ÿWPCT …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ H 0lP 0D¼  0J 0TR 0^¦ 0h 0rl 0|Þ 0†Z 0à 1up 0då BIU>fB)¤DCÍU* AM: D3‡ߺ…™ 0@v~^vÓÜ AO¯Æþ 0DÄ D/ B7˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ q Ur [s t {u v Ew x Dy [z Ó€Ô¡¨ x3|xƒ ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd< Œ 9p`(Arial€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ""""'ÿÿdxd ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌJune€26,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó {Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àÔ€(ÔThe€defendant€was€ordered€to€pay€restitution€to€the€victimððsÏmother.€€The€trial€court€found€that€she,€and€not€the€victimððs€estate,€had€paid€theÏfuneral€and€burial€expenses.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÓÓò òÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÔ€(ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑßR€)+'A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌÌIN›€THE€CRIMINAL€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌœAT€NASHVILLEÌÌó óFebruary€1997€SESSION›ÌÌÓÓò òÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€œTENNESSEEó ó,›à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àœAppellee,›à àà àà àœ)€€€€€C.C.A.›€œNo.€01C01„9605„CC„00220›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€œDickson›€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìœò òSTEVEN€A.€BUSH,à àó ó›à àà àà à)€€€€€œHonorable€Robert€E.€Burch›Ìœò òà àà àó ó›à àà àà àà à)Ìà àœà àAppellant.›à àà àà à)€€€€€œ(Voluntary€manslaughter)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€›ÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà à€€€€€œFOR›€THE€œAPPELLEE:›ÌÌœMICHAEL€J.€FLANAGAN›à àà àà à€€€€€œJOHN›€KNOX€WALKUPÌœDALE€M.€QUILLEN›à àà àà à€€€€€œà à€€€€€Attorney›€General€&€ReporterÌœAttorneys€At€Law›Ìœ95€White€Bridge€Road€#208à àà à€€€€€€SANDY€R.€COPOUSà àÌNashville,€TN€37205à àà àà à€€€€€€Assistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€Nashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€DAN€MITCHEM€ALSOBROOKSÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€District€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€ROBERT€WILSONÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€Asst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€P.O.€Box€580Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€Charlotte,€TN€36036ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€_____________ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIEDÌÌÌó óCURWOOD€WITT,€JUDGEÇÑ7€årXXdìXXdì7Ñà@ àOPINION›ÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓà àà àThe€defendant,€Steve€A.€Bush,€brings€a€direct€appeal€from€theÏCircuit€Court€of€Dickson€County€where€he€was€indicted€for€murder€in€the€secondÏdegree€and€was€convicted€of€voluntary€manslaughter,€a€Class€C€felony.€€HeÏreceived€a€sentence€of€six€years€to€serve€in€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏCorrection€and€was€ordered€to€pay€restitution€in€the€amount€of€$8,500.00.× ƒ, ××  ×€€OnÏappeal€the€defendant€challenges€only€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€probation.€€AfterÏa€thorough€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment;€however,Ïwe€hold€that€the€order€for€payment€of€restitution€should€be€vacated.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€was€convicted€of€the€voluntary€manslaughter€of€hisÏson„in„law,€Danny€Leaster,€who€was€nineteen€years€of€age€and€lived€with€hisÏwife,€Rachel€(the€defendantððs€daughter),€and€their€infant€son€in€a€mobile€homeÏlocated€on€property€owned€by€the€defendant.€€The€Leasters€hosted€a€smallÏgathering€at€their€mobile€home€on€the€evening€of€November€4,€1994.€€After€theÏLeasters€and€guests€consumed€food€and€alcohol,€Danny€and€Rachel€LeasterÏargued.€€The€argument€culminated€in€Rachel€Leaster€leaving€the€mobile€homeÏin€Danny€Leasterððs€truck.€€Upon€learning€later€that€his€wife€had€wrecked€theÏtruck,€Danny€Leaster€and€two€companions,€Billy€Adams€and€Lisa€Leaster,€wentÏto€Stephanie€Springerððs€house€where€Rachel€Leaster,€who€was€not€hurtÍseriously€in€the€accident,€had€gone€after€the€accident.€€Rachel€Leaster,€Danny,ÏLisa€and€Billy€Adams€went€together€to€get€Danny€Leasterððs€truck.€When€theÏgroup€arrived€at€the€wreck€location,€Danny€Leaster€determined€that€a€wreckerÏwould€be€required€to€recover€the€truck.€€At€his€request,€Rachel€and€Lisa€LeasterÏtook€Adamsðð€vehicle€to€obtain€a€œwrecker.Ç›à àà àA€few€minutes€after€they€departed,€the€defendant€arrived€in€his€car.€ÏHe€was€accompanied€by€his€wife,€Stephanie€Springer,€and€Springerððs€infantÏdaughter.€€Danny€Leaster€approached€the€defendantððs€car€casually,€in€a€non„threatening€manner.€€The€defendant,€who€remained€seated€in€his€car,€accusedÏLeaster€of€assaulting€and€contributing€to€the€delinquency€of€Rachel.€€DannyÏLeaster€replied,€ð ðNo,€I€ainððt€been€hitting€her.€€Iððm€just€trying€to€get€my€G„d€truckÏout€of€the€ditch€that€your€daughter€put€in€there.ðð€€Adams,€who€had€remained€onÏthe€scene,€testified,€ð ðThe€next€thing€I€knowed,€bam.ðð€€Adams€testified€that€whenÏthe€fatal€shot€was€fired€the€victim€was€standing€ð ða€little€over€armððs€distanceðð€fromÏthe€defendantððs€car€and€was€pointing€to€his€truck.€€He€testified€that€the€victimÏwas€unarmed.ÌÌà àà àStephanie€Springer€testified€that,€after€Rachel€Leaster€wrecked€theÏvictimððs€truck€and€came€to€Springerððs€house,€Springer€spoke€with€the€defendantÏon€the€telephone€and€informed€him€that€the€Leasters€had€fought,€that€RachelÏhad€thrown€the€first€punch,€and€that€Danny€Leaster€ð ðhit€her€once.ðð€€SpringerÏtestified€that€the€defendant€and€his€wife€then€came€to€pick€up€Springer€so€thatÏshe€could€show€them€where€the€accident€had€occurred.€€She€further€testifiedÏthat€prior€to€the€shooting€there€was€no€ð ðbad€argument,€not€really€yelling,€butÏmore€of€a€high€tone.ðð€€She€testified€that€the€victim€never€made€any€movementsÏor€threatening€gestures€toward€the€defendant€and€that,€after€the€shooting,€theÏdefendant€appeared€calm.€€Rachel€Leaster€was€not€present€at€the€scene€whenÏDanny€Leaster€was€shot.ÌÌà àà àThe€jury€convicted€the€defendant€of€voluntary€manslaughter.€ÏTestimony€at€the€sentencing€hearing€(including€the€defendantððs)€and€theÏpresentence€report€show€that€the€defendant€was€sixty„one€€years€of€age€at€theÏtime€of€the€sentencing.€€He€had€been€regularly€and€continuously€employed€for€aÏlong€time€at€a€stove€plant€in€Ashland€City.€€He€testified€that€his€wife€is€diabeticÏand€has€other€illnesses€and€that€he€needed€to€remain€employed€in€order€toÏhave€medical€insurance€coverage€available€for€her.€€In€denying€probation,€€theÏtrial€judge€œreferredÇto›€the€provisions€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„210(b).€€ÏSpecifically,€he€cited€his€reliance€upon€the€evidence€adduced€at€trial€and€at€theÏsentencing€hearing,€€the€principles€of€sentencing,€the€arguments€of€counsel,€theÏfacts€supporting€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors,€and€the€nature€andÏcircumstances€of€the€crime.€€The€court€declined€to€find€any€applicable€mitigatingÏfactors€and€found€only€one€enhancement€factor,€that€the€defendant€used€aÏfirearm€during€the€commission€of€the€offense.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(9)Ï(Supp.€1996).€€The€trial€judge€acknowledged€the€principle€of€presumptiveÏminimum€sentencing€in€Class€C€cases€and€that€€the€defendant€was€essentially€aÏgood€man€œwho€had€›€ð ðworked€hard€all€his€life€.€.€.€the€type€of€man€.€.€.€the€countryÏcan€be€proud€of.ðð€€€The€court€also€acknowledged€that€the€defendant€wasÏremorseful.€€However,€the€trial€judge€determined€that€the€presence€ofÏenhancement€factor€(a)€outweighed€all€other€considerations€and€justified€theÏmaximum€sentence€within€the€range.€€The€trial€judge€then€alluded€to€the€facts€ofÏthe€case€that€were€accredited€by€the€jury,€including€the€defendantððs€armingÏhimself€prior€to€the€shooting€and€the€lack€of€provocation.€€In€the€trial€courtððsÏexpressed€opinion,€the€proof€supported€a€conviction€for€second„degree€murder.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€sentenced€the€defendant€to€serve€six€years,€theÏmaximum€within€Range€I,€Class€C.€€The€trial€court€then€acknowledged€that€it€wasÏrequired€by€law€to€consider€alternative€sentencing.€€The€trial€judge€stated,€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒœÓÓEssentially›€what€we€have€is€a€homicide.€€And€the€law€of€this€stateÏis€that€a€suspended€sentence€is€inappropriate€in€a€situation€inÏwhich€a€homicide€occurs.€€And€I€think€that€is€the€case€here,€that€itÍwould€not€be€appropriate€to€suspend€the€sentence€in€a€homicideÏcase,€particularly,€in€one€of€this€nature€in€which€a€firearm€was€usedÏand€there€was€no€provocation€and€so€forth.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒœWith›€this€explanation,€the€court€denied€the€defendantððs€request€for€œprobation.Ì›Ì̛̜ÓÓà àà àOn€appeal,€the€defendant€concedes€the€appropriateness€of€theÏlength€of€sentence€but€challenges€the€denial€of€probation.ÌÌà àà àWhen€there€is€a€challenge€to€the€length,€range,€or€manner€ofÏservice€of€a€sentence,€it€is€the€duty€of€this€court€to€conduct€a€òòde€novoóó€review€ofÏthe€record€with€a€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€the€trial€court€areÏcorrect.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)€(1990).€€This€presumption€isÏð ðconditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€courtÏconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€ÏòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€ð ðThe€burden€of€showingÏthat€the€sentence€is€improper€is€upon€the€appellant.ðð€€òòIdóó.€In€the€event€the€recordÏfails€to€demonstrate€the€required€consideration€by€the€trial€court,€review€of€theÏsentence€is€purely€òòde€novoóó.€€òòIdóó.€If€appellate€review€reflects€the€trial€courtÏproperly€considered€all€relevant€factors€and€its€findings€of€fact€are€adequatelyÏsupported€by€the€record,€this€court€must€affirm€the€sentence,€ð ðeven€if€we€wouldÏhave€preferred€a€different€result.ðð€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1991).ÌÌà àà àIn€making€its€sentencing€determination,€the€trial€court,€at€theÍconclusion€of€the€sentencing€hearing,€determines€the€range€of€sentence€andÏthen€determines€the€specific€sentence€and€the€propriety€of€sentencingÏalternatives€by€considering€(1)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€at€the€trial€and€theÏsentencing€hearing;€(2)€the€presentence€report;€(3)€the€principles€of€sentencingÏand€arguments€as€to€sentencing€alternative;€(4)€the€nature€and€characteristics€ofÏthe€criminal€conduct€involved;€(5)€evidence€and€information€offered€by€theÏparties€on€the€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors;€(6)€any€statements€theÏdefendant€wishes€to€make€in€the€defendantððs€behalf€about€sentencing;€and€(7)Ïthe€potential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(a),Ï(b)€(Supp.€1996);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(5)(1990);€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€860ÏS.W.2d€53,€60€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àà àIn€òòAshbyóó,€our€supreme€court€said:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ð[A]€case„by„case€approach€to€sentencing€underlies€this€Act€as€aÏfundamental€policy.€€An€individual€criminal€is€sentenced€based€onÏthe€nature€of€the€offense€and€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€inÏwhich€it€was€committed,€including€the€defendantððs€background...ÏAny€case„by„case€approach€will€embody€discretion,€since€all€of€theÏappropriate€factors€and€circumstances€must€be€weighed€andÏconsidered€as€a€whole€for€the€disposition€of€each€case.ðð€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€168€(Tenn.€1991)€(quoting€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727ÏS.W.2d€229,€235€(Tenn.€1986)).ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.€€Alternative€Sentencing.ÌÓ  Óó óÌà àà àThe€defendant€is€clearly€eligible€for€alternative€sentencing€inÍgeneral,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(5),€(6)€(Supp.€1996),€and€he€is€eligibleÏfor€probation€as€a€particular€alternative€to€confinement.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6).€€The€trial€court€is€required€to€automatically€consider€probation€as€aÏð ðpart€of€the€sentencing€determination€at€the€conclusion€of€the€sentencingÏhearing.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303(b)€(Supp.€1996).€€The€defendant€€isÏpresumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidate€for€alternative€sentencing,€but€theÏpresumption€of€suitability€for€alternatives€to€confinement€may€be€overcome€byÏevidence€to€the€contrary.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6).€€€ÌÌà àà àWhen€€the€defendant€requests€alternative€sentencing,€we€look€firstÏto€the€presumption€of€favorable€candidacy€and€to€the€presence€or€absence€ofÏevidence€that€would€overcome€the€presumption.€€Our€analysis€includes€theÏconsiderations€enumerated€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sections€40„35„210(b)€and€„103(5).€€One€of€these€considerations€is€the€ð ðnature€andÏcharacteristics€of€the€criminal€conduct€involved.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(b)(4)€(Supp.€1996);€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.€€In€addition€we€utilize€theÏconsiderations€for€ordering€confinement€that€appear€in€section€40„35„103(1).€ÏOne€of€these€is€semantically€linked€to€the€nature€and€circumstances€of€theÏoffense.€€It€is€the€consideration€found€in€section€40„€35„103(1)(B):€ConfinementÏmay€be€ordered€when€it€is€ð ðnecessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€ofÏthe€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(1)(B)€(1990).ÌÌà àà àThe€nexus€between€the€nature€and€circumstances€of€the€offenseÍand€sentencing€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense€is€wellÏœrecognized.€€òòState›€v.€Hartleyóó,€818€S.W.2d€370,€375€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€ÏThe€nature€and€circumstances€of€the€offense€may€serve€as€the€sole€basis€forÏdenying€probation€when€the€facts€are€ð ðespecially€violent,€horrifying,€shocking,Ïreprehensible,€offensive€or€otherwise€of€an€excessive€or€exaggerated€degree;Ïand€it€would€have€to€be€clear€that,€therefore,€the€nature€of€the€offense,€asÏcommitted,€outweighed€all€other€factors€...€which€might€be€favorable€to€grant€ofÏprobation.ðð€€òòState€v.€Travisóó,€622€S.W.2d€529,€534€(Tenn.€1981);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.ÏCleavoróó,€691€S.W.2d€541,€543€(Tenn.€1985).€€€ð ðThis€standard€has€essentiallyÏbeen€codified€in€the€first€part€of€T.C.A.€Section€40„35„103(1)(B)€which€providesÏfor€confinement€if€it€is€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€theÏoffense.ðð€€òòHartleyóó,€818€S.W.2d€at€375.€€Thus,€the€òòTravisóó€qualifiers€apply€underÏthe€first€clause€of€section€40„35„103(1)(B)€to€assist€the€court€in€determiningÏwhen€the€need€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense€overcomesÏthe€presumption€of€suitability€for€alternative€sentencing.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€case€now€before€us,€the€defendant€asks€for€probation,Ïalthough€€he€mentions€on€appeal,€for€the€first€time€in€the€case,€the€possibility€ofÏsplit€confinement.€€Since€split€confinement€is€a€sentence€composed€partially€ofÏconfinement€and€partially€of€probation,€we€discern€his€request€for€alternativeÏsentencing€to€be€a€request€for€probation€entirely,€or€failing€that,€probation€as€aÏpart€of€split€confinement.ÌÌà àà àAt€the€sentencing€hearing,€probation€was€the€only€form€ofÏalternative€sentencing€proposed€to€the€trial€court.€€When€probation€is€the€onlyÏform€of€alternative€sentencing€sought,€a€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€probationÏrequest€€could€be€founded€upon€(1)€a€threshold€finding€that€the€presumption€ofÏsuitability€for€alternative€sentencing€has€been€overcome€by€evidence€to€theÏcontrary,€or€(2)€a€finding€that€the€defendant,€although€found€to€be€suitable€forÏalternative€œsentencing,Çhas›€failed€to€carry€his€burden€of€showing€that€he€is€entitled€to€probation.€€òòSeeóóÏòòState€v.€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.Ï1995);€€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303(b)€(Supp.€1996).€€ÌÌà àà àFor€purposes€of€our€review€in€this€case,€we€find€that€the€trial€courtÏdisposed€of€the€issue€of€alternative€sentencing€at€the€threshold€stage.€€HeÏentertained€the€threshold€question€of€suitability€for€alternative€sentencing€inÏgeneral€and€essentially€found€that€confinement€was€necessary.€€This€finding€is,Ïof€course,€a€finding€that€the€presumption€in€favor€of€alternative€sentencing€isÏovercome€and€that€the€defendantððs€claim€to€alternative€sentencing€is€defeated.€ÏHis€claim€to€probation,€as€an€included€form€of€alternative€sentencing,€isÏnecessarily€defeated€òòipso€factoóó.€€ÌÌà àà àGiven€this€history€of€the€proceeding,€we€review€the€trial€courtððsÏdisposition€of€the€issue€at€the€threshold€stage.€€We€find€that€the€trial€judgeÏplaced€on€the€record€his€reliance€upon€the€principles€of€sentencing€and€uponÏthe€other€factors€mandated€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„210(b)€and€that€he€recorded€his€findings€and€recited€the€basis€for€such€findings.€ÏTherefore,€we€review€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€with€the€presumption€that€theÏdeterminations€are€correct.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€acted€arbitrarily€inÏdenying€probation€merely€because€this€is€a€homicide€case.€€He€cites€the€trialÍcourtððs€comment€that€in€homicide€cases€probation€would€be€inappropriate.€ÏAlthough€it€has€been€held€that€ð ðexceptional€circumstances€must€be€shown€inÏorder€to€support€probation€in€a€case€involving€the€death€of€another€person,ððÏòòKilgore€v.€Stateóó,€588€S.W.2d€567,€568€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1979),€the€legislatureÏhas€altered€the€rule€by€making€probation€available€for€offenses€such€as€the€oneÏnow€before€us.€ð ð[R]eliance€upon€the€mere€fact€that€a€violent€crime€wasÏcommitted€in€order€to€deny€probation€is€ordinarily€insufficient€to€justify€totalÏdenial€of€probation.ðð€òòState€v.€Howard€Martin€Adamsóó,€No.€03C01„9403„CR„00123,€slip€op.€at€18€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€January€11,€1995).€€Indeed,Ïð ðwhen€the€legislature€provides€probation€eligibility€for€an€inherently€violentÏoffense,€the€mere€fact€that€the€offense€was€committed€is€an€insufficient€basis€toÏdeny€probation.ðð€€òòIdóó;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Travisóó,€622€S.W.2d€529,€533„534€(Tenn.Ï1981);€òòState€v.€Hartleyóó,€818€S.W.2d€370,€374€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€ÏTherefore,€if€the€trial€judge€denied€probation€merely€because€this€probation„eligible€offense€was€committed,€the€denial€of€probation€for€such€reason€aloneÏwould€be€unjustified.ÌÌà àà àWe€note€that€the€trial€judge€qualified€his€comments€about€theÏpropriety€of€probation€in€homicide€cases€by€adding€that€probation€is€notÏappropriate,€ð ðparticularly,€in€[a€case]€of€this€nature.ðð€€Furthermore,€the€courtÏexpressly€grounded€the€denial€of€alternative€sentencing€in€the€evidence,€theÏstatutory€principles€of€sentencing,€and€on€the€nature€and€circumstances€of€theÏoffense.€€The€defendant€armed€himself€and€then€shot€the€victim.€€In€the€courtððsÍview,€there€was€no€privilege€nor€provocation€for€committing€this€homicide.€€In€itsÏorder€overruling€the€motion€for€new€trial,€the€court€stated€that€confinement€wasÏnecessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„103(1)(B)€(1990).€€The€trial€judge€reached€this€result,€ð ðgiven€theÏfacts€of€this€case€and€the€length€of€the€sentence,ðð€because€he€determined€thatÏthe€jury€had€extended€leniency€to€the€defendant€in€acquitting€him€of€second„degree€murder.€€This€factor€is€properly€considered€by€the€court€in€€finding€thatÏconfinement€is€necessary€under€section€103(1)(B).€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Fredrick€DonaÏBlackóó,€No.€03C01„9404„CR„00139,€slip€op.€at€3„4€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,ÏApril€6,€1995);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Nealy€Walter€Perryóó,€No.€89„133„III,€slip€op.€at€4„5€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€August€29.,€1990)€(Dwyer,€J.,€concurring€andÏdissenting).€€ÌÌà àà àThe€record€in€this€case€demonstrates€a€basis€for€concluding€thatÏthe€nature€of€the€offense€as€committed€is€especially€reprehensible€and/orÏoffensive,€satisfying€òòTravisóó€and€òòHartleyóó.€€The€punishment€for€the€unjustifiedÏkilling€of€this€unarmed,€non„threatening€victim€is€limited€to€a€term€of€six€years.€ÏThe€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€alternative€sentencing€based€onÏits€finding€that€€confinement€is€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousnessÏof€this€offense.ÌÌà àà àAs€pointed€out€above,€alternative€sentencing€issues€must€beÏdetermined€by€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€individual€case.€€òòState€v.ÍMossóó,€727€S.W.2d€229,€235€(Tenn.€1986).€€If€the€trial€court€has€considered€theÏrelevant€facts€and€the€findings€are€adequately€supported€in€the€record,€the€trialÏcourt€has€the€discretion€to€resolve€these€issues,€bottoming€the€case€upon€itsÏown€facts.€€òòState€v.€Tayloróó,€744€S.W.2d€919,€922€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987);€òòseeÏAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€168;€òòFletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€at€789.ÌÌà àà àThe€presumption€of€suitability€for€alternative€sentencing€has€beenÏovercome€by€proof€to€the€contrary.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€thatÏconfinement€is€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense€isÏsupported€in€the€record,€and€the€action€of€the€trial€court€in€denying€alternativeÏsentencing€is€affirmed.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓII.€€Restitution.ÌÌÓ  Óó óà àà àOn€this€appeal€the€defendant€has€not€raised€the€issue€of€the€trialÏcourtððs€order€of€restitution.€€Nevertheless,€we€review€this€issue€under€ourÏauthority€to€address€plain€error:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓAn€error€which€has€affected€the€substantial€rights€of€an€accusedÏmay€be€noticed€at€any€time,€even€though€not€raised€in€the€motionÏfor€new€trial€or€assigned€as€error€on€appeal,€in€the€discretion€of€theÏappellate€court€where€necessary€to€do€substantial€justice.ò òÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓó óTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(b).€€The€ordering€of€restitution€in€this€cause€is€an€errorÏaffecting€the€substantial€rights€of€the€defendant€in€light€of€the€Tennessee€lawÏapplicable€to€this€case€as€amplified€in€òòState€v.€Davisóó,€940€S.W.2d€559€(Tenn.Í1997).€€In€òòDavisóó€our€supreme€court€considered€whether€a€trial€court€had€theÏstatutory€authority€to€order€restitution€along€with€a€sentence€of€incarceration.€ÏThe€court€reviewed€the€language€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sections€40„35„104(c)(2),€„303(d)(10),€and€„304(a)€and€found€that€restitution€may€be€orderedÏin€conjunction€with€a€sentence€of€confinement€only€when€the€latter€is€suspendedÏand€the€defendant€placed€on€probation.€€òòDavisóó,€940€S.W.2d€at€561.€€The€courtÏconcluded€that€a€trial€court€has€no€authority€to€ð ðimpose€restitution€as€part€of€aÏcustodial€sentence.ðð€€òòDavisóó,€940€S.W.2d€at€562.ÌÌà àà àThe€legislature€amended€section€40„35„104(c)(2)€in€order€toÏprovide€for€the€payment€of€restitution€in€addition€to€ð ðany€other€sentenceÏauthorized€by€this€subsection.ðð€€Pub.€Acts,€ch.€699€(1996).€€This€amendmentÏapplies€to€any€defendant€€sentenced€on€or€after€July€1,€1996.€€The€defendant€inÏthe€case€now€before€us€was€sentenced€on€June€21,€1995.€Therefore,€the€ruleÏannounced€in€òòDavisóó€controls,€and€we€must€conclude€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏhave€the€statutory€authority€to€order€restitution€as€a€part€of€the€defendantððsÏsentence€of€confinement.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Timothy€Alan€Lockridgeóó,€No.Ï01C01„9603„CR„00090,€slip.€op.€at€6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€May€7,€1997)Ï(finding€that€an€order€of€restitution€in€conjunction€with€confinement€is€notÏstatutorily„authorized€under€òòDavisóó,€when€the€sentencing€occurred€prior€to€July€1,Ï1996).€€The€requirement€of€the€payment€of€restitution€must€be€vacated.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIII.€€Conclusion.ÌÌÓ  Óó óà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€modified€in€order€to€vacate€theÏorder€of€payment€of€restitution,€and€in€all€other€respects€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€is€affirmed.ò òÌó óà àà àÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€Curwood€Witt,€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_________________________ÌGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeÌÌÌ_________________________ÌDavid€G.€Hayes,€Judge