WPC: 3# UN %3 094w@* 0 j 0Dt 0J 0T 0^V 0h 0r 0| 0 0 1u 0d 0@ D39 U>l B U* B) DC AM] AQ 0D 0D D/I Bxbv~vgHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nLH(9 Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(j$` ` 4XTR[A' Legal[A' LegalA' LegalA' LegalTa"3|x^ JEKLEMNEOPeQRӀ^((3eB$ j!` 4XTR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T     0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X("$    $$$$'dxd<  9p`(&Times New Roman d<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd* 'C << G*+ ,-C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3$ !  ($$   1  ..' dxdP Pd  !  #d## `   4  X \RA'\  +"  %%   YYY FILED%X August27,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.%AppellateCourtClerk  } !#d## `   4  X \RA'\   $       %%Amajorityofthispaneladherestotheviewthatthe1995amendmenttothePostConvictionProcedureActdidnotcreateanopportunitytofileapostconvictionclaimwithinoneyearafterMay10,1995,forthosepetitionerswhohadbeenbarredbytheformerthreeyearstatuteoflimitations.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.4030102(repealed1995);Tenn.CodeAnn.4030202(1996Supp.).Also,thestatutorydefenseofwaiverwouldlikelybarthisclaim.SeeHousev.State,911S.W.2d705(Tenn.1995).Thepresumptionofwaiverisnotovercomebyanallegationthatthepetitionerwasnotpersonallyawareofagroundforrelief.Waiveristobedeterminedbyanobjectivestandardandthepetitionerisboundbytheactionorinactionofhiscounsel.Id.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'hStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva ! . # `   4  X \RA'\  ݛ70Xdd7  ќ%ԛ @ INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATJACKSON@ MAY1997SESSIONJAMESE.DELBRIDGE,  * C.C.A.#02C019605CR00142 Appellant,   * SHELBYCOUNTY̜*R(/'A1-j|C` - `@RߛVS.     * Hon.L.T.Lafferty,JudgeSTATEOFTENNESSEE,  * (PostConviction)     Appellee.   *ForAppellant:    ForAppellee:JamesE.Delbridge,prose  CharlesW.BursonColdCreekCorrectionalFacility  AttorneyGeneral&ReporterRoute2,Box1000Henning,TN380411000   DeborahA.Tullis      AssistantAttorneyGeneral      450JamesRobertsonParkway      Nashville,TN372430493         KarenCook      AssistantDistrictAttorneyGeneral      CriminalJusticeComplex      201PoplarAvenue      Memphis,TN38103OPINIONFILED:_____________________AFFIRMEDGARYR.WADE,JUDGE   OPINION     Thepetitioner,JamesE.Delbridge,appealsthetrialcourt'sdenialofhispetitionforpostconvictionrelief.Thedispositiveissueiswhetherthetrialcourtcorrectlydismissedthepetitionwithoutanevidentiaryhearingonthebasisthatitwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitations.Weaffirmthejudgmentofdismissal.  OnMay9,1981,thepetitionerwasconvictedofseconddegreemurderandsentencedtoatermoffortyfiveyears.Thiscourtaffirmedondirectappeal,Statev.Delbridge,630S.W.2d626(Tenn.Crim.App.1981),andapplicationforpermissiontoappealwasdeniedbythesupremecourtonDecember28,1981.Thereafter,thepetitionermadeotherattacksuponhisconviction.InanorderfiledDecember21,1987,thesupremecourt,whiledismissingthepetitioner'sthirdpostconvictionpetition,madethefollowingobservationabouthisfirsttwoapplicationsforpostjudgmentrelief:"[The][d]efendantfiledapostconvictionpetitionin1982andawritoferrorcoramnobisin1984,bothofwhichweredismissedinthetrialcourtandthedismissalsaffirmedbytheCourtofCriminalAppeals."Delbridgev.State,742S.W.2d266,266(Tenn.1987).  InthisNovember14,1995,petition,thepetitionerprimarilyallegedthathehadbeendenieddueprocessbythejuryinstructiononreasonabledoubt.SeeCagev.Louisiana,498U.S.39(1991).Thepetitioneralsoarguedthathiscounselwasineffectiveforhavingfailedtoarguethatthereasonabledoubtinstructionwasunconstitutional.Thetrialcourtdismissedthepetitionwithoutanevidentiaryhearingandwithouttheappointmentofcounselforthreereasons:8 8 (1)thepetitionwasnottimelyfiled;8 8 (2)theissuehadbeenwaivedforthefailuretopresentitinapriorproceeding;and8 8 (3)that,astotheclaimofineffectiveassistanceofcounsel,thegroundhadbeenpreviouslydetermined.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.4030206(1996Supp.).Thetrialcourtconsideredandrejectedthemeritsofthepetitioner'sclaimthatthereferencetomoralcertaintyinthejuryinstructionsviolateddueprocess.Weconcurintheobservationsbythetrialcourt.Evenwithoutconsideringtheproceduralbars, 0   ׀thedueprocessclaimlacksmeritasdoestheallegationofineffectiveassistanceofcounselforfailuretoasserttheground.  InCagev.Louisiana,theUnitedStateSupremeCourtheldthattheterms,"actualsubstantialdoubt"and"grave"uncertaintyindeterminingwhetherthedoubtwassufficientforacquittal,loweredthenecessaryburdenofproofrequiredforconviction;whenthosephraseswereconsideredalongwiththeterm"moralcertainty,"areasonablejurorcouldhaveinterpretedtheinstructiontoallowfindingofguiltbasedonadegreeofproofbelowthatrequiredbythedueprocessclause.498U.S.at41.InSullivanv.Louisiana,508U.S.275(1993),itwasdeterminedthatadeficientreasonabledoubtinstructionisneverharmlesserror.  Here,thepetitionerreliesuponrecentdecisionsbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtbyattackingtheuseoftheterm"moralcertainty"inconjunctionwiththereasonabledoubtstandard.Thisveryterminology,however,hasbeenapprovedbythiscourtaslongasnotusedinconnectionwithotherqualifyingphrasessuchas"substantial"or"grave."See,e.g.,Statev.Hallock,875S.W.2d285(Tenn.Crim.App.1993);EanosEarlHuntv.State,No.03C019308CR00266(Tenn.Crim.App.,atKnoxville,Feb.3,1994);Statev.GaryLeeBlank,No.01C019105CC00139(Tenn.Crim.App.,atNashville,Feb.29,1992).Here,thepetitioneroffersnoproofthatthereferencetomoralcertaintyloweredthedegreeofproofinviolationofthedueprocessclause.Thetrialcourtfoundfavorablyforthestateonthisissue.Becausetherewasnoerrorintheinstructions,counselforthepetitionercannotbedeemedineffectiveforhavingfailedtoallegethegroundasameansofrelief.  Accordingly,thejudgmentisaffirmed.      __________________________________      GaryR.Wade,JudgeCONCUR:______________________________JohnH.Peay,Judge_______________________________ThomasT.Woodall,Judge