ÿWPCùy ±,¦ªXCìõ®Èý+ìÃÜü3äaÜ™ )7ãÿo"ã¬rçn ‡Œ‡…ó´T… —Æ@Kfâ­Z °T΄ %ˆ4ù·1Å­ i¹YÀ—nRwà0LA“àæÞ Ámù£E´àÕ‰¾÷ÝeŸ'ÞÕ8µ5öÝñž´7)6»¸ítA×ÒŒ›5ãLÖÉœ—¨c‚|'Í66„WY=¼Ív¸ÉÕ)˜Ùã{âRolqÙ¯¤ðãfk?íHº ñÐÂâZ´³ù²AÚ:0œ.ûa]~VÔø £ÀI¹é‚S$v®Ý‡± C)¥ei¢°,’µ7”@”yê„I×üFt£S÷öÎ>R³HFOR ”-½ßââœí6í/¨ó™ø"9˜ñÞPaÎÚÜ•xü†¥s iv£v-’nÈçù] LbÐÀ zLß%¿98=1'~(©bI›-»izxÔŽ"V <ü|ôªrÏîð빩½za%&½@Ÿïø±ýÀ¸²ÅaËxpÜ SŽ#Ðw§äVBÝõzÌWV–Ùfk¨bþÍÑfL¹ZXgEÊVS;bž1‰Ôn,ÝFhOeM^=ÈÂ}oµe`z¶`ÌVPÁ]lzp¹XXr¢/¤»fô=… %F w@L 0ÜŒ U:h 4¢ ¶ Å R 0 Z 0Dzè¾i¦Ra€î)n#Ç—)^-U:}0Y·0ï2Üÿ5æÛ<•Á=U:VBVBzBì E%öGöG BLL8L+LQšwU™ ]]]Lªi=önë3s D3www 0DQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQwQw¿•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w•w AOTxÆ£x£x 0Diy D/­y BÜyX ‡ˆD‰ŠD‹ŒDDŽDÓ€(´`$¡¡Ñ°ÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€‰GXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularuM%Nz²3|x™ ƒÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€appellant€met€the€four€young€men€while€she€was€employed€at€Calsonic.€€The€menÐ  Ðworked€second€shift,€3:00€p.m.€to€midnight,€and€were€accustomed€to€socializing€after€work.€€TheÏappellant€was€terminated€from€Calsonic€on€February€20,€1995,€after€being€late€for€work€on€severalÏoccasions.€€While€employed€at€Calsonic,€she€also€worked€second€shift.(Ð(3R˜$¤¤Ý ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€l«XXdædæ7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÞÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝOn€cross„examination€of€Mrs.€Bain,€the€State€produced€evidence€that€the€appellant€hadÐ  Ðconsistently€scored€well€within€her€expected€level€of€performance€throughout€her€school€years. _Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€the€appellantððs€sufficiency€argument€also€encompasses€her€challenge€toÐ  Ðthe€trial€courtððs€instruction€on€the€definition€of€ð ðknowingly.ðð€€As€one€issue€cannot€be€addressedÏwithout€logical€reference€to€the€other,€both€will€be€considered€in€our€analysis€of€the€sufficiency€ofÏthe€evidence. HÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€acknowledge€that,€although€supposedly€a€simplified€approach€to€understandingÐ  Ðculpability,€element€analysis€has€produced€similar€confusion€and€ambiguity€as€its€counterpart,Ïoffense€analysis.€€€Legal€scholars€recognize€that€to€rectify€such€problems€state€legislators€mustÏinitiate€necessary€revisions€to€current€criminal€codes€to€express€each€element€as€a€separate€wordÏto€negate€confusion€as€to€which€conduct€element€the€element€references.€€Until€such€a€time,Ïhowever,€the€courts€are€duty€bound€to€separate€the€elements€by€interpretation. ƒÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€appellant€met€the€four€young€men€while€she€was€employed€at€Calsonic.€€The€menÐ  Ðworked€second€shift,€3:00€p.m.€to€midnight,€and€were€accustomed€to€socializing€after€work.€€TheÏappellant€was€terminated€from€Calsonic€on€February€20,€1995,€after€being€late€for€work€on€severalÏoccasions.€€While€employed€at€Calsonic,€she€also€worked€second€shift. vÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note,€however,€that€had€the€record€not€been€sufficient€regarding€the€constitutionalÐ  Ðissues€before€us,€it€would€be€necessary€to€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€level€for€completion€of€theÏrecord.€€òòSeeóó€€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€592€S.W.2d€902,€904€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,Ð „| Ð(Tenn.€1979). Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€appellantððs€claim€arises€from€the€presumption€that€ð ðthe€factual€and€legal€findings€onÐ  Ðsuppression€motions€are€virtually€conclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€defense€can€show€that€thereÏwas€no€evidence€to€support€the€findings€of€the€trial€court.ðð€€Appellantððs€Brief,€at€60€(citing€òòState€v.Ð „| ÐStearnsóó,€620€S.W.2d€92€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981)).€€Ð B : ÐÌà ` àOur€standard€of€appellate€review€on€suppression€issues€was€firmly€established€in€òòState€v.Ð ¾ ¶ ÐOdomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,23€(Tenn.€1996),€which€held€that:Ð | t ÐÐ : 2  Ðà8 ` à[t]he€party€prevailing€in€the€trial€court€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€ofÏthe€evidence€adduced€at€the€suppression€hearing€as€well€as€all€reasonable€andÏlegitimate€inferences€that€may€be€drawn€from€it.€€So€long€as€the€greater€weight€ofÏthe€evidence€supports€the€trial€courtððs€findings,€those€findings€shall€be€upheld.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÓÓ ½Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝTo€determine€which€conduct€element€is€applicable,€one€must€simply€look€at€the€penalÐ  Ðproscription€and€determine€whether€the€Legislature€intended€to€punish€ð ðspecific€conductðð€asÏopposed€to€a€ð ðspecific€result.ðð€€òòSeeóó€€òòAlvarado€v.€Stateóó,€704€S.W.2d€36,€39€(Tex.€Crim.€App.),€òòrehððgÐ „| Ðdeniedóó,€(1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€514€U.S.€1112,€115€S.Ct.€1967€(1995). Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401(d)€provides,€in€part:€ð ð[a]€violation€of€[39„15„401(a)]€may€beÐ  Ða€lesser€included€offense€of€any€kind€of€homicide€.€.€.€if€the€victim€is€a€child€and€the€evidenceÏsupports€a€charge€under€this€section.ðð,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular OÝ ƒ ´Â$ÝÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ôãÝôXXÔòòBut€seeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302(a)€(intentional€refers€to€nature€of€conduct€orÐ  Ðresult€of€conduct);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302(c)€(reckless€refers€to€circumstances€or€result€ofÏconduct). åÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€In€addressing€the€offense€of€first€degree€murder€by€aggravated€child€abuse,€a€panel€ofÐ  Ðthis€court€recently€held€that€ð ð[t]here€is€nothing€inconsistent€about€a€reckless€killing€beingÏcommitted€in€the€course€of€a€knowing€child€abuse.ðð€€òòState€v.€Robersonóó,€No.€02C01„9702„CC„Ð „| Ð00083€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Jan.€23,€1998)(comparing€ðð€39„13„202(a)(4)€with€theÏconcept€of€felony€murder,€ðð€39„13„202(a)(2)). ÒÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú23Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝWhen€counselððs€argument€goes€beyond€these€guidelines,€reversal€is€required€if€theÐ  Ðimpropriety€ð ðaffected€the€verdict€to€the€prejudice€of€the€defendant.ðð€€òòCribbsóó,€967€S.W.2d€at€783Рƾ Ð(citing€òòHarrington€v.€Stateóó,€385€S.W.2d€758,€759€(Tenn.€1965)).€€Critical€factors€in€determining€ifÐ „| Ðprejudice€exists€include:Ìà8 ` à(1)€the€conduct€complained€of€viewed€in€light€of€the€facts€and€circumstances€ofÐ  ø  Ðthe€case;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(2)€the€curative€measures€undertaken€by€the€court€and€the€prosecution;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(3)€the€intent€of€the€prosecutor€in€making€the€improper€arguments;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(4)€€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€improper€conduct€and€any€other€error€in€theÏrecord;€andÐ ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(5)€€the€relative€strength€and€weakness€of€the€case.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌòòCribbsóó,€967€S.W.2d€at€783€(citing€òòState€v.€Bigbeeóó,€885€S.W.2d€797,€809€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.Ð : 2 ÐBuckóó,€670€S.W.2d€600,€609€(Tenn.€1984);€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340,€344€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð ø ð Ð1976)). ÜÔ€Xl«XXXÔÔ€bXXl«ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xl«XbÔÐ  ÐÌMarch€25,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó ‹Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€other€words,€although€generally€to€the€contrary,€an€offense€may€be€a€lesser€grade€orÐ  Ðclass€of€offense€even€though€it€requires€the€same€or€higher€culpability€than€that€required€by€theÏgreater€offense.€For€example,€voluntary€manslaughter,€which€requires€the€mental€state€ofÏknowing,€is€not€a€lesser€included€offense€of€second€degree€murder€(also€requiring€a€knowingÏmental€state)€because€it€requires€the€additional€element€of€provocation.€€However,€voluntaryÏmanslaughter€is€a€lesser€grade€or€class€of€second€degree€murder€because€of€the€statutoryÏgrading€of€homicide€offenses€established€by€our€legislature.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular pÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú17Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€€Derivation€Comments,€òòProposed€Draftóó,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„403€(1973). âÝ ƒ ´Â$ÝÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú18Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔThe€appellate€court€of€Texas€has€adopted€an€element€approach€to€culpabilityÐ  Ðrequirements.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€€òòPatrick€v.€Stateóó,€906€S.W.2d€481,€492€(Tex.€Crim.€App.),€òòrehððg€deniedóó,Рƾ Ð(1995),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€517€U.S.€1106,€116€S.Ct.€1323€(1996);€òòHughes€v.€Stateóó,€897€S.W.2d€285,Ð „| Ð296€(Tex.€Crim.€App.),€òòrehððg€deniedóó,€(1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€514€U.S.€1112,€115€S.Ct.€1967€(1995);Ð B : ÐòòCook€v€Stateóó,€884€S.W.2d€485,€487€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994);€òòAlvaradoóó,€704€S.W.2d€at€38.Ô#†Xœ…XôôãÝR#Ô Ý ƒ ´Â$ÝÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔThe€greater€area€of€confusion€is€found€in€those€multiple€culpability€crimes€which€provideÐ  Ðfor€no€culpable€mental€state€in€the€definition€of€the€offense.€€Under€the€provisions€of€our€criminalÏcode,€if€the€mental€state€for€the€respective€element€is€not€defined€in€the€offense,€ð ðintent,€knowingÏor€reckless€suffices€.€.€.€with€respect€to€each€element€of€the€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„¼301(a)(1).€€For€example,€the€offense€of€aggravated€sexual€battery,€causing€bodily€injury,€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„13„504€(1997),€contains€two€elements:€(1)€unlawful€sexual€contact€and€(2)€bodilyÏinjury.€€Because€the€definition€of€sexual€contact€requires€an€ð ðintentionalðð€touching,€the€requisiteÏmental€state€for€this€element€is€that€of€ð ðintentional.ðð€€However,€because€the€offense€defines€noÏmental€state€for€ð ðbodily€injury,ðð€a€mental€state€of€either€ð ðintentional,€knowing€or€reckless€suffices.ðð d Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú19Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝAcknowledging€that€the€concept€of€€ð ðelement€analysisðð€in€the€Model€Penal€Code€wasÐ  Ðforeign€to€the€Texas€courts,€Judge€Maloney,€concurring€with€the€majorityððs€decision€in€òòCook€v.Рƾ ÐStateóó,€884€S.W.2d€at€492,€recognized,€ð ðThe€initial€drafters€of€the€Penal€Code€attempted€to€adoptÐ „| Ðthe€ððelement€analysisðð€characteristic€of€the€Model€Penal€Code.€€However,€in€removing€twoÏprovisions€key€to€the€application€of€this€analysis.€.€.€the€Legislature€in€effect€tossed€the€Code€intoÏthe€air€and€allowed€it€to€crash€to€the€ground€splintered€and€disjointed,€leaving€it€to€the€courts€toÏdetermine€whether€an€element€analysis€or€an€offense€analysis€should€be€employed€in€itsÏapplication.ðð€ !Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSee€generallyóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„201(a)(1);€„(a)(2);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„Ð  Ð301€(a)(1);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302(b).€€òòCfóó.€€òòState€v.€Parkeróó,€887€S.W.2d€825€(Tenn.€Crim.Рƾ ÐApp.€1994);€òòState€v.€Kimmelóó,€No.€02C01„9701„CR„00006€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Jan.€12,Ð „| Ð1998)€(holding€that€the€òòmens€reaóó€requirements€of€a€particular€crime€may€differ€with€regard€to€theÐ B : Ðdifferent€elements€of€the€crime). Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý(citing€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€Ala.€Code€ðððð€13A„2„2€to€„2„4€(1982);€Alaska€Stat.€ðððð€11.81.600„.610,Ð  Ð.900(a)€(Supp.€1982);€Ariz.€Rev.€Stat.€Ann.€ðððð€13„105(5),€„202€(1978€&€Supp.€1982„1983);€Ark.ÏStat.€Ann.€ðððð€41„202€to€„204€(1977);€Colo.€Rev.€Stat.€ðððð€18„1„501(3),€„501(5)„(6),€„501(8),€„503Ï(1978);€Conn.€Gen.€Stat.€Ann.€ðððð€53a„3(11)„(14),€„5€(West€1972);€Del.€Code€Ann.€tit.€11,€ðððð€231,Ï251„253€(1979€&€Supp.€1982);€Hawaii€Rev.€Stat.€ðððð€704„204,€„206€to€„208,€„212€to€„213€(1976);ÏCriminal€Code€of€1961,€ðððð€4„3€to€„7,€„9,€Ill.€Ann.€Stat.€cha.€38,€4„3€to€„7,€„9€(Smith„Hurd€1972);€Ky.ÏRev.€Stat.€ðððð€501.010(1),€.020,€.030(2)„€.050€(1975);€Me.€Rev.€Stat.€Ann.€tit.€17„A,€ðððð€34„35Ï(1982);€Mo.€Ann.€Stat.€ðððð€562.016,€.021,€.026€(Vernon€1979);€Mont.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€45„2„101(33),Ï(37),€(58),€„103€to€„104€(1981);€N.H.€Rev.€Stat.€Ann.€ðð€626:2€(1974);€N.J.€Stat.€Ann.€ðð€2C:2„2Ï(West€1982);€N.Y.€Penal€Law€ðððð€15.00(6),€.05„.15€(McKinney€1975);€N.D.€Cent.€Code€ðð12.1„02„02Ï(1976);€Ohio€Rev.€Code€Ann.€ðð€2901.21„.22€(Page€1982);€Or.€Rev.€Stat.€ðððð€161.085(6)„(10),Ï.095(2),€.105„.115€(1981);€18€Pa.€Cons.€Stat.€Ann.€ðððð€302,€305€(Purdon€1973);€Tex.€Penal€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€6.02„.03€(Vernon€1974);€Utah€Code€Ann.€ðððð€76„2„101€to€„104€(1978);€Wash.€Rev.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€9A.08.010€(1977)).€€ Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòModel€Penal€Code€ðð€2.02óó€provides€in€parts€pertinent€to€the€issue€before€us:Ð  Ðà8 ` à(1)€òòMinimum€Requirements€of€Culpabilityóó.€€.€.€.€a€person€is€not€guilty€of€an€offenseРƾ Ðunless€he€acted€purposely,€knowingly,€recklessly€or€negligently€.€.€.€with€respect€toÏeach€material€element€of€the€offense.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8 ` à(2)€€òòKinds€of€Culpability€Definedóó.о ¶` Ð ` Ð  Ðà ` àà ¸ à.€.€.€(b)€òòKnowinglyóó.Ð | t Ðà ` àà8 ¸ àA€person€acts€knowingly€with€respect€to€a€material€element€of€an€offenseÏwhen:Ð ¸ Ð ¸ Ð  Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` Ð ` Ð à(i)€if€the€element€involves€òòthe€nature€of€his€conduct€or€theÐ ¶ ®  Ðattendant€circumstancesóó,€he€is€aware€that€his€conduct€is€of€thatÐ tl  Ðnature€or€that€such€circumstances€exist;€andÐ ¸ x¸ x Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` Ð ` Ð à(ii)€if€the€element€involves€a€òòresult€of€his€conductóó,€he€is€aware€thatÐ ðè  Ðit€is€practically€certain€that€his€conduct€will€cause€such€a€result.€.€.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ` àComparatively,€relevant€portions€of€the€Tennessee€Code€provide:Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` àÐ ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` àò òTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„201ó 󀄀(a)€No€person€may€be€convicted€of€an€offenseÐ ¦ž  Ðunless€each€of€the€following€is€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt:Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` Ð ` Ð à(1)€òòThe€conduct,€circumstances€surrounding€the€conduct,€or€aÐ *" Ðresult€of€the€conduct€describedóó€in€the€definition€of€the€offense;Ðèภx¸ x Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` Ð ` Ð à(2)€€The€culpable€mental€state€required€.€.€.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ` àò òTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„301€ó ó„€(a)(1)€A€person€commits€an€offense€who€actsÐ " Ðintentionally,€knowingly,€recklessly€or€with€criminal€negligence,€as€the€definition€ofÏthe€offense€requires,€òòwith€respect€to€each€element€of€the€offenseóó€.€.€.Цž` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8 ` àò òTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„€302ó 󀄀.€.€.€(b)€ð ðKnowingðð€refers€to€a€person€who€actsÐ " Ðknowingly€òòwith€respect€to€the€conduct€or€to€circumstances€surrounding€theÐ èà Ðconductóó€when€the€person€is€aware€of€the€nature€of€the€conduct€or€that€theÐ ¦ž Ðcircumstances€exist.€€A€person€acts€knowingly€with€òòrespect€to€a€result€of€theÐ d\ Ðpersonððs€conductóó€when€the€person€is€aware€that€the€conduct€is€reasonably€certainÐ " Ðto€cause€the€result.€.€.€.ò ò€€€€ó ó€€ BÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú20Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€appellant€also€complains€that,€although€the€trial€court€provided€the€blanketÐ  Ðinstruction€in€its€written€charge,€the€court€failed€to€instruct€the€jury€as€to€the€ð ðresult€of€conductððÏelement€in€its€oral€charge.€€Although€the€court€did€not€verbally€recite€the€ð ðresult€of€conductððÏelement€of€knowingly,€the€court€did€do€so€in€the€previous€instruction€for€first€degree€murder.€€TheÏcourt,€in€instructing€the€jury€as€to€the€definition€of€knowingly,€remarked€that€this€definition€would€beÏrepetitious€as€it€had€been€previously€provided.€We€conclude€that€any€error€in€the€courtððsÏinadvertent€omittance€of€the€ð ðresult€of€conductðð€element€is€harmless€at€best€since€it€was€providedÏelsewhere€in€the€oral€charge€and€it€was€provided€in€the€written€charge.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(b). 3Ô‡ôãÝôXXÔÝ ƒ ´ÂÿÝÑ@°ÑÒ°ÒÑT@R[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7Àœ…XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú21Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý"Serious€bodily€injuryðð€is€defined€as€bodily€injury€which€involves:Ð  Ðà8 ` à(A)€A€substantial€risk€of€death;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(B)€Protracted€unconsciousness;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(C)€Extreme€physical€pain;Ð ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(D)€Protracted€or€obvious€disfigurement;€orÐ ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8 ` à(E)€Protracted€loss€or€substantial€impairment€of€a€function€of€a€bodily€member,Ïorgan€or€mental€faculty.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„106(a)(33). áÝ ƒ ´Â$ÝÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔOn€November€1,€1989,€Tennessee€enacted€a€new€criminal€code€which€was€in€large€partÐ  Ðan€adoption€of€the€American€Law€Instituteððs€Model€Penal€Code.€€Among€the€advantages€ofÏadopting€a€Model€Penal€Code€provision€is€recourse€to€the€commentary€which€accompanies€theÏprovision€and€to€judicial€decisions€from€other€Model€Penal€Code€states.€€However,€caution€is€oftenÏadvised€when€reviewing€judicial€decisions€as€variations€are€found€in€the€criminal€statutes€fromÏstate€to€state.€€In€this€regard,€we€acknowledge€that€a€significant€portion€of€the€Tennessee€CriminalÏCode,€including€those€provisions€which€deal€with€the€general€principles€of€criminal€liability,€wereÏlargely€adopted€from€the€Texas€derivation€of€the€Model€Penal€Code.€€òòSeeóó€€€Derivation€Comments,Ð : 2 ÐòòProposed€Draftóó,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„403€(1973).€€Ð ø ð Ð'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý µÝ ƒ ´Â$ÝÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú22Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ôãÝôXXÔTenn.€R.€Evid.€607€permits€impeachment€of€a€witness€by€either€party.€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€l«XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýññ›ññÓ ÔþÓò òññßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@EÈ ` 8ttxPð  rß›ññà@. . ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðà@ÜÜ(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌà@ââ&®àMAY€SESSION,€1998ˆÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à h àà À à)Ð | t Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àNo.€01C01„9704„CC„00143Ð h` Ðà ` àAppelleeà  àà h àà À à)Ð TL  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àWARREN€COUNTYÐ @8  Ðvs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ð ,$  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHon.€Charles€Haston,€JudgeÐ   ÐJENNIE€BAIN€DUCKER,à h àà À à)Ð ü  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à(Aggravated€Child€Abuse,Ð ðè  Ðà ` àAppellantà  àà h àà À à)à  àTwo€Counts)Ð ÜÔ  Ðó óÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à  àà h àà À àà  àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:Ð zr ÐÌò òDavid€L.€Raybinó óà  àà h àò òà À àà  àJohn€Knox€Walkupó óÐ F> ÐHollins,€Wagster€&€Yarbroughà À àà  àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ 2* Ð2210€SunTrust€Centerà h àÐ  Ð424€Church€Streetà  àà h àà À àà  àò òSandy€C.€Patrickó óÐ þö ÐNashville,€TN€€37219à h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€Generalà Ð àà (# àÐ êâ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌandà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÐ ¶® Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à x àà Ð àà (# àÐ œ ” Ðò òMichael€D.€Galliganó óà h àÐ ‚!z Ð308€West€Main€Streetà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àà  àÐ n"f ÐP.€O.€Box€289ò òà  àà h àà À àà  àWilliam€M.€Lockeó óÐ T#L ÐMcMinnville,€TN€€37110„0289à À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÐ @$8  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àP.€O.€Box€410,€Professional€Bldg.Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àMcMinnville,€TN€€37110Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ p+h$( ÐÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌò òDavid€G.€Hayesó óÐ Ô0Ì). ÐJudgeÐ  À1¸*/ ÐÓÓà@+®àòòò òOPINIONóóó óˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant,€Jennie€Bain€Ducker,€was€indicted€in€June,€1995,€on€two€countsÏof€first€degree€murder€resulting€from€the€aggravated€child€abuse€of€her€two€children,Ïages€13€months€and€23€months.€€A€Warren€County€jury,€on€October€3,€1995,€foundÏthe€appellant€guilty€of€two€counts€of€the€lesser€charged€offense€of€aggravated€childÏabuse.€€€Concurrent€sentences€of€eighteen€years€were€imposed€for€each€of€the€classÏA€felony€convictions.€€In€this€appeal€as€of€right,€the€appellant€raises€the€followingÏissues:ÌÓÓà8 ` àI.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€the€appellantððs€motions€toÏsuppress:€(1)€her€statement€to€law€enforcement€officials,€(2)€the€resultsÏof€her€blood€alcohol€test,€and€(3)€the€results€of€the€search€of€herÏvehicle€(appellantððs€issues€VI,€VII,€VIII,€IX);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àII.€€Whether€the€crimes€of€Child€Abuse,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„¼401(1994€Supp.)€and€Aggravated€Child€Abuse,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„¼15„402€(1994€Supp.),€are€unconstitutionally€void€for€vaguenessÏ(appellantððs€issue€V);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àIII.€Whether€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€convictions€for€twoÏcounts€of€aggravated€child€abuse€because€the€trial€court€failed€toÏproperly€instruct€the€jury€as€to€the€definition€of€ð ðknowinglyðð€(appellantððsÏissues€I€&€IV);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àIV.€€Whether€aggravated€child€abuse€is€a€lesser€included€offense€ofÏfirst€degree€murder€(appellantððs€issue€II);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àV.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€evidence€that€MicahÏMajors€had€previously€engaged€in€sexual€relations€with€the€appellantÏ(appellantððs€issue€X);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àVI.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€permitting€the€prosecution€toÏerroneously€argue€facts€that€were€not€in€evidence€(appellantððs€issueÏXI);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àVII.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€permitting€the€prosecution€toÏcross„examine€the€appellant€regarding€prior€bad€acts,€and,Ïsubsequently,€by€permitting€the€prosecution€to€introduce€rebuttalÏtestimony€concerning€these€prior€bad€acts€(appellantððs€issue€XII);Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àVIII.€€Whether€the€introduction€of€testimony€and€the€Stateððs€argumentÏregarding€the€appellantððs€sexual€relationship€with€Mr.€Majors€and€priorÏbad€acts€of€the€appellant€constituted€cumulative€error€(appellantððsÏissue€XIII);€andÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àIX.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€imposing€class€A€felony€sentencesÏfor€the€appellantððs€convictions€for€aggravated€child€abuse€since€the€juryÏwas€only€instructed€as€to€the€class€B€version€of€the€offense€(appellantððsÏissue€III).ÓÓÐJ:B39` ü!` ü! Ðà ` àAfter€a€review€of€the€record€and€the€applicable€law,€we€affirm€the€judgment€ofÏthe€trial€court.ÌÌà@ff)®àò òBackgroundó óˆÐ l d ÐÌà ` àThe€events€leading€to€the€tragic€deaths€of€thirteen€month€old€Dustin€DuckerÏand€twenty„three€month€old€Devin€Ducker€began€in€the€early€evening€hours€of€JuneÏ5,€1995.€€€€At€around€6:30€p.m.,€the€appellant,€the€twenty€year€old€mother€of€theÏvictims,€arrived€with€her€two€children€at€the€home€of€her€boyfriend,€Jimmy€Turner.€ÏAlthough€married,€the€appellant€was€estranged€from€her€husband.€€She€spent€theÏevening€cleaning€Turnerððs€home€and€playing€with€her€two€children.€€Around€10:30Ïp.m.,€Turner€retired€to€his€bedroom€accompanied€by€his€own€small€child,€while€theÏappellant€and€her€two€children€continued€to€play€video€games.€€Sometime€during€theÏearly€morning€hours,€the€appellant€and€her€children€left€Turnerððs€residence.ÌÌà ` àMcMinnville€Police€Officer€Alan€Dalton€testified€that€he€was€on€duty€during€theÏearly€morning€hours€of€June€6,€1995.€€He€stated€that€it€had€been€raining€ð ðon€and€offððÏthroughout€the€night€and€it€was€ð ðreal€foggy.ðð€€Around€3:30€a.m.,€Officer€Dalton,€whileÏpatrolling€Old€Smithville€Highway,€observed€a€white€vehicle€with€dark€tinted€windowsÏtraveling€in€the€northbound€lane.€€The€white€vehicle€pulled€into€the€Pioneer€ServiceÏStation,€made€a€U„turn,€and€headed€southbound€toward€town.€€Because€of€the€timeÏof€night,€Officer€Dalton€followed€the€vehicle.€€The€vehicle€pulled€into€a€driveway€in€aÏresidential€area.€€€The€residence€was€later€determined€to€be€a€vacant€house€ownedÏby€the€appellantððs€grandmother.€€The€appellant€got€out€of€her€vehicle€and€beganÏwaving€something€at€Officer€Dalton.€€Dalton€parked€his€patrol€car€and€wasÏconfronted€by€the€appellant.€€She€asked€him€if€he€had€stopped€her€because€of€herÏtinted€windows.€€The€appellant€explained€that€she€had€been€cited€earlier€for€tintedÏwindows€and€speeding.€€After€discussing€the€appellantððs€particular€concerns€aboutÏthese€violations,€Officer€Dalton€asked€her€what€she€was€doing€out€so€late€at€night.€Ð d9\28 ÐThe€appellant€answered€that€she€and€her€boyfriend€were€having€problems.€€TheÏappellant€did€not€appear€intoxicated€and€spoke€ð ðintelligently.ðð€€Officer€Dalton€testifiedÏthat€he€could€not€see€whether€other€persons€were€in€the€appellantððs€vehicle€due€toÏthe€tinted€windows.ÌÌà ` àAt€approximately€3:45€a.m.,€the€appellant€arrived€at€Room€222€of€the€HolidayÏInn€in€McMinnville.€€This€was€the€temporary€residence€of€Micah€Majors,€anotherÏboyfriend€of€the€appellant.€€With€the€children€securely€strapped€in€their€car€seats,€theÏappellant€closed€the€windows€and€locked€the€doors.€€Brad€Pepper,€Matt€Holder,€andÏBuddy€Majors€were€already€in€the€room€with€Micah€when€the€appellant€arrived.ñsñ׃×ñsññsñ׃×ñsñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€TheÐ 4, Ðfour€men€were€playing€a€Sega€video€golf€game€and€drinking€alcoholic€beverages.€ÏThe€men€continued€to€play€their€video€game,€paying€little€or€no€attention€to€theÏappellant.€€They€did€notice,€however,€that€the€appellant€poured€herself€a€glass€ofÏwine.€€Additionally,€they€observed€her€leave€the€room€on€two€occasions,€once€to€getÏice€and€once€to€get€BC€powders€from€Micahððs€car.€€The€appellant€never€mentionedÏthat€her€children€were€in€her€car€or€that€she€needed€to€check€on€the€children.€€AllÏfour€men€testified€that,€despite€her€usual€ð ðdingyðð€attitude,€the€appellant€did€notÏappear€intoxicated.ÌÌà ` àPepper,€Holder,€and€Buddy€Majors€left€Micahððs€room€around€5:00€a.m.€€TheÏappellant€followed€the€three€men€to€the€parking€lot,€but€never€checked€on€herÏchildren.€€As€they€were€pulling€out€of€the€parking€lot,€Pepper€noticed€that€theÏappellant€was€already€back€on€the€second€floor€balcony€near€Micahððs€room.€ÌÌà ` àWhen€the€others€left€his€room,€Micah€had€changed€into€boxer€shorts€andÏgotten€into€bed.€€The€appellant€knocked€on€his€door€and€he€let€her€back€in€the€room.€ÏMicah€testified€that€he€was€trying€to€go€to€sleep,€but€the€appellant€sat€next€to€him€onÐ À5¸.4 Ðthe€bed€trying€to€talk€to€him€about€a€ð ðcommitmentðð€in€their€relationship.€€Micah€thenÏfell€asleep.€€When€his€alarm€went€off€the€next€afternoon€around€twelve€or€oneÏoððclock,€the€appellant€was€still€there.€€She€patted€Micah€on€the€side€of€the€leg€andÏsaid,€ð ðI€have€to€go.ðð€€She€never€mentioned€her€children.ÌÌà ` àAt€1:03€p.m.,€the€appellant€arrived€at€the€emergency€room€of€the€River€ParkÏHospital€in€McMinnville.€€While€she€was€attempting€to€get€one€child€out€of€the€car,ÏDavid€Smith,€a€bystander,€heard€her€say,€ð ðSomebody€help€me.€€My€babies€haveÏbeen€in€the€car€for€four€hours.ðð€€He€responded€to€her€plea€for€assistance.€€When€heÏreached€the€appellant,€he€observed€that€the€child€she€was€carrying€appearedÏlifeless.€€The€appellant€told€Smith€that€she€had€been€shopping.€€Susan€Smith,€DavidÏSmithððs€wife,€tried€to€comfort€the€appellant,€who€was€not€crying€at€that€time.€€TheÏappellant€informed€Lois€Argo,€€a€nurseððs€assistant,€that€she€thought€that€the€childÏwas€dehydrated.€€Geraldine€Fults,€a€registered€nurse,€also€met€the€appellant€as€sheÏentered€the€emergency€room.€€Fults€noticed€that€both€children€were€not€exhibitingÏany€signs€of€life.€€The€appellant€told€Fults€that€the€children€had€been€left€in€a€car€forÏthree€hours€with€the€windows€closed.€€She€explained€that€she€had€fallen€asleep€at€aÏfriendððs€house€on€Lucky€Road.€€At€this€point,€the€appellant€became€frantic,€ð ðshe€wasÏpacing€the€floor,ðð€€ð ðwringing€her€hands,ðð€ð ðrunning€her€hands€through€her€hair.ððÌà ` àÌà ` àAlan€Cleek,€the€Director€of€Psychiatric€Services,€was€directed€to€theÏemergency€room€where€he€met€the€appellant,€who€was€sitting€in€the€waiting€areaÏsobbing€and€wringing€her€hands.€€Cleek€escorted€the€appellant€to€the€physiciansððÏlounge,€where€she€could€have€some€privacy.€€Cleek€asked€the€appellant€what€hadÏhappened€and€she€responded€that€she€had€fallen€asleep.€€Cleek€then€asked€herÏhow€he€could€get€in€touch€with€her€family.€€The€appellant€would€not€respond€and€justÏshook€her€head.€€Jeanine€Ritchey,€a€registered€nurse,€was€also€in€the€lounge€whenÏDoctors€Bigbee€and€Snyder€entered€and€informed€the€appellant€that€the€two€childrenÏwere€dead.€€Ritchey€testified€that€the€appellant€was€in€a€ð ðballed€position,ðð€her€eyesÐ X9P28 Ðwere€not€focused€and€her€hair€was€disheveled.€€The€appellant€started€moaning,Ïstating€ð ðThis€canððt€be€happening.ðð€€€€Shortly€thereafter,€law€enforcement€investigatorsÏarrived.€€Cleek€informed€the€officers€that€the€appellant€was€too€upset€to€talk€and€thatÏshe€needed€sedation.€€He€testified€that,€although€he€did€not€remain€in€the€lounge€forÏthe€duration€of€the€questioning,€he€felt€that€the€appellant€did€not€wish€to€speak€withÏlaw€enforcement€officials.ÌÌà ` àAfter€being€advised€of€the€situation,€TBI€Special€Agent€Mark€Gwyn€wasÏrequested€to€accompany€the€district€attorney€to€the€hospital.€€When€Agent€GwynÏarrived€at€the€hospital,€he€noticed€the€appellantððs€white€Cutlass€parked€in€front€of€theÏemergency€room.€€As€he€entered€the€emergency€room,€Chief€Investigator€HerbÏRowland€informed€him€that€the€appellant€had€brought€the€children€to€the€hospital.€ÏRowland€also€informed€him€that€the€appellant€was€in€the€physiciansðð€lounge.€€Gwyn,Ïaccompanied€by€Assistant€District€Attorney€Larry€Ross,€interviewed€the€appellant€inÏthe€lounge.€€Gwyn€testified€that,€at€this€point,€all€questioning€was€just€of€anÏinvestigatory€nature,€because€it€was€unknown€as€to€whether€a€crime€had€beenÏcommitted.€€He€explained€to€the€appellant€that€she€was€not€under€arrest€and€thatÏshe€was€free€to€go€at€any€time.€€He€informed€the€appellant€that€he€was€just€trying€toÏfind€out€the€facts€surrounding€the€death€of€the€children.€€Gwyn€stated€that€at€no€timeÏwas€the€appellant€threatened€or€coerced€into€providing€a€statement.€€The€appellantÏagreed€to€talk€with€Gwyn€and€she€appeared€to€comprehend€what€was€being€said.€ÏShe€also€instructed€Gwyn€that€she€did€not€want€any€of€her€family€members€in€theÏroom.€ÌÌà ` àAlthough€the€appellant€appeared€distraught,€when€posed€a€question€byÏGwyn,€the€appellant€would€reflect€upon€her€answer€before€responding.€€TheÏappellant€told€Agent€Gwyn€that€she€had€spent€the€night€with€her€boyfriend,€JimmyÏTurner.€€She€had€been€up€until€around€3:00€or€4:00€a.m.€playing€Nintendo.€€DuringÏthis€time,€the€appellant€had€one€glass€of€wine.€€Around€4:00€a.m.,€she€went€to€bedÐ X9P28 Ðand€slept€a€couple€of€hours.€€At€8:00€a.m.,€the€appellant€awoke,€got€the€children€up,Ïand€went€to€Tiegenððs€CB€where€she€bought€a€coke€out€of€the€coke€machine.€€SheÏthen€ð ðproceeded€over€to€Micah€Majorsðð,€who€lived€behind€the€Ford€dealership.ðð€ÏOfficer€Gwyn,€who€was€aware€that€no€residences€were€behind€the€Ford€dealership,Ïfurther€questioned€the€appellant€concerning€the€location€of€Micah€Majorsðð€home.€ÏThe€appellant€explained€that€ð ðhe€lived€out€past€Evaððs€Dairy€Chef€at€[the]€ScottishÏInn.ðð€€She€stated€that€she€arrived€at€Micahððs€around€10:00€a.m.€and€she€fell€asleep.€ÏAt€1:00€p.m.,€she€awoke€and€went€to€the€hospital.€€ÌÌà ` àDuring€the€interview,€Agent€Gwyn€noticed€the€odor€of€alcohol€on€theÏappellant.€€He€requested€that€a€sample€of€her€blood€be€taken.€€The€appellant€agreedÏto€the€sample€as€long€as€only€one€tube€of€blood€was€taken€and€as€long€as€she€wasÏonly€ð ðstuckðð€one€time.€€These€conditions€were€complied€with€and€the€blood€sampleÏwas€drawn€at€2:00€p.m.ÌÌà ` àAfter€talking€with€the€appellant,€Agent€Gwyn€determined€that€the€appellantððsÏcar€constituted€a€crime€scene.€€The€car€was€parked€immediately€outside€theÏemergency€room€entrance€and€was€unlocked€with€the€windows€rolled€down.€€AsÏsuch,€Agent€Gwyn€felt€that€the€car€could€have€easily€been€tampered€with€or€moved.€ÏHe€ordered€that€crime€scene€tape€be€placed€around€the€vehicle.€€Moreover,€becauseÏa€crowd€of€people€was€gathering€around€the€car,€€he€made€arrangements€toÏtransport€the€vehicle€to€the€McMinnville€Police€Department€impound€lot.€€€TheÏsubsequent€search€of€the€vehicle,€conducted€several€days€after€the€incident,Ïrevealed€three€baby€bottles€on€the€back€floorboard€and€a€750€milliliter€bottle€ofÏCrown€Royal€Blended€Canadian€Whiskey,€which€was€approximately€one„third€full,Ïunder€the€driverððs€seat.ÌÌà ` àRaymond€Siler,€Jr.,€a€forensic€scientist€employed€by€the€Tennessee€BureauÏof€Investigation,€conducted€the€analysis€of€the€appellantððs€blood€sample€andÐ X9P28 Ðdetermined€that€the€appellantððs€blood€alcohol€content€at€2:00€p.m.€on€June€6,€1995,Ïwas€ð ð.06€gram€percent.ðð€€In€rebuttal€of€this€testimony,€the€defense€introduced€Dr.ÏJohnathan€Cowan€and€Dr.€Terry€Holmes,€who€testified€that€the€appellant€had€aÏfungal€infection€on€her€arm€and€that€such€infection€could€skew€the€results€of€a€bloodÏalcohol€test.€Despite€the€testimony€of€the€defense€experts,€Siler€testified€that€he€hadÏnever€heard€that€contamination€could€occur€in€a€preserved€blood€sample.ÌÌà ` àDr.€Charles€Harlan,€the€medical€examiner,€testified€that,€through€the€processÏof€extrapolation,€€the€appellant€would€have€had€a€blood€alcohol€content€of€aroundÏ.1925€at€five€in€the€morning,€if€she€had€stopped€drinking€at€that€time.€€Otherwise,€heÏstated,€in€order€to€reach€a€blood€alcohol€level€of€.06€percent,€an€individual€would€beÏrequired€to€consume€three€units€of€alcohol€in€one€hour.€€The€autopsies€performed€byÏDr.€Harlan€revealed€that€the€two€young€boys€died€of€systemic€hyperthermia,€aÏcondition€where€the€entire€body€is€overheated€and€unable€to€cool€itself,€as€a€result€ofÏbeing€locked€in€the€appellantððs€vehicle.€€Based€upon€established€studies€of€ambientÏtemperatures,€Dr.€Harlan€testified€that€the€temperature€in€the€vehicle€wasÏapproximately€120€degrees€at€noon€on€June€6,€1995.€€He€further€testified€thatÌÓÓà8 ` àÐ ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àWhenever€the€body€temperature€rises€so€that€the€body€temperature€isÏaround€one€hundred€and€six€(106)€degrees€Fahrenheit€or€about€forty„¼one€(41)€degrees€Centigrade,€then,€a€person€may€have€what€is€calledÏheat€stroke,€and€they€may€die€as€a€result€of€systemic€hyperthermia€„Ïthat€is,€increased€body€temperature.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àA€person€would€usually€become€unconscious€when€the€bodyÏtemperature€is€at€a€level€of€one€hundred€six€degrees€Fahrenheit€.€.€.€.€ÏWhen€you€reach€a€temperature€of€about€one€hundred€and€seven€pointÏfive€degrees€or€higher,€you€start€to€coagulate€the€body€protein€itself.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓDr.€Harlan€opined€that€the€two€children€died€at€some€time€between€6:00€a.m.€andÏ12:00€noon€on€June€6th,€1995.ÌÌà ` àIn€her€defense,€the€appellant€introduced€proof€to€establish€that€she€sufferedÏfrom€Bipolar€Disorder/manic€depression€and€that€the€deaths€of€her€children€were€anÏaccident.€€Eddie€and€Janie€Bain,€the€appellantððs€parents,€testified€that€the€appellantÐ X9P28 Ðhad€both€academic€and€social€problems€in€school€and€did€not€want€to€associate€withÏother€people.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Her€mother€testified€that€the€appellant,€at€age€six,€beganÐ ÔÌ Ðexperiencing€sleep€disorders€where€she€would€not€sleep€for€two€to€three€days,Ïultimately€going€into€such€a€deep€sleep€that€she€could€not€be€awakened.€€TheÏappellant€also€complained€of€visual€and€auditory€hallucinations.€€Despite€theseÏoccurrