ÿWPC $ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 0lH 0D´ 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð 1u` 0dÕ U >9U *w B¡B)¾DCç AM*wß D3n 0D¡˜å 0@}k½v~(vÓ¦ AQy"ÆÊ" 0D# D/Ô# B$˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- cdeDfg hiUjkÓ€wäzz!3|xw((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial d% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òMarch€19,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€òòÔ€"ôÔÔ€#ÔDyleóó€was€released€on€May€15,€1995.€€Appellantððs€notice€of€appeal€was€filed€on€April€21,€1995.€Ïà0 àTherefore,€the€new€instruction€applies€to€Appellantððs€case€despite€the€fact€the€defense€neverÏrequested€it.Ô€"ÔÔ€"XÔÌÌà à€Ì$$$$'ÿÿdxd(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý ŽÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Ô€#ÔÔ€#ôÔ€Appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€also€considered€the€frequency€of€automated€teller€machineÏà0 àrobberies€as€an€enhancement€factor.€€Appellant€correctly€points€out€that€no€such€enhancementÏfactor€is€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„35„114€and€that€the€application€ofÏnon„statutory€factors€to€enhance€a€sentence€is€improper.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Stricklandóó,€885€S.W.2d€85,Ï89€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€However,€the€record€fails€to€demonstrate€that€the€trial€court€appliedÏthis€consideration€as€an€enhancement€factor.€€Instead,€we€believe€that€the€trial€court€properlyÏconsidered€deterrence€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Sections€40„35„102(3)(A)€and€40„35„103(1)(B)€justifying€incarceration.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò aÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ôÔÔ€#Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€Having€asserted€that€no€enhancement€factors€apply,€Appellant€goes€on€to€argue€that€he€shouldÏà0 àhave€been€sentenced€as€an€especially€mitigated€offender.€€A€sentencing€court€may€assignÏespecially€mitigated€offender€status€if€(1)€the€defendant€has€no€prior€felony€convictions€and€(2)Ïmitigating€but€no€enhancement€factors€apply.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„109(a).€€TheÏdetermination€of€whether€a€defendant€is€an€especially€mitigated€offender€rests€within€the€soundÏdiscretion€of€the€sentencing€court.€€òòState€v.€Hicksóó,€868€S.W.2d€729,€730€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€ÏHere,€Appellant€fails€to€even€allege€that€any€mitigating€factors€apply,€nor€do€we€believe€that€any€do.€ÏThus,€even€if€we€agreed€that€no€enhancement€factors€apply,€Appellant€would€still€not€be€eligibleÏfor€sentencing€as€an€especially€mitigated€offender€because€no€mitigating€factors€apply.€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„109(a)(2).Ì€Ô€"ÔÔ€"XÔÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€+-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€æ'XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÞ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€JACKSONÌÌSEPTEMBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€02C01„9509„CR„00275Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÙ€€Ùó óßR€'(&A1-j|oT` Å `€€@ÿRßà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€BERNIE€WEINMANó óÌò òGREGORY€B.€BUFFORD,ó óà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à à(Direct€Appeal)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌWALKER€GWINNà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ201€Poplar€Suite€2„01à àÌMemphis,€TN€€38103à àà àà àWILLIAM€DAVID€BRIDGERSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€W.€PIEROTTIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPATIENCE€BRANHAMÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€Avenue€„€3rd€FloorÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€€38103ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED;€SENTENCE€MODIFIEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÇòòò òÓ  ÓÔ€#„ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€#ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓA€Shelby€County€Criminal€Court€jury€found€Appellant€Gregory€B.€Bufford€guilty€ofÏaggravated€robbery.€€As€a€Range€I€standard€offender,€he€received€a€sentenceÏof€ten€years€in€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Correction.€€In€this€direct€appeal,ÏAppellant€presents€the€following€issues€for€review:€(1)€whether€the€evidenceÏpresented€at€trial€is€legally€sufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction€for€aggravatedÏrobbery;€(2)€whether€the€jury€was€properly€instructed€on€eyewitnessÏidentification;€and€(3)€whether€his€sentence€is€excessive.ÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€Appellantððs€conviction€forÏaggravated€robbery€but€modify€his€sentence€to€nine€years.€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.€€FACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óÓ  Óà àAs€accredited€by€the€juryððs€verdict,€theÏproof€shows€that,€during€the€early€evening€of€August€20,€1994,€Rose€MarieÏHouston€and€her€daughter€Brenda€King€went€to€a€Memphis€bank€for€theÏpurpose€of€withdrawing€one€hundred€dollars€from€an€automated€teller€machine.€ÏThe€bank€itself€was€closed.€€While€Ms.€King€waited€in€the€car,€Ms.€HoustonÏentered€the€lobby€where€the€automated€teller€machine€was€located.€€As€sheÏentered,€an€unidentified€woman€was€conducting€a€transaction€and€AppellantÏwas€standing€in€a€corner.€€When€the€unidentified€woman€completed€herÍtransaction€and€left,€Ms.€Houston€waited€for€Appellant€to€take€his€turn€but€soonÏconcluded€that€he€too€was€leaving.€€Ms.€Houston€then€proceeded€to€withdrawÏone€hundred€dollars.ÌÌà àUpon€completion€of€the€withdrawal,€Appellant,€who€had€not€left€the€bankÏlobby,€confronted€Ms.€Houston€with€a€gun€and€demanded€her€money.€€Ms.ÏHouston€hesitated,€prompting€Appellant€to€repeat€his€demand€two€more€times,Ïplace€the€gun€in€her€face,€and€threaten€to€kill€her.€€Ms.€Houston€then€turned€overÏthe€money.€€As€Appellant€left€the€bank,€he€threatened€to€kill€Ms.€Houston€if€sheÏattempted€to€leave€the€bank.€€Soon€thereafter,€Ms.€King€entered€the€lobby€toÏcheck€on€her€mother.€€Ms.€Houston€told€her€daughter€that€she€had€just€beenÏrobbed.€€In€response,€Ms.€King€exited€the€bank€in€time€to€observe€Appellant€asÏhe€ran€away.ÌÌà àOn€September€9,€1994,€Ms.€Houston€identified€Appellant€from€aÏphotographic€line„up€that€investigating€officers€brought€to€her€house.€€OnÏDecember€1,€1994,€a€Shelby€County€Grand€Jury€indicted€Appellant€forÏaggravated€robbery€in€violation€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€39„13„402(a)(1).€€On€February€27€and€28,€1995,€Appellant€was€tried€before€a€jury€inÏthe€Shelby€County€Criminal€Court.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€the€jury€foundÏAppellant€guilty€of€the€offense€as€charged€in€the€indictment.€€Following€aÍsentencing€hearing€on€March€24,€1995,€the€trial€court€imposed€a€sentence€of€tenÏyears.ÌÓ  ÓÌò òII.€€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEÌÓ  Óó óà àAppellant€first€alleges€that€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€is€legallyÏinsufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction€for€aggravated€robbery.€€Specifically,€heÏargues€that€the€State€failed€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€he€wasÏthe€perpetrator.€€In€support€of€this€argument,€Appellant€contends€that€Ms.ÏHoustonððs€description€of€the€perpetrator€was€general€and€inconsistent€with€hisÏphysical€appearance,€that€Ms.€Kingððs€identification€was€unreliable,€and€that€theÏeyewitness€testimony€was€uncorroborated€by€any€circumstantial€evidence.ÌÌà àWhen€an€appeal€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€the€standardÏof€review€is€whether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÏState,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€theÏcrime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€318Ï(1979);€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€190„91€(Tenn.€1992);€Tenn.€R.€App.ÏP.€13(e).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏevidence€and€all€reasonable€or€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawnÏtherefrom.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€This€CourtÏwill€not€reweigh€the€evidence,€re„evaluate€the€evidence,€or€substitute€itsÍevidentiary€inferences€for€those€reached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Careyóó,€914ÏS.W.2d€93,€95€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€Furthermore,€in€a€criminal€trial,€greatÏweight€is€given€to€the€result€reached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€910€S.W.2dÏ897,€899€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àOnce€approved€by€the€trial€court,€a€jury€verdict€accredits€the€witnessesÏpresented€by€the€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.ÏWilliamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983).€€Determining€the€credibility€ofÏwitnesses€and€the€weight€to€be€given€their€testimony€as€well€as€reconcilingÏconflicts€in€the€proof€are€matters€entrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€trier€of€fact.€ÏòòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,€676€S.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984).€€A€juryððs€guilty€verdictÏremoves€the€presumption€of€innocence€enjoyed€by€the€defendant€at€trial€andÏraises€a€presumption€of€guilt.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.Ï1982).€€The€defendant€then€bears€the€burden€of€overcoming€this€presumption€ofÏguilt€on€appeal.€€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€175€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àIn€order€to€convict€Appellant€of€aggravated€robbery,€the€State€had€toÏpresent€evidence€establishing€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€he€was€in€factÏthe€perpetrator.€€At€trial,€both€Ms.€Houston€and€Ms.€King€positively€identifiedÏAppellant€as€the€individual€who€had€committed€the€robbery.€€Ms.€Houston€reliedÏupon€her€somewhat€lengthy,€face„to„face€interaction€with€Appellant€in€the€well„litÍbank€lobby,€commenting€that€she€would€ð ðnever€forget€his€eyes.ðð€€OfficerÏStephen€Ray€Cole€of€the€Memphis€Police€Department€testified€that€Ms.ÏHouston€had€ð ðpretty€quicklyðð€identified€Appellant€from€a€photographic€line„up.€ÏMs.€King€relied€upon€her€observation€of€Appellant€as€he€fled€the€scene.ÌÌà àDespite€this€eyewitness€testimony,€Appellant€maintained€that€he€did€notÏcommit€the€robbery.€€In€an€effort€to€substantiate€his€claim€of€innocence,ÏAppellant€presented€alibi€testimony€and€questioned€the€reliability€of€the€StateððsÏeyewitness€testimony.€€When€factual€conflicts€arise€in€the€proof,€the€jury€mustÏreconcile€them€by€weighing€the€credibility€of€each€witness.€€òòSeeóó€òòSheffieldóó,€676ÏS.W.2d€at€547.€€Here,€it€appears€that€the€jury€found€the€eyewitness€testimony€ofÏMs.€Houston€and€Ms.€King€more€convincing€than€the€testimony€of€AppellantððsÏalibi€witnesses.€€Under€well„settled€Tennessee€law,€the€jury€was€within€itsÏprovince€in€doing€so.€€We€will€not€disturb€the€factual€conclusions€reached€by€theÏjury.€€òòSeeóó€òòCareyóó,€914€S.W.2d€at€95.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that,€when€viewed€in€aÏlight€most€favorable€to€the€State,€the€evidence€is€legally€sufficient€to€supportÏAppellantððs€conviction€for€aggravated€robbery.Ó  ÓÌò òIII.€€JURY€INSTRUCTIONÌÓ  Óó óà àAppellant€next€alleges€that€the€jury€was€not€properly€instructed€onÏeyewitness€identification.€€Appellant€correctly€points€out€that,€in€òòState€v.€Dyleóó,Ï899€S.W.2d€607€(Tenn.€1995),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€rejected€asÍinadequate€Tennesseeððs€pattern€jury€instruction€on€eyewitness€identification€andÏpromulgated€the€following€new€instruction:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓOne€of€the€issues€in€this€case€is€the€identification€of€theÏdefendant€as€the€person€who€committed€the€crime.€€TheÏstate€has€the€burden€of€proving€identity€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€€Identification€testimony€is€anÏexpression€of€belief€or€impression€by€the€witness,€and€itsÏvalue€may€depend€upon€your€consideration€of€severalÏfactors.€€€Some€of€the€factors€which€you€may€considerÏare:ÌÌ(1)€The€witness'€capacity€and€opportunity€to€observe€theÏoffender.€€€This€includes,€among€other€things,€the€length€ofÏtime€available€for€observation,€the€distance€from€whichÏthe€witness€observed,€the€lighting,€and€whether€theÏperson€who€committed€the€crime€was€a€priorÏacquaintance€of€the€witness;ÌÌ(2)€The€degree€of€certainty€expressed€by€the€witnessÏregarding€the€identification€and€the€circumstances€underÏwhich€it€was€made,€including€whether€it€is€the€product€ofÏthe€witness'€own€recollection;ÌÌ(3)€The€occasions,€if€any,€on€which€the€witness€failed€toÏmake€an€identification€of€the€defendant,€or€made€anÏidentification€that€was€inconsistent€with€the€identification€atÏtrial;€€andÌÌ(4)€The€occasions,€if€any,€on€which€the€witness€made€anÏidentification€that€was€consistent€with€the€identification€atÏtrial,€and€the€circumstances€surrounding€suchÏidentifications.€€ÌÌAgain,€the€state€has€the€burden€of€proving€every€elementÏof€the€crime€charged,€and€this€burden€specifically€includesÏthe€identity€of€the€defendant€as€the€person€whoÏcommitted€the€crime€for€which€he€or€she€is€on€trial.€€€If€afterÏconsidering€the€identification€testimony€in€light€of€all€theÏproof€you€have€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€defendant€isÍthe€person€who€committed€the€crime,€you€must€find€theÏdefendant€not€guilty.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€at€612ò ò.€ó ó€The€Supreme€Court€held€that€this€instruction€applies€to€all€cases€onÏappeal€at€the€time€òòDyleððsóó€issuance.× ƒ) ××  ×€€The€Court€further€held€that,€if€defenseÏcounsel€fails€to€request€the€instruction€where€identification€is€a€material€issue,€theÏtrial€courtððs€failure€to€give€it€is€reviewable€under€a€harmless€error€standard.€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).ò òÌÌà àó óAppellant€maintains€that€his€jury€would€not€have€found€him€guilty€had€aÏòòDyleóó€instruction€been€given.€€We€disagree.€€During€the€robbery,€Ms.€HoustonÏhad€several€minutes€to€observe€her€attacker€from€a€very€short€distance€away,€inÏa€well„lit€area.€€Moreover,€Ms.€Houston€expressed€great€certainty€in€herÏidentification,€quickly€picking€Appellant€from€a€photographic€line„up€prior€to€trialÏand€testifying€that€she€would€ð ðnever€forget€his€eyes.ðð€€At€no€point€during€theÏinvestigation€of€the€robbery€or€during€trial€did€Ms.€Houston€hesitate€or€vary€fromÏher€identification€of€Appellant€as€the€perpetrator.€€In€our€opinion,€consideration€ofÏthe€factors€set€out€in€òòDyleóó€only€serves€to€strengthen€the€Stateððs€identificationÏtestimony.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€failure€to€give€the€òòDyleóó€instructionÍhad€no€effect€on€the€outcome€of€the€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Robinsonóó,€No.Ï02C01„9509„CR„00264,€1996€WL€417662,€at€*4€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€July,€26,Ï1996),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Feb.€3,€1997);€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€No.Ï02C01„9509„CC„002,€1996€WL€218371,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€May€1,€1996).ò òÓ  ÓÌIV.€€SENTENCINGó óÌÓ  Óà àFinally,€Appellant€alleges€that€his€sentence€is€excessive.€€Specifically,ÏAppellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€the€length€of€hisÏsentence.ÌÌà àWhen€an€appeal€challenges€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€aÏsentence,€this€Court€conducts€a€òòde€novoóó€review€with€a€presumption€that€theÏdetermination€of€the€trial€court€was€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)Ï(1990).€€However,€this€presumption€of€correctness€is€ð ðconditioned€upon€theÏaffirmative€showing€that€the€trial€court€in€the€record€considered€the€sentencingÏprinciples€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823ÏS.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€event€that€the€record€fails€to€demonstrateÏsuch€consideration,€review€of€the€sentence€is€purely€òòde€novoóó.€€òòId.óó€€If€appellateÏreview€reflects€that€the€trial€court€properly€considered€all€relevant€factors€and€itsÏfindings€of€fact€are€adequately€supported€by€the€record,€this€Court€must€affirmÏthe€sentence,€ð ðeven€if€we€would€have€preferred€a€different€result.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏFletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€In€conducting€a€review,Íthis€Court€must€consider€the€evidence,€the€presentence€report,€the€sentencingÏprinciples,€the€arguments€of€counsel,€the€nature€and€character€of€the€offense,Ïmitigating€and€enhancement€factors,€any€statements€made€by€the€defendant,Ïand€the€potential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€860€S.W.2d€53,Ï60€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€The€defendant€bears€the€burden€of€showing€theÏimpropriety€of€the€sentence€imposed.€€òòState€v.€Gregoryóó,€862€S.W.2d€574,€578Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àWe€note€initially€that,€because€the€record€demonstrates€that€the€trial€courtÏadequately€considered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€andÏcircumstances,€our€review€of€Appellantððs€sentence€will€be€òòde€novoóó€with€aÏpresumption€of€correctness.ÌÌà àIn€the€absence€of€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors,€the€presumptiveÏlength€of€sentence€for€a€Class€B,€C,€D,€and€E€felony€is€the€minimum€sentence€inÏthe€statutory€range€while€the€presumptive€length€of€sentence€for€a€Class€AÏfelony€is€the€midpoint€in€the€statutory€range.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(c)Ï(Supp.€1995).€€Where€one€or€more€enhancement€factors€apply€but€no€mitigatingÏfactors€exist,€the€trial€court€may€sentence€above€the€presumptive€sentence€butÏstill€within€the€range.€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(d).€€Where€both€enhancement€andÏmitigating€factors€apply,€the€trial€court€must€start€at€the€minimum€sentence,Íenhance€the€sentence€within€the€range€as€appropriate€to€the€enhancementÏfactors,€and€then€reduce€the€sentence€within€the€range€as€appropriate€to€theÏmitigating€factors.€€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(e).€€The€weight€afforded€an€enhancement€orÏmitigating€factor€is€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court€so€long€as€the€trial€courtÏcomplies€with€the€purposes€and€principles€of€the€Tennessee€CriminalÏSentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€and€its€findings€are€supported€by€the€record.€ÏòòState€v.€Hayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€175,€185€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àAppellant€was€convicted€of€aggravated€robbery,€a€Class€B€felony.€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„402(b).€€As€a€Range€I€standard€offender€convicted€ofÏa€Class€B€felony,€Appellantððs€statutory€sentencing€range€was€eight€to€twelveÏyears.€€òòSee€id.óó€ðð€39„17„417(c)(1).€€The€trial€court€found€the€followingÏenhancement€factors€applicable€to€the€sentence:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à(1)€the€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminalÏconvictions€or€criminal€behavior€in€addition€to€thoseÏnecessary€to€establish€the€appropriate€range;Ìà à(2)€a€victim€of€the€offense€was€particularlyÏvulnerable€because€of€age€or€physical€or€mental€ability;Ìà à(3)€the€defendant€had€no€hesitation€aboutÏcommitting€a€crime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€high;ÏandÌà à(4)€the€crime€was€committed€under€circumstancesÏunder€which€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€wasÍgreat.× ƒ, ××  ×ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€40„35„114(1),€(4),€(10),€(16).€€The€trial€court€found€no€mitigating€factors.€€AtÏthe€conclusion€of€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€trial€court€imposed€an€effectiveÏsentence€of€ten€years.€€Appellant€contests€the€application€of€all€fourÏenhancement€factors.× ƒ. ××  ×€€We€will€address€each€contested€enhancement€factor€inÏturn.ÌÌò òÓ  Ó1.€€PREVIOUS€CRIMINAL€HISTORYó óÓ  Óà àAppellant€first€argues€that€the€trialÏcourt€improperly€applied€enhancement€factor€(1),€concerning€his€previous€criminalÏhistory.€€Appellantððs€pre„sentence€report€reveals€only€a€misdemeanor€convictionÍfor€reckless€endangerment€and€various€driving€offenses.€€Nevertheless,€there€isÏno€prohibition€against€using€prior€misdemeanor€convictions€to€enhance€aÏsentence.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Dixonóó,€No.€02C01„9508„CC„00247,€1996€WL€417668,Ïat€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€July€26,€1996),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Dec.€23,Ï1996);€òòState€v.€Shyóó,€No.€01C01„9301„CC„00033,€1993€WL€247954,€at€*2Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€July€8,€1993).€€Thus,€we€conclude€that€enhancement€factor€(1)Ïis€applicable.Ì€€Ìò òÓ  Ó2.€€PARTICULAR€VULNERABILITYÌÓ  Óó óà àAppellant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€applied€enhancementÏfactor€(4),€concerning€the€particular€vulnerability€of€the€victim.€€This€enhancementÏfactor€is€applicable€when€a€victim,€as€a€result€of€natural€physical€or€mentalÏlimitations,€is€unable€to€resist€the€commission€of€a€crime,€to€call€for€help,€or€toÏtestify€against€the€perpetrator.€€òòState€v.€Hayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€175,€185€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1995).€€In€order€to€establish€this€enhancement€factor,€the€State€mustÏshow€that€the€victim€was€particularly€vulnerable€because€of€age,€physicalÏdisability,€or€mental€disability,€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Adamsóó,€864€S.W.2d€31,€35€(Tenn.Ï1993),€and€that€the€condition€of€the€victim€was€a€factor€in€the€commission€of€theÏoffense.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Sealsóó,€735€S.W.2d€849,€853„54€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€ÏThe€State€fails€to€make€such€a€showing€here.€€While€there€was€evidence€thatÏMs.€Houston€was€elderly€and€suffered€from€high€blood€pressure,€there€was€noÍevidence€offered€establishing€that€this€disability€made€her€particularly€vulnerableÏto€attack€or€her€physical€condition€was€a€factor€in€the€commission€of€the€offense.€ÏMoreover,€Ms.€Houston€was€able€to€testify€effectively€against€her€attacker.€ÏThus,€we€conclude€that€enhancement€factor€(4)€is€inapplicable.Ìò òÌÓ  Ó3.€€HIGH€RISK€TO€HUMAN€LIFEÌÓ  Óà àó óAppellant€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€applied€enhancementÏfactor€(10),€concerning€the€high€risk€to€human€life.€€While€this€enhancement€factorÏis€inapplicable€when€the€only€person€subject€to€injury€is€the€victim,€this€CourtÏhas€consistently€held€that€it€is€applicable€when€other€individuals€are€subject€to€aÏhigh€risk€of€injury.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€909€S.W.2d€461,€464€n.1€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1995);€òòState€v.€Makokaóó,€885€S.W.2d€366,€373€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€ÏThe€record€reveals€that€this€robbery€took€place€in€a€bank€lobby€open€to€theÏpublic.€€The€record€further€reveals€that€the€bank€was€situated€at€the€intersectionÏof€two€well„traveled€Memphis€streets.€€Moreover,€evidence€presented€at€trialÏestablished€that€an€unidentified€women€left€the€lobby€just€prior€to€the€robberyÏand€that€Ms.€King€entered€just€following€it.€€By€employing€a€firearm€during€theÏcommission€of€the€offense,€Appellant€subjected€not€only€Ms.€Houston€to€a€highÏrisk€of€injury€but€also€the€unidentified€woman,€Ms.€King,€and€nearby€motorists.€ÏThus,€because€individuals€other€than€the€actual€victim€were€subject€to€a€highÍrisk€of€injury€during€the€commission€of€the€offense,€we€conclude€thatÏenhancement€factor€(10)€is€applicable.Ì€€ò òÌÌÓ  Ó4.€€GREAT€POTENTIAL€FOR€BODILY€INJURY€ó óà àÌÓ  Óà àFinally,€Appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€appliedÏenhancement€factor€(16),€concerning€the€great€potential€for€bodily€injury.€€WhenÏproof€that€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€the€victim€was€great€also€proves€anÏessential€element€of€the€offense€charged,€this€enhancement€factor€isÏinapplicable.€€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€597,€599€(Tenn.€1994).€€However,€inÏsituations€where€individuals€other€than€the€victim€are€in€the€area€and€are€subjectÏto€injury,€this€enhancement€factor€is€applicable.€€òòState€v.€Simsóó,€909€S.W.2d€46,Ï50€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€Here,€the€circumstances€of€the€robbery€createdÏgreat€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€individuals€other€than€Ms.€Houston.€€As€statedÏpreviously,€Appellantððs€use€of€a€firearm€to€threaten€Ms.€Houston€also€threatenedÏthe€woman€who€had€just€left€the€bank,€Ms.€King€as€she€sat€in€her€car€justÏoutside€the€bank,€and€all€motorists€driving€past€the€bank€at€the€time€of€theÏrobbery.€€Thus,€because€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€these€individuals€wasÏgreat,€we€conclude€that€enhancement€factor€(16)€is€applicable.ÌÌà àBecause€of€the€improper€application€of€enhancement€factor€(4),€weÏmodify€Appellantððs€sentence€to€nine€years.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€convicting€Appellant€ofÏaggravated€robbery€is€affirmed.€€€The€sentence€is€modified€to€nine€years.€€€ThisÏcase€is€remanded€solely€for€entry€of€a€new€sentencing€order.ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGE