ÿWPC¶ -# †U:‘ %Ë 0(Ñb ùw@4EYLh 0J´ 0Tþ 0^R 0h° 0r 0|Š 0† 0Œ 1u 0d‘U *õB) DCH AQ‹ ÆÜ 0D¢ 0@æ 0D& AMj D/· Bæ B D3 S v~e vÓã˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - ðñòóôõö÷Ó€ê‚_#x3|xC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó!#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌJune€12,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€¢XXdæXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òÔ€¼ÔÓ  ÓÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€!ÙßR€%*A1-j|Æ,` ç `€€@ÿRßà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€XÔÌÌÌÌÌTHOMAS€A.€(TOMMY)€WORTHAM,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9709„CV„00464ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDickson€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€CV762ÌWEST€MEADE€CORPORATION,à à)à àà àà àà àà àà àÌJOY€MARSH,€PRESIDENT,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DICKSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€CHARLOTTE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€BURCH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌNEAL€LOVLACEÌHARVILL€&€LOVLACEÌ102€Bank€AvenueÌCenterville,€Tennessee€37033Ìà àAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€JR.ÌTODD,€SPENCER€&€ATKINSÌ404€East€College€StreetÌDickson,€Tennessee€37055Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendant/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌKOCH,€J.ÌWELLES,€S.J.ÌÌÌÓÓò òÔ€„Ôòòà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€XÔÌÌà àà àThe€plaintiff€filed€suit€for€specific€performance€on€an€option€toÏpurchase€real€property.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€plaintiff€had€failed€toÏexercise€the€option€before€it€expired,€and€granted€summary€judgment€to€theÏdefendant€property„owner.€We€affirm€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€facts€of€this€case€are€undisputed,€and€relatively€simple.€€InÏSeptember€of€1993,€Mark€Cook€and€Kenneth€Godwin€signed€a€contract€to€leaseÏthe€Tice€Springs€Market€in€Dickson,€Tennessee€from€West€Meade€Corporation.€ÏThe€duration€of€the€lease€was€to€be€three€years,€from€September€1,€1993€untilÍAugust€31,€1996.€€One€clause€in€the€contract€set€out€the€terms€of€an€option€toÏpurchase€the€property:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà àOPTION€TO€PURCHASE.€It€is€hereby€granted€toÏLessee€an€option€to€purchase€said€property€at€any€timeÏduring€the€term€of€this€agreement€or€renewal€therof.€€SuchÏoption€shall€be€secured€by€the€payment€of€Five€ThousandÏand€No/100€($5,000.00)€Dollars,€cash€in€hand€paid,€theÏreceipt€of€which€is€hereby€acknowledged.€€In€the€event€thatÏthis€option€is€exercised,€said€Five€Thousand€and€No/100Ï($5,000.00)€Dollars€shall€be€applied€to€the€purchase€price.ÏThe€purchase€price€for€said€real€property€under€this€optionÏshall€be€Sixty€Thousand€and€No/100€($60,000)€Dollars.€ÏThe€Lessee€upon€exercising€this€option€shall€be€givenÏcredit€for€the€principal€amount€of€payments€amortized€on€aÏbalance€of€Fifty€Five€Thousand€and€No/100€($55,000)ÏDollars€for€a€period€of€ten€(10)€years€at€10.5%€interest.€ÏSaid€payments€shall€be€deducted€from€the€purchase€price.€ÏIf€the€option€is€not€exercised,€any€and€all€monthlyÏpayments€and€the€original€option€payment€of€FiveÏThousand€and€No/100€($5,000)€Dollars€shall€now€andÏforever€be€considered€as€rent€for€the€period€of€occupancyÏof€the€Lessee€and€possession€of€the€real€property.ÌÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àAnother€clause€in€the€lease€gave€the€lessee€the€right€to€renew€theÏcontract€for€an€additional€three€years€at€the€end€of€the€initial€lease€period,€subjectÏto€renegotiation€of€the€rental€rate,€said€new€rental€rate€not€to€exceed€the€currentÏlevel€by€more€than€10%.€€Still€another€clause€provided€that€if€at€the€end€of€theÏthree„year€term€the€lessee€remained€in€possession€of€the€premises€withoutÏrenewal,€he€would€then€become€a€tenant€at€will€on€a€month„to„month€basis,€andÏthere€could€be€no€ð ðrenewal,€dislease,€or€exercise€of€any€option€by€operation€ofÏlaw.ðð€€€ÌÌà àà àOn€February€1,€1994,€the€lessees€assigned€the€lease€to€the€plaintiff,ÏTommy€Wortham,€ð ðin€consideration€of€Ten€Dollars€($10.00)€and€other€good€andÏvaluable€considerations.ðð€€Mr.€Wortham€presumably€operated€the€market€for€theÏremainder€of€the€lease€period.€€On€August€14th€or€15,€1996,€Eric€Baxter,€anÏemployee€of€West€Meade€Corporation€met€with€Mr.€Wortham,€and€gave€him€anÏamortization€schedule,€which€indicated€that€if€Mr.€Wortham€wished€to€purchaseÏthe€property,€the€pay„off€amount€was€$41,580.33.€€In€his€affidavit,€Mr.€Baxter€statedÏthat€he€advised€Mr.€Wortham€at€that€time€that€if€he€wanted€to€purchase€theÏproperty,€but€was€not€yet€ready€to€do€so,€he€could€preserve€his€rights€by€renewingÏthe€lease.ÌÌà àà àOn€August€22,€1996,€Mr.€Worthamððs€attorney€sent€a€letter€to€WestÏMeade€which€stated,€ð ð[p]lease€be€advised€that€Mr.€Wortham€intends€to€exerciseÏthe€option€to€purchase.€€He€will€make€every€effort€to€finish€his€financingÏarrangements€so€that€the€purchase€can€be€completed€within€the€next€thirty€(30)Ïdays.ððÌÌà àà àThe€attorney€for€West€Meade€responded€with€a€letter€that€was€sentÏon€August€28,€1996:€€ð ðPlease€remember€that€the€lease€expires€on€September€1,Ï1996.€Without€waiving€any€rights€or€altering€the€lease,€my€client€has€advised€meÍthat€your€client€may€purchase€the€property€for€the€pay„off€amount€as€long€as€it€isÏclosed€by€September€15,€1996.ððÌÌà àà àMr.€Worthamððs€attorney€replied€with€a€letter€dated€September€16,Ï1996,€which€reads€in€pertinent€part:€ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðMy€client€has€been€working€on€financing€and€heÏanticipates€that€we€will€be€able€to€tender€the€purchaseÏprice€before€the€end€of€the€month.€€I€would€point€out€that€IÏcould€not€tell€from€the€lease€and€option€to€purchase€thatÏthe€September€15th€deadline€you€mentioned€in€your€letterÏwas€called€for€by€the€terms€of€the€lease.€€In€fact,€the€leaseÏprovides€that€should€the€Lessee€hold€over€then€it€becomesÏa€month€to€month€lease.€€I€have€advised€my€client€that€heÏnow€has€a€month€to€month€lease€and,€in€fact,€he€hasÏtendered€the€lease€payment€of€$800.00€as€he€has€done€inÏmany€months€past.ððÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌÌÒ € ÒÒ „ Òà àà àOn€September€30,€1996,€Mr.€Wortham€tendered€the€purchase€price.ÏWest€Meade€did€not€accept€it.€€Mr.€Wortham€then€filed€suit€to€enforce€the€option.ÏBoth€parties€filed€motions€for€summary€judgment,€each€one€declaring€that€thereÏwere€no€disputes€of€material€fact.€€The€trial€court€found€the€case€to€be€a€close€one,Ïbut€upon€examination€of€the€facts€and€the€applicable€case€law,€he€grantedÏsummary€judgment€to€the€defendant.€€This€appeal€followed.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€cardinal€rule€for€interpreting€contracts€(including€optionÏcontracts)€is€to€ascertain€the€intention€of€the€parties,€and€to€give€effect€to€thatÏintention,€consistent€with€legal€principles.òò€€Bob€Pearsall€Motors€v.€Regal€Chrysler„Plymouth,óó€521€S.W.2d€578€(Tenn.€1975).€€To€learn€the€partiesðð€intention,€theÏwords€within€the€contract€must€be€given€their€usual,€natural€and€ordinaryÏmeaning,€unless€both€parties€agree€at€the€time€of€contract€that€their€meaning€isÏotherwise.€òòMoore€v.€Mooreóó,€603€S.W.2d€736€(Tenn.€App.€1980);€òòAmericanÏNational€Property€and€Casualty€v.€Grayóó,€803€S.W.2d€693€(Tenn.€App.1990).€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€contract€at€issue€gave€the€plaintiff€the€right€ð ðto€purchase€saidÏproperty€at€any€time€during€the€term€of€this€agreement€or€renewal€thereof,ðð€but€theÏright€expired€when€he€became€a€tenant€at€will.€€Although€Mr.€Wortham€asserts€thatÏhe€exercised€the€option€by€sending€his€letter€of€August€22,€1996,€we€do€not€deemÏthat€letter€to€be€the€equivalent€of€a€ð ðpurchase,ðð€as€that€word€is€ordinarilyÏunderstood.€€We€would€not€go€so€far€as€to€construe€the€terms€of€the€contract€asÏabsolutely€requiring€the€parties€to€close€before€September€1,€1996,€but€weÏbelieve€a€more€definitive€act€was€required€on€the€part€of€Mr.€Wortham€toÏð ðpurchaseðð€the€property€within€the€applicable€period.ÌÌà àà àThe€general€law€of€options€is€not€so€rigorous€as€to€require€a€party€toÏclose€on€the€property€within€the€option€period€in€order€to€exercise€his€rightsÏ(unless€the€contract€so€specifies),€but€it€does€require€him€to€bind€himself€by€anÍunqualified€acceptance€before€he€will€be€deemed€to€have€validly€elected€to€makeÏthe€purchase:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àð ðAn€option€cannot€be€enforced€as€a€contract€untilÏexercised€by€acceptance.€The€acceptance€must€beÏunqualified,€absolute,€positive,€without€reservation,€andÏaccording€to€the€terms€of€the€option.€€An€acceptance€ofÏan€option€must€be€such€a€compliance€with€theÏconditions€as€to€bind€both€parties,€and€if€it€fails€to€do€so,Ïit€binds€neither.ðð€€ÌÌòòPinney€v.€Tarpleyóó,€686€S.W.2d€574,€580€(Tenn.App.€1984)ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àIt€does€not€appear€to€us€that€the€plaintiffððs€letter€of€August€22€met€thisÏstandard.€€We€are€doubtful€that€the€mere€announcement€of€an€intention€toÏexercise€an€option,€coupled€with€a€promise€to€attempt€to€secure€the€financing€inÏthirty€days€is€so€definite€an€acceptance€as€to€bind€the€optionee€if€he€were€toÏchange€his€mind€or€unable€to€secure€financing.€ÌÌà àà àAt€trial€and€on€appeal,€the€parties€relied€upon€two€different€cases€toÏbolster€their€respective€positions:€òò€Adams€v.€Swiftóó,€500€S.W.2d€437€(Tenn.€App.Ï1973)€and€òòDave€Williams€Printing€Co.€v.€Wooten,óó€644€S.W.2d€403€(Tenn.€App.Ï1982).€€In€both€of€those€cases,€as€in€the€present€case,€an€optionee€announced€anÏintention€to€exercise€his€option€shortly€before€the€option€contract€expired,€but€wasÏnot€prepared€to€close€within€the€option€period;€the€owner€in€each€case€refused€toÏsell€the€property,€and€the€optionee€brought€suit€for€specific€performance.€€€In€theÍòòAdamsóó€case,€this€court€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€specific€performance,Ïwhile€in€the€òòDave€Williamsóó€case,€we€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€order€that€the€plaintiffÏbe€granted€specific€performance.€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€contract€in€the€òòDave€Williamsóó€case€required€that€the€terms€ofÏclosing€be€those€provided€in€a€Mid„South€Title€Company€sales€contract.