ÿWPCá …# VUNa %¯ 0(µÝ 0lå 0DQ w@• 4Õ é bø 0J 0TJ 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh U,Ý 0d U,mU>™U *×B) B*DCG AMŠ D3×, Y6 0@Ïv~ëvÓi AO<Æ‹ 0DQ D/• BĘHP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó }[~[E€‚ƒ„…†Ó€ypÑ 3|x‘- ù-2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d&&&&7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ'''''ÿÿdxd "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌò òJuly€15,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€%ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó OÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔThis€act€was€repealed,€effective€July€1995,€and€recodified€under€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏà àsection€40„30„201,€et€seq.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIn€òòMeadowsóó,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€ð ða€new€state€constitutional€rule€is€to€be€retroactivelyÏapplied€to€a€claim€for€post„conviction€relief€if€the€new€rule€materially€enhances€the€integrity€and€reliability€ofÏthe€fact€finding€process€of€the€trial.ðð€€849€S.W.2d€at€755.€€Here,€the€decision€which€the€Petitioner€claimsÏsets€forth€a€new€constitutional€rule€requiring€retroactive€application€is€federal.€€Thus,€we€are€bound€byÏfederal€retroactivity€analysis.€€òòSeeóó€òòGreat€Northern€Ry€Co.€v.€Sunburst€Oil€&€Refining€Co.óó,€287€U.S.€358,Ï364„65€(1932).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€##X„d&ÓÑ#€##Xd#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€$ŠÔÔ€%ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ ÑÑ7€vXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßL€)+(;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›IN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌAT€œKNOXVILLE›ÌÌœJANUARY›€SESSION,€œ1996›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœJAMES€DAVID€CARTER,à à)›à àC.C.A.€NO.Ïœ03C01„9506„CC„00179›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àœAppellant,›à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœGREENE›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œJAMES€E.€BECKNERó ó›Ìò òœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó ó›à àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àœAppellee.›à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Post„Conviction)Ìà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà à(Death€Penalty)ò òÌó óÌÌÓ  Óò òON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCRIMINAL›€COURT€OF€œGREENE€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœGARY€C.€SHOCKLEY›à àà àà àœCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌ207€Mockingbird€Laneà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌP.O.€Box€3038ÌJohnson€City,€TN€37601à àà àà àJOHN€P.€CAULEYÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àC.€BERKELEY€BELLÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àERIC€CHRISTIANSENÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à113€West€Church€St.,€Suite€JÌà àà àà àà àà àà àGreeneville,€TN€37743›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€%°Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€%ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€of€the€TennesseeÏRules€of€Appellate€Procedure€from€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€his€third€petitionÏfor€post„conviction€relief.€€The€Petitioner€was€convicted€œon€a€jury€verdict€of›€firstÏdegree€murder.€€He€was€sentenced€to€death€by€electrocution.€€The€trial€courtÏdenied€the€Petitioner€post„conviction€relief€because€two€of€the€three€issues€hadÏbeen€previously€determined€and€the€third€issue€lacked€merit.€€We€affirm€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court.€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€was€convicted€of€first€degree€murder€in€November€of€1984.€ÏœHe€had›€kidnaped€the€victim€from€a€rest€area,€driven€him€to€an€area€nearÏCherokee€Lake€and€shot€and€killed€him.€€The€Petitioner€attempted€to€push€theÏvictimððs€body€off€a€bluff€into€œthe€lake,›€but€the€body€landed€on€a€rocky€ledgeÏwhere€it€was€subsequently€found.€€The€Petitioner€unsuccessfully€appealed€hisÏconviction€to€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court.€€òòState€v.€Carteróó,€714€S.W.2d€241Ï(Tenn.€1986),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€479€U.S.€1046€(1987).€€The€Petitioner€then€appealedÏto€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€and€œthe›€Court€denied€certiorari.€€òòTennesseeÏv.€Carteróó,€479€U.S.€1046€(1987).€€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€then€filed€the€first€of€his€post„conviction€petitions€which€wasÏdenied€and€then€appealed€to€the€Tennessee€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€òòJamesÏDavid€Carter€v.€Stateóó,€No.€304€Greene€County,€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,Ïfiled€Sept.€14,€1989).€€His€first€petition€was€unsuccessful.€€òòId.óó€€The€PetitionerððsÏsecond€post„conviction€petition€was€filed€prior€to€the€time€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€had€rendered€a€decision€on€his€first€petition.€€The€trial€court€denied€theÏPetitioner€relief€on€the€grounds€that€the€issues€argued€had€been€previouslyÏdetermined.€€òòCarter€v.€Stateóó,€802€S.W.2d€223,€224€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990),Ïòòpermóó.€œòòtoóó€òòappealóó›€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1991).€€On€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€decision,Ïthis€court€œaffirmed€the€denial€of€relief›€because€the€Petitioner€had€simultaneousÏactions€pending€in€state€courts.€€òòId.óó€at€225.ÌÌà àAfter€the€failure€of€his€two€post„conviction€petitions,€the€Petitioner€filed€aÏpetition€for€writ€of€habeas€corpus€with€the€United€States€District€Court€in€theÏEastern€District€of€Tennessee€in€March€of€1991.€In€November€and€December€ofÏ1994,€the€District€Court€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€State€concerningÏcertain€issues€raised€in€the€œpetition€for€writ›€of€habeas€corpus.€€Among€œthe€issues›Ïdismissed€were€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue€and€the€òòBradyóó€issue€that€areÏœaddressed€herein.€€At€the€time€this€opinion€in€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó€was€written,Ïthe€Petitioner€had€a€pending€issue€remaining€in€the€District€Court€concerning€theÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€filed€this,€his€third,€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€onÏJanuary€30,€1995.€€The€issues€in€this€petition€were€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue,Ïconcerning€the€application€of€the€aggravating€circumstance€at€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€39„2„203(I)(7)€(1982),€the€òòBradyóó€issue,€concerning€certainÏinformation€that€the€State€failed€to€disclose€at€trial,€and€an€argument€that€theÏinstructions€to€the€jury€concerning€the€definition€of€ð ðreasonable€doubtðð€wereÏunconstitutional€under€a€1994€United€States€Supreme€Court€case.€€The€trial€courtÏdenied€the€Petitioner€relief€on€the€grounds€that€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€and€òòBradyóóÏissues€had€been€previously€determined€and€that€the€third€issue€was€withoutÏmerit.€€The€Petitioner€now€appeals€the€dismissal€of€his€petition€by€the€trial€court.€ÏHe€argues€that€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€and€òòBradyóó€issues€have€not€been€ð ðpreviouslyÏdeterminedðð€by›€the€United€States€District€Court€and€œthat€the›€third€issue€doesÏhave€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.€€Middlebrooks€and€Brady€œIssuesó ó›ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Petitionerððs€first€issue€is€that€the€United€States€District€CourtððsÏinterlocutory€order€did€not€ð ðpreviously€determineðð€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€and€òòBradyóóÏissues€brought€by€the€Petitioner€in€his€œpetition›€for€œpost„conviction›€relief.€€ThisÏissue€is€further€divided€into€two€sub„issues.€€His€first€sub„issue€is€that€the€DistrictÍCourt€was€not€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€to€rule€on€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue.€ÏThe€œsecond›€œsub„issue›€is€that€the€District€Courtððs€interlocutory€order€was€not€aÏruling€on€the€merits€after€a€full€and€fair€hearing.ÌÌÓ  Óò òA.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àWe€will€first€address€whether€the€District€Court€was€a€court€of€competentÏjurisdiction€to€decide€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue.€€The€District€Court€submitted€aÏMemorandum€Opinion€concerning€the€œclaims›€to€be€œdismissed€and€addressedÏthe€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue€in€this€memorandum€opinion.€€The€District€Court€stated:ÌÓÓÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒòòFelony€Murder€Aggravator€Violates€Eighth€Amendmentóó€€TheÏpetitioner€alleges€that€the€imposition€of€capital€punishment€in€hisÏcase€violates€the€Eighth€Amendment€because€the€felony€murderÏaggravator€found€by€the€jury€is€invalid€under€the€holding€in€òòStateÏv.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992),€òòcert.óó€òògrantedóó,Ï___€U.S.€___,€113€S.Ct.€1840€(1993),€òòcert.óó€òòdismissedóó,€___€U.S.Ï___,€114€S.Ct.€651€(1993).€€Under€Tennessee€law,€use€of€theÏfelony€murder€aggravating€circumstance€to€impose€capitalÏpunishment€is€invalid€under€certain€circumstances.€€TheÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that:ÌÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` Ò[W]hen€the€defendant€is€convicted€of€first„degreeÏmurder€òòsolelyóó€on€the€basis€of€felony€murder,€theÏaggravating€circumstance€set€out€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€39„2„203(I)(7)€(1982)€and€39„2„203(I)(7)Ï(1991),€does€not€narrow€the€class€of€death„eligibleÏmurderers€sufficiently€under€the€Eighth€AmendmentÏto€the€U.S.€Constitution,€and€Article€I,€ðð€16€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution€because€it€duplicates€theÏelements€of€the€offense.ÌÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒòòState€v.€Middlebrooksóó,€òòsupraóó,€at€346€(emphasis€supplied).Ìà àThe€Court€first€notes€that€there€is€no€constitutional€infirmityÏwhen€a€jury€renders€a€general€verdict€of€guilty€of€first€degreeÏmurder€where€both€premeditated€and€felony€murder€areÏsubmitted€to€the€jury,€even€though€the€verdict€does€not€indicateÏwhether€the€defendant€has€been€found€guilty€of€premeditated€orÏfelony€murder.€òòSchad€v.€Arizonaóó,€115€L.Ed.€2d.€555,€574€(1991).€ÏFurther,€it€does€not€appear€that€the€verdict€itself€is€infirm€underÏstate€law;€state€law€provides€that€a€general€verdict€of€guilty€isÏsustainable€if€any€one€count€in€the€indictment€is€sustained€byÏproof.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„18„111.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Coeóó,€655€S.W.2dÏ903€(Tenn.€1983),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€464€U.S.€1063€(1984).€€In€theÏpetitionerððs€case,€both€premeditated€and€felony€murder€were,€inÏfact,€submitted€to€the€jury.Ìà àThe€essence€of€the€petitionerððs€argument€is€that€theÏEighth€Amendment€requires€this€court€to€completely€excludeÏpremeditation€as€a€basis€of€liability€for€first€degree€murder€in€theÏgeneral€verdict,€and€to€presume€that€the€petitioner€wasÏconvicted€solely€on€the€basis€of€felony€murder.€€A€careful€reviewÏof€the€record€shows€there€is€sufficient€proof€of€premeditation,€soÏthat€this€Court€is€unable€to€exclude€premeditated€murder€as€aÏbasis€for€the€juryððs€verdict€of€first€degree€murder.€€Therefore,ÏòòMiddlebrooksóó€does€not€apply€to€invalidate€the€felony€murderÏaggravating€circumstance€in€his€case€because€the€record€doesÏnot€show€that€the€petitioner€was€convicted€òòsolelyóó€on€the€basisÏof€felony€murder.€€Ìà àIf€the€felony€murder€aggravator€is€not€invalid€under€stateÏlaw,€then€the€Eighth€Amendment€has€not€been€violated€throughÏits€use€to€impose€a€capital€sentence.€€òòLowenfeld€[sic]€v.€Phelpsóó,Ï484€U.S.€231,€246„47€(1988)€(Use€of€an€aggravatingÏcircumstance€which€duplicates€an€element€of€the€capital€offenseÏto€impose€the€death€penalty€is€not€invalid€under€the€federalÏconstitution).€This€claim€will€be€dismissed.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÌÌÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€argues€in€his€brief€that€the€District€Court€was€not€competentÏto€rule€on€the€validity€of€the€Petitionerððs€death€sentence€because€the€sentenceÍwas€based€on€an€aggravating€circumstance€that€was€invalid€as€a€matter€ofÏstate€law.€€He€argues€that€in€such€a€case€the€District€Court€must€remand€to€aÏstate€court€to€reweigh€the€factors.€€While€we€agree€that€this€is€a€correctÏstatement€of€law,€we€believe€it€does€not€apply€to€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€becauseÏapplication€of€the€aggravating€circumstance€is€not€invalid€under€òòMiddlebrooksóóÏand€thus,€no€reweighing€is€required.›ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€application€of€the€aggravating€factor€is€not€invalid€inÏthe€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€restricted€the€invalidity€ofÏthe€felony€murder€aggravating€circumstance€to€a€conviction€based€solely€onÏfelony€murder.€€òòMiddlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€at€346.€€As€stated€above€in€theÏDistrict€Courtððs€opinion,€the€œPetitionerððs€first€degree€murder€conviction€was€notÏbased€solely€on€felony€murder,€but€rather€on€a€combination€of€felony€andÏpremeditated€murder.€€ÌÌà àThis€court€has€stated:ÌÓÓÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒWhen€a€defendant€is€convicted€of€felony€murder€in€this€state,€theÏunderlying€felony€may€not€be€used€as€an€aggravatingÏcircumstance€in€the€death€penalty€phase€of€the€trial.€€òòSeeóó€òòStateÏv.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992),€òòcert.óó€òòdismissedóó,Ï___€U.S.€___,€114€S.Ct.€651,€126€L.Ed.€555€(1993);€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„13„202(a)(1)€and€(2).€€The€felony€may€be€used,Ïhowever,€when€the€defendant€has€been€found€guilty€ofÏpremeditated€first€degree€murder.€€Thus,€while€a€merger€of€theseÍtwo€offenses€is€not€error,€the€issue€of€whether€the€underlyingÏfelony€may€be€used€in€the€death€penalty€phase€under€our€stateÏconstitutional€guidelines€has€not€yet€been€resolved.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Zirkleóó,€910€S.W.2d€874,€889„90€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóóÏòòdeniedóó,€òòid.óó€(Tenn.€1995).€€This€court€did€not€address€the€specific€question€raisedÏin€this€case€because€the€òòZirkleóó€case€did€not€involve€the€application€of€the€deathÏpenalty€where€the€defendant€had€been€convicted€of€both€felony€murder€and€firstÏdegree€murder.ÌÌà àWe€will€address€the€question€as€to€whether€the€merger€of€first€degreeÏmurder€and€felony€murder€preclude€the€application€of€the€felony€aggravatingÏfactor.€€As€stated€above,€there€is€no€constitutional€violation€when€a€defendant€isÏconvicted€of€a€combination€of€felony€murder€and€premeditated€murder.€€òòSchad€v.ÏArizonaóó,€501€U.S.€624,€644€(1991).€€Therefore,€the€conviction€can€stand€as€aÏconviction€for€first€degree€murder€based€on€both€felony€murder€and€premeditatedÏmurder.€€òòMiddlebrooksóó€applies€only€when€the€conviction€is€solely€for€felonyÏmurder.€€Because€the€Petitioner€was€convicted€of€a€combination€of€felony€murderÏand€premeditated€murder,€as€opposed€to€felony€murder€alone,€òòMiddlebrooksóóÏwould€not€apply.ÌÌà àThe€holding€in€òòMiddlebrooksóó€does€not€apply€to€invalidate€the€aggravatingÏfactor€and€thus€does€not€require€a€reweighing€of€the€aggravating€factors.€€NoÏremand€to€the€state€court€was€necessary.€€Therefore,€the€District€Court€hadÏjurisdiction€to€rule€on€the€application€of€òòMiddlebrooksóó€in€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó.€€WeÏconclude€that€the€United€States€District€Court€previously€determined€this€issue,Ïand€did€so€correctly.ÌÌà àThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òB.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àWe€now€turn€to€the€question€of€whether€the€District€Courtððs€InterlocutoryÏOrder€concerning€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€and€òòBradyóó€issues€constitutes€a€ruling€on€theÏmerits€after€a€full€and€fair€hearing,€and€therefore,€whether€these€issues€haveÏbeen€previously€determined€by€the€District€Court.€€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€40„30„112(a)€reads,€ð ðA€ground€for€relief€is€ððpreviously€determinedðð€if€aÏcourt€of€competent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€full€and€fair€hearing.ðð€€ÌÌà àWe€have€already€determined€that€the€District€Court€was€a€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€to€rule€on€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€claim.€€The€question€nowÏbefore€us€is€whether€the€Petitioner€was€afforded€a€full€and€fair€hearing.ÌÌà àIn€a€recent€case,€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€705€(Tenn.€1995),€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€addressed€the€question€of€what€constitutes€a€fullÏand€fair€hearing.€€In€òòHouseóó,€the€supreme€court€stated,€ð ðWe€conclude€that€a€ððfullÏand€fair€hearingðð€sufficient€to€support€a€finding€of€previous€determination€occurs€ifÏa€petitioner€is€given€the€opportunity€to€present€proof€and€argument.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€714.ÌÌà àIt€is€apparent€from€the€District€Courtððs€order€and€detailed€memorandumÏopinion€that€the€court€had€the€record€of€the€Petitionerððs€trial€before€it.€€The€courtÏcould€not€have€made€the€rulings€without€the€record.€€In€the€order€addressing€theÏòòBradyóó€issue,€the€court€mentions€the€brief€it€ordered€from€the€Petitioner€on€theÏòòBradyóó€issue.€€On€the€òòBradyóó€issue,€at€the€request€of€the€District€Court,€theÏPetitioner€submitted€a€brief€in€answer€to€the€Stateððs€Motion€for€SummaryÏJudgment,€and€the€District€Court€reviewed€the€record.€€Therefore,€under€theÏstandard€enunciated€in€òòHouseóó,€the€òòBradyóó€issue€was€accorded€a€full€and€fairÏhearing.€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€same€is€true€as€to€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue.€€ð ðNoticeÏpleadingðð€is€not€sufficient€for€writ€of€habeas€corpus€petitions.€€òòAubut€v.€Maineóó,Ï431€F.2d€688,€689€(1st€Cir.€1970).€€Thus,€we€can€safely€assume€from€theÏrequirement€that€pleadings€must€have€more€substance€than€ð ðnotice€pleadingsððÍand€from€the€detail€of€the€District€courtððs€order€that€the€Petitioner€was€givenÏample€opportunity€to€argue€his€position.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€there€wasÏalso€a€full€and€fair€hearing€of€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue€under€òòHouseóó.ÌÌà àTherefore,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àò òII.€€Jury€Instructionó óÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓÌà àThe€Petitioner€next€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€instructions€on€reasonableÏdoubt€at€the€guilt€and€sentencing€phases€of€his€trial€violated€his€due€processÏrights€under€the€United€States€Constitution.€€The€Petitioner€contends€that€theÏphrase€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€used€in€the€instructions€allowed€a€finding€of€guilt€andÏaggravating€circumstances€based€on€a€degree€of€proof€below€that€which€isÏconstitutionally€required.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€bases€his€claim€upon€the€recent€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€decision€in€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó,€__U.S.€__,€114€S.€Ct.€1239€(1994)€and€itsÏcompanion€case,€òòSandoval€v.€Californiaóó,€òòidóó.€€He€argues€that€òòVictoróó€set€forth€aÏnew€constitutional€rule€that€should€be€retroactively€applied.€€The€State€disagreesÏand€argues€that€òòVictoróó€did€not€announce€a€new€rule€ð ðso€novel€that€[theÏPetitioner]€could€not€have€raised€it€on€direct€appeal€or€in€his€first€post„convictionÍproceeding.ðð€€Thus,€the€State€contends€that€the€Petitioner€waived€this€claim€byÏfailing€to€present€it€at€an€earlier€proceeding,€and€additionally,€that€the€issue€isÏtime„barred€because€it€was€not€brought€within€the€statute€of€limitations.ÌÌà àThe€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€provides€relief€to€a€Petitioner€who€hasÏsuffered€an€abridgement€of€any€right€guaranteed€by€the€United€States€orÏTennessee€Constitutions.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„105.× ƒ, ××  ×€€The€applicable€actÏprovided€a€three„year€statute€of€limitations€from€the€date€of€the€final€action€of€theÏhighest€state€appellate€court€to€which€an€appeal€was€taken€or€the€petition€mustÏbe€dismissed€as€being€time„barred.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102.€€However,Ïthe€petition€will€not€be€barred€if€the€Petitioner€is€asserting€a€violation€of€a€rightÏthat€was€not€recognized€as€existing€at€the€time€if€either€constitution€requiresÏretrospective€application€of€that€right.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„105.ÌÌà àThe€State€asserts€that€this€was€not€a€novel€issue,€and€therefore,€it€isÏwaived€because€the€Petitioner€did€not€raise€it€on€direct€appeal€or€in€his€firstÏpetition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€The€Petitioner€contends€that€the€issue€is€notÏwaived€because€the€legal€basis€for€his€claim€was€not€available€prior€to€1994,Ïwhen€òòVictoróó€was€decided.€€The€Petitioner€is€correct€that€òòVictoróó€was€handedÍdown€well€after€the€statute€of€limitations€had€passed.€€He€apparently€arguesÏthat€he€is€properly€before€this€court€because€the€right€resulting€from€òòVictoróó€wasÏnot€previously€recognized.€€If€so,€the€Petitioner€is€not€precluded€by€either€a€priorÏwaiver€of€the€issue€or€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€ÌÌà àIn€order€to€determine€whether€due€process€precludes€application€of€theÏstatute€of€limitations€under€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204€(Tenn.€1992),€weÏmust€first€determine€whether€òòVictoróó€and€òòSandovalóó€created€a€new€constitutionalÏright;€if€so,€then€we€must€determine€whether€such€right€should€be€appliedÏretroactively.€€òòMeadows€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€748€(Tenn.€1993).€ÌÌà àIn€òòMeadowsóó,€the€Supreme€Court€stated€that€ð ða€case€announces€a€newÏrule€if€the€result€was€not€òòdictatedóó€by€precedent€existing€at€the€time€theÏdefendantððs€conviction€€became€final.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€751€(quoting€òòTeague€v.€Laneóó,€489ÏU.S.€288,€301€(1989)(emphasis€in€original)).€€Retroactive€application€of€a€newÏrule€of€federal€constitutional€law€must€be€given€retroactive€application€to€casesÏon€collateral€review€if€(1)€the€rule€places€certain€kinds€of€primary,€privateÏindividual€conduct€beyond€the€power€of€the€state€to€proscribe,€or€(2)€the€ruleÍrequires€the€observance€of€procedures€implicit€in€the€concept€of€ordered€liberty.€ÏòòTeague€v.€Laneóó,€489€U.S.€at€307.× ƒ. ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€issue€of€whether€a€petitioner€is€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitationsÏfrom€challenging€the€constitutionality€of€a€reasonable€doubt€instruction€wasÏraised€in€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó€òòtoóóÏòòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1994).€€In€òòPettyjohnóó,€this€Court€held€that€the€instructionÏdid€not€violate€due€process€under€òòCage€v.€Louisianaóó,€498€U.S.€39€(1990)€andÏòòSullivan€v.€Louisianaóó,€508€U.S.€275€(1993),€which€preceded€òòVictoróó€andÏòòSandovalóó.€€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€at€366.€€While€this€Court€held€thatÏthe€trial€court€correctly€dismissed€the€petition€as€barred€by€the€three„year€statuteÏof€limitations,€application€of€the€two„prong€analysis€set€out€in€òòTeagueóó€wasÏunnecessary€because€the€Court€found€that€the€specific€jury€instruction€did€notÏviolate€due€process€under€òòCageóó.€€We€too€find€that€this€analysis€is€unnecessaryÏbecause€on€the€merits,€the€Petitionerððs€claim€does€not€present€a€constitutionalÏviolation.ÌÌà àA€longstanding€tenet€of€criminal€law€is€that€the€government€must€proveÏevery€element€of€a€charged€offense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòIn€re€Winshipóó,Ï397€U.S.€358€(1970).€€The€due€process€provisions€of€our€state€and€federalÏconstitutions€require€that€the€reasonable€doubt€standard€be€used,€but€they€doÏnot€specify€that€any€particular€definition€or€form€of€words€be€used€in€instructingÏthe€jury€on€the€governmentððs€burden€of€proof.€€Rather,€ð ðtaken€as€a€whole,€theÏinstructions€[must]€correctly€conve[y]€the€concept€of€reasonable€doubt€to€the€jury.ðð€ÏòòHolland€v.€United€Statesóó,€348€U.S.€121,€140€(1954).ÌÌà àIn€òòVictoróó,€the€Court€stated€that€the€proper€inquiry€for€a€jury€instruction€is€notÏwhether€the€instruction€ð ðcould€haveðð€been€applied€in€an€unconstitutional€manner,Ïbut€whether€there€is€a€reasonable€likelihood€that€the€jury€òòdidóó€so€apply€it.€114ÏU.S.€at€1242€(citing€òòEstelle€v.€McGuireóó,€502€U.S.€62,€72€n.€4€(1991)).€€ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€during€the€guiltÏphase€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€law€presumes€that€the€defendant€is€innocent€of€theÏcharges€against€him.€€This€presumption€remains€with€the€defendantÏthroughout€every€stage€of€the€trial,€and€it€is€not€overcome€unlessÏfrom€all€the€evidence€in€the€case€you€are€convinced€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt€that€the€defendant€is€guilty.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€state€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€guilt€of€theÏdefendant€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€and€this€burden€neverÏshifts€but€remains€on€the€state€throughout€the€trial€of€the€case.€€TheÏdefendant€is€not€required€to€prove€his€innocence.ÌÌà8 àà àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€suchÏinvestigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€guilt.€ÏReasonable€doubt€does€not€mean€a€captious,€possible,€orÏimaginary€doubt.€€Absolute€certainty€of€guilt€is€not€demanded€by€theÏlaw€to€convict€of€any€criminal€charge,€but€moral€certainty€is€required,Ïand€this€certainty€is€required€as€to€every€propostition€[sic]€of€proofÏrequisite€to€constitute€the€offense.ÌÓÓÌà àAt€the€sentencing€phase,€the€trial€court€again€defined€reasonable€doubtÏwhen€instructing€the€jury€that€the€State€must€prove€statutory€aggravatingÏcircumstances€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt:ÌÌÓÓà8 àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€an€investigation€ofÏall€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€toÏlet€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€your€findings.€€You€areÏthe€sole€and€exclusive€judges€of€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses€andÏthe€weight€to€be€given€to€the€evidence€presented.€€€ÌÓÓÌà àTennessee€appellate€courts€have€consistently€held€that€similar€instructionsÏpassed€constitutional€scrutiny.€€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€734€(Tenn.Ï1994);€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364,€365„66€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€toÏappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€òòid.óó€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Hallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€285,€294€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€òòid.óó€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Gary€LeeÏBlankóó,€No.€01C01„9105„CC„00139,€Williamson€County,€slip€op.€at€5„6€(Tenn.ÍCrim.€App.,€Nashville,€filed€Feb.€26),€òòapplic.€dismissedóó€(Tenn.€Filed€May€4,Ï1992).€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€found€similar€results,€holding€inÏonly€one€case€that€a€definition€of€reasonable€doubt€violated€the€Due€ProcessÏClause€of€the€Constitution.€€òòCage€v.€Louisianaóó,€498€U.S.€39€(1990)€(per€curiam).€ÏThere,€the€court€instructed€the€juryÌÌÓÓà8 à[A€reasonable€doubt]€is€one€that€is€founded€upon€a€real€tangibleÏsubstantial€basis€and€not€upon€mere€caprice€and€conjecture.€€òòItÏmust€be€such€doubt€as€would€give€rise€to€a€grave€uncertainty,óóÏraised€in€your€mind€by€reasons€of€the€unsatisfactory€character€ofÏthe€evidence€or€lack€thereof.€€A€reasonable€doubt€is€not€a€mereÏpossible€doubt.€€òòIt€is€an€actual€substantial€doubt.óó€€It€is€a€doubt€thatÏa€reasonable€man€can€seriously€entertain.€€What€is€required€is€notÏan€absolute€or€mathematical€certainty,€but€a€òòmoral€certaintyóó.ÌÓÓÌòòCageóó,€498€U.S.€at€40€(emphasis€added€by€the€Supreme€Court).€€The€SupremeÏCourt€determined€that€the€words€ð ðsubstantialðð€and€ð ðgraveðð€suggest€a€higherÏdegree€of€doubt€than€required€for€acquittal€under€the€reasonable€doubt€standard.€ÏòòId.óó€at€41.€€Moreover,€when€these€words€were€considered€with€the€term€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€rather€than€evidentiary€certainty,€a€danger€arose€that€a€jury€could€find€aÏdefendant€guilty€based€on€a€lesser€degree€of€proof€than€required€by€the€DueÏProcess€Clause.€€The€Court€subsequently€reversed€the€Defendantððs€conviction.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€considered€similar€due€processÏchallenges€to€jury€instructions€defining€reasonable€doubt€in€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó,€òò€€€óóÏU.S.€òò€€€óó,€114€S.Ct.€1239€(1994),€and€the€companion€case€of€òòSandoval€v.ÏCaliforniaóó,€òòidóó.€€In€analyzing€the€relationship€of€reasonable€doubt€to€the€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€phrase,€the€Court€upheld€the€use€of€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€languageÏwhen€the€complete€instruction€lends€context€to€the€phrase.€ÌÌà àThe€Court€held€that,€when€taken€as€a€whole,€both€instructions€correctlyÏconveyed€the€concept€of€reasonable€doubt€and€the€degree€of€proof€that€isÏconstitutionally€required€to€acquit€or€convict€a€defendant.€€The€instructions€given€inÏSandovalððs€case€defined€reasonable€doubt€as€ð ðnot€a€mere€possible€doubt,ðð€butÏone€ð ðdepending€on€òòmoral€evidenceóó,ðð€such€that€the€jurors€could€not€say€they€feltÏan€abiding€conviction,€ð ðòòto€aóó€òòmoral€certaintyóó,ðð€of€the€truth€of€the€charge.€€òòId.óó€atÏ1244.€€The€instructions€in€Victorððs€case€defined€reasonable€doubt€as€one€thatÏwould€not€let€a€juror€ð ðhave€an€abiding€conviction,òò€to€a€moral€certaintyóó,€of€the€guiltÏof€the€accused,ðð€and€as€an€ð ðòòactual€and€substantial€doubtóó€arising€from€theÏevidence,€from€the€facts€or€circumstances€shown€by€the€evidence.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1249.€€Ìà àIn€òòVictoróó,€the€Court€traced€the€origins€of€the€term€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€in€relationÏto€the€reasonable€doubt€standard.€€The€phrase€originated€in€the€mid„nineteenthÏcentury€and€meant€a€ð ðstate€of€subjective€certitude€about€some€event€orÏoccurrence.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1246.€€Thus,€the€Court€explained,€a€jury€must€rely€onÍevidence€to€a€ð ðmoral€certainty,ðð€because€absolute€certainty€is€unattainable€inÏmatters€relating€to€human€affairs.€€òòId.óó€€The€Court€found€that€standing€alone,€theÏphrase€might€be€construed€by€modern€juries€to€mean€something€less€than€theÏvery€high€level€of€proof€constitutionally€required€in€criminal€cases.€€Although€theÏSupreme€Court€found€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€phrase€to€be€antiquated€andÏdiscouraged€its€use,€the€Court€said€that€if€the€complete€jury€charge€addedÏcontext€to€the€phrase,€then€the€instructions€would€not€be€deemedÏunconstitutional.€€òòId.óó€at€1246„47.ÌÌà àThe€òòVictoróó€court€further€distinguished€òòCageóó€on€these€grounds,€reasoningÏthat€the€òòCageóó€instruction€simply€told€the€jurors€that€they€had€to€be€morally€certainÏof€the€defendantððs€guilt,€without€providing€any€instruction€to€lend€meaning€to€theÏnebulous€phrase.€€In€the€instructions€from€both€òòSandovalóó€and€òòVictoróó,€the€CourtÏnoted€that€the€jurors€were€explicitly€told€that€their€determinations€were€to€beÏbased€on€the€evidence€in€the€case.€€Accordingly,€there€was€no€reasonableÏlikelihood€that€the€jury€would€have€understood€moral€certainty€to€beÏdisassociated€from€the€evidence€in€the€cases,€nor€did€the€term€suggest€aÏstandard€of€proof€lower€than€due€process€required.€€In€Victorððs€case,€the€CourtÏnoted€that€ð ð[i]nstructing€the€jurors€that€they€must€have€an€abiding€conviction€ofÏthe€defendantððs€guilt€does€much€to€alleviate€any€concerns€that€the€phrase€moralÏcertainty€might€be€misunderstood.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1250„51.€€The€Supreme€Court€couldÍfind€no€reasonable€likelihood€that€the€jurors€understood€the€reference€to€moralÏcertainty€to€allow€a€conviction€on€an€insufficient€standard€or€on€factors€other€thanÏthe€Stateððs€proof.€€òòId.óó€at€1251.€€ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€the€Petitioner€makes€the€same€argument€that€wasÏrejected€in€òòVictoróó.€€He€contends€that€the€instruction€given€at€trial€suffers€from€theÏsame€constitutional€infirmities€identified€in€òòCageóó€and€òòVictoróó,€namely€a€tendency€toÏconfuse€and€mislead€the€jury€as€to€the€meaning€of€reasonable€doubt€and€toÏlessen€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proof.€€He€also€asserts€that€the€instructions€wereÏunconstitutional€because€they€did€not€add€context€to€the€phrase€ð ðmoral€certaintyððÏby€giving€reference€to€evidentiary€certainty€or€to€some€other€common€senseÏbenchmark.€€Thus,€he€argues€that€the€instructions€could€easily€lead€a€juror€toÏconclude€that€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€was€based€on€ethics€rather€than€evidence,€andÏsuch€standard€could€be€satisfied€with€something€less€than€the€higher€probabilityÏof€guilt€required€by€due€process.ÌÌà àAs€òòVictoróó€clarifies,€the€phrase€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€is€not€constitutionallyÏinappropriate;€rather,€it€must€be€scrutinized€in€context€with€the€complete€juryÏcharge.€€Again,€the€proper€inquiry€of€the€instructionððs€constitutionality€is€whetherÏthere€exists€a€reasonable€likelihood€that€the€jury€òòhasóó€applied€the€challengedÍinstructions€in€a€way€that€would€lower€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proof,€not€whetherÏthe€jury€òòcouldóó€have€done€so.€€òòEstelle€v.€McGuireóó,€502€U.S.€at€72€n.4.€€ÌÌà àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€instructions€told€the€jury€that€reasonable€doubtÏdid€not€include€a€ð ðcaptious,€possible,€or€imaginary€doubt,ðð€but€was€oneÏð ðengendered€by€an€investigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,Ïafter€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€guilt.ðð€ÏThe€instruction€clearly€stated€that€the€jury€must€consider€the€proof,€that€theÏburden€of€proof€was€on€the€State,€and€that€the€proof€required€a€moral€certaintyÏas€to€every€element€of€the€offense.€€The€instructions€explained€that€absoluteÏcertainty€was€not€required.€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€instructions€here€did€not€contain€the€objectionable€languageÏof€ð ðgrave€uncertaintyðð€and€ð ðactual€substantial€doubtðð€found€in€òòCageóó,€whichÏoverstated€the€quantum€of€doubt€necessary€for€acquittal;€rather,€they€onlyÏcontained€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€language.€€This€court€has€held€that€òòCageóó€doesÏnot€mandate€the€abandoning€of€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€terminology.€€òòState€v.ÏHallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€285,€294€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,Ïòòid.óó€(Tenn.€1994).€€Likewise,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€further€held€thatÏthe€ð ðuse€of€the€phrase€ððmoral€certaintyðð€by€itself€is€insufficient€to€invalidate€anÏinstruction€on€the€meaning€of€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2dÍ722,€734€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€phrase€is€permissible€if€the€context€in€which€theÏinstruction€is€given€ð ðclearly€convey[s]€the€juryððs€responsibility€to€decide€the€verdictÏbased€on€the€facts€and€the€law.ðð€€òòId.óó€€€€€€€€Ìà àÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€instructions€given€in€this€case€conveyed€the€juryððsÏresponsibility€to€make€a€determination€based€on€the€facts,€not€on€an€ethicalÏvalues€system.€€We€also€conclude€that€the€instructions€were€not€misleading€orÏconfusing€to€the€jury.€€Rather,€the€instructions€correctly€conveyed€the€standard€ofÏreasonable€doubt€and€the€degree€of€proof€necessary€to€convict€afterÏexamination€of€the€evidence.€€We€conclude€that€the€instructions€as€a€whole€didÏnot€make€it€reasonably€likely€the€jury€construed€the€words€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€to€beÏa€lesser€standard€of€proof€than€required€by€due€process€or€as€allowingÏconviction€upon€factors€other€than€the€evidence.€€Thus,€we€find€this€issue€to€beÏwithout€merit.€€ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGE