ÿWPC„ 0_yÿvC'°íÝŠ9ï³p~kßôcÝC·zW„ç™Åx)¨Ûv´?³8}´iVe0v—¤Â´ïjô s»ížâ›¦Ð‡—ó¹$ÃFò¦µÕg½"çêsòâh¬g±Ë­yz¢žC€K ¾f²KFPh“Óᜈò7ÕØW½ÕT”ÊÕëƒðö|ÁÎiw¿«¢­>/f®`àú¿QEJ—Q„õõõy,œœlÕÝpŽ×Þ…ç.˜µ)c^ ?ÜúF(–¼p$ÅúœÅñº³i¾Fâû X`ì [óáòìÕÞ7U«ë0ÙÜ.ÏÒ#$ÄÞµó±Duüê¥hÑÉ!øîås«—Zü{\ÝôTNL¡«0¼€Ñœ•ɵ®Ï«¤²k·ßv^j mÅ¢%­XT 7üD”Ø. oàGƒRY½ìVF‘Ò~,Ý‚nH +Ñ!^­³B»Ô°¬RÞ-¤¡ˆ0¾2ü” ®}hW*;µ&·uÐçïEr'¤u™@¯JüÙC¯wáË$¡ÐÙ™/Õà ú ¦,|ÙkÂy<ÖfÇ×ÛÎböݾCn\•Ô=´¾ø|˜ÇÉô’lY9ÝÆƒ'ÚóM"ŸÀÚjȾµŸ #ˆ°ë…# F UNQ %Ÿ 0(¥ U:Í b w@ 4O c Dr 0ƶ 0D|DÀpU:tU:®èþèU:îé(U: BKKKKKKKKKKK D3hhh 0D›››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››› AO߯.. 0Dô D/8 Bg˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,“í|AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù- <D=D>?U@DAUBDFeGÓ€QuM%3|xZ :Ý ƒ –G$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xà XXXÔÔ€ôX¶ô XXÃÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIndeed,€the€trial€court€stated€in€its€order€imposing€the€conditions€that€ð ð[Appellant]€is€a€man€ofÐ `  Ðsubstantial€means€who,€in€the€Courtððs€opinion,€is€attempting€to€circumvent€the€system€of€justice€and€buyÏhimself€time.€€In€the€interim,€all€this€Court€can€do€is€try€to€set€conditions€to€protect€society€from€him€untilÏthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€can€review€his€sentence.ðð€€ò ò(I€20)ó ó(v(2Ð$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X×ÌXXXÔÔ€ô(ëôXX×ÌÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó :Ý ƒ –G$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xà XXXÔÔ€ôX¶ô XXÃÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIndeed,€the€trial€court€stated€in€its€order€imposing€the€conditions€that€ð ð[Appellant]€is€a€man€ofÐ `  Ðsubstantial€means€who,€in€the€Courtððs€opinion,€is€attempting€to€circumvent€the€system€of€justice€and€buyÏhimself€time.€€In€the€interim,€all€this€Court€can€do€is€try€to€set€conditions€to€protect€society€from€him€untilÏthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€can€review€his€sentence.ðð€€ò ò(I€20)ó ó fÝ ƒ –G$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xà XXXÔÔ€ôX¶ô XXÃÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝBecause€of€our€disposition€of€this€case,€we€need€not€address€Appellantððs€claims€that€hisÐ `  Ðsentences€were€excessive€or€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€imposing€consecutive€sentences.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝBecause€of€our€disposition€of€this€case,€we€need€not€address€Appellantððs€claims€that€hisÐ `  Ðsentences€were€excessive€or€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€imposing€consecutive€sentences. ÞÔ€X×ÌXXXÔÔ€œu XX×ÌÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X×ÌX œuÔÐ  ÐÌJanuary€14,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ßÔ€X×ÌXXXÔÔ€œu XX×ÌÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X×ÌX œuÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€22,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñGññFñ›ñFññGñÑ` °ÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ŠRŒŠXXÔÔ€Š3XŠŠŠRŒÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€ÖXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òñQññGñßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@Eôf ` 8ttxP,` ð  rßñGññQññQñßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@Eôf ` 8ttxP,` ð  rßñQññGñ›ñGñIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌJULY€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à À à)à  àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9609„CR„00396Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àó ó)Ð ` Ðà ` àAppellee,à  àà h àà À àò ò)Ð Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àSUMNER€COUNTYÐ Xø  ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHON.€JANE€W.€WHEATCRAFTó óÐ Xø  Ðò òJAMES€W.€CONNORS,€III,ó óà À àò ò)à  àJUDGEó óÐ Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ Xø Ðà ` àAppellant.à  àà h àà À àò ò)à  à(Direct€Appeal€„€Sentencing)Ð Xø Ðó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à h àà À àà  àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:Ð 8Ø ÐÌJOHN€E.€HERBISONà h àà À àà  àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÐ ( È Ð2016€Eighth€Avenue€Southà À àà  àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ  !À ÐNashville,€TN€€37204Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àLISA€A.€NAYLORÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àLAWRENCE€RAY€WHITLEYÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWAYNE€HYATTÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à113€East€Main€StreetÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àGallatin,€TN€€37066ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÐ  p6-.W ÐÓ  Óò òòòÔ‡„ „ŠŠ3XÔOPINIONóóó óÔ#†Š3XŠ„„ † #ÔÐ `  ÐÓ  ÓÓÓà@®®.®àˆÌÌà ` àOn€October€13,€1994,€Appellant€James€W.€Connors,€III,€pleaded€guilty€toÏdriving€under€the€influence,€second€offense;€driving€on€a€revoked€license;€andÏreckless€endangerment.€€After€a€sentencing€hearing€on€December€6,€1994,ÏAppellant€received€an€effective€sentence€of€120€days€imprisonment€followed€byÏ2ðð€years€of€probation.€€Appellant€appealed€his€sentence€and€this€Court€vacatedÏhis€sentence€and€remanded€the€case€for€resentencing.€€After€a€sentencingÏhearing€on€May€28,€1996,€Appellant€received€an€effective€sentence€of€240€daysÏimprisonment€followed€by€sixteen€months€of€probation.€€Appellant€challenges€hisÏsentence,€raising€the€following€issues:ÌÓÓà0 ` à1)€whether€the€trial€judge€should€have€recused€herself€from€AppellantððsÏresentencing€hearing;€andÐ ` T$` T$ Ðà0 ` à2)€whether€the€imposition€of€a€harsher€sentence€after€AppellantððsÏsuccessful€appeal€violates€due€process.Ð ` T$` T$ ÐÌÓ·ÓAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€andÏremand€this€matter€for€resentencing€before€another€trial€judge.ÌÌà@II,®àò òFACTSó óˆÐ ¼*\!" Ðà ` àAppellant€pleaded€guilty€to€driving€under€the€influence,€second€offense;Ïdriving€on€a€revoked€license;€and€reckless€endangerment€on€October€13,€1994.€ÏAfter€a€sentencing€hearing€on€December€6,€1994,€the€trial€court€sentencedÏAppellant€to€eleven€months,€twenty-nine€days€for€driving€under€the€influence,€allÏsuspended€except€120€days€and€followed€by€eleven€months,€twenty-nine€daysÏprobation;€to€eleven€months,€twenty-nine€days€for€reckless€endangerment,€allÏsuspended€except€120€days€and€followed€by€eleven€months,€twenty-nine€daysÐ \8ü.0 Ðprobation;€and€to€six€months€for€driving€on€a€revoked€license,€all€suspendedÏexcept€120€days€and€followed€by€six€months€probation.€€The€periods€ofÏincarceration€were€to€run€concurrently,€while€the€periods€of€probation€were€to€runÏconsecutively.€ÌÌà ` àAfter€the€sentencing€on€December€6,€1994,€Appellant€filed€a€notice€ofÏappeal€and€a€motion€to€set€bond€pending€appeal.€€The€trial€court€entered€an€orderÏsetting€bond€at€$100,000€and€setting€the€following€conditions:€1)€Appellant€wasÏto€go€directly€from€jail€to€an€in„patient€treatment€facility;€2)€upon€completion€of€aÏtwenty„eight€day€in„patient€treatment€program,€Appellant€was€to€be€placed€onÏintensive€probation€and€was€to€make€daily€reports€to€his€probation€officer;€3)ÏAppellant€was€not€to€drive;€4)€Appellant€was€to€take€antabuse€or€some€other€drugÏas€prescribed€by€a€physician€to€keep€him€from€drinking€without€serious€sideÏeffects;€5)€Appellant€was€to€have€periodic€unannounced€drug€and€alcohol€tests;Ïand€6)€Appellant€was€to€attend€Alcoholics€Anonymous€every€day.€€On€DecemberÏ15,€1994,€this€Court€removed€these€six€conditions€of€bond€because€they€wereÏunrelated€to€assuring€Appellantððs€appearance€in€court.€ÌÌà ` àSubsequently,€in€òòState€v.€Connorsóó,€924€S.W.2d€362€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð @,à"$ Ð1996),€this€Court€vacated€Appellantððs€sentence€and€remanded€this€matter€forÏresentencing.€€This€Court€concluded€that€resentencing€was€required€because€theÏtrial€court€had€failed€to€make€specific€reference€to€mitigating€and€enhancementÏfactors,€had€failed€to€place€the€specific€findings€of€fact€upon€which€AppellantððsÏsentence€was€based€on€the€record,€and€had€failed€to€consider€the€principles€ofÏâ âthe€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.€€òòId.óó€at€364.€€In€addition,€this€Court€held€thatÐ à7€.0 Ðperiods€of€probation€must€run€in€the€same€manner€(either€consecutively€orÏconcurrently)€as€the€periods€of€incarceration.€€òòId.óó€€Ð P ð Ðâ âÌà ` à€On€May€6,€1996,€€this€Court€ordered€that€Appellantððs€bail€bond€beÏimmediately€reinstated€and€that€the€Sumner€County€Sheriff€release€AppellantÏfrom€custody€pending€further€proceedings€in€the€trial€court.€€Appellant€was€notÏreleased€until€May€9,€1996.€ÌÌà ` àOn€May€24,€1996,€Appellant€filed€a€motion€for€recusal€of€the€trial€judge.€€OnÏMay€28,€1996,€the€trial€court€denied€the€motion€after€finding€that€the€motion€wasÏinsufficient€on€its€face€to€state€grounds€for€recusal.€€€€Following€the€denial€of€theÏrecusal€motion,€the€trial€court€sentenced€Appellant€to€eleven€months€and€twenty„¼nine€days€for€driving€under€the€influence,€all€suspended€except€120€days€followedÏby€eight€months€of€probation;€to€eleven€months€and€twenty„nine€days€for€recklessÏendangerment,€all€suspended€except€120€days€followed€by€eight€months€ofÏprobation;€and€six€months€for€driving€on€a€revoked€license,€all€suspended€exceptÏ120€days€followed€by€six€months€of€probation.€€The€trial€court€ordered€toÏsentences€for€driving€under€the€influence€and€reckless€endangerment€to€runÏconsecutively€and€ordered€the€sentence€for€driving€on€a€revoked€license€to€runÏconcurrently€with€the€others.€ÌÌà@§§+®àò òRECUSALó óˆÐ 2°(* Ðñ<ññ3ñÌñ3ññ<ñà ` àAppellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€denied€his€motion€forÏrecusal.€Whether€to€grant€a€motion€to€recuse€is€discretionary€with€the€trial€judge.€ÏòòCaruthers€v.€Stateóó,€814€S.W.2d€64,€67€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€This€Court€mayÐ ð7.0 Ðreverse€only€when€the€trial€judge€has€clearly€abused€that€discretionary€authority.€Ð à9€02 ÐòòState€v.€Cashóó,€867€S.W.2d€741,€749€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€The€trial€judgeÐ `  Ðshould€recuse€herself€whenever€ð ðher€ððimpartiality€might€reasonably€beÏquestioned.ðððð€€òòAlley€v.€Stateóó,€882€S.W.2d€810,€820€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994)Ð @ à Ð(quoting€Code€of€Judicial€Conduct,€Canon€3(c)).€€Recusal€is€appropriate€ð ðwhenÏa€person€of€ordinary€prudence€in€the€judgeððs€position€.€.€.€would€find€a€reasonableÏbasis€for€questioning€the€judgeððs€impartiality.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ °  ÐÌà ` à€Appellantððs€motion€for€recusal€alleged,€among€other€things,€that€the€sixÏconditions€of€bond€pending€appeal€were€significantly€more€onerous€than€theÏactual€sentence€and€that€these€conditions€were€imposed€to€penalize€Appellant€forÏexercising€his€right€to€appeal;€that€the€trial€court,€in€an€ex€parte€communication,Ïordered€the€Sumner€County€Sheriff€to€continue€to€confine€Appellant€despite€thisÏcourtððs€order€that€he€be€released;€and€that€the€trial€court€had€participated€in€exÏparte€conversations€about€the€case€with€the€district€attorney€generalððs€office.€€ÏThe€trial€court€denied€that€any€of€these€allegations€were€true€and€it€ruled€that€theÏmotion€should€be€denied€because€it€was€insufficient€on€its€face€in€stating€theÏgrounds€for€recusal.€ÌÌà ` àThe€trial€court€clearly€abused€its€discretion€in€ruling€that€these€allegationsÏpresented€facially€insufficient€grounds€for€recusal.€€Appellantððs€motion€containedÏserious€allegations€of€judicial€misconduct.€€Certainly,€ð ðððassuming€the€truth€of€theÏfacts€alleged,€a€reasonable€person€would€conclude€that€[this]€particular€judge€isÏbiased€or€prejudiced€against€[this]€particular€[Appellant].ðððð€€òòId.óó€at€821€(quotingÐ 4 *, ÐòòUnited€States€v.€Bakeróó,€441€F.€Supp.€612,€616€(M.D.€Tenn.€1977)).€€It€was€notÐ ð5,. Ðenough€for€the€trial€court€to€determine€that€she€had€no€subjective€bias€againstÏAppellant,€she€was€also€required€to€determine€whether€her€impartiality€mightÐ Ð9p02 Ðreasonably€be€questioned€under€an€objective€standard.€€òòId.óó€at€822.€€In€short,€weÐ `  Ðhold€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€denying€the€recusal€motionÏwithout€giving€Appellant€an€opportunity€to€present€proof€on€the€matter.ÌÌà@#®àò òJUDICIAL€VINDICTIVENESSó óˆÐ  À Ðñ=ñÌñ=ñà ` àAppellant€contends€that€the€trial€courtððs€imposition€of€a€harsher€sentenceÏafter€his€successful€appeal€violates€his€right€to€due€process.€€In€òòNorth€Carolina€v.Ð °  ÐPearceóó,€395€U.S.€711,€724ð!ð25,€89€S.€Ct.€2072,€2080,€23€L.€Ed.€2d€656€(1969),Ð    Ðthe€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€it€is€a€violation€of€basic€due€processÏto€punish€a€person€because€he€has€done€what€the€law€plainly€allows.€€TheÏSupreme€Court€stated€that€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€FourteenthÏAmendment€prevents€increased€sentences€which€are€actually€or€likely€motivatedÏby€a€vindictive€desire€to€punish€a€defendant€for€the€exercise€of€a€statutory€orÏprocedural€right.€€òòId.óó,€395€U.S.€at€723ð!ð24,€89€S.€Ct.€at€2080.€€The€òòPearceóó€CourtÐ  "@ Ðstated:Ìñ>ñÓÓñ>ñà0 ` àDue€process€of€law,€then,€requires€that€vindictiveness€against€a€defendantÏfor€having€successfully€attacked€his€first€conviction€must€play€no€part€in€theÏsentence€he€receives€after€a€new€trial.€€And€since€the€fear€of€suchÏvindictiveness€may€unconstitutionally€deter€a€defendantððs€exercise€of€theÏright€to€appeal€or€collaterally€attack€his€first€conviction,€due€process€alsoÏrequires€that€a€defendant€be€freed€of€apprehension€of€such€a€retaliatoryÏmotivation€on€the€part€of€the€sentencing€judge.€€ñ?ñÐ ` T$` T$ Ðñ?ñÌñ>ñÓ.Óñ>ñòòId.óó,€395€U.S.€at€725,€89€S.€Ct.€at€2080.€€€To€prevent€vindictiveness€from€enteringÐ @.à$& Ðinto€the€decision€and€to€allay€any€fear€on€the€part€of€a€defendant€that€anÏincreased€sentence€is€the€product€of€vindictiveness,€the€Court€fashioned€aÏprophylactic€rule€that€ð ðwhenever€a€judge€imposes€a€more€severe€sentence€uponÏa€defendant€after€a€new€trial,€the€reasons€for€his€doing€so€must€affirmativelyÏappear.ðð€€òòId.óó,€395€U.S.€at€726,€89€S.€Ct.€at€2081.€€€Otherwise,€a€presumptionÐ ð7.0 Ðarises€that€a€greater€sentence€has€been€imposed€for€a€vindictive€purposeð"ðaÐ à9€02 Ðpresumption€that€must€be€rebutted€by€ð ðððobjective€information€.€.€.€justifying€theÏincreased€sentence.ðððð€€òòTexas€v.€McCulloughóó,€475€U.S.€134,€142,€106€S.€Ct.€976,Ð P ð Ð981,€89€L.€Ed.€2d€104€(1986)€(quoting€òòUnited€States€v.€Goodwinóó,€457€U.S.€368,Ð @ à Ð374,€102€S.€Ct.€2485,€2489,€73€L.€Ed.€2d€74€(1982)).ÌÌà ` à€In€òòAlabama€v.€Smithóó,€490€U.S.€794,€109€S.€Ct.€2201,€1021€L.€Ed.€2d€865Ð °  Ð(1989),€the€Supreme€Court€limited€the€application€of€€òòPearceóó€to€circumstances€inÐ    Ðwhich€there€is€a€ð ðððreasonable€likelihoodðð€that€the€increase€in€sentence€is€theÏproduct€of€actual€vindictiveness€on€the€part€of€the€sentencing€authority.ðð€€òòId.óó,€490Ð à€ ÐU.S.€at€799,€109€S.€Ct.€at€2205.€€ð ðWhere€there€is€no€such€reasonable€likelihood,Ïthe€burden€remains€upon€the€defendant€to€prove€actual€vindictiveness.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ À` Ðà ` à€Ìà ` àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€did€not€articulate€any€justification€for€increasingÏAppellantððs€term€of€imprisonment€from€120€to€240€days€on€resentencing.€€Indeed,Ïthe€State€has€also€failed€to€offer€any€explanation€as€to€why€the€increasedÏsentence€was€justified.€€In€fact,€it€appears€from€the€record€that€the€only€thingÏconsidered€during€resentencing€that€was€not€considered€in€the€originalÏsentencing€hearing€was€the€fact€that€Appellant€had€been€successful€on€appeal:Ìà0 ` àMR.€HERBISON:€Your€Honor,€that€is€an€effective€sentence€of€240€days,Ïwith€the€balance€of€the€sentence€to€be€served€on€probation?Ð ` T$` T$ Ðà0 ` àTHE€COURT:€Yes,€it€will.€€My€original€thought€was€I€didnððt€really€want€himÏto€serve€more€than€120€days,€but€the€opinion€that€came€out€of€theÏ[Criminal]€Court€of€Appeals€indicates€that€he€canððt€do€the€time€concurrentlyÏand€the€rest€of€the€sentence€consecutively;€so€Iððm€trying€to€be€inÏcompliance€with€the€opinion.€€And€that€being€the€case,€he€is€going€to€haveÏto€do€240€unless€you€can„„ÐÐ9p02` T$` T$ Ðà0 ` àMR.€HERBISON:€May€it€please€the€Court,€I€donððt€mean€to€beÏñFñpresumptiousñFññFñpresumptuousñFñ€[sic]€here,€but€if€the€Court€deemed€an€effective€120„dayÏsentence€to€be€appropriate,€certainly€two€consecutive€60„day€sentencesÏwould€achieve€that€objective.Ð ` T$` T$ Ðà0 ` àTHE€COURT:€I€think€that€he€should€do€120€on€the€DUI,€since€it€is€his€5thÏDUI.Ð ` T$` T$ Ðñ@ñÌÌñ@ññAñÌñAñà ` àWe€hold€that€in€this€case,€there€is€a€ð ðreasonable€likelihoodðð€that€theÏincreased€sentence€was€the€product€of€actual€vindictiveness.€€€This€is€especiallyÏtrue€given€the€trial€courtððs€previous€imposition€of€the€six€invalid€conditions€ofÏAppellantððs€appeal€bondñFñ׃ ×ñFññFñ׃ ×ñFñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€the€trial€courtððs€improper€denial€of€AppellantððsÐ À` Ðrecusal€motion.€€This€Court€is€hard-pressed€to€accept€either€the€trial€courtððs€failureÏto€objectively€justify€Appellantððs€increased€effective€sentence€or€the€Stateððs€failureÏto€offer€any€explanation€at€all.€€€Indeed,€the€Supreme€Court€noted€in€òòSmithóó€thatÐ "0 Ðwhen€the€same€sentencing€judge€presides€at€both€the€original€trial€and€theÏsubsequent€retrial,€the€judge€ð ðcan€be€expected€to€operate€in€the€context€ofÏroughly€the€same€sentencing€considerations€after€the€second€trial€as€he€doesÏafter€the€first;€any€unexplained€change€in€the€sentence€is€therefore€subject€to€aÏpresumption€of€vindictiveness.ðð€€òòId.óó,€490€U.S.€at€802,€109€S.€Ct.€at€2206.€Ð @,à"$ ÐTherefore,€it€is€the€opinion€of€this€Court€that€there€is€a€presumption€of€actualÏvindictiveness€in€this€case€that€has€not€been€rebutted.Ìâ âÐ 2°(* Ðà ` àBecause€of€our€conclusion€that€the€State€has€not€overcome€theÏâ âpresumption€that€Appellantððs€sentence€was€the€product€of€actual€vindictivenessÏand€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Appellantððs€motion€for€recusal,€we€remandÏthis€case€for€transfer€to€another€trial€judge€who€will€conduct€a€new€sentencingÏhearing€in€accordance€with€the€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.ñFñ׃×ñFññFñ׃×ñFñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  À ÐñBñÌ€ÌÌà ` àà ` àà ` àà ` àà ` àÌÌÌÌñBñÓ  ÓñBñà ` àÌÌñBñÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUDGE