ÿWPC÷" …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝ4åù 1m 0du 0lÙ 0DE U .‰ · 0J· 0T wU 0^e 0hà 0r+ 0| 0† 0Ÿ 1u/U,¤ 0dÐU,4 D3` B“U>° 0@îB).DCW AMš-çïv~vÓ 0T 0Šã 0 m 0´  0ÇÁ 0Ûˆ 0ïc AOR!Æ¡! 0Dg" D/«" BÚ"˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0†(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù-S‚k 3|xZ tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó%ä2¼A`ArialTT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔLÓ€X2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco++++'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd€-/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ #Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òMarch€20,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó åÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ôÔÔ€ÔA€Range€I€sentence€for€a€Class€E€felony€is€one€to€two€years,€with€eligibility€for€release€after€service€à0 àof€thirty€percent€of€the€sentence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€,Ôðððð€40„35„112(a)(5)Ô€Ô,€Ô€,Ô40„35„501(c)Ô€Ô.€€The€sentence€for€aÏRange€III€offender€is€four€to€six€years,€with€eligibility€for€release€after€service€of€forty„five€percent€of€theÏsentence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€,Ôðððð€40„35„112€(c)(5);€40„35„501(e).Ô€ÔÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÓ&€))X„d&ÓÑ#€))Xd#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€æXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÙ€€ÙßL€01/;+'h|‚` Å `€€LßAT€JACKSONÌÌDECEMBER€SESSION,€1995ÌÌÌÓ  ÓBILL€R.€DIXON,€JR.,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.Ï02C01„9503„CC„00070Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àAppellant,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àMADISON€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€FRANKLIN€MURCHISONó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó óà àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àò ò)ó óà à(Post„Conviction)ÌÌÌÓ  Óò òON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCIRCUIT€COURT€OF€MADISON€COUNTYó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌGEORGE€MORTON€GOOGEà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌPAMELA€J.€DREWERYà àà àà àWILLIAM€DAVID€BRIDGERSÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ227€W.€Baltimore€Streetà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌJackson,€TN€€38301à àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€WOODALLÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDONALD€ALLENÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€2825Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJackson,€TN€€38302ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;€REMANDEDÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€°Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€XÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€Petitioner,€Bill€Dixon,€brings€this€appeal€after€the€trial€court's€dismissal€ofÏhis€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€The€Petitioner€sought€post„conviction€reliefÏalleging€that€his€guilty€plea€was€not€entered€voluntarily,€understandingly,€andÏknowingly,€and€further€alleging€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏpreceding,€during,€and€after€the€entry€of€his€guilty€plea.€€After€conducting€anÏevidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€relief.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€in€part€and€reverse€in€part€with€respect€to€the€sentence€imposed€on€theÏPetitioner.ÌÌà àOn€September€15,€1992,€the€Petitioner€was€arraigned€on€a€two„countÏindictment€for€first€degree€murder€and€the€unlawful€possession€of€a€deadly€weaponÏwith€the€intent€to€employ€it€in€the€commission€of€a€felony.€€He€entered€a€guilty€pleaÏin€both€counts€and€was€sentenced€to€twenty„five€years€incarceration€as€a€Range€IÏstandard€offender€for€the€reduced€charge€of€second€degree€murder.€€He€was€alsoÏordered€to€serve€a€consecutive€sentence€of€five€years€incarceration€for€the€secondÏcount€of€the€indictment.€€On€this€charge,€the€Petitioner€was€sentenced€as€a€Range€IIIÏoffender,€but€the€sentence€was€ordered€to€be€served€at€the€Range€I€releaseÏeligibility€rate€of€thirty€percent.ÌÌà àOn€March€23,€1994,€the€Petitioner€filed€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€inÏthe€Madison€County€Circuit€Court.€€After€an€evidentiary€hearing€on€November€22,Ï1994,€the€trial€court€denied€relief€and€dismissed€the€petition.€€It€is€from€this€orderÏthat€the€Petitioner€appeals.ÌÌÌà àWe€will€address€the€Petitioner's€contention€that€his€guilty€pleas€were€notÏentered€into€voluntarily,€understandingly,€and€knowingly.€€Specifically,€he€arguesÏthat€had€he€been€informed€on€the€law,€he€would€not€have€pleaded€to€such€anÏexcessive€and€illegal€sentence;€therefore,€his€uninformed€plea€cannot€be€deemedÏvoluntary.ÌÌà àIn€òòBoykin€v.€Alabamaóó,€395€U.S.€238€(1969),€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€held€that€the€record€must€show€that€a€guilty€plea€was€made€voluntarily,Ïunderstandingly€and€knowingly.€€In€òòBoykinóó,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€entryÏof€a€guilty€plea€effectively€constituted€a€waiver€of€the€constitutional€rights€againstÏcompulsory€self„incrimination,€the€right€to€confront€one's€accusers,€and€the€right€toÏtrial€by€jury.€€òòId.óó€at€243.€€If€a€guilty€plea€is€not€voluntary€and€knowing,€it€has€beenÏentered€in€violation€of€due€process€and€is,€therefore,€void.€€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€stated€in€òòBoykinóó€that€a€voluntary€pleaÏcannot€be€found€from€a€silent€record.€€òòBoykinóó,€395€U.S.€at€242.€€The€issue€onÏwhether€a€guilty€plea€is€invalid€is€controlled€by€òòState€v.€Nealóó,€810€S.W.2d€131Ï(Tenn.€1991)€and€òòJohnson€v.€Stateóó,€834€S.W.2d€922€(Tenn.€1992),€which€outlineÏthe€procedural€and€substantive€requirements€for€the€entry€of€a€guilty€plea€as€a€validÏjudgment€of€conviction.€€These€cases€also€dictate€the€standard€of€review€toÏdetermine€whether€a€conviction€based€upon€a€guilty€plea€is€valid.€ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€a€verbatim€transcript€of€the€Petitioner's€guilty€pleaÏhearing.€€The€trial€court€specifically€asked€the€Petitioner€if€he€understood€that€heÏwas€pleading€out€of€his€range€for€the€weapons€charge,€and€whether€he€understoodÏthat€he€would€still€serve€the€Range€III€sentence€at€a€Range€I€release€eligibility€date.€ÏThe€Petitioner€answered€that€he€understood€this.€€When€asked€by€the€trial€court€ifÏhe€had€any€further€questions€about€his€sentence€or€his€plea,€the€DefendantÏanswered€that€he€did€not.€ÌÌà àThe€court€then€instructed€the€Petitioner€on€the€rights€he€was€giving€up€byÏentering€the€plea,€including€the€right€to€trial€and€to€appeal.€€The€Petitioner€told€theÍcourt€that€he€had€not€been€coerced€into€accepting€the€plea.€€In€concluding€the€guiltyÏplea€hearing,€the€court€asked:ÌÌÓÓà8 àTHE€COURT:€€Then€I€take€it€that€you€are€pleading€guilty€because€youÏthink€that€is€the€thing€for€you€to€do€all€things€being€considered;€is€thatÏcorrect,€sir?ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€€Yes,€sir.ÌÌà8 àTHE€COURT:€€And€because€you€are€guilty?ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€€Yes,€sir.ÌÌà8 àTHE€COURT:€€Are€you€satisfied€with€Mr.€Staton€as€your€attorney?ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€€Yes,€sir.ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€Do€you€have€any€questions€at€all€about€anything€today€that€weÏà àhave€talked€about?ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€€No,€sir.ÌÓÓÌÌThe€Petitioner's€argument€is€refuted€by€his€answers€to€the€questions€asked€of€himÏby€the€trial€court€during€the€sentencing€hearing.€€The€record€establishes€that€theÏPetitioner's€plea€was€entered€into€voluntarily,€understandingly,€and€knowingly.€€ÌÌà àAfter€hearing€the€Petitioner's€testimony€and€arguments€at€the€the€post„conviction€proceeding,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€the€Petitioner€had€been€fullyÍapprised€of€his€rights€at€the€guilty€plea€hearing,€and€the€court€thereby€denied€post„conviction€relief.€€Again,€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€are€afforded€the€weight€of€aÏjury€verdict,€and€this€court€is€bound€by€the€trial€court's€findings€unless€the€evidenceÏin€the€record€preponderates€against€those€findings.€€òòBlackóó,€794€S.W.2d€at€755.€€WeÏconclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€court's€findingsÏthat€the€Petitioner€knowingly€and€voluntarily€entered€the€guilty€pleas€to€secondÏdegree€murder€and€possession€of€a€deadly€weapon€with€the€intent€to€employ€it€inÏthe€commission€of€a€felony.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€next€argues€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏat€the€plea€bargaining€stage€because€he€was€advised€to€plead€to€an€excessiveÏsentence€for€the€offense€of€second€degree€murder.€€He€also€contends€that€hisÏcounsel€was€ineffective€in€allowing€him€to€plead€to€an€excessive€or€illegal€sentenceÏfor€the€offense€involving€possession€of€the€weapon.€€ÌÌà àThe€test€to€determine€whether€counsel€provided€effective€assistance€at€trialÏis€whether€his€performance€was€within€the€range€of€competence€demanded€ofÏattorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930€(Tenn.€1975).€€UnderÏòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€òòreh'góó€òòdeniedóó,€467€U.S.€1267€(1984),€aÏtwo„prong€test€places€the€burden€on€the€appellant€to€show€that€(1)€theÍrepresentation€was€deficient,€requiring€a€showing€that€counsel€made€errors€soÏserious€that€he€was€not€functioning€as€the€"counsel"€guaranteed€a€defendant€by€theÏSixth€Amendment,€and€(2)€the€deficient€representation€prejudiced€the€defense€toÏthe€point€of€depriving€the€defendant€of€a€fair€trial€with€a€reliable€result.€€466€U.S.Ï687.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52€(1985),€the€Supreme€Court€applied€theÏòòStricklandóó€two„part€standard€to€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€claims€arising€outÏof€the€plea€process.€€The€Court€in€òòHillóó€modified€the€"prejudice"€requirement€byÏstating€that€"the€defendant€must€show€that€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that,€butÏfor€counsel's€errors€he€would€not€have€pleaded€guilty€and€would€have€insisted€onÏgoing€to€trial."€€òòId.óó€at€59.€€Thus,€to€succeed€on€his€claim,€the€appellant€must€showÏthat€there€is€a€"reasonable€probability,"€which€is€a€probability€sufficient€toÏundermine€confidence€in€the€outcome,€that,€but€for€the€counsel's€unprofessionalÏerrors,€the€results€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòStricklandóó,€466ÏU.S.€at€694.€€The€burden€rests€on€the€appellant€to€prove€his€allegations€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòLong€v.€Stateóó,€510€S.W.2d€83,€86€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1974).€€We€do€not€use€the€benefit€of€hindsight€to€second„guess€trial€strategyÏby€counsel€and€criticize€counsel's€tactics.€€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.Ï1982).ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€argues€that€his€attorney€was€ineffective€by€failing€to€get€€theÏsecond€count€of€the€indictment€merged€with€the€first€count.€€In€making€this€assertion,Ïthe€Defendant€relies€on€òòState€v.€Hudsonóó,€562€S.W.2d€416€(Tenn.€1978),€and€òòStateÏv.€Welchóó,€836€S.W.2d€586,€588€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€òòid.óóÏ(Tenn.€1992).€€In€òòHudsonóó,€however,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€was€faced€withÏthe€question€of€whether,€in€enacting€former€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„4914,€the€legislature€intended€to€create€a€separate€felony€offense€or€whether€theÏintent€was€to€amend€existing€felony€offenses€to€provide€for€enhanced€punishmentÏwhen€those€felonies€were€committed€with€a€weapon.€€òòHudsonóó,€562€S.W.2d€at€418.€ÏThe€court€held€that€the€statute€did€not€create€a€separate€offense,€but€only€acted€toÏenhance€the€punishment€for€the€felony€offenses€if€they€were€committed€with€aÏweapon.€€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€however,€the€Petitioner€was€convicted€of€secondÏdegree€murder,€not€felony€murder.€€Unlike€the€òòHudsonóó€defendant,€the€PetitionerÏpled€guilty€to€the€offense€of€possession€of€a€deadly€weapon€with€the€intent€toÏemploy€it€in€a€felony,€which€is€statutorily€set€out€as€a€distinct€and€separate€offense.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„1307(c)(1).€€Therefore,€because€merger€was€notÍappropriate€in€this€case,€the€Petitioner's€counsel€was€not€ineffective€in€failing€to€getÏthe€two€convictions€merged.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€next€argues€that€counsel€was€ineffective€for€advising€him€toÏaccept€a€plea€agreement€that€was€excessive.€€The€Petitioner€pleaded€guilty€toÏsecond€degree€murder€which€had€a€range€of€fifteen€to€twenty„five€years.€€HeÏcontends€that€because€no€enhancement€factors€were€found€applicable,€theÏmaximum€sentence€of€twenty„five€years€was€erroneously€imposed€on€him;€only€theÏminimum€sentence€of€fifteen€years€could€be€justified€by€the€facts.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Mahleróó,€735€S.W.2d€226€(Tenn.€1987),€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€held€that€parties€could€legitimately€agree€to€a€sentence€within€a€range€ofÏpunishment€provided€by€law€even€if€the€facts€would€call€for€a€different€range.€ÏLikewise,€the€parties€can€agree€to€the€term€of€the€sentence,€even€though€aÏdefendant€might€have€been€sentenced€to€less€time€if€there€had€been€no€pleaÏagreement.€€Here,€the€Petitioner€was€originally€charged€with€first€degree€murderÏwhich€carried€a€maximum€term€of€life€imprisonment.€€The€Petitioner€agreed€to€beÏconvicted€of€the€lesser€offense€of€second€degree€murder€and€to€receive€a€sentenceÏof€twenty„five€years.€€The€sentence€of€twenty„five€years€incarceration€was€clearlyÏwithin€the€statutory€limits€fixed€for€the€offense€of€murder€in€the€second€degree.€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner's€attorney€testified€that€he€fully€discussed€with€the€PetitionerÏthe€plea€agreement€and€the€consequences€of€pleading€guilty.€€The€Petitioner€hadÏadmitted€to€the€police€and€to€his€attorney€that€he€had€killed€the€victim.€€The€co„defendant€in€the€case€would€testify€at€trial€that€when€he€asked€the€Petitioner€why€heÏhad€shot€the€victim,€the€Petitioner€replied,€"I€just€felt€like€it€was€the€right€thing€to€do.€€IÏjust€wanted€to€see€what€it€was€like€to€kill€somebody."€€The€Petitioner's€counselÏtestified€that€the€Petitioner€wanted€to€make€a€plea€agreement€so€that€he€would€notÏhave€to€plead€guilty€to€first€degree€murder.€€Subsequently,€the€Petitioner€decided€toÏaccept€the€plea€agreement€which€required€the€service€of€twenty„five€years€for€theÏmurder,€thereby€waiving€any€right€to€contest€the€length€of€the€sentence.€€€ÌÌà àWe€cannot€conclude€that€the€twenty„five€year€sentence€was€excessive,€norÏdo€we€conclude€that€any€advice€given€by€the€Petitioner's€attorney€to€accept€theÏsentence€constituted€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€next€argues€that€his€counsel€was€ineffective€for€allowing€himÏto€accept€an€excessive€or€illegal€sentence€for€possession€of€a€weapon€with€theÏintent€to€commit€a€felony,€a€Class€E€felony.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„1307(c)(1).€For€this€offense,€the€Petitioner€was€sentenced€as€a€Range€III€offender€toÍfive€years€incarceration.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€However,€the€sentence€was€ordered€to€be€served€with€aÏRange€I€release€eligibility€after€service€of€thirty€percent€of€the€sentence,€rather€thanÏthe€Range€III€release€eligibility€rate€of€forty„five€percent.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€contends€and€the€State€concedes€that€the€five„year€sentenceÏis€illegal€because€the€trial€court€lacked€authority€to€enter€a€judgment€sentencing€theÏPetitioner€to€serve€a€Range€III€sentence€with€a€Range€I€release€eligibilityÏpercentage.Ì€€Ìà àAs€previously€noted,€the€òòMahleróó€opinion€held€that€parties€can€legitimatelyÏagree€to€a€sentence€within€a€range€of€punishment€provided€by€law€even€if€the€factsÏwould€call€for€a€different€range.€€òòMahleróó,€735€S.W.2d€at€228.€€Thus,€the€sentence€isÏnot€illegal€merely€because€the€Petitioner€pleaded€to€a€Range€III€sentence€when€heÏotherwise€would€not€have€qualified€for€such€a€range.€€ÌÌà àHowever,€"a€judgment€imposed€by€a€trial€court€in€direct€contravention€ofÏexpress€statutory€provisions€regarding€sentencing€is€illegal€and€is€subject€to€beingÏset€aside€at€any€time,€even€if€it€has€become€final."€€òòMahleróó,€735€S.W.2d€at€228.€ÍBecause€the€sentence€imposed€on€the€Petitioner€did€not€comply€with€the€statutoryÏsentencing€guidelines,€the€sentence€is€"a€nullity€and€cannot€be€waived."€€òòState€v.ÏCutrightóó,€Order,€No.€02C01„9108„CC„00175€(Tenn.,€Jackson,€filed€Aug.€31,€1992).€€ÌÌà àThe€precise€issue€which€we€are€facing€is€whether€one€may€be€legallyÏsentenced€to€a€term€of€years€within€one€range,€but€with€a€release€eligibility€dateÏdetermined€by€the€percentage€set€forth€in€a€separate€range.€€Here,€the€petitionerÏwas€sentenced€to€a€term€of€years€authorized€for€a€Range€III€offender,€yet€theÏsentence€was€ordered€to€be€served€at€the€Range€I€release€eligibility€percentage.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€State€concedes€this€issue,€and€we€believe€correctly€so,€theÏissue€has€been€a€troubling€one€for€this€court.€€Such€a€sentencing€structure€wasÏapproved€in€òòState€v.€Terryóó,€755€S.W.2d€854€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988);€òòTerry€L.€HicksÏv.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9503„CC„00071,€Madison€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,Ïfiled€Jan.€31,€1996);€òòDarnell€Gentry€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9304„CC„00052,€GibsonÏCounty€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€filed€June€29,€1994).€€€Such€a€sentencingÏstructure€was€determined€to€be€an€illegal€sentence€in€òòGeorge€Cheairs€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï02C01„9304„CC„00070,€Fayette€County€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€filed€Oct.€26,Ï1994),€and€òòRonald€Lature€McCray€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9412„CC„00277,€FayetteÏCounty€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€filed€Sept.€27,€1995).€€We€choose€to€follow€theÍreasoning€of€the€cases€that€have€concluded€that€a€sentence€such€as€the€oneÏordered€herein€is€an€illegal€sentence€and€thus€a€nullity.ÌÌà àThe€illegal€five„year€sentence€for€the€weapons€charge€was,€from€the€State'sÏperspective,€inextricable€from€the€part€of€the€plea€agreement€pertaining€to€theÏsecond€degree€murder€charge.€€We€must€conclude€that€this€leaves€the€status€of€theÏoriginal€prosecution€at€the€sentencing€stage.€€The€transcript€of€the€guilty€pleaÏproceeding€reflects€that€the€State€recommended€the€sentence€imposed€herein,€andÏthe€trial€court€accepted€the€recommendation.€€Because€the€recommendationÏincluded€a€sentence€which€is€illegal,€on€remand€the€trial€court€must€reject€theÏrecommended€sentence.€€At€that€stage,€proceedings€on€the€guilty€plea€shall€beÏgoverned€by€Rule€11(e)(2)€or€11(e)(4)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CriminalÏProcedure.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Hodgesóó,€815€S.W.2d€151€(Tenn.€1991).€€ÌÌà àNot€withstanding€our€holding€as€to€the€illegality€of€the€sentence,€we€will€nowÏaddress€the€Petitioner's€remaining€issues€to€expedite€any€further€appellate€review.€ÏThe€Petitioner€argues€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€during€theÏpre„trial€and€appellate€stages€of€his€convictions€because:€€(1)€Counsel€failed€toÏappeal€the€guilty€plea€or€sentence;€(2)€counsel€failed€to€interview€witness€CindyÍWade;€(3)€counsel€failed€to€review€transcripts€of€Petitioner's€preliminary€hearing;Ïand€(4)€counsel€did€not€file€a€motion€to€suppress€the€Petitioner's€confession.€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner's€former€attorney€testified€that€he€interviewed€several€potentialÏwitnesses€for€the€case,€including€police€officers.€€Although€the€Petitioner€said€thatÏCindy€Wade€would€have€placed€the€Petitioner€at€her€home€during€the€time€of€theÏkilling,€the€attorney€had€never€heard€of€this€witness.€€Additionally,€the€Petitioner€hadÏconfessed€that€he€committed€the€killing€to€the€police€and€to€counsel.€€The€attorneyÏtestified€that€he€reviewed€the€case€thoroughly,€had€frequent€contact€with€theÏPetitioner€during€the€preparation€of€the€case,€and€was€preparing€to€go€to€trial€on€aÏtheory€of€self„defense.€€He€also€testified€that€he€fully€discussed€the€issues€with€theÏpetitioner€including€potential€witness€testimony€and€evidence.ÌÌà àAfter€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€found€that€theÏallegations€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€were€vague,€uncertain,€and€general.€ÏAfter€hearing€the€testimony€of€the€Petitioner€and€his€former€counsel,€the€courtÏconcluded€that€the€Petitioner€had€been€fully€apprised€of€his€rights€by€the€court€andÏhis€attorney€and€also€concluded€that€the€Petitioner's€attorney€adequatelyÏrepresented€him.€€The€record€supports€the€findings€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€burden€rests€on€the€appellant€to€prove€his€allegations€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòLong€v.€Stateóó,€510€S.W.2d€83,€86€(Tenn.€1982).€ÏThe€Petitioner€has€not€shown€that€counsel€made€errors€so€serious€that€he€was€notÏfunctioning€as€counsel€as€guaranteed€by€the€Sixth€Amendment.€€The€PetitionerÏmakes€the€allegations€without€showing€or€explaining€how€these€alleged€errors€ofÏcounsel€prejudiced€him€in€any€way.€€ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€Petitioner€has€failed€to€carry€his€burden€of€showing€thatÏeither€prong€of€the€òòStricklandóó€test€has€been€met.€€Because€the€trial€court's€findingsÏof€fact€are€afforded€the€weight€of€a€jury€verdict,€this€court€is€bound€by€those€findingsÏunless€the€evidence€contained€in€the€record€preponderates€against€them.€€òòBlack€v.ÏStateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€755€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Here,€they€do€not.€€This€issueÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€in€part€and€affirmed€in€part,€andÏthis€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏopinion.ÌÌÓ  Ó€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGEÌÌÌòò(See€separate€concurring€opinion)€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGE