t Ðdivorce€decree.€€òòIdóó.€541€S.W.2d€at€409„10.Ô#†XXXjX!f#ÔÐ  ` ÐÌÔ‡jXXXXÔà  àThe€distribution€of€marital€property€resulting€from€a€divorce€is€not€the€type€of€propertyÐ è 8  Ðinterest€that€will€allow€an€action€to€set€aside€a€divorce€decree.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà8  àòòBaggettóó€and€the€other€cases€cited€herein€do€not€provide€a€means€by€which€a€party€toÐ ¬ü  Ða€divorce€can€use€the€death€of€a€former€spouse€to€receive€a€more€favorable€propertyÐ ˜è  Ðsettlement€than€had€been€negotiated€while€the€deceased€was€living.Ð„Ô Ð Ð  ÐÌòòMcMahon€v.€McMahonóó,€No.€85„349„II,€1986€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€3012,€at€*6„*7€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€MayÐ \¬ Ð23,€1986)Ô#†XXXjXzr#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔ€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed)€(citing€òòLarkin€v.€Larkinóó,€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€MayÐ H˜ Ð25,€1979)).Ô#†XXXjXPu#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔÐ 4„ ÐÌà  àInstead,€it€would€appear€that€the€property€interest€must€be€one€that€is€adversely€affected€byÐ  \ Ðthe€change€in€status€from€spouse€to€former€spouse.€€We€conclude€such€a€property€interest€exists€inÐ øH Ðthe€case€before€us.€€Under€the€terms€of€Mr.€Williamsððs€will,€Ms.€Williams€would€inherit€property€asÐ ä4 Ðhis€wife.€€She€is€disinherited€therefrom€only€by€the€operation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„202(a)€byÐ Ð  Ðvirtue€of€the€divorce.€€In€addition,€Ms.€Williams€filed€in€the€Probate€Case€a€Petition€for€Homestead,Ð ¼  ÐExempt€Property,€Yearððs€Support€and€Elective€Share€seeking€all€statutory€benefits€to€which€a€widowÐ ¨ø Ðis€entitled.€€This€pleading€was€filed€after€the€hearing€on€the€motion€òòin€limineóó€but€before€the€courtÐ ”ä Ðruled€on€the€Rule€60€motion€in€the€Divorce€Case.€€In€this€petition,€Ms.€Williams€asserted€she€hadÐ €Ð Ðsought€to€have€the€divorce€decree€set€aside.Ð l¼ ÐÔ#†XXXjXv#ÔÌà  àOf€course,€òòBaggettóó€involved€a€challenge€to€a€divorce€decree€as€void€because€it€was€enteredÐ D!” Ðwithout€personal€jurisdiction.€€Thus,€the€holding€is€consistent€with€the€general€rule€that€a€void€decreeÐ 0"€  Ðmay€be€attacked€at€any€time€and€such€a€decree€is€unenforceable.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Ragsdale€v.€Sandefuróó,Ð #l! Ð389€S.W.2d€266,€271€(Tenn.€1965);€òòMiller€v.€Morelockóó,€185€Tenn.€466,€470,€206€S.W.2d€427,€429Ð $X" Ð(Tenn.€1947);€òòTeam€Design€v.€Gottliebóó,€No.€M1999„00911„COA„R3„CV,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXISÐ ô$D # Ð508,€at€*32€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€18,€2002)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà@¶¶!ìàB.€€Decree€Not€VoidˆÐ ¸'#& ÐÌà  àMs.€Williams€first€asserts€that€the€final€order€of€divorce€should€have€been€set€aside€because€Ð )à$( Ðit€was€entered€by€the€trial€court€in€contravention€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„103(c)(1)€which€requiresÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€a€divorce€petition€on€the€ground€of€irreconcilable€differences€be€on€file€for€sixty€(60)€days€priorÐ h+¸&* Ðto€the€granting€of€a€divorce.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Although€various€of€her€arguments€assert€the€divorce€was€ð ðinvalid€asÐ ° Ða€matter€of€law,ðð€it€is€clear€that€she€does€not€claim€that€the€order€was€void,€in€recognition€of€theÐ œì ÐTennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€holding€in€òòGentry€v.€Gentryóó,€924€S.W.2d€678€(Tenn.€1996).€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€òòGentryóó,€the€Supreme€Court€considered€a€claim€that€a€divorce€decree€that€had€been€enteredÐ `° Ðwithout€compliance€with€the€statutory€waiting€period€for€irreconcilable€differences€divorces,€theÐ L œ Ðsame€statute€relied€on€herein€by€Ms.€Williams,€was€void.€€The€Court€reaffirmed€the€standard€forÐ 8 ˆ Ðdetermining€whether€a€judgment€is€void:€whether€the€court€had€general€jurisdiction€of€the€subjectÐ $ t Ðmatter,€whether€the€judgment€was€wholly€outside€the€pleadings,€and€whether€the€court€hadÐ  ` Ðjurisdiction€of€the€parties.€€924€S.W.2d€at€680„81.€€The€Court€found€that€absent€such€a€òòprima€facieóóÐ ü L  Ðvoid€decree,€ð ða€flaw€in€procedureðð€would€not€render€a€decree€void.€€òòIdóó.€924€S.W.2d€at€681.€€BecauseÐ è 8  Ðit€was€apparent€the€court€entering€the€decree€had€subject€matter€over€a€suit€for€divorce,€had€personalÐ Ô$  Ðjurisdiction€over€the€parties€to€the€divorce,€and€the€decree€was€not€outside€the€pleadings€but€insteadÐ À  Ðgranted€the€relief€actually€sought€in€the€pleadings,€the€Court€held€the€divorce€decree€was€not€void,Ð ¬ü  Ðbut€was€either€voidable€or€valid.€€òòIdóó.€924€S.W.2d€at€680.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àMs.€Williams€does€not€assert€that€the€court€entering€the€divorce€decree€herein€was€withoutÐ pÀ Ðeither€subject€matter€or€personal€jurisdiction€or€that€the€decree€was€wholly€outside€the€pleadings.€Ð \¬ ÐOn€appeal,€she€does€not€rely€on€subsection€(3)€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€ð ðthe€judgment€is€void,ðð€asÐ H˜ Ða€ground€for€relief.€€The€divorce€decree€challenged€by€Ms.€Williams€in€the€instant€case€is€not€void.€Ð 4„ ÐThe€trial€court€obviously€had€general€jurisdiction€of€the€subject€matter,€a€suit€for€divorce;€the€decreeÐ  p Ðawarding€the€divorce€was€not€outside€the€pleadings,€it€was€the€specific€relief€sought;€and,€the€courtÐ  \ Ðhad€jurisdiction€over€the€parties.Ð øH ÐÌÓ  ÓC.€€Relief€Under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02Ð Ð  ÐÓõˆÓÌà  àCognizant€of€òòGentryððsóó€holding€that€a€merely€voidable€order€cannot€be€reversed€through€aÐ ¨ø Ðcollateral€attack,€Ms.€Williams€launched€a€direct€attack€by€filing€in€the€Divorce€Case€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.Ð ”ä ÐP.€60.02€motion€for€relief€from€judgment.€€ð ðIf€an€action€or€proceeding€is€brought€for€the€very€purposeÐ €Ð Ðof€impeaching€or€overturning€a€judgment,€it€is€a€direct€attack€upon€it,€such€as€a€motion€or€otherÐ l¼ Ðproceeding€to€vacate,€annul,€cancel€or€set€aside€a€judgment,€or€any€proceeding€to€review€it€in€anÐ X ¨ Ðappellate€court€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòTurner€v.€Bellóó,€198€Tenn.€232,€241,€279€S.W.2d€71,€75€(Tenn.€1955)€(quotingÐ D!” ÐòòJordan€v.€Jordanóó,€145€Tenn.€378,€454,€239€S.€W.€423,€445€(1921)).€€Seeking€Rule€60€relief€in€theÐ 0"€  ÐDivorce€Case€was€a€procedurally€appropriate€method€to€bring€the€attack.€€òòJerkins€v.€McKinneyóó,€533Ð #l! ÐS.W.2d€275€(Tenn.€1976).Ð $X" ÐÌà  àRule€60.02€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€provides,€in€pertinent€part:Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà8  àOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€party€.€.€.€from€aÐ ¸'#& Ðfinal€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€the€following€reasons:€(1)€mistake,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðinadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect;€(2)€fraud€(whether€heretoforeÐ )à$( Ðdenominated€intrinsic€or€extrinsic),€misrepresentation,€or€other€misconduct€of€anÐ ° Ðadverse€party;€.€.€.€or€(5)€any€other€reason€justifying€relief€from€the€operation€of€theÐ œì Ðjudgment.€€The€motion€shall€be€made€within€a€reasonable€time,€and€for€reasons€(1)Ð ˆØ Ðand€(2)€not€more€than€one€year€after€the€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€was€enteredÐ tÄ Ðor€taken.€Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€denied€Ms.€Williams€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€and€this€courtððsÐ  ` Ðreview€of€that€decision€is€limited€to€whether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion.€€òòFederated€Ins.€Co.€Ð ü L  Ðv.€Lethcoeóó,€18€S.W.3d€621,€624€(Tenn.€2000);€òòUnderwood€v.€Zurich€Ins.€Co.óó,€854€S.W.2d€94,€97Ð è 8  Ð(Tenn.€1993);€òòEllison€v.€Alleyóó,€902€S.W.2d€415,€418€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Ô‡jXXXXÔÐ Ô$  ÐÌà8  àUnder€the€abuse€of€discretion€standard,€a€trial€courtððs€ruling€ð ðwill€be€upheld€so€longÐ ¬ü  Ðas€reasonable€minds€can€disagree€as€to€the€propriety€of€the€decision€made.ðð€€A€trialÐ ˜è  Ðcourt€abuses€its€discretion€only€when€it€ð ðapplies€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€orÐ „Ô  Ðreaches€a€decision€which€is€against€logic€or€reasoning€or€that€causes€an€injustice€toÐ pÀ Ðthe€party€complaining.ðð€€The€abuse€of€discretion€standard€does€not€permit€theÐ \¬ Ðappellate€court€to€substitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€trial€court.ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌòòEldridge€v.€Eldridgeóó,€42€S.W.3d€82,€85€(Tenn.€2001)€(citations€omitted).€Ô#†XXXjXÅ’#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔÐ  p ÐÌÔ#†XXXjXô•#Ôà  àRelief€under€Rule€60.02€is€considered€ð ðan€exceptional€remedy.ðð€€òòNails€v.€Aetna€Ins.€Co.óó,€834Ð øH ÐS.W.2d€275,€294€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€function€of€the€rule€is€ð ðto€strike€a€proper€balance€between€theÐ ä4 Ðcompeting€principles€of€finality€and€justice.ðð€€òòBanks€v.€Dement€Constr.€Co.,€Incóó.,€817€S.W.2d€16,€18Ð Ð  Ð(Tenn.€1991)€(quoting€òòJerkinsóó,€533€S.W.2d€at€280).€€In€examining€the€purpose€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ð ¼  Ð60.02,€our€Supreme€Court€has€said:Ð ¨ø ÐÌà8  àð ðRule€60.02€acts€as€an€escape€valve€from€possible€inequity€that€might€otherwise€ariseÐ €Ð Ðfrom€the€unrelenting€imposition€of€the€principle€of€finality€imbedded€in€ourÐ l¼ Ðprocedural€rules.€.€.€.ðð€€Because€of€the€importance€of€this€ð ðprinciple€of€finality,ðð€theÐ X ¨ Ðð ðescape€valveðð€should€not€be€easily€opened.ÐD!”Ð Ð  ÐÌòòBanksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€18òò€óó(quoting€òòToney€v.€Mueller€Co.óó,€810€S.W.2d€145,€146€(Tenn.€1991)).€€Ð #l! ÐÌà  àThe€party€seeking€relief€has€the€burden€of€showing€grounds€therefor;€he€or€she€must€showÐ ô$D # Ðthat€he€is€entitled€to€relief.€òò€Spruce€v.€Spruceóó,€2€S.W.3d€192,€194€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999);€òòHoward€v.Ð à%0!$ ÐHowardóó,€991€S.W.2d€251,€255€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999);€òòDavidson€v.€Davidsonóó,€916€S.W.2d€918,€923Ð Ì&"% Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€There€must€be€proof€of€the€basis€on€which€the€relief€is€sought.€€òòLethcoeóó,€18Ð ¸'#& ÐS.W.3d€at€624,òò€Banksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€18;€òòDuncan€v.€Duncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€557,€563€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ¤(ô#' Ð1990).€€The€movant€must€substantiate€entitlement€to€the€request€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€Ð )à$( ÐòòDavidsonóó,€916€S.W.2d€at€923;€òòDuncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€at€563.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àIn€order€to€succeed,€the€moving€party€must€describe€the€basis€for€relief€with€specificity.€Ð ° ÐòòHopkins€v.€Hopkinsóó,€572€S.W.2d€639,€640€(Tenn.€1978);€òòDuncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€at€563.€€As€aÐ œì Ðprerequisite€to€the€extraordinary€relief€available€under€Rule€60.02,€the€movant€is€required€to€set€forthÐ ˆØ Ðin€a€motion€or€petition,€or€in€affidavits€in€support€thereof,€facts€explaining€why€the€movant€is€entitledÐ tÄ Ðto€relief.€€òòSeeóó€òòTravis€v.€City€of€Murfreesboroóó,€686€S.W.2d€68,€69€(Tenn.€1985);€òòBivins€v.€Hosp.€Corp.Ð `° Ðof€Am.óó,€910€S.W.2d€441,€446€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòTurner€v.€Turneróó,€776€S.W.2d€88,€92€(Tenn.Ð L œ ÐCt.€App.€1988).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àWhere€the€motion€and€supporting€affidavits€are€insufficient€to€warrant€relief€from€judgment,Ð  ` Ðthe€motion€is€properly€denied.€€òòEllisonóó,€902€S.W.2d€at€417„18;€òòJenkins€v.€Jenkinsóó,€No.€01A01„9609„Ð ü L  ÐCV„00399,€1997€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€487,€at€*6€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€16,€1997)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.Ð è 8  ÐP.€11€application€filed)€(holding€that€because€ð ðHusband€did€not€set€forth€facts€and€circumstances€toÐ Ô$  Ðjustify€invocation€of€the€extraordinary€relief€afforded€by€Rule€60.02€either€in€his€motion€for€reliefÐ À  Ðfrom€the€judgment€or€in€his€accompanying€affidavit,ðð€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€inÐ ¬ü  Ðdenying€the€motion€after€taking€the€affidavit€and€argument€of€counsel€into€consideration).€€MereÐ ˜è  Ðconclusory€statements€are€not€sufficient.€òò€Ellisonóó,€902€S.W.2d€at€417.Ð „Ô  ÐÌÓ  Ó(1)€€MistakeÐ \¬ ÐÓΤÓÌà  àFirst,€Ms.€Williams€sought€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(1)€on€the€basis€that€the€trialÐ 4„ Ðcourt€made€a€mistake€in€entering€the€divorce€decree€prematurely.€€The€trial€court,€however,€ruled€thatÐ  p Ðthe€ð ðmistakeðð€contemplated€in€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€was€intended€to€address€ð ðexcusable€mistakesÐ  \ Ðof€parties€or€counsel,€not€an€action€by€the€court.ððÐ øH ÐÌà  àIn€òòJerkins€v.€McKinneyóó,€533€S.W.2d€275,€280€(Tenn.€1976),€our€Supreme€Court€held€thatÐ Ð  ÐTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(1)€can€be€utilized€by€an€aggrieved€party€in€order€to€grant€relief€predicatedÐ ¼  Ðupon€a€mistake€of€court.€€The€mistake€in€òòJerkinsóó€was€the€failure€of€the€court€clerk€to€provide€counselÐ ¨ø Ðwith€a€copy€of€an€order€overruling€a€motion€for€a€new€trial€or€notify€counsel€of€the€existence€of€suchÐ ”ä Ðan€order.€€Ms.€Williams€simply€does€not€allege€the€type€of€mistake€contemplated€by€Tenn.€R.€Civ.Ð €Ð ÐP.€60.02(1)€or€òòJerkinsóó.€€Ms.€Williams€is€not€arguing€that€a€mistake€of€the€court€prevented€her€fromÐ l¼ Ðfinding€out€about€the€trial€courtððs€ruling.€€Rather,€she€argues€that€the€court€ð ðmistakenlyðð€entered€theÐ X ¨ Ðdivorce€decree€before€the€expiration€of€the€statutory€waiting€period.€€This€is€an€assertion€that€theÐ D!” Ðcourt€failed€to€follow€the€law.€€Unlike€the€aggrieved€party€in€òòJerkinsóó,€Ms.€Williams€had€knowledgeÐ 0"€  Ðof€the€final€order€of€the€trial€court.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àA€mistake€of€law€is€not€a€ground€for€relief€under€Rule€60.02.€€òòSpruceóó,€2€S.W.3d€at€195.€Ð ô$D # ÐOtherwise,€ð ðit€is€hard€to€conceive€how€any€judgment€could€be€safe€from€assault.ðð€òò€Food€Lion,€Inc.Ð à%0!$ Ðv.€Washington€County€Beer€Bd.óó,€700€S.W.2d€893,€896€(Tenn.€1985).€€Even€where€it€is€alleged€thatÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€trial€court,€rather€than€one€of€the€parties,€committed€a€mistake€of€law,€Rule€60.02€cannot€beÐ ¸'#& Ðapplied€to€provide€relief.€€The€proper€remedy€lies€in€appeal€or€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àFurther,€the€action€by€the€divorcing€court€in€entering€the€decree€cannot€be€characterized€asÐ |*Ì%) Ða€mistake.€€We€have€no€basis€to€determine€that€the€court€did€not€intend€to€enter€the€decree€when€itÐ h+¸&* Ðdid.€€The€court€entered€the€decree€in€accordance€with€the€partiesðð€agreement€that€grounds€for€divorceÐ ° Ðexisted,€that€Ms.€Williams€waived€her€right€to€file€an€answer€or€contest€the€divorce,€and€that€they€hadÐ œì Ðagreed€upon€the€distribution€of€their€property.€€Any€failure€to€follow€statutory€procedures׃l×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€wasÐ ˆØ Ðintentional,€not€a€mistake.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€Ms.€Williamsððs€motion€for€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ð L œ Ð60.02(1).€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@` ` ìà(2)€€Fraud€or€Misconduct€of€Mr.€WilliamsˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àThe€second€ground€for€relief€sought€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€by€Ms.€Williams€is€basedÐ è 8  Ðon€her€assertion€that€Mr.€Williams€engaged€in€some€type€of€misconduct.€€Later€filings€make€clearÐ Ô$  Ðthat€the€alleged€misconduct€involved€Mr.€Williams€ð ðsurprisingðð€Ms.€Williams€with€his€intention€toÐ À  Ðget€a€divorce€and€with€the€documents€themselves€and€his€coercing€her€into€signing€them.€€She€doesÐ ¬ü  Ðnot,€however,€assert€that€she€requested€more€time€or€explain€her€failure€to€attempt€to€set€aside€theÐ ˜è  Ðdecree€within€thirty€days€after€its€entry.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àAs€stated€above,€Rule€60€relief€should€be€granted€sparingly€in€deference€to€the€principle€ofÐ \¬ Ðfinality.€€In€addition€to€final€judgments,€that€principle€is€also€particularly€important€in€two€situationsÐ H˜ Ðwhich€are€present€in€the€case€before€us:€an€attempt€to€set€aside€an€agreed€order€disposing€of€an€actionÐ 4„ Ðand€an€attempt€to€rescind€a€contract.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àA€marital€dissolution€agreement€is€essentially€a€contract€between€a€husband€and€wife€inÐ øH Ðcontemplation€of€divorce€proceedings.€€òòTowner€v.€Towneróó,€858€S.W.2d€888,€890€(Tenn.€1993);€òòGrayÐ ä4 Ðv.€Estate€of€Grayóó,€993€S.W.2d€59,€63€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€Such€a€contract€is€enforceable.€€òòHoltÐ Ð  Ðv.€Holtóó,€995€S.W.2d€68,€72€(Tenn.€1999).€€ð ðA€property€settlement€agreement€between€a€husband€andÐ ¼  Ðwife€is€ððwithin€the€category€of€contracts€and€is€to€be€looked€upon€and€enforced€as€an€agreement,€andÐ ¨ø Ðis€to€be€construed€as€other€contracts€as€respects€its€interpretation,€its€meaning€and€effect.ðð€òò€Bruce€v.Ð ”ä ÐBruceóó,€801€S.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990)€(quotingòò€Matthews€v.€Matthewsóó,€24€Tenn.€App.€580,Ð €Ð Ð593,€148€S.W.2d€3,€11„12€(1940)).€€Where€the€MDA€or€property€settlement€is€incorporated€into€theÐ l¼ Ðdecree€of€the€court,€the€agreement€with€regard€to€division€of€property€does€not€lose€its€contractualÐ X ¨ Ðnature.€òò€Grayóó,€993€S.W.2d€at€64;€òòMoore€v.€Mooreóó,€No.€01„A„01„9708€„CV„00444,€1998€Tenn.€App.Ð D!” ÐLEXIS€831,€at€*5€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Dec.€8,€1998)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed)€(citingÐ 0"€  ÐòòPenland€v.€Penlandóó,€521€S.W.2d€222,€224€(Tenn.€1975)).€€Ð #l! ÐÔ‡jXXXXÔÌà  àRescission€of€a€contract€ð ðis€not€looked€upon€lightlyðð€and€ð ðis€available€only€under€the€mostÐ ô$D # Ðdemanding€circumstances.ðð€€òòRobinson€v.€Brooksóó,€577€S.W.2d€207,€208€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1978).€Ð à%0!$ ÐFurther,€the€party€seeking€recission€bears€the€burden€of€proof.€€òòWilliamson€v.€Upchurchóó,€768€S.W.2dÐ ° Ð265€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€When€a€contract€is€valid€and€no€injustice€will€result,€courts€are€ð ðboundÐ œì Ðto€enforce€it.ðð€€òòBush€v.€Catheyóó,€598€S.W.2d€777,€781€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1979).Ô#†XXXjX‹»#ÔÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€the€òòMatthewsóó€case,€the€court€found€that€the€separation€agreement€at€issue€ð ðmust€beÐ `° Ðregarded€as€a€contract,€a€settlement€of€disputes,€a€compromise€and€an€arbitration.ðð€òòMatthewsóó,€24Ð L œ ÐTenn.€App.€at€593,€148€S.W.2d€at€11.€€Ô‡jXXXXÔConsent€decrees,€compromise€and€settlement€agreements,€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðagreed€orders€are€favored€by€the€courts€and€represent€the€achievement€of€an€amicable€result€toÐ $ t Ðpending€litigation.€€A€consent€decree€signed€by€the€parties€involved€has€been€described€as€ð ðabout€theÐ  ` Ðmost€binding€of€agreements€that€can€be€made.ðð€€òòBringhurst€v.€Tualóó,€598€S.W.2d€620,€622€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ü L  ÐApp.€1980)€(citing€òòSmelcer€v.€Broylesóó,€225€Tenn.€187,€190,€465€S.W.2d€355,€356€(1971);€òòBoyce€v.Ð è 8  ÐStantonóó,€83€Tenn.€346,€375„76€(1885)).€€A€consent€decree€is€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà8  à.€.€.€a€written€judicial€contract,€duly€acknowledged€and€executed,€and€conclusive€uponÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€parties.€€It€may€be€impeached€and€rescinded€for€fraud€in€its€procurement;€butÐ ˜è  Ðotherwise€it€must€stand.€€The€parties€may€not€appeal€from€it,€or€otherwise€correct€itsÐ „Ô  Ðerrors.€€They€may€not€recede€from€it€or€withdraw€their€consent€to€it.€€ÐpÀÐ Ð  ÐÌòòBoyceóó,€83€Tenn.€at€375„76.Ð H˜ ÐÔ#†XXXjXR¿#ÔÌÔ‡jXXXXÔà  àIn€order€to€set€aside€or€alter€a€consent€decree,€a€party€must€show€that€the€consent€decree€wasÐ  p Ðentered€through€fraud€or€mistake.€€In€the€absence€of€fraud€or€mistake,€a€consent€decree€will€stand€asÐ  \ Ðmade€unless€it€is€vacated€in€the€same€manner€as€it€was€procured,€by€consent.€€òòState€ex€rel.€BedfordÐ øH ÐCountyóó,€220€Tenn.€197,€206„07,€415€S.W.2d€139,€144€(1967);òò€Bringhurstóó,€598€S.W.2d€at€622.€€€€Ô#†XXXjX Ä#ÔÐ ä4 ÐÌÔ‡jXXXXÔà  àIn€this€regard,€it€is€well€settled€that€Rule€60.02€should€not€be€used€to€relieve€a€party€from€hisÐ ¼  Ðfree,€calculated,€and€deliberate€choice€in€signing€a€settlement€agreement.€€òòLethcoeóó,€18€S.W.3d€at€625;Ô#†XXXjX;Æ#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔòòÐ ¨ø ÐTyler€v.€Tyleróó,€671€S.W.2d€492,€495€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€In€addition,€the€failure€to€take€legalÐ ”ä Ðsteps€to€protect€oneððs€own€interests€precludes€relief€under€Rule€60.02.€€òòHopkinsóó,€572€S.W.2d€at€640;Ð €Ð ÐòòBivinsóó,€910€S.W.2d€at€448Ô#†XXXjXkÇ#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔ.€€In€òòLethcoeóó,€the€choices€referred€to€were:€(1)€to€settle€rather€than€litigate;Ð l¼ Ð(2)€not€to€insist€on€other€terms€in€the€settlement€agreement;€and€(3)€not€to€appeal.€€Because€a€partyÐ X ¨ Ðð ðremains€under€a€duty€to€take€legal€steps€to€protect€his€own€interests,ðð€òòBanksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€19,Ð D!” Ðthese€actions€and€inactions€precluded€relief€under€Rule€60.02(5).€€The€same€principle€was€appliedÐ 0"€  Ðin€òòDay€v.€Dayóó,€931€S.W.2d€936€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),€to€a€decision€not€to€appealòò€óóand€inòò€Cain€v.Ð #l! ÐMacklinóó,€663€S.W.2d€794€(Tenn.€1984),€to€a€choice€to€ignore€or€not€defend€against€a€lawsuit.€€ð ðRuleÐ $X" Ð60€is€not€a€substitute€for€appeal€and€motions€under€the€rule€have€been€denied€when€made€to€avoidÐ ô$D # Ða€partyððs€decision€to€settle€the€litigation€or€forego€an€appeal.ðð€€11€òòCharles€Alan€Wright,€et€al.,Ð à%0!$ ÐFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó,€ðð€2851€(2d€ed.€1987).Ô#†XXXjXàÈ#Ô€€We€are€aware€that€agreed€orders€ofÐ Ì&"% Ðsettlement€are€generally€not€appealable,€but€they€are€reviewable€or€modifiable€by€proper€action€takenÐ ¸'#& Ðwithin€the€time€for€appeal.Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà  àOf€course,€Ms.€Williams€claims€that€her€agreement€to€the€MDA,€which€included€herÐ ° Ðagreement€not€to€contest€the€divorce,€was€not€a€free€and€deliberate€choice€on€her€part,€but€rather€wasÐ œì Ðthe€product€of€her€husbandððs€coercion€or€of€her€ð ðsurpriseðð€and€lack€of€time€to€consider€it.€€Ð ˆØ Ðâ âÌà  àIn€òòMatthewsóó,€a€wife€sued€for€divorce€and€asked€that€prior€separation€agreements€be€set€asideÐ `° Ðbecause€they€were€unfair€and€procured€by€fraud,€coercion,€and€undue€pressure.€€In€òòMatthewsóó,€the€wifeÐ L œ Ðwas€represented€by€counsel€when€the€agreements€were€reached,€a€situation€not€present€in€the€caseÐ 8 ˆ Ðbefore€us.€€Nonetheless,€some€of€the€holdings€of€òòMatthewsóó€are€relevant,€including€the€following:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àSo€far€as€we€can€learn€there€was€not€concealment€of€a€single€fact,€nor€anyÐ ü L  Ðmisrepresentation€of€a€fact,€and€no€Damoclean€sword€kept€hanging€over€the€head€ofÐ è 8  Ðthe€wife€during€the€negotiations.€€Hence€the€entire€absence€of€any€legal€grounds€uponÐ Ô$  Ðwhich€to€base€a€decree€annulling€said€contract.ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌòòIdóó.€24€Tenn.€App.€at€593,€148€S.W.2d€at€11.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àAlthough€some€authority€indicates€to€the€contrary,€our€courts€have€held€that€an€MDA€and€theÐ pÀ Ðdecree€incorporating€it€can€be€set€aside€on€the€basis€of€duress.€€In€Ô‡jXXXXÔòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€863€S.W.2d€432,Ð \¬ Ð434€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993),€this€court€considered€a€request€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€for€reliefÐ H˜ Ðfrom€a€divorce€decree€which€incorporated€an€MDA.€€The€asserted€grounds€for€relief€wereÐ 4„ Ðmisrepresentation€or€duress.€€Because€the€only€evidence€of€fraudulent€misrepresentation€that€wasÐ  p Ðplead€was€insufficiently€specific€to€support€an€accusation€of€fraud€and€had€been€available€before€theÐ  \ Ðdivorce€judgment€was€entered,€this€court€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€discovery€related€to€theÐ øH ÐRule€60€motion.€€In€addition,€we€found€there€was€no€fraudulent€concealment€and€the€movant€was€notÐ ä4 Ðentitled€to€relief€on€that€ground.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€court€in€òòBrownóó€acknowledged€that€duress,€if€present,€could€justify€relief€from€the€divorceÐ ¨ø Ðdecree€and€MDA,€citing€òòGilley€v.€Gilleyóó,€778€S.W.2d€862€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€òòBrownóó,€863Ð ”ä ÐS.W.2d€at€435.€€Essentially,€the€wife€testified€that€she€agreed€to€the€divorce,€even€though€she€did€notÐ €Ð Ðwant€one,€and€signed€the€MDA€because€her€husband€had€been€violent€at€times€during€the€marriageÐ l¼ Ðand€she€was€afraid€not€to€sign€the€documents.€€When€asked€about€force€and€threats€directly€relatedÐ X ¨ Ðto€the€signing€of€the€documents,€the€wife€stated,€ð ðHe€did€not€force€me€to€sign€anything.€€But€theÐ D!” Ðstress€and€the€emotional€strain€I€was€under€the€last€year€and€a€half€that€we€were€married,€I€wasnððtÐ 0"€  Ðcapable€of€making€a€decision€that€I€had€to€make.ðð€€This€court€concluded€that€the€trial€court€correctlyÐ #l! Ðdetermined€that€this€was€not€sufficient€to€invalidate€a€contract€that€had€been€approved€by€the€courtÐ $X" Ðand€incorporated€into€the€judgment€of€the€court€and€found€that€the€decision€was€supported€by€theÐ ô$D # Ðcircumstance,€among€others,€that€there€was€a€lack€of€overt€threat€of€present€harm.€€òòIdóó.€863€S.W.2dÐ à%0!$ Ðat€436.€€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThis€holding€is€consistent€with€general€requirement€regarding€duress€or€coercion€sufficientÐ ¤(ô#' Ðto€set€aside€a€contract.€Duress€is€often€defined€in€our€case€law€as:Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà8  àan€unlawful€restraint,€intimidation,€or€compulsion€of€another€to€such€an€extent€andÐ ° Ðâ âdegree€as€to€induce€such€other€person€to€do€or€perform€some€act€which€he€is€notÐ œì Ðlegally€bound€to€do,€contrary€to€his€will€and€inclination.€€The€alleged€coercive€eventÐ ˆØ Ðmust€be€of€such€severity,€either€threatened,€impending€or€actually€inflicted,€so€as€toÐ tÄ Ðovercome€the€mind€and€will€of€a€person€of€ordinary€firmness.Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌòòMcClellan€v.€McClellanóó,€873€S.W.2d€350,€351„52€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€òòSee€also€Fed.€Deposit€Ins.Ð 8 ˆ ÐCorp.€v.€Ramseyóó,€612€F.€Supp.€326€(E.D.€Tenn.€1985).Ð $ t ÐÌà  àHowever,€we€have€also€held€in€a€case€where€the€former€wife€attempted€to€set€aside€a€divorceÐ ü L  Ðdecree€incorporating€a€MDA€on€the€basis€that€her€former€husband€coerced€her€into€signing€the€MDAÐ è 8  Ðthat€his€actions€did€not€constitute€misconduct€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(2).€€Ô#†XXXjX)Ô#Ô€òòLee€v.€Leeóó,€No.€29,Ð Ô$  Ð1990€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€448€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€3,€1990)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€applicationÐ À  Ðfiled)Ô‡jXXXXÔ.€€That€decision€was€based€largely€on€federal€court€interpretations€of€€the€federal€rule€which€isÐ ¬ü  Ðidentical€to€Tennesseeððs€Rule€60.02.€€As€the€òòLeeóó€court€found,€the€type€of€misconduct€included€inÐ ˜è  Ðð ðfraud,€misrepresentation,€or€other€type€of€misconduct€by€an€adverse€partyðð€is€limited€to€the€type€thatÐ „Ô  Ðð ðprevented€the€other€party€from€fully€and€fairly€presenting€its€case.ðð€òò€Leeóó,€1990€Tenn.€App.€LEXISÐ pÀ Ð448,€at€*4€(quoting€òòU.S.€v.€An€Undetermined€Quantity€Of€An€Article€of€Drug€Labeled€As€BenylinÐ \¬ ÐCough€Syrupóó,€583€F.2d€942,€948€(7th€Cir.€1978)).€€That€rule€has€been€applied€uniformly€by€federalÐ H˜ Ðcourts,€where€misconduct€within€the€context€of€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€60(b)(3)€has€been€construed€as€thatÐ 4„ Ðtype€of€conduct€affecting€the€litigation€or€thwarting€the€judicial€process,€with€the€result€that€a€litigantÐ  p Ðwas€prevented€from€fully€and€fairly€presenting€his€or€her€case.€€òòSee€Furman€v.€Commððr€of€InternalÐ  \ ÐRevenueóó,€785€F.2d€308€(6th€Cir.€1986);€òòU.S.€v.€An€Undetermined€Quantity€of€an€Article€of€DrugÐ øH ÐLabeled€as€Benylin€Cough€Syrupóó,€583€F.2d€942€(7th€Cir.€1978);€òòHarris€v.€Mappóó,€719€F.€Supp€1317Ð ä4 Ð(E.D.Va.€1989);€òòGilmour€v.€Strescon€Indus.,€Inc.óó,€66€F.R.D.€146€(E.D.€Pa.€1975),€òòaffirmedóó,€521€F.2dÐ Ð  Ð1398€(3d€Cir.€1975).Ð ¼  ÐÔ#†XXXjX¿â#ÔÔ‡jXXXXÔÌà  àIn€òòLeeóó,€the€former€wife€testified€that€she€signed€the€MDA€because€her€husband€had€hit€herÐ ”ä Ðbefore,€she€was€afraid€he€would€hit€her€again,€she€wanted€to€avoid€further€violent€confrontations,€andÐ €Ð Ðthat€he€had€grabbed€her€arm€and€told€her€she€had€to€sign€the€MDA.€€The€òòLeeóó€court€found€that€such€Ð l¼ Ðconduct€did€not€amount€to€misconduct€under€Rule€60.02(2).€€In€addition€to€federal€courtÐ X ¨ Ðinterpretation€of€misconduct€under€the€rule,€the€court€also€relied€upon€interpretations€by€TennesseeÐ D!” Ðcourts€on€the€requirements€of€an€allegation€of€fraud€under€the€same€provision€of€Rule€60.02.€€As€theÐ 0"€  ÐòòLeeóó€court€noted,€our€courts€have€held,€with€regard€to€a€claim€based€upon€fraud,€thatÔ#†XXXjXüè#Ô€Rule€60.02€reliefÐ #l! Ðis€warranted€only€when€the€moving€party€proves€with€clear€and€convincing€evidence€the€existenceÐ $X" Ðof€conduct€by€the€non„moving€party€which€amounts€to:Ð ô$D # ÐÌà8  àan€intentional€contrivance€by€a€party€to€keep€complainant€and€the€Court€in€ignoranceÐ Ì&"% Ðof€the€real€facts€touching€the€matter€in€litigation,€whereby€a€wrong€conclusion€wasÐ ¸'#& Ðreached,€and€positive€wrong€done€to€the€complainantððs€rights.Ф(ô#'Ð Ð  ÐÌòòDuncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€at€563€(quoting€òòLeeson€v.€Chernauóó,€734€S.W.2d€634,€638€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð |*Ì%) Ð1987)).€€Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThe€òòLee€óócourt€also€found€that€there€was€no€showing€that€the€wife€had€been€prevented€fromÐ ° Ðfully€and€fairly€presenting€her€case€after€signing€the€MDA.€òò€Leeóó,€1990€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€448,€at€*5.€Ð œì ÐThis€holding€is€consistent€with€previously€discussed€authority€regarding€a€conscious€decision€not€toÐ ˆØ Ðappeal€or€seek€other€relief.€€In€the€case€herein,€Ms.€Williams€has€made€no€claim€that€she€was€coercedÐ tÄ Ðor€otherwise€prevented€from€seeking€to€set€aside€the€divorce€earlier.€€She€has€not€explained€why,Ð `° Ðafter€the€surprise€and€shock€produced€by€the€suddenness€of€the€situation€which€she€claimed€affectedÐ L œ Ðher€ability€to€appreciate€the€significance€of€the€documents€presumably€wore€off,€she€never€took€stepsÐ 8 ˆ Ðto€remedy€the€situation,€either€during€the€time€for€filing€an€appeal€or€a€Rule€59€motion€to€alter€orÐ $ t Ðamend€or€thereafter,€before€Mr.€Williams€died€and€before€she€learned€of€the€effect€of€the€divorce€onÐ  ` Ðthe€will.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àAgainst€this€background€of€the€stringent€requirements€that€Ms.€Williams€must€meet€to€beÐ Ô$  Ðentitled€to€relief,€as€well€as€the€burden€she€has€to€overturn€a€discretionary€decision€by€the€trial€court,€Ð À  Ðher€factual€allegations€must€be€considered.€€Those€are€found€in€the€affidavit€she€filed€in€support€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðher€motion€for€relief.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€that€affidavit,€she€testifies€that:€on€May€10,€Mr.€Williams€informed€her€thatÐ ˜è  Ðhe€wanted€a€divorce€and€that€they€had€an€appointment€to€see€his€lawyer€the€next€morning;€prior€toÐ „Ô  Ðthis€discussion€Mr.€Williams€had€only€once,€ð ðin€passing,ðð€mentioned€the€possibility€of€a€divorce;€Ð pÀ Ðon€the€morning€of€May€11,€Mr.€Williams€and€Ms.€Williams€met€with€his€attorney€and€she€was€notÐ \¬ Ðrepresented€by€counsel;€Mr.€Williams€and€his€attorney€asked€her€to€sign€the€marital€dissolutionÐ H˜ Ðagreement€and€she€did€so;€the€divorce€decree€was€entered€that€day;€and€after€the€divorce€Mr.€andÐ 4„ ÐMrs.€Williams€continued€to€live€together€and€discussed€reconciliation.Ð  p ÐÌà  àThere€were€simply€no€facts€alleged€which€would€come€close€to€the€type€of€coercion€or€duressÐ øH Ðthat€might€be€sufficient€to€set€aside€an€agreed€divorce€decree€under€the€most€liberal€standard.