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Hooper II, JudgeУ У WALTER LEE ALLEN,СССС*ССФ Ф(Robbery) г ‚X гУ У г ‚А гФ ФAppellant.ССУ УСС* Ф Ф У У Ф ФУУFOR THE APPELLANTФФ:У УССССССФ ФУУFOR THE APPELLEEФФ:У У Ф ФEDWARD CANTRELL MILLERССССPAUL G. SUMMERS г ‚№ё га 4„D„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ АDааDistrict Public DefenderССССССAttorney General & Reporter а D„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааP. O. Box 416 Dandridge, TN 37725Љ0416ССССERIK W. DAAB г ‚ гAssistant Attorney General г ‚ г425 Fifth Avenue North г ‚ гNashville, TN 37243 г ‚ г г ‚ гAL C. SCHMUTZER, JR. г ‚ гDistrict Attorney General г ‚ г г ‚ гGENERAL JAMES L. GASS г ‚ гAssistant District Attorney г ‚ гP. O. Box 70 г ‚ гDandridge, TN 37725 г ‚ г OPINION FILED: _______________ ааУ УAFFIRMEDФ Ф ааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ„xЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааУ УСС ааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааJOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, ааФ ФJudge ааб# xф2МP  P#бУ УŒа ААe аб#ђJф2МP ђP#ба Шђ аб# xф2МP  P#бааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааOPINION ааг ‚X гб#XZф2МP XP#бФ ФааThe defendant, Walter Lee Allen, appeals from a guilty verdict returned by a Jefferson County jury for robbery, a Class C felony. УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ13Љ401. The defendant was sentenced to the Department of Correction for ten years as a Range II Multiple Offender, consecutive to a sentence imposed in Hamblen County. The defendant contends in this appeal that:вŒ 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.џџAutoList2Œвййлa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И Тлла 4„Œ м аааааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!(#T$€%Ќ&џџџџџџџџџџџџџџАџџааа Œ мŒ м аHis actions do not constitute Р РviolenceРР as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated РР 39Љ13Љ402 л#a1AutoList2#л лл лa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И Тллand therefore there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the offense alleged in the indictment.л#a1AutoList2#л лла Œ мz м а лa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И Тлла z мŒ м аThe prosecutor was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct in his closing argument, and therefore the trial court should have granted a mistrial.л#a1AutoList2#л лл лa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И ТллThe trial court improperly confused the jury by charging all portions of the Criminal Responsibility Statute.л#a1AutoList2#л лл лa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И ТллThe trial court erred in its failure to charge the jury concerning facilitation of a felony.л#a1AutoList2#л лл лa1AutoList2ли€иТИ И И ТллThe trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by failing to consider two mitigating factors and by imposing service consecutive to his Hamblen County sentence.л#a1AutoList2#л лл ааг ‚X гааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааа Œ мz м аа z м™ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ‘щA ™ ёIЁљQЉYБ!ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАA ааб#Šaф2МPŠP#блblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба ™ мИ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла И м` „ аа ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааAfter careful review of the record and the applicable law, we AFFIRM the judgment from the trial court.лblockл а 4„A „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ‘щA ™ ёIЁљQЉYБ!ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАA ааааб#Šaф2МPŠP#бб блла A „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4аа аалblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллааа ` „4„ аааааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааУ УFACTSФ Флblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#Šaф2МPŠP#бб бллаалblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллг ‚X га ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааThe facts in this case are not in dispute. Kathy Shoun was employed at the FastЉStop Market, a gas station and food market, in White Pine. She was working the second shift by herself when a man entered the store and spoke to her. He asked her if she was alone. The man then pulled a gun out of his shorts, pointed it at her, and demanded that she give him the money. As she was handing over the money, the appellant, the accomplice of the gunman, walked to the store and stood silently in the doorway. The entry of the appellant did not phase the gunman. The gunman did not look back nor did he act scared а АА аеNа аа 4„4„ аггггааб#єAє\  PєP#бУ Уааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааФ ФаШа а 4„АА аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџААааааNеа АА аor surprised that someone else had entered the store standing in the only exit. The store building was so small that while the gunman was standing in front of the counter, the appellant had no choice but to stand in the doorway. лblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#Šaф2МPŠP#бб блллblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалллblockл а ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#Šaф2МPŠP#бб бллССб#XZф2МPXP#бThe appellant stood in the doorway silent, while the victim gave the gunman money from the cash register, while the gunman told the victim to give him her purse, while the gunman reached over the counter, grabbed the deposit bag, looked in it and saw that it was empty, while the victim explained to the gunman that she could not open the safe and while the gunman ordered the victim to move out from behind the counter and go to the corner of the store. This entire time the gunman was displaying a gun in plain view of the victim and the appellant. The gunman and the appellant fled from the store together. At trial, Ms. Shoun identified Mr. Haney as the gunman and Mr. Allen, the appellant, as the accomplice. Ms. Shoun testified that Mr. Allen never said a word to her, never threatened her in any way, and never touched her. Mr. Allen wore sunglasses during the robbery. The appellantРРs defense was mistaken identity. ааУ УааANALYSISФ Ф У УInsufficient Evidence and Fatal VarianceФ ФУУУУФФФФ ааааг ‚X гааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааб#X`ЗopQX#бThe defendant contends that a material variance exists between the allegations in the indictment and the evidence proven at trial: The indictment alleges aggravated robbery УУby violenceФФ, but the proof showed only robbery УУby fearФФ. Similarly, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove robbery by violence. The state contends that the codefendantРРs actions, for which the defendant is responsible, of pointing the gun, cocking the gun, and demanding cash from the cashier can be construed as violence. Thus, it argues that the evidence is sufficient.Œг ‚X г™г ‚X гRobbery is defined as the Р Рintentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.РР УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ13Љ401. Violence and putting a person in fear are alternative means of committing the offense of robbery. УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ13Љ402(a)(1). г ‚X г г ‚X гThe indictment in the present case alleges that the defendant: а 4„Œ м аааdid unlawfully, feloniously, intentionally and knowingly obtain property, to wit: U.S. monies, food stamps, and personal property from the person of Kathy Shoun, УУby violenceФФ and accomplished with a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun, with the intent to deprive said Kathy Shoun of the property and without her effective consent in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ13Љ402. г ‚X г а Œ м4„ ааа(emphasis added). The defendant argues that because the proof showed only that the victim was placed in fear, not that the robbery was committed by violence, the evidence is insufficient and a fatal variance exists in the indictment. г ‚X г г ‚X гOur determination of this issue hinges upon the definition of violence and a determination of whether the defendantРРs actions constitute violence. Violence is not defined in our criminal code. However, the state argues that a panel of this Court has previously addressed this issue and determined that violence is synonymous with force. УУSeeФФ УУState v. Tony FitzФФ, No. 02C01Љ9712ЉCCЉ00486, Tipton County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Oct. 19, 1998, at Jackson), УУapp.ФФ УУgrantedФФ, (Tenn. Apr. 5, 1999). Thus, because the defendantРРs actions amounted to force, they necessarily amounted to violence. Force is defined in our code as Р Рcompulsion by the use of physical power or violence. . . .РР УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ11Љ106(a)(12). г ‚X г г ‚X гIn УУFitzФФ, the defendant was indicted and convicted of robbery by violence. The proof at trial showed that the defendant entered a convenience store and when the cashier opened the register drawer, he pushed the cashier with both hands in the shoulders, hitting the cashier hard enough to knock the cashier back into the wall. УУSeeФФ УУFitzФФ, No. 02C01Љ9712ЉCCЉ00486.УУФФ On appeal, the defendant contended that the state failed to prove the element of violence. He argued that although his actions amounted to force, violence requires something more than force. г ‚X г г ‚X гA panel of this Court rejected the defendantРРs contention, concluding that a showing of physical force is sufficient to establish the element of violence. The court determined that the terms Р РforceРР and Р РviolenceРР may be used synonymously such that violence is shown by a defendantРРs exertion of Р Рsome type of УУphysicalФФ УУforceФФ upon the victim.РР УУSeeФФ УУFitzФФ, No. 02C01Љ9712ЉCCЉ00486УУФФ (emphasis original). г ‚X г г ‚X гThe state asks this Court to follow the УУFitzФФ courtРРs holding that violence is synonymous with force and to conclude that because force was displayed in the present case, violence was proven. The flaw in the stateРРs argument, however, is that the УУFitzФФ court specifically required a showing of УУphysicalФФ УУforceФФ which is absent in the present case. Thus, the УУFitzФФ decision is not persuasive. г ‚X г г ‚X гBefore the enactment of the present statute, robbery was historically defined in Tennessee as the Р Рfelonious and forcible taking from the person of another, goods or money of any value, by violence, or putting the person in fear.РР УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ3901 (1956); УУHammond v. StateФФ, 43 Tenn. 129, 133 (Tenn. 1866). Essentially, violence and fear were two alternative means of showing force, with violence being distinguished from fear by the proof of some overt, physical act. Thus, if one proved violence, one necessarily proved one of the methods of force. However, the inverse is not true. That is to say, proof of force did not necessarily mean proof of violence ЉЉ it could simply mean proof of в Ш0УУФФУУФФШ0УУФФУУФФ ва АА аfear. In УУHammondФФ, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Р Р[r]obbery is a species of larceny, involving the same elements and turpitude, aggravated by taking from the person, by УУopenФФ УУviolenceФФ, or putting the person in fear.РР УУId.ФФ at 134 (emphasis added). Similarly, in УУJames v. StateФФ, the Supreme Court determined that robbery by violence is tantamount to battery, whereas robbery by fear is tantamount to assault. УУSeeФФ УУФФ385 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tenn. 1964). г ‚X г г ‚X гAlthough the foregoing cases were construed under our stateРРs earlier robbery statutes, the current statute maintains the distinction between robbery by violence and robbery by fear. Thus, analysis under previous case law is instructive and relevant. УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 39Љ11Љ104 (Р РThe provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common law interpretations, to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal code.РР). We also note that the criminal code interpretations include references to prior law. г ‚X г г ‚X гThe earlier cases and our previous robbery statutes demonstrate that proof of violence has historically required a showing of some physical contact and that this requirement distinguishes robbery by violence from robbery by fear. We believe that, likewise, our current robbery statute requires a physical act against a person to establish violence. Thus, we agree with УУFitzФФ to the extent that it holds that a showing of physical force is sufficient to prove violence under the robbery statute. We also note that this is consistent with our current statutory definition of force, which no longer encompasses fear but is instead defined in terms of physical violence. г ‚X г г ‚X гIn the present case, there has been no showing of physical force toward the victim. Thus, there has been no showing of violence, and we agree with the defendant that the evidence is insufficient to prove robbery by violence. The evidence is sufficient, however, to prove robbery by fear, and we must now address whether a fatal variance exists between the indictment and the proof in this case such that the defendantРРs conviction cannot stand. г ‚X г г ‚X гOur Supreme Court has relaxed the common law rule requiring strict conformity between the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial. In УУState v. MossФФ, 662 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1984), the court held as follows: а 4„Œ м аааUnless substantial rights of the defendant are affected by a variance, he has suffered no harm, and a variance does not prejudice the defendantРРs substantial rights (1) if the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the charges against him so that he may prepare his defense and not be misled or surprised at trial, and (2) if the variance is not such that it will present a danger that the defendant may be prosecuted a second time for the same offense; all other variances must be considered to be harmless error. г ‚X га Œ м4„ ааа г ‚X гIn the present case, there has been no showing that substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced. The indictment sufficiently informed the defendant that he was charged with aggravated robbery. Although the indictment stated that the means of robbery was by violence, and the proof showed that it was by fear, the defendant has not established that the variance hampered his defense or that he was surprised at trial. In fact, a review of the record shows that the defendantРРs primary defense was identity. In addition, we conclude that the variance in this case does not put the defendant in jeopardy of being prosecuted a second time for the same offense. Under these facts, we conclude that the variance in this case is not fatal and that the evidence sufficiently establishes the offense of robbery by putting a person in fear. б#XZф2МPXP#б г ‚X г г ‚X г г ‚X гŒа ААА аУУааааФФУ УProsecutorial MisconductФ Ф ааааг ‚X глblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллг ‚X га ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааNext, the defendant contends that the prosecution committed prosecutorial misconduct in his closing argument and that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial in response to this prosecutorial misconduct. In relevant part, the District Attorney General stated during his closing argument before the jury:б#Šaф2МPŠP#бааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4аалblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МPXP#бб бг ‚X глллblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` „Œ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАŒ ааааThey have impressed upon you how important this trial is. It certainly is important; itРРs important to both these defendants, but itРРs important to the victim in this case as well. It is important to every citizen in Jefferson County because there is no difference in any of you, or anybody else in the county, than this lady sitting right here, who is the victim in that robbery. No differences, except fate cast her in that place at that time when [the coЉdefendant] pulled that gun and stuck it in her face. лblockл а Œ мŒ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МPXP#бб бг ‚X глла Œ мф м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ АŒ аа лblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP XP#бб ба ф мИ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла И м` „ аг ‚X га ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааIn response, the defendant stated, Р Рwe would object to the Attorney General placing the jurors in the position of the victim.РР The court then instructed the jury, Р Р[y]ou all will not look at it in that fashion.РР лblockл а 4„Œ „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ АŒ ааааб#XZф2МP!XP#бб бг ‚X глла Œ „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4аа лblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP"XP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааССOur Supreme Court has recognized that closing argument is a valuable ааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааprivilege for both the state and the defense and has allowed wide latitude to ааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааcounselmen arguing their cases to the jury. УУSeeФФ УУState v. BybeeФФ, 885 S.W.2d ааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4аа797, 807 (Tenn. 1994). Nonetheless, closing argument is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and must be temperate, predicated on evidence introduced during the trial, and relevant to the issues being tried. УУSeeФФ УУState v. ФФ УУKeenФФ, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn. 1994). In determining whether a closing argument entitles a defendant to a new trial, an appellate court must find that the statements were improper and that they prejudiced the verdict. УУSeeФФ УУState v. SuttonФФ, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978). Our Supreme Court in УУState v. CauthernФФ, 967 S.W.2d 726, 737 (Tenn. 1998), set out five factors for examining possible prejudice:лblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МP#XP#бб бллг ‚дў га 4„И м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАИ аааа1. ТИ И И ТThe conduct complained of, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; ааŒлblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP$XP#бб ба И м` м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллг ‚дў га ` мИ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАИ аааа2. ТИ И И ТThe curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution;лblockл а И мИ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАИ ааааб#XZф2МP%XP#бб бг ‚дў глллblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP&XP#бб ба И м` м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллг ‚дў гаалblockл а ` мИ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАИ ааааб#XZф2МP'XP#бб бг ‚дў глла И мŒ м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ,X„Ам4` Œ И ф <h”РьDpœШє LxЄа ќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАŒ аа3. ТИ И И ТThe intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement; ааТИ И И ТС€Œ Œ С4. The cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; andаа 5. The relative strength or weakness of the case. а Œ м4м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА4аалblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP(XP#бб ба 4м` м аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` м4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4аалblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџА4ааааб#XZф2МP)XP#бб бллв Ш0УУФФУУФФШ0УУФФУУФФ влblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP*XP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллг ‚X га ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааAfter reviewing the remarks of the District Attorney General in their appropriate context, we conclude that the statements were not intended to ask the jury to place itself in the place of the victim, but rather were directed at emphasizing the random nature of the crime, a crime in which the defendants did not care whom they victimized. The defendantРРs characterization of this statement as Р РerrorРР is therefore inaccurate.жвџџа аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#€%и'0*ˆ,р.813ш5@8˜:№XP#бб бг ‚X глл лblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МP?XP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` „4„ аг ‚X гWe further conclude that facilitation of robbery is a lesser included offense of criminal responsibility for robbery under part (a) and (c) of the newly adopted УУBurnsФФ definition. лblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџT$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МP@XP#бб бг ‚X глл лblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPAXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` „4„ аг ‚X гHowever, we conclude in the instant case, that the lesser included offense of facilitation of robbery should not have been charged because the evidence did not justify the charge of robbery. When we view the evidence pursuant to the two step analysis set forth in УУBurnsФФ we conclude that this defendant was entitled to a jury charge on criminal responsibility for aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery and nothing more. Therefore, the trial courtРРs failure to charge facilitation of robbery is not error because the proof did not justify such a charge.лblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџT$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МPBXP#бб бг ‚X глл лblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPCXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` ааааллССлblockл а ` „4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџT$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МPDXP#бб бг ‚X гллааааУ УSentencingФ Ф аааалblockлг ‚дў гб#XZф2МPEXP#бб ба 4„` „ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А` аааалла ` „4„ аг ‚X гFinally, the defendant alleges two sentencing errors. First, he argues that the trial court improperly failed to find and apply two mitigating factors. Second, he argues that the trial court improperly imposed service of his tenЉyear sentence consecutive to a sentence from Hamblen County.лblockл а 4„4„ аааџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџT$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ А4ааааб#XZф2МPFXP#бб бг ‚X глл г ‚X гWe review a criminal sentence de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness. УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. 40Љ35Љ401(d); УУState v. SheltonФФ, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). This presumption applies if the record affirmatively shows that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant factors and circumstances. УУSeeФФ УУState v. AshbyФФ, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Where the record indicates that the proper factors were considered, we will accept the trial courtРРs decision even if we would have preferred a different result. УУSeeФФ УУState v. FletcherФФ, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Furthermore, the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is improper. УУSeeФФ УУState v. JohnsonФФ, 909 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). г ‚X г г ‚X гWe conclude that the defendant has failed to meet his burden and demonstrate that the trial court erred. The trial court conducted a full sentencing hearing and heard all enhancing and mitigating factors offered by the parties. The court then found several enhancing factors, supported by the record, and specifically rejected the mitigating factors: (1) That the defendantРРs criminal conduct neither caused not threatened serious bodily injury; and (4) that the defendant played a minor role in the commission of the offense. УУSeeФФ Tenn. Code Ann. РР 40Љ35Љ113. The trial court emphasized the fact that this robbery was, in fact, committed with a gun and therefore posed a serious risk of harm and noted that while the defendant did not personally wield the weapon during the robbery, his role cannot properly be described as minor. Accordingly, the trial court gave no weight to these mitigating factors, and we find no reason to disturb that decision. УУSeeФФ УУSheltonФФ, 854 S.W.2d at 123. г ‚X г г ‚X гNext, we reject the defendantРРs complaint of improper consecutive sentencing. The defendantРРs Hamblen County sentence was obtained and imposed prior to the instant conviction and sentence. Therefore, imposition of consecutive service was proper. УУSeeФФ УУState v. BigbeeФФ, 885 S.W.2d 797, 817 (Tenn. 1994). We note that Allen is a proper candidate for consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated РР 40Љ35Љ115(b)(1), as the trial court found him to be a Р Рprofessional criminal.РР Accordingly, we do not disturb his sentence. г ‚X гУ Уаа CONCLUSIONФ Фааг ‚X гAccordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment from the trial court. г ‚X г г ‚X гСJT$T$MСƒ г ‚X гаа _____________________________ г ‚X г JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge аа CONCUR:Œаа _______________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge _______________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, Judgeг ‚X гаа