€€TheÏsales€contract€in€question€allowed€fifteen€days€from€the€examination€of€title€beforeÏthe€parties€settled€by€the€reciprocal€performances€of€making€a€cash€payment€forÏany€balance€owing,€and€presenting€a€warranty€deed.€€The€proof€showed€thatÏthree€days€before€the€end€of€the€option€period,€the€lessee€hand„delivered€to€theÏdefendant€a€notice€that€she€wished€to€purchase€the€property€under€the€optionÏclause.€€Accompanying€the€notice€was€a€Mid„South€Title€Company€sales€contractÏfor€the€sellerððs€signature,€and€a€$1,000€check€as€earnest€money.ÌÌà àà àThe€court€held€that€this€was€sufficient€to€bind€the€parties,€and€notedÏin€particular€the€importance€of€the€clause€relating€to€the€Mid„South€Title€salesÏcontract€in€its€decision.€€We€believe€that€the€tender€of€the€sales€contract€servedÏthree€important€functions:€€it€signalled€to€the€seller€the€intention€of€the€buyer€toÏstrictly€comply€with€the€terms€of€the€option,€it€extended€the€permissible€date€ofÏclosing€by€a€specific€number€of€days,€and€it€provided€for€ð ðan€orderly€exchange€ofÏpayment€and€title€to€the€property€in€order€to€consummate€a€purchase.ðð€644ÏS.W.2d€at€407.€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€òòDave€Williamsóó€court€specifically€distinguished€that€case€fromÏòòAdams€óó€in€that€there€was€no€such€sales€contract€clause€involved€in€the€òòAdamsóóÏcase.€€The€same€distinction€applies€to€the€present€case.€€Like€the€contract€in€theÏpresent€case,€the€òòAdamsóó€contract€was€quite€specific€as€to€the€time€in€which€theÏoption€had€to€be€exercised,€but€far€less€specific€as€to€the€manner€in€which€it€was€toÏbe€exercised.€€The€relevant€language€of€the€option€contract€in€the€òòAdamsóó€caseÏsimply€read€ð ð[s]aid€option€to€purchase€may€be€exercised€by€said€second€party€atÏany€time€prior€to€January€20,€1970,€or€by€his€assigns,€upon€terms€as€follows:€€theÏpurchase€or€option€price€is€$15,100.00€payable,€as€follows:€.€.€.€.ððÌÌà àà àOn€January€15,€1970,€Mr.€Adams€notified€the€Swifts€by€letter€of€hisÏintention€to€exercise€the€option.€€As€in€the€present€case,€there€was€no€tender€ofÏmoney€or€of€a€contract.€€On€January€28,€1979,€the€plaintiff€sent€the€defendantsÏanother€letter,€stating€ð ð[w]e€have€made€arrangements€for€closing€on€the€sale€ofÏyour€property,€.€.€.€on€Monday,€February€2,€1970€at€2:30€P.M.ðð€€Counsel€for€theÏdefendants€replied€with€a€letter€ð ðto€advise€you€that€the€said€option€agreement€wasÏnot€properly€exercised€within€the€permissible€period€in€accordance€with€the€termsÏthereof,€and€therefore,€pursuant€to€the€applicable€Tennessee€law,€the€said€optionÏagreement€has€terminated.ðð€ÌÌà àà àThe€òòAdamsóó€court€noted€that€the€contract€did€not€provide€for€theÏexercise€of€the€option€by€the€mere€giving€of€notice,€and€construed€it€as€requiringÏthat€the€sale€close€within€the€option€period.€€As€the€contract€in€the€present€caseÏlikewise€does€not€provide€for€exercise€of€the€option€by€the€giving€of€notice€alone,Ïwe€must€conclude€that€Mr.€Worthamððs€letter€of€August€22,€1996€was€not€sufficientÏto€exercise€the€option€within€the€applicable€period,€and€that€the€option€expired€byÏits€own€terms€before€it€was€exercised.€€€€€€ÌÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Remand€this€cause€to€theÏCircuit€Court€of€Dickson€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏopinion.€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ÌÌÓÓÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÇÑ  ÑÔ€¼Ôò òà@ àó ó