׃mÜ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€It€isÐ ä4 Ðimportant€to€note€what€Ms.€Williams€has€not€alleged€or€has€specifically€acknowledged.€Ô‡jXXXXÔ€She€doesÐ ° Ðnot€dispute€and€agrees€that€Mr.€Williams€was€entitled€to€a€divorce€on€the€ground€of€her€inappropriateÐ œì Ðmarital€conduct.€€She€does€not€allege€that€she€was€unaware€of€the€property€held€by€the€parties,Ð ˆØ Ðindividually€or€jointly,€or€that€Mr.€Williams€misrepresented€or€hid€assets.€She€does€not€aver€that€sheÐ tÄ Ðdid€not€understand€the€documents€she€was€signing€or€understand€that€she€was€waiving€her€right€toÐ `° Ðcontest€the€divorce.׃qà×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†XXXjXú#ÔWe€note€that€the€MDA€was€notarized€by€a€deputy€clerk€of€the€court€and€itÐ L œ Ðreflected€several€handwritten€changes€initialed€by€both€Mr.€Williams€and€Ms.€Williams.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àBased€upon€the€record€before€us,€and€our€review€of€the€authorities€discussed€above€andÐ  ` Ðpresented€by€the€parties,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€denying€Ms.Ð ü L  ÐWilliamsððs€motion€for€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(2).€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àIn€finding€that€the€question€was€whether€one€party€to€an€action€can€pursue€relief€against€theÐ À  Ðother,€now€deceased,€party€on€the€basis€of€alleged€fraud€or€misconduct,€the€court€expressed€itsÐ ¬ü  Ðconcern€regarding€allowing€testimony€which€could€not€be€refuted€by€the€deceased€party.€ThisÐ ˜è  Ðlanguage,€of€course,€reflects€the€policy€considerations€behind€Tennesseeððs€Dead€Manððs€Statute.€€ThatÐ „Ô  Ðstatute,€found€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„203,€provides:Ð pÀ ÐÌà8  àIn€actions€or€proceedings€by€or€against€executors,€administrators,€or€guardians,€inÐ H˜ Ðwhich€judgments€may€be€rendered€for€or€against€them,€neither€party€shall€be€allowedÐ 4„ Ðto€testify€against€the€other€as€to€any€transaction€with€or€statement€by€the€testator,Ð  p Ðintestate,€or€ward,€unless€called€to€testify€thereto€by€the€opposite€party.Ð \Ð Ð  ÐÐ øH Ðà  àAs€this€court€has€explained:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àThe€purpose€of€the€statute€is€to€ð ðprevent€the€surviving€party€from€having€the€benefitÐ ˆØ Ðof€his€own€testimony,€when,€by€the€death€of€his€adversary,€his€representative€wasÐ tÄ Ðdeprived€of€the€decedentððs€version€of€the€transaction€or€the€statement.ðð€€òòBaker€v.Ð `° ÐBakeróó,€24€Tenn.€App.€220,€142€S.W.2d€737,€744€(1940).ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àWhile€the€general€approach€is€to€construe€the€exclusion€narrowly,€òòBakeróó,€at€744,Ð $ t Ðð ðtransactions€byðð€encompasses€a€large€range€of€excludable€testimony€on€things€doneÐ  ` Ðin€the€decedentððs€presence.€€ð ðTransactions€with€the€intestate€refer€to€things€done€inÐ ü L  ÐÔ  Ôhis€presence,€to€which€he€might€testify€of€his€personal€knowledge,€were€he€alive.€.€.Ð è 8  Ð.ðð€€òòWaggoner€v.€Dorrisóó,€17€Tenn.€App.€420,€426,€68€S.W.2d€142€(1933)€(quotingÐ Ô$  ÐòòMorris€v.€Norton€(C.C.A.)óó,€75€F.€912,€922).ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌòòBurke€v.€Arnoldóó,€836€S.W.2d€99,€107€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àThere€can€be€no€question€that€the€MDA€was€a€transaction€with€the€decedent.€€The€prohibitionÐ pÀ Ðin€the€statute€does€not€apply€to€cases€where€the€transaction€at€question€did€not€increase€or€diminishÐ \¬ Ðthe€estate€but€concerned€only€the€manner€in€which€the€assets€will€be€distributed.€€òòPetty€v.€Estate€ofÐ H˜ ÐNicholsóó,€569€S.W.2d€840,€845„46€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1977);€òòBaker€v.€Bakeróó,€24€Tenn.€App.€220,€230„Ð 4„ Ð31,€142€S.W.2d€737,€744€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1940).€€However,€a€spouseððs€demand€for€yearððs€supportÐ  p Ðand€exempt€property€have€been€determined€to€have€the€effect€of€decreasing€the€estate.€€òòCantrell€v.Ð  \ ÐCantrellóó,€19€S.W.3d€842,€846€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€Ms.€Williams€filed€such€a€demand€herein€inÐ øH Ðcase€the€divorce€were€set€aside.€€In€addition,€in€the€case€before€us,€the€MDA€can€be€regarded€asÐ ä4 Ðaffecting€the€contents€and€size€of€Mr.€Williamsððs€estate,€and€Ms.€Williams€sought€to€have€the€MDA€Ð Ð  Ðset€aside,€an€action€that€would€affect€the€size€of€the€estate.€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àNeither€party€has€raised€the€Dead€Manððs€Statute,€and€the€trial€court€did€not€specifically€relyÐ ”ä Ðupon€it,€although€the€court€referred€to€the€policies€underlying€it.€€Because€no€evidentiary€hearing€wasÐ €Ð Ðheld,€and€no€objection€was€made€to€the€affidavit,€the€court€was€not€called€upon€to€rule€on€theÐ l¼ Ðadmissibility€of€Ms.€Williamsððs€testimony€regarding€the€signing€of€the€MDA.€€However,€we€cannotÐ X ¨ Ðconceive€of€how€Ms.€Williams€could€establish€the€ð ðmisconductðð€she€alleges€without€violating€theÐ D!” Ðstatute.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àIn€any€event,€the€trial€courtððs€decision€rests€upon€its€determination€that€Ms.€Williams€hadÐ $X" Ðseemingly€acquiesced€in€the€divorce€until€she€learned€of€its€effect€upon€her€inheritance€and€that€herÐ ô$D # Ðchallenge€should€not€be€sustained€in€view€of€the€policies€favoring€finality.€€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€in€denying€Ms.€Williamsððs€motion€for€relief€fromÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€divorce€decree€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(2).Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* ÐÓ  Ó(3)€€Extraordinary€Circumstances€Ð ° ÐÓçÓÌà  àLastly,€Ms.€Williams€sought€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(5),€claiming€that€the€factsÐ ˆØ Ðand€public€policy€issues€present€ð ðextraordinary€circumstancesðð€justifying€relief.€€She€argues€that€ð ðinÐ tÄ Ða€case€such€as€this€where€the€husband€engaged€in€misconduct€such€as€rushing€the€matter€throughÐ `° Ðwhile€obtaining€the€divorce€to€the€severe€detriment€of€the€wifeððs€legal€rights,€public€policy€shouldÐ L œ Ðweigh€in€favor€of€ensuring€that€justice€is€done€if€the€preservation€of€marriage€is€no€longer€possibleðð€Ð 8 ˆ Ðand€that€the€ð ðfacts€of€this€case€and€the€public€policies€of€this€State€compel€the€ruleððs€applicationÐ $ t Ðhere.ðð€€The€trial€court€felt€that€this€was€ð ðnot€a€case€which€rises€to€the€level€of€such€ððextraordinaryÐ  ` Ðcircumstancesðð€or€ððextreme€hardshipðð€which€would€justify€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(5),ððÐ ü L  Ðand€denied€Ms.€Williamsððs€motion€on€that€basis.€€We€agree.€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(5)€reads€like€somewhat€of€a€catch„all€provision,€allowing€relief€fromÐ À  Ða€final€judgment€for€ð ðany€other€reason€justifying€relief€from€the€operation€of€the€judgment.ðð€€DespiteÐ ¬ü  Ðits€broad€language,€the€rule€has€been€construed€very€narrowly€by€the€courts€of€this€state.€òò€Lethcoeóó,Ð ˜è  Ð18€S.W.3d€at€625;€òòUnderwoodóó,€854€S.W.2d€at€97;òò€Henderson€v.€Kirbyóó,€994€S.W.2d€602€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð „Ô  ÐApp.€1996);€òòSteioff€v.€Steioffóó,€833€S.W.2d€94,€97€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòDuncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€at€564;Ð pÀ ÐòòTyler€v.€Tyleróó,€671€S.W.2d€492,€495€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€The€standards€of€Rule€60.02(5)€are€moreÐ \¬ Ðdemanding€than€those€applicable€to€the€other€grounds€for€relief€under€the€rule.€€òòMCNB€Natððl€BankÐ H˜ Ðof€N.C.€v.€Thrailkillóó,€856€S.W.2d€150,€154€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòDuncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€at€564.€€InÐ 4„ Ðfact,€relief€under€Rule€60.02(5)€is€only€appropriate€in€cases€involving€extraordinary€circumstancesÐ  p Ðor€extreme€hardship.€€òòLethcoeóó,€18€S.W.3d€at€624€(citing€òòUnderwoodóó,€854€S.W.2d€at€97).€€ð ððð[A]nyÐ  \ Ðother€reasonðð€under€Rule€60.02(5)€is€to€be€defined€as€a€reason€of€ððoverriding€importance.ðððð€€òòBanksóó,Ð øH Ð817€S.W.2d€at€19.