ÿWPCú …# VU:a %› 0 (¡w@É4  b , 0l8 0D¤ 0Pè 8 D3@ 0Js 0T½ 0^ 0ho 0r× 0|I 0†Å 0K 1uÛ 0dP 0@´U*ôB) BG AdDCã AM&üsÓoDB^† äv~vÓ‚ AOUƤ 0Dj D/® BݘHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡ ™DšD›DœDžDŸ D¡D¢Ó€Ô¡¨ ¸¨¨¨¨¨3|x«- ù -((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó((3/Q$««Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ d Ô))))'ÿÿdxd2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d&yúÿ  <<= 8ÀÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ((((7Border 1dd€&+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ òÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌNovember€10,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÉÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÔ€'ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIt€is€interesting€to€note€that€Justice€Penny€White€who€wrote€the€opinion€on€òòTrustyóó€was€not€aÏmember€of€the€Supreme€Court€when€the€appellantððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€wasÏconsidered,€but€she€was€a€member€of€the€panel€of€this€Court€which€affirmed€the€dismissal.Ì :Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÔ€'ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAlthough€Mr.€Key€was€the€central€figure€in€the€testimony€regarding€this€issue,€he€was€notÏasked€to€testify€at€the€post„conviction€hearing.Ì TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€'ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€District€Attorney€General€testified€the€favorable€plea€bargain€with€Ms.€Kelly€was€relatedÏto€the€poor€quality€of€his€proof€against€her,€not€her€trial€testimony.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€'ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThat€holding€has€since€been€overruled.€€òòBlackburn€v.€Stateóó,€694€S.W.2d›€934,€œ937›€(Tenn.Ï1985).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€&‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ ÑÑ7€·ÖXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßR€,-+A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌà@ àòòIN›€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEóóÌÌà@ àòòAT€œNASHVILLEóó›ÌÌà@ àòòNOVEMBER€1994€SESSIONÌ̛̜Ìà@ àóóÌÌÌDAVID€CARL€DUNCANà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€œ01C01›„9510„CR„00347Ìà àAPPELLANTà àà àà à)à àNO.€œ01C01›„9311„CR„00412Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœSUMNER›€CRIMINALÌœVS›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€FRED€KELLY,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JANE€œWHEATCRAFT›ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Post„Conviction€Relief)Ìà àAPPELLEEà àà àà àà à)à àÌÌÌÌœòòÌFOR›€THE€APPELLANT:óóà àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌJohn€E.€œHerbison›à àà àà àà àà àœJohn€Knox€Walkup›Ì2016€Eighth€Avenue€Southà àà àà àAttorney€œGeneral€&€Reporter›ÌNashville,€TN€37204Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€P.€œCauley›ÌJoanie€L.€Abernathyà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€œGeneralÌ136›€Fourth€Avenue€œSouthà àà àà àà àÌFranklin,›€TN€37064à àà àà àà àà àœChristina€S.€ShevalierÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àLawrence›€Ray€WhitleyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€œGeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à113€West€Main€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àGallatin,€TN€37066„2803›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€___________________ÌÌÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌÌÌœJERRY›€SCOTT,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€'„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€'XÔÌÌà àThe€appellant,€David€Carl€Duncan,€was€convicted€of€murder€in€the€firstÏdegree€for€which€he€received€a€sentence€of€death€by€electrocution.€€On€appeal€toÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€his€conviction€was€affirmed.€€òòState€v.€Duncanóó,€œ698›ÏS.W.2d€63€(Tenn.€1995).€€His€œpetition›€for€certiorari€was€denied€by€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court.€€òòDuncan€v.€Tennesseeóó,€475€U.S.€1031,€106€œS.Ct›.€1240,Ï89€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€348€(1986).ÌÌà àOn€December€23,€1986,€the€appellant€filed€his€first€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€Following€an€evidentiary€hearing,€relief€was€denied.€€The€denialÏwas€affirmed€by€this€Court.€€œòòDavid€Carl€Duncan›€v.€œState€of€Tennesseeóó,›€TennesseeÍCriminal€Appeals,€opinion€filed€at€Nashville,€February€9,€1988.€€The€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€denied€permission€to€appeal€on€May€2,€1988.ÌÌà àOn€December€7,€1988,€the€appellant€filed€his€second€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€Following€an€evidentiary€hearing,€that€petition€was€alsoÏdismissed.€€While€the€dismissal€of€that€petition€was€on€appeal,€the€appellant€filedÏa€motion€for€consideration€of€post„judgment€facts€and€for€remand€for€further€proof.€ÏThe€motion€œto€consider€post„judgment€facts€was›€denied,€but€the€motion€to€remandÏwas€granted,€pending€resolution€of€a€third€petition€for€post„conviction€relief,€whichÏhad€been€filed€twelve€days€before€the€motion€to€consider€post€judgment€facts€wasÏfiled.€€(Also,€while€the€second€petition€for€post„€conviction€relief€was€on€appeal€toÏthis€Court,€the€appellant€filed€a€petition€for€the€writ€of€habeas€corpus,€which€wasÏsummarily€dismissed€by€the€trial€court.€€On€appeal€to€this€Court,€the€dismissal€wasÏaffirmed.€€òòDavid€Carl€Duncan€v.€State€of€Tennesseeóó,€Tennessee€CriminalÏAppeals,€opinion€filed€at€Nashville,€August€26,€1993.€€Permission€to€appeal€wasÏdenied€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€on€December€28,€1993.)ÌÌà àThe€third€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€was€denied€after€an€evidentiaryÏhearing€and€it€is€that€denial€and€the€denial€of€the€second€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€which€are€the€subject€of€this€opinion,€the€appeals€having€beenÏconsolidated€by€order€of€this€panel€of€this€Court.ÌÌà àIn€one€issue€the€appellant€contends€that€the€opinion€of€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€in€òòState€v.