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AMKÞ˜v~vvÓô D3Ç 0@ú 0: 0ŠÉ 0 S 0´ó 0ǧ 0Ûn 0ïI AO8Ƈ 0DM D/‘ BÀ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ¤¥E¦§D¨©Dª«D¬U­Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|x¶ tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd< Œ 9p`(Arial d€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÔÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌJune€6,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ 8 ÒÑ\R AØ'\ќـ€ÙÓ  ÓÔ€$ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑßR€&'#A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌ€›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àMARCH€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àC.C.A.€No.€01C01„9603„CC„00094Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àAppellee,à àà àà à)à àWILLIAMSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌvsà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€HENRY€DENMARK€BELL,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌJOHN€M.€AKE,à àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Aggravated€Robbery€and€Theft)Ìà àà àAppellant.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌò òJOHN€H.€HENDERSONà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONà àà àÌó óDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€Reporterà àÌ407€C€Main€Streetà àà àà àà àà àÌP.€O.€Box€68à àà àà àà àà àà àò òKAREN€M.€YACUZZOó óÌFranklin,€TN€37065„0068à àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òJOSEPH€D.€BAUGH,€JR.ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òMARK€PURYEARÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àó óAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àP.€O.€Box€937Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFranklin,€TN€37065„0937ÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌó óÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌJOE€G.€RILEY,ÌJUDGEÌÌÌó óÌÑ7€¾XdðXXdð7Ñà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€is€a€direct€appeal€resulting€from€a€jury€verdict€of€guilty€of€aggravatedÏrobbery€and€theft€under€$500.€€Defendant,€John€M.€Ake,€was€sentenced€to€eightÏ(8)€years€as€a€Range€I,€Standard€Offender€for€the€offense€of€aggravated€robberyÏand€sixty€(60)€days€in€the€county€jail€for€the€offense€of€theft€under€$500.€€TheÏsentences€were€ordered€to€run€concurrently€with€each€other.€€Ake€presents€theÏfollowing€issues€for€our€review:ÌÓÓà àà à1.€€whether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€sustain€theÌà àà àconviction€for€aggravated€robbery;€andÌÌà àà à2.€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€suppressÌà àà àthe€confession€given€during€custodial€interrogation.€€ÌÌÓÓWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@ àòòò òFACTSó óóóÌÌà àOn€December€12,€1994,€defendant€entered€Papa€Johnððs€Pizza,€placed€aÏgun€to€the€head€of€the€assistant€manager,€demanded€and€received€the€storeððsÏmoney,€and€fled€the€premises.€€The€assistant€manager€identified€the€defendant€atÏtrial€as€the€person€who€committed€the€armed€robbery.€€Ìà àThe€manager€followed€the€defendant€out€of€the€premises€and€observedÏthe€defendant€get€into€the€passenger€side€of€a€gray€Lincoln€Continental.€€TheÏmanager€was€able€to€secure€the€license€number€as€the€car€sped€away.€€He€gaveÏthe€car€description€and€license€tag€number€to€the€police.Ìà àThe€license€tag€number€secured€by€the€manager€at€the€scene€identified€aÏLincoln€Continental€registered€to€one€Randall€Cobb.€€Officers€went€to€the€CobbÏresidence€and€spoke€to€Randall€Cobbððs€wife,€Sharon€Cobb.€€While€the€officersÏwere€present,€a€call€came€into€the€residence€and€was€identified€on€the€caller€IDÏas€coming€from€a€pay€phone€outside€the€Subway€in€the€Brentwood€PlaceÏShopping€Center.€€à àA€vehicle€matching€the€description€given€by€the€managerÏwas€found€in€the€Brentwood€Place€Shopping€Center.€€At€this€time€the€license€tagÏon€the€vehicle€was€registered€to€one€James€Jordan.€€The€license€tag€had€justÏbeen€stolen€by€the€defendant€from€Mr.€Jordanððs€vehicle€in€the€same€area.€€Ìà àOfficers€discovered€the€defendant€and€his€co„defendant€in€the€SubwayÏRestaurant.€€A€loaded€revolver€was€found€under€the€table,€and€a€large€number€ofÏsmall€bills€was€found€on€the€defendant.€€The€defendant€later€confessed€toÏcommitting€the€armed€robbery€as€well€as€the€theft€of€the€license€plate.ÌÌà@ àò òòòSUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEóóÌÌà àó óIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€does€not€reweighÏor€re„evaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835Ï(Tenn.1978).€€A€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€stateððsÏwitnesses€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€state.€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€657ÏS.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983).€€On€appeal,€the€state€is€entitled€to€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€legitimate€or€reasonable€inferences€whichÏmay€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€75€(Tenn.1992).€€ThisÏCourt€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€due€to€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidenceÏunless€the€defendant€demonstrates€that€the€facts€contained€in€the€record€and€theÏinferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€forÏa€rational€trier€of€fact€to€find€the€accused€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòStateÏv.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€780€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Accordingly,€it€is€theÏappellate€courtððs€duty€to€affirm€the€conviction€if€the€evidence,€viewed€under€theseÏstandards,€was€sufficient€for€any€rational€trier€of€fact€to€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€offenses€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443ÏU.S.€307,€317,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2789€(1979);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€259Ï(Tenn.€1994);€T.R.A.P.€13(e).Ìà àRobbery€is€the€intentional€or€knowing€theft€of€property€from€the€person€ofÏanother€by€violence€or€putting€the€person€in€fear.€€T.€C.€A.€ðð€39„13„401(a).€ÏAggravated€robbery€is€a€robbery€accomplished€with€a€deadly€weapon€or€byÏdisplay€of€any€article€used€or€fashioned€to€lead€the€victim€to€reasonably€believe€itÏto€be€a€deadly€weapon.€€T.€C.€A.€ðð€39„13„402(a)(1).€€The€evidence€clearly€isÍsufficient€to€support€the€conviction€for€aggravated€robbery.€€This€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌà@ àòòò òMOTION€TO€SUPPRESS€CONFESSIONó óóóÌÌà àDefendant€contends€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€suppress€hisÏconfession€given€during€custodial€interrogation.€€More€specifically,€he€contendsÏquestioning€should€have€ceased€when€he€made€ambiguous€and€equivocalÏrequests€for€counsel.€€We€disagree.€€Ìà àShortly€after€defendantððs€arrest€he€was€questioned€at€the€policeÏdepartment.€€He€was€advised€of€his€òòMirandaóó€rights€orally€and€in€writing.€€TheÏdefendant€indicated€that€he€understood€those€rights€and€signed€the€waiverÏindicating€ð ðI€am€willing€to€make€a€statement€and€answer€questions.€€I€do€not€wantÏa€lawyer€at€this€time...ðð€€Ìà àDuring€questioning€the€defendant€was€asked€about€the€co„defendant€whoÏallegedly€was€an€accomplice.€€Indicating€that€he€did€not€want€anything€to€happenÏto€her,€he€stated,€ð ðI€donððt€„€I€„€I„€probably€need€to€get€a€lawyer,€donððt€œI...ð𛀀The€officerÏthen€advised€defendant€that€he€had€to€state€whether€he€wanted€an€attorney.€€TheÏdefendant€did€not€state€he€wanted€an€attorney.€€Thereafter,€the€officer€attemptedÏto€get€the€defendantððs€clarification€as€to€whether€he€desired€an€attorney€duringÏquestioning.€€The€defendant€indicated€ð ðI€think€I€probably€do,€donððt€I...ðð€€The€officerÏthen€asked€if€he€thought€he€needed€an€attorney€at€that€time€or€when€theÏdefendant€went€to€court.€€The€defendant€replied,€ð ðI€donððt€„€I€donððt€know.ðð€€ThereÍwere€no€further€discussions€about€counsel,€and€the€defendant€subsequentlyÏconfessed.€€Ìà àIt€is€undisputed€that€when€a€defendant€clearly€requests€an€attorney€duringÏcustodial€interrogation,€all€questioning€must€cease€until€an€attorney€is€present,Ïunless€the€defendant€subsequently€initiates€further€conversation€with€theÏauthorities.€€òòEdwards€v.€Arizonaóó,€451€œU.S.›€477,€101€S.Ct.€1880,€68€L.€Ed.€2d€378Ï(1981).€€However,€the€precise€issue€in€the€present€case€is€whether€an€ambiguousÏor€equivocal€invocation€œof›€the€œright€to€counsel›€limits€further€custodialÏinterrogation.€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òA.€€STEPHENSONóóÌÌó óà àThe€issue€was€œaddressed›€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòState€v.ÏStephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€Court€noted€that€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court€had€not€resolved€the€issue€of€what€should€be€regarded€asÏa€valid€invocation€of€the€right€to€counsel.€€After€examining€cases€from€otherÏjurisdictions,€the€Court€concluded€that€an€equivocal€invocation€of€the€right€toÏcounsel€limits€further€interrogation€to€questions€clarifying€a€defendantððs€desire€forÏan€attorney.€€òòIdóó.€at€548.€€Implicit€in€this€finding€was€the€Courtððs€conclusion€thatÏboth€the€Fifth€Amendment€of€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€SectionÏ9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€require€this€result.€€à àÌÌà@ àò òB.€œòòDAVISóó›Ìó óÌà àShortly€after€òòStephensonóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€did€indeedÏaddress€this€issue€in€òòDavis€v.€United€Statesóó,€512€U.S.€452,€114€S.Ct.€2350,€129ÏL.Ed.€2d€362€(1994).€€The€Court€concluded€that€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€does€not€require€officers€to€cease€interrogation€whenÏthe€suspect€makes€an€ambiguous€or€equivocal€request€for€counsel.€€The€CourtÏnoted€the€need€for€a€bright€line€rule€and€was€unwilling€to€œprevent›€policeÏquestioning€when€the€suspect€òòmightóó€want€a€lawyer.€€œòòDavisóó,€114€S.Ct.€at€2356„2357.›€€Unless€the€defendant€œactually€requests›€an€attorney,€questioning€mayÏcontinue.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà@ àò òC.€œòòFARMERó óóó›ÌÌà àThereafter,€our€Court€noted€that€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€provides€similar,€albeit€broader,€protection€for€the€accused€asÏcompared€to€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€€òòState€v.ÏFarmeróó,€927€S.W.2d€582,€594€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).€€Our€Court€followedÏòòStephensonóó€and€remanded€for€a€factual€determination€as€to€whether€theÏdefendant€made€a€request,€equivocal€or€not,€for€counsel€during€questioning.€€OurÏCourt€did€not€make€any€reference€to€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€decisionÏin€òòDavis€v.€United€Statesóó.€€ÌÌà@ àò òD.€€œòòHUDDLESTONóóó ó›ÌÌà àSubsequently,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€revisited€this€issue.€€TheÏCourt€cited€òòDavisóó€with€approval€noting€that€police€need€not€cease€questioning€if€aÏsuspect€fails€to€make€an€unambiguous€request€for€counsel.€€òòState€v.€Huddlestonóó,Ï924€S.W.2d€666,€669„70€(Tenn.€1996).€€It€would€appear€that€òòHuddlestonóó€wasÏdecided€under€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€as€thereÏwas€no€reference€whatever€to€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€Ìà àMore€recently,€our€Court€in€òòState€v.€Jack€Jay€North,€Jr.óó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9512„CC„00369,€Hardin€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€December€9,€1996,€atÏJackson)€noted€that€òòHuddlestonóó€cited€òòDavisóó€with€approval.€€Our€Court,€therefore,Ïconcluded€that€the€questioning€of€a€defendant€could€continue€until€and€unlessÏthe€defendant€clearly€requested€an€attorney.€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòE.€€OUR€CONCLUSIONóóó óÌÌà àœOur›€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòHuddlestonóó€approved€the€holding€inÏòòDavisóó.€€Although€the€precise€issue€in€òòHuddlestonóó€related€only€to€Fifth€AmendmentÏprotection,€the€Court€gave€no€indication€that€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€would€require€a€different€result.€€The€need€for€a€bright€line€rule€asÏnoted€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòDavisóó€with€regard€to€the€FifthÏAmendment€is€equally€applicable€to€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€œThere€is›€no€justÏreason€to€extend€greater€protection€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution€than€hasÏbeen€extended€under€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€€ÌœÌÌà@ àò òF.€€òòHARMLESS€ERRORóóÌó ó›Ìà àœThe€admission€of€defendantððs€confession€was,€at€most,€harmless€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€T.R.A.P.€36(b).€€Proof€of€guilt€was€overwhelming,€and€theÏconfession€was€merely€cumulative€to€other€admissible€evidence€which€clearlyÏestablished€guilt.€€See€òòHartman€v.€Stateóó,€896€S.W.2d€94€(Tenn.€1995).›€€Ìœà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€in€all€respects.ÌÓÓÌ›à àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóóJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€œ(SEE€SEPARATE€CONCURRING€OPINION›œ)ÌóóJOSEPH›€M.€œTIPTON,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌÌœòò(SEE€SEPARATE€CONCURRING€OPINION)›ÌóóTHOMAS€T.€œWOODALL,€JUDGE›ÌÌ