€€This€case€does€not€present€extraordinary€or€exceptional€circumstances,Ð ä4 ÐòòHendersonóó,€944€S.W.2d€at€606,€or€issues€of€overriding€importance,€òòBanksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€19.Ð Ð  ÐÌà@**!ìàII.€€The€AnnuitiesˆÐ ¨ø ÐÌà  àIn€the€Probate€Case€the€Estate€filed€a€complaint€seeking€a€declaratory€judgment€that€certainÐ €Ð Ðannuities€belonged€to€the€Estate€and€not€to€Ms.€Williams.€€The€annuities€that€the€Estate€claimed€hadÐ l¼ Ðbeen€awarded€to€Mr.€Williams€in€the€final€divorce€decree,€but€Ms.€Williams€was€still€named€as€theÐ X ¨ Ðbeneficiary€at€his€death.€€The€Estate€later€amended€the€complaint,€asking€the€trial€court€to€impose€aÐ D!” Ðconstructive€trust€over€all€the€assets€awarded€to€Mr.€Williams€in€the€divorce€and€to€order€Ms.Ð 0"€  ÐWilliams€to€convey€any€interest€she€had€in€the€annuities€to€the€Estate.€€The€three€annuities€at€issueÐ #l! Ðwere€issued€by€Lincoln€National,€Guardian,€and€Hartford,€and€had€a€value€of€approximatelyÐ $X" Ð$900,000.Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àLater,€Lincoln€National€filed€an€interpleader€action€to€determine€the€proper€beneficiary€of€theÐ Ì&"% Ðproceeds€of€a€death€benefit€payable€pursuant€to€the€terms€of€an€annuity€contract€as€a€result€of€theÐ ¸'#& Ðdeath€of€Mr.€Williams.€€Several€months€later,€Guardian€filed€a€motion€to€intervene€in€the€LincolnÐ ¤(ô#' ÐNational€case€because€it€too€sought€a€determination€as€to€the€proper€beneficiary€of€an€annuityÐ )à$( Ðcontract€purchased€by€Mr.€Williams.€€Hartford€filed€a€separate€complaint€for€interpleader€toÐ |*Ì%) Ðdetermine€the€proper€beneficiary€of€a€third€annuity€contract.€€The€interpleader€actions€wereÐ h+¸&* Ðconsolidated€with€the€Divorce€Case€and€the€Probate€Case,€where€the€issue€of€entitlement€to€theÐ ° Ðannuity€of€proceeds€had€been€raised.€€The€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€for€Ms.€WilliamsÐ œì Ðand€awarded€her€the€annuities.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€Estate€appealed,€arguing€that€the€trial€court€should€have€imposed€a€constructive€trust€toÐ `° Ðdefeat€the€award€of€the€proceeds€to€Ms.€Williams€as€the€named€beneficiary€because€the€MDAÐ L œ Ðspecifically€awarded€Mr.€Williams€the€annuity€contracts€at€issue€and,€therefore,€the€trial€court€shouldÐ 8 ˆ Ðhave€merely€implemented€and€enforced€the€MDA.€€It€is€undisputed€that€during€their€marriage,€Mr.Ð $ t ÐWilliams€made€Ms.€Williams€the€beneficiary€of€the€annuity€contracts€and€that€Mr.€Williams€did€notÐ  ` Ðchange€the€beneficiary€before€his€death.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àIn€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€we€review€the€trial€courtððs€factual€findings€òòde€novoóó,Ð Ô$  Ðwith€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€factual€findings€of€the€trial€court.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ð À  Ð13(d).€€No€such€presumption€applies€to€a€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law,€which€we€review€òòde€novoóó.€Ð ¬ü  ÐòòId.óó;€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€The€questions€of€the€right€to€the€annuitiesððÐ ˜è  Ðdeath€benefit,€the€apportionment€of€estate€taxes,€and€the€interpleaderððs€dismissal,€as€raised€herein,Ð „Ô  Ðall€involve€questions€of€law.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€based€its€decision€on€òòBowers€v.€Bowersóó,€637€S.W.2d€456€(Tenn.€1982),€andÐ H˜ Ðstated:Ð 4„ ÐÌà8  àIn€òòBowersóó,€the€husband€died€thirty„four€(34)€days€after€his€divorce.€€The€divorceÐ  \ Ðdecree€provided€that€wife€released€husband€from€all€claims€and€waived€any€otherÐ øH Ðrights€not€provided€for€in€the€divorce€decree.€€Husband€never€changed€the€designatedÐ ä4 Ðbeneficiary€under€an€insurance€policy€after€the€divorce.€€After€husband€died,€a€disputeÐ Ð  Ðarose€as€to€whether€former€wife€or€the€children€were€entitled€to€the€proceeds€underÐ ¼  Ðthe€life€insurance€policy.€€òòId.óó€at€457.ШøÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€Supreme€Court€held€that€former€wife€was€entitled€to€the€insurance€proceeds.€€InÐ €Ð Ðso€holding,€the€Court€opined€as€follows:Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àBeing€a€beneficiary€of€the€life€insurance€of€her€ex„husband€was€not€aÐ D!” Ðð ðproperty€right,ðð€a€result€of€an€ð ðobligation€to€support€a€wife,ðð€aÐ 0"€  Ðð ðright,ðð€or€a€ð ðclaimðð€which€was€waived€and€relinquished€by€theÐ #l! Ðproperty€settlement€agreement.€€The€husband€was€under€no€duty€byÐ $X" Ðlaw€or€by€contract€to€have€life€insurance€in€the€first€place€or€toÐ ô$D # Ðdesignate€[wife]€as€the€beneficiary€of€it;€he€could€have€changed€theÐ à%0!$ Ðbeneficiary€at€any€time€without€encountering€any€of€[wifeððs]€rights;Ð Ì&"% Ðshe€simply€had€no€claim€with€respect€to€the€life€insurance.€€ThereforeÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€terms€of€the€property€settlement€agreement€do€not€affect€the€lifeÐ ¤(ô#' Ðinsurance€policy€at€all.€€Ð)à$(` x` x ÐÌòòà8  àId.óó€at€457„58.Ðh+¸&*Ð Ð  Їà8  àIn€the€instant€case,€Mr.€Williams€died€fifty„four€(54)€days€after€the€entry€of€the€FinalÐ ° ÐDecree,€a€period€even€longer€than€in€òòBowersóó.€€Yet€at€no€time€did€he€even€begin€theÐ œì Ðprocess€of€changing€the€designated€beneficiary€under€the€Annuity€Contract.€€As€aÐ ˆØ Ðresult,€under€the€controlling€authority€of€òòBowersóó,€this€Court€concludes€as€a€matter€ofÐ tÄ Ðlaw€that€Ms.€Williams€is€entitled€to€the€proceeds€payable€under€the€Annuity€Contract.Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€also€noted€that€the€Estate€attempted€to€distinguish€òòBowersóó€on€the€grounds€thatÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€divorce€decree€in€òòBowersóó€did€not€expressly€address€the€life€insurance€policy€at€issue.€€The€EstateÐ $ t Ðargued€that€the€Williams€MDA€expressly€referred€to€the€annuity€contract€by€name€and€number.€€TheÐ  ` Ðtrial€court€determined€that€it€could€not€conclude€that€ð ðthis€distinction€would€cause€the€Supreme€CourtÐ ü L  Ðto€carve€out€an€exception€to€the€òòBowersóó€rule€of€law.ððÐ è 8  ÐÌà  àIn€òòBowersóó,€the€Supreme€Court€defined€the€single€issue€in€that€case€as€ð ðwhether€a€propertyÐ À  Ðsettlement€agreement€incorporated€in€a€divorce€decree,€wherein€wife€released€husband€from€allÐ ¬ü  Ðclaims€should€be€construed€as€effecting€a€change€in€beneficiary€of€husbandððs€life€insurance,€whereÐ ˜è  Ðwife€was€still€the€named€beneficiary€under€the€policy€at€the€date€of€husbandððs€death,€thirty„four€daysÐ „Ô  Ðafter€the€divorce.ðð€€637€S.W.2d€at€456.€€On€that€issue,€the€Court€held€that€ð ðthe€property€settlementÐ pÀ Ðagreement€had€no€force€and€effect€whatever€upon€the€life€insurance€policy€and€neither€the€agreementÐ \¬ Ðnor€the€divorce€terminated€wifeððs€status€as€named€beneficiary€in€the€policy€or€her€right€to€receive€theÐ H˜ Ðproceeds.ðð€€637€S.W.2d€at€459.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIn€Tennessee€a€change€of€beneficiary€must€be€accomplished€in€substantial€compliance€withÐ  \ Ðthe€terms€of€the€insurance€contract.€€òòSun€Life€Assurance€Co.€v.€Hicksóó,€844€S.W.2d€652,€654€(Tenn.Ð øH ÐCt.€App.€1992).€€Consequently,€our€courts€have€held€that€a€provision€in€a€will€attempting€to€changeÐ ä4 Ðthe€beneficiary€cannot€vary€the€provisions€of€the€contract.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[T]he€language€in€a€will€does€not€operate€to€deprive€the€named€beneficiary€of€herÐ ¨ø Ðrights€to€the€policy€proceeds.€€òòCook€v.€Cookóó,€521€S.W.2d€808,€813€(Tenn.€1975).€Ð ”ä ÐWhen€there€is€no€attempt€to€change€the€beneficiary€according€to€the€procedures€setÐ €Ð Ðforth€in€the€policy,€the€law€of€this€state€provides€that€a€constructive€trust€does€notÐ l¼ Ðarise,€requiring€distribution€according€to€the€terms€of€the€will,€even€though€theÐ X ¨ Ðtestator€clearly€indicated€in€his€will€that€he€wanted€the€insurance€proceeds€to€benefitÐ D!” Ðan€individual€other€than€the€named€beneficiary.€€òòStoker€v.€Comptonóó,€643€S.W.2d€895,Ð 0"€  Ð898€(Tenn.€App.€1981).Ð#l!Ð Ð  ÐÌòòTravelers€Ins.€Co.€v.€Webb.óó,€No.€01„A„01„9508„CH„00379,€1996€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€44,€at€*6€Ð ô$D # Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Jan.€24,€1996)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àIt€is€well€settled€that€divorce€itself€does€not€create€a€presumption€that€a€former€spouse€isÐ ¸'#& Ðremoved€as€a€beneficiary.€€òòSun€Life€Assurance€Co.óó,€844€S.W.2d€at€654.€€òòBowersóó€and€its€progenyÐ ¤(ô#' Ðestablished€that€a€property€settlement€agreement€also€does€not€affect€a€designation€of€beneficiary.€Ð )à$( Ðâ âThe€same€principles€have€been€applied€to€a€designation€of€beneficiary€in€an€annuity€contract,€Ð |*Ì%) ÐòòTeachers€Ins.€&€Annuity€Assoc.€v.€Harrisóó,€709€S.W.2d€592,€595€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985),€because€thereÐ ° Ðis€no€relevant€distinction€between€an€insurance€contract€and€an€annuity€contract.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€Courtððs€conclusion€in€òòBowersóó€rested€in€part€upon€its€determination€that€being€aÐ tÄ Ðbeneficiary€was€not€a€right€or€claim€arising€out€of€the€marital€relationship€and,€therefore,€was€notÐ `° Ðincluded€in€the€property€settlementððs€language€waiving€or€relinquishing€such€rights€and€claims.׃f×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òòóó€637Ð L œ ÐS.W.2d€at€457„58.€€However,€the€Court€also€explicitly€found€that€a€property€settlement€agreementÐ 8 ˆ Ðhas€ð ðno€force€and€effect€whateverðð€upon€a€life€insurance€policy,€indicating€its€reliance€on€legalÐ $ t Ðrequirements€for€changing€a€beneficiary.€€òòIdóó.€at€459.€€The€Estate€argues€that€òòBowersóó€should€not€beÐ  ` Ðapplied€herein€because€of€the€language€of€the€MDA€at€issue.€€The€Williams€MDA€listed,€along€withÐ ü L  Ðother€assets,€the€three€annuities,€giving€a€value€to€each€and€awarding€each€to€Mr.€Williams€ð ðfree€ofÐ è 8  Ðany€claim€by€Wife.ðð€€The€Estate€argues€that€the€MDA€explicitly€grants€the€annuities€to€Mr.€WilliamsÐ Ô$  Ðand€no€further€search€for€Mr.€Williamsððs€intent€is€required.€€It€further€asserts€that€a€constructive€trustÐ À  Ðshould€have€been€granted€to€prevent€unjust€enrichment€to€Kathryn€Williams€ð ðas€a€matter€of€equityÐ ¬ü  Ðand€good€conscience.ððÐ ˜è  ÐÌà  àThere€is€nothing€about€the€language€in€the€MDA€to€make€inapplicable€the€principlesÐ pÀ Ðdiscussed€above.€€Althoughòò€Bowersóó€interpreted€general€language€waiving€claims€arising€from€theÐ \¬ Ðmarriage,€and€Ms.€Williams€agreed€to€waive€any€claim€to€the€annuities€themselves,€the€fact€remainsÐ H˜ Ðthat€no€attempt€was€made€to€change€the€beneficiary€in€compliance€with€the€annuity€contractÐ 4„ Ðprovisions.€€If€the€explicit€language€of€a€decedentððs€will€expressing€an€intent€contrary€to€theÐ  p Ðdesignation€of€beneficiary€cannot€effectuate€a€change€of€beneficiary,€certainly€the€ð ðfree€of€claimððÐ  \ Ðlanguage€does€not.€€We€do€not€disagree€that€the€MDA€clearly€awarded€the€annuities€to€Mr.€Williams.€Ð øH ÐAs€the€owner,€he€was€free€to€name€any€beneficiary€he€chose,€including€Ms.€Williams,€whether€heÐ ä4 Ðwas€married€to€her€or€not.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€to€Ms.€Williams€and€the€resultingÐ ¨ø Ðaward€to€her€of€the€proceeds€from€the€Lincoln€National,€Guardian,€and€Hartford€annuities.€€Ð ”ä ÐÓ  ÓÌÓŽKÓÓ  ÓA.€€Estate€Taxes€on€the€AnnuitiesÐ l¼ ÐÓ«KÓÌà  àAs€a€result€of€the€large€size€of€Mr.€Williamsððs€estate,€federal€estate€taxes€were€owed€in€theÐ D!” Ðamount€of€$1,667,340.€€After€the€trial€court€awarded€the€Lincoln€National€annuity€to€Ms.€Williams,Ð 0"€  Ðthe€Estate€sought€injunctive€relief€relating€to€the€estateððs€tax€liability€for€the€annuities€on€which€Ms.Ð ° ÐWilliams€was€the€named€beneficiary.€€The€Estate€requested€that€the€trial€court€require€Ms.€WilliamsÐ œì Ðto€immediately€relinquish€funds€sufficient€to€cover€the€tax€burden€attributable€to€the€annuities.€€TheÐ ˆØ Ðtrial€court€declined€to€issue€an€injunction€at€that€time.׃h×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àHowever,€the€trial€court€did€release€four€accounts€from€a€previous€agreed€order€preventingÐ L œ Ðthe€dissipation€of€assets€in€the€Estate€so€that€the€Estate€would€be€able€to€pay€the€tax€liability.€€TheÐ 8 ˆ Ðtrial€court€also€required€that€the€funds€in€the€annuities€be€preserved€pending€a€resolution€of€the€issueÐ $ t Ðregarding€the€tax€liability.€€The€trial€court€also€ordered€the€parties€to€brief€the€tax€liability€issue.€Ð  ` ÐAfter€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€determined€that€Ms.€Williams€was€responsible€for€her€pro€rata€shareÐ ü L  Ðof€the€estate€taxes€and€awarded€the€Estate€a€judgment€against€her€in€the€amount€of€$430,395.40€asÐ è 8  Ðthat€pro€rata€share.€€Ms.€Williams€appeals.€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThe€Estate€asserts€that€the€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€tax€liability€should€be€upheld€because:Ð ¬ü  Ð(1)€it€is€an€equitable€apportionment€consistent€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„614;€and€(2)€byÐ ˜è  Ðoperation€of€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„202€the€divorce€deprived€Ms.€Williams€of€the€benefit€of€theÐ „Ô  Ðwillððs€tax€allocation€clause.€€Ms.€Williams€maintains€that€the€will€itself€governs€and€requires€that€allÐ pÀ Ðestate€taxes€be€paid€out€of€the€Estate.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„614€addresses€the€proration€of€federal€and€state€estate€andÐ 4„ Ðinheritance€taxes.€€It€provides€that€where€an€executor€has€paid€estate€taxes,Ð  p ÐÌà8  àupon,€or€with€respect€to,€any€property€required€to€be€included€in€the€gross€estate€ofÐ øH Ða€decedent€under€the€provisions€of€any€such€[tax]€law,€the€amount€of€the€tax€so€paid,Ð ä4 Ðò òexcept€in€a€case€where€a€testator€otherwise€directs€in€the€testatorððs€willó ó,€shall€beÐ Ð  Ðequitably€prorated€among€the€persons€interested€in€the€estate€to€whom€such€propertyÐ À Ðis€or€may€be€transferred€or€to€whom€any€benefit€accrues.ЬüÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„614(b)€(emphasis€added).Ð „Ô ÐÌà  àAdditionally,€the€statute€directs€that€ð ðso€far€as€practicable,€and€unless€otherwise€directed€byÐ \ ¬ Ðthe€will€of€the€decedentðð€the€executor€is€to€pay€the€taxes€before€distribution€of€the€estate.€€It€Ð H!˜ Ðspecifically€allows€an€executor€to€bring€an€action€to€recover€from€a€person€in€possession€of€propertyÐ 4"„  Ðincluded€in€the€estate€for€tax€purposes€but€which€passed€outside€the€estate€and€never€came€into€theÐ ° Ðpossession€of€the€executor,€such€as€the€annuities€herein,€ð ðthe€proportionate€amount€of€such€taxÐ œì Ðpayable€by€the€persons€interested€in€the€estate€with€which€such€persons€interested€in€the€estate€areÐ ˆØ Ðchargeable€under€the€provisions€of€this€section.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„614(c).€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àAs€the€language€of€the€statute€makes€clear,€a€testator€may€direct€payment€of€taxes€other€thanÐ L œ Ðby€proration€and€even€other€than€equitably.€€Equitable€apportionment€under€the€statute€is€merely€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðdefault€rule.€€òòUnion€Planters€Natððl€Bank€v.€Dedmanóó,€86€S.W.3d€515,€519€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).€Ð $ t ÐA€direction€by€the€testator€makes€the€statute€inapplicable.€€òòWolfe€v.€Mid„Continent€Corp.óó,€222€Tenn.Ð  ` Ð348,€355„56,€435€S.W.2d€836,€840€(1968).׃o×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àBecause€Mr.€Williams€ð ðotherwise€directedðð€the€apportionment€of€taxes,€the€statutoryÐ Ô$  Ðequitable€proration€does€not€apply.€€Where€a€testator€has€directed€how€taxes€are€to€be€paid,€ð ðtheÐ À  Ðexecutors€are€not€privileged€to€ignore€the€will€even€though€some€indirect€benefits€may€accrue€toÐ ¬ü  Ðpersons€not€claiming€title€to€property€pursuant€to€its€provisions.ðð€€òòWolfeóó,€222€Tenn.€at€356,€435Ð ˜è  ÐS.W.2d€at€840€(quoting€òòCommerce€Union€Bank€v.€Albertóó,€201€Tenn.€631,€635„36,€301€S.W.2d€352,€Ð „Ô  Ð354€(Tenn.€1957)).€€Mr.€Williams€gave€specific€direction€regarding€the€payment€of€taxes€in€his€will:Ð pÀ ÐÌà8  àExcept€as€otherwise€provided€herein,€I€further€direct€that€all€estate,€inheritance,Ð H˜ Ðgeneration„skipping€transfer€and€other€taxes€of€the€same€nature€which€are€payableÐ 4„ Ðbecause€of€my€death€with€respect€to€the€property€comprising€my€estate€for€such€taxÐ  p Ðpurposes,€whether€or€not€such€property€passes€under€this€Will€and€whether€such€taxesÐ  \ Ðare€payable€by€my€estate€or€by€any€recipient€or€beneficiary€of€any€such€property,€shallÐ øH Ðbe€paid€entirely€out€of€my€residuary€estate€(after€any€reductions€due€to€amountsÐ ä4 Ðpassing€to€Kathy€H.€Williams,€whom€I€hereinafter€refer€to€as€my€wife)€as€an€expenseÐ Ð  Ðof€administration€and€without€apportionment,€and€with€no€right€of€reimbursementÐ ¼  Ðfrom€any€recipient€or€beneficiary€of€any€such€property.€€Any€interest€and€penaltiesÐ ¨ø Ðpayable€with€respect€to€said€taxes€shall€be€a€charge€against€the€income€from€myÐ ”ä Ðresiduary€estate.€€Each€portion€of€my€residuary€estate€with€respect€to€which€a€federalÐ €Ð Ðor€state€generation„skipping€transfer€tax,€if€any,€is€payable,€including€any€interest€orÐ l¼ Ðpenalties€thereon,€shall€be€charged€directly€with€such€tax.€€My€Executors,€in€their€soleÐ X ¨ Ðand€absolute€discretion,€may€use€the€proceeds€of€any€life€insurance€payable€to€myÐ D!” Ðestate€for€the€payment€of€debts€or€taxes.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThis€clause€evidences€the€testatorððs€intent€to€have€the€Estate€bear€the€burden€of€any€taxÐ $X" Ðliability€rather€than€placing€that€burden€on€the€beneficiaries€of€his€estate.€€His€clearly€stated€intentÐ ô$D # Ðwas€to€have€his€property€transfer€to€its€recipients€free€of€an€estate€tax€burden€ð ðwhether€or€not€suchÐ à%0!$ Ðproperty€passes€under€this€Will€and€whether€such€taxes€are€payable€by€my€estate€or€by€any€recipientÐ Ì&"% Ðor€beneficiary€of€any€such€property.ðð€€Thus,€the€annuities€passing€to€Ms.€Williams€as€the€namedÐ ° Ðbeneficiary€are€clearly€covered.€€òòSee€Marler€v.€Claunchóó,€221€Tenn.€693,€699„700€€420€S.W.2d€452,Ð œì Ð455€(1968)€(holding€that€dissenting€widow,€unnamed€in€the€will,€was€not€chargeable€with€any€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðestate€taxes€in€view€of€the€language€in€the€will€directing€executor€to€pay€all€taxes€with€respect€to€theÐ tÄ Ðestate€regardless€of€whether€or€not€such€beneficiary€was€named€in€the€will);òò€Merchants€&€PlantersÐ `° ÐBank€v.€Myersóó,€644€S.W.2d€683,€687€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982)€(holding€that€the€term€ð ðall€taxesðð€in€aÐ L œ Ðwill€was€broad€enough€to€exonerate€nontestamentary€property€from€the€burden€of€estate);€MauriceÐ 8 ˆ ÐT.€Brunner,€Annotation,€òòConstruction€and€Effect€of€Will€Provisions€Relating€to€the€Burden€of€EstateÐ $ t Ðor€Inheritance€Taxesóó,€69€òòA.L.R.€3dóó€122€(2002).Ð  ` ÐÌà  àFurther,€under€the€tax€allocation€clause€of€Mr.€Williamsððs€will,€the€Estate€has€no€right€ofÐ è 8  Ðreimbursement€from€a€recipient€of€such€property,€herein€Kathryn€Williams.€€Consequently,€Ms.Ð Ô$  ÐWilliams€was€subject€to€no€requirement€that€she€pay€a€proportionate€share€of€the€estate€taxes€fromÐ À  Ðthe€annuities€she€received€as€beneficiary€thereof,€and€there€was€no€basis€for€the€judgment€against€Ms.Ð ¬ü  ÐWilliams€for€that€liability,€as€long€as€she€is€entitled€to€assert€the€benefit€of€the€tax€allocation€clause.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àThe€Estate€argues€that€as€a€result€of€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€uphold€the€validity€of€theÐ pÀ Ðdivorce,€Ms.€Williams€is€not€entitled€to€the€benefit€of€the€Estate€shouldering€the€tax€burden€becauseÐ \¬ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„202€revokes€any€provision€in€Mr.€Williamsððs€will€which€would€benefit€Ms.Ð H˜ ÐWilliams.€€Ms.€Williams€argues€that€the€only€provisions€of€the€will€that€were€revoked€by€operationÐ 4„ Ðof€the€statute€are€those€listed€in€the€statute€itself.€Ð  p ÐÌà  àTenn.€Code€Ann€ðð€32„1„202€provides,€in€pertinent€part:Ð øH ÐÌà8  à(a)€If€after€executing€a€will€the€testator€is€divorced€or€the€testatorððs€marriage€annulled,Ð Ð  Ðthe€divorce€or€annulment€revokes€any€disposition€or€appointment€of€property€madeÐ ¼  Ðby€the€will€to€the€former€spouse,€any€provision€conferring€a€general€or€special€powerÐ ¨ø Ðof€appointment€on€the€former€spouse,€and€any€nomination€of€the€former€spouse€asÐ ”ä Ðexecutor,€trustee,€conservator€or€guardian,€unless€the€will€expressly€providesÐ €Ð Ðotherwise.Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€Property€prevented€from€passing€to€a€former€spouse€because€of€revocation€byÐ D!” Ðdivorce€or€annulment€passes€as€if€the€former€spouse€failed€to€survive€the€decedent€butÐ 0"€  Ðthe€provisions€of€ðð€32„3„105€shall€not€apply.€€Other€provisions€conferring€someÐ #l! Ðpower€or€office€on€the€former€spouse€are€interpreted€as€if€the€spouse€failed€to€surviveÐ $X" Ðthe€decedent.Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€Estate€first€argues€that€the€statute€results€in€the€revocation€of€all€provisions€in€Mr.Ð Ì&"% ÐWilliamsððs€will€that€benefit€Ms.€Williams,€ð ðincluding€any€direction€rendering€an€indirect€benefitÐ ¸'#& Ðupon€Kathryn€L.€H.€Williams€such€as€a€direction€for€the€Estate€to€pay€taxes.ðð€€In€support€of€thisÐ ¤(ô#' Ðâ âstatement,€the€Estate€relies€uponòò€Third€Natððl€Bank€v.€Cottenóó,€536€S.W.2d€330€(Tenn.€1976),€whichÐ )à$( Ðinvolved€a€dispute€over€apportionment€of€estate€taxes€to€a€widow€who€dissented€from€the€will.׃n×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р° Ðâ âWhile€assuming,€without€ruling,€that€the€tax€allocation€clause€of€the€will€in€question€required€thatÐ œì Ðsuch€taxes€be€paid€from€the€residuary€estate€and€not€charged€to€the€beneficiaries,€the€Court€held€theÐ ˆØ Ðwidow€could€not€take€advantage€of€the€tax€allocation€provision€because€of€another€provision€of€theÐ tÄ Ðwill€which€provided€that€ð ðif€his€widow€should€dissent€and€take€against€the€will,€ò òany€provision€inÐ `° Ðthe€will€in€her€favoró ó€would€become€void.ðð€€536€S.W.2d€at€332€(emphasis€added).€Ð P   ÐÌà  àThe€language€ð ðany€provision€of€the€will€in€her€favorðð€varies€significantly€from€the€statuteððsÐ , | Ðlanguage€listing€specific€grants€that€are€revoked.€€We€cannot€equate€the€two€or€assign€the€same€legalÐ  h Ðconsequence€to€them.€€With€regard€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann€ðð€32„1„202,€our€Supreme€Court€has€stated:Ð  T  ÐÌà8  àThe€purpose€of€the€statute€is€not€to€confer€rights€that€do€not€exist,€but€to€eliminate€theÐ Ü,  Ðdevise€to€a€former€spouse€and€pass€the€property€to€the€next€taker,€whether€under€theÐ È  Ðwill€or€by€intestacy.€€Nor€is€the€purpose€of€the€statute€to€cure€deficiencies€in€the€willÐ ´  Ðor€to€provide€opportunities€for€the€courts€to€speculate€about€a€testatorððs€intent.Рð Ð Ð  ÐÌòòIn€re€Walkeróó,€849€S.W.2d€766,€770€(Tenn.€1993).Ð xÈ ÐÌà  àMs.€Williams€argues€that€the€benefit€to€a€beneficiary€or€recipient€of€property€from€the€taxÐ P  Ðallocation€clause€is€not€a€disposition€or€appointment€of€property,€a€power€of€appointment€or€aÐ <Œ Ðnomination€as€a€fiduciary€and€that€this€specific€list€cannot€be€enlarged€to€include€any€indirect€benefit.€Ð (x ÐWe€agree€that€the€Estateððs€argument€in€essence€asks€us€to€interpret€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„1„202€toÐ d Ðinclude€items€not€expressly€included€therein.€€The€rules€of€statutory€construction€which€courts€mustÐ P Ðfollow€are€well„settled:Ð ì< ÐÌÌà8  àThe€purpose€of€statutory€construction€is€ð ðto€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€the€legislativeÐ ° Ðintent€without€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€a€statuteððs€coverage€beyond€itsÐ œì Ðintended€scope.ðð€€òòOwens€v.€Stateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923,€926€(Tenn.€1995)€(citationÐ ˆØ Ðomitted).€€Courts€must€restrict€their€review€ð ðto€the€natural€and€ordinary€meaning€ofÐ tÄ Ðthe€language€used€by€the€legislature€in€the€statute,€unless€an€ambiguity€requires€resortÐ ` ° Ðelsewhere€to€ascertain€legislative€intent.ðð€€òòBrowder€v.€Morrisóó,€975€S.W.2d€308,€311Ð L!œ Ð(Tenn.€1998)€(citing€òòAustin€v.€Memphis€Pub.€Co.óó,€655€S.W.2d€146,€148€(Tenn.Ð 8"ˆ  Ð1983)).€€The€construction€of€a€statute€is€a€question€of€law€subject€to€òòde€novoóó€reviewÐ $#t! Ðwithout€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòIvey€v.€Trans€Global€Gas€&€Oilóó,€3€S.W.3dÐ $`" Ð441,€446€(Tenn.€1999).Ðü$L #Ð Ð  ЇòòRobinson€v.€LeCorpsóó,€83€S.W.3d€718,€722„23€(Tenn.€2002).Ð ° ÐÌà  àThe€statute€revokes€three€specific€types€of€provisions€in€a€will