ÿWPCó4 … %Vw@\ 0 ÜœU:x 4² Æ Õ 0 Ý 0Dý 0JA 0T‹ 0^ß 0h= 0r¥ 0| 0†“ 0 1u©U , 0dJ B®U,ËU*÷B)! D3JDC} AMÀ 0@ ÇM7ØKs#‘–ø'Ù ºø"c²%è(v~ý+vÓ{- AON3Æ3 0Dc4 D/§4 BÖ4X ED E  [  [Ó€(´`$¡¡Ñ°ÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€‰GXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularÔe{ x£3|x(Ð(3pÿ$¤¤Ý ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ ‰XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""'ÿÿdxd))))7Border 1dd€-+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò ½Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ! ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òMarch€28,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAp…pellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó -Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóWe€note€that€the€fact€that€a€death€occurred€is€not€relevant€in€determiningÏthe€burden€of€proof.Ì ÎÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€the€proof€demonstrates€that€a€presentence€report€wasÏprepared,€it€was€not€included€in€the€record€for€our€review.Ì iÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóMere€proof€of€the€victim's€age€is€not€sufficient€to€establish€vulnerability.€ÏòòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Hayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€175,€185€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).Ì ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIt€appears€that,€in€arguing€this€position,€the€appellant€assumes€that€theÏapplication€of€the€"vulnerability€of€the€victim"€enhancement€factor€wasÏerroneously€applied€by€the€trial€court.Ì îÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝConsideration€of€the€defendant's€truthfulness€is€appropriate€inÏsentencing€matters.€€A€defendant's€candor€is€probative€of€his/her€amenability€toÏrehabilitation.€€òòSeeóó€€òòUnited€States€v.€Graysonóó,€438€U.S.€41,€50,€98€S.Ct.€2610,Ï2616€(1978);€€òòState€v.€Poeóó,€614€S.W.2d€403,€404€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981);€òòStateÏv.€Wilsonóó,€No.€03C01„9312„CR„00408€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€Mar.€6,Ï1995).Ì ÏÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóEven€though€probation€must€be€automatically€considered€as€aÏsentencing€option€for€eligible€defendants,€the€defendant€is€not€automaticallyÏentitled€to€probation€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Sentencing€Commission€Comments,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303€(1994€Supp.).Ì °Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThis€provision€provides€that€"nothing€in€this€chapter€shall€be€construedÏas€altering€any€provision€of€present€statutory€or€case€law€requiring€that€theÏburden€of€establishing€suitability€for€probation€rests€with€the€defendant."Ì YÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀJ—XXdìXXdì7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAs€the€trial€judge€stated,€"€If€we€can't€be€safe€in€our€homes€and€on€ourÏproperty€from€the€effects€of€drunk€driving,€we€are€in€sad€shape."€Ì ÞÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÿXXdðXXdð7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAt€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€State€presented€evidence€to€illustrate€theÏneed€for€a€deterrence€to€alcohol€related€offenses.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Bonestelóó,€871ÏS.W.2d€163,€169€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€Specifically,€the€State€introduced€theÏfollowing€as€exhibits:€òòTennessee€Motor€Vehicle€Traffic€Accident€Facts€„€1988€„1992óó,€òòKnox€County„Statistics€from€General€Sessions€Court€„€Criminal€Division€„Ï1992óó,€and€òòKnox€County€„Statistics€from€General€Sessions€Court€„€CriminalÏDivision€„€Year€End€Report€„€1993óó.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€''X„d&ÓÑ#€''Xd#ÑÔ€(ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýò ò›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OFÏCRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€€ÙœßL€,.+;+'h|` | `€€Lß›à@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌà@ àOCTOBER€SESSION,Ï1995Ìó óÌÌÌÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEó ó,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9501„CR„00021Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àKNOXÏCOUNTYÌvs.à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.ÏRichard€Baumgartner,€JudgeÌò òKAREN€SUE€BOGGSó ó,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à(VehicularÏHomicide)Ìà àAppellantà àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌMark€E.€Stephensà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌPaula€R.€VossÌTimothy€McLaughlinà àÌAsst.€Public€Defendersà àà àà àHunt€S.€BrownÌ1209€Euclid€Avenueà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€œGeneralÌKnoxville,€TN€37921›à àà àà àœCriminal›€Justice€DivisionÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àRandall€Eugene€NicholsÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€W.€GillÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJerry€Cunningham,€Special€ProsecutorÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCity„County€BuildingÌœà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TN€37902›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌò òDavid€G.€Hayesó óÌJudgeÇÓÓà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌà àThe€appellant,€Karen€Sue€Boggs,€pled€guilty€to€one€count€of€vehicularÏhomicide€as€the€proximate€result€of€intoxication€in€the€Criminal€Court€of€KnoxÏCounty.€€Following€a€sentencing€hearing,€the€trial€court€imposed€a€six€yearÏsentence€of€split€confinement,€with€one€year€of€confinement€followed€by€fiveÏyears€of€supervised€probation.€€The€appellant€appeals€the€sentence€presentingÏthree€issues€for€our€review.€€First,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€judgeÏerred€by€not€recusing€himself€from€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€appellant's€case.€ÏSecond,€the€appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€the€appellantÏa€sentence€of€total€probation.€€Finally,€the€appellant€contends€that€her€sentenceÏis€excessive€because:€(1)€there€was€insufficient€proof€to€support€the€use€of€theÏvictim's€vulnerability€as€an€enhancement€factor;€(2)€the€trial€court€gaveÏexcessive€weight€to€the€appellant's€prior€criminal€record;€(3)€the€sentence€doesÏnot€reflect€the€presence€of€mitigation€factors€found€by€the€trial€court;€and€(4)€theÏsentence€does€not€conform€to€the€sentencing€considerations€set€forth€in€theÏCriminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.ÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òI.€€Factual€Backgroundóóó óÌÌà àEvidence€at€the€sentencing€hearing€revealed€the€following€facts€leadingÏto€the€ultimate€death€of€the€victim€in€this€case,€Katie€Spangler.€€Shortly€afterÏawakening€on€December€3,1993,€the€appellant€began€arguing€with€her€live„inÏboyfriend.€€Apparently,€this€argument€continued€throughout€the€course€of€theÏday.€€The€appellant€testified€that,€after€their€first€argument,€her€boyfriend€left€inÏher€car,€and€she€consumed€two€beers.€€Around€3:00€p.m.€that€afternoon,€theÏappellant€walked€to€a€nearby€tavern.€€Before€she€reached€the€bar,€her€boyfriendÏapproached€her,€and,€again,€they€argued.€€After€a€struggle,€her€boyfriend€left€inÏher€car,€and€she€entered€the€bar.€€Once€inside€the€bar,€the€appellant€drankÏanother€three€or€four€beers€and€had€something€to€eat.€€While€the€appellant€wasÏat€the€bar,€her€boyfriend€returned,€threw€her€car€keys€at€her,€and€left.€€BetweenÏ5:00€and€5:30€p.m.,€the€appellant€finished€her€beer,€left€the€bar,€and€attemptedÏto€drive€to€the€home€of€a€cousin.€€Her€cousin's€residence€is€located€on€SimpsonÏRoad,€approximately€three„quarters€of€a€mile€from€the€bar.€€While€entering€aÏcurve€on€Simpson€Road,€the€appellant€lost€control€of€her€car€just€beforeÏreaching€the€Spangler€residence.€€Deputy€Charles€Lassiter,€an€accidentÏreconstruction€expert€with€the€Knox€County€Sheriff's€Department,€testified€that:€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓ` X°‚,` ™XÓÓÓ[The€car]€crossed€three€different€yards.€.€.€went€through€aÏhedge.€.€.sideswiped€a€tree,€went€under€a€guide€wire,Ïthrough€another€hedgerow,€knocked€down€a€small€tree.€.€.Ïcrossed€[another]€lawn€and€it€was€during€this€travelingÏacross€this€lawn€that€the€victim€was€struck€and€killed.€€TheÏvehicle€impacted€a€bird€bath,€continued€on,€crossed€a€yard,Ïwent€across€Allen€Road€into€the€third€yard,€went€a€fairÏdistance€through€that€yard€before€it€finally€impacted€andÍcame€to€rest€against€a€large€tree.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓ ` °œXÓÓÓÌà àThe€appellant€remained€at€the€scene€until€the€police€arrived€and€admittedÏto€being€the€driver€of€the€car.€€However,€because€she€had€been€injured€as€aÏresult€of€the€incident,€no€further€questioning€occurred€and€she€was€taken€to€theÏhospital€for€treatment.€€At€the€hospital,€a€blood€sample€from€the€appellant€wasÏdrawn€and€she€was€treated€for€multiple€lacerations.€€At€the€sentencing€hearing,Ïher€medical€records€were€admitted€as€evidence€and€showed€a€blood€serumÏalcohol€level€of€.235.€€The€trial€court€found€this€level€equivalent€to€a€bloodÏalcohol€level€of€.16€to€.20€percent€and,€therefore,€found€that€the€appellant€wasÏintoxicated€at€the€time€of€the€offense.ÌÌÌà àThe€victim's€daughter,€Linda€Spangler,€testified€that€she€was€at€herÏmother's€home€on€the€day€of€the€offense.€€She€stated€that€her€mother,€a€sixty„seven€year€old€retiree,€suffered€from€diabetes,€problems€with€her€knees,€and€aÏtotal€loss€of€hearing€in€her€right€ear.€€This€hearing€impairment€prevented€theÏvictim€from€hearing€sounds€behind€her.ÌÌà àMs.€Spangler€testified€that€on€the€day€of€the€offense,€her€mother€wasÏoutside€working€on€Christmas€lights.€€Ms.€Spangler€heard€a€loud€noise€andÍwent€outside€to€investigate.€€She€saw€her€mother€lying€in€the€yard€with€"herÏclothes€exploded€from€her€body."€€Spangler€admitted€that€at€first€she€thought€herÏmother€had€been€electrocuted€and€called€911.€€However,€shortly€thereafter,€sheÏlearned€from€a€neighbor€that€her€mother€had€been€hit€by€a€car.ÌÌà àAccording€to€Ms.€Spangler,€the€appellant€approached€the€spot€where€theÏvictim€lay€and€asked,€"Is€she€dead?"€€Ms.€Spangler€stated€that€"[A]t€that€point€inÏtime,€it€seemed€to€me€that€her€concern€was€not€so€much€that€a€person€had€beenÏkilled,€but€that€there€could€be€consequences€she€might€suffer€because€of€it."ÌÌà àOn€behalf€of€the€appellant,€a€probation€officer€testified€that,€in€December,Ï1988,€the€state€of€South€Carolina€placed€the€appellant€on€probation€for€a€term€ofÏfive€years€following€a€felony€conviction€for€€possession€of€marijuana€for€œresale.›€ÏIn€July,€1990,€her€probation€was€transferred€to€Tennessee,€and€on€April€12,Ïœ1991,€after€only€two€years,€she›€was€discharged€from€œprobation›€based€upon€herÏexemplary€conduct.€€ÌÌà àThe€appellant's€family€testified€with€respect€to€the€character€of€theÏappellant,€the€effect€this€incident€had€on€her€life,€and€the€support€they€wouldÏprovide€to€the€appellant€if€she€were€released€on€probation.€€A€former€employerÏtestified€that€the€appellant€was€a€good€worker€and€was€not€known€to€consumeÏalcohol.€€A€counselor€with€Baptist€Hospital€testified€that€the€appellant€completedÍan€in„patient€drug€and€alcohol€abuse€program€at€the€hospital€on€August€24,Ï1994.€€The€counselor€observed€that€the€appellant€seemed€highly€motivated€toÏremain€sober.€€ÌÌà àThe€appellant€testified€that€she€was€forty€years€old.€€She€stated€that,€priorÏto€the€offense,€she€was€employed€at€Shoney's,€however,€since€that€time,€sheÏwas€released€from€her€position€due€to€the€charges€filed€against€her.€€Since€herÏtermination€at€Shoney's,€the€appellant€has€maintained€employment€at€BurgerÏKing.€€ÌÌà àAdditionally,€the€appellant€admitted€that€she€is€an€alcoholic,€and€she€isÏnow€receiving€out„patient€treatment€at€Baptist€hospital€and€attending€AlcoholicsÏAnonymous€meetings.€The€appellant€confessed€that,€prior€to€this€offense,€sheÏwould€normally€purchase€a€six€or€twelve„pack€of€beer€every€day.€€She€statedÏthat€she€continued€to€drink€for€four€to€five€months€after€this€offense€because€sheÏ"could€not€deal€with€it."€€She€indicated,€through€her€testimony,€that€she€would€doÏwhatever€was€necessary€to€make€sure€nothing€like€this€ever€happens€again.€ÏShe€also€expressed€her€remorse€for€the€death€of€Katie€Spangler,€and€admittedÏto€her€intoxication€and€excessive€use€of€alcohol€on€the€day€of€the€offense.ÌÌÌà àWhen€questioned€about€her€prior€felony€conviction€for€marijuana€and€aÍshoplifting€charge€in€South€Carolina,€the€appellant€did€not€contest€her€guilt€butÏmaintained€that€she€was€a€victim€of€circumstance€who€"was€at€the€wrong€placeÏat€the€wrong€time."€€She€added€that€she€entered€a€guilty€plea€to€the€marijuanaÏcharge€and€received€five€years€probation.€€The€appellant€stated€that,€while€onÏprobation€for€the€marijuana€charge,€€she€completed€a€drug€and€alcohol€programÏand€remained€sober€until€her€return€to€Tennessee€in€1990.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€stated€that€she€has€continued€the€relationship€with€herÏboyfriend€of€two€years.€€She€testified€that€her€boyfriend€is€an€alcoholic€and,Ïdespite€her€efforts€to€remain€sober,€he€continues€to€drink€in€front€of€her.€ÏMoreover,€she€admitted€that,€even€after€this€offense,€she€has€gone€with€herÏboyfriend€to€purchase€alcohol€and€has€accompanied€him€to€bars€on€severalÏoccasions.€€She€resided€with€her€boyfriend€at€the€time€of€the€hearing€althoughÏshe€stated€that€she€was€trying€to€get€into€a€half„way€house.€ÌÌà àAfter€reviewing€the€evidence€presented€at€the€sentencing€hearing,€theÏtrial€court€sentenced€the€appellant€to€six€years€as€a€range€I€offender€of€a€class€CÏfelony.€€The€court€ordered€that€the€appellant€serve€this€sentence€in€a€term€of€splitÏconfinement.€€The€appellant€was€ordered€to€serve€one€year€of€incarceration€withÏthe€remaining€five€years€to€be€served€on€intensive€probation.€ÌÌà@ àòòò òII.€€Recusal€of€Trial€Judgeóóó óÌÌà à€The€appellant€argues€that€the€trial€judge's€comments€at€the€guilty€pleaÏhearing€indicate€that,€prior€to€hearing€the€evidence€at€the€sentencing€hearing,Ïthe€judge€determined€that€a€sentence€of€incarceration€would€be€appropriateÏgiven€the€nature€of€the€crime€(vehicular€œhomicide).›€ÌÌà àOn€July€19,€1994,€the€appellant€entered€a€plea€of€guilty€to€one€count€ofÏvehicular€homicide€without€the€benefit€of€a€plea€agreement.€€During€the€guiltyÏplea€hearing,€the€trial€judge€stated:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àI€will€be€very€candid€with€you,€Ms.€Boggs,€and€that€is,Ïin€vehicular€homicide€cases€„€„€in€any€type€of€homicideÏcases,€even€in€the€class„C€classification€„€„€it€is€unusual€forÏthis€Court€to€grant€probation€in€those€cases.€€As€a,€matter€ofÏfact,€I€cannot€recall€a€case€I€have€handled€in€which€I€haveÏgiven€probation€in€that€type€of€case.Ìà àSo€I€want€to€be€up€front€and€candid€with€you€aboutÏthat€so€that€you€understand€that€you€are€likely€facing€a€termÏof€imprisonment€in€this€case;€do€you€understand€that?ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà àOn€August€16,€1994,€the€appellant€filed€a€motion€to€have€the€trial€judgeÏrecuse€himself€at€the€sentencing€phase€based€upon€his€comments€at€the€guiltyÏplea€hearing.€€In€support€of€this€motion,€the€appellant€argued€that€the€trial€judgeÏcould€not€be€fair€and€impartial€in€arriving€at€the€disposition€of€her€case.€€ÌÌà àOn€August€25,€1994,€the€trial€court€denied€the€appellant's€motion€forÍrecusal.€€In€doing€so,€the€trial€judge€stated€that,€because€the€appellant€did€notÏhave€a€prior€agreement€as€to€punishment,€he€felt€compelled€to€review€the€issuesÏof€probation€and€incarceration.€€With€respect€to€probation,€he€added€"that€aÏperson€convicted€of€a€crime€involving€the€loss€of€human€life€has€the€obligation€.€.Ï.€of€carrying€the€burden€of€proof€to€show€that€they€are€entitled€to€[probation].€.€.€."× ƒ/ ××  ×€ÏAdditionally,€the€trial€judge€stated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓ.€.€.€I€have€not€decided€what€is€going€to€be€the€finalÏdisposition€of€this€case.€€I€have€not€decided€what€theÏsentence€is€going€to€be.€€I€have€not€reached€[that]€point€inÏthe€decision„making€process.Ìà àWhen€I€discussed€with€you€.€.€.€the€likelihood€ofÏimprisonment,€I€wanted€you€to€understand€that,€because€ofÏthe€nature€and€extent€of€this€crime€and€the€circumstancesÏinvolving€it,€that€there€was€a€likelihood€that€you€would€serveÏsome€time€in€prison.€.€.€.Ìà àI€.€.€.€do€not€feel€that€I€have€prejudged€this€case€orÏmade€any€predetermination€of€the€disposition€of€this€case.€€IÏhave€now€the€benefit€of€a€pre„sentence€investigation€thatÏhas€come€in€this€week.€€I€have€the€benefit€of€someÏcorrespondence€in€this€case€from€people€on€both€sides€ofÏthe€issue,€and€I€intend€to€continue€in€this€case.€€I€decline€toÏrecuse€myself€in€this€matter.€.€.€.Ìà àSo€I€have€no€blanket€policy€in€these€cases.€€I€don'tÏintend€to€ever€have€a€blanket€policy.€€I€intend€to€approachÏevery€case€on€its€own€merits€and€address€the€issues€thatÏare€presented€by€that€particular€case.€.€.€.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌà àA€trial€judge€should€recuse€himself€whenever€he€has€any€doubt€as€to€hisÏability€to€preside€impartially€in€a€criminal€case,€or€whenever€he€believes€hisÍimpartiality€can€reasonably€be€questioned,€òòState€v.€Cashóó,€867€S.W.2d€741,€749Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòLackey€v.€Stateóó,€578€S.W.2d€101,€104€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1978).€€Moreover,€recusal€is€warranted€when€a€person€of€ordinaryÏprudence€in€the€judge's€position,€knowing€all€of€the€facts€known€to€the€judge,Ïwould€find€a€reasonable€basis€for€questioning€the€judge's€impartiality.€€òòAlley€v.ÏStateóó,€882€S.W.2d€810,€820€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Any€comments€made€byÏthe€trial€court€must€be€construed€in€the€context€of€all€the€facts€and€circumstancesÏto€determine€whether€a€reasonable€person€would€construe€those€remarks€asÏindicating€partiality€on€the€merits€of€the€case.€€òòIdóó.€at€822.€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àIn€the€instant€case,€the€trial€judge€indicated€that€he€fully€understood€theÏneed€for€impartiality€and€an€open€mind€before€entering€the€sentencing€phase€ofÏthe€proceedings.€€He€also€explained€that€his€comments€at€the€guilty€pleaÏhearing€were€made€to€ensure€that€the€appellant€was€voluntarily€entering€a€guiltyÏplea€with€the€understanding€that€incarceration€could€be€a€consequence€of€herÏplea.€€The€record€indicates€that€the€trial€judge€followed€the€proper€sentencingÏprocedure€and€applied€applicable€sentencing€principles€in€determining€theÏappellant's€punishment.€€The€matter€of€recusal€is€left€to€the€sound€discretion€ofÏthe€trial€court€and€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€unless€clear€abuse€appears€onÏthe€face€of€the€record.€€€òòCashóó,€867€S.W.2d€at€749;€òòCaruthers€v.€Stateóó,€814ÏS.W.2d€64,€67€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Furthermore,€the€issue€to€beÏdetermined€is€not€the€propriety€of€the€judicial€conduct€of€the€trial€judge,€butÍwhether€he€committed€an€error€which€resulted€in€an€unjust€disposition€of€theÏcase.€€òòState€v.€Hurleyóó,€876€S.W.2d€57,€64€(Tenn.€1993).€€In€the€present€case,€weÏcannot€conclude€that€the€trial€judge€abused€his€discretion,€and€we€laterÏœconclude€that›€the€trial€court€did€not€commit€error€in€sentencing€the€appellant.€ÏThus,€the€appellant's€contention€is€without€merit.€€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òIII.€€Sentencingóóó óÌÌà àReview,€by€this€court,€of€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€aÏsentence€is€òòde€novoóó€with€a€presumption€that€the€determination€made€by€the€trialÏcourt€is€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)(1990).€€This€presumption€onlyÏapplies,€however,€if€the€record€demonstrates€that€the€trial€court€properlyÏconsidered€relevant€sentencing€principles.€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,Ï169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€case€before€us,€the€trial€court€correctly€appliedÏsentencing€principles,€thus,€the€presumption€applies.€€ÌÌÌà àIn€making€our€review,€this€court€must€consider€the€evidence€heard€at€trialÏand€at€sentencing,€the€presentence€report,× ƒ0 ××  ×€the€arguments€of€counsel,€theÍnature€and€characteristics€of€the€offense,€any€mitigating€and€enhancementÏfactors,€the€defendant's€statements,€and€the€defendant's€potential€forÏrehabilitation.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„35„102,€„103(5),€„210(b)€(1990);€òòsee€alsoóó€ÏòòState€v.€Byrdóó,€861€S.W.2d€377,€379€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993)€(citing€òòAshbyóó,€923ÏS.W.2d€at€168).€€The€burden€is€on€the€appellant€to€show€that€the€sentenceÏimposed€was€improper.€€Sentencing€Commission€Comments,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€40„35„401(d).€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòA.€€Enhancement€and€Mitigating€FactorsóóÌÌà àó óThe€trial€court€found€that€two€enhancement€factors€and€one€mitigatingÏfactor€are€present€and€imposed€the€maximum€six€year€sentence.€€Specifically,Ïthe€trial€court€found€that€"the€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminalÏconvictions€or€criminal€œbehavior,ðð›€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(1)€(1994ÏœSupp);›€and€that€"a€victim€of€the€offense€was€particularly€vulnerable€because€ofÏage€or€physical€or€mental€œdisability,ðð›€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(4)(1994ÏœSupp.).›€€Although€the€court€found€that€no€enumerated€statutory€mitigating€factorsÏwere€present,€the€court€applied€two€non„enumerated€€mitigators:€the€appellant'sÏremorsefulness€and€her€acceptance€of€responsibility€for€the€crime.€€€TheÏappellant€contends€that€"the€trial€court€erred€in€the€application€of€certainÏenhancement€factors€to€the€sentence€and€in€the€weight€accorded€them;€[theÏcourt]€failed€to€follow€the€statutory€scheme€for€applying€mitigation€andÍenhancement€factors;€and€[the€court]€failed€to€comply€with€the€sentencingÏrequirements€and€alternatives€set€forth€in€the€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989."ÌÌÌà@ àòòò ò1.€€Victim's€Vulnerability€óóó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€the€victim€was€especially€vulnerable€because€ofÏher€age€and€physical€condition.€€The€victim€was€sixty„seven€years€old,€had€anÏinjured€knee,€and€was€hearing€impaired.€€The€trial€judge€reasoned€that,€"hadÏMrs.€Spangler€had€all€her€capabilities€„„€had€full€hearing€capabilities,€had€fullÏmobility€abilities„„€that,€under€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€this€case,€sheÏwould€have€been€in€a€better€position€to€avoid€being€struck€by€this€vehicle."€€TheÏappellant€contends€that€this€factor€was€erroneously€applied€because€LindaÏSpangler,€the€victim's€daughter,€was€the€only€witness€to€testify€regarding€herÏmother's€physical€œÌÌÌcondition.›€€The€appellant€argues€that€medical€œproof›€is€necessary€to€corroborateÏthe€testimony€of€a€non„expert€regarding€an€individual's€vulnerability€due€toÏphysical€infirmities.€€Moreover,€the€appellant€insists€that€the€State€failed€to€showÏthat€the€victim's€physical€condition€had€any€bearing€on€the€outcome€of€theÏoffense.ÌÌÓ` °ž` šXÓà àWhen€applying€the€"vulnerability€of€the€victim"€as€an€enhancement€factor,Ï"the€relevant€inquiry€is€whether€the€victim€was€òòparticularly€vulnerableóó€becauseÏof€age€or€physical€or€mental€disability."€€òòState€v.€Adamsóó,€864€S.W.2d€31,€35Ï(Tenn.€1993)€(emphasis€in€original).€€A€victim€is€particularly€vulnerable€withinÏthe€meaning€of€this€enhancement€factor€when€the€victim€lacks€the€ability€to€resistÏthe€commission€of€the€crime€due€to€age,€a€physical€condition,€or€a€mentalÏcondition.€€òòState€v.€Butleróó,€900€S.W.2d€305,€313€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€InÏòòAdamsóó,€the€supreme€court€noted€that€"the€vulnerability€enhancement€relatesÏmore€to€the€natural€physical€and€mental€limitations€of€the€victim€than€merely€toÏthe€victim's€age."€× ƒ1 ××  ×€€òòAdamsóó,€864€S.W.2d€at€35.€€Additionally,€the€State€bears€theÏburden€of€proving€the€victim's€limitations€rendering€him€or€her€particularlyÏvulnerable.€€òòIdóó.€€In€the€present€case,€the€State€offered€proof€through€theÏtestimony€of€Linda€Spangler€as€to€the€victim's€age€and€to€her€physicalÏdisabilities.€The€Stateððs€proof€is€sufficient€to€establish€that€the€victim€wasÏ"particularly€vulnerable."̛̜Ìà àHowever,€the€appellant€questions€the€sufficiency€of€the€State's€proof€asÏMs.€Spangler's€testimony€was€not€corroborated€by€expert€medical€testimony.€ÍFrom€the€facts€presented,€we€conclude€that€the€State€sufficiently€established€theÏvictim's€vulnerability€through€Ms.€Spangler's€testimony.€€The€following€colloquyÏbetween€Ms.€Spangler€and€Jerry€Cunningham,€the€special€prosecutor,€occurredÏat€the€hearing:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒMR.€CUNNINGHAM:€€Describe€her€health€to€His€Honor,€please.ÌÌMS.€SPANGLER:€€She€suffered€from€diabetes€and€had€„€„€withinÏthe€last€year€or€two,€had€begun€giving€herself€insulin€shots.€€EarlierÏon€in€the€year,€she€had€knee€surgery€„€„€arthroscopic€surgery€onÏher€knee€„€„€and€the€physician€told€us€that€soon€she€would€have€toÏhave€a€total€knee€replacement.ÌÌMR.€CUNNINGHAM:€€Was€her€motion€limited€in€any€way?ÌÌMS.€SPANGLER:€€Yes,€sir,€to€a€certain€extent,€it€was.ÌÌMR.€CUNNINGHAM:€€All€right.€€Could€she€run?ÌÌMS.€SPANGLER:€€No.ÌÌMR.€CUNNINGHAM:€€What€about€her€hearing,€and€her€vision,€andÏthose€senses?ÌÌMS.€SPANGLER:€€Well,€she€œhad€had›€cataract€surgery,€but€she€sawÏvery€well€afterwards.€€But€the€hearing€in€her€right€ear,€she€couldn'tÏhear€if€her€back€was€to€you.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌMR.€CUNNINGHAM:€€All€right.€€You€mentioned€her€hearing.€€If€youÏcame€up€behind€her€and€spoke€to€her€or€a€car€approached€herÏfrom€behind,€could€she€hear€that?ÌÌMS.€€SPANGLER:€€No.Ì€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° Ò€ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà àTenn.€R.€Evid.€701€permits€the€use€of€lay€testimony€in€certain€situations.€ÏHowever,€in€order€to€have€any€probative€value,€the€lay€testimony€must€be€basedÏupon€factual€predicate€found€in€facts€admissible€in€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€€J.€HoustonÏGordon,€òòThe€Admissibility€of€Lay€and€Expert€Opinionsóó,€57€Tenn.€L.€R.€103Ï(1989)€(citing€òòSecurities€Inv.€Co,€v.€Whiteóó,€91€S.W.2d€581,€587€(Tenn.€1935)).€ÏUnder€Rule€701,€a€lay€witness'€opinion€is€only€admissible€when€the€followingÏconditions€are€met:€€(1)€there€is€no€special€knowledge,€skill,€experience€orÏtraining€required€for€the€opinion;€(2)€the€witness€cannot€easily€expressÏaccurately€what€he€or€she€saw€without€expressing€the€opinion;€and€(3)€theÏexpression€of€the€opinion€will€not€prejudicially€mislead€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòIdóó.€atÏ104.€€Thus,€the€admissibility€of€a€lay€witness'€testimony€rests€on€whether€theÏfacts€in€issue€are€within€the€range€of€knowledge€or€understanding€of€ordinaryÏlaymen.€€òòIdóó.€at€106€(citations€omitted).€€Likewise,€expert€testimony€is€onlyÏnecessary€when€the€average€person€would€not€be€knowledgeable€on€theÏsubject€matter€at€issue.€€òòIdóó.€€at€106„107€(citing€òòKinley€v.€Tennessee€State€MutualÏInsurance€Companyóó,€620€S.W.2d€79€(Tenn.€1981)).€€In€the€case€before€us,€Ms.ÏSpangler€had€the€requisite€knowledge€of€her€mother's€physical€condition.€€HerÏtestimony€was€based€upon€facts€and€her€own€perceptions.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.ÏMetcalfóó,€No.€331€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€June€14,€1991)€(holding€that€"itÏis€well€settled€that€a€witness€may€testify€as€to€what€he€perceived").€€Moreover,Ïbecause€the€ordinary€lay€person€would€know€that€another€person€wasÏphysically€impaired,€an€expert€witness€was€not€necessary.€€As€such,€weÍconclude€that€expert€testimony€was€not€necessary€to€corroborate€the€layÏtestimony€of€Ms.€Spangler€regarding€her€mother's€physical€condition.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€also€contends€that,€even€if€the€State€can€prove€the€victim'sÏphysical€vulnerability,€the€appellant€did€not€take€advantage€of€the€victim's€ageÏand€physical€disability€during€the€commission€of€the€offense.€€òòSeeóó€òòButleróó,€900ÏS.W.2d€at€313;€€òòState€v.€Sealsóó,€735€S.W.2d€849,€854€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€ÏWe€disagree.€€This€is€a€different€situation€than€one€where€the€victim'sÏvulnerability€is€irrelevant€to€the€crime€in€question.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€€òòButleróó,€900€S.W.2dÏat€313€(defendant€shot€first€victim€who€came€down€stairway;€victim€was€notÏparticularly€vulnerable€due€to€age€and€use€of€cane);€€òòSealsóó,€735€S.W.2d€at€854Ï(crime€involved€theft€from€mailboxes;€victims€not€particularly€vulnerable€due€toÏadvanced€age).€€Although€the€appellant€did€not€purposefully€seek€out€the€victimÏdue€to€her€vulnerable€condition,€the€victim's€physical€infirmities€were€aÏcontributing€factor€in€the€ultimate€outcome,€her€death.ÌÌà àFurthermore,€the€determination€of€whether€the€victim€is€"particularlyÏvulnerable"€is€a€factual€issue€to€be€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact€on€a€case€by€caseÏbasis.€€òòAdamsóó,€864€S.W.2d€at€35.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€victim's€age€andÏinfirmities€made€her€particularly€vulnerable€considering€the€evidence€indicatingÏthat€the€appellant's€approach€may€have€been€noticed€by€a€person€withoutÏphysical€limitations.€€Although€we€concede€that€the€issue€presented€is€a€closeÍquestion,€we€defer€to€the€trial€court's€findings€absent€evidence€to€the€contrary.€ÏThus,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€correctly€applied€this€enhancement€factorÏto€the€appellant's€sentence.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò ò2.€€Weight€Given€to€Appellant's€Prior€Convictionóóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€gave€excessive€weight€to€theÏappellant's€prior€felony€conviction€for€possession€of€marijuana.€€Specifically,€theÏappellant€argues€that,€because€this€charge€arose€five€years€before€the€currentÏcharge€and€because€she€had€been€released€from€probation€early€due€toÏexemplary€behavior,€this€conviction€is€not€sufficient€to€raise€her€sentence€to€theÏmaximum€within€the€range.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€Even€if,€the€trial€court€weighed€this€factor€moreÏheavily€than€the€appellant€feels€appropriate,€the€court's€decision€to€do€so€isÏproper€given€the€discretion€allowed€a€trial€court€in€considering€enhancementÏfactors.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727€S.W.2d€229,€238€(Tenn.€1986)€(legislature€hasÏleft€weight€of€applicable€factors€to€guided€discretion€of€trial€court€whenÏ"balancing€the€relative€degrees€of€culpability€within€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances€of€the€case€involved").€€Thus,€the€weight€afforded€to€theÍappellant's€prior€conviction€by€the€trial€court€does€not€constitute€error.ÌÌà@ àòòò ò3.€€Presence€of€Mitigating€Factorsóóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€argues€that€her€sentence€does€not€reflect€the€presence€ofÏthe€mitigating€factors€found€by€the€trial€court.€€The€trial€court€did€not€find€theÏpresence€of€any€enumerated€statutory€mitigators.€€However,€œthe€court€noted›€theÏpresence€of€two€non„enumerated€mitigators:€the€appellant's€remorsefulnessÏand€her€willingness€to€accept€responsibility€for€her€role€in€the€death€of€KatieÏSpangler.€€The€court€found€that€the€presence€of€these€two€factors€"amounts€to,€inÏessence,€a€single€mitigating€factor."€€In€addition€to€the€two€enhancement€factorsÏand€the€non„enumerated€mitigating€factor,€the€trial€court€considered€the€fact€thatÏthe€appellant€had€been€"less€than€completely€candid€with€the€Court€about€[her]Ïpast€experiences,€particularly€those€in€South€Carolina."œ× ƒ3 ××  ×›€€In€setting€the€length€ofÏthe€appellant's€sentence,€the€trial€court€€stated€that€"this€offense€and€the€facts€ofÏthis€case€require€that€this€Court€impose€the€maximum€penalty€in€this€case."ÌÌà àIn€determining€the€appropriate€sentence€for€a€felony€conviction,€Tenn.ÍCode€Ann.€ðð€œ40„35„210(c)›€(1990)€instructs€the€sentencing€court€that€"[t]heÏpresumptive€sentence€shall€be€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€range€if€there€areÏno€enhancement€or€mitigating€factors."€€If€there€are€enhancement€and€mitigatingÏfactors,€the€court€must€start€at€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€range,€then€enhanceÏthe€sentence€in€accordance€with€the€enhancement€factors,€then€reduce€theÏsentence€in€accordance€with€the€mitigating€factors.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(e)€(1990).€€The€appellant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€reduce€herÏsentence€in€accordance€with€the€applicable€mitigating€factors.ÌÌà àThe€appellant's€sentence€is€not€determined€by€the€mathematical€processÏof€adding€the€sum€total€of€enhancing€factors€present€then€subtracting€from€thisÏfigure€the€mitigating€factors€present€for€a€net€number€of€years.€€€Rather,€theÏweight€to€be€afforded€an€existing€factor€is€left€to€the€trial€court's€discretion€soÏlong€as€the€court€complies€with€the€purposes€and€principles€of€the€1989ÏSentencing€Act€and€its€findings€are€adequately€supported€by€the€record.€€òòHayesóó,Ï899€S.W.2d€at€185€(citing€Sentencing€Commission€Comments,€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„210;€òòMossóó,€727€S.W.2d€at€237;€òòseeóó€€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.).€ÏAs€the€supreme€court€noted€in€òòMossóó,€727€S.W.2d€at€237:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓ[T]he€Legislature€has€provided€only€for€ranges€within€whichÏa€determinate€sentence€will€be€imposed€and€has€notÏchosen€to€assign€any€controlling€value€to€these€mitigatingÏand€enhancement€factors€in€how€they€are€weighed€inÏdetermining€where€within€the€appropriate€range€a€particularÏdefendant's€sentence€should€fall.€€Such€a€statutory€schemeÍgrants€the€exercise€of€discretion€to€the€sentencing€court.€.€.€.ÌA€systematic€application€of€these€provisions€of€the€ActÏcannot€be€reduced€to€a€mechanical€process€or€a€formula;Ïrather,€these€statutes€entrust€sentencing€decisions€to€trialÏcourts€in€the€first€instance.€€These€courts,€familiar€with€theirÏlocale€and€having€seen€the€evidence€and€the€defendant,€asÏwell€as€possessing€the€benefit€of€experience€in€sentencingÏmatters,€should€retain€that€discretion€necessary€to€achieveÏall€of€the€purposes€of€the€Act.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓThe€court,€in€òòMoss,óó€specifically€stated€that€"the€Act€does€not€attribute€anyÏparticular€value€vis„a„vis€how€many€years€should€be€added€or€subtracted€basedÏon€the€presence€of€any€of€these€factors."€€òòIdóó.€at€238.€€"The€weight€to€be€affordedÏmitigating€and€enhancement€factors€derives€from€balancing€relative€degrees€ofÏculpability€within€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€of€the€case€involved."€€òòIdóó.€€òòSeeÏalsoóó€€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€870€S.W.2d€532,€541€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€ÌÌà àFor€the€purpose€of€review,€the€trial€court€must€preserve€in€the€record€theÏfactors€it€found€to€apply€and€the€specific€findings€of€fact€upon€which€it€appliedÏthe€sentencing€principles€to€arrive€at€the€sentence.€€òòHayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€at€185Ï(citation€omitted).€€This€was€done€in€the€present€case.€€The€trial€court€assignedÏthe€non„enumerated€mitigator€little€or€no€weight,€in€accordance€with€theÏdiscretion€permitted€him.€€Moreover,€as€we€have€stated€before,€the€presumptionÏof€correctness€applies€to€the€trial€court's€determination€if€the€trial€court€correctlyÏapplied€the€principles€of€sentencing€and€his€findings€are€supported€by€theÏevidence€in€the€record.€€€Again,€we€conclude€that€the€presumption€ofÍcorrectness€applies,€and€the€trial€court's€imposition€of€the€maximum€sentence€ofÏsix€years€is€justified.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò ò4.€€Non„conformance€with€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€ofÏ1989óóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€maintains€that€her€sentence€is€not€in€accordance€with€theÏSentencing€Act,€because€the€sentence€received€is€greater€than€that€deservedÏfor€the€offense€committed€and€because€the€sentence€is€not€the€least€severeÏmeasure€necessary€to€achieve€the€purposes€for€which€it€is€imposed.€ÏSpecifically,€the€appellant€argues€that€"[V]ehicular€homicide€sentences€at€theÏtop€of€the€range€should€be€reserved€for€those€defendants€whose€actions€areÏparticularly€aggregious€[sic]."€€The€appellant€suggests€that€maximum€sentencesÏshould€only€be€imposed€in€cases€where€"the€lives€of€individuals€other€than€theÏvictim€were€endangered"€or€in€cases€where€"the€defendant€had€a€recent,€priorÏhistory€of€DUI€or€other€traffic€related€convictions."€€Although€the€appellantÏconcedes€"that€each€case€must€rest€on€its€own€facts,"€she€notes€that€"the€courtÏshould,€nevertheless€strive€to€establish€a€fair€range€of€punishment€for€similarÏcrimes€upon€which€defendants€and€their€attorneys€can€rely."ÌÌà àWe€are€compelled€to€note€that€central€to€the€purpose€of€the€1989ÍSentencing€Act€and€its€strictures€is€the€elimination€of€unjustified€disparity€andÏthe€expression€of€a€fair€sense€of€predictability€of€the€criminal€law€and€itsÏsanctions.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(2)(1990).€€€Trial€courts€are€permittedÏto€exercise€their€discretion€in€determining€the€sentencing€alternatives€or€theÏlength€of€the€term€of€confinement€and€by€imposing€different€sentencesÏdepending€upon€the€nature€of€the€crime,€the€characteristics€and€history€of€theÏcriminal,€and€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€particular€offense€involved.€ÏòòMossóó,€727€S.W.2d€at€235.€€The€sentencing€act,€however,€guides€the€trial€court'sÏdiscretion€by€establishing€general€sentencing€principles€that€must€be€followed.€ÏIn€order€for€the€act€to€be€successful,€the€act€must€be€applied€on€a€case„by„caseÏbasis,€tailoring€each€sentence€to€that€particular€person€based€upon€the€facts€ofÏthat€case€and€the€circumstances€of€that€defendant.€€òòIdóó.€€The€policy€expressed€isÏthat€the€punishment€imposed€should€fit€the€crime€òòas€well€asóó€the€offender.€€òòIdóó.Ï(emphasis€added).€€òòSee€alsoóó€œòòState›€œv.›€Dowdyóó,€894€S.W.2d€301,€305€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1994)€(discussing€the€individualized€nature€of€alternativeÏsentencing).€ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€correctly€applied€the€sentencingÏprinciples€to€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€this€case.€€As€such,€we€cannot€findÏerror€in€the€trial€court's€determination.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.à à̛̜Ìà@ àòòò òB.€€Probationóóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€argues€that€she€should€have€been€granted€total€probationÏas€she€met€her€burden€of€proving€herself€suitable€for€a€suspended€sentence.€ÏThe€determination€of€whether€the€appellant€is€entitled€to€an€alternative€sentenceÏand€whether€the€appellant€is€entitled€to€full€probation€are€different€inquiries.€ÏThese€inquiries€require€a€different€burden€of€proof.€€Thus,€even€though€theÏappellant,€a€class€C€offender,€is€presumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidate€forÏalternative€sentencing,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6)(1994€Supp.),€€theÏappellant€has€the€burden€of€establishing€her€suitability€for€total€probation.€× ƒ4 ××  ×€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303(b)(1994€Supp.).× ƒ5 ××  ×€€To€meet€the€burden€ofÏestablishing€suitability€for€full€probation,€the€appellant€must€demonstrate€thatÏprobation€will€"subserve€the€ends€of€justice€and€the€best€interest€of€both€theÏpublic€and€the€œdefendant."€€òòState€v.›€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448,€€456€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1995)€(citing€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803ÏS.W.2d€250,€259€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990)).ÌÌà àIn€determining€one's€suitability€for€full€probation,€the€court€may€considerÏthe€circumstances€of€the€offense,€€the€defendant's€potential€or€lack€of€potentialÏfor€rehabilitation,€whether€full€probation€will€unduly€depreciate€the€seriousnessÏof€the€offense,€and€whether€a€sentence€other€than€full€probation€would€provideÏan€effective€deterrent€to€others€likely€to€commit€similar€crimes.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðððð€40„35„210(b)(4),€„103(5),€„103(1)(B)(1990).€€òòSee€alsoóó€€òòBinghamóó,€910€S.W.2dÏat€456.€€Denial€of€probation€may€be€based€solely€upon€the€circumstances€of€theÏoffense€when€they€are€of€such€a€nature€as€to€outweigh€all€other€factors€favoringÏprobation.€€òòIdóó.€(citing€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€788„89€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1991)).€€The€proof€in€the€record€reveals€that€the€circumstances€of€thisÏoffense€were€offensive€and€reprehensible.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€The€appellant€was€forty€years€oldÏand€familiar€with€the€destructive€consequences€of€alcohol.€€By€the€appellant'sÏown€admission,€she€was€"drunk€that€day€and€under€the€influence€of€alcoholicÏbeverages,€and€voluntarily€chose€to€drive€an€automobile€that€afternoon."€€€HerÏcallous€indifference€to€others€is€further€manifested€by€the€fact€that€herÏautomobile€traveled€a€total€of€three€hundred€and€ninety„six€feet€off€the€highway,Ïof€which€fourteen€feet€were€airborne.€€During€this€episode,€the€victim€was€killed.€ÏThere€is€no€evidence€to€show€that€the€appellant€made€any€attempt€to€stop€herÏvehicle.€€To€the€contrary,€the€evidence€shows€that€her€destructive€course€wouldÍhave€continued€but€for€the€presence€of€a€large€tree.€€€The€record€also€reflectsÏthat€measures€less€restrictive€than€confinement€have€failed€in€deterring€theÏappellant's€conduct.€€Based€on€the€nature€and€circumstances€of€this€offense,€theÏappellant's€past€behavior€and€lack€of€rehabilitative€potential,€and€the€need€toÏdeter€drunk€driving,× ƒ7 ××  ×€we€conclude€that€the€appellant€has€failed€to€establish€herÏentitlement€to€total€probation.€ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òIV.€€Conclusionóóó óÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record€before€us,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€didÏnot€err€by€refusing€to€recuse€himself€from€the€sentencing€phase€of€theÏproceeding.€€Furthermore,€as€the€record€demonstrates€that€the€trial€courtÏcorrectly€applied€and€considered€the€relevant€sentencing€principles,€weÏconclude€that€the€sentence€imposed€by€the€trial€court€is€justified.€€Accordingly,Ïthe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGE