ÿWPC) …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0JH 0T’ 0^æ 0hD 0r¬ 0| 0†š 0 1u° 0d% U>‰ B)Ç DCð AM3U*€ BªùÇv~ÀvÓ> D3 0@D AO„ÆÓ 0D™ D/Ý B ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ W EX Y DZ [ \ E] ^ D_ Ó€k z!ÔLPÔô3|xk 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d ïÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òSeptember€25,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò""""'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÑ7€5XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñ›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌROY€ERNEST€YOUNG€€€€€€€€à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àó óPlaintiff/Appellee,ò òà àà àà à)à àó óHardin€General€Sessions€No.€3469ÌÙ€€ÙœßL€ #;+'h|$œ` Å `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌSANDRA€LEE€(RUPERT)€YOUNG€€€€€€€€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€Ìò ò€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ó ó€ò òà à)à àó ó02A01„9506„GS„00133ò òÌó óà àDefendant/Appellant.à àà àò òà à)à àÌó óòòÌóóò òÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€GENERAL€SESSIONS€COURT€OF€HARDIN€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€SAVANNAH,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€MAX€SEATON,€JUDGEÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appelleeóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendant/Appellantóó:òòÌóóÌW.€Lee€Lackey€€€€à àà àà àà àNan€Barlow€€€€€ÌSavannah,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àSavannah,€TennesseeÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÇØØÙ  ÙÑ7€5XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓà@ àOPINION€Ìà àThis€is€an€action€to€set€aside€a€divorce€decree.€€Defendant€Sandra€Young€appeals€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€her€Amended€Motion€to€Set€Aside€Final€Decree€of€Divorce.€€Because€œRoy€Young›Ïfailed€to€take€appropriate€measures€to€give€œSandraYoung›€notice€of€the€œdivorce€proceedings,›€weÏreverse€the€trial€court,€œvacate›€the€divorce€decree€and€the€award€of€œcustody,€and›€remand€œthe€case€toÏthe€trial€court.€€›Ìà àSandra€Young€(Wife)€and€Roy€Young€(Husband)€were€married€in€1979€and€have€a€son,ÏMatthew.€€They€lived€in€Maryland€until€April€10,€1994,€at€which€time€they€moved€to€Olive€Hill€inÏHardin€County,€Tennessee.€€Their€marriage€was€a€troubled€one,€and€Wife€had€left€Husband€on€atÏleast€one€previous€occasion.€€On€June€21,€1994,€Husband€obtained€a€restraining€order€forbiddingÏWife€to€remove€Matthew€from€Hardin€County,€Tennessee.€€Husband€told€Wife€about€theÏrestraining€order€that€evening€but€did€not€show€her€a€copy€of€the€order.€€The€order€was€not€filedÏwith€the€court€until€the€following€day.€€On€the€evening€of€June€21,€Husband€also€told€Wife€he€wasÏfiling€for€divorce,€which€he€did€the€next€day,€June€22.€€On€the€morning€of€June€22,€Wife€picked€upÏMatthew€from€his€babysitter€and€left€the€state,€returning€to€Maryland,€where€she€resumed€her€oldÏjob€and€moved€in€with€her€parents.Ìà àEarly€the€next€month€Husband€filed€an€Amended€Complaint€in€which€he€alleged€that€WifeÏhad€left€the€state€and€that,€as€a€nonresident,€process€should€be€served€by€publication.€€Notice€wasÏpublished€for€four€consecutive€weeks,€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„1„204,€in€a€local€paperÏin€Hardin€County.€€No€other€attempts€at€service€of€process€were€made.€€Husband€knew€the€addressÏand€phone€number€of€Wifeððs€parents,€but€it€is€undisputed€that€he€made€no€attempt€to€contact€œthemÏto›€let€his€wife€know€of€the€impending€divorce€proceedings.€€Husband€alleges€that€the€failure€toÏcontact€Wifeððs€parents€was€because,€when€Wife€left€him€in€the€past,€her€parents€would€not€tell€himÏher€whereabouts.€€Husband€knew€the€address€and€telephone€number€of€Wifeððs€former€employer€inÏMaryland€but€did€not€contact€him.€€Husband€stated€this€was€because€he€thought€Wife€had€retiredÏand€he€did€not€know€she€had€only€taken€a€leave€of€absence.€€Default€judgment€was€entered€againstÏWife€on€September€8,€1994.€€The€divorce€decree€gave€custody€of€Matthew€to€Husband,€requiredÍWife€to€pay€child€support€to€Husband,€awarded€the€marital€property€to€Husband€except€for€WifeððsÏcar,€and€required€Wife€to€pay€all€œthe€marital€debts.›€€ÌÇà àLater€that€month€Husband,€allegedly€having€learned€Wifeððs€whereabouts€throughÏMatthewððs€school€records,€went€to€Maryland€to€pick€up€his€son.€€At€this€time€Wife€learned€that€aÏdivorce€had€been€granted€and€that€custody€of€Matthew€had€been€awarded€to€Husband.€€Wife€filed€aÏMotion€to€Set€Aside€Final€Decree€of€Divorce€and€an€Amended€Motion€to€Set€Aside€Final€Decree€ofÏDivorce,€claiming€that€both€her€federal€and€state€due€process€rights€had€been€violated€becauseÏservice€was€only€by€publication,€that€the€court€had€no€jurisdiction€over€her,€that€the€final€judgmentÏwas€void€and€should€be€set€aside€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€and€that€the€custody€orderÏshould€be€vacated€because,€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ36„6„203,›€the€trial€court€did€not€haveÏjurisdiction€over€Matthew€to€determine€custody.€€The€motion€was€filed€more€than€thirty€days€afterÏthe€divorce€decree€was€issued.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€amended€motion,€from€which€decisionÏWife€appeals.Ìà àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€review€the€case€òòò òde€novoó óóóÏupon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€ÌTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).Ìà àIn€seeking€relief€from€the€divorce€decree,€Wife€relies€on€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€whichÏprovides€in€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà àOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€party€orÏthe€partyððs€legal€representative€from€a€final€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€theÏfollowing€reasons:€.€.€.€(3)€the€judgment€is€void€.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓWife€argues€that€the€divorce€decree€is€void€because€the€method€of€serving€process€upon€her,Ïpublication€in€a€Hardin€County€newspaper,€violated€her€rights€to€due€process€under€both€theÏfederal€and€state€constitutions.Ìà àProcess€was€served€upon€Wife€by€publication€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„1„203,Ïwhich€provides€in€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà à(a)€Personal€service€of€process€on€the€defendant€in€a€court€of€chancery€isÏdispensed€with€in€the€following€cases:Ìà8 àà à(1)€When€the€defendant€is€a€nonresident€of€this€state;Ìà8 àà à(2)€When,€upon€inquiry€at€the€defendantððs€usual€place€of€abode,€theÏdefendant€cannot€be€found,€so€as€to€be€served€with€process,€and€there€is€justÍground€to€believe€that€the€defendant€is€gone€beyond€the€limits€of€the€state€.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„1„203(a)(1)„(2)€(1994).€€The€Order€of€Publication€gave€the€reason€forÏpublication€as€being€that€Wife€was€not€a€resident€of€the€state,€but€Husband€argues€that€publicationÏwould€have€also€been€appropriate€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„1„203(a)(2).€€Wife€contends€thatÏpublication€was€not€appropriate€as€her€address€in€Maryland€was€easily€ascertainable€by€contactingÏher€parents€or€her€Maryland€employer.€€Wife€also€notes€that€Husband€knew€she€was€in€MarylandÏbecause€he€alleged€that€fact€in€his€Amended€Complaint.€€She€argues€that€it€was€highly€unlikelyÏanyone€seeing€the€published€notice€in€Hardin€County€would€attempt€to€contact€her€because€she€hadÏlived€there€such€a€short€time.€€Consequently,€the€failure€to€serve€her€personally€violated€her€dueÏprocess€rights.€€Ìà àThe€classic€statement€regarding€the€due€process€requirements€of€any€method€of€servingÏnotice€was€made€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòò òMullane€v.€Central€Hanover€BankÏ&€Trust€Co.ó óóó,€339€U.S.€306,€70€S.€Ct.€652€(1950),€where€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà àAn€elementary€and€fundamental€requirement€of€due€process€in€anyÏproceeding€which€is€to€be€accorded€finality€is€notice€reasonably€calculated,€under€allÏthe€circumstances,€to€apprise€interested€parties€of€the€pendency€of€the€action€andÏafford€them€an€opportunity€to€present€their€objections.€€The€notice€must€be€of€suchÏnature€as€reasonably€to€convey€the€required€information,€and€it€must€afford€aÏreasonable€time€for€those€interested€to€make€their€appearance.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€at€314,€70€S.€Ct.€at€657€(citations€omitted).€€In€addition,€the€Court€noted:ÌÓÓà8 à[W]hen€notice€is€a€personððs€due,€process€which€is€a€mere€gesture€is€not€dueÏprocess.€€The€means€employed€must€be€such€as€one€desirous€of€actually€informingÏthe€absentee€might€reasonably€adopt€to€accomplish€it.€€The€reasonableness€andÏhence€the€constitutional€validity€of€any€chosen€method€may€be€defended€on€theÏground€that€it€is€in€itself€reasonably€certain€to€inform€those€affected,€or,€whereÏconditions€do€not€reasonably€permit€such€notice,€that€the€form€chosen€is€notÏsubstantially€less€likely€to€bring€home€notice€than€other€of€the€feasible€andÏcustomary€substitutes.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€at€315,€70€S.€Ct.€at€657„58€(citations€omitted).€€In€a€later€case,€the€Supreme€Court€summarizedÏthe€holding€in€òòò òMullaneó óóó:€ð ðThe€general€rule€that€emerges€from€the€Mullane€case€is€that€notice€byÏpublication€is€not€enough€with€respect€to€a€person€whose€name€and€address€are€known€or€veryÏeasily€ascertainable€and€whose€legally€protected€interests€are€directly€affected€by€the€proceedings€inÍquestion.ðð€€òòò òSchroeder€v.€City€of€New€Yorkó óóó,€371€U.S.€208,€212„13,€83€S.€Ct.€279,€282Ï(1962).Ìà àThe€seminal€case€on€the€adequacy€of€process€in€Tennessee€is€òòò òBaggett€v.€Baggettó óóó,€541ÏS.W.2d€407€(Tenn.€1976).€€In€òòò òBaggettó óóó,€the€question€before€the€Court€was€whether€or€not€it€was€aÏdue€process€violation€for€a€husband€suing€a€nonresident€wife€for€divorce€to€rely€solely€onÏpublication€as€a€means€of€serving€process,€without€mailing€her€a€notice€of€the€filing€of€the€divorceÏpetition€at€her€last€known€address.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€408.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€husband€knew€orÏcould€have€easily€ascertained€the€wifeððs€mailing€address.€€However,€the€trial€court€found€noÏviolation€in€that€the€husband€followed€the€procedures€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„218.€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€reversed€and€vacated€the€divorce€decree.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€408„09.€€The€Supreme€Court,€relying€onÏòòò òSchroederó óóó,€affirmed€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€held€that€it€was€a€due€process€violation€not€to€sendÏthe€wife€a€notice€of€the€pending€action€at€her€last€known€mailing€address€because€her€husbandÏeither€knew€that€address€or€could€have€easily€discovered€it.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€410„11.€€The€Court€declaredÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„218€unconstitutional€and€void€to€the€extent€that€it€ð ð[could€have€been]Ïconsidered€to€relieve€the€Court€of€the€obligation€to€give€such€notice€to€a€non„resident€defendantÏwhose€last€known€place€of€residence€is€known€or€can€be€ascertained€upon€inquiry.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€411.Ìà àIn€a€subsequent€decision,€this€Court€has€stated:€ð ðIt€is€clear€that€notice€by€publication€is€notÏsufficient€to€comply€with€due€process€when€the€personððs€name€or€address€is€known€or€is€veryÏeasily€ascertainable.€€Failure€to€give€notice€surely€fails€the€dictates€of€due€process.ðð€€òòò òLove€v.ÏFirst€Natððl€Bankó óóó,€646€S.W.2d€163,€165€(Tenn.€App.€1982).Ìà àUnder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€21„1„205,€the€successor€to€the€statute€found€unconstitutional€inÏò òòòBaggettó óóó,€the€trial€court€and€the€clerk€of€the€court€have€some€obligation€to€ascertain€if€a€defendantÏserved€by€publication€received€actual€notice€and,€if€not,€to€consider€further€action€to€give€theÏdefendant€notice.€€From€the€record€in€this€case,€it€appears€that€there€was€no€effort€to€determineÏWifeððs€whereabouts€or€determine€if€she€received€actual€notice.€€Husband€knew€her€parentsððÏaddress€and€telephone€number€and€could€have€called€them€in€an€attempt€to€give€actual€notice.€€ÍRegardless€of€his€subjective€belief€that€this€act€would€have€been€futile,€he€was€obligated€to€do€so.€ÏHusband€never€contacted€Wifeððs€former€employer€in€Maryland,€even€though€this€would€have€beenÏa€logical€step€to€find€her.€€No€measures€were€taken€to€serve€notice€beyond€the€act€of€publication.€€Ìà àHusband€argues€that€he€gave€his€wife€notice€when€heòò€ò òtoldó óóó€her€he€was€filing€for€divorceÏand€that€he€had€obtained€a€restraining€order€against€her.€€Despite€the€fact€that€Wife€was€neverÏserved€with€papers,€Husband€asserts€that€his€verbal€statement€to€her€was€enough€to€put€her€onÏinquiry€notice€to€determine€whether€divorce€pleadings€had€been€filed,€citing€òòò òBlevins€v.€JohnsonÏCountyó óóó,€746€S.W.2d€678€(Tenn.€1988).€€€Wife€asserts€that€Husband€only€told€her€that€he€wantedÏa€divorce,€not€that€a€divorce€had€been€filed.€€She€concedes€that€Husband€told€her€of€a€restrainingÏorder€but€states€that€Husband€in€the€past€had€told€her€many€things€that€were€untrue€and€that€she€didÏnot€believe€him.€€Ìà àThe€òòò òBlevinsó óóó€Court€notes€that€inquiry€notice€in€Tennessee€is€considered€a€variant€of€actualÏnotice:ÌÓÓà8 àð ðThe€words€ððactual€noticeðð€do€not€always€mean€in€law€what€in€metaphysicalÏstrictness€they€import;€they€more€often€mean€knowledge€of€facts€and€circumstancesÏsufficiently€pertinent€in€character€to€enable€reasonably€cautious€and€prudent€personsÏto€investigate€and€ascertain€as€to€the€ultimate€facts.ððÌÌÓÓò òòòBlevinsó óóó,€746€S.W.2d€at€683€(quoting€òòò òTexas€Co.€v.€Aycockó óóó,€190€œTenn.€16,›€27,€227€S.W.2dÏ41,€46€(1950)€(citation€omitted)).€Indeed,€once€facts€have€been€given€to€put€one€on€inquiry€notice,Ïð ð[e]ven€a€good€faith€failure€to€undertake€the€inquiry€is€no€defense.ðð€€òòò òIdó óóó.€€The€issue€of€inquiryÏnotice€must€be€evaluated€considering€the€circumstances€as€a€whole.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€684.€€TheseÏcircumstances€include€the€extent€and€reliability€of€the€information€known€by€the€defendant,€theÏplaintiffððs€obligation€to€give€actual€notice,€and€the€interests€at€stake€in€the€litigation.Ìà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€recently€discussed€the€issue€of€notice€in€òòò òEstate€ofÏJenkins€v.€Guytonó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€134€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€òòò òGuytonó óóó,€a€creditor€failed€to€file€aÏclaim€against€an€estate€within€the€six„month€statutory€period,€but€both€the€probate€court€and€theÏappellate€court€allowed€the€claim,€prompting€an€appeal€to€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€by€theÍestate.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€134„35.€€The€estate€asserted€that€it€had€notified€the€creditorððs€attorney€of€theÏdecedentððs€death€and€that€the€will€was€being€probated€in€Davidson€County.€€The€Court€had€toÏdetermine€if€this€communication€constituted€actual€notice€to€the€creditor.€€òòò òId.ó óóóÌà àThe€estate€argued€that€under€Tennessee€law€actual€notice€is€ð ðanything€that€serves€to€put€aÏreasonably€prudent€person€on€inquiry€as€to€the€legal€consequences€of€a€particular€set€of€facts.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóóÏat€137.€€The€Court€recognized€that€this€definition€might€well€be€valid€in€other€areas€of€TennesseeÏlaw€but€then€found€that€it€was€unduly€restrictive€in€the€context€of€the€case€before€it€and€would€put€atÏrisk€the€constitutionality€of€the€stateððs€notice€provisions.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€The€Court€quoted€a€bankruptcy€caseÏdecided€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€which€discussed€notice:ÌÓÓà8 àð ðNor€can€the€bar€order€against€New€York€be€sustained€because€of€the€cityððsÏknowledge€that€reorganization€of€the€railroad€was€taking€place€in€the€court.€€TheÏargument€is€that€such€knowledge€puts€a€duty€on€creditors€to€inquire€for€themselvesÏabout€possible€court€orders€limiting€the€time€for€filing€claims.€€But€even€creditorsÏwho€have€knowledge€of€a€reorganization€have€a€right€to€assume€that€the€statutoryÏððreasonable€noticeðð€will€be€given€them€before€their€claims€are€forever€barred.€€WhenÏthe€judge€ordered€notice€by€mail€to€be€given€the€appearing€creditors,€New€York€CityÏacted€reasonably€in€waiting€to€receive€the€same€treatment.ÌÌà8 àThe€statutory€command€for€notice€embodies€a€basic€principle€of€justice„„that€aÏreasonable€opportunity€to€be€heard€must€precede€judicial€denial€of€a€partyððs€claimedÏrights.€€New€York€City€has€not€been€accorded€that€kind€of€notice.ððÌÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€at€138€(quoting€òòò òCity€of€New€York€v.€New€York,€N.H.€&€H.R.€Co.ó óóó,€344€U.S.€293,Ï297,€73€S.€Ct.€299,€301€(1953)).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€concluded€thatÌÓÓà8 àwhile€the€term€ð ðactual€noticeðð€in€ðð€30„2„307(a)(1)€may€be€something€other€than€anÏexact€copy€of€the€published€òòò òNotice€to€Creditorsó óóó€outlined€in€ðð€30„2„306(c),€suchÏnotice€must,€at€a€minimum,€include€information€regarding€the€commencement€ofÏprobate€proceedings€and€the€time€period€within€which€claims€must€be€filed€with€theÏprobate€court.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€Ìà àThe€principles€in€òòò òGuytonó óóó€may€be€applied€to€this€case.€€In€òòò òGuytonó óóó,€as€in€this€case,€theÏapplicable€statutes€provided€for€publication€but€also€contained€requirements€designed€to€give€actualÏnotice.€€òòò òGuytonó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€at€135„37.€€€Under€the€facts€of€this€case,€in€which€HusbandÏverbally€informed€Wife€that€he€had€obtained€a€restraining€order€and€was€going€to€file€for€divorce,Íin€the€context€of€a€relationship€in€which€there€was€active€mistrust€between€the€parties,€the€verbalÏstatement€was€not€sufficient€to€relieve€Husband€of€his€obligation€to€make€a€reasonable€effort€toÏascertain€Wifeððs€whereabouts€and€serve€notice€on€her.€€Moreover,€considering€the€interests€at€stakeÏin€the€litigation,€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€award€the€custody€of€a€child€by€default€under€theseÏcircumstances€is€clearly€unacceptable.€Ìà àTherefore,€œthe€trial€courtððs€denial€of€Wifeððs€Rule›€œ60.02€motion€to€set€aside€the€final€decreeÏof€divorce€is€reversed,€and€the€divorce€decree€is€void.›€€The€award€of€custody€of€Matthew€is€œvoid€asÏwell.›€€The€original€Complaint,€of€course,€is€still€before€the€trial€court.€€Wife€apparently€has€filedÏsuit€in€Maryland€seeking€a€custody€determination.€€From€the€record,€it€is€unclear€with€whomÏMatthew€now€resides,€and€there€is€not€enough€information€for€us€to€determine€the€appropriateÏforum€for€custody€œproceedings.€€Under›€Tennessee€law,€the€first€step€in€determining€the€appropriateÏforum€for€custody€proceedings€involves€deciding€which€is€the€ð ðhome€stateðð€of€the€minor€child.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„203€(1991);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„202(5)€(1991);€òòò òBrown€v.ÏBrownó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€496€(Tenn.€1993);€òòò òState€ex€rel.€Cooper€v.€Hamiltonó óóó,€688€S.W.2dÏ821€(Tenn.€1985);€òòò òCulp€v.€Culpó óóó,€917€S.W.2d€233€(Tenn.€App.€1995);€òòò òGutzke€v.€Gutzkeó óóó,Ï908€S.W.2d€198€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€€We€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€court€to€consider€the€divorceÏand€the€appropriate€forum€for€custody€determination.€€If€the€court€finds€that€Tennessee€is€theÏappropriate€forum€to€decide€custody,€then€it€shall€hold€an€expedited€hearing€for€interim€placementÏof€the€child,€with€full€opportunity€for€both€parties€to€appear€and€be€heard.Ìà àWe€reverse€the€trial€court,€set€aside€the€divorce€decree€and€the€award€of€custody€ofÏMatthew,€€and€remand€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€Opinion.€€Costs€on€appeal€areÏtaxed€to€the€Appellee,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ì€€€€€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó ó