ÿWPC¤( @# U>› %Ù 0´ßUB“U:Õ4# 0ø2 0D* U:n ¨ w@° ð 0Ðð ÆÀ† 0J† AOÐ 0D 0Tc 0^·U@ 0hU 0r½ 0|/ 0†« 0@1 0q D3 1u4 D/©U,Ø B B! 0d>U,¢U6ÎU.U *2B)\DC… AMȬqÁx2©ªv~S!vÓÑ"˜HP LaserJet 4/4MHPPCL5E,,,,0 <@ˆÐ9Z &Courier RegularX(Œ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑÑÑ7€„—XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑÑÑ  ÑÑTR[  AØ'Legal[  AØ'Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÑÜÜÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÔ€X¸RXXXÔ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular¨vÙ 3|x¬?(¨(3ýÁ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒѰÑÑ7€T¯XXdðdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑÑÑ  ÑÑTR[  AØ'Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑܰÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÔ€XhXXXÔÝ  Ýà ¸ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó`"Arial Regular ™?Dš?D›?œ?Ó€?ž?Ÿ?‚ ?Ó€¡?¢?(¨3š¸$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒѰÑÑ7€T¯XXdðdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑÑÑ  ÑÑTR[  AØ'Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑܰÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÔ€XhXXXÔÝ  ݃Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô É¸·`(ZapfCalligr BTTT26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô++++'ÿÿdxd !"#% ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)**'÷ÿ dxd< Œ 9p`(ModernüÿP Pd dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Courier< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d77777Border 1dd$8Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ¢Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÔ€4ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ Ü ÑÓ` °˜XÓÔ€6ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€6ÔÓ  ÓÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€6XÔó óÌò òAugust€Ï2,Ï1996ÏCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.Ô€Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€ÂÔÔ€6ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€ÔÔ€XÔ gÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÔ€4ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ Ü ÑÓ` °˜XÓÔ€6ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ôÔ€€Ms.€Woodson€admitted€on€cross„examination€that€she€did€not€remember€telling€theÏpolice€that€she€opened€the€door€and€allowed€the€defendant€inside€her€apartment.€Ô€6XÔÌ nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÔ€4ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ Ü ÑÓ` °˜XÓÔ€6ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€6ôÔ€For€Class€A€felonies€committed€on€or€after€July€1,€1995,€the€presumptive€sentence€isÏthe€midpoint€of€the€range.€€òòSeeóó€1995€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts,€ch.€493€(amending€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210(c)).Ì ŸÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÔ€4ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ Ü ÑÓ` °˜XÓÔ€6ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Ô€6ôÔThe€state€incorrectly€asserts€that€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€a€Class€B€felony€andÏthus€argues€that€he€is€not€presumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidate€for€alternative€sentencing€options€underÏT.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(6).Ô€6XÔÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€)ÔÓ&€33X„d&ÓÑ#€33Xd#ÑÔ€4ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€55Xd#ÑÑ#€55Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ Ü ÑÓ` °˜XÓÔ€6ÔÝ  ÝÑ7€ h XXdðXXdð7Ñ€›Ìœ›à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OFÏCRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÙ€ÙœßL€9:8;+'h|ÿý;º- `€€Lß›à@ àAT€JACKSON€€à@ à€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€FEBRUARY€SESSION,€1995ÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellee,à àà à)à àNo.€02C01„9409„CR„00186Ìà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àShelby€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€W.€FredÏAxley,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà à)ÌDEREK€DENTON,€€€€€€€€€€à àà à)à à(AggravatedÏburglary;€aggravated€Ìà àà àà àà à)à àassault;Ïcriminally€negligent€homicide)Ìà àAppellant.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àòòà àFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌMarvin€E.€Ballinà àà àà àà àCharles€W.ÏBursonÌ200€Jefferson€Avenueà àà àà àAttorney€GeneralÏof€TennesseeÌSuite€1250€€à àà àà àà àà àà àandÌMemphis,€TN€€38103à àà àà àCharlette€ReedÏChambers€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àAssistantÏAttorney€General€of€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà à450€JamesÏRobertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àJohn€W.€Pierotti,€Jr.€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€Generalà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àandÌà àà àà àà àà àJames€J.€Challen€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€General€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€Ave.Ìà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103„1947ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÌÌœCONVICTIONS€FOR€AGGRAVATED€BURGLARY€AND€CRIMINALLY€NEGLIGENTÏHOMICIDE€AFFIRMED;€CONVICTION€FOR€AGGRAVATED€ASSAULT€REDUCEDÌTO€ASSAULT;€SENTENCES€MODIFIED›ÌÌJoseph€M.€TiptonÌœJudge€›Çœ›Ìà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€defendant,€Derek€C.€Denton,€appeals€as€of€right€from€his€convictionsÏby€a€jury€in€the€Shelby€County€Criminal€Court€for€aggravated€burglary€and€aggravatedÏassault,€Class€C€felonies,€and€criminally€negligent€homicide,€a€Class€E€felony.€€As€aÏRange€I,€standard€offender,€he€received€six„year€sentences€and€was€fined€$10,000€forÏeach€of€the€aggravated€burglary€and€aggravated€assault€convictions€and€a€two„yearÏsentence€and€$2,500€fine€for€the€criminally€negligent€homicide€conviction.€€TheÏdefendant€was€ordered€to€serve€each€sentence€consecutively,€for€an€effectiveÏsentence€of€fourteen€years,€in€the€local€workhouse.€€The€defendant€presents€theÏfollowing€issues€for€our€review:€€ÌÓÓà à(1)à àwhether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€supportÌà àà àthe€defendant's€convictions;Ìà àÌà à(2)à àwhether€the€trial€court€properly€charged€the€jury€on€Ìà àà àcircumstantial€evidence;ÌÌà à(3)à àwhether€the€trial€court€properly€charged€the€jury€onÌà àà àthe€prosecution's€burden€of€proof;€andÌÌà à(4)à àwhether€the€defendant's€sentence€was€excessive.ÌÓÓÌà àThe€defendant€was€charged€with€breaking€into€his€former€girlfriend'sÏapartment,€assaulting€her,€and€killing€Adrian€Williamson.€€Officer€William€ChesterÏSweet€and€Officer€Eric€Dates€of€the€Memphis€Police€Department€testified€that€theyÏanswered€a€disturbance€call€at€Joanne€Woodson's€ninth„floor€apartment€on€May€8,Í1993.€€When€Ms.€Woodson€answered€the€door,€Officer€Sweet€testified€that€she€wasÏupset€and€holding€her€face.€€He€stated€that€the€right€side€of€her€face€was€swollenÏwhere€she€had€been€hit.€€Officer€Sweet€also€testified€that€the€chain€lock€on€theÏentrance€door€of€the€apartment€had€been€forced€out€of€the€wall.€€Officer€Dates€testifiedÏthat€the€bedroom€window€was€open€and€when€he€looked€outside,€he€saw€theÏdeceased€lying€face€down€on€a€ledge€approximately€eight€stories€below€the€window.€ÏOfficer€Dates€stated€on€cross„examination€that€he€did€not€remember€if€there€was€anyÏevidence€of€a€struggle€in€the€bedroom.€€ÌÌà àDr.€O'Brian€Clary€Smith,€an€assistant€medical€examiner€for€ShelbyÏCounty,€testified€that€he€performed€an€autopsy€on€the€deceased€on€May€11,€1993.€€HeÏstated€that€the€deceased,€who€was€5'11"€and€weighed€190€pounds,€died€as€a€result€ofÏmultiple€injuries€that€were€consistent€with€a€high€velocity€fall€onto€a€hard€surface.€€HeÏtestified€that€the€deceased's€fingernails€showed€evidence€of€delamination,€or€splittingÏinto€layers,€which€is€consistent€with€the€edge€of€the€fingernail€being€scraped€against€aÏhigh€friction€surface.€€Dr.€Smith€also€testified€that€the€deceased€had€a€blood€blister€onÏhis€right€index€finger,€which€could€have€been€caused€by€"some€degree€of€compressiveÏforce€[being€placed€upon]€the€fingertip"€and€then€the€finger€being€forcibly€moved.€€HeÏstated€that€the€deceased's€blood€alcohol€content€was€.02€percent,€but€his€urine€wasÏnegative€for€the€presence€of€alcohol.€€Also,€the€deceased's€blood€and€urine€wereÍnegative€for€the€presence€of€drugs.€€Dr.€Smith€testified€on€cross„examination€that€theÏdeceased€was€not€tested€for€marijuana.€ÌÌà àLaquinton€Cortez€Underwood€testified€that€he€went€to€Ms.€Woodson'sÏapartment€with€the€defendant€on€May€8,€œ1993,›€to€help€the€defendant€get€his€clothesÏand€property.€€He€stated€that€Ms.€Woodson€told€the€defendant€to€leave€when€heÏknocked€on€the€door,€but€the€defendant€used€his€key€to€unlock€the€door€and€thenÏkicked€the€chain€lock€off€with€his€foot.€€He€testified€that€the€deceased€ran€into€theÏbedroom€when€the€defendant€entered€the€apartment€and€began€arguing€with€Ms.ÏWoodson.€€He€stated€that€Ms.€Woodson€appeared€to€be€drunk€and€he€saw€a€bottle€ofÏclear€liquor€in€her€apartment.€€Mr.€Underwood€testified€that€after€the€defendant€struckÏMs.€Woodson€and€knocked€her€unconscious,€the€defendant€poured€two€jugs€of€waterÏon€her€face€in€an€attempt€to€revive€her.€€The€defendant€then€went€into€the€bedroom€toÏretrieve€his€possessions€and€Mr.€Underwood€heard€him€tell€the€deceased€"[t]o€find€hisÏbest€way€out€the€house€was€out€through€the€window."€€Mr.€Underwood€stated€thatÏwhen€he€went€into€the€bedroom€and€did€not€see€the€deceased,€he€looked€out€theÏwindow€and€saw€the€deceased€lying€outside.€€He€told€the€defendant€that€the€deceasedÏwas€lying€outside€on€the€ledge€of€the€apartment€building,€but€the€defendant€refused€toÏbelieve€him.€€Mr.€Underwood€testified€that€he€then€helped€the€defendant€take€hisÏpossessions€to€the€defendant's€mother's€house.€€Mr.€Underwood€ultimately€pled€guiltyÏto€criminal€trespassing.€€ÌÌà àJoanne€Woodson€testified€that€she€had€been€engaged€to€the€defendant,Ïbut€she€had€ended€the€relationship€approximately€two€weeks€before€the€night€inÏquestion.€€She€stated€that€the€defendant€had€previously€told€her€that€he€would€hurt€herÏand€anyone€she€was€with€if€she€ever€tried€to€leave€him.€€On€May€8,€1993,€she€statedÏthat€she€and€the€deceased€walked€to€the€liquor€store€and€then€came€back€to€herÏapartment.€€She€testified€that€although€she€was€drinking€vodka,€she€never€saw€theÏdeceased€drink€any€alcoholic€beverage.€€At€approximately€8:30€p.m.,€the€defendantÏcame€to€her€apartment€with€Mr.€Underwood.€€She€told€the€defendant€that€he€could€notÏcome€in,€but€he€broke€the€chain€lock€off€the€door.× ƒ; ××  ×€€€She€stated€that€they€argued€andÏthe€defendant€began€hitting€her.€€Ms.€Woodson€testified€that€the€defendant€knockedÏher€unconscious€and€she€heard€him€yelling€in€the€bedroom€when€she€awoke.€€TheÏdefendant€then€gathered€his€possessions€and€left.€€She€testified€that€the€bedroomÏwindow€was€closed€before€the€defendant€came€into€the€apartment.€€Ms.€WoodsonÏtestified€that€the€defendant€called€her€from€jail€after€he€was€arrested€and€she€askedÏhim€"why€he€had€thrown€[the€deceased]€out€the€window."€€She€stated€that€theÏdefendant€told€her€that€"[h]e€was€drunk,€and€he€didn't€mean€to."ÌÌà àThe€defendant€testified€that€he€dated€Ms.€Woodson€and€frequently€stayedÏat€her€apartment,€until€she€ended€the€relationship€sometime€prior€to€the€incident€onÏMay€8,€1993.€€However,€he€stated€that€he€continued€to€stay€at€her€apartment€and€lastÏspent€the€night€there€some€four€days€before€the€incident.€€On€May€8,€the€defendantÏcalled€Ms.€Woodson€and€informed€her€that€he€was€coming€to€her€apartment€to€pick€upÏhis€possessions.€€He€stated€that€when€he€arrived,€he€unlocked€the€door€with€his€keyÏbecause€loud€music€was€playing€inside€the€apartment€and€Ms.€Woodson€did€not€hearÏhis€knocks€on€the€door.€€However,€he€admitted€on€cross„examination€that€afterÏunlocking€the€door,€he€kicked€it€open€and€broke€the€chain€lock.€€He€testified€that€whenÏhe€opened€the€door,€the€deceased€ran€into€another€room€and€the€defendant€beganÏarguing€with€Ms.€Woodson.€€The€defendant€stated€that€Ms.€Woodson€was€drunk€whenÏhe€arrived€and€they€began€to€argue€and€to€hit€each€other.€€Ms.€Woodson€fell€downÏbecause€the€defendant€"hit€her€probably€a€little€too€hard."€€He€stated€that€she€wasÏunconscious€for€approximately€one€minute,€during€which€time€the€defendant€pouredÏtwo€glasses€of€water€on€her€face€to€revive€her.€€The€defendant€then€went€through€theÏbedroom€to€retrieve€his€clothes€from€the€bathroom€closet,€but€he€did€not€see€theÏdeceased.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€testified€that€the€bedroom€window€in€Ms.€Woodson'sÏapartment€opened€approximately€twenty„eight€inches.€€He€stated€that€he€noticed€thatÏthe€window€was€open€and€the€air€conditioner€was€on€when€he€walked€through€theÍbedroom€to€get€his€clothing.€€He€explained€that€his€fingerprints€were€on€the€windowÏbecause€he€had€stayed€in€the€apartment€"four€days€before€the€murder."€€He€deniedÏseeing,€touching,€or€threatening€the€deceased€while€in€the€bedroom.€€The€defendantÏalso€stated€that€he€did€not€remember€telling€the€deceased€to€jump€out€the€window.€€HeÏtestified€that€he€thought€the€deceased€had€left€the€apartment€by€running€past€Mr.ÏUnderwood€and€refused€to€believe€Mr.€Underwood€when€he€said€that€the€deceasedÏhad€jumped€out€the€window.€€The€defendant€stated€that€he€turned€himself€in€to€theÏpolice€on€Mother's€Day€because€Mr.€Underwood€had€been€picked€up€for€questioningÏand€the€defendant€"got€tired€of€waiting."€€After€signing€a€waiver€of€his€rights,€theÏdefendant€œtold›€the€police€that€he€did€not€kill€the€deceased.€€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌà àIn€his€first€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€evidence€is€insufficientÏto€support€his€convictions€because€the€state€did€not€prove€the€elements€of€each€of€theÏoffenses€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€With€respect€to€his€conviction€for€criminallyÏnegligent€homicide,€he€argues€that€a€reasonable€doubt€exists€as€to€his€guilt€becauseÏthe€state€failed€to€present€any€direct€evidence€showing€that€he€caused€the€death€ofÏAdrian€Williamson.€€Criminally€negligent€conduct€that€results€in€death€constitutesÏcriminally€negligent€homicide.€€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„212.€€Criminal€negligence€requires€"aÏsubstantial€and€unjustified€risk€.€.€.€of€such€a€nature€and€degree€that€the€failure€toÏperceive€it€constitutes€a€gross€deviation€from€the€standard€of€care€that€an€ordinaryÍperson€would€exercise€under€all€the€circumstances€as€viewed€from€the€accusedÏperson's€standpoint."€€T.C.A.€ðð€œ39„11„302(d).›€€à àÌÌà àOur€standard€of€review€when€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€isÏquestioned€on€appeal€is€"whether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€òòanyóó€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt."€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,Ï319,€99€S.€Ct.€2781,€2789€(1979).€€This€means€that€we€may€not€reweigh€the€evidence,Ïbut€must€presume€that€the€jury€has€resolved€all€conflicts€in€the€testimony€and€drawn€allÏreasonable€inferences€from€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€state.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,Ï676€S.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984);€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.Ï1978).€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€his€conviction€for€criminally€negligentÏhomicide€was€based€solely€upon€circumstantial€evidence.€€For€circumstantial€evidenceÏto€constitute€the€sole€basis€for€a€conviction€the€facts€must€be€"so€closely€interwovenÏand€connected€that€the€finger€of€guilt€is€pointed€unerringly€at€the€defendant€and€theÏdefendant€alone."€€òòState€v.€Crawfordóó,€225€Tenn.€478,€484,€470€S.W.2d€610,€613€(Tenn.Ï1971).€€The€evidence€must€be€both€consistent€with€the€defendant's€guilt€andÏinconsistent€with€the€defendant's€innocence,€exclude€all€other€reasonable€theoriesÏexcept€that€of€guilt,€and€establish€the€defendant's€guilt€so€as€to€convince€the€mindÍbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€he€or€she€committed€the€crime.€€òòPatterson€v.€Stateóó,€4ÏTenn.€Crim.€App.€657,€661,€475€S.W.2d€201,€203€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1971).€€ÌÌà àWe€disagree€with€the€defendantððs€contention€that€his€conviction€forÏcriminally€negligent€homicide€was€based€solely€on€circumstantial€evidence.€€In€òòState€v.ÏThompsonóó,€519€S.W.2d€789,€792€(Tenn.€1975),€our€supreme€court€explained€thatÏdirect€evidence€is€ð ðevidence€which,€if€believed,€proves€the€existence€of€the€fact€in€issueÏwithout€inference€or€presumption,€whereas€circumstantial€evidence,€without€goingÏdirectly€to€prove€existence€of€a€fact,€gives€rise€to€a€logical€inference€that€such€factÏexists.ðð€€A€defendantððs€confession€to€a€crime€is€direct€evidence.€€òòMonts€v.€Stateóó,€379ÏS.W.2d€34,€40€(Tenn.€1964).€€In€this€case,€Ms.€Woodson€testified€that€when€she€askedÏthe€defendant€why€he€killed€Adrian€Williamson,€the€defendant€responded€by€sayingÏthat€he€was€drunk€and€ð ðhe€didn't€mean€to."€€The€defendantððs€acknowledgment€that€heÏkilled€the€victim€is€direct€evidence€of€his€guilt.ÌÌà àAlso,€when€viewed€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€state,€other€evidenceÏpresented€at€the€defendantððs€trial€was€corroborative€of€his€guilt.€€When€the€defendantÏentered€Ms.€Woodson's€apartment,€the€deceased€ran€into€the€bedroom.€€After€fightingÏwith€Ms.€Woodson,€the€defendant€also€went€into€the€bedroom.€€Both€Ms.€Woodson€andÏMr.€Underwood€stated€that€the€defendant€was€yelling€while€in€the€bedroom.€€Mr.ÏUnderwood€heard€him€tell€the€deceased€"[t]o€find€his€best€way€out€[of]€the€house€.€.€.Íthrough€the€window."€€Ms.€Woodson€testified€that€the€window€was€closed€before€theÏdefendant's€arrival.€€However,€when€Mr.€Underwood€entered€the€bedroom,€the€windowÏhad€been€opened.€€When€Mr.€Underwood€looked€out€the€window,€he€saw€that€theÏdeceased€had€fallen€to€his€death.€€Also,€Dr.€Smith€testified€that€the€victim's€fingernailsÏwere€frayed,€as€if€they€had€been€scraped€across€a€rough€surface€and€the€victim€had€aÏblood€blister€on€his€right€index€finger€that€was€consistent€with€the€finger€being€forciblyÏmoved€while€there€was€compressive€force€against€it.€€We€conclude€that€ampleÏevidence€was€presented€for€the€jury€to€conclude€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€theÏdefendantððs€conduct€resulted€in€the€victimððs€death.ÌÌà àNext,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€evidence€was€insufficient€toÏsupport€his€conviction€for€aggravated€assault.€€The€defendant€admitted€at€trial€that€heÏstruck€Ms.€Woodson€in€the€face€and,€thus,€assaulted€her.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„101(a)(1).€€However,€he€contends€that€the€state€failed€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt€that€Ms.€Woodson€suffered€serious€bodily€injury,€an€essential€element€ofÏaggravated€assault.€€The€state€counters€that€the€proof€sufficiently€demonstrated€thatÏMs.€Woodson€suffered€extreme€physical€pain€and€protracted€unconsciousness€andÏthus€sufficiently€established€serious€bodily€injury.ÌÌà àUnder€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„102(a)(1)(A),€aggravated€assault€is€an€assault€thatÏresults€in€serious€bodily€injury,€as€opposed€to€just€bodily€injury.€€Bodily€injury€is€definedÍas€"a€cut,€abrasion,€bruise,€burn€or€disfigurement;€physical€pain€or€temporary€illness€orÏimpairment€of€the€function€of€a€bodily€member,€organ,€or€mental€faculty."€€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„106(a)(2).€€"Serious€bodily€injury"€is€defined€as€bodily€injury€involving:Ìà à(A)€€€A€substantial€risk€of€death;Ìà à(B)€€€Protracted€unconsciousness;Ìà à(C)€€€Extreme€physical€pain;Ìà à(D)€€€Protracted€or€obvious€disfigurement;€orÌÓÓà à(E)€€€Protracted€loss€or€substantial€impairment€Ìà à€€€€€€€€of€a€function€of€a€bodily€member,€organ€ÌÓÓà à€€€€€€€€or€mental€faculty.ÌT.C.A.€ðð€39„11„106(a)(33).€€We€conclude€that€Ms.€Woodsonððs€injuries€were€not€severeÏenough€to€constitute€the€"serious€bodily€injury"€necessary€for€a€conviction€ofÏaggravated€assault.€€€ÌÌà àOfficer€Sweet€testified€that€Ms.€Woodson€was€crying€and€holding€her€faceÏwhen€he€answered€the€disturbance€call€at€her€apartment€and€that€she€had€obviouslyÏbeen€struck€in€the€face.€€Mr.€Underwood€testified€that€the€defendant€hit€Ms.€WoodsonÏseveral€times,€knocked€her€unconscious,€and€then€poured€water€on€her€in€order€toÏrevive€her.€€He€said€that€she€was€unconscious€for€about€a€minute.€€Ms.€WoodsonÏtestified€that€the€defendant€came€into€the€apartment€and€started€beating€her.€€SheÏstated€that€he€knocked€her€unconscious€for€an€indeterminate€amount€of€time,€and€that€Ïthe€defendant€had€gone€into€the€bedroom€by€the€time€she€awoke.€€After€the€policeÍarrived,€Ms.€Woodson€was€taken€to€the€hospital€to€be€treated€for€her€injuries,€whichÏincluded€a€blackened€eye,€a€busted€lip,€and€a€cut€above€her€eyebrow.€€However,€Ms.ÏWoodson€testified€that€she€was€only€at€the€hospital€for€approximately€ten€to€fifteenÏminutes.ÌÌà àThe€state€contends€that€the€defendant€committed€aggravated€assaultÏbecause€Ms.€Woodson€suffered€extreme€physical€pain.€€However,€there€was€noÏtestimony€as€to€the€degree€of€her€injuries€or€the€pain€that€she€suffered.€€The€physicianÏthat€treated€her€at€the€hospital€did€not€testify.€€Also,€the€victim€did€not€testify€that€herÏinjuries€caused€extreme€physical€pain.€€The€only€evidence€as€to€the€extent€of€Ms.ÏWoodsonððs€injuries€was€testimony€that€she€received€cuts€and€a€blackened€eye€and€aÏphotograph€depicting€these€injuries.€€Although€Ms.€Woodson€suffered€injuries€that€mayÏhave€been€painful,€she€did€not€suffer€pain€extreme€enough€to€constitute€serious€bodilyÏinjury.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Simsóó,€909€S.W.2d€46,€48„49€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóóÏ(Tenn.€1995)›€(Victim€who€received€a€broken€nose€and€black€and€blue€eyes€did€notÏsuffer€the€extreme€physical€pain€that€comprises€serious€bodily€injury.).ÌÌà àWith€regard€to€the€state's€contention€that€Ms.€Woodson€sufferedÏ"protracted€unconsciousness,"€we€start€by€recognizing€that€the€provisions€of€theÏcriminal€code€are€to€be€construed€by€the€fair€import€of€their€œterms.€›€œòòSeeóó›€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„104.€€This€includes€relying€upon€the€natural€and€ordinary€meaning€of€the€languageÍused.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€690€S.W.2d€517,€529€(Tenn.€1985).€€"Protracted"€isÏan€adjective€used€to€describe€something€that€is€delayed€or€prolonged€in€time.€€òòSeeóóÏòòMerriam€Webster's€Collegiate€Dictionaryóó€939€(10th€ed.€1994);€òòAmerican€HeritageÏDictionaryóó€568€(1975).€€Both€the€defendant€and€Mr.€Underwood€testified€that€Ms.ÏWoodson€was€unconscious€for€approximately€one€minute.€€The€victim€was€unsure€asÏto€how€long€she€was€unconscious.€€In€order€to€constitute€"serious€bodily€injury,"€theÏvictim€must€suffer€"protracted€unconsciousness."€€The€fact€that€the€victim€wasÏunconscious€for€such€a€short€amount€of€time€does€not€satisfy€the€definition€ofÏ"protracted€unconsciousness"€necessary€to€establish€serious€bodily€injury.€€òòCfóó.€òòState€v.ÏBill€Nelson€Narrimoreóó,€No.€03C01„9308„CR„00276,€McMinn€Co.€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.ÏJan.€11),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€May€8,€1995)€(The€victim€suffered€protractedÏunconsciousness€when€he€was€knocked€unconscious€in€a€parking€lot€and€thenÏtransported€to€a€hospital,€where€he€remained€unconscious€until€he€was€in€a€helicopterÏbeing€flown€to€another€hospital.).€€We€conclude€that€there€is€insufficient€evidence€toÏsupport€the€serious€bodily€injury€necessary€for€an€aggravated€assault€conviction.€ÏTherefore,€the€defendant's€conviction€must€be€modified€to€assault.€€€ÌÌà àFinally,€the€defendant€asserts€that€he€should€not€have€been€convicted€ofÏaggravated€burglary€because€the€state€failed€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€thatÏhe€entered€Ms.€Woodson's€apartment€with€the€intent€to€commit€aggravated€assault.€€HeÍstates€that€his€only€purpose€in€entering€her€apartment€was€to€retrieve€his€personalÏbelongings.€€ÌÌà àA€person€commits€aggravated€burglary€by€entering€a€habitation€withoutÏthe€effective€consent€of€the€property€owner,€with€the€intent€to€commit€a€felony.€€T.C.A.Ïðððð€39„14„402(a)(1),€„403(a).€€Aggravated€assault€is€a€Class€C€felony.€€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„102(b).€€The€defendant€testified€that€he€called€Ms.€Woodson€and€asked€if€he€couldÏcome€to€her€apartment,€but€she€refused.€€The€defendant€went€to€her€apartment€anywayÏand€kicked€in€the€door€and€broke€the€chain€lock€when€she€would€not€allow€him€inside.€ÏAlso,€Ms.€Woodson€testified€that€the€defendant€had€threatened€to€hurt€her€"if€[she]€everÏtried€to€leave€him€or€break€up€with€him."€€She€stated€that€she€had€recently€ended€herÏrelationship€with€the€defendant€at€the€time€of€the€incident€at€her€apartment.€€BasedÏupon€the€testimony€that€the€defendant€had€previously€threatened€to€harm€Ms.ÏWoodson€and€then€violently€kicked€in€the€door€of€her€apartment€and€assaulted€her,€theÏjury€was€entitled€to€infer€that€the€defendant€entered€her€apartment€without€her€consentÏwith€the€intent€to€commit€an€aggravated€assault€against€her,€even€though€her€injuriesÏonly€supported€a€misdemeanor€assault.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌà àThe€defendant€challenges€his€conviction€for€criminally€negligentÏhomicide€based€upon€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€instruct€the€jury€properly€regardingÍcircumstantial€evidence.€€He€argues€that€his€conviction€for€criminally€negligentÏhomicide€is€based€solely€upon€circumstantial€evidence€and€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏfailing€to€instruct€the€jury€that€before€an€accused€can€be€convicted€of€a€criminal€offenseÏbased€solely€on€circumstantial€evidence,€the€"facts€and€circumstances€must€.€.€.Ïexclude€every€other€reasonable€hypothesis€save€the€guilt€of€the€defendant."€€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€gave€the€following€instruction€on€circumstantial€evidence:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àEvidence€may€be€direct€or€circumstantial.€€Direct€evidenceÏis€testimony€by€a€witness€about€what€that€witness€personallyÏsaw€or€heard€or€did.€€Circumstantial€evidence€is€indirectÏevidence,€that€is,€it€is€proof€of€one€or€more€facts€from€whichÏone€can€find€another€fact€but€which€do€not€directly€prove€theÏfact€in€issue.€€By€way€of€example,€if€you€wake€up€in€theÏmorning€and€see€that€the€sidewalk€is€wet,€you€may€find€fromÏthat€fact€that€it€rained€during€the€night.€€However,€otherÏevidence€such€as€a€turned€on€garden€hose,€may€explain€theÏwater€on€the€sidewalk.€€Therefore,€before€you€decide€that€aÏfact€has€been€proved€by€circumstantial€evidence,€you€mustÏconsider€all€the€evidence€in€the€light€of€reason,€experience,Ïand€common€sense.ÌÌà8 àYou€are€to€consider€both€direct€and€circumstantial€evidence.€ÏThe€law€permits€you€to€give€equal€weight€to€both,€but€it€is€forÏyou€to€decide€how€much€weight€to€give€to€any€evidence.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌÓ#` °‹X¹(0*ŒX#ÓAlthough€defense€counsel€objected€to€this€instruction€at€trial€and€told€the€court€that€heÏintended€to€request€the€ð ðold€pattern€instruction,ðð€he€never€submitted€a€written€requestÏfor€a€different€instruction,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€30,€nor€did€he€specify€that€he€wantedÍthe€jury€charged€with€respect€to€weighing€circumstantial€evidence€in€a€solelyÏcircumstantial€case.Ìà àÌà à€A€trial€court€has€a€duty€to€give€a€complete€charge€of€the€law€applicable€toÏthe€facts€of€the€case.€€òòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€519€S.W.2d€at€792.€€When€all€the€proof€in€aÏcase€is€circumstantial,€the€trial€court€has€a€duty€to€charge€the€jury€as€to€the€law€ofÏweighing€circumstantial€evidence€even€if€such€an€instruction€is€not€requested.€€òòIdóó.€ÏHowever,€when€the€proof€in€a€case€consists€of€both€direct€and€circumstantial€evidenceÏan€instruction€on€the€law€for€weighing€solely€circumstantial€proof€must€be€given€only€ifÏthe€defendant€requests€it.€€òòMonts€v.€Stateóó,€214€Tenn.€171,€379€S.W.2d€34,€40€(1964).ÌÌà àAs€previously€noted,€the€proof€in€this€case€consists€of€both€direct€andÏcircumstantial€evidence.€€Although€the€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏfailing€to€instruct€the€jury€concerning€the€weight€to€be€given€circumstantial€evidence€inÏa€solely€circumstantial€case,€he€never€requested€such€an€instruction€at€trial.€€Instead,Ïhe€made€only€a€broad€assertion€that€he€wanted€to€request€a€pattern€instruction.€€TheÏtrial€court€did€not€err€by€failing€to€give€a€complete€instruction€on€weighingÏcircumstantial€evidence€because€the€defendant€did€not€request€one.€€Furthermore,Ïeven€if€we€were€to€interpret€defense€counselððs€remarks€as€a€request€for€a€completeÏinstruction€on€weighing€circumstantial€evidence,€the€defendant€would€not€be€entitled€toÏrelief.€€Rule€30,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€requires€a€request€for€a€special€jury€instruction€to€beÍin€writing.€€Absent€a€written€request,€a€trial€courtððs€refusal€to€give€a€special€instruction€isÏnot€error.€€òòState€v.€Mackeyóó,€638€S.W.2d€830,€836€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóóÏ(Tenn.€1982).›ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óà àà@ àò òIIIó óÌà àNext,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€improperly€instructed€€theÏjury€regarding€the€burden€of€proof€because€it€did€not€instruct€the€jury€that€the€state€hadÏthe€burden€of€proving€the€defendantððs€guilt€to€a€moral€certainty.€€The€trial€court€gave€theÏfollowing€reasonable€doubt€instruction:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àA€reasonable€doubt€is€a€doubt€based€upon€reasonÏand€common€sense€after€careful€and€impartialÏconsideration€of€all€the€evidence€in€this€case.ÌÌà8 àà àIt€is€not€necessary€that€the€defendant's€guilt€beÏproved€beyond€all€possible€doubt,€as€absolute€certainty€ofÏguilt€is€not€demanded€by€law€to€convict€of€any€criminalÏcharge.ÌÌà8 àà àA€reasonable€doubt€is€just€that„„a€doubt€that€isÏreasonable€after€an€examination€of€all€the€facts€of€this€case.ÌÌà8 àà àIf€you€find€the€State€has€not€proven€every€elementÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€then€you€should€find€theÏdefendant€not€guilty.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòSeeóó€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03(a)€(4th€ed.).€€Defense€counsel€objected€to€this€instruction€at€trialÏbecause€it€does€not€include€ð ðmoral€certainty.ðð€€Although€the€defendant€contends€onÏappeal€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€give€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.),€he€did€notÏrequest€that€instruction€at€trial.€€€ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€defendant,€though,€that€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.)Ïcorrectly€states€the€burden€of€proof€for€criminal€convictions€in€Tennessee:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,Ïafter€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€theÏcertainty€of€guilt.€€Reasonable€doubt€does€not€mean€aÏcaptious,€possible€or€imaginary€doubt.€€Absolute€certainty€ofÏguilt€is€not€demanded€by€the€law€to€convict€of€any€criminalÏcharge,€but€moral€certainty€is€required,€and€this€certainty€isÏrequired€as€to€every€proposition€of€proof€requisite€toÏconstitute€the€offense.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòSeeóó€òòHardin€v.€Stateóó,€210€Tenn.€116,€355€S.W.2d€105€(1962);€òòState€v.€Sextonóó,€917ÏS.W.2d€263,€266€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€However,€we€also€note€that€Tennessee€lawÏdoes€not€mandate€any€particular€jury€instructions€be€given€so€long€as€the€trial€courtÏgives€a€complete€charge€on€the€applicable€law.€€òòState€v.€Westóó,€844€S.W.2d€144,€151Ï(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€refused€to€include€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€in€itsÏcharge€to€the€jury€because€it€was€concerned€about€the€constitutionality€of€using€theÏphrase€in€a€reasonable€doubt€instruction€after€the€Supreme€Courtððs€decision€in€òòCageÏv.€Louisianaóó,€498€U.S.€39,€111€S.€Ct.€328€(1990).€€In€òòCageóó,€the€Supreme€Court€heldÏunconstitutional€an€instruction€which€equated€reasonable€doubt€with€ð ðsubstantialÏdoubtðð€and€ð ðgrave€uncertainty.ðð€€The€Court€held€that€ð ð[w]hen€those€statements€are€thenÏconsidered€with€the€reference€to€ððmoral€certainty,ðð€rather€than€evidentiary€certainty,€itÍbecomes€clear€that€a€reasonable€juror€could€have€interpreted€the€instruction€to€allow€aÏfinding€of€guilt€based€on€a€degree€of€proof€below€that€required€by€the€Due€ProcessÏœClause.ðð€›Ì€€€Ìà àIn€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó€and€òòSandoval€v.€Californiaóó,€òò€€€€€€€óó€U.S.€òò€€€€€€óó,€114ÌS.€Ct.€1239€(1994),€the€Supreme€Court€further€explained€the€relationship€ofÏreasonable€doubt€to€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€phrase.€€The€Court€indicated€that€the€phraseÏð ðmoral€certaintyðð€may€have€lost€its€nineteenth€century€meaning€relative€to€the€level€ofÏcertainty€humanly€attainable€in€matters€relating€to€human€affairs.€€It€recognized€that€aÏmodern€jury,€unaware€of€the€historical€meaning,€might€understand€the€phrase,€in€theÏabstract,€to€mean€something€less€than€the€very€high€level€of€certainty€constitutionallyÏrequired€in€criminal€cases.€€Although€it€expressed€criticism€of€the€continued€use€of€theÏð ðmoral€certaintyðð€phrase,€the€Court€did€not€actually€hold€that€it€was€constitutionallyÏinappropriate,€but€looked€to€the€full€charge€to€the€jury€to€determine€if€the€phrase€wasÏplaced€in€such€a€context€that€a€jury€would€understand€that€it€meant€certainty€withÏrespect€to€human€affairs.ÌÌà àIn€the€context€of€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.),€use€of€the€phrase€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€is€appropriate.€€òòSeeóó€òòNichols€v.€Stateóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€œ734€(Tenn.€1994),Ïòòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€115€S.€Ct.€909€(1995);›€òòState€v.€Sextonóó,€917€S.W.2d€œat›€œ266;€òòPettyjohn€v.ÏStateóó,›€885€S.W.2d€364,€366€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994);›€œòòState›€v.ÍHallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€285,€294€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€œ1993),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994).›€€òòButóóÏòòseeóó€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€864€F.Supp.€686€(M.D.€Tenn.€1994).€€In€this€case,€though,€theÏdefendant€did€not€request€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.)€or€any€other€specific€reasonableÏdoubt€instruction.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€30.€€Given€the€Supreme€Courtððs€criticism€ofÏthe€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€terminology€and€the€importance€of€looking€to€the€full€charge€toÏdetermine€whether€the€phrase€is€placed€in€the€appropriate€context,€we€cannotÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusing€to€include€the€phrase€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€inÏits€charge.ÌÌà àHowever,€we€remain€concerned€about€the€reasonable€doubt€instructionÏgiven€in€this€case.€€Our€supreme€court€recently€addressed€the€standard€of€proof€forÏcriminal€trials€in€Tennessee€in€òòNichols€v.€Stateóó,€877€S.W.2d€at€734.€€In€òòNicholsóó,€theÏdefendant€challenged€the€reasonable€doubt€instruction€the€trial€court€gave€during€theÏpenalty€phase€of€his€trial.€€The€instruction€at€issue€stated€that€the€jury€must€find€proofÏð ðððbeyond€a€reasonable€doubtðð€and€be€convinced€to€a€ððmoral€certaintyðð€of€the€existenceÏof€the€aggravating€circumstances€and€of€the€fact€they€outweighed€the€mitigatingÏcircumstances.ðð€€The€instruction€defined€reasonable€doubt€as€a€ð ðððdoubt€engendered€byÏan€investigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€toÏlet€the€mind€rest€easily€upon€the€certainty€of€your€verdict.ðððð€€òòNicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€at€734.€ÏOur€supreme€court€held€that€the€instruction€was€a€proper€statement€of€the€evidentiaryÏcertainty€required€by€our€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€ÌÌà àThe€instruction€in€òòNicholsóó€and€the€instruction€in€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.),Ïwhich€this€court€has€repeatedly€approved,€òòseeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòSextonóó,€917€S.W.2d€at€266;ÏòòPettyjohnóó,€885€S.W.2d€at€366;€òòHallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€293„94,€both€emphasize€theÏhigh€level€of€certainty€required€for€a€conviction.€€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.)€definesÏreasonable€doubt€as€a€ð ðdoubt€engendered€by€an€investigation€of€all€the€proof€in€theÏcase€and€an€òòinability€after€such€an€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€theÏcertainty€of€guiltóóðð€€(emphasis€added).€€In€this€fashion,€although€the€instruction€statesÏthat€the€law€does€not€require€absolute€certainty€for€a€conviction,€it€explains€the€level€ofÏcertainty€required€in€more€than€just€terms€of€moral€certainty.€ÌÌà àThe€instruction€given€in€this€case€did€not€focus€on€the€certainty€that€a€juryÏmust€attain€to€convict€a€defendant.€€Instead,€it€tended€to€emphasize€the€lack€of€certaintyÏthat€is€permissible€under€the€reasonable€doubt€standard.€€The€trial€court€definedÏreasonable€doubt€as€ð ða€doubt€based€upon€reason€and€common€sense€after€carefulÏand€impartial€consideration€of€all€the€evidenceðð€and€then€instructed€the€jury€thatÏabsolute€certainty€of€the€defendantððs€guilt€was€not€necessary€to€convict€him.€€The€trialÏcourt€then€restated€its€definition€of€reasonable€doubt€and€explained€that€the€state€hadÏthe€burden€of€proving€the€defendantððs€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Because€weÏare€concerned€that€this€instruction€does€not€adequately€convey€the€evidentiaryÏcertainty€required€under€the€reasonable€doubt€standard,€as€it€has€been€historicallyÍused€and€understood€in€Tennessee,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòOwen€v.€Stateóó,€89€Tenn.€(5€Pickle)€704,Ï705„06€(1891);€òòHardinóó,€355€S.W.2d€at€108,€we€caution€trial€courts€against€using€it,€andÏwe€believe€that€T.P.I.„Crim.€2.03€(4th€ed.)€should€be€used€even€if€it€is€not€requested€byÏa€party.€€ÌÌò òà@ àIVó óÌà àThe€defendant's€final€contention€is€that€his€sentence€was€excessive.€€He€Ïcontests€the€denial€of€probation€and€the€length€and€consecutive€nature€of€hisÏsentences.€€The€trial€court€sentenced€the€defendant,€a€Range€I€standard€offender,€toÏthe€maximum€sentence€for€each€offense€and€ordered€that€the€sentences€be€servedÏconsecutively.ÌÌà àAppellate€review€of€sentencing€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€on€the€record€with€aÏpresumption€that€the€trial€court's€determinations€are€correct.€€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„401(d)Ïand€„402(d).€€As€the€Sentencing€Commission€Comments€to€these€sections€note,€theÏburden€is€now€on€the€appealing€party€to€show€that€the€sentencing€is€improper.€€ThisÏmeans€that€if€the€trial€court€followed€the€statutory€sentencing€procedure,€made€findingsÏof€fact€that€are€adequately€supported€in€the€record,€and€gave€due€consideration€andÏproper€weight€to€the€factors€and€principles€that€are€relevant€to€sentencing€under€theÏ1989€Sentencing€Act,€we€may€not€disturb€the€sentence€even€if€a€different€result€wereÏpreferred.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€ÌÌà àHowever,€"the€presumption€of€correctness€which€accompanies€the€trialÏcourt's€action€is€conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trialÏcourt€considered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances."€ÏòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€this€respect,€for€the€purpose€ofÏmeaningful€appellate€review,ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àthe€trial€court€must€place€on€the€record€its€reasons€forÏarriving€at€the€final€sentencing€decision,€identify€theÏmitigating€and€enhancement€factors€found,€state€the€specificÏfacts€supporting€each€enhancement€factor€found,€andÏarticulate€how€the€mitigating€and€enhancement€factors€haveÏbeen€evaluated€and€balanced€in€determining€the€sentence.ÏT.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„210(f)€(1990).€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòState€v.€Jonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€599€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àAlso,€in€conducting€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€review,€we€must€consider€(1)€the€evidence,Ïif€any,€received€at€the€trial€and€sentencing€hearing,€(2)€the€presentence€report,€(3)€theÏprinciples€of€sentencing€and€arguments€as€to€sentencing€alternatives,€(4)€the€natureÏand€characteristics€of€the€criminal€conduct,€(5)€any€mitigating€or€statutory€enhancementÏfactors,€(6)€any€statement€that€the€defendant€made€on€his€own€œbehalf,›€and€(7)€theÏpotential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„102,€„103€and€„210;€òòseeóóÏòòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€168;€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727€S.W.2d€229€(Tenn.€1986).€ÌÌà àThe€sentence€to€be€imposed€by€the€trial€court€is€presumptively€theÏminimum€in€the€range€unless€there€are€enhancement€factors€present.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210(c).× ƒ< ××  ×€€Procedurally,€the€trial€court€is€to€increase€the€sentence€within€the€rangeÏbased€upon€the€existence€of€enhancement€factors€and,€then,€reduce€the€sentence€asÏappropriate€for€any€mitigating€factors.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210(d)€and€(e).€€The€weight€to€beÏafforded€an€existing€factor€is€left€to€the€trial€court's€discretion€so€long€as€it€complies€withÏÑ7€xXXdð XXdð7Ñthe€purposes€and€principles€of€the€1989€Sentencing€Act€and€its€findings€areÏadequately€supported€by€the€record.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210,€Sentencing€CommissionÏComments;€òòMossóó,€727€S.W.2d€at€237;€òòseeóó€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.ÌÌà@ àò òAó ó€Ìà àRegarding€the€length€of€his€sentences,€the€defendant€contends€that€theÏtrial€court€improperly€enhanced€his€sentences€for€criminally€negligent€homicide,Ïaggravated€burglary,€and€aggravated€assault€and€erred€by€refusing€to€apply€anyÏmitigating€factors.€€The€trial€court€applied€the€following€factors€to€enhance€all€three€ofÏthe€sentences:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 à(2)€the€defendant€was€a€leader€in€the€commission€of€anÏoffense€involving€two€(2)€or€more€criminal€actors;ÌÌà8 à(6)€the€personal€injuries€inflicted€upon€or€the€amount€ofÏdamage€to€property€sustained€by€or€taken€from€the€victimÏwas€particularly€great;ÌÌà8 à(10)€the€defendant€had€no€hesitation€about€committing€aÏcrime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€high;ÌÌà8 à(16)€the€crime€was€committed€under€circumstances€underÏwhich€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€was€great.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€enhanced€the€defendantððs€sentence€forÏcriminally€negligent€homicide€because€it€found€that€the€defendant€inflicted€bodily€injuryÏon€another€person€during€the€commission€of€the€offense.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(12).ÌÌà àEnhancement€factors€must€be€appropriate€for€the€offense€and€cannot€beÏessential€elements€of€the€offense.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114.€€With€this€in€mind,€we€mustÏconsider€the€particular€circumstances€of€this€case€to€determine€the€applicableÏenhancement€factors.€€òòJonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€601.€ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€the€criminally€negligent€homicide€conviction,€we€concludeÏthat€the€trial€court€incorrectly€applied€every€enhancement€factor€except€factor€(12).€ÏThis€factor€may€be€used€when,€during€the€commission€of€a€felony,€the€defendantÏwillfully€inflicts€bodily€injury€upon€another€person€or€his€actions€result€in€the€death€orÏserious€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€or€a€person€other€than€the€victim.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114Ï(12).€€In€this€case,€the€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€defendantÍwillfully€inflicted€bodily€injury€upon€Ms.€Woodson€during€the€commission€of€theÏcriminally€negligent€homicide.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€improperly€enhanced€the€defendantððs€sentence€forÏcriminally€negligent€homicide€by€finding€that€the€defendant€was€a€ð ðleader€in€theÏcommission€of€an€offense€involving€two€or€more€criminal€actors.ðð€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(2).€€Although€the€proof€established€that€Mr.€Underwood€accompanied€theÏdefendant€to€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment,€none€of€the€proof€at€trial€or€at€the€sentencingÏhearing€implicated€him€in€the€death€of€the€deceased.€€Because€the€evidence€does€notÏsupport€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€anyone€other€than€the€defendant€was€involved€inÏthe€death€of€the€deceased,€enhancement€factor€(2)€is€inapplicable€to€the€defendantððsÏsentence€for€criminally€negligent€homicide.€€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€also€erred€by€applying€enhancement€factor€(6),€regardingÏparticularly€great€injury€to€a€victim,€to€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€criminally€negligentÏhomicide.€€Particularly€great€injury€to€a€victim€is€an€essential€element€of€criminallyÏnegligent€homicide€because€no€greater€injury€than€death€can€be€inflicted€on€a€person.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Lambertóó,€741€S.W.2d€127,€134€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€ÌÌà àSimilarly,€the€trial€court€erred€by€applying€factor€(10)€to€the€defendantððsÏsentence€for€criminally€negligent€homicide€because€the€risk€to€human€life€is€alwaysÍhigh€in€a€homicide€case.€€Because€there€was€ð ðno€risk€to€the€life€of€a€person€other€thanÏthe€victimðð,€factor€(10)€is€inapplicable.€€òòState€v.€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448,€453€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1995).€€ÌÌà àFactor€(16)€also€does€not€apply€to€enhance€the€defendantððs€sentence€forÏcriminally€negligent€homicide.€€An€essential€element€of€criminally€negligent€homicideÏis€that€the€defendantððs€conduct€create€a€substantial€and€unjustifiable€risk€that€results€inÏthe€victimððs€death.€€T.C.A.€ðððð€39„13„212(a);€39„11„302(d).€€The€same€facts€necessaryÏto€establish€this€element€encompass€the€proof€necessary€to€show€that€ð ðthe€potential€forÏbodily€injury€to€a€victim€was€great.ðð€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(16);€òòBinghamóó,€910€S.W.2dÏat€452.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€aggravated€burglary,€weÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€properly€applied€factors€(6),€(10),€and€(16),€regarding€theÏinfliction€of€particularly€great€injuries€on€a€victim,€the€creation€of€a€high€risk€to€humanÏlife,€and€the€commission€of€a€crime€under€circumstances€evidencing€a€great€potentialÏfor€bodily€injury€to€a€victim.€€We€also€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€enhancingÏthe€defendantððs€sentence€based€upon€factor€(2),€but€that€the€record€supports€theÏapplication€of€two€enhancement€factors€not€considered€by€the€trial€court,€factors€(3)Ïand€(12).ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€properly€enhanced€the€defendantððs€sentence€forÏaggravated€burglary€based€upon€the€infliction€of€particularly€great€injury€on€a€victim.€ÏòòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(6).€€Initially,€we€note€that€particularly€great€injury€to€a€victim€isÏnot€an€essential€element€of€aggravated€burglary€that€is€based€on€the€defendantððs€intentÏto€commit€aggravated€assault.€€The€indictment€for€aggravated€burglary€charged€theÏdefendant€with€entering€Joanne€Woodsonððs€habitation€without€her€consent€and€withÏthe€intent€to€commit€aggravated€assault.€€We€recognize€that€factor€(6)€is€an€essentialÏelement€of€aggravated€assault€causing€serious€bodily€injury€because€ð ðproof€of€seriousÏbodily€injury€will€always€constitute€proof€of€particularly€great€injury.ðð€€òòJonesóó,€883ÏS.W.2d€at€602.€€However,€it€does€not€follow€that€factor€(6)€is€an€essential€element€ofÏaggravated€burglary€that€is€based€on€a€defendantððs€intent€to€commit€aggravatedÏassault.€€As€the€facts€of€this€case€demonstrate,€proof€of€serious€bodily€injury€is€notÏessential€to€proving€the€defendantððs€intent€to€commit€aggravated€assault.€€€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€evidence€in€this€case€supports€application€of€factor€(6)€toÏthe€defendantððs€sentence€for€aggravated€burglary.€€Factor€(6)€applies€when€a€victim€ofÏa€crime€suffers€particularly€great€personal€injuries.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(6).€€In€thisÏcase,€both€Joanne€Woodson€and€Adrian€Williamson€were€victims€of€the€aggravatedÏburglary€because€both€were€lawfully€present€in€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment€at€the€timeÏof€the€burglary€and€both€were€injured€by€the€defendant€during€the€burglary.€€òòSeeóó€òòStateÏv.€Rainesóó,€882€S.W.2d€376,€384€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994)€(definingÍvictim€under€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(3)€as€ð ða€person€or€entity€that€is€injured,€killed,€hadÏproperty€stolen,€or€had€property€destroyed€by€the€perpetrator€of€the€crimeðð)€(footnoteÏomitted).€€The€defendant€undoubtedly€inflicted€particularly€great€injury€on€AdrianÏWilliamson€by€causing€his€death,€and€factor€(6)€is€applicable€to€his€sentence€forÏaggravated€burglary.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€was€also€correct€in€enhancing€the€defendantððs€sentence€forÏaggravated€burglary€because€ð ðthe€defendant€had€no€hesitation€about€committing€aÏcrime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€high.ðð€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(10).€€WhenÏdetermining€the€applicability€of€factor€(10),€we€focus€on€whether€the€defendant€createdÏa€high€risk€to€human€life.€€òòJonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€602.€€This€factor€represents€aÏlegislative€determination€that€ð ðacts€which€cause€high€risk€to€human€life€may€establishÏculpability€beyond€that€necessary€for€conviction€of€a€charged€offense.ðð€€òòJonesóó,€883ÏÑ7€xXXdðXXdð7ÑS.W.2d€at€603.€€Thus,€for€factor€(10)€to€apply,€the€facts€establishing€the€high€risk€toÏhuman€life€must€demonstrate€a€culpability€greater€than€that€incident€to€the€offense.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€facts€that€establish€that€the€defendant€created€a€high€riskÏto€human€life€also€demonstrate€a€greater€culpability€than€that€incident€to€the€offense€ofÏaggravated€burglary.€€In€addition€to€entering€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment€with€the€intentÏto€assault€her€and€cause€serious€bodily€injury,€the€defendant€created€a€high€risk€toÍhuman€life€when€he€caused€Adrian€Williamsonððs€death.€€The€trial€court€properlyÏapplied€factor€(10).€ÌÌà àWe€also€agree€with€the€trial€courtððs€application€of€factor€(16),€regarding€aÏgreat€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim,€to€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€aggravatedÏburglary.€€We€recognize€that€by€enhancing€the€range€of€punishment€for€aggravatedÏburglary,€our€legislature€has€acknowledged€generally€that€a€burglary€of€a€habitationÏinvolves€increased€potential€for€bodily€injury.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€891€S.W.2d€922,Ï930€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Averyóó,€818€S.W.2d€365,Ï369€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€However,€application€of€factor€(16)€is€similar€to€theÏapplication€of€factor€(10)€because€ð ð[t]he€condition€ððhigh€risk€of€deathðð€is€not€appreciablyÏdifferent€from€ððthe€[great]€potential€for€bodily€injury.ðððð€€òòJonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€597€(Tenn.Ï1994).€€Thus,€factor€(16)€can€be€applied€to€enhance€a€sentence€for€aggravatedÏburglary€when€the€facts€establishing€the€great€potential€for€bodily€injury€demonstrate€aÏculpability€greater€than€that€incident€to€the€general€offense€of€aggravated€burglary.à àÌÌà àIn€this€case,€extraordinary€circumstances€exist€to€justify€application€ofÏfactor€(16)€to€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€aggravated€œburglary.›€€In€addition€to€kickingÏopen€the€door€and€entering€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment€with€the€intent€to€cause€herÏserious€bodily€injury,€the€defendant€caused€the€death€of€Adrian€Williamson.€œ€These›Ïfacts€establish€a€greater€culpability€than€that€incident€to€a€mere€burglary€of€a€habitationÍand€thus€warrant€application€of€factor€(16)€to€the€defendantððs€aggravated€burglaryÏsentence.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€should€not€have€enhanced€the€defendantððs€aggravatedÏburglary€sentence€for€the€defendant€being€a€leader€in€committing€a€crime€that€involvedÏtwo€or€more€criminal€actors,€òòseeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(2),€because€there€is€no€evidenceÏthat€anyone€other€than€the€defendant€participated€in€the€offense.€€As€previously€noted,Ïthe€defendantððs€conviction€for€aggravated€burglary€was€based€upon€his€entry€into€Ms.ÏWoodsonððs€apartment€with€the€intent€to€commit€aggravated€assault.€€Although€Mr.ÏUnderwood€admitted€entering€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment€that€night,€nothing€in€theÏrecord€indicates€that€he€did€so€with€the€intent€to€commit€aggravated€assault.€€To€theÏcontrary,€all€the€proof€at€trial€established€that€Mr.€Underwood€was€not€a€party€to€theÏdefendantððs€criminal€conduct.€€Because€Mr.€Underwood€did€not€participate€in€theÏaggravated€burglary,€the€aggravated€burglary€did€not€involve€two€or€more€criminalÏactors,€and€factor€(2)€does€not€apply.ÌÌà àAlthough€not€applied€by€the€trial€court,€we€conclude€that€the€record€in€thisÏcase€also€supports€enhancement€of€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€aggravated€burglaryÏbased€on€factors€(3)€and€(12).€€Factor€(3)€applies€when€an€offense€involves€more€thanÏone€victim.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(3).€€In€the€context€of€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(3),€the€termÏvictim€refers€to€a€ð ðperson€or€entity€that€is€injured,€killed,€had€property€stolen,€or€hadÍproperty€destroyed€by€the€perpetrator€of€the€crime.ðð€€òòRainesóó,€882€S.W.2d€at€384.€€In€thisÏcase,€application€of€factor€(3)€is€warranted€because€both€Joanne€Woodson€and€AdrianÏWilliamson€were€victims€of€the€defendantððs€aggravated€burglary.Ì€€Ì€à àApplication€of€factor€(12)€is€appropriate€when€the€defendantððs€actionsÏduring€the€commission€of€a€felony€result€in€the€death€or€serious€bodily€injury€of€anotherÏperson.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(12).€€In€this€case,€factor€(12)€applies€to€the€defendantððsÏsentence€for€aggravated€burglary€because€the€defendantððs€actions€during€theÏcommission€of€the€aggravated€burglary€resulted€in€Adrian€Williamsonððs€death.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€his€sentence€for€aggravated€assault,€the€defendantÏcontends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€applying€enhancement€factors€(2),€(6),€(10),€andÏ(16).€€We€agree€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€applying€factors€(2)€and€(6)€but€concludeÏthat€the€trial€court€properly€applied€factors€(10)€and€(16).€€Because€we€have€modifiedÏthe€defendantððs€conviction€from€aggravated€assault€to€assault,€a€class€A€misdemeanor,Ïòòseeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„101,€we€need€not€explain€the€trial€courtððs€errors€in€enhancing€theÏdefendantððs€sentence€for€aggravated€assault,€but€will€instead€discuss€the€sentencingÏconsiderations€applicable€to€the€defendantððs€assault€conviction.ÌÌà àUnlike€felony€sentencing,€the€law€does€not€provide€a€presumptiveÏminimum€sentence€for€misdemeanor€convictions.€€òòState€v.€Creasyóó,€885€S.W.2d€829,Í832€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1994).€€Misdemeanor€sentences€are€to€beÏconsistent€with€the€purposes€and€principles€of€the€1989€Sentencing€œAct.›€œ€T.C.A.›€ðð€œ40„35„302(b).›€€A€court€imposing€a€misdemeanor€sentence€is€obligated€to€fix€a€percentageÏof€the€sentence€that€must€be€served€before€the€defendant€is€eligible€for€œrelease.€›€T.C.A.Ïðð€40„35„302(d).€€The€percentage€of€actual€confinement€that€must€be€served€isÏdetermined€by€considering€the€purposes,€principles,€enhancing,€and€mitigating€factorsÏof€the€act.€€òòIdóó.€€ÌÌà àBased€on€the€seriousness€of€the€defendantððs€assault€on€Ms.€WoodsonÏand€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€assault,€we€conclude€that€a€sentence€of€elevenÏmonths€and€twenty„nine€days€with€a€seventy„five€percent€release€eligibility€shall€beÏimposed€for€the€defendantððs€assault€conviction.€€The€defendant€in€this€case€violentlyÏforced€his€way€into€Ms.€Woodsonððs€apartment€intending€to€inflict€serious€bodily€injuryÏupon€her.€€He€then€beat€her€until€she€was€unconscious,€threw€two€jugs€of€water€on€herÏto€revive€her,€and€continued€his€rampage€through€the€apartment€causing€AdrianÏWilliamsonððs€death.€€By€imposing€the€maximum€sentence€for€assault,€we€recognize€theÏseriousness€of€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€assault.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(1).€€ÏIn€this€respect,€we€note€that€the€fact€that€Ms.€Woodsonððs€injuries€were€insufficient€toÏsupport€a€conviction€for€aggravated€assault€does€not€make€the€defendantððs€conductÏany€less€deplorable.€€In€addition,€the€violent€circumstances€surrounding€theÍdefendantððs€assault€on€Ms.€Woodson€indicate€a€great€potential€for€bodily€injury€and€aÏhigh€risk€to€human€life.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(10)€and€(16).€€ÌÌà àRegarding€mitigation,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏrefusing€to€mitigate€all€of€his€sentences€based€upon€his€age€and€his€lack€of€a€criminalÏrecord.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„113(6),€(13).€€The€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€refusalÏto€mitigate€the€defendantððs€sentence€based€upon€his€age.€The€defendant€committedÏthe€present€offenses€four€days€before€his€twentieth€birthday,€and€nothing€in€the€recordÏindicates€that€the€defendant€lacked€substantial€judgment€because€of€his€age.€€ÏHowever,€the€trial€court€should€have€considered€the€defendantððs€lack€of€a€prior€criminalÏrecord.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Thoma€Shawn€Noles€and€Michael€Stanleyóó,€Nos.€01C01„9301„CC„00003€and€01C01„9301„CC„00005,€Rutherford€Co.€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Nov.€18,Ï1993),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€Apr.€4,€1994).ÌÌà àAlthough€the€presumption€of€correctness€that€accompanies€the€trialÏcourtððs€determinations€has€fallen€because€the€trial€court€did€not€properly€consider€all€ofÏthe€relevant€sentencing€principles,€òòseeóó€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169,€we€affirm€theÏdefendantððs€sentences€for€aggravated€burglary€and€criminally€negligent€homicide.€ÏEven€considering€the€defendantððs€lack€of€a€prior€criminal€record€as€mitigation,€the€proofÏin€this€case€supports€a€six„year€sentence€for€aggravated€burglary€and€a€two„yearÏsentence€for€criminally€negligent€homicide,€given€the€circumstances€surrounding€theÍoffenses€under€the€applicable€enhancement€factors.€€The€defendant€shall€also€serveÏan€eleven„month„twenty„nine„day€sentence€with€a€seventy„five€percent€releaseÏeligibility€date€for€assault.ÌÌà@ àò òBó óÌà àNext,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€himÏprobation.€€He€correctly€asserts€that€he€is€presumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidate€forÏprobation€in€the€absence€of€evidence€to€the€contrary,€because€he€does€not€meet€theÏdescription€of€one€who€should€be€given€first€priority€regarding€a€sentence€involvingÏincarceration€under€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(5)€and€he€was€convicted€of€Class€C€and€ClassÏE€felonies.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(6).× ƒ= ××  ×€€However,€as€the€Sentencing€CommissionÏComments€to€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„303(b)€state,€although€"probation€must€be€automaticallyÏconsidered€as€a€sentencing€option€for€eligible€defendants,€the€defendant€is€notÏautomatically€entitled€to€probation€as€a€matter€of€law."€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805ÏS.W.2d€at€787.€€ÌÌà àThe€presumption€of€eligibility€may€be€rebutted€if€any€of€the€followingÏfactors€outweigh€the€defendant's€rehabilitative€capabilities:€€(1)€confinement€isÏnecessary€to€protect€society€by€restraining€a€defendant€who€has€a€long€history€ofÍcriminal€conduct,€(2)€confinement€is€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousnessÏof€the€offense€or€confinement€is€particularly€suited€to€provide€an€effective€deterrence€toÏothers€likely€to€commit€similar€offenses,€or€(3)€measures€less€restrictive€thanÏconfinement€have€been€frequently€applied€unsuccessfully€to€the€defendant.€€òòSeeóóÏT.C.A.€ðð€40„35„103(1);€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€œS.W.2d€at€169;›€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805ÏS.W.2d€at€787„88.€€The€trial€court€relied€upon€the€second€sentencing€consideration€inÏdenying€probation,€finding€that€confinement€was€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€theÏseriousness€of€the€defendant's€actions€and€to€deter€others€from€committing€similarÏcrimes.€€Because€the€record€adequately€supports€this€finding,€the€trial€court€wasÏjustified€in€denying€probation.Ìà@ àò òÌà@ àCó óÌà àFinally,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€should€not€haveÏordered€consecutive€sentencing.€€We€agree.€€At€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€trial€courtÏordered€the€defendant's€sentences€to€be€served€consecutively€solely€because€it€foundÏthe€defendant€to€be€a€"dangerous€offender€whose€behavior€indicates€little€or€no€regardÏfor€human€life,€and€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€in€which€the€risk€to€humanÏlife€is€high."€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(4).€€This€finding€alone€will€not€justify€consecutiveÏsentencing.€€òòState€v.€Wilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€933,€939€(Tenn.€1995).€ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 à[T]he€imposition€of€consecutive€sentences€on€an€offenderÏfound€to€be€a€dangerous€offender€requires,€in€addition€toÏthe€application€of€general€principles€of€sentencing,€theÍfinding€that€an€extended€sentence€is€necessary€to€protectÏthe€public€against€further€criminal€conduct€by€the€defendantÏand€that€the€consecutive€sentences€must€reasonably€relateÏto€the€severity€of€the€offenses€committed.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòIdóó.ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€the€defendant€to€serveÏhis€sentences€consecutively.€€The€trial€court€did€not€make€sufficient€findings,€and€theÏrecord€does€not€support€consecutive€sentences.€€There€is€no€indication€from€theÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€offenses€that€consecutive€sentencing€is€necessary€toÏprotect€society€from€the€defendant€or€that€upon€release€he€will€be€unwilling€to€lead€aÏproductive€life€and€resort€to€criminal€activity.€€òòSeeóó€òòidóó;€òòGray€€v.€Stateóó,€538€S.W.2d€391,Ï393€(Tenn.€1976).€€ÌÌà àIn€consideration€of€the€foregoing,€the€defendant's€convictions€andÏsentences€for€aggravated€burglary€and€criminally€negligent€homicide€are€affirmed.€€HisÏconviction€for€aggravated€assault€is€modified€to€assault,€and€a€sentence€of€elevenÏmonths€and€twenty„nine€days€with€a€seventy„five€percent€release€eligibility€dateÏimposed.€€All€three€sentences,€though,€shall€be€served€concurrently€to€each€other.€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€Judge€€ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJerry€Scott,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌòòÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌDavid€H.€Welles,€Judge