ÿWPC“ …# VU>a %Ÿ 0í¥UB’ 4Ô è n­÷ U:¤ w@Þ  0J& 0Tp 0^Ä 0h" 0rŠ 0|ü 0†x 0þ 1uŽ 0dU6gU.U*ËB)õ BDC; AM~_Ëv~* D3¨vÓÛ 0@® AOîÆ= 0D D/G Bv˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(ÅÕÐ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÑ7€'CXXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiÔ¡¨ 3|xm«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular [\U]8e^_D`aDbcdÓ€2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Courier< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ UÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌJune€6,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h%%%%'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÑ  ÑÑ#€""Xd#ÑÑ#€""Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#ÔÑ7€ Lè XXdæXXdÈ7ќـ€ÙßR€'(&A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌ€à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEà@ à€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€MARCH€1997€SESSIONÌÌÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àÌ€à àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellee,€à àà à)à àNo.€01C01„9603„CC„00094Ìà à€€€€€à àà à€€à à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àWilliamson€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)à àHonorable€Henry€Denmark€Bell,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà à)ÌJOHN€M.€AKE,à àà à€€€à à)à à€(Aggravated€Robbery€and€Theft)Ìà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€Ìà àAppellant.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ àò òòòCONCURRING€OPINIONóóó óÌÌà àI€concur€in€the€results€reached€in€the€lead€opinion,€but€I€disagree€with€itsÏconclusion€that€the€defendantððs€confession€was€properly€obtained€and€admissible.€€IÏbelieve€that€we€are€bound€by€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530€(Tenn.€1994),€toÏhold€that€under€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€an€in„custodyÏsuspectððs€equivocal€request€for€an€attorney€limits€further€police€interrogation€to€theÏsubject€of€clarifying€the€desire€for€counsel.€€If€the€clarification€shows€that€the€suspect€isÏnot€requesting€counsel,€then€the€police€may€proceed€with€investigatory€questioning.€ÏSuch€a€clarification€did€not€occur€in€this€case.€€ÌÌà àIn€this€respect,€I€am€reluctant€to€agree€with€Judge€Woodallððs€conclusionÏthat€the€defendant€made€an€unequivocal€request€for€counsel,€because€we€do€not€haveÏthe€tape€recording€of€the€interrogation€before€us.€€Detective€Campsey€testified€that€theÏdefendantððs€remarks€were€not€taken€by€him€as€a€request€for€counsel€at€that€time,€givenÏthe€defendantððs€expression€of€concern€for€the€codefendant.€€The€trial€court€appears€toÏindicate,€in€œan›€œunclear€portion€of€the›€video€record€before€us,€that€it€recognized€theÏdefendantððs€statements€as€ambiguous.€€Under€these€circumstances€and€reviewing€the€œ›Ïœtranscript€of€the€interrogation,›€I€am€unable€to€conclude€from€that€document,€alone,€thatÏthe€defendantððs€statements€constituted€an€unequivocal€expression€of€his€desire€toÏhave€counsel€present.Ìœ€›Ìà àIn€òòStephensonóó,€a€capital€case,€our€supreme€court€dealt€with€anÏinterrogation€in€which€the€defendant€asked€the€interrogating€agent€whether€the€agentÏthought€he€needed€an€attorney.€€Stephenson€claimed€that€this€question€was,€at€least,Ïan€equivocal€invocation€of€his€right€to€counsel€that€should€have€prohibited€furtherÏquestioning.€€As€to€the€particular€constitutional€rights€at€issue,€our€supreme€court€statedÏthat€the€ð ðbetter€argument€is€that€he€invoked€the€right€to€counsel€that€is€encompassed€inÏthe€right€against€self€incrimination€which€is€protected€by€the€Fifth€Amendment€of€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ðð€€878ÏS.W.2d€at€547.€€ÌÌà àIn€beginning€its€analysis,€the€court€stated€that€neither€it€nor€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court€had€resolved€the€issue€of€what€constitutes€a€valid€invocation€ofÏthe€right€to€counsel€by€a€suspect.€€òòId.óó€at€548.€€It€noted,€though,€that€ð ð[m]ost€courts,Ïattempting€to€accommodate€both€the€mandate€of€òò[Miranda€v.€Arizonaóó,€384€U.S.€436,€86ÏS.€Ct.€1602€(1966)]€and€the€legitimate€goals€of€law€enforcement,€have€concluded€thatÏwhen€a€suspect€makes€an€ambiguous€or€equivocal€request€for€counsel,€furtherÏquestions€by€officers€thereafter€must€be€limited€to€clarifying€the€suspectððs€desire€for€anÏattorney,ðð€and€referred€to€both€sister€state€and€federal€circuit€opinions.€€òòId.óó€€Also,€theÏcourt€stated€that€its€research€revealed€that€other€jurisdictions€were€evenly€split€as€toÏwhether€a€question€about€the€officerððs€opinion€of€the€suspectððs€need€for€counsel€evenÏconstitutes€an€equivocal€invocation€of€the€right€to€counsel.€€In€this€respect,€the€courtÏbelieved€that€what€constitutes€an€equivocal€invocation€of€the€right€to€counsel€must€beÏdetermined€on€a€case€by€case€basis.€€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àMost€importantly€for€our€purposes€in€the€present€case,€our€supreme€courtÏconcluded€as€follows:ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 àà àòòBecause€we€agree€that€courts€should€give€a€broadÏinterpretation€to€a€suspectððs€request€for€counsel,€weÏconclude€that€the€defendantððs€question€herein€constitutedÏan€equivocal€invocation€of€the€right€to€counsel€that€limitedÏfurther€interrogation€to€questions€clarifying€his€desire€for€anÏattorneyóó.€€Agent€Davenport€clarified€the€defendantððsÏambiguous€statement€by€informing€Stephenson€that€€anÍattorney€was€immediately€available€if€he€wished€to€consultÏwith€him.€€In€response,€the€defendant,€who€twice€previouslyÏhad€been€advised€of€his€rights,€unambiguously€asserted€hisÏdesire€to€proceed€without€an€attorney,€stating€ð ðNo,€Iððll€just€goÏahead.€€Iððm€going€to€tell€the€truth.ðð€€This€response€clearlyÏindicated€the€defendantððs€desire€to€proceed€without€anÏattorney.€€òòAs€a€result€there€was€no€violation€of€either€theÏdefendantððs€federal€or€state€constitutional€right€to€counselóó.€€€ÌÌòòÓÓÓ  ÓId.óó€(emphasis€added).€€To€me,€this€issue€analysis€and€decision€by€our€supreme€courtÏconstitutes€a€pronouncement€of€the€law€under€our€state€constitution.ÌÌà àAs€the€lead€opinion€notes,€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏsubsequently€concluded€that€procedural€safeguards€for€the€protection€of€rights€underÏthe€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€did€not€require€that€an€officerÏstop€questioning€upon€an€ambiguous€invocation€of€the€suspectððs€right€to€counsel.€ÏòòDavis€v.€United€Statesóó,€512€U.S.€452,€114€S.€Ct.€2350,€2355€(1994).€€Rather,Ïquestioning€must€stop€only€when€the€suspect€communicates€a€desire€for€an€attorney€inÏsuch€a€sufficiently€clear€fashion€that€a€reasonable€officer€would€understand€theÏstatement€to€be€a€request€for€counsel.€€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àObviously,€to€the€extent€our€supreme€court€relied€upon€the€FifthÏAmendment€in€òòStephensonóó€to€require€clarification€by€the€police€when€a€suspect€makesÏan€ambiguous€request€regarding€counsel,€òòDavisóó€now€controls.€€However,€to€the€extentÏour€supreme€court€relied€upon€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution,ÍòòStephensonóó€remains€binding€authority€that€we€are€obligated€to€follow.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòStateÏv.€Farmeróó,€927€S.W.2d€582,€593„94€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòapp.óó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1996)Ï(remanding€case€for€hearing€under€Article€I,€Section€9€standard€announced€inÏòòStephensonóó€regarding€equivocal€requests€for€counsel€limiting€law€enforcementÏquestions€to€clarification€of€request).€€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€the€lead€opinion€in€the€present€case€chooses€to€followÏa€trail€similar€to€the€one€taken€in€òòState€v.€Jack€Jay€North,€Jr.óó,€No.€02C01„9512„CC„00369,€Hardin€County,€slip€op.€at€31„32€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Dec.€9,€1996),€òòapplic.óó€òòfiledóóÏ(Tenn.€Jan.€21,€1997),€that€ends€with€a€conclusion€that€òòStephensonóó€is€no€longer€theÏstandard€under€our€state€constitution.€€The€problem€is€that€the€trail€from€òòStephensonóó€toÏsuch€a€conclusion€does€not€exist.ÌÌà àIn€both€the€lead€opinion€and€òòNorthóó,€much€is€made€of€our€supreme€courtððsÏopinion€in€òòState€v.€Huddlestonóó,€924€S.W.2d€666€(Tenn.€1996)€„„€too€much,€in€myÏopinion.€€In€òòHuddlestonóó,€the€court€was€confronted€with€a€defendant€who€claimed€thatÏhis€response€of€ð ðI€ainððt€signing€nothingðð€to€a€police€request€to€sign€a€rights€waiver€formÏð ðconstituted€an€invocation€of€his€òòFifth€Amendmentóó€right€to€counsel€which€precludedÏfurther€questioning€outside€the€presence€of€his€attorney.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€669€(emphasis€added).€ÏOur€supreme€court€noted€that€òòDavisóó€held€that€the€invocation€of€the€Fifth€AmendmentÏright€to€counsel€pursuant€to€òòMirandaóó€requires€the€use€of€an€unambiguous€requestÍbefore€police€must€cease€questioning.€€òòId.óó€at€669„70.€€The€court€then€applied€the€òòDavisóóÏstandard€to€the€facts€and€concluded€that€Huddleston€never€made€an€unambiguousÏrequest€for€counsel.€€It€held€that€ð ð[a]ccordingly,€Huddlestonððs€Fifth€Amendment€right€toÏcounsel€claim€is€without€merit.ðð€€924€S.W.2d€at€670.ÌÌà àThe€lead€opinion€in€the€present€case€states€that€this€court€in€òòNorthóó€ð ðnotedÏthat€òòHuddlestonóó€cited€òòDavisóó€with€approval.ðð€€Actually,€the€òòNorthóó€opinion€states€that€ourÏsupreme€court€cited€òòDavisóó€ð ðòòseemingly€with€approvalóó€.€.€.€for€the€general€proposition€thatÏif€a€suspect€fails€to€make€an€unambiguous€expression€of€his€or€her€desire€for€anÏattorney,€then€the€police€need€not€terminate€their€interrogation.ðð€€òòNorthóó,€slip€op.€at€32Ï(emphasis€added).€€I€respectfully€disagree€with€any€such€interpretation€of€òòHuddlestonóó.ÌÌà àIn€òòNorthóó,€this€court€made€no€mention€of€the€fact€that€the€issue€inÏòòHuddlestonóó€was€raised,€analyzed,€and€decided€òòsolelyóó€on€the€basis€of€the€FifthÏAmendment.€€In€fact,€a€fair€reading€of€òòHuddlestonóó€reflects€that€it€did€no€more€than€apply€ÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€case€law€to€a€federal€constitutional€claim,€i.e.,€itÏexercised€the€legally€required€deference€to€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtððsÏauthority€on€federal€issues.€€There€simply€is€nothing€in€òòHuddlestonóó€to€warrant€anyÏinference€that€our€supreme€court€was€ð ðseeminglyðð€approving€any€ð ðgeneral€propositionððÏsupposedly€espoused€in€òòDavisóó.à àÌÌà àAlthough€the€lead€opinion€in€the€present€case€somewhat€acknowledgesÏthat€òòHuddlestonóó€was€decided€under€the€Fifth€Amendment,€it€also€€concludes€that€ourÏsupreme€court€ð ðapproved€the€holding€in€òòDavisóó,ðð€attaching€significance€to€the€fact€thatÏthe€court€ð ðgave€no€indication€that€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€ConstitutionÏwould€require€a€different€result.ðð€€Again,€as€with€òòNorthóó,€I€see€nothing€in€òòHuddlestonóó€toÏsupport€the€lead€opinionððs€reasoning.€€In€fact,€it€is€rather€odd€that€our€court€seesÏsignificance€in€our€supreme€courtððs€failure€to€address€an€issue€that€was€not€raised,€anÏabstention€that€is€greatly€preferred€by€the€appellate€rules.€€òòSeeóó€T.R.A.P.€13(b),€AdvisoryÏCommission€Comments.€€Rather,€I€believe€that€under€our€rules€dealing€with€unraisedÏissues,€the€failure€to€raise€upon€its€own€the€issue€of€the€state€constitution€indicates,€atÏmost,€only€that€the€supreme€court€did€not€see€any€Article€I,€Section€9€rights€plainlyÏimplicated€by€Huddlestonððs€response€to€the€police.€€ÌÌà àFinally,€our€supreme€court€has€previously€stated€that€Article€I,€Section€9€isÏbroader€and€more€protective€of€individual€rights€than€the€Fifth€Amendment€relative€toÏthe€test€of€voluntariness€for€self„incrimination€purposes.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€834ÏS.W.2d€915,€921€(Tenn.€1992);€òòState€v.€Crumpóó,€834€S.W.2d€265,€268€(Tenn.€1992).€€InÏaddition,€the€supreme€court€in€òòStephensonóó€specifically€expressed€òòitsóó€belief€that€courtsÏshould€give€a€broad€interpretation€to€a€suspectððs€request€for€counsel.€€878€S.W.2d€atÏ548.€€Given€this€background,€I€do€not€believe€that€it€is€appropriate€for€us€to€apply€aÏstandard€contrary€to€the€one€in€òòStephensonóó.ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€there€is€no€doubt€in€my€mind€that€the€defendant€wouldÏhave€been€convicted€without€the€statement€being€used€as€evidence.€€The€web€ofÏverified€circumstances€and€direct€evidence€inevitably€and€conclusively€point€to€theÏdefendant€being€the€perpetrator.€€Therefore,€I€concur€in€results.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€Judge€Ìà0 àÌÌà àÌÌò ò€Ìó óÌà àà àà àà àÌÌ