ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ U.H 0Lv 0J 0T 0^` 0h¾ 0r& 0|˜ 0† 0š 1u* U,Ÿ 0dË U,/U>[B)™ BÂDCß AM"õov~d D3âvÓ 0@è 0N( AOvÆÅ 0D‹ D/Ï Bþ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ üDýDþÿDD$eÓ€Ô¡¨ 3|x%ä2¼A`ArialTT> ÿÿ$Small Circleððà0 à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ëÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌAugust€1,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`%%%%'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò>‡¦$"Small Circleð"ðà0  à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ Ô›œßL€'(&;+'h|` ç `€€Lß›IN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌDECEMBER€1995€SESSIONÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€APPELLEE,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€01„C„01„9505„CC„00158Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àBedford€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àW.€Charles€Lee,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Theft€Over€$1,000)ÌTERRY€BOWEN,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àAPPELLANT.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌBill€R.€Barronà àà àà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌJ.€Mark€Johnsonà àà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌ124€East€Court€Squareà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌTrenton,€TN€38382à àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493Ì(Appeal€Only)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRuth€A.€ThompsonÌRobert€L.€Marlowà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌP.O.€Box€1119à àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌFayetteville,€TN€37334Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àW.€Michael€McCownÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌOF€COUNSEL:à àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€904Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFayetteville,€TN€37334ÌJohn€H.€Dickeyà àÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àà àGary€M.€JonesÌP.O.€Box€1119à àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌFayetteville,€TN€37334à àà àà àà àà àBedford€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelbyville,€TN€37160ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:_____________________________ÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌJoe€B.€Jones,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÓ  Óò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÓ  ÓÌÑ7€FXXdìXXdì7ÑØØÙ  ÙÌÌÓÓà àThe€appellant,€Terry€Bowen,€was€convicted€of€theft€over€$1,000,€a€Class€DÏfelony,€by€a€jury€of€his€peers.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€appellant€was€a€multipleÏoffender€and€imposed€a€Range€II€sentence€consisting€of€confinement€for€eight€(8)Ïyears€in€the€Department€of€Correction.€€This€sentence€is€to€be€served€consecutivelyÏwith€the€sentences€imposed€in€three€prior€cases.Ìà àIn€this€appeal€as€of€right,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€evidence€contained€inÏthe€record€is€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€support€a€finding€by€a€rational€trier€of€factÏthat€he€is€guilty€of€theft€over€$1,000€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€He€also€contends€thatÏthe€trial€court€committed€error€of€prejudicial€dimensions€by€(a)€ruling€that€he€could€notÏintroduce€evidence€that€a€prior€burglary€case€had€been€dismissed€and€(b)€instructingÏthe€jury€on€ð ðrecently€stolen€propertyðð€after€the€state€opted€to€seek€a€conviction€for€theÏunlawful€exercise€of€control€of€property.€€The€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.Ìà àOn€the€evening€of€October€14,€1993,€Lambertððs€Jewelry€Store,€located€inÏShelbyville,€Tennessee,€was€burglarized.€€Police€officers€found€that€the€glass€in€theÍfront€door€had€been€broken.€€Inside,€the€glass€display€cases€had€been€broken.€€WhenÏthe€burglars€left,€they€took€with€them€three€watches,€one€bracelet,€one€pendant€withÏgold€chain,€and€a€gold€domed€ring.Ìà àThe€appellant€went€to€the€home€of€James€Farrar€shortly€after€the€burglary.€€HeÏtold€Farrar€that€he€had€items€of€jewelry€he€wanted€to€sell€him.€€He€showed€Farrar€theÏjewelry.€€The€liberty€coin€pendant€and€chain€were€in€a€box€bearing€the€nameÏð ðLambertððs€Jewelry.ðð€€Farrar€gave€the€appellant€$35€and€told€him€he€would€get€moreÏmoney€later.€€The€appellant€left€with€the€jewelry.€€He€got€into€a€motor€vehicle€occupiedÏby€two€other€people€and€drove€away€with€the€jewelry.€€Farrar€subsequently€called€theÏShelbyville€police.€€He€told€the€officers€what€occurred.€€He€agreed€to€purchase€theÏjewelry€from€the€appellant€and€surrender€it€to€the€police.Ìà àOn€October€16,€1993,€the€appellant€returned€to€Farrarððs€residence€with€theÏjewelry.€€Farrar€gave€the€appellant€an€additional€$255€for€the€three€watches,€bracelet,Ïand€liberty€coin€pendant€with€gold€chain.€€Farrar€subsequently€surrendered€the€itemsÏhe€purchased€to€the€police.Ìà àThe€appellant€sold€the€gold€domed€ring€to€Carolyn€Farrar€for€$50.€€She€testifiedÏthat€she€had€purchased€additional€items€from€the€appellant.€€€It€appears€the€latter€itemsÏwere€taken€in€another€burglary.Ìà àThe€owner€of€the€jewelry€store€identified€the€property€recovered€by€the€police.€ÏShe€testified€that€the€bracelet€was€valued€at€$235,€the€pendant€and€chain€were€worthÏ$1,195,€the€ring€was€valued€at€$469,€one€watch€was€valued€at€$395,€another€watchÏhad€a€value€of€$195,€and€the€third€watch€was€worth€$110.Ì€€ÌÓ  Ó€ò òI.ó óÌÓ  Óà àÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€hisÏconviction.€€He€argues:€€ð ðUnder€these€set€[sic]€of€facts,€there€is€no€proof€the€defendantÏknowingly€obtained€or€exclusively€exercised€control€of€property€he€knew€to€be€stolen.€ÏThe€nexus€between€the€burglary€and€the€defendantððs€possession€of€the€jewelry€isÏinsufficient€to€sustain€the€conviction€of€theft€of€property.ðð€€The€state€argues€that€ð ðanyÏrational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€[appellant]€guilty€of€[this€offense]€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.ððÌÌÓ  Óò òA.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,€thisÏCourt€must€review€the€record€to€determine€if€the€evidence€adduced€at€trial€is€sufficientÏ"to€support€the€finding€of€the€trier€of€fact€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt."€€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.€13(e).€€This€rule€is€applicable€to€findings€of€guilt€based€upon€direct€evidence,Ïcircumstantial€evidence,€or€a€combination€of€direct€and€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòStateÏv.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€253€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1990).Ìà àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,€this€Court€does€notÏreweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1990).€€Nor€may€this€Court€substitute€itsÏinferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€trier€of€fact€from€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòLiakas€v.ÏStateóó,€199€Tenn.€298,€305,€286€S.W.2d€856,€859,€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€352€U.S.€845,€77€S.Ct.Í39,€1€L.Ed.2d€49€(1956).€€To€the€contrary,€this€Court€is€required€to€afford€the€State€ofÏTennessee€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€contained€in€the€record€asÏwell€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€theÏevidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).Ìà àQuestions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€toÏbe€given€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€areÏresolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€Court.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€at€835.€€In€òòState€v.ÏGraceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973),€our€Supreme€Court€said:€€"A€guilty€verdictÏby€the€jury,€approved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€the€testimony€of€the€witnesses€for€theÏState€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€theory€of€the€State."Ìà àSince€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€and€replaces€itÏwith€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused,€as€the€appellant,€has€the€burden€in€this€CourtÏof€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdicts€returned€by€theÏtrier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€This€Court€will€notÏdisturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€due€to€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€unless€the€factsÏcontained€in€the€record€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€for€a€rational€trier€of€fact€toÏfind€that€the€accused€is€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòTuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€at€914.à àÌÌÓ  Óò òB.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àBefore€an€accused€can€be€convicted€of€theft€over€the€value€of€$1,000,€the€stateÏmust€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that:Ìà àa)€€the€accused€(1)€knowingly€obtained€the€property€of€another,€(2)€without€theÍownerððs€effective€consent,€and€(3)€with€the€intent€to€deprive€the€owner€of€the€property,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„14„103,€orÌà à(b)€€the€accused€(1)€knowingly€exercised€control€over€the€property€of€another,Ï(2)€without€the€ownerððs€consent,€and€(3)€with€the€intent€to€deprive€the€owner€of€theÏproperty,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„14„103;€andÌà à(c)€€the€value€of€the€property€in€question€exceeds€$1,000.Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€state€introduced€evidence€that€placed€the€stolen€property€in€theÏhands€of€the€appellant€shortly€after€the€burglary€and€again€the€next€day.€€He€certainlyÏexercised€control€over€the€property€because€he€personally€showed€the€jewelry€toÏFarrar€and€later€sold€the€property€to€him€and€another€person.€€He€was€in€possession€ofÏthe€property€without€the€ownerððs€consent.€€It€is€obvious€that€the€appellant€had€everyÏintent€of€depriving€the€owner€of€the€property€because€he€sold€the€property.Ìà àThere€is€sufficient€evidence€contained€in€the€record€to€support€a€finding€by€aÏreasonable€trier€of€fact€that€the€appellant€was€guilty€of€theft€over€$1,000€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e);€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319,€99ÏS.Ct.€2781,€2789,€61€L.Ed.2d€560,€573€(1979).ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€committed€error€of€prejudicialÏdimensions€by€charging€the€jury€on€the€law€regarding€ð ðrecently€stolen€property.ðð€€HeÏcites€an€Alabama€case€to€support€his€theory€that€the€instruction€shifted€the€burden€ofÏproof€to€the€defendant€to€prove€his€innocence.Ìà àThe€appellant€overlooks€that€trial€counsel€sought€this€instruction.€€Moreover,€itÏwas€discussed€by€counsel€and€the€trial€court€regarding€its€effect.€€The€followingÏcolloquy€took€place:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓMR.€MARLOW:€€One€thing€I€am€going€to€ask€is€in€thisÏparticular€case,€is€the€Court€going€to€give€in€its€instructionsÏthe€inference€of€possession€of€recently€stolen€property€sinceÏthis€is€a€theory€based€upon€exercise€and€control€versus€theÏactual€obtain?€€Is€the€Court€inclined€to€give€that€instructionÏor€not?ÌÌTHE€COURT:€€Yes.€€As€you€might€recall€the€instructions€onÏrecent€possession€can€go€two€ways.€€One€is€that€the€juryÏcan€infer€œthat€that›€was€the€person€that€took€it,€or€they€mayÏinfer€that€he€had€knowledge€it€was€taken€through€theft€whichÏgoes€to€the€intent€required€for€the€theory€of€exercisingÏcontrol.Ìà àNow,€the€instructions€do€read,€however,€not€„„€ð ðIf€youÏfind€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€from€the€evidence€that€theÏproperty€in€question€had€been€recently€stolen€and€soonÏthereafter€the€same€property€was€discovered€in€theÏexclusive€possession€of€the€defendant,€this€possession,Ïunless€satisfactorily€explained,€is€ordinarily€a€circumstanceÏfrom€which€you€may€reasonably€draw€an€inference€that€theÏdefendant€had€knowledge€that€the€property€had€beenÏstolen.ððÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓÓà àThe€fallacy€in€the€appellantððs€argument€is€that€a€party€cannot€ask€the€trial€courtÏto€give€an€instruction€and€later€challenge€the€instruction€on€appeal.€In€other€words,€theÏappellant€cannot,€from€his€viewpoint,€invite€the€trial€court€to€give€an€erroneousÏinstruction€and,€as€here,€challenge€the€very€instruction€that€was€sought€by€the€party.€ÏòòState€v.€Thien€Duc€Leóó,€743€S.W.2d€199,€202€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóóÏ(Tenn.1987);€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Dickersonóó,€885€S.W.2d€90,€91€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.Ïòòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Banesóó,€874€S.W.2d€73,€82€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€òòperóó.Íòòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994).€€Thus,€this€issue€has€been€waived.Ìà àThis€Court€parenthetically€notes€that€the€appellate€courts€of€this€state€have€heldÏthat€this€instruction€is€constitutional.€€òòSeeóó€òòBales€v.€Stateóó,€585€S.W.2d€610€(Tenn.€1979);ÏòòState€v.€Hawkóó,€688€S.W.2d€467,€473„74€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985);€òòState€v.€Ratliffóó,€673ÏS.W.2d€884,€885„86€(Tenn.€Crim.€App),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1984);€òòState€v.€Craigóó,Ï655€S.W.2d€186,€191€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983).Ìà àThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òIII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àDuring€the€cross„examination€of€James€Farrar,€defense€counsel€asked€theÏwitness€if€he€or€any€member€of€his€family€had€been€ð ðpromisedðð€anything€for€theÏtestimony€that€he€was€giving€for€the€state.€€The€following€colloquy€occurred€betweenÏFarrar€and€defense€counsel:ÌÓÓÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓ` „X× ¸ —XÓQ.à àMr.€Farrar,€have€you€been€promised€anything€for€yourÏtestimony€here€today?ÌÌA.à àNo,€sir.ÌÌQ.€à àHas€any€member€of€your€family€been€promisedÏanything€for€your€testimony€here€today?ÌÌA.à àNo.ÌÌQ.à àNo€consideration€for€your€testimony?ÌÌA.à àNo,€sir.€€Ainððt€nobody€promised€me€nothing.ÌÌQ.à àOkay.€€Have€they€promised€somebody€else€anything€forÏyour€testimony€today?ÌÌA.à àNo.€€The€one€thing€I€know€is€Terry€Bowen€and€my€sonÏbroke€in€a€house,€but€I€didnððt€testify€for€him.€€Both€of€themÏwas€guilty,€went€in€on€those€poor,€old€people€on€that€houseÏand€tore€it€all€to€pieces.€€Poor€old€lady€fixing€to€have€a€baby.€ÏThey€went€in€there€and€riddled€her€house.€€Iððm€not€taking€upÏfor€him€or€the€man.ÌÌQ.à àAll€right.€€Now€that€you€have€brought€that€up€soÏgraciously,€the€lady€came€into€this€courtroom,€did€she€not,Ïand€pointed€out€somebody€else€as€the€man€who€came€in?€ÏDid€not€point€out€this€defendant,€but€pointed€out€your€son,Ïdidnððt€she?Ìà àYes€or€No.€And€explain€your€answer.ÌÌA.à àWhen€the€lady€come€in€here,€the€little€girl€was€kind€of€aÏlittle€retarded.€€Another€colored€guy€walked€in€back€here,Ïbut€it€was€Terry€Bowen€and€my€son€broke€in€that€house€withÏthem€people.€€And€went€in€there€and€riddled€the€poor€oldÏpeoples€stuff,€and€they€ainððt€got€a€dime.€€They€thought€theyÏhad€a€pill.€€They€went€in€there€to€rob€them€for€pills.€€Got€theirÏTV€and€took€it€out€and€set€it€over€in€the€field.ÌÌQ.à àNow,€your€son€is€still€facing€those€charges,€isnððt€he?ÌÌA.à àBoth€of€them€are€facing€them€charges€as€far€as€I€know.€€IÏainððt€taking€up€for€my€son,€because€heððs€a€dope€addict.€€TheÏbest€thing€that€boy€needs€„„€he€needs€help€or€in€jail,€one.ÌÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ ` „°šXÓÓÓà àDefense€counsel€sought€to€impeach€Farrarððs€testimony€to€the€extent€that€theÏburglary€charges€were€still€pending€against€the€appellant.€€He€called€the€clerk€of€theÏcourt.€€The€clerk€testified€that€the€warrants€against€the€appellant€had€been€dismissedÏafter€a€probable€cause€hearing.€€The€warrants€against€Farrarððs€son€had€been€retired€onÏmotion€of€the€state.€€When€defense€counsel€attempted€to€move€the€warrants€intoÏevidence,€the€assistant€district€attorney€general€objected.€€The€trial€court€ruled€that€theÏwarrants€could€not€be€moved€into€evidence.€€The€trial€court€said€in€ruling:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌTHE€COURT:€If€it€is€relevant,€it€is€so€remotely€relevant€toÏinclude€this€line€of€inquiry€it€would,€in€the€Courtððs€opinion,Ïconfuse€the€jury€on€the€true€issues€here.ÌÌà àUnder€Rule€404,€the€Court€will€rule€that€theÏprejudicial€effect€in€that€it€might€confuse€the€jury€as€to€whatÏis€the€relevant€issue€here€outweighs€the€probative€value.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÌÓ  Óò òA.ó óÌÔ  ÔÓ  ÓÓÓâââââ  âÌà àThe€evidence€that€the€appellant€attempted€to€introduce€was€collateral€to€theÏprinciple€matter€in€dispute.€€A€collateral€fact€is€defined€as€ð ðone€which€affords€noÏreasonable€inference€as€to€the€principle€matter€in€dispute.ðð€€òòState€v.€Marlowóó,€665ÏS.W.2d€410,€412€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983);€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1984)€(citingÏòòSaunders€v.€City€and€Suburban€R.€Co.óó,€99€Tenn.€130,€41€S.W.€1031€(1897)).Ìà àPrior€to€the€enactment€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence,€a€party€was€notÏentitled€to€inquire€about€collateral€facts€during€cross„examination.€€òòSeeóó€òòFranklin€v.ÏFranklinóó,€90€Tenn.€44,€49,€16€S.W.€557,€558€(1891);€òòMarlowóó,€665€S.W.2d€at€412;€òòStateÏv.€Hillóó,€598€S.W.2d€815,€820€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980);€òòHoneycutt€v.€Stateóó,€544€S.W.2dÏ912,€915„916€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1976).€€However,€if€counsel€was€permitted€to€inquireÏinto€a€collateral€matter€during€cross„examination,€counsel€was€bound€by€the€witnessððsÏanswers;€and€counsel€could€not€call€other€witnesses€in€rebuttal€to€prove€facts€whichÏwere€inconsistent€with€the€answers€given€by€the€witness€during€cross„examination.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòMcGowen€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€442,€451,€427€S.W.2d€555,€559€(1968);€òòLivermoreÏFoundry€&€Machine€Co.€v.€Compress€Coóó.,€105€Tenn.€187,€201,€58€S.W.€270,€273Ï(1900);€òòFranklinóó,€90€Tenn.€at€49,€16€S.W.€at€558;€òòMarlowóó,€665€S.W.2d€at€412.Ìà àThe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€do€not€mention€the€collateral€facts€rule.€ÏMoreover,€it€is€unknown€if€this€rule€will€continue€to€be€recognized.€€òòSeeóó€Neil€P.€CohenÏet€al.,€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€ðð€613.5€(3rd€ed.€1995).ÌÌÓ  Óò òB.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€collateral€facts€rule€should€be€maintained€to€assist€trial€courts€in€excludingÏevidence€that€is€irrelevant,€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€402,€or€evidence€that€is€time„consuming€andÏhas€little,€if€any,€probative€value.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€403.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€courtÏproperly€excluded€the€certified€judgments€that€the€accused€attempted€to€introduce€intoÏevidence.€€However,€the€trial€court€should€have€relied€upon€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€403€ratherÏthan€Rule€404.€€In€short,€the€trial€court€reached€the€right€result,€but€for€the€wrongÏreason.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€JOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________________Ìà àPAUL€G.€SUMMERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ_______________________________________Ìà àJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