€Trustyóó,€œ919›€S.W.2d€œ305,›€œ312›€(Tenn.€1996)€should€beÏapplied€retroactively€and€that€his€conviction€should€be€reversed€and€the€causeÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€ð ðfor€further€proceedings.ððÌÌà àIn€òòTrustyóó,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€one€who€was€indicted€for€attemptedÏfirst€degree€murder€cannot€be€convicted€of€aggravated€assault,€because€aÏconviction€for€an€unindicted€offense€that€is€not€a€lesser€degree€of€the€chargedÏoffense€cannot€stand€because€such€a€conviction€offends€the€Sixth€Amendment€toÏthe€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€ConstitutionÏwhich€œrequire›€that€the€accused€in€a€criminal€prosecution€be€informed€of€theÏð ðnature€and€cause€of€the€œaccusation.ðð€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€309.›ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€indictment€charges€that€the€appellant€ð ðdid€unlawfully,Ïfeloniously,€wilfully,€with€premeditation€and€malice€aforethought€kill€and€murderÏRuby€Evelyn€Burgess€in€the€perpetration€of€the€act€of€aggravated€rape€on€RubyÏEvelyn€Burgess€and,€therefore,€David€Carl€Duncan€did€commit€murder€in€the€firstÏdegree.ðð€€This€was€the€standard€language€used€in€indictments€for€felony€murder,Ïhaving€been€approved€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòSullivan€v.€Stateóó,€173ÏTenn.€475,€121€S.W.2d€535,€537„38€(1938).ÌÌà àThe€appellant€argues€that€because€the€trial€judge€charged€the€juryÏconcerning€both€common€law€murder€in€the€first€degree€and€felony€murder€that€itÏis€impossible€to€determine€of€which€offense€they€found€the€appellant€guilty.€€Thus,Ïhe€reasons€that€òòTrustyóó€applies€and€that€his€conviction€must€be€reversed.ÌÌà àIn€his€petition€for€the€writ€of€habeas€corpus€which€he€previously€filed€œtheÏappellant›€made€the€same€contention,€i.e.,€that€the€indictment€failed€to€charge€all€ofÏthe€elements€of€common€law€first€degree€murder,€that€the€trial€judge€improperlyÏinstructed€the€jury€regarding€common€law€first€degree€murder€and€that€was€theÏoffense€of€which€he€was€convicted.€€On€appeal€to€this€Court,€a€panel€of€this€Court,Ïspeaking€through€Judge€Joseph€M.€œTipton›€held€ð ð(c)œlearly›,€the€indictment€chargesÏfirst€degree€murder€in€terms€of€felony€murder,€the€guilty€verdict€returned€by€the€juryÏfor€ððmurder€in€the€first€degreeðð€under€the€indictment€is€ððvalid€on€its€faceðð€and€theÏconviction€is€not€invalid€because€the€jury€failed€to€return€a€verdict€of€guilty€ofÏððmurder€in€the€perpetration€of€a€felony.ðððð€œòòDavid€Carl€Duncan€v.€State€ofÏTennesseeóó,€Tennessee€Criminal€Appeals,€opinion€filed€at€Nashville,€August€26,Ï1993.€€As›€previously€noted€the€appellant€sought€review€of€this€Courtððs€opinionÏdismissing€that€habeas€corpus€petition€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€and€theÏCourt€refused€to€grant€his€application€for€permission€to€œappeal€on€December€28,Í1993.›× ƒ. ××  ×€€Thus,€it€is€clear€that€this€issue€has€already€been€addressed€and€rejectedÏby€a€panel€of€this€Court€and€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court.€€This€issue€clearlyÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà àIn€two€other€issues€the€appellant€contends€that€the€prosecutionððs€failure€toÏprovide€defense€counsel€with€investigative€reports€regarding€a€former€boyfriend€ofÏthe€victim€rendered€his€conviction€and€sentence€void€or€voidable.€€He€asserts€thatÏthis€evidence€was€ð ðexculpatory€or€favorableðð€and€that€the€fact€that€it€was€notÏrevealed€ð ðput€the€whole€case€in€such€a€different€light€as€to€undermine€confidenceððÏin€the€conviction€and€sentence.ÌÌà àThe€victim€had€previously€had€a€tumultuous€and€violent€relationship€withÏDavid€Key€prior€to€1977.€€However,€they€had€not€had€any€relationship€forÏapproximately€four€years€before€Ms.€Burgessðð€murder.€€Nevertheless,€Mr.€Key€wasÏinterviewed€immediately€after€the€murder€investigation€began.€€He€had€an€alibiÏthat€was€checked€and€verified€by€a€œGallatin›€Police€Department€detective.€€InÏaddition€to€giving€his€sworn€statement,€Mr.€Key€agreed€to€submit€to€a€polygraphÏexamination,€which€was€administered€with€no€indication€of€deception€beingÏfound.€€Four€fingerprints€found€on€a€sweating€bottle€of€Tropicana€fruit€punch€at€theÍscene€of€the€murder€were€found€not€to€be€Mr.€Keyððs€fingerprints.€€They€wereÏclearly€identified€as€the€appellantððs€fingerprints.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€insists€that€Mr.€Key€had€a€motive€to€kill€the€victim€becauseÏMs.€Burgess€had€reported€Mr.€Key€to€the€Internal€Revenue€Service€for€claimingÏhis€dog€as€a€dependent.€€However,€the€proof€revealed€that€Mr.€Key€was€not€evenÏaware€of€her€report€to€the€IRS€prior€to€the€demise€of€Ms.€Burgess.× ƒ/ ××  ×ÌÌà àòòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373€U.S.€83,€83€œS.Ct›.€1194,€1196„97,€10€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€215Ï(1963)€requires€the€prosecution,€upon€request,€to€provide€defense€counsel€withÏany€ð ðevidence€favorable€to€an€accused.ðð€€The€failure€to€do€so€amounts€toÏsuppression€of€evidence€and€violates€due€process€ð ðirrespective€of€the€good€faithÏor€bad€faithðð€of€the€prosecution.ÌÌà àThis€Court€has€held€that€such€non„disclosure€offends€the€due€processÏguaranties€of€the€United€States€Constitution€and€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€ÏòòState€v.€Marshallóó,€845€S.W.2d€228,€234€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€Seventh€Circuit€has€delineated€three€criteria€for€making€out€aÏsuccessful€claim€of€a€òòBradyóó€violation.€€First,€it€must€be€established€that€theÍprosecutor€suppressed€the€œevidence;›€œthen€it€must€be€shown€that›€the€evidenceÏwas€favorable€to€the€œdefense;›€and€œfinally€it€must€be€shown€that›€the€evidence€wasÏmaterial.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Driveróó,€798€F.œ2d›€248,€250€(œ7th›€Cir.€1986).€€This€CourtÏhas€delineated€the€same€three€requirements€with€a€fourth€added€that€the€accusedÏmade€a€proper€request€for€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€œSpurlock›óó,€874€S.W.2d€602,€609Ï(Tenn.€œCrim›.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àThere€can€be€no€doubt€that€the€defense€made€a€proper€request€for€anyÏòòBradyóó€material.€€The€State€concedes€that€the€prosecutor€suppressed€the€evidenceÏin€that€it€was€not€revealed€to€the€defense€and€that€it€was€favorable€to€the€defenseÏð ðby€virtue€of€the€nature€of€the€information€presented.ðð€€However,€the€StateÏcontends€that€the€information€was€not€ð ðmaterialðð€in€the€context€of€òòBradyóó.ÌÌà àIn€òòœKyles›€v.€Whitleyóó,€___€U.S.€___,€115€œS.Ct›.€1555,€1566„67,€œ131›€œL.Ed›.œ2d›Ïœ490›€(1995),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€provided€additional€guidance€as€toÏthe€definition€of€ð ðmaterialðð€in€the€context€of€òòBradyóó€material.€€First,€there€is€noÏrequirement€that€it€be€demonstrated€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€theÏdefendant€would€be€acquitted€if€the€evidence€was€available.€€Second,€materialityÏis€not€judged€by€a€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€test.€€Next,€materiality€precludes€aÏharmless€error€analysis.€€Finally,€suppressed€evidence€must€be€consideredÏcollectively,€not€item„by„item.€€However,€as€the€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€hasÏheld,€there€is€no€constitutional€remedy€unless€the€defendant€can€show€that€theÍnondisclosure€deprived€him€of€a€fair€trial.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Presseróó,€844€F.œ2d›Ï1275,€1281„82€(œ6th›€Cir.€1988).€€ÌÌà àWe€cannot€say€from€the€evidence€adduced€that€the€appellant€was€in€anyÏway€deprived€of€a€fair€trial€in€this€case€by€the€nondisclosure€of€the€informationÏabout€Mr.€Key.€€There€was€absolutely€no€evidence€that€Mr.€Key€killed€Ms.€BurgessÏor€that€he€was€anywhere€near€the€market€at€the€time€of€the€murder.€€Without€moreÏthan€the€fact€that€Mr.€Key€once€had€a€stormy€relationship€with€the€œvictim,›€all€of€theÏevidence€about€him€œwas›€irrelevant.€€These€issues€have€no€merit.ÌÌà àFollowing€the€second€post„conviction€hearing,€the€appellant€filed€his€briefÏin€which€he€raised€twenty„three€issues€with€several€sub„issues.ÌÌà àFirst,€he€alleges€that€he€was€put€to€trial€upon€homicide€offenses€notÏœcharged,›€€i.e.,€that€it€is€not€clear€whether€the€jury€found€him€guilty€of€common€lawÏfirst€degree€murder€or€felony€murder.€€As€the€appellant€œconcedes›€in€his€œbrief,›€thisÏis€the€same€issue€addressed€and€rejected€by€this€Court€in€òòDavid€Carl€Duncan€v.ÏState€of€Tennesseeóó,€Tennessee€Criminal€œAppeals,›€opinion€filed€at€NashvilleÏAugust€26,€1993.€€Thus,€this€is€a€matter€already€decided€adversely€to€theÏappellant€by€Judge€œTipton›ððs€opinion€œin›€that€habeas€corpus€case€and€cannot€beÏœrelitigated›€in€a€subsequent€post„conviction€proceeding.ÌÌà àIn€the€next€issue,€the€appellant€contends€that€his€sentence€of€death€is€voidÏor€voidable€based€upon€òòState€v.€œMiddlebrooks›óó,€840€œS.W.2d›€317,€346€(Tenn.Ï1992).€€œHowever,€in›€òòœMiddlebrooks›óó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€œoverruledÏòòState€v.€Smithóó,€755€S.W.2d€757,€768€(Tenn.€1988)€and€its€progeny,€but€did€notÏintimate€that€the€opinion€would€be€applied€retroactively.€€However,€in€òòBarber€v.ÏStateóó,€889€S.W.2d€185,€187€(Tenn.€1994),€the€Supreme€Court€held€thatÏòòMiddlebrooksóó€will€be€applied€retroactively.ÌÌà àIn€òòMiddlebrooksóó,€the€Supreme€Court€found€that€when€a€defendant€isÏconvicted€of€felony€murder€the€aggravating€circumstance€that€the€murder€wasÏcommitted€while€committing€an€enumerated€felony€cannot€alone€be€the€basis€forÏthe€imposition€of€the€death€penalty.€€òòMiddlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€at€306.€€However,Ïas€noted€by€our€Supreme€Court€in€the€opinion€in€this€case€on€direct€appeal,€theÏjury€found€two€aggravating€factors€were€present.€€In€addition€to€the€commission€ofÏthe€offense€while€engaged€in€a€rape€and€robbery,€the€jury€also€found€the€murderÏespecially€heinous,€atrocious€and€cruel.€€òòDuncanóó,€698€S.W.2d€at€67.€€HavingÏconducted€the€same€analysis€the€Supreme€Court€conducted€in€òòBarberóó,€889ÏS.W.2d€at€189,€we€conclude,€as€the€Supreme€Court€did€in€òòBarberóó,€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt€that€ð ðthe€sentence€would€have€been€the€same€had€the€juryÏgiven€no€weight€to€the€invalid€felony€murder€aggravating€factor.ðð€€This€issue€hasÏno€merit.€›Ìœà à›Ìà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€failure€of€the€trial€judge€to€define€theÏterms€ð ðheinous,ðð€ð ðatrocious,ðð€ð ðcruel,ðð€ð ðtorture,ðð€and€ð ðdepravity€of€mindðð€constitutesÏprejudicial€error€of€constitutional€dimension.€€The€appellant€admits€that€theÏTennessee€Supreme€œCourt›€addressed€and€rejected€this€issue€œin›€its€opinion€on€hisÏdirect€appeal,€òòDuncanóó,€898€œS.W.2d›€at€70„71,€but€contends€that€the€SupremeÏCourt€ð ðcommitted€such€fundamental€error,€which€is€so€œegregiously›€prejudicial€toÏthe€judicial€process,€as€now€requires€post„conviction€relief.ðð€€Be€that€as€it€may,€thisÏCourt,€as€an€intermediate€appellate€court,€is€powerless€to€set€aside€a€judgment€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€œCourt,›€which€is€the€final€authority€on€all€matters€ofÏTennessee€œlaw€in€which€is€vested€ð ð[t]he€supreme€judicial€power€of€this€State.ðð€€òòInÏRe:€Bursonóó,›€œ909›€œS.W.2d›€œ768,›€œ772›€œ(Tenn.€1995).›€€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€ð ðmuch€exculpatory€evidenceðð€wasÏwithheld€from€defense€counsel€in€violation€of€òòBradyóó€and€œits›€progeny.ÌÌà àFirst,€the€appellant€points€to€a€report€by€Danny€White,€œa€Deputy›€œSheriff,›€thatÏhe€saw€the€victim€standing€behind€the€counter€at€5:10€A.M.€and€that€at€5:34€œA.M.›Ïhe€saw€a€black€œCordova›€automobile€bearing€Nashville€tags€with€two€black€menÏinside€at€a€location€about€.7€mile€from€the€scene€of€the€murder.€€He€did€not€stopÏthe€car€and€the€murder€of€Ms.€Burgess€was€reported€four€minutes€later.€€TheÏappellantððs€counsel€suggested€that€Glen€David€Randolph€resembled€theÍcomposite€drawing€of€the€alleged€murderer€and€that€Mr.€Randolph€had€a€similarÏcar.ÌÌà àHe€contends€that€the€failure€to€disclose€the€sighting€of€that€automobileÏœ(which,€as€previously€noted,›€was€not€stopped€by€Mr.€White,€nor€were€theÏoccupants€ever€identified)€was€exculpatory€evidence€which€should€have€beenÏdisclosed€to€defense€counsel.€€The€mere€presence€of€a€vehicle€with€œblack›€œmaleÏoccupants›€at€a€location€nearly€a€mile€from€the€scene€at€about€the€time€of€the€crimeÏwas€not,€without€more,€œð ðexculpatoryðð›€evidence.ÌÌà àThe€test€for€materiality€of€undisclosed€exculpatory€evidence€is€whetherÏthere€is€ð ða€reasonable€probability€that,€had€the€evidence€been€disclosed€to€theÏdefense,€the€result€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€œdifferent.ð𛀀òòUnited€States€v.ÏœBagley›óó,€473€U.S.€667,€105€œS.Ct›.€3375,€3383,€87€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€481€(1985).€€œIn€this›€case,Ïthere€is€no€such€probability.€€Given€the€evidence€against€the€appellant,€theÏevidence€œabout€the€car€and€its€occupants€could›€œnot€have›€œaffected›€the€verdict.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€nondisclosure€of€òòBradyóó€material,€the€appellant€argues€that€theÏState€failed€to€disclose€that€police€had€been€given€a€description€of€a€green€ArmyÏjacket€worn€by€the€killer€œafter›€a€witness€testified€that€the€appellant€was€wearing€aÏdark€colored€œwindbreaker›.ÌÌà àWilliam€œRogan›,€a€œGallatin›€police€officer,€testified€that€he€was€attempting€toÏlocate€some€suspects€œin›€this€case€and€that€he€encountered€one€person€whoÏmatched€the€description€of€the€killer€who€was€wearing€a€green€œArmy„type›€jacket.€ÏThe€person€was€quickly€ruled€out€as€a€suspect€and€the€appellant€concedes€in€hisÏbrief€œthat€that›€determination€was€correct.€€Thus,€what€œthat›€suspect€was€wearing€atÏthe€time€the€officer€spoke€with€him€is€not€exculpatory€evidence€and€the€failure€toÏreveal€what€œthat›€person€was€wearing€was€not€a€òòBradyóó€violation.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€òòBradyóó€issue,€the€appellant€finally€contends€that€the€circumstancesÏof€this€case€ð ðstrongly€suggestðð€that€a€prosecution€witness€was€afforded€ð ðlenientÏtreatmentðð€with€regard€to€her€pending€felony€drug€charge€only€after€she€testifiedÏagainst€the€appellant.€€However,€no€evidence€was€presented€that€the€witness,ÏLinda€Kelly,€was€afforded€any€preferential€treatment€because€she€testified€at€theÏappellantððs€trial.€€Indeed,€both€Ms.€Kelly€and€the€District€Attorney€General€testifiedÏto€the€contrary.× ƒ0 ××  ×€This€sub„issue€and€the€entire€òòBradyóó€issue€lack€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€limitation€on€Ms.€Kellyððs€cross„examination€at€trial€unconstitutionally€abridged€his€right€to€confrontation€andÏcross„examination.€€In€this€issue,€he€again€attacks€Ms.€Kelly,€contending€that€trialÏdefense€counselððs€attempt€to€cross„examine€her€concerning€a€pending€charge€ofÍselling€marijuana€should€have€been€allowed€by€the€trial€judge€and€that€to€limit€hisÏcross„examination€on€that€issue€denied€him€his€right€to€confrontation€and€cross„examination.ÌÌà àAs€previously€set€forth,€both€Ms.€Kelly€and€the€District€Attorney€GeneralÏdenied€any€relationship€between€the€plea€bargain€and€her€earlier€testimony€andÏthe€appellant€presented€no€proof€to€rebut€their€testimony.€€Thus,€the€post„conviction€judge€did€not€err€by€finding€no€constitutional€violation€from€the€refusalÏto€allow€cross„examination€regarding€the€pending€marijuana€charge€and€herÏimpending€guilty€plea.€€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€judgeððs€œdecision€to€allow›€the€juryÏto€deliberate€until€11:40€P.M.€on€the€issue€of€the€penalty€to€be€imposed€was€plainÏand€prejudicial€error€of€constitutional€dimension,€even€though€there€was€noÏobjection€by€trial€defense€counsel.ÌÌà àAlthough€this€Court€has€opined€that€late€night€court€sessions€should€beÏheld€only€when€œrequired€by€unusual›€œcircumstances,›€òòState€v.€œParton›óó,€817€œS.W.2d›Ï28,€33„34€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1991),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€œCourt›€has€held€thatÏthe€determination€of€how€long€into€the€evening€a€trial€should€continue€is€a€matterÏwithin€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Poeóó,€755€œS.W.2d›€41,€œ47›€(Tenn.Ï1988).€€The€Supreme€Court€has€never€intimated€that€late€night€court€sessionsÍabridge€any€constitutional€right€and€only€errors€of€constitutional€dimension€„„Ïunder€either€the€United€States€Constitution€or€the€Tennessee€Constitution€„„€areÏgrounds€for€the€granting€of€post„conviction€relief.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ40„30„203.›ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€failure€of€defense€counsel€to€offer€anyÏproof€at€the€penalty€phase€of€a€capital€case€falls€below€the€standard€ofÏcompetence€expected€of€defense€counsel€œin›€capital€cases.ÌÌà àAs€to€this€issue€the€trial€court€found:ÌœÓÓà8 àà8 à[m]uch€of€the€Petitionerððs€thrust€concerns€the€lack€ofÏpreparation€or€the€fact€that€no€testimony€was€presentedÏon€behalf€of€the€Petitioner€at€the€sentencing€phase€ofÏthe€trial.€€Upon€hearing€all€of€the€background,€the€CourtÏfinds€no€reason€for€requesting€a€psychologicalÏexamination€of€the€Petitioner€and€that€there€was€noÏdefense€at€the€sentencing€hearing€that€had€not€beenÏpreviously€presented€at€the€guilt€phase.€€Contrary€toÏthe€allegations,€testimony€regarding€the€PetitionerððsÏcharacter€was€filled€with€pitfalls€and€could€have€beenÏof€little€benefit€to€the€Petitioner€and€may€well€haveÏresulted€in€exacerbating€his€plight.€€The€nature€of€theÏcrime€committed€was€especially€heinous€in€that€theÏvictim€was€dragged€to€the€back€of€the€market,€raped,Ïand€murdered€by€having€her€throat€cut€with€evidence€ofÏstruggle€and€all€the€horrible€aspects€of€fear,€pain€andÏdeath€by€the€nature€of€the€wound€which€wouldÏaccompany€such€a€crime.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àConsiderable€testimony€was€presented€to€theÏeffect€that€the€deprived€background€of€the€PetitionerÏshould€have€been€presented€to€the€Jury€at€theÏsentencing€phase.€€Simply€put,€the€Court€finds€that€theÏfacts€do€not€support€the€allegations€of€the€PetitionerððsÍchildhood.€€He€suffered€no€hunger,€no€deprivation€ofÏclothing€or€living€conditions€and€the€only€abuse€wasÏverbal€when€his€father€would€occasionally€be€underÏthe€influence€of€alcohol.€€While€not€an€ideal€familyÏcondition,€the€Petitionerððs€youth€was€ordinary€and€notÏunusual€for€the€many€persons€in€that€time€and€place.€ÏThe€defendantððs€father€was€a€well€thought€of€black€manÏwho€held€janitorial€positions€in€two€banks€in€GallatinÏand€was€fully€trusted€by€both€institutions.€€TheÏPetitionerððs€mother€can€be€described€as€kind,€religious,Ïwise,€and€well€respected€in€her€community.€€The€CourtÏfinds€that€there€was€nothing€in€Petitionerððs€backgroundÏthat€would€disclose€him€to€have€psychological€defectsÏthat€would€have€been€considered€exculpatory€by€theÏJury.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€questions€regarding€the€correctness€of€theÏsentences€rendered€by€the€Jury€has€been€decidedÏpreviously€on€appeals€and€the€previous€Post„Conviction€Relief€Petition.€€The€Court€finds€that€theÏtestimony€presented€was€not€credible€enough€to€raiseÏa€serious€challenge€to€the€previous€decisions€by€theÏvarious€Courts€nor€to€warrant€further€proceedings.€€ItÏwas€obvious€to€this€Court€that€much€of€the€testimonyÏwas€calculated€to€be€of€what€little€assistance€it€might€beÏto€the€Petitioner.€€The€Petitionerððs€trial€attorney€wasÏaware€of€all€of€these€facts€and€weighed€both€the€proÏand€con€and€there€is€no€basis€for€second€guessing€hisÏdecisions€at€trial€and€no€prejudice€to€the€Petitioner€hasÏbeen€shown.ÌÌÌ›ÓÓà àThe€trial€courtððs€findings€of€œfact›€at€a€post„conviction€proceeding€have€theÏœweight›€of€a€jury€verdict€and€are€conclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€findings.€€òòTurner€v.€Stateóó,€698€œS.W.2d›€90,€91€(Tenn.ÏœCrim›.€œApp›.€1985).€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€judgeððsÏfindings.€€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€his€defense€counselððs€failure€to€requireÏthe€State€to€elect€between€the€felony€murder€count€of€the€indictment€and€the€countÏcharging€the€underlying€felony€amounted€to€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€ÏThe€State€conceded€that€it€was,€at€the€time€of€the€appellantððs€trial,€a€œdouble›Ïjeopardy€œviolation€for›€a€defendant€to€be€convicted€of€both€felony€murder€and€theÏunderlying€felony.€€òòSeeóó€òòBriggs€v.€Stateóó,€573€œS.W.2d›€157,€œ159›€(Tenn.€1978).œ× ƒ1 ××  ×›€ÏTherefore,€had€counsel€moved€to€dismiss€the€rape€count€of€the€indictment,€theÏmotion€would€undoubtedly€have€been€granted.€€However,€that€is€not€to€say€thatÏthe€evidence€of€the€rape€would€have€been€excluded.€€Obviously,€the€sameÏevidence€would€have€been€presented€and€it€is€clear€that€the€evidence€of€theÏmurder€resulted€in€the€punishment€of€death,€not€the€rape.€€Thus,€it€is€clear€beyondÏa€reasonable€doubt€that€any€error€was€harmless€and€did€not€affect€the€sentence€œof›Ïdeath€in€any€way.ÌÌà àNext,€he€contends€that€the€prosecutor€unconstitutionally€injected€aÏgratuitous€appeal€to€racial€prejudice€into€his€rebuttal€argument€at€the€guilt€phaseÏwhen€he€œsaid:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àð ðIððm€sure€[Linda€Kelly]€was€kind€of€nervous€and€upset€toÏcome€in€here€and€testify.€€She€was€put€underÏsubpoena€to€do€it.€€And€she€might€not€have€wanted€toÍcome€in€here€and€testify€about€a€black€man€here€inÏGallatin,€Tennessee€who€has€committed€first€degreeÏmurder€and€rape€and€robbery.ððÌÌÌÌ›ÓÓà àOn€direct€appeal€the€appellant€challenged€fifteen€different€aspects€of€theÏprosecutorððs€argument.€€œWhile€this›€issue€was€not€œraised,›€œour›€Supreme€œCourt›Ïreviewed€the€entire€argument€and€found€that€the€argument€was€proper€except€œin›Ïone€œunrelated€particular,›€finding€that€if€that€portion€was€error,€it€was€harmless.€ÏœòòDuncanóó,›€698€œS.W.2d›€at€70.€€This€issue€has€œno›€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€evidence€that€he€took€property€ð ðfromÏthe€personðð€of€the€victim€was€not€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€and€that€hisÏconviction€of€armed€robbery€was€therefore€constitutionally€œinfirm.›ÌÌà àAgain,€this€was€a€matter€addressed€by€our€Supreme€Court€on€direct€appealÏand€our€highest€court€found€that€ð ð[œt]here›€is€no€question€but€that€the€crimes€ofÏmurder,€aggravated€rape,€and€robbery€were€committed,€and€the€evidence,€thoughÏœcircumstantial,›€points€unerringly€to€the€defendant€as€the€person€guilty€of€theÏcrimes.ðð€€œòòDuncanóó,›€693€œS.W.2d›€at€67.€€That€œfinding,€like€all€other€findings€of€theÏSupreme€Court,›€is€not€subject€to€reexamination€by€this€intermediate€appellateÏcourt€and€this€issue€has€no€merit.€€Furthermore,€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€is€not€aÍmatter€cognizable€in€post„conviction€proceedings.€€œòòBrotherton€v.›€Stateóó,€œ477›ÏœS.W.2d›€œ522,€524›€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€œ1971).›ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€says€the€trial€judge,€by€his€instructions€to€the€jury,Ïimpermissibly€relieved€the€State€of€its€burden€to€prove€the€killing€was€malicious.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Kingóó,€694€œS.W.2d›€941,€œ946›€(Tenn.€1985),€our€Supreme€œCourt,Ïspeaking€through€the€late€Justice€Harbison,›€œreviewed›€its€œprior€holdings,›€œandÏspecifically€found›€that€œfelony›€murder€does€not€require€proof€of€œmalice.€›€This€issueÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€his€trial€defense€counselððs€failure€toÏrequest€the€Courtððs€approval€of€assistance€from€and/or€œfunding›€for€qualifiedÏforensic€experts€deprived€him€of€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel.ÌÌà àAs€the€appellant€noted€in€his€brief,€his€trial€predated€the€express€authorityÏfor€the€employment€of€defense€experts€at€state€expense,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„207(b),€Supreme€Court€Rule€13.€€He€relies€on€this€Courtððs€opinion€in€òòState€v.ÏGoodmanóó,€643€œS.W.2d›€375,€379€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1982)(which€also€œantedates›Ïthe€same€authorities)€for€the€proposition€that€ð ðemployment€of€an€expert€at€stateÏexpense€is€not€authorized€or€required€in€the€absence€of€a€threshold€showing€œa›Ídenial€of€œdue›€process€by€the€failure€to€employ€such€an€expert.ðð€€He€contends€theÏthreshold€showing€was€made€in€this€case.ÌÌà àAt€the€post„conviction€relief€hearing,€the€appellant€offered€the€affidavit€of€Dr.ÏKris€œSperry›,€a€forensic€pathologist€and€Dr.€œGilliam›€Blair,€a€clinical€psychologist.ÌÌà àThrough€Dr.€œSperry›€he€sought€to€show€that€none€of€the€evidence€adducedÏat€the€trial€showed€that€the€victim€was€raped,€since€the€evidence€of€sexualÏpenetration€of€the€victim€was€as€consistent€with€consensual€sex€as€with€forcibleÏrape€because€there€was€no€evidence€of€trauma€to€her€vaginal€area€and€there€wasÏno€evidence€of€when€the€semen€found€in€her€vagina€was€deposited€there.ÌÌà àHowever,€as€our€Supreme€Court€noted€in€its€opinion,€the€presence€ofÏsemen€was€not€the€only€evidence€that€the€victim€was€raped.€€Her€ð ðstill„warmððÏpartially€nude€body€was€found€with€her€pants€and€undergarments€pulled€downÏaround€her€lower€right€leg.€€Her€clothes€were€torn€and€there€were€bruises€on€herÏthighs.€€œòòDuncanóó,›€698€œS.W.2d›€at€65„66,€69.ÌÌà àThus,€even€if€Dr.€œSperry›ððs€opinion€had€been€presented€to€the€jury€theÏoutcome€on€the€œissue›€of€whether€the€victim€was€raped€would€have€been€theÏsame.ÌÌà àDr.€œSperry›€also€questioned€the€Sumner€œCounty›€medical€examinerððsÏfindings€that€the€victim€died€from€an€air€embolism,€that€she€was€in€a€prone€positionÏwhen€her€throat€was€cut,€and€that€her€throat€was€cut€with€a€hawk€bill€knife.€€Be€allÏthat€as€it€may,€the€proof€showed€that€the€victimððs€throat€was€cut€and€she€died€fromÏthat€cutting€and€Dr.€œSperry›€agrees€that€was€the€cause€of€her€death.€€Thus,€anyÏsuch€evidence€from€Dr.€œSperry›€would€not€have€changed€the€outcome€of€the€trial€inÏany€way€whatsoever.ÌÌà àDr.€œSperry›,€noting€that€the€lack€of€a€complete€autopsy€was€nothing€short€ofÏastounding,€also€found€that€the€medical€examiner€could€have€performed€severalÏœenzymatic€tests›€to€œsubidentify›€seminal€fluid€to€a€much€smaller€group€than€theÏpopulation€of€Type€O€œsecretors›.€€However,€he€has€presented€no€proof€that€suchÏtestimony€would€have€excluded€him€as€the€perpetrator.ÌÌà àFinally,€he€concluded€that€a€defense€forensic€expert€could€have€been€ofÏinvaluable€assistance€to€the€defendant€in€cross„examining€the€Stateððs€expertsÏand€adducing€defense€evidence€for€their€case€in€chief€and€the€failure€to€seek€suchÏassistance€seriously€undermined€confidence€in€the€verdict€of€guilt€and€the€deathÏsentence.ÌÌà àWhile€it€can€hardly€be€doubted€that€such€an€expert€would€have€beenÏhelpful€to€the€defense€œin›€those€tasks,€it€does€not€follow€that€the€failure€to€requestÍsuch€assistance€œ„„€at›€a€time€œwhen€under›€òòGoodmanóó,€683€œS.W.2d›€at€379,€it€wasÏnecessary€to€show€that€it€was€a€denial€of€due€process€not€to€have€such€assistanceÏ„„€œundermined›€the€verdict€of€guilt€and€the€sentence€of€death.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€psychological€evidence,€Dr.€œBlair›€œopined›€that€the€appellant€did€notÏsuffer€from€a€diagnosable€mental€illness.€€Thus,€the€appellant€reasons€that€the€juryÏcould€well€have€found€a€lack€of€future€dangerousness€as€a€mitigating€factor.ÌÌà àThere€is€no€evidence€that€the€lack€of€mental€illness€equates€to€lack€ofÏdangerousness.€€Indeed,€given€the€horrible€facts€of€this€murder,€evidence€that€theÏappellant€was€not€mentally€ill€could€just€as€well€have€convinced€the€jury€that€theÏappellant€was€a€very€dangerous€individual€who€must€be€sentenced€to€death.ÌÌà àNext,€œthe›€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€judgeððs€jury€instructions€œat›€theÏpenalty€phase€left€the€incorrect€impression€that€mitigating€circumstances€had€toÏœbe›€found€unanimously€in€order€to€impose€a€life€sentence.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€quoted€two€paragraphs€from€the€judgeððs€charge€which€heÏclaims€has€the€ð ðunfortunate€effectðð€of€œequating›€the€requirement€that€aggravatingÏfactors€be€œunanimously›€œfound€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€with›€a€œsimilar›Ïrequirement€for€mitigating€factors.€€The€jury€instructions€contain€no€suchÏlanguage.€€In€the€charge€the€requirement€of€unanimity€is€applicable€only€toÍòòaggravatingóó€circumstances,€never€to€mitigating€circumstances.€€This€issue€has€œno›Ïmerit.ÌÌà àFinally,€œin€this€vein,›€the€appellant€includes€the€standard€catch„all€allegation€Ïthat€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€errors€at€trial€deprived€him€of€his€constitutionalÏright€to€a€fundamentally€fair€trial.€€Given€the€fact€that€we€have€found€no€errorsÏrequiring€reversal,€there€was€no€ð ðsnowball€effectðð€as€alleged€by€the€appellant.€ÏThis€issue€has€no€merit.€ÌÌà àIn€the€next€œseries›€of€issues,€the€appellant€contends€that€œvarious›€allegedÏerrors€entitle€him€to€a€new€post„conviction€relief€hearing.ÌÌà àFirst,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€failure€of€the€trial€judge€to€authorizeÏfunding€for€his€forensic€œpathologist,›€Dr.€Kris€œSperry,›€was€error.ÌÌà àAs€the€State€points€out€in€its€brief,€this€issue€is€moot.€€Dr.€œSperry›ððs€affidavitÏwas€admitted€as€evidence€and€issues€heretofore€covered€in€this€opinion€relate€toÏthe€doctorððs€findings.€€œÌ›Ìà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€judge€hearing€the€post„convictionÏrelief€petition€erred€by€refusing€to€strike€the€Stateððs€procedural€defenses€becauseÏthe€State€did€not€comply€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„114(b)€which€requires€theÍDistrict€Attorney€General€to€include€the€material€records€and€transcripts€ð ðwith€theÏresponsive€pleading€or€within€a€reasonable€time€thereafter.ðð€€ÌÌà àœThe›€transcript€was€admitted€as€an€exhibit€at€the€post„conviction€œhearingÏand›€is€part€of€the€record€on€appeal.€€Thus,€any€failure€of€the€District€AttorneyÏGeneral€to€comply€precisely€with€the€œstatute›€was€of€no€consequence€and€theÏappellant€clearly€was€not€prejudiced€by€his€actions.€€This€issue€has€no€merit.€ÌÌà àNext,€he€contends€that€the€judge€hearing€the€post„conviction€proceedingÏwrongly€interfered€with€counselððs€efforts€to€make€a€record€for€appellate€review€byÏrefusing€to€allow€his€counsel€to€make€an€offer€of€proof€œin›€flagrant€disregard€of€theÏrules€of€œevidence.ÌÌà àAs€to€this€issue,€the€appellant€first€contends€the€trial€judge€erred€by€notÏallowing€an€offer€of€proof€as€to€how€Judge€Ernest€Pellegrin€(who€presided€at€theÏappellantððs€trial)€would€probably€have€ruled€if€defense€counsel€had€made€aÏreasonable€request€for€the€appointment€of€forensic€experts.€€Judge€PellegrinÏtestified€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€that€he€had€no€independent€recollection€ofÏthe€appellantððs€trial€which€occurred€ten€years€before€his€testimony.€€Thus,€as€theÏState€points€out€in€its€brief,€Judge€Pellegrinððs€testimony€about€how€he€would€haveÏruled€would€have€been€nothing€but€speculation.€€Furthermore,€it€was€a€questionÏfor€the€court€hearing€the€post„conviction€petition€to€decide€when€presented€withÍthe€issue€and€the€opinion€of€Judge€Pellegrin€would€be€of€no€benefit€to€the€trialÏjudge€who€alone€was€required€to€determine€at€the€hearing€whether€there€wasÏerror€of€constitutional€dimension.ÌÌà àNext,€he€contends€that€the€trial€judge€hearing€the€post„convictionÏproceeding€erred€by€failing€to€issue€an€instanter€subpoena€for€a€detective.€€TheÏjudge€did€not€rule€that€the€detective€could€not€testify,€only€that€no€instanterÏsubpoena€would€issue.€€During€this€lengthy€post„conviction€proceeding€defenseÏcounsel€could€have€obtained€a€subpoena€and€had€the€detective€present€later€inÏthe€proceeding.ÌÌà àFinally,€as€to€this€issue,€the€appellant€says€the€trial€judge€erred€by€making€aÏð ðpreemptive€determinationðð€that€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Gilliam€Blair€wasÏinadmissible.€€However,€a€lengthy€offer€of€proof€was€made€and€the€trial€judge€thusÏhad€ample€opportunity€to€consider€the€doctorððs€testimony€in€determining€theÏoutcome€of€the€appellantððs€petition€for€post„convition€relief.€€This€issue€has€noÏmerit.ÌÌà àIn€the€next€series€of€issues,€the€appellant€launched€a€broadside€attack€onÏTennesseeððs€death€penalty€statute.€€First,€he€says€the€statute€fails€to€ð ðmeaningfullyÏnarrow€the€class€of€death€eligible€defendants.ðð€€In€this€regard,€he€says€theÏaggravating€circumstance€that€the€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€orÍcruel,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(i)(5),€is€vague€and€overbroad.€€Our€SupremeÏCourt€has€repeatedly€rejected€this€contention.€€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,Ï181„82€(Tenn.€1991).€€He€also€contends€that€ð ð(i)n€combination,ðð€subsections€(I)(2),Ï(5),€(6)€and€(7)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204€encompass€the€majority€ofÏhomicides€committed€in€Tennessee.€€Again,€our€Supreme€Court€has€addressedÏthe€constitutionality€of€the€statute€and,€whether€viewed€òòsinglyóó€or€collectively,€theÏaggravating€circumstances€are€constitutional.€€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àIn€the€next€issue€the€appellant€contends€the€death€penalty€is€imposedÏcapriciously€and€arbitrarily.€€In€this€regard,€he€alleges€that€unlimited€discretion€isÏvested€in€the€prosecutor€as€to€whether€or€not€to€seek€the€death€penalty,€but€thisÏargument€was€rejected€by€our€Supreme€Court€in€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2dÏ75,€86€(Tenn.€1994);€the€death€penalty€is€imposed€in€a€discriminatory€manner,Ïanother€contention€rejected€in€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87€n.5;€there€are€noÏuniform€standards€or€procedures€for€jury€selection€to€insure€open€inquiryÏconcerning€potentially€prejudicial€subject€matter,€even€though€our€Supreme€CourtÏhas€established€such€standards€in€numerous€cases;€the€death€qualificationÏprocess€skews€the€makeup€of€the€jury€and€results€in€a€relatively€prosecution„prone,€guilty„prone€jury,€another€issue€rejected€by€our€Supreme€Court€in€òòState€v.ÏTeelóó,€793€S.W.2d€236,€246€(Tenn.€1990),€where€the€Court€noted€that€the€U.S.ÏSupreme€Court€has€likewise€rejected€this€argument;€defendants€are€prohibitedÏfrom€addressing€jurorsðð€popular€misconceptions€about€matters€relevant€toÍsentencing,€another€argument€rejected€in€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€86„87;€the€juryÏis€instructed€that€it€must€agree€unanimously€in€order€to€impose€a€life€sentence€andÏis€prohibited€from€being€told€the€effect€of€a€non„unanimous€verdict,€an€issue€alsoÏrejected€in€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87,€and€in€other,€earlier€cases;€theÏrequirement€for€unanimity€for€a€life€sentence€violates€òòMills€v.€Marylandóó,€486€U.S.Ï367,€108€S.Ct.€1860,€100€L.Ed.2d€384€(1988)€and€òòMcKay€v.€North€Carolinaóó,€494ÏU.S.€433,€110€S.Ct.€1227,€108€L.Ed.2d€369€(1990),€another€claim€consistentlyÏrejected€by€our€Supreme€Court€as€it€was€in€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87,€andÏearlier€cases;€there€is€a€reasonable€likelihood€that€jurors€believe€they€areÏrequired€to€unanimously€agree€as€to€the€existence€of€mitigating€circumstancesÏbecause€of€the€failure€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€meaning€and€function€of€mitigatingÏcircumstances;€the€jury€is€not€required€to€make€the€ultimate€determination€thatÏdeath€is€the€appropriate€penalty;€and€the€defendant€is€denied€the€final€closingÏargument€in€the€penalty€phase€of€the€trial.ÌÌà àAs€previously€and€subsequently€noted,€these€complaints€about€the€deathÏpenalty€have€been€addressed€by€our€Supreme€Court€numerous€times.€€TheÏapellant€cites€various€authorities€including€a€study€by€the€Tennessee€PublicÏDefenders€Conference,€the€òòDallas€Times€Heraldóó€and€various€other€publicationsÏnot€presented€to€the€trial€court.€€Failure€to€present€his€arguments€regarding€theÏdiscriminatory€imposition€of€the€death€penalty€to€the€trial€court€amounted€to€aÏwaiver€of€these€issues.€€Ìà àAs€to€popular€misconceptions€about€the€death€penalty,€the€appellant€hasÏnot€presented€proof€regarding€such€misconceptions€and€this€issue€was€waived.ÌÌà àRegarding€the€requirement€of€unanimity,€our€Supreme€Court€has€rejectedÏthis€argument€in€òòState€v.€Boydóó,€797€S.W.2d€589,€597€(Tenn.€1989),€and€otherÏcases,€and€this€Court€lacks€authority€to€overrule€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏeven€if€we€wanted€to€do€so.ÌÌà àThe€failure€to€instruct€on€ð ðthe€meaning€and€function€ofðð€mitigatingÏcircumstances€was€considered€in€òòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€768€S.W.2d€239,€251„52Ï(Tenn.€1989),€and€other€cases€and€found€not€to€constitute€error.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€argument€that€the€jury€is€not€required€to€make€the€ultimateÏdetermination€that€death€is€the€proper€penalty,€that€is€precisely€what€ourÏprocedures€require€the€jury€to€do.€€The€jurors€weigh€aggravating€and€mitigatingÏcircumstances€and€determine€whether€a€defendant€deserves€a€life€sentence€orÏdeserves€to€be€executed.€€This€issue€has€also€been€soundly€rejected€by€ourÏSupreme€Court.€€òòSeeóó€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87.ÌÌà àAs€to€the€final€closing€argument€being€given€by€the€prosecution,€not€theÏdefendant,€the€appellant€does€not€challenge€the€constitutionality€of€the€procedure,Ïonly€its€unfairness.€€Only€constitutional€issues€may€be€reached€on€post„convictionÍproceedings.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„203.€€Furthermore,€our€Supreme€CourtÏhas€rejected€this€contention€in€at€least€two€prior€cases,€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87Ïn.5,€òòState€v.€Caughronóó,€855€S.W.2d€526,€542€(Tenn.€1993),€and€this€argumentÏwas€recently€rejected€by€this€court€in€òòState€of€Tennessee€v.€Perry€A.€Cribbsóó,ÏTennessee€Criminal€Appeals,€opinion€filed€at€Jackson,€February€14,€1997.€€ThisÏentire€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àIn€the€next€issue,€the€appellant€contends€that€electrocution€is€a€cruel€andÏunusual€punishment€prohibited€by€the€Eighth€Amendment€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€16€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€because€it€is€anÏunnecessarily€painful€and€torturious€form€of€execution.€€However,€our€SupremeÏCourt,€faced€with€this€issue€in€virtually€every€death€penalty€appeal,€hasÏconsistently€refused€to€so€find.€€òòSee€e.g.óó€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€179Ï(Tenn.€1991);€òòState€v.€Howellóó,€868€S.W.2d€238,€258€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,Ï875€S.W.2d€253,€268€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€737€(Tenn.Ï1994).€€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àIn€the€penultimate€issue€and€its€subissues,€the€appellant€contends€that€theÏappellate€review€process€is€inadequate,€an€issue€consistently€rejected€by€ourÏSupreme€Court.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€77€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àIn€this€regard,€he€first€contends€the€review€is€not€meaningful€because€theÏjury€is€not€required€to€make€written€finding€concerning€the€mitigatingÏcircumstances.€€Thus,€he€reasons€the€appellate€courts€cannot€reweigh€the€proofÏconcerning€the€mitigating€circumstances.€€Our€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€theÏstatute€is€constitutional€and€that€defendants€are€afforded€meaningfulÏproportionality€review.€€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€367€(Tenn.€1982).ÌÌà àNext,€he€contends€that€the€information€relied€upon€for€the€proportionalityÏreview€is€inadequate€and€incomplete.€€Specifically,€he€contends€that€the€formÏrequired€of€trial€judges€by€Rule€12€of€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€Rules€in€allÏfirst€degree€murder€cases€is€inadequate.€€However,€it€is€clear€that€the€Rule€12€formÏis€not€the€only€document€relied€upon€in€the€appellate€court€for€proportionalityÏreview.€€The€Supreme€Court€has€the€entire€record€of€the€trial€and€the€benefit€ofÏhaving€reviewed€numerous€death€penalty€and€non„death€penalty€cases.€€Finally,Ïthe€issue€of€the€adequacy€of€the€form€required€by€Rule€12€of€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€Rules€must€be€addressed€to€the€creator€of€the€rule€and€the€form,Ïthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court,€not€this€intermediate€appellate€court.€€This€issueÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€the€Supreme€Courtððs€methodology€forÏappellate€review€is€flawed€because€it€does€not€ð ðexplore€the€wellsprings€of€humanÏemotion.ðð€€The€Supreme€Court€has€heretofore€had€ample€opportunity€and€shall,Íno€doubt,€continue€to€have€ample€opportunity€to€design,€implement€and€refine€itsÏmethodology€for€appellate€review.€€Any€opinion€by€this€intermediate€appellateÏcourt€as€to€proper€methodology€for€the€Supreme€Court€to€follow€would€beÏadvisory€only€and€clearly€would€not€bind€the€Supreme€Court€in€any€way.€€Thus,Ïthis€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€the€proportionality€review€is€conducted€inÏviolation€of€due€process€and€the€law€of€the€land€because€there€is€no€uniformÏcomprehensive€and€substantially€reliable€state„wide€procedure€for€collecting€andÏevaluating€data€regarding€death€penalty€murder€cases€and€non„death€penaltyÏmurder€cases.€€Thus,€the€Supreme€Court€ð ðcan€act€or€not€act,€at€its€whim.ðð€€TheÏappellant€has€cited€only€statistics€regarding€death€penalty€cases€to€support€hisÏassertion€that€the€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee€acts€merely€on€ð ðwhim.ðð€€AnÏexamination€of€even€one€Supreme€Court€opinion€in€a€death€penalty€case€wouldÏconvince€even€the€most€casual€observer€that€such€is€not€the€case.€€Our€SupremeÏCourt€gives€particularized€attention€to€each€and€every€death€penalty€case€and€theÏargument€that€they€do€not€is€without€merit€as€best€and€spurious€at€worst.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€death€penalty€statute€enacted€inÏ1977€by€the€General€Assembly€embraced€more€than€one€subject€in€violation€ofÏArticle€II,€ðð€17€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà àOur€Supreme€Court€has€repeatedly€held,€as€has€this€Court,€that€theÏð ðsubsequent€reenactment€and€codificationðð€of€statutes€eliminates€any€questionÏregarding€the€original€caption€of€the€bill€passed€by€the€legislature.€€òòHarmon€v.ÏAngus€R.€Jessup€Associates,€Inc.óó,€619€S.W.2d€522,€523€(Tenn.€1981).€€This€issueÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà àFinding€no€merit€to€any€issue,€the€judgment€is€affirmed.ÌÌÌÓÓ›à àœÌÌà à›à àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€SCOTT,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌœÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌJOE€D.€DUNCAN,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌœ›