ÿWPCF …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 H 0JP 0Tš 0^î 0hL 0r´ 0|& 0†¢ 0( 1u¸ 0d- U>‘ U*Ï B)ù DC" AMe² BÀv~ÝvÓ[ D3. 0@a AO¡Æð 0D¶ D/ú B)˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- D[DVU Ó€Ô¡¨ $¡¡3|x"2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌApril€24,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ ° ÒÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€¬“XXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€#$"A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€œNASHVILLE›ÌÌœJANUARY›€SESSION,€œ1997›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœKENNY€D.€COVINGTON,›à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ01C01„9604„CR„00149›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àœAppellant,›à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœDAVIDSON›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œJ.€RANDALL€WYATT,€JR.ó ó›Ìœò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó ó›à àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àœAppellee.›à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Post„Conviction)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCRIMINAL›€COURT€OF€œDAVIDSON€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœROBERT€J.€MENDES›à àà àà àœCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌ209€Tenth€Avenue€Southà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌSuite€511ÌNashville,€TN€37203à àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àVICTOR€S.€JOHNSONÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCHERYL€BLACKBURNÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWashington€Square,€Suite€500Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à222€Second€Avenue€NorthÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37201„1649›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€ °ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Petitioner€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€pursuant€to€Rule€3€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€AppellateÏProcedure.€€He€was€convicted€by€a€guilty€plea€of€three€counts€of€selling€overÏ.5€grams€of€cocaine,€one€count€of€selling€over€26€grams€of€cocaine,€one€countÏof€possession€for€sale€of€over€26€grams€of€œcocaine,›€œone›€count€œof›€possessionÏfor€sale€of€over€.5€grams€of€cocaine,€one€count€of€possession€of€drugÏparaphernalia,€and€one€count€of€a€felon€possessing€a€weapon.€€He€wasÏsentenced€by€the€trial€court€as€a€Range€I€offender€to€thirty€œ(30)€years›Ïimprisonment.€€In€this€appeal,€the€Petitioner€contends€that€counsel€renderedÏineffective€assistance€and€that€his€guilty€plea€was€not€entered€voluntarily,Ïknowingly,€or€understandingly.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€filed€a€pro„se€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€on€AugustÏ4,€1995.€€Counsel€was€appointed€and€filed€an€amended€petition€on€OctoberÏ2,€1995.€€A€hearing€in€the€trial€court€was€conducted€on€October€23,€1995€andÏœan€order›€was€issued€on€November€17,€œ1995,›€denying€the€petition.€€TheÏPetitioner€now€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€order.ÌÌà àAs€his€first€issue,€the€Petitioner€argues€that€he€was€denied€theÏeffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€In€determining€whether€counsel€providedÏeffective€assistance€at€trial,€the€court€must€decide€whether€counselððsÏperformance€was€within€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€inÏcriminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€€ToÏsucceed€on€a€claim€that€his€counsel€was€ineffective€at€trial,€a€petitioner€bearsÏthe€burden€of€showing€that€his€counsel€made€errors€so€serious€that€he€wasÏnot€functioning€as€counsel€as€guaranteed€under€the€Sixth€Amendment€andÏthat€the€deficient€representation€prejudiced€the€petitioner€resulting€in€a€failure€toÏproduce€a€reliable€result.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687,€òòrehððgóóÏòòdeniedóó,€467€U.S.€1267€(1984);€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€747€(Tenn.Ï1993);€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990).€€To€satisfy€theÏsecond€prong€the€petitioner€must€show€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€forÏcounselððs€unreasonable€error,€the€fact€finder€would€have€had€reasonableÏdoubt€regarding€petitionerððs€guilt.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€695.€€ThisÏreasonable€probability€must€be€ð ðsufficient€to€undermine€confidence€in€theÏoutcome.ðð€€òòHarris€v.€Stateóó,€875€S.W.2d€662,€665€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àWhen€reviewing€trial€counselððs€actions,€this€court€should€not€use€theÏbenefit€of€hindsight€to€second„guess€trial€strategy€and€criticize€counselððsÏtactics.€€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€Counselððs€allegedÍerrors€should€be€judged€at€the€time€they€were€made€in€light€of€all€facts€andÏcircumstances.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€690;€òòseeóó€œòòCooperóó,›€849€S.W.2d€at€746.ÌÌà àThis€two€part€standard€of€measuring€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏalso€applies€to€claims€arising€out€of€the€plea€process.€€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474ÏU.S.€52€(1985).€€The€prejudice€requirement€is€modified€so€that€the€petitionerÏð ðmust€show€that€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððsÏerrors€he€would€not€have€pleaded€guilty€and€would€have€insisted€on€going€toÏtrial.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€59.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€the€Petitioner€was€represented€by€threeÏattorneys€and€he€alleges€that€all€three€had€a€role€in€failing€to€provide€effectiveÏassistance.€€The€Petitioner€was€arrested€on€August€14,€1993€based€on€aÏwarrant€for€his€arrest€for€possessing€and€selling€cocaine.€€A€police€informantÏhad€made€several€controlled€buys€of€cocaine€from€the€Petitioner€and€theÏpolice€had€made€audio€tapes€of€telephone€calls€involving€discussions€aboutÏdrug€sales.€€€ÌÌà àHis€first€attorney,€Glen€Funk,€represented€the€Petitioner€when€he€wasÏarrested.€€Mr.€Funk€went€to€the€jail€and€met€with€him,€represented€him€theÏnext€day€when€the€case€was€bound€over€to€œthe›€grand€jury€and€was€makingÍpreparations€to€represent€him€at€a€Community€œCorrections›€revocationÏhearing.€€Mr.€Funkððs€assessment€of€the€case€was€that€the€State€had€veryÏstrong€proof€against€the€Petitioner.€€Mr.€Funk€reviewed€with€the€Petitioner€theÏsearch€warrant,€the€execution€of€the€search€warrant,€and€the€potentialÏpenalties€for€the€alleged€crimes.€€Mr.€Funk€advised€him€€to€waive€aÏpreliminary€hearing€because€the€Petitioner€had€indicated€that€he€was€goingÏto€cooperate€with€the€police€and€give€information€about€other€drug€dealers.€ÏMr.€Funk€testified€that€he€œadvised€him›€to€waive€the€hearing€because€œtheÏPetitioner›€wanted€to€cooperate€with€the€police€and€€the€CommunityÏœCorrections›€hearing€would€serve€the€purpose€of€a€preliminary€hearing€inÏterms€of€presenting€and€cross„examining€witnesses.€€The€Petitioner€claimsÏthat€he€did€not€understand€the€purpose€of€a€preliminary€hearing,€yet€he€hadÏbeen€previously€represented€by€Mr.€Funk€and€had€extensive€meetingsÏregarding€another€case.€Before€the€hearing,€the€Petitionerððs€family€told€Mr.ÏFunk€that€another€attorney,€Jack€Butler,€would€be€assuming€hisÏrepresentation.€€We€cannot€conclude,€from€the€evidence€before€us,€that€Mr.ÏFunkððs€representation€fell€below€the€acceptable€range€of€œcompetence.€›ÏFurthermore,€the€Petitioner€œhas›€presented€no€evidence€regarding€anyÏprejudice€he€suffered€because€of€Mr.€Funkððs€representation.ÌÌà àJack€Butler,€the€Petitionerððs€second€attorney,€represented€him€throughÏhis€arraignment.€€Mr.€Butler€investigated€the€case,€interviewed€witnesses,Ïand€made€requests€for€discovery.€€His€paralegal€reviewed€the€discoveryÏmaterials€with€the€Petitioner.€€Mr.€Butler€œtestified€that€he€did›€not€listen€to€theÏaudiotapes€because€they€were€set€out€in€the€search€warrant.€€He€alsoÏstated€that€would€have€listened€to€the€tapes€had€the€case€gone€to€trial,€butÏthat€the€case€at€that€point€was€focused€on€settling.€€He€also€concluded€thatÏthe€Stateððs€proof€was€extremely€strong.€€The€Petitioner€contends€and€Mr.ÏButler€testified€that€the€State€offered€a€plea€agreement€of€twenty„four€years€ifÏboth€he€and€his€co„defendant,€his€girlfriend,€would€agree.€€She€apparentlyÏrefused€the€offer.€€The€State€counters€that€the€only€offer€that€was€made€to€theÏPetitioner€was€for€thirty€years€as€a€Range€II€offender.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€contends€that€he€was€advised€to€refuse€the€offer.€ÏHowever,€Mr.€Butler€testified€that€he€did€not€œso€advise›€the€Petitioner€becauseÏhe€had€already€indicated€he€would€not€agree.€€Mr.€Butler€filed€a€motion€toÏwithdraw€œfrom›€representation€after€discovering€that€the€Petitioner€had€beenÏcommunicating€on€his€own€with€his€co„defendantððs€attorney.€€Although€Mr.ÏButler€did€not€advise€the€Petitioner€on€his€options,€he€testified€that€he€wouldÏnot€œhave€recommended›€going€to€trial€because€the€proof€was€so€strong,€andÏthat€his€other€options€were€to€accept€the€plea€agreement€or€plead€guilty€andÍsubmit€to€sentencing€by€the€trial€judge.€€He€would€have€recommended€takingÏthe€thirty„year€agreement.€€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€was€represented€by€his€third€attorney,€Mr.€R.N.€Taylor,Ïthrough€his€guilty€plea€and€sentencing.€€Mr.€Taylor€requested€the€file€from€Mr.ÏButler€and€reviewed€the€evidence€against€the€Petitioner.€€He€also€concludedÏthat€the€proof€was€very€strong€and€that€he€would€not€recommend€a€trial.€€HeÏdid,€however,€advise€the€Petitioner€to€plead€guilty€and€leave€the€sentenceÏopen€to€be€determined€at€a€sentencing€hearing.€€He€assessed€theÏPetitionerððs€case€and€advised€that€he€might€do€better€than€the€fixed€thirty„year,€Range€II€sentence€at€35%€offered€by€the€State.€€At€the€hearing,€theÏPetitioner€was€sentenced€to€thirty€years€as€a€Range€I€offender€at€30%.€€HeÏclaims€that€the€advice€of€his€attorney€was€erroneous€and€that€he€wouldÏhave€proceeded€to€trial.€€However,€the€outcome€after€the€sentencing€hearingÏwas€better€than€the€Stateððs€offer.€€Therefore,€this€argument€must€fail.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€also€asserts€that€both€Mr.€Butler€and€Mr.€Taylor€failed€toÏœinvestigate›€the€œcase€adequately.›€€It€is€well„established€that€defense€counselÏmust€conduct€an€appropriate€investigation€into€both€the€facts€and€the€law€toÏdetermine€what€matters€of€defense€can€be€developed.€€òòSee€e.g.óó,€òòBaxter€v.ÏRoseóó,€523€S.W.2d€at€936;€òòMcBee€v.€Stateóó,€655€S.W.2d€191,€195€(Tenn.ÍCrim.€App.€1983).€€Furthermore,€our€supreme€court€recognized€in€òòBaxteróó€thatÏthe€American€Bar€Association€Standards€for€Criminal€Justice€provide€usefulÏguidance€with€regard€to€the€function€and€responsibilities€of€defense€counsel.€ÏThe€American€Bar€Association€standards€explain€defense€counselððs€duty€toÏinvestigate€with€the€following€language:Ìœà8 à›ÓÓIt€is€the€duty€of€the€lawyer€to€conduct€a€prompt€investigation€ofÏthe€circumstances€of€the€case€and€to€explore€all€avenuesÏleading€to€facts€relevant€to€the€merits€of€the€case€and€theÏpenalty€in€the€event€of€conviction.€€The€investigation€shouldÏalways€include€efforts€to€secure€information€in€the€possession€ofÏthe€prosecution€and€law€enforcement€authorities.€€The€duty€toÏinvestigate€exists€regardless€of€the€accusedððs€admissions€orÏstatements€to€the€lawyer€of€facts€constituting€guilt€or€theÏaccusedððs€stated€desire€to€plead€guilty.ÌÌœ›€ABA€Standards€for€Criminal€Justice€ðð€4„4.1€(2d€ed.€Supp.€1986).Ìœ›ÓÓà àœÌà àSpecifically,›€the€Petitioner€argues€that€his€attorneys€failed€to€review€theÏsurveillance€tapes€with€him.€€Furthermore,€he€contends€that€Mr.€Taylor€failedÏto€request€independent€testing€of€the€substances€seized€or€challenge€theÏvalidity€of€the€warrant.€€However,€there€is€evidence€that€Mr.€Butler€reviewedÏthe€tape€transcripts.€€Furthermore,€Mr.€Taylor€had€the€tapes€in€hisÏpossession,€although€he€œdid›€not€œspecifically€recall›€reviewing€them.€€There€isÏalso€evidence€that€both€œattorneys›€reviewed€the€search€warrant€œand€the›Ïnature€of€the€information€supporting€that€warrant.€€€Finally,€the€Petitioner€hadÏall€along€admitted€to€the€police,€the€Assistant€District€Attorney,€and€to€hisÍattorneys€that€he€had€made€the€drugs€sales€in€œquestion€and€he€initiallyÏindicated€a€desire€to€become€an€informant.›€The€focus€of€œthe›€representation,€inÏthe€face€of€such€strong€proof,€was€to€obtain€a€œfavorable€plea€agreement.€€All›Ïthe€attorneys€agreed€that€a€trial€was€not€in€the€Petitionerððs€best€interest.€ÌÌà àWe€are€œreluctant€to,›€and€indeed€œprecluded›€œfrom,›€second„guessing€Mr.ÏButlerððs€and€Mr.€Taylorððs€actions.€€From€a€review€of€the€surroundingÏcircumstances,€we€œcannot›€conclude€that€œany›€failure€œby€the€attorneys€to›Ïreview€the€tapes€œrendered€their€representation›€deficient.€The€attorneys€didÏevaluate€the€strength€of€the€case€against€the€Petitioner€and€concluded€that€aÏtrial€would€not€be€in€his€best€interest.€€There€was€no€evidence€suggestingÏthat€the€substances€obtained€from€the€Petitioner€œwere›€not€cocaine€nor€did€theÏwarrant€appear€defective.€€Although€the€Petitioner€claims€that€he€would€haveÏgone€to€trial,€he€has€presented€no€evidence€that€suggests€œhow€further›Ïinvestigation€would€have€œbenefitted€him;›€his€allegations€are€merelyÏspeculative.€We€note€that€under€the€provisions€of€the€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act€of€1995,€a€petitioner€bears€the€burden€of€proving€theÏallegations€in€the€petition€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„210(f)€(Supp.€1996).€€In€reviewing€post„conviction€proceedings,Ï"the€factual€findings€of€the€trial€court€are€conclusive€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€such€findings."€€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,Í746€(Tenn.1993);€€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.1990).€€UnderÏthese€circumstances,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€evidence€œpreponderates›Ïagainst€the€trial€courtððs€findings.ÌÌà àSecond,€the€Petitioner€argues€that€he€did€not€knowingly€or€intelligentlyÏenter€into€his€guilty€plea€œbecause:€(1)€he›€relied€on€erroneous€legal€œadvice;›€œ(2)Ïa›€full€investigation€was€not€œconducted;›€œ(3)›€he€waived€a€preliminary€œhearing;›Ïand€œ(4)›€counsel€failed€to€make€two€motions€requested€by€him.€€A€defendantÏmust€be€advised€of€his€constitutional€rights€before€he€is€allowed€to€enter€aÏguilty€plea.€€òòBoykin€v.€Alabamaóó,€395€U.S.€238€(1969).€€Among€those€rightsÏare€the€right€against€self„incrimination,€the€right€to€confront€witnesses€and€theÏright€to€a€trial€by€jury.€€òòId.óó€at€243.€€The€record€must€show€that€a€guilty€pleaÏwas€made€voluntarily,€understandingly,€and€knowingly.€€òòId.óó€at€242.€€In€òòStateÏv.€Mackeyóó,€553€S.W.2d€337€(Tenn.€1977),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏimposed€stricter€standards€than€those€mandated€in€òòBoykinóó.€€Included€in€theÏòòMackeyóó€requirements:ÌÒ 4 ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌA.€Before€accepting€a€plea€of€guilty,€the€court€must€address€theÏdefendant€personally€in€open€court€.€.€.€œ.€.›€.€.€.ÌÌD.€A€verbatim€record€of€the€proceedings€at€which€the€defendantÏenters€a€plea€shall€be€made€and,€if€there€is€a€plea€of€guilty,€theÏrecord€shall€include,€without€limitation,€(a)€the€courtððs€advice€toÏthe€defendant,€(b)€the€inquiry€into€the€voluntariness€of€the€pleaÏincluding€any€plea€agreement€and€into€the€defendantððsÍunderstanding€of€the€consequences€of€his€entering€a€plea€ofÏguilty,€and€(c)€the€inquiry€into€the€accuracy€of€a€guilty€plea.ÌÌÌÒ 4 ÒÒ  ÒÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€at€341.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Nealóó,€810€S.W.2d€131€(Tenn.€1991),€our€supreme€courtÏstated€that€the€purpose€for€these€guidelines€is€to€"seek€to€insulate€guiltyÏpleas€from€coercion€and€relevant€defendant€ignorance.€€They€are€designed€toÏinsure€that€guilty€pleas€are€voluntary€and€knowing."€€òòId.óó€at€135.€€œThe›ÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€has€also€stated:€ÌÒ 4 ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌFor€the€plea€to€be€acceptable€it€must€be€voluntary.€€That€doesÏnot€mean€that€the€defendant€would€want€to€plead€guilty€if€he€orÏshe€had€the€option€available€to€go€free.€€The€option€available€isÏto€go€to€trial,€with€its€uncertainties,€or€to€plead€guilty.€€TheÏknowledge€that€is€most€relevant€to€this€decision€of€the€accusedÏpertains€to€the€rights€that€are€available€to€him€or€her€upon€a€trialÏthat€are€given€up€by€pleading€guilty.ÌÌÌÒ 4 ÒÒ  ÒÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óóÌÌà à€The€Petitioner€cites€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52,€106€S.Ct.€366,€88ÏL.Ed.2d€203€(1985),€for€the€proposition€that€a€guilty€plea€may€be€madeÏinvoluntarily€because€of€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€We€iterate€thatÏwe€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€finding€that€he€wasÏprovided€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€Therefore,€the€Petitionerððs€argumentÍthat€his€plea€was€not€knowingly€or€intelligently€entered€fails€on€this€ground.€ÏFurthermore,€the€trial€court€reviewed€œwith€the€petitioner€the›€consequences€ofÏwaiving€a€jury€trial€at€the€time€he€pleaded€guilty€and€the€Petitioner€indicatedÏthat€he€understood.€€In€òòHillóó,€€the€attorney€wrongly€advised€the€defendantÏabout€his€parole€eligibility€upon€which€he€relied€in€choosing€to€plead€guilty.€ÏœòòHillóó,€474›€U.S.€at€60,€106€œS.Ct.›€at€371.€€Here,€the€attorneys€did€not€provideÏincorrect€information,€but€œinstead€rendered›€legal€advice€considering€theÏcircumstances€of€the€case.€€There€was€no€guarantee€of€the€outcome,€whichÏunfortunately€was€not€to€the€Petitionerððs€liking.€€However,€he€was€informed€ofÏhis€options€and€their€potential€risks€and€œthe€Petitioner€then€made›€a€choice.€ÏAlthough€there€was€œsome›€failure€to€œfully€investigate,›€the€Petitioner€has€notÏdemonstrated€how€this€prejudiced€him.€€As€for€the€preliminary€hearing€waiverÏand€the€failure€to€make€motions,€the€Petitioner€has€only€made€conclusoryÏallegations.€€Without€more,€we€cannot€adequately€review€these€claims.€€€ThisÏissue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÌÓӜ̛œÌ›à àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌœÇCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGE›