WPC# U:V %U .nX, 04 U:Q w@ 4 0a 0D@  0JU: 0T 0^b 0h 0r( 0| 0 0 1u,U, 0d B1U,NB)zDC D3 AMf 0@6=vv~v AO!A" 0D# D/K# Bz#<6X9`("Courier NewTTX%2A`ArialTT3|x<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@%2A`ArialTTTTXXX2PQXP($X6CXXXiXX6CX  ii` TRY3' Letter[A'red 3' LetterA' LegalT,cAZ"Arial Regular |}D~EDDӀԡ ppppp8((3$ !XɸXXX6XXɸX  66` TRY3' Letter3' 3' Letter3'T   `   0  (#$  0  H2 0Indent123  ,  AZ"Arial Regular2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)<  9p`(ModernP 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X d<  9p`(Monaco% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd$$$$'dxd-)C << G  !  #d#   X   `   \R3'\     YYY FILEDXAugust29,1996CecilW.CrowsonAppellateCourtClerk  ("$     3 !#d#   X   `   \R3'\   $       ݀JudgeJohnH.Peayacceptedpetitionersguiltypleas.SinceJudgePeaywasappointedtotheCourtofCriminalAppealsin1990,JudgeRobertWedemeyerheardthepetitionsforpostconvictionrelief.  !#d#   X   `   \R3'\   $       ݀Forpetitioner,thestatutoryperiodexpiredonMay24,1991.SeeT.C.A.4030102(1990Repl.)(repealed1995).PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'@Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Monaco   BA Op Monaco  BA Op Monaco -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! . &''Xd&#''Xd#   X   `   \R3'\     7XXdd7  \RA'\XL+,);+'h|` . `Lߛ@ INTHETENNESSEECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS̀@ AT@ NASHVILLE@ JUNE1994SESSIONSCOTTL.DEEM,    )          )   Appellant,    ) No.01C019403CC00083      ) v.      ) MontgomeryCounty       )STATEOFTENNESSEE,   ) Hon.RobertW.Wedemeyer,Judge      )  Appellee.    ) (PostConviction)       )            FORTHEAPPELLANT:    FORTHEAPPELLEE:GregoryD.Smith     CharlesW.BursonOnePublicSq.,Ste.321    AttorneyGeneralofTennesseeClarksville,TN.37040     and       KimbraSpann        CriminalJusticeDivision       450JamesRobertsonParkway       Nashville,TN372430493       JohnWesleyCarney,Jr.       DistrictAttorneyGeneral        and       ArthurBieber       AssistantDistrictAttorneyGeneral       204FranklinSt.Suite200       Clarksville,TN37041      OPINIONFILED:____________________      AFFIRMED̜PERCURIAMӜ̛ @  OPINIONH4 ` XX Thepetitioner,ScottL.Deem,appealsfromthetrialcourtsdenialofhissecondpetitionforpostconvictionrelief.Thesingleissuepresentedforreviewiswhetherthetrialcourtproperlydismissedthepetitionwithoutanevidentiaryhearing.Weaffirm. OnJuly9,1987,petitionerenteredbestinterestguiltypleastotwocountsofaggravatedrape,onecountofaggravatedkidnapping,andonecountofacrimeagainstnature.Thetrialcourtimposedaneffectivesixtyyearsentence.ThiscourtaffirmedhissentencesinScottL.Deemv.State,No.87277III,MontgomeryCo.(Tenn.Crim.App.May24,1988).In1989,petitionerfiledaprosepetitionforpostconvictionreliefallegingthathehadnotknowinglyandintelligentlyenteredhisguiltypleas.Thetrialcourtappointedcounseland,afteranevidentiaryhearing,foundthatpetitionersguiltypleaswereknowinglyandvoluntarilyentered.Accordingly,thetrialjudgedismissedthepetition.Thedismissalwasaffirmedonappeal.ScottL.Deemv.State,No.01C019005CC00127,MontgomeryCo.(Tenn.Crim.App.March7,1991). OnSeptember22,1993,petitionerfiledasecondapplicationforpostconvictionrelief.Thisprosepetitionraisedanumberofissuesincludingdoublejeopardyandineffectiveassistanceofbothtrialandpostconvictioncounsel.Thetrialjudge .   כappointedcounseltorepresentpetitioner.Afterhearingtheargumentsofcounsel,thetrialcourtfoundthattheissuesinthesecondpetitionhadbeenwaivedandthatthepetitionwasbarred%  Ԁbythestatuteoflimitations.Hegrantedthestatesmotiontodismissthepetitionwithoutanevidentiaryhearing. Inthisappeal,petitionerconcedesthathispetitionwasfiledoutsidethestatutoryperiod. /   כHecontends,however,thattheerrorsofpostconvictioncounselinthefirstpostconvictionproceedingjustifiesholdinganevidentiaryhearinginthesecond.Inessence,petitionerarguesthatheshouldhavetheopportunitytocallthepreviouspostconvictioncounseltodeterminewhytheissuesraisedinthesecondpetitionwerenotpreviouslyaddressed.Hecontendsthatcounselsfailuretoraisetheseissuescreatesanexceptiontothethreeyearstatuteoflimitations. Inthisargument,petitionerreliesontheholdingofBurfordv.State,845S.W.2d204(Tenn.1992).InBurford,theTennesseeSupremeCourtheldthatthedueprocessclausesofthestateandfederalconstitutionsrequirethattheclaimantbegiven"areasonableopportunitytohavetheclaimedissueheardanddetermined,"andthatwheresuchanopportunitydidnotexist,arigidapplicationofthetimebarwoulddepriveapetitionerofdueprocessoflaw.Sandsv.State,903S.W.2d297,301(Tenn.1995);Burford,845S.W.2dat208.InSands,thesupremecourtsetforthathreestepprocessfordeterminingwhethertheBurfordruleappliedinagivenfactualsituation: 1.8 determinewhenthelimitationsperiodwouldnormallyhavebeguntorun; 2.8 determinewhetherthegroundsforreliefactuallyaroseafterthelimitationsperiodwouldnormallyhavecommenced;and 3.8 ifthegroundsare"laterarising,"determinewhetherastrictapplicationofthelimitationsperiodwouldeffectivelydeprivethepetitionerofareasonableopportunitytopresenttheclaim.Sands,903S.W.2dat301. PetitionermaynotrelyuponaBurfordexceptioninthiscase.NoneofthegroundspresentedinthesecondpetitionaroseafterMay24,1991,thedateonwhichthestatutoryperiodexpired.Allofthegroundsinthesecondpetitionwereavailableatthetimeofthefirstexceptone.Petitionersallegationofineffectiveassistanceofpostconvictioncounselobviouslydidnotexistatthetimeofthefirstpetition.However,ineffectiveassistanceofcounselinapostconvictionproceedingisnotaconstitutionalviolationandisnotcognizableasagroundforpostconvictionrelief.Housev.State,911S.W.2d705,712(Tenn.1995);Statev.Garrard,693S.W.2d921,922(Tenn.Crim.App.1988).Inhisfirstpostconvictionpetition,thetrialcourtappointedcounselandheldafullevidentiaryhearing.Petitionerhadareasonableopportunitytohaveallissuesheardanddetermined.Thispetitionisbarredbythestatuteoflimitations. Evenifpetitionerhadtimelyfiledhissecondpetition,thetrialcourtcouldnothaveconsideredtheissues.Petitionerwaivedhisrighttopresentthemwhenhefailedtoraisetheminhisfirstpetition.SeeT.C.A.4030111(1990Repl.)(repealed1995).Agroundforreliefiswaivedifapetitionerknowinglyandunderstandinglyfailedtopresentitfordeterminationinanyproceedingbeforeacourtofcompetentjurisdictioninwhichpetitionercouldhavepresentedtheissue.T.C.A.4030112(1)(repealed1995).Thestatutecreatesarebuttablepresumptionthatagroundforreliefnotraisedinapriorproceedingwaswaived.T.C.A.4030112(2)(repealed1995). A"fullandfairhearing"occursifapetitionerisgiventheopportunitytopresentproofandargumentonthepetitionforpostconvictionrelief.House,911S.W.2dat714.Waiverisdeterminedbyanobjectivestandardunderwhichapetitionerisboundbytheactionorinactionofcounsel.Id.Apetitionermaynotovercometherebuttablepresumptionofwaiverbyallegingthatpetitionerdidnotpersonallywaivethegroundforrelief.House,911S.W.2dat814;Statev.Smith,814S.W.2d45,4748(Tenn.1991).Inthisinstance,thetrialcourtheldafullandfairhearingontheissuespetitionerraisedinthefirstpostconvictionproceeding.Hecannotnowclaimthathedidnot"knowinglyandunderstandingly"waivethegroundsraisedinthesecondpetition. Petitionerfiledhissecondpetitionforpostconvictionreliefafterthestatutoryperiodexpired.Moreover,hehasnotovercomethepresumptionthatallgroundsnotraisedinthefirstpetitionarewaived.Thetrialcourtdidnoterrindismissingthesecondpetitionwithoutanevidentiaryhearing. Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.      PERCURIAM            (TiptonandWelles,JJ.;      Bevil,Sp.J.,notparticipating)      ̛