WPC # VU>a % 0UB 4  n  w@ 01 0D 0Ja 0T 0^ 0h] 0r 0|7 0 09 1uU,> 0dj BU,U6U.M D3{U*B) 0@DCA AMvGv~vk AO> 0DS D/ BHP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPT0 <( 9Z &Courier RegularX($  7'CXXdXXd7    iUX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<H?AXi<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiԡ 3|x<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXx6X@JQX@ {|a}e~DDDDDDӀ((3D$ !  7^XXdd7    iUX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<H?AXi   `   0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)<  9p`(ModernP 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X d<  9p`(Monaco<  9p`(Courier New<  9p`(Courier$$$$'dxd<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d("$    ,,,,7Border 1dd-.C << G l !  #d#(  #d#  ` X  ++   YYY FILED+XAugust1,1996CecilW.CrowsonAppellateCourtClerk    !#d#(  #d#  ` X  $       ++"TobeexcludedunderRule404(b),thedangerofunfairprejudicemustsimplyoutweigh󀀀theprobativevalue.ButtobeexcludedunderRule403,thedangerofunfairprejudicemust̀substantiallyoutweightheprobativevalue.NeilP.Cohen,etal.,TennesseeLawofEvidence,̀404.7at172(3ded.1995).PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'`Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Monaco   BA Op Monaco  BA Op Monaco -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! . &''Xd&#''Xd#(  #))Xd##))Xd#  ` X    X     \RA'\+ԛL/0.;+'h|`  `Lߛ8 @ INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATNASHVILLE@   DECEMBER1995SESSIONSTATEOFTENNESSEE,  ) ̀    ) Appellee,  ) No.01C019505CC00158    )    ) BedfordCountyv.    )    ) Hon.W.CharlesLee,Judge    )TERRYBOWEN,  ) (Theftover$1,000)    ) Appellant.  )@  CONCURRINGOPINION  Iconcurintheresultsreachedandmostofthereasoningusedinthemajorityopinion.However,althoughIagreethatthecollateralfactruleessentiallyremainsviablethroughRule403,Tenn.R.Evid.,IquestionitsuseinthiscaserelativetotheappellantsattempttoimpeachMr.FarrarstestimonythroughextrinsicevidencethatFarrarssonhadpreviouslybeenchargedwiththeappellantandthathissonschargeshadbeenretiredonmotionofthestate. OneoftheappellantsargumentsisthattheevidenceregardingFarrarssonbeingpreviouslychargedwiththeappellantandthenhavingthechargesdismissedshowsthatFarrarhada biasedmotivetotestifyadverselytotheappellant.PursuanttoRule616,Tenn.R.Evid.,apartymayprovethebiasorprejudiceofawitness bycrossexamination,extrinsicevidence,orboth....ThisrulefollowsthecommonlawinTennessee.SeeCreepingBearv.State,113Tenn.322,87S.W.653(1905). Inthisrespect,thecollateralfactruleuponwhichthemajorityopinionreliesdidnotanddoesnotapplyrelativetoprovingbias.Thus,totheextentthattheappellantwasprovingfactsprobativeofbias,thefactthattheproofwasinconsistentwiththepreviousanswersgivenbythewitnessisirrelevanttotheissueofadmissibility.  8 Ontheotherhand,ifthewitnessoncrossexaminationdeniesordoesnotfullyadmitthefactsclaimedtoshowbias,theattackerhastherighttoprovethosefactsbyextrinsicevidence.Incourtroomparlance,factsshowingbiasarenot collateral,andthecrossexaminerisnotrequiredto taketheanswerofthewitness,butmaycallotherwitnessestoprovethem.  1JohnW.Strong,etal.,McCormickonEvidence,39at136(4thed.1992)(footnotesomitted).Inotherwords,eventhoughFarrardeniedhavinganybiasorprejudiceanddeniedthathissonschargesweredropped,theappellantwasnotboundbytheseanswersunderthecollateralfactrule,butcouldpresentextrinsicproofofbias. ThisraisesthemoredifficultquestionrelativetowhethertheevidencewasprobativeofFarrarsbiasand,ifso,whattypeofandwhatamountof prejudicemustexisttojustifyexclusion.ThemajorityopinionstatesthatadmissibilityofthecertifiedjudgmentsshouldhavebeenconsideredunderRule403,Tenn.R.Evid.,implyingthattheevidencehadlittleprobativevalueandwastimeconsuming,andnotunderRule404(b)asthetrialcourtdid. 1   ׀Iagreewiththemajorityopinionasfarasthejudgmentsareconcerned. However,IbelievethattherecordshowsthatthetrialcourtsRule404(b)analysisrelatednotonlytothejudgments,butalsotothefollowingproof:thatFarrarssonhadpreviouslycommittedandbeenchargedwithaburglaryandresultingtheft,withtheappellantbeingacodefendant,andthatthesonschargeswereretireduponmotionofthestate.TheappellantarguedthatthejurywasentitledtoinferfromthesefactsthatFarrarwouldbebiasedinfavorofthestate.Essentially,thetrialcourtruledthatthemerefactthatthestatehadapreviouschargeagainstFarrarssonretiredwassoremotelyrelevantthatthedangerofprejudice,intermsofjuryconfusion,    outweighedtheprobativevalueoftheevidence,thestandardofadmissibilityprovidedinRule404(b). IaminclinedtoagreewiththetrialcourtthattheproperstandardwouldbeRule404totheextentthattheevidenceprovedthatFarrarssoncommittedcrimes.ButIaminclinedtodisagreewiththetrialcourtsviewthatevidencethatthesoncommittedandwaschargedwithanotherburglaryandtheftandthatthestatehadthechargesretiredpresentedagreaterdangerofjuryconfusionthanitwasprobativeofFarrarbeingabiasedwitnessed.ItwouldbereasonabletoinferthatFarrarwouldlookfavorablyuponthestateforhavinghissonschargesretiredandunfavorablyupontheappellantforpotentiallyinvolvinghissonincriminalactivityorcharges.ThejuryhadalreadyheardFarrartestify,withoutobjection,thathissonhadcommittedthepreviousburglaryandhadchargespending.Iseelittledangerofconfusioninprovingthatthechargeswereactuallyretired. Inthefinalanalysis,though,Idonotbelievethatthetrialcourtsdeterminationsharmedtheappellantsoastowarrantareversal.Throughtheevidence,thejurywasmadefullyawareofFarrarssonscommissionofapreviousburglary,hisbeingcharged,andhischargesbeingretired.ThroughcrossexaminationofFarrar,thejurywasawareofthesignificancetheappellantplaceduponthesonscircumstancesinrelationtoFarrarstestimony.Thetrialcourtrefusedtostrikeanyoftheproof,therebyexcludingonlythecertifiedjudgmentsfromthejurysconsideration.Giventheevidencepresented,Idonotbelievethatthelimitedimpactofthetrialcourtsrulingsrisestothelevelofreversibleerror.      _____________________________      JosephM.Tipton,Judge