ÿWPCi …UBV %˜U.žÌnXÜ 044 4h | 1m„ 0dñ w@U • 0J› 0Tå 0^9 0h— 0rÿ 0|q 0†í 0s 1u 0dxU6ÜB)DC; B~ AM›èv~vÓ€ D3S 0@† 0Æ 0ŠU 0 ß 0´ 0Ç3 0Ûú 0ïÕ AOÄÆ 0DÙ D/ BL<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX%ä2¼A`ArialTT3|Xo «<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@%ä2¼A`ArialTTt10cpiXXXä2¼P±ŠQXP( ¤T$¡¡Ó  Ó»{s  tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à Y DZ [ \ D] ^ D_ ` Ea Ó€m HM2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd d€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òOctober€31,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÑ X ÑÑ7€‡ðXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ ` ÑÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓ  ÓÔ€Ô€›à àà àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€€ÙœßL€&'$;+'h|èÿ3` Å `€€Lß›Ìà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÓ  Óà@ àJULY€1996€SESSIONÌÌÌÌó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà àò òC.C.A.€NO.€ó ó€ò òœ02C01›„9512„CC„00381ó óÌà àà àAppellee,à àò ò€€€€€à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDYER€COUNTYó óÌœVS›.à àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JOE€G.€œRILEY›,ÌTROY€ANDERSON,à àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)ó óà à(Sale€of€Marijuana)ÌÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANT:óóà àà àà à€€€€€òòà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌÌò òCHARLES€M.€AGEE,€JR.à àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€œBURSON›ó óÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌP.O.€Box€280ÌDyersburg,€TN€€38025„0280ò òà àà àà àROBIN€L.€HARRISó óÌà àà àà àà à€à àà àà àœAsst›.€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€Pkwy.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òC.€PHILLIP€œBIVENS›ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ29th›€Judicial€DistrictÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDyer€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDyersburg,€TN€€38024ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDó óÌÌÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,ÌJudgeÑ Ü ÑÓ  Óà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€defendant€was€charged€in€an€indictment€returned€October€10,Ïœ1994,›€with€the€sale€of€marijuana€weighing€over€œone„half›€ounce.€€He€was€first€tried€onÏJanuary€26,€1995,€but€the€jury€was€unable€to€reach€a€verdict.€€A€mistrial€wasÏdeclared,€and€the€defendant€was€subsequently€tried€again.€€He€was€found€guilty€at€aÏjury€trial€on€April€25,€1995.€€The€trial€court€sentenced€him€as€a€range€one€standardÏoffender€to€one€year€and€two€months€with€the€Department€of€Correction,€andÏimposed€a€fine€of€two€thousand€dollars€œ($2000).›€€In€this€appeal€as€of€right,€theÏdefendant€raises€the€following€seven€issues:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ V ÒÓÓœÌ(1)›€€whether€he€was€denied€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial;ÌœÌ(2)›€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€suppress€aÏtape€recording€of€the€alleged€drug€transaction;ÌœÌ(3)›€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€theÍdefendantððs€request€for€a€change€of€venue;ÌœÌ(4)›€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€exclude€theÏtestimony€of€the€officer€who€allegedly€witnessed€the€drugÏtransaction;ÌœÌ(5)›€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€dismiss€theÏindictment€due€to€the€Stateððs€alleged€failure€to€discloseÏexculpatory€evidence;ÌœÌ(6)›€€whether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€byÏdenying€alternative€sentencing;€andÌœÌ(7)›€€whether€he€was€denied€due€process€of€law€when€theÏjury€deliberated€only€ten€minutes€before€returning€with€aÏverdict.̛̜ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓWe€find€that€the€defendantððs€issues€on€appeal€lack€merit.€€His€conviction€andÏsentence€are€therefore€affirmed.ÌÌà àà àThe€alleged€offense€in€the€present€case€arose€from€an€undercoverÏoperation.€€Dennis€Davis€was€arrested€for€DUI€and€drug€charges€shortly€before€JulyÏ8,€1992.€€As€a€result,€he€agreed€to€cooperate€in€undercover€work.€€He€met€RonnieÏShirley,€an€officer€with€the€Tennessee€Highway€Patrol,€on€July€8,€œ1992,›€for€theÏpurpose€of€completing€a€drug€transaction€near€an€apartment€complex€and€bar€knownÏas€South€Fork.€€Davis€and€Shirley€arrived€in€the€vicinity€of€South€Fork€in€the€earlyÏevening€hours.€€Shirley€searched€Davis€to€ensure€that€the€latter€did€not€possessÍnarcotics.€€Shirley€then€gave€Davis€one€hundred€twenty€dollars€($120)€for€theÏpurchase€of€drugs€and€placed€a€micro„cassette€recorder€in€Davisðð€boot.€€They€thenÏproceeded€to€South€Fork.ÌÌà àà àOnce€they€had€arrived€at€South€Fork,€Davis€exited€the€vehicle€andÏapproached€an€apartment€which€he€believed€was€inhabited€by€Donald€Bradford.€€HeÏknocked€at€the€door,€but€there€was€no€answer.€€Davis€then€saw€the€defendant,€whomÏhe€knew,€and€stated€his€intention€to€purchase€three€one„quarter€ounce€bags€ofÏmarijuana.€€The€defendant€replied€that€he€had€an€ounce€of€marijuana.€€They€beganÏto€walk€toward€a€residence€in€the€complex.€€Officer€Shirley€lost€sight€of€them€for€five€toÏten€seconds€as€they€walked,€but€moved€the€vehicle€to€allow€him€to€see€them€again.€ÏDavis€and€the€defendant€stopped€beside€a€tree€adjacent€to€the€residence,€and€theÏdefendant€lowered€a€plastic€bag€from€the€tree.€€Davis€walked€back€to€the€vehicle€toÏrequest€more€money€to€complete€the€transaction.€€Shirley€gave€Davis€an€additionalÏtwenty€dollars€($20),€and€Davis€returned€to€the€defendant.€€Davis€gave€the€defendantÏthe€one€hundred€forty€dollars€($140)€and€received€the€plastic€bag€in€exchange.ÌÌà àà àDavis€came€back€to€the€vehicle,€and€Shirley€drove€away€from€theÏscene.€€Shortly€thereafter,€Shirley€searched€Davis€again€and€retrieved€a€plastic€bagÏcontaining€a€green,€leafy€substance.€€Shirley€also€took€the€cassette€recorder€fromÍDavisðð€boot.€€Aside€from€the€five€to€ten€second€period€when€Davis€and€the€defendantÏwere€walking€toward€the€residence,€Shirley€testified€that€he€had€witnessed€the€entireÏtransaction.€€Both€Shirley€and€Davis€testified€that€they€had€not€seen€any€otherÏindividuals€in€the€area€during€the€entire€time€of€the€transaction.ÌÌà àà àThe€State€introduced€the€tape€recording€of€the€transaction€as€evidenceÏat€trial.€€The€State€also€offered€the€testimony€of€Kay€œSherriff,›€a€forensic€scientist€withÏthe€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation,€who€stated€that€the€green,€leafy€substance€inÏthe€plastic€bag€was€0.9€ounces€of€marijuana.ÌÌà àà àOn€cross„examination,€Davis€admitted€that€he€had€multiple€priorÏconvictions.€€Davis€also€testified€that€Jack€Cunningham,€an€officer€with€theÏTennessee€Highway€Patrol,€had€told€him€that€the€DUI€and€drug€charges€from€lateÏJune€and€early€July€of€1992€would€be€dropped€if€he€cooperated€with€an€undercoverÏoperation.€€Davis€testified€further,€however,€that€the€district€attorney€generalððs€officeÏhad€made€no€promises€regarding€his€undercover€work.€€Davis€stated€that€he€had€notÏyet€been€to€court€for€those€charges.€€With€regard€to€the€alleged€drug€transaction,ÏDavis€testified€that€Shirley€could€not€have€seen€the€location€of€the€exchange€from€theÏplace€where€they€had€originally€parked.€€Davis€also€stated€that€he€was€not€sureÏwhether€the€vehicle€was€still€parked€at€the€same€location€where€he€had€first€exitedÍwhen€he€returned€after€making€the€drug€purchase.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€testified€in€his€own€behalf€at€trial.€€He€stated€thatÏsomeone€had€knocked€on€his€door€on€the€evening€of€July€8,€1992.€€He€answered€theÏdoor,€and€the€individual€at€the€door€asked€for€ð ðDon.ðð€€Another€individual€was€walkingÏaround€behind€the€person€at€the€door.€€Since€one€of€the€defendantððs€children€wasÏcrying,€the€defendant€closed€the€door.€€The€defendant€contends€that€the€tapeÏrecording€introduced€by€the€State€supports€his€testimony.€€On€cross„examination,€theÏdefendant€stated€that€he€could€not€identify€the€individual€who€had€been€at€his€door€asÏeither€Dennis€Davis€or€Officer€Shirley.€€Moreover,€the€defendant€also€admitted€that€heÏwas€unsure€if€the€incidents€about€which€he€testified€had€occurred€on€July€8,€1992.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€first€issue,€the€defendant€argues€that€he€was€denied€his€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial.€€The€record€reveals€that€there€was€a€delay€between€the€commission€ofÏthe€offense€and€indictment€as€well€as€between€indictment€and€trial.€€The€defendantÏrefers€to€the€entire€period€between€the€commission€of€the€offense€and€his€trial€whenÏframing€his€speedy€trial€issue.€€It€is€well„established,€however,€that€no€speedy€trialÏproblem€arises€until€after€formal€accusation,€either€by€arrest€or€grand€jury€action.€ÏòòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Lovascoóó,€431€U.S.€œ783€(1977);›€òòUnited€States€v.€Marionóó,Ï404€U.S.€307,€œ313„20€(1971);›€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352,€353€(Tenn.€1981);ÍòòState€v.€Waltonóó,€673€S.W.2d€166,€170€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984).€€A€delay€between€theÏcommission€of€the€offense€and€formal€accusation€is€properly€addressed€through€aÏstatute€of€limitations€claim€or€a€due€process€claim.€€òòSeeóó€òòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€354Ï(citing€òòLovascoóó,€œ431€U.S.€at€789„90;›€òòMarionóó,€œ404€U.S.€321„22).›€€Accordingly,€theÏdefendant€improperly€frames€his€speedy€trial€issue€as€covering€the€entire€periodÏbetween€commission€of€the€offense€and€trial.€€We€will€therefore€address€the€delayÏbetween€the€offense€and€the€trial€as€two€distinct€issues,€one€involving€due€processÏguarantees€and€the€other€involving€speedy€trial€guarantees.ÌÌà àà àTo€aid€our€resolution€of€the€due€process€and€speedy€trial€problems,€weÏwill€first€review€the€relevant€events€which€occurred€between€the€commission€of€theÏoffense€and€the€defendantððs€conviction€for€that€offense.€€The€offense€allegedlyÏoccurred€on€July€8,€1992.€€The€defendant€was€œfirst€indicted›€in€October€of€1993,Ïapproximately€sixteen€months€after€the€offense.€€In€June€of€1994,€approximately€eightÏmonths€after€indictment,€the€prosecution€of€the€defendant€was€terminated€by€entry€ofÏa€òònolleóó€òòprosequióó€order.€€The€prosecution€was€dismissed€without€prejudice,Ïapparently€by€agreement€with€the€defendant.€€The€defendant€was€indicted€again€onÏOctober€10,€1994.€€He€was€tried€on€January€25,€1995,€but€the€jury€was€unable€toÏreach€a€verdict.€€A€mistrial€was€declared,€and€the€case€was€set€for€trial€again.€€OnÏApril€25,€1995,€the€defendant€was€tried€and€convicted.ÌÌà àà àWe€will€first€consider€the€delay€between€the€commission€of€the€offenseÏand€formal€accusation€by€indictment.€€The€record€reveals€that€this€period€of€delayÏwas€approximately€sixteen€months.€€Given€that€the€Tennessee€Highway€Patrol€set€upÏthe€drug€transaction€at€issue€as€part€of€an€undercover€operation,€the€record€alsoÏreveals€that€the€State€was€aware€of€the€offense€from€the€time€of€its€commission.€€ToÏprevail€on€a€claim€that€the€pre„indictment€period€of€delay€violated€due€process,€theÏdefendant€bears€the€burden€of€establishing€that€there€was€a€delay,€that€he€sufferedÏactual€prejudice€as€a€direct€and€proximate€result€of€the€delay,€and€that€the€StateÏcaused€the€delay€in€order€to€gain€a€tactical€advantage€over€or€to€harass€theÏdefendant.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Dykes,óó€803€S.W.2d€250,€256€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990);ÏòòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€354.ÌÌà àà àFrom€the€record€before€us,€we€find€that€the€defendant€has€establishedÏthat€there€was€a€sixteen€month€pre„indictment€period€of€delay.€€The€defendant,Ïhowever,€has€utterly€failed€to€establish€any€actual€prejudice€stemming€from€thatÏdelay.€€The€defendant€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€the€indictment€based€on€a€speedyÏtrial€violation,€as€well€as€a€host€of€other€pre„trial€motions,€on€November€30,€1994.€ÏThe€trial€court€conducted€a€hearing€on€these€motions€on€January€9,€1995.€ÏApparently€the€defendant€testified€at€that€hearing€in€an€effort€to€demonstrateÍprejudice€for€the€purpose€of€his€speedy€trial€motion.€€The€transcript€from€that€hearingÏwas€not€made€a€part€of€the€record€on€appeal.€€As€a€result,€there€is€no€proof€in€theÏrecord€establishing€any€prejudice€to€the€defendant€arising€from€the€pre„indictmentÏperiod€of€delay.€€It€is€the€defendantððs€duty€to€have€prepared€an€adequate€record€inÏorder€to€allow€a€meaningful€review€on€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€T.R.A.P.€24(b);€òòState€v.€Bunchóó,Ï646€S.W.2d€158,€160€(Tenn.€1983);€òòState€v.€Robertsóó,€755€S.W.2d€833,€836€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1988).€€When€no€evidence€is€preserved€in€the€record€for€review,€we€areÏprecluded€from€considering€the€issue.€€òòSeeóó€òòRobertsóó,€755€S.W.2d€at€836.ÌÌà àà àFurthermore,€even€if€we€were€to€find€that€the€defendant€hadÏdemonstrated€prejudice€arising€from€the€pre„indictment€delay,€the€defendant€hasÏfailed€to€establish€that€the€State€caused€the€delay€in€order€to€gain€a€tacticalÏadvantage€over€or€to€harass€him.€€In€fact,€from€the€sparse€record€before€us,€it€appearsÏthat€the€delay€between€the€offense€and€the€indictment€of€the€defendant€was€due€to€anÏeffort€to€preserve€the€secrecy€of€the€continuing€undercover€operations€conducted€byÏthe€Tennessee€Highway€Patrol.€€There€is€no€proof€that€the€State€delayed€indicting€theÏdefendant€for€purposes€of€either€harassment€or€gaining€a€tactical€advantage.€€Thus,Ïthe€defendant€has€failed€to€carry€his€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€pre„indictmentÏperiod€of€delay€violated€his€due€process€rights.ÌÌà àà àWe€will€now€consider€whether€the€period€of€delay€between€theÏdefendantððs€indictment€and€his€trial€constitutes€a€violation€of€his€right€to€a€speedyÏtrial.€€Both€federal€and€state€constitutions€and€our€statutes€guarantee€criminalÏdefendants€a€speedy€trial.€€U.S.€Const.€amend.€VI;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€9;€T.C.A.€ððÏ40„14„101.€€In€òòBarker€v.€œWingo›óó,€407€U.S.€œ514€(1972),›€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€set€out€a€balancing€test€to€be€used€in€determining€whether€a€defendantððs€rightÏto€a€speedy€trial€had€been€violated.€€Our€Supreme€Court€has€adopted€this€test.€€òòSeeóóÏòòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€355;€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81,€84€(Tenn.€1973).€€If€theÏdefendant€was€in€fact€denied€a€speedy€trial,€then€his€or€her€conviction€must€beÏreversed€and€the€charges€dismissed.€€òòSeeóó€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€83.€€In€conductingÏthe€balancing€test€mandated€by€òòBarkeróó,€we€are€required€to€examine€the€conduct€ofÏboth€the€prosecution€and€the€defendant,€looking€especially€to€four€factors:€(1)€theÏlength€of€the€delay,€(2)€the€reasons€for€the€delay,€(3)€whether€the€defendant€assertedÏhis€or€her€right€to€a€speedy€trial,€and€(4)€whether€the€defendant€was€prejudiced€by€theÏdelay.€€òòSeeóó€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€84.ÌÌà àà àIn€considering€the€first€factor,€the€length€of€the€delay,€a€careful€review€ofÏthe€significant€events€between€indictment€and€trial€is€necessary€in€the€present€case.€ÏThe€defendant€was€first€indicted€in€October€of€1993.€€In€June€of€1994,€that€indictmentÏwas€òònolleóó€òòprosequióó€with€the€agreement€of€the€defendant.€€It€appears€that€the€principalÍreason€for€the€dismissal€without€prejudice€of€that€indictment€was€the€fact€that€aÏmaterial€witness€for€the€prosecution€was€unavailable.€€Shortly€after€that€witnessÏbecame€available,€the€defendant€was€re„indicted€on€October€10,€1994.€€TheÏdefendant€filed€a€number€of€pre„trial€motions€on€November€30,€1994,€including€aÏmotion€to€dismiss€the€indictment€for€violation€of€speedy€trial€rights.€€The€trial€courtÏconducted€a€hearing€on€the€motions€on€January€9,€1995,€and€subsequently€deniedÏthe€motion€to€dismiss.€€The€defendant€was€first€tried€on€January€25,€1995.€€The€juryÏwas€unable€to€reach€a€verdict,€and€a€mistrial€was€declared€on€January€26,€1995.€€TheÏdefendant€was€then€tried€again€and€convicted€on€April€25,€1995.ÌÌà àà àThe€apparent€length€of€time€between€the€defendantððs€first€indictmentÏand€the€trial€which€resulted€in€his€conviction€is€approximately€eighteen€months.€€It€isÏclear,€however,€that€the€case€at€bar€proceeded€from€indictment€to€trial€in€an€unusualÏmanner.€€As€a€result,€certain€intervening€circumstances€make€the€period€betweenÏindictment€and€trial€seem€longer€than€it€truly€is.€€The€record€does€not€reveal€anyÏunreasonable€delays€given€the€unusual€progress€of€this€case€from€indictment€to€trialÏand€conviction.€€In€fact,€it€is€doubtful€that€the€period€of€delay€in€the€present€case€isÏsufficient€to€trigger€further€speedy€trial€analysis.€€òòSeeóó€òòBarkeróó,€œ407€U.S.€at€530„31.›€€InÏany€event,€the€period€of€delay€is€not€presumptively€prejudicial€given€that€ourÏSupreme€Court€has€held€that€a€two€year€delay€alone€does€not€establish€a€speedyÍtrial€violation€in€the€absence€of€prejudice.€€òòSeeóó€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€85.ÌÌà àà àWe€turn€now€to€the€second€òòBarkeróó€factor,€the€reasons€for€the€delay.€ÏThere€appear€to€be€two€principal€reasons€for€the€delay€in€this€case.€€First,€the€OctoberÏ1993€indictment€was€òònolleóó€òòprosequióó€because€a€material€witness€was€unavailable.€ÏShortly€after€the€witness€became€available,€the€defendant€was€re„indicted€and€hisÏcase€was€set€for€trial.€€Second,€the€jury€was€unable€to€reach€a€verdict€in€theÏdefendantððs€first€trial.€€The€case€was€then€immediately€set€for€another€trial,€whichÏresulted€in€the€defendantððs€conviction.€€Thus,€although€there€were€delays,€theÏdefendantððs€case€proceeded€in€a€reasonable€manner.€€Certainly€the€reasons€for€theÏdelays€do€not€weigh€in€favor€of€a€finding€of€a€speedy€trial€violation.ÌÌà àà àThe€third€òòBarkeróó€factor€asks€whether€the€defendant€asserted€his€right€toÏa€speedy€trial.€€The€record€reveals€that€the€defendant€did€not€assert€his€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial€at€any€time€during€the€eight€months€between€his€first€indictment€and€theÏStateððs€decision€to€òònolleóó€òòprosequióó.€€On€October€10,€1994,€the€defendant€was€re„indicted.€€He€filed€a€pre„trial€motion€to€dismiss€based€on€a€speedy€trial€violation€onÏNovember€30,€1994.€€We€find,€therefore,€that€the€defendant€did€assert,€albeitÏbelatedly,€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial.ÌÌà àà àWe€now€consider€the€fourth€and€most€important€òòBarkeróó€factor,€whetherÏthe€defendant€was€prejudiced€by€the€delay.€€òòBishopóó€suggested€the€following€threeÏpossible€types€of€prejudice:€(1)€undue€and€oppressive€incarceration;€(2)€anxietyÏaccompanying€public€accusation;€and€(3)€impairment€of€the€ability€to€prepare€aÏdefense.€€òòSeeóó€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€85.€€Since€the€defendant€was€not€incarceratedÏprior€to€trial,€the€first€type€of€prejudice€is€inapplicable€to€the€present€case.€€With€regardÏto€the€other€two€types€of€prejudice€from€òòBishopóó,€we€are€again€faced€with€the€problemÏof€a€deficient€record€on€appeal.€€As€we€stated€above,€the€defendant€apparentlyÏtestified€at€a€hearing€on€his€pre„trial€motion€to€dismiss€concerning€the€prejudice€heÏbelieved€he€had€suffered€as€a€result€of€the€delay€between€the€commission€of€theÏoffense€and€his€trial.€€The€transcript€of€that€hearing€is€not,€however,€a€part€of€theÏrecord€on€appeal.€€The€defendant€bears€the€burden€of€preparing€an€adequate€recordÏin€order€to€allow€meaningful€appellate€review.€€òòSeeóó€T.R.A.P.€24(b);€òòBunchóó,€646ÏS.W.2d€at€160;€òòRobertsóó,€755€S.W.2d€at€836.€€From€the€record€before€us,€we€simplyÏcannot€conclude€that€the€delay€between€the€defendantððs€indictment€and€his€trialÏviolated€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial.€€The€defendantððs€first€issue€is€therefore€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€second€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏfailing€to€suppress€the€tape€recording€of€the€alleged€drug€transaction€becauseÍportions€of€the€recording€are€inaudible.€€The€defendant€concedes€that€it€is€well„established€in€Tennessee€that€the€audibility€of€a€tape€recording€goes€to€its€weightÏand€not€to€its€admissibility.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€œBeasley›óó,€699€S.W.2d€565,€569€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1985);€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€637€S.W.2d€896,€898€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€TheÏdefendant,€however,€argues€that€at€some€point,€if€the€tape€recording€is€so€inaudibleÏthat€it€is€not€helpful€to€the€trier€of€fact,€the€recording€should€be€excluded€under€Tenn.ÏR.€œEvid›.€401.€€Likewise,€the€defendant€argues€that,€if€the€inaudible€portions€of€theÏrecording€are€crucial€to€a€fair€understanding€of€the€conversation€recorded,€theÏrecording€should€be€excluded€under€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€403.€€òòSeeóó€Neil€P.€Cohen€et.€al.,ÏTennessee€Law€of€Evidence€ðð€401.12,€at€n.126€(œ2nd›€ed.€1990).ÌÌà àà àRegardless€of€whether€we€find€the€defendantððs€argument€persuasive,Ïthere€is€no€proof€in€the€record€that€the€tape€recording€at€issue€merits€exclusion€underÏeither€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€401€or€403.€€In€fact,€the€defendant€points€to€only€one€inaudibleÏportion€of€the€recording€in€his€argument.€€From€the€record€before€us,€we€cannotÏconclude€either€that€the€recording€is€so€inaudible€that€the€recording€is€not€helpful€toÏthe€trier€of€fact,€or€that€the€inaudible€portions€are€so€crucial€that€the€recording€doesÏnot€convey€a€fair€understanding€of€the€transaction€recorded.€€It€is€within€the€discretionÏof€the€trial€court€to€determine€whether€to€admit€such€evidence,€and€that€discretion€willÏnot€be€disturbed€absent€abuse.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€œElrod›óó,€721€S.W.2d€820,€823€(Tenn.ÍCrim.€App.€1986).€€We€find€no€abuse€of€discretion€in€the€case€at€bar.€€The€defendantððsÏsecond€issue€is€therefore€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€third€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏdenying€his€motion€for€a€change€of€venue.€€The€defendant€asserts€by€affidavitÏattached€to€his€pre„trial€motion€for€a€change€of€venue€that€he€could€not€be€tried€inÏDyer€county€by€an€impartial€jury€due€to€extensive€pre„trial€publicity.€€The€defendantÏfurther€contends€that€because€he€was€charged€with€the€sale€of€narcotics,€whichÏnecessarily€carries€œÌð ðinstant›€notoriety€and€disdain,ðð€he€could€not€be€tried€by€an€impartial€jury€in€DyerÏcounty.ÌÌà àà àVenue€may€be€changed€ð ðif€it€appears€to€the€court€that,€due€to€undueÏexcitement€against€the€defendant€in€the€county€where€the€offense€was€committed€orÏany€other€cause,€a€fair€trial€probably€could€not€be€had.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€21(a).€€TheÏdecision€as€to€whether€to€change€venue€rests€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court,Ïand€the€decision€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€absent€a€clear€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€œMelson›óó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€360€(Tenn.€1982).€€To€reverse€a€conviction€onÏthe€basis€of€an€improper€denial€of€a€request€to€change€venue,€the€defendant€mustÏdemonstrate€that€the€jurors€who€actually€heard€his€case€were€biased€or€prejudicedÍagainst€him.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€192€(Tenn.€1992)€(citing€òòState€v.ÏBurton,óó€751€S.W.2d€440€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988)).ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€defendant€contends€that€the€pre„trial€publicity€was€soÏextensive€as€to€render€a€fair€trial€impossible,€the€record€demonstrates€otherwise.€€InÏfact,€the€transcript€of€the€voir€dire€proceeding€reveals€that€none€of€the€jurors€knewÏanything€about€the€defendant€personally€or€anything€about€the€case.€€In€short,€thereÏis€nothing€in€the€record€to€indicate€that€any€juror€would€have€rendered€a€verdictÏbased€on€anything€other€than€the€evidence€presented€at€trial.€€Thus,€we€find€that€theÏtrial€judge€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€in€denying€the€defendantððs€request€for€aÏchange€of€venue.€€The€defendantððs€third€issue€is€therefore€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€fourth€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏfailing€to€exclude€the€testimony€of€Officer€Ronnie€Shirley.€€The€defendant€asserts€thatÏthe€district€attorney€general€told€defense€counsel€that€Officer€Shirley€could€positivelyÏidentify€the€defendant€because,€during€an€interview€at€the€district€attorney€generalððsÏoffice,€Shirley€was€shown€a€photograph€purporting€to€be€the€defendant€and€indicatedÏthat€the€person€in€the€photograph€was€the€individual€who€had€sold€the€plastic€bag€ofÏmarijuana€to€Dennis€Davis.€€The€defendant€argues€further€that€Shirley€was€unable€toÏview€the€transaction€clearly€from€his€location€in€the€vehicle,€thereby€amplifying€theÍimproper€nature€œof€Shirleyððs›€identification€of€the€defendant€from€a€single€photographÏduring€the€interview€at€the€district€attorney€generalððs€office.ÌÌà àà àWe€recognize€that€Tennessee€courts€do€not€approve€of€photographicÏline„ups€consisting€of€only€one€picture€designated€as€the€accused.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏœTyson›,óó€603€S.W.2d€748,€753€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€In€this€case,€however,€the€trialÏcourt€did€not€err€in€allowing€Officer€Shirley€to€testify€regarding€the€transaction€and€toÏidentify€the€defendant€as€the€individual€who€had€sold€the€marijuana.€€The€recordÏreveals€that,€according€to€the€undercover€operation€plan,€Dennis€Davis€was€going€toÏattempt€to€purchase€drugs€from€an€individual€named€Donald€Bradford.€€There€was€noÏmention€of€the€defendant€prior€to€their€arrival€at€South€Fork.€€As€Shirley€and€DavisÏdrove€up€to€South€Fork,€they€saw€the€defendant€walking€nearby,€and€Shirley€said€toÏDavis,€ð ðIs€that€Troy?ðð€€Given€that€Shirley€and€Davis€intended€to€purchase€drugs€fromÏDonald€Bradford,€this€statement€indicates€that€Officer€Shirley€knew€the€identity€of€theÏdefendant€well€before€the€interview€at€the€district€attorney€generalððs€office.€€Moreover,Ïcontrary€to€the€defendantððs€assertion,€the€record€demonstrates€that€Officer€ShirleyÏclearly€witnessed€virtually€the€entire€transaction€between€Davis€and€the€defendant.€ÏShirley€testified€that€he€lost€sight€of€Davis€and€the€defendant€for€five€to€ten€secondsÏas€they€walked€toward€a€residence.€€Shirley€regained€sight€of€them€by€moving€theÏvehicle€to€obtain€an€unobstructed€view.€€Davis€testified€that€Shirley€could€not€haveÍseen€the€location€of€the€exchange€of€money€for€marijuana€from€the€location€where€heÏoriginally€parked.€€This€statement€is€consistent€with€Shirleyððs€testimony€that€he€lostÏsight€of€Davis€and€the€defendant€momentarily.€€Davis€testified€further€that€he€wasÏunsure€as€to€whether€the€vehicle€was€in€the€same€location€when€he€returned€afterÏmaking€the€purchase.€€Thus,€the€record€indicates€that€Shirley€had€an€adequateÏopportunity€to€view€the€defendant€during€the€drug€transaction€and€that€Shirley€knewÏthe€identity€of€the€defendant€at€that€time.€€From€these€circumstances,€we€can€onlyÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€allowing€the€testimony€of€Officer€Shirley€atÏtrial.€€The€defendantððs€fourth€issue€is€therefore€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€fifth€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏfailing€to€dismiss€the€indictment€due€to€the€Stateððs€failure€to€disclose€exculpatoryÏevidence.€€More€specifically,€the€defendant€states€that€the€district€attorney€general€didÏnot€inform€him€that€an€officer€of€the€Tennessee€Highway€Patrol€had€promisedÏconsideration€of€Dennis€Davisðð€cooperation€in€the€prosecution€of€the€defendant€withÏregard€to€DUI€and€drug€charges€pending€against€Davis.€€As€a€result,€the€defendantÏargues€that€he€was€deprived€of€due€process€and€a€fair€trial,€citing€primarily€òòBrady€v.ÏMarylandóó,€373€U.S.€œ83›€œ(1963).›ÌÌà àà àIn€òòBradyóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€State€has€aÍduty€to€furnish€the€accused€with€any€exculpatory€evidence€pertaining€either€to€guilt€orÏinnocence€or€to€possible€punishment€upon€conviction.€€òòSeeóó€òòBradyóó,€373€U.S.€at€œ87.›€ÏExculpatory€evidence€under€òòBradyóó€includes€witness€statements€which€are€materialÏand€favorable€to€the€accused.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòœMcDowell›€v.€Dixonóó,€858€F.2d€945€(œ4th›€Cir.Ï1988),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€489€U.S.€œ1033€(1989);›€òòState€v.€Goodmanóó,€643€S.W.2d€375,€œ379„80›€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€Moreover,€exculpatory€evidence€under€òòBradyóó€includesÏinformation€which€can€be€used€only€for€impeachment€purposes.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€StatesÏv.€Bagleyóó,€473€U.S.€667,€œ676€(1985).›€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòGiglio€v.€United€Statesóó,€405€U.S.€œ150›Ï(1972);€òòNapue€v.€Illinoisóó,€360€U.S.€œ264€(1959).›€€Moreover,€a€defendant€has€the€rightÏto€explore€on€cross„examination€any€promises€of€leniency€or€other€favorableÏtreatment€offered€to€a€witness.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Spurlockóó,€874€S.W.2d€602,€617€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993);€òòState€v.€Norrisóó,€684€S.W.2d€650,€654€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984).ÌÌà àà àTo€prevail€on€a€claim€that€the€State€failed€to€disclose€exculpatoryÏevidence€under€òòBradyóó€and€its€progeny,€the€defendant€must€establish€that€(1)€he€orÏshe€made€a€proper€request€for€the€production€of€evidence,€unless€the€evidence€isÏobviously€exculpatory€in€nature€when€viewed€by€the€prosecution,€(2)€the€StateÏsuppressed€the€evidence,€(3)€the€evidence€was€material,€and€(4)€the€evidence€wasÏfavorable€to€the€defendant.€€òòSeeóó€òòSpurlockóó,€874€S.W.2d€at€609.€€The€defendant€bearsÏthe€burden€of€demonstrating€the€elements€of€this€claim€by€a€preponderance€of€theÍevidence.€€òòSeeóó€òòSmith€v.€Stateóó,€757€S.W.2d€14,€19€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).ÌÌà àà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€record€reveals€that€the€defendant€filed€a€motionÏrequesting€disclosure€of€impeaching€information,€including€any€promises€ofÏfavorable€treatment€offered€to€any€witness€on€behalf€of€the€State,€on€November€30,Ï1994.€€The€trial€court€conducted€a€hearing€on€this€motion€and€several€others€onÏJanuary€9,€1995,€and€granted€the€motion€for€disclosure€of€exculpatory€evidenceÏincluding€any€agreements€by€the€State€with€witnesses.€€As€a€result,€in€a€letter€datedÏJanuary€11,€1995,€the€district€attorney€general€advised€the€defendant€that€his€officeÏhad€made€no€promises€regarding€favorable€treatment€to€Dennis€Davis€for€hisÏcooperation€in€the€case.€€The€district€attorney€general,€however,€further€advised€theÏdefendant€that€there€were€charges€still€pending€against€Davis€from€approximatelyÏJune€of€1992.€€He€explained€the€situation€to€the€defendant€as€follows:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ V ÒÓӜ̛à àApparently€Mr.€Davis€was€arrested€by€TrooperÏFrank€McLin€on€or€about€June€27,€1992€for€charges€ofÏDUI,€Possession€of€Marijuana€for€Resale,€Violation€ofÏRegistration€Law,€and€Possession€of€Drug€Paraphernalia.€ÏAs€you€are€aware,€this€was€prior€to€my€taking€office€onÏSeptember€1,€1992.€€After€Mr.€Davisðð€arrest€theÏinvestigation€of€these€charges€was€apparently€turned€overÏto€the€CID€Division€of€the€Tennessee€Highway€Patrol€andÏthe€hearing€on€these€charges€was€continued.€€I€do€notÏknow€if€any€agreement€was€reached€between€CID€and€Mr.ÏDavis€concerning€these€charges€or€if€the€AttorneyÍGeneralððs€Office€was€contacted€concerning€these€charges.€ÏI€was€never€made€aware€of€these€charges€after€takingÏoffice€on€September€œ1st›€and€was€not€aware€of€theÏundercover€drug€operation€involving€Mr.€Davis€until€weÏwere€supplied€with€files€and€requests€for€indictments€inÏ1993.Ìà àI€have€not€spoken€to€Jack€Cunningham,€the€CIDÏAgent€who€was€investigating€these€charges,€nor€have€IÏtalked€to€Mr.€Davis€concerning€these€charges,€but€I€haveÏspoken€to€Frank€McLin€and€the€charges€are€still€pending.€ÏTrooper€McLin€advises€me€that€he€has€made€no€promisesÏto€Mr.€Davis.€œ.€.€.›€I€am€enclosing€copies€of€the€citations€thatÏare€presently€pending€in€connection€with€this€matter.̛̜ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓFrom€this€detailed€explanation€provided€by€the€district€attorney€general,€it€is€clear€thatÏthe€defendant€was€made€aware€of€the€charges€still€pending€against€Dennis€Davis.ÌÌà àà àIn€fact,€the€defendant€thoroughly€cross„examined€Davis€regarding€theÏcharges€against€him€which€were€still€pending€and€the€alleged€promise€of€OfficerÏCunningham€to€drop€the€charges€in€exchange€for€cooperation€in€the€undercoverÏoperation.€€The€defendant€obviously€made€the€jury€aware€of€the€alleged€promise€forÏfavorable€treatment€by€Officer€Cunningham.€€As€is€apparent€from€the€verdict€of€guilt,Ïthe€jury€did€not€consider€this€information€as€detracting€from€the€evidence€against€theÏdefendant.€€From€the€record€before€us,€we€can€only€conclude€that€any€error€by€theÏprosecution€in€disclosing€impeaching€information€was€harmless.€€The€defendantððsÏfifth€issue€is€therefore€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€sixth€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€in€denying€alternative€sentencing.€€The€record€reveals€that€the€trial€courtÏsentenced€the€defendant€as€a€range€one€standard€offender€to€one€year€and€twoÏmonths€with€the€Department€of€Correction.€€The€defendant€claims€that€he€met€all€ofÏthe€eligibility€criteria€for€probation€or€community€corrections€and€that€he€is€not€aÏserious€offender€for€which€incarceration€is€deemed€appropriate.ÌÌà àà àWhen€a€defendant€complains€of€his€or€her€sentence,€we€must€conduct€aÏòòdeóó€òònovoóó€review€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€TheÏburden€of€showing€that€the€sentence€is€improper€is€upon€the€appealing€party.€€T.C.A.€œÌðð›€40„35„401(d)€Sentencing€Commission€Comments.€€This€presumption,€however,€ð ðisÏconditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€court€consideredÏthe€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,Ï823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àà àT.C.A.€ðð€40„35„103€sets€out€sentencing€considerations€which€areÏguidelines€for€determining€whether€or€not€a€defendant€should€be€incarcerated.€ÏThese€include€the€need€ð ðto€protect€society€by€restraining€a€defendant€who€has€a€longÏhistory€of€criminal€conduct,ðð€the€need€ð ðto€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€theÍoffense,ðð€the€determination€that€ð ðconfinement€is€particularly€suited€to€provide€anÏeffective€deterrence€to€others€likely€to€commit€similar€offenses,ðð€or€the€determinationÏthat€ð ðmeasures€less€restrictive€than€confinement€have€frequently€or€recently€beenÏapplied€unsuccessfully€to€the€defendant.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„103(1).ÌÌà àà àIn€determining€the€specific€sentence€and€the€possible€combination€ofÏsentencing€alternatives,€the€court€shall€consider€the€following:€(1)€any€evidence€fromÏthe€trial€and€sentencing€hearing,€(2)€the€presentence€report,€(3)€the€principles€ofÏsentencing€and€the€arguments€concerning€sentencing€alternatives,€(4)€the€natureÏand€characteristics€of€the€offense,€(5)€information€offered€by€the€State€or€theÏdefendant€concerning€enhancing€and€mitigating€factors€as€found€in€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„113€and€„114,€and€(6)€the€defendantððs€statements€in€his€or€her€own€behalfÏconcerning€sentencing.€€T.C.A.€œÌðð›€40„35„210(b).€€In€addition,€the€legislature€established€certain€sentencing€principlesÏwhich€include€the€following:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ V ÒÓÓœÌ(5)›€In€recognition€that€state€prison€capacities€and€theÏfunds€to€build€and€maintain€them€are€limited,€convictedÏfelons€committing€the€most€severe€offenses,€possessingÏcriminal€histories€evincing€a€clear€disregard€for€the€lawsÏand€morals€of€society,€and€evincing€failure€of€past€effortsÏat€rehabilitation€shall€be€given€first€priority€regardingÏsentencing€involving€incarceration;€andÌÌ(6)€A€defendant€who€does€not€fall€within€the€parameters€ofÏsubdivision€(5)€and€is€an€especially€mitigated€or€standardÏoffender€convicted€of€a€Class€C,€D€or€E€felony€is€presumedÏto€be€a€favorable€candidate€for€alternative€sentencingÏoptions€in€the€absence€of€evidence€to€the€contrary.̛̜ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102.ÌÌà àà àAfter€reviewing€the€statutes€set€out€above,€it€is€obvious€that€the€intent€ofÏthe€legislature€is€to€encourage€alternatives€to€incarceration€in€cases€whereÏdefendants€are€sentenced€as€standard€or€mitigated€offenders€convicted€of€C,€D,€or€EÏfelonies.€€However,€it€is€also€clear€that€there€is€an€intent€to€incarcerate€thoseÏdefendants€whose€criminal€histories€indicate€a€clear€disregard€for€the€laws€andÏmorals€of€society€and€a€failure€of€past€efforts€to€rehabilitate.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€present€case,€the€State€concedes€that€the€defendant€has€met€theÏgeneral€statutory€eligibility€requirements€for€probation€or€community€corrections.€ÏòòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„303(a);€T.C.A.€ðð€40„36„106(a).€€Mere€eligibility,€of€course,€doesÏnot€end€the€inquiry.€€Instead,€the€defendant€still€bears€the€burden€of€establishing€thatÏhe€is€a€suitable€candidate€for€alternative€sentencing.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„303(b);ÏòòState€v.€Taylor,óó€744€S.W.2d€919,€922€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€Militating€againstÍalternative€sentencing€are€circumstances€indicating€that€measures€less€restrictiveÏthan€confinement€have€recently€been€applied€unsuccessfully€to€the€defendant€or€thatÏconfinement€is€necessary€either€to€protect€society€from€a€defendant€with€a€longÏhistory€of€criminal€conduct€or€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense.€ÏòòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„103(1);€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€denied€alternative€sentencing€for€aÏnumber€of€reasons.€€The€court€noted€that€the€defendant€had€a€history€of€criminalÏconduct,€including€felony€convictions€from€1972€and€several€misdemeanors€datingÏfrom€1975€through€1987.€€The€court€noted€further€that€those€individuals€convicted€ofÏselling€narcotics€were€generally€incarcerated€and€that€the€State€had€made€a€showingÏof€a€need€for€deterrence.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€found€that€measures€lessÏrestrictive€than€confinement€had€recently€been€applied€to€the€defendant€for€hisÏmisdemeanors€without€success.€€As€a€result,€the€court€found€that€the€defendantððsÏpotential€for€rehabilitation€was€poor.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€stated€that€confinementÏwas€necessary€in€this€case€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense.€€ForÏall€of€the€above€reasons,€the€trial€judge€concluded€that€granting€an€alternativeÏsentence€would€not€serve€the€ends€of€justice,€and€he€therefore€denied€theÏdefendantððs€request.ÌÌà àà àFrom€a€review€of€the€entire€record,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€properlyÏconsidered€the€relevant€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€andÏcircumstances.€€We€can€only€conclude€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretionÏin€denying€alternative€sentencing.€€The€defendant€has€failed€to€carry€his€burden€ofÏdemonstrating€that€his€sentence€was€improper.€€His€sixth€issue€is€therefore€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€seventh€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€he€was€denied€dueÏprocess€because€the€jury€deliberated€only€ten€minutes€before€returning€œits›€verdict.€ÏHe€asserts€that€proper€deliberation€requires€that€the€jury€analyze,€discuss€and€weighÏthe€evidence€together€in€the€secrecy€of€the€jury€room,€citing€òòRushing€v.€Stateóó,€565ÏS.W.2d€893,€895€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1977).€€The€defendant€points€to€testimony€fromÏone€of€the€jurors€after€the€conclusion€of€the€case€that€the€jury€retired€to€deliberate,Ïselected€a€foreman,€and€took€an€initial€vote€as€to€whether€the€defendant€was€guilty€orÏnot€guilty.€€All€of€the€jurors€stated€that€they€believed€the€defendant€to€be€guilty,€so€theÏforeman€completed€the€verdict€form€without€further€debate.€€They€then€returned€toÏopen€court€and€announced€the€verdict.€€The€defendant€argues€that€theseÏcircumstances€indicate€that€the€jury€did€not€properly€deliberate€within€the€meaning€ofÏð ðdeliberationðð€set€forth€in€òòRushingóó.ÌÌà àà àWe€believe€that€the€defendant€misconstrues€the€language€of€òòRushingóó.€ÏòòRushingóó€involved€a€challenge€to€the€fact€that€the€jury€was€allowed€to€separate€and€goÏto€their€respective€homes€overnight€after€being€unable€to€reach€a€verdict€on€the€firstÏevening€of€deliberation.€€òòSeeóó€òòRushingóó,€565€S.W.2d€at€895.€€The€defendant€thereÏargued€that€once€the€jury€had€begun€deliberation,€neither€the€court€nor€the€attorneysÏcould€allow€them€to€separate.€€òòSeeóó€òòRushingóó,€565€S.W.2d€at€895.€€The€òòRushingóó€courtÏrejected€that€argument€and€ruled€that€deliberation€required€that€the€jury€decide€theÏcase€in€the€jury€room,€but€not€that€the€jury€be€prevented€from€separating€should€theyÏbe€unable€to€reach€a€verdict€after€deliberating€into€the€night.€€òòSeeóó€òòRushingóó,€565ÏS.W.2d€at€895.ÌÌà àà àFrom€the€record€before€us,€we€find€no€evidence€that€the€jury€wasÏinfluenced€improperly€or€that€their€verdict€was€based€on€passion€or€prejudice.€€WhileÏit€is€true€that€the€jury€retired€for€only€ten€minutes€before€returning€a€verdict,€we€œwill€not›Ïœimpose›€an€arbitrary€œminimum€time›€œperiod›€for€which€the€jury€must€deliberate.€€TheÏrecord€contains€ample€evidence,€including€the€testimony€of€two€eyewitnesses,€toÏsupport€the€jury€verdict.€€The€defendant€testified€in€his€own€behalf€at€trial,€but€the€juryÏrejected€his€testimony,€as€was€their€prerogative.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2dÏ832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€In€short,€we€find€nothing€improper€about€the€method€in€whichÏthe€jury€chose€to€resolve€this€case€once€œit›€had€retired€to€deliberate.€€The€defendantððsÍseventh€issue€is€therefore€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àFor€the€reasons€set€out€in€the€discussion€above,€we€find€that€œtheÏdefendantððs›€seven€issues€on€appeal€all€lack€merit.€€His€conviction€and€sentence€areÏtherefore€affirmed.ÌÔ€ŠÔÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àœà àà à____________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àœà àà àJOHN›€H.€PEAY,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌœ______________________________›ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JudgeÌÌÌœÌ______________________________ÌÔ€XÔÔ% € ÔCORNELIA›€A.€CLARK,€Special€Judge