ÿWPCî ý-ÅB‚òjÝUØ™ƒÊi}Î[âhL诎_JQfeð;a¥¤[W‹ð³—U+ÝÚD­¯áýjžJ™¼ˆ»aþË”[£rÕœ¾…+%•¨ô¯\ÁNgæ–"쟵ʥJ²¤Í°·Åw½4HcV|B<* ,‘,™Ü‚‰P¶0„-·/úRKè#ôã²O¢g%cÛÕ ¥ß jÙTRh>wÞØL¸—Š=q/qõ'ÆÊ³€T)nû>{•'Pî–¨g† ä׳ Kç¦Ò§¤+ÿl‘¹=Y>é™ùxµ®RïnO…u¸£w×ÇâCé[“íeöQÑÇ@¬oÒÁ{ U ã©@{A×ú|WÒê…>µ'œÒEØÔ"Œ2A>RÒ7ó£$‡ +3’«ÐcNKHpÖ œ'#êŒÃú­êÕ¥Á#Ú׳‘7Àø×ÀðéÝü§ìN¼p»^ÊdDÐcóVlëÊà‡a[ýµ }‚€à¤×49¦ò$¨ôÛe[¶SÖÄ[.ÖÌ4Q % 0í• UB‚ 4Ä Ø n­ç U:” fÎ 4 "< w:^ 㘠U:{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{ Bµµµµµ D3ÒÒÒ 0D AOIƘ˜ 0D^ D/¢ BјHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(ÅÕÐ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÑ7€'CXXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiuM%3|x:«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular \Ñ\R AØ'ÿ Legal\Ñ Ñ Ü ÑÑ  Ñ '(D)*D+,D-e0r‚1Ó€ ÙÔ€XL–XXXÔÔ€UXXL–ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XL–XUÔÐ  ÐÌMay€6,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒÕÐ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ7€«„XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÝ  Ýñ-ñ›ñ-ññ-ñ›ñ-ñѰÑÑܰÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÑ€ †ÑÑ€ í:ÑÔ€ XL–XXXÔÑ7€ L– XXdæXXdÈ7Ññ1ñœßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@E  ` 8ttxPXð  rß›ñ1ñ€à8 ¸ àà@Ñ Ñ D¸ x¸ xàIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðà@ƒƒ%DàAT€NASHVILLEà@@66-Rà€€€€€€€€€ˆÌà ¸ àà  à€€€€€€€€€€€€€DECEMBER€1998€SESSIONÌÌÓÓJAMES€GORDON€COONS,€III,à À à)à  àÐ 80 Ѐà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ   Ðà ¸ àAppellant,à h àà À à)à  àNo.€01C01„9801„CR„00014Ð ü  Ðà ¸ à€€€€€à  àà h à€€à À à)Ð êâ  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àDavidson€CountyÐ ÐÈ  Ðv.à ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)€€€€€€€€€Ð ¶®  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHonorable€Ann€Lacy€Johns,€Judge€€€Ð œ”  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,€€€€€à À à)à  à(Post„Conviction)Ð h` Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)€€€€€€€€Ìà ¸ àAppellee.à h àà À à)Ð 4, Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ÑÑ&Dàòòò òCONCURRING€OPINIONˆÐ ˜ ÐÌóóó óà ¸ àI€concur€with€the€majority€opinion.€€I€note,€though,€that€the€case€uponÐ H @ Ðwhich€the€opinion€relies€to€conclude€that€the€statute€of€limitations€may€not€be€raised€forÏthe€first€time€on€appeal€was€decided€under€the€former€post„conviction€procedure€act.€€ñ-ñœñ-ñIñ-ñ›ñ-ññ0ñœñ0ñÏam€hesitant€to€say€that€such€a€total€bar€exists€under€the€1995€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act,€given€the€affirmative€duty€of€the€trial€court€to€assess€the€timeliness€ofÏthe€petition€regardless€of€whether€it€is€raised€by€the€state€as€a€defense€and€theÏapparent€jurisdictional€effect€of€the€running€of€the€statute.ÌÌà ¸ àPursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„206(a),€the€trial€court€must€examineÏthe€petition€and€the€existing€court€records.€€According›€to€206(b),€ð ð[i]f€it€plainly€appearsÏfrom€the€face€of€the€petition,€any€annexed€exhibits€or€the€prior€proceedings€in€the€caseÏthat€the€petition€was€not€filed€.€.€.€within€the€time€set€forth€in€the€statute€of€limitations€.€.€.Ïthe€judge€shall€enter€an€order€dismissing€the€petition.ðð€€These€provisions€should€put€aÏpetitioner€on€notice€that€the€issue€of€the€statute€of€limitations€is€always€present€in€post„¼conviction€cases.Ð p9h28 Їà ¸ àAlso,€it€is€significant€to€note€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a)€providesÏthe€following€relative€to€the€significance€of€the€running€of€the€statute€of€limitations:ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 ¸ àTime€is€of€the€essence€of€the€right€to€file€a€petition€forÏpost„conviction€relief€or€a€motion€to€reopen€establishedÏby€this€chapter,€and€the€one„year€limitations€period€is€anÏelement€of€the€right€to€file€such€an€action€and€is€aÏcondition€upon€its€exercise.€€Except€as€specificallyÏprovided€in€subsections€(b)€and€(c),€the€right€to€file€aÏpetition€for€post„conviction€relief€or€a€motion€to€reopenÏunder€this€chapter€shall€be€extinguished€œñ'ñuponñ'ñ›€theÏexpiration€of€the€limitations€period.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌÓÓÓ  ÓSubsection€(b)€expressly€states€that€no€court€shall€have€jurisdiction€to€consider€anÏuntimely€petition€absent€three€exceptions€that€do€not€apply€in€the€present€case.ÌUnder€these€circumstances,€I€believe€that€the€running€of€the€statute€of€limitations€couldÏbe€addressed€for€the€first€time€on€appeal€if€it€were€plainly€shown€from€the€face€of€theÏrecord.ÌÌà ¸ àOn€the€other€hand,€if€the€record€does€not€plainly€show€that€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€has€run,€I€believe€that€the€state,€as€the€majority€opinion€concludes,€should€beÏbarred€from€raising€the€issue€for€the€first€time€on€appeal.€€œñ(ñWithout›€the›€issue›€being›€raisedñ(ññ)ñIf€the€issue€is€not€raisedñ)ñ›€in€theÏtrial€court,€œtheñ*ñreñ*ññ+ñ€petitioner€has€no€opportunityñ+ññ,ñ›€is›€no›€opportunity›€for›€the›€petitionerñ,ñ›€to€resolve€any€questions€of€fact.€€Thus,€weÏshould€not€try€to€resolve€such€a€question€from€an€unclear€record.€€Such€is€the€caseÏbefore€us.ÌÌà ¸ àIn€its€brief,€the€state€notes€that€the€petition€ð ðappears€to€be€time€barred.ðð€€ItÏstates€that€the€trial€court€entered€its€judgment€of€conviction€on€April€25,€1996,€and€thatÏthe€petitioner€filed€his€petition€on€April€28,€1997.€€However,€although€the€record€reflectsÏthat€the€petition€was€stamped€filed€in€the€trial€courtððs€office€on€April€28,€1997,€œthe›Ïpetitionerððs€certificate€of€service€of€an€exact€copy€upon€the€district€attorney€generalÏreflects€that€the€copy€was€delivered€to€the€prison€post€office€for€mailing€on€April€24,Ï1997.€€For€incarcerated€post„conviction€petitioners,€a€òòproóó€òòseóó€petition€is€deemed€filedÐ À5¸.4 Ðwhen€it€is€delivered€to€or€received€by€the€appropriate€prison€official.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.Ð Œ7„06 ÐP.€49(c);€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€28,€ðð€2(G).€€Thus,€the€petition€indicates€that€it€was€filedÏwithin€one€year€of€the€entry€of€the€judgment€of€conviction.ÌÌà ¸ àMoreover,€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a),€the€petition€mustÏbe€filed€within€one€year€of€the€date€that€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€of€conviction€becameÏfinal.€€Ordinarily,€a€judgment€becomes€final€thirty€days€after€it€is€œentered,€meaning›€thatÏthe€petitioner€in€the€present€case€would€have€had€until€May€25,€1997,€to€file€his€petition.€ÏI€note€that€in€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€983€S.W.2d€710,€711€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1998),€this€courtÐ œ”  Ðheld€that€when€a€plea€is€entered€pursuant€to€a€plea€agreement€and€the€defendantÏwaives€his€right€to€appeal,€the€judgment€becomes€final€on€the€date€of€the€entry€of€theÏjudgment€of€conviction,€not€thirty€days€later.€€In€this€respect,€the€record€before€usÏreflects€that€the€defendant€waived€his€right€to€ð ðtrial€and€appellate€review€of€theÏconviction.ðð€€However,€nothing€in€the€record€indicates€whether€the€waiver€includedÏsentencing€or€whether€the€petitioner€knowingly€intended€to€waive€an€appeal€completely.ÌÌà ¸ àThe€ultimate€point€is€that€the€record€does€not€plainly€show€that€the€petitionÏwas€filed€untimely.€€Thus,€we€are€to€treat€the€petition€as€timely€filed.ÌÌÓÓà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à___________________________Ìà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€JudgeÌ