ÿWPCS …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0JH 0T’ 0^æ 0hD 0r¬ 0| 0†š 0 1u° 0d% U>‰ U*Ç B)ñ DCb] AMe B²Ïv~êvÓh D3; 0@n AO®Æý 0Dà D/ B6˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,hh,,,0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ æç{èéEêëìíDîMeïÓ€·‚^! àà 3|xú2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd- ù-€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òFebruary€25,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€#ÑÑ7€egXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÞ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌDECEMBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9603„CC„00088̜ـ€ÙßR€$&"A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àó ó)Ìà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àSULLIVAN€COUNTYÌV.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€R.€JERRY€BECKó óÌò òBRIAN€KEITH€COLLINS,ó óà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à à(VIOLATION€HABITUAL€TRAFFICÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àOFFENSE;€RESISTING€ARREST)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCRIMINAL€COURT€OF€SULLIVAN€COUNTYÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òSTEPHEN€M.€WALLACEà àà àCHARLES€BURSONÌó óDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌò òGALE€K.€FLANARYà àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌó óAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌOffice€of€the€Public€Defenderà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌP.O.€Box€839à àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌBlountville,€TN€€37617ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òH.€GREELEY€WELLS,€JR.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSecond€Judicial€DistrictÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€526Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBlountville,€TN€€37617Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€ °ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Appellant€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€of€the€TennesseeÏRules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€At€a€jury€trial,€he€was€found€guilty€of€Violation€ofÏan€Habitual€Traffic€Offender€Order,€Resisting€Arrest,€and€Vandalism€underÏ$500.00€in€the€Sullivan€County€Criminal€Court.€€An€assault€charge€wasÏdismissed.€€The€Appellant€was€sentenced€to€two€years€as€a€Range€I€StandardÏOffender€with€a€fine€of€$2200.00€on€the€Habitual€Traffic€Offender€charge€whichÏwas€run€consecutive€to€a€previous€unrelated€sentence.€€He€was€alsoÏsentenced€to€thirty€days€and€a€fine€of€$350.00€on€the€Vandalism€under€$500.00Ïand€to€thirty€days€and€a€fine€of€$700.00€for€Resisting€Arrest.€€The€two€thirty€dayÏsentences€were€run€concurrently€to€each€other€and€with€the€Habitual€TrafficÏOffender€sentence.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€Appellant€argues€four€issues:€(1)€Whether€there€was€sufficientÏevidence€for€the€jury€to€find€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€Appellant€was€theÏsame€party€listed€in€the€Habitual€Traffic€Offender€Order;€(2)€whether€there€wasÏsufficient€evidence€for€the€jury€to€find€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€AppellantÏwas€the€same€party€operating€the€motor€vehicle€on€the€date€of€the€allegedÏoffense;€(3)€whether€there€was€sufficient€evidence€for€the€jury€to€find€beyond€aÍreasonable€doubt€that€Appellant€knowingly€damaged€the€pants€of€the€twoÏofficers;€(4)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Appellantððs€motion€for€aÏmistrial€after€the€district€attorney€generalððs€statement€to€the€jury€that,€ð ð[I]f€[theÏdefense€attorney]€had€any€evidence€to€offer€to€you€that€this€was€not€œthe€the›€[sic]Ïsame€person€named€in€that€indictment,€you€would€have€heard€it.ððÌà àDuring€the€early€morning€hours€of€August€9,€1994€a€Kingsport€police€officerÏon€patrol€in€a€marked€car€passed€a€Dodge€Colt€coming€towards€him.€€ForÏreasons€unrelated€to€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€officer€paid€close€attention€to€thisÏcar€and€made€eye€contact€with€the€driver€of€the€car.€€The€driver€of€the€car€wasÏthe€Appellant.€€There€was€also€a€female€in€the€passengerððs€seat.€€TheÏAppellant€immediately€pulled€into€a€Conoco€station€upon€passing€the€police€car.€ÏThe€officer€made€a€u„turn,€never€losing€sight€of€the€Dodge€Colt,€and€requestedÏback„up.€€When€the€Dodge€stopped€at€the€Conoco€station,€the€officer€observedÏthe€Appellant€get€out€of€the€driverððs€side€of€the€car.€€The€female€passengerÏstepped€out€of€the€car€and€got€into€the€driverððs€side€seat.€€At€this€time,€a€secondÏofficer€arrived.€€Both€officers€approached€the€Appellant€and€asked€forÏidentification.€€It€was€then€determined€by€checking€with€the€dispatcher€that€theÏAppellant€did€not€have€a€valid€driverððs€license,€and€he€was€an€habitual€trafficÏoffender.€€When€the€officers€attempted€to€arrest€the€Appellant,€he€resisted.€€AÏphysical€fight€then€ensued€between€the€two€officers€and€the€Appellant.€€DuringÏthis€fight,€both€of€the€officersðð€pants€were€ripped.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓI.ÌÓ  Óà àÌà àThe€Appellantððs€first€three€issues€deal€with€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence.€ÏWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€mustÏreview€the€record€to€determine€if€the€evidence€adduced€during€the€trial€wasÏsufficient€ð ðto€support€the€findings€by€the€trier€of€fact€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.ðð€€T.R.A.P.€13(e).€€This€rule€is€applicable€to€findings€of€guilt€predicatedÏupon€direct€evidence,€circumstantial€evidence€or€a€combination€of€direct€andÏcircumstantial€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1990).ÌÌà àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€does€not€reweighÏor€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.Ï1978).€Nor€may€this€court€substitute€its€inferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€trier€ofÏfact€from€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòLiakas€v.€Stateóó,€199€Tenn.€298,€305,€286ÏS.W.2d€856,€859€(1956).€€To€the€contrary,€this€court€is€required€to€afford€the€StateÏof€Tennessee€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€contained€in€theÏrecord€as€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawnÏfrom€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Herrodóó,€754€S.W.2d€627,€632€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1988).ÌÌà àQuestions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€andÏvalue€to€be€given€the€evidence€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€theÏevidence€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754ÏS.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€In€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,Ï476€(Tenn.€1973),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€stated,€ð ðA€guilty€verdict€by€theÏjury,€approved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€the€testimony€of€the€witnesses€for€theÏState€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€theory€of€the€State.ððÌÌà àBecause€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€andÏreplaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€476,€theÏaccused€has€the€burden€in€this€court€of€illustrating€why€the€evidence€isÏinsufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639ÏS.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€This€court€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€due€toÏthe€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€unless€the€facts€contained€in€the€record€and€theÏinferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€the€facts€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw,€for€a€rational€trier€of€fact€to€find€the€accused€guilty€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€at€780.ÌÌÓ  ÓA.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Appellant€first€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€for€the€jury€toÏfind€that€the€Appellant€was€the€same€party€listed€in€the€Habitual€Traffic€OffenderÏOrder.€€The€Appellant€contends€that€the€State€did€not€present€sufficient€evidenceÏto€prove€that€the€Appellant€listed€as€Brian€Keith€Collins€is€the€same€individual,ÏBrian€K.€Collins,€that€is€listed€in€the€previous€judgment.€€The€previous€judgmentÏwas€signed€ð ðBrian€Collinsðð€as€opposed€to€Brian€K.€Collins€or€Brian€Keith€Collins.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€dealt€with€a€similar€case€in€òòCumbo€v.ÏStateóó,€205€Tenn.€260,€326€S.W.2d€454€(1959),€in€which€an€appellant€arguedÏthat€an€indictment€for€an€Habitual€Criminal€charge€suffered€from€a€fatal€varianceÏbecause€the€name€for€the€previous€convictions€was€not€the€same€as€that€of€theÏHabitual€Criminal€charge.€€The€appellant€in€òòCumboóó€had€been€convicted€in€NorthÏCarolina€on€two€separate€occasions€as€ð ðChas.€Cumbo,€alias€Irvin€Cumbo.ðð€ÏòòCumboóó,€205€Tenn.€at€262„63,€326€S.W.2d€at€455„56.€€The€TennesseeÏindictment€read€ð ðCharles€Irvin€Cumbo,€alias€Charlie€Ervin€Cumbo.ðð€€òòCumboóó,€205ÏTenn.€at€263,€326€S.W.2d€at€455.€€The€supreme€court€held€that€Chas.€is€aÏcommonly€known€abbreviation€of€Charles€and€the€fact€that€the€North€CarolinaÏindictment€read€ð ðChas.€Cumbo,€alias€Irvin€Cumboðð€was€actually€corroborative€ofÏthe€Tennessee€indictment.€€òòCumboóó,€205€Tenn.€at€263,€326€S.W.2d€at€455.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòJones€v.€Stateóó,€733€S.W.2d€517€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóóÏòòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1987),€an€appellant€challenged€his€habitual€criminal€convictionÏbecause€of€the€difference€of€names€on€previous€convictions€outside€ofÏTennessee.€€The€appellantððs€prior€convictions€were€under€the€names€JesseÏLewis€Jones,€Jesse€L.€Jones,€and€Jessie€Lewis€Jones.€€òòJonesóó,€733€S.W.2d€atÏ520.€€The€question€was€ð ðwhether€Jesse€L.€Jones€is€the€same€name€as€JessieÏLewis€Jones€and€Jessie€L.€Jones€for€the€purposes€of€the€ð ðsame€nameððÏprovision€of€the€statute.ðð€€When€addressing€the€question€of€the€letter€ð ðLðð€this€courtÏstated€that€ð ð[t]he€letter€ððLðð€is€the€initial€for€the€name€ððLewis,ðððð€and€held€that€the€priorÏjudgments€were€sufficient€to€prove€habitual€criminal€status.€€òòJonesóó,€733€S.W.2dÏat€520.€€We€agree€with€the€previous€decision€in€this€court,€and€conclude€that€theÏletter€ð ðKðð€is€the€initial€for€the€name€ð ðKeith.ððÌÌà àWe€find€that€there€is€sufficient€evidence€for€the€jury€to€find€that€Brian€KeithÏCollins€is€the€same€person€as€the€Brian€K.€Collins€in€the€previous€judgments.€ÏQuestions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€toÏbe€given€the€evidence€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€areÏresolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,Ï623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€First,€it€is€feasible€that€a€rational€trier€of€fact€wouldÏconclude€that€the€initial€ð ðK.ðð€in€Brian€K.€Collins€stands€for€Keith.€€In€addition,€theÏjudgment€was€entered€in€Sullivan€County,€the€same€county€where€the€incident€inÍquestion€occurred.€€Also,€the€convictions€that€support€the€Habitual€TrafficÏOffender€judgment€occurred€in€Sullivan€County.ÌÌà àWe€find€that€there€is€sufficient€circumstantial€evidence€for€a€rational€trier€ofÏfact€to€conclude€that€Brian€Keith€Collins€is€Brian€K.€Collins.ÌÌà àThis€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌÓ  ÓB.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Appellantððs€second€issue€is€whether€there€was€sufficient€evidence€forÏthe€jury€to€find€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€Appellant€was€the€sameÏparty€operating€the€vehicle€at€the€time€of€the€offense.€€At€trial,€the€first€officerÏtestified€that€he€made€eye€contact€with€the€Appellant€as€they€passed€eachÏother,€and€then€he€observed€the€Appellant€get€out€of€the€car€on€the€driverððs€side.ÏHe€also€testified€that€the€female€passenger€told€him€at€the€scene€that€she€hadÏbeen€at€work€and€the€Appellant€came€to€pick€her€up.€€Questions€concerning€theÏcredibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence€asÏwell€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,Ïnot€this€court.€€òòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€ÍWe€conclude€that€this€is€sufficient€evidence€to€prove€that€the€Appellant€was€theÏdriver€of€the€car.ÌÌà àThis€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌÓ  ÓC.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Appellantððs€third€issue€is€whether€there€was€sufficient€evidence€forÏthe€jury€to€find€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€Appellant€knowinglyÏdamaged€the€pants€of€the€two€officers.€€ð ðA€person€acts€knowingly€with€respectÏto€a€result€of€the€personððs€conduct€when€the€person€is€aware€that€the€conduct€isÏreasonably€certain€to€cause€the€result.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302(b).ÌÌà àThe€Appellant€argues€that€any€damage€to€the€officersðð€pants€wasÏcaused€accidentally€and€not€knowingly.€€However,€the€definition€of€ð ðknowinglyððÏdoes€not€require€an€individual€to€purposefully€cause€a€result,€but€rather€that€heÏð ðbe€aware€that€the€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€a€result.ðð€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302(b).€€We€believe€that€an€individual€would€be€aware€thatÏa€struggle€during€which€people€fell€to€the€ground€would€be€reasonably€certain€toÏtear€clothing.€€Therefore,€we€find€that€there€is€sufficient€evidence€for€a€rational€trierÍof€fact€to€find€that€the€Appellant€knowingly€caused€the€damage€and€is€guilty€ofÏVandalism€under€$500.00.ÌÌà àThis€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌII.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Appellantððs€final€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€theÏAppellantððs€motion€for€a€mistrial€following€a€statement€made€by€the€districtÏattorney€general.€€During€closing€argument,€the€district€attorney€general€stated,Ïð ð[I]f€[the€defense€attorney]€had€any€evidence€to€offer€to€you€that€this€was€not€the€Ïthe€[sic]€same€person€named€in€that€indictment,€you€would€have€heard€it.ðð€€AtÏthis€point,€the€defense€attorney€objected.€€The€trial€court€sustained€the€objectionÏand€directed€the€jury€to€disregard€the€statement.€€The€defense€attorney€thenÏasked€for€a€mistrial.€€The€trial€court€then€conducted€a€bench€conference,€whichÏevolved€into€a€jury„out€hearing.€€The€trial€court€refused€to€grant€the€request€for€aÏmistrial€stating€that€there€was€no€manifest€necessity.€€When€the€jury€wasÏbrought€in,€the€trial€court€instructed€them€with€these€words:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌLadies€and€gentlemen,€the€last€sentence€by€the€DistrictÏAttorney€just€before€the€objection,€I€am€going€to€ask€youÏall,€and€tell€you,€and€instruct€you€all€to€disregard€thatÏstatement,€and€not€consider€it€in€any€manner.€€Can€all€ofÏyou€all€do€this,€everybody€raise€their€hand€that€can€doÏthat.€€Okay.€€Each€juror€has€raised€their€right€hand.ÌÌÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ „ ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àThe€decision€of€whether€or€not€to€enter€a€mistrial€rests€with€the€soundÏdiscretion€of€the€trial€court.€€This€court€will€not€interfere€with€the€trial€courtððs€decisionÏabsent€a€clear€abuse€of€discretion€on€the€record.€€òòState€v.€McPhersonóó,€882ÏS.W.2d€365,€370€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1994).€ÏThe€Appellantððs€issue€is€similar€to€the€issue€of€improper€comments€on€aÏdefendantððs€€failure€to€testify€when€he€has€a€right€not€to€testify.€€In€the€line€ofÏcases€dealing€with€this€issue,€this€court€has€stated€that€ð ð[m]ere€argument€by€theÏState€that€proof€on€a€certain€point€is€unrefuted€or€uncontradicted€is€not€anÏimproper€comment€upon€a€defendantððs€failure€to€testify.ðð€€òòState€v.€Couryóó,€697ÏS.W.2d€373,€378€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1985).€ÏIn€òòState€v.€Thomas€E.€Meddersóó,€No.€02C01„9407„CR„00139,€Shelby€CountyÏ(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€filed€July€19,€1995),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.Ï1996),€the€prosecutor€made€a€statement€in€his€closing€argument€concerning€theÏdefendantððs€flight€from€the€scene,€ð ðððNo€proof€offered,€no€circumstances€of€theÏcase€to€show€why€they€didnððt€stay€there.€.€.€.€€No€evidence,€no€explanation€asÏto€why€he€didnððt€stay€there„„€why€the€three€of€them€didnððt€stay€there.ðððð€€òòMeddersóó,ÍNo.€02C091„9407„CR„00139,€slip.€op.€€This€court€held€that€the€prosecutorððsÏcomment€on€the€lack€of€evidence€was€not€reversible€error.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€we€do€not€find€an€abuse€of€discretion€on€the€trialÏcourtððs€part€in€not€granting€the€mistrial.€€First,€as€noted€above,€comments€similarÏto€the€district€attorney€generalððs€have€been€held€to€not€violate€the€defendantððsÏrights.€€Second,€we€find€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€support€thisÏconviction,€and€the€district€attorneyððs€statement,€while€improper,€did€not€affect€theÏoutcome€of€the€trial.€€Third,€the€trial€court€made€an€immediate€instruction,€and€thenÏasked€the€jury€if€they€all€could€follow€his€instruction€to€disregard€the€statement.€ÏAll€the€jurors€answered€that€they€could€follow€the€instruction.ÌÌà àTherefore,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€properly€denied€the€AppellantððsÏrequest€for€a€mistrial.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court.€Ìà àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌà àÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌÓ  ÓDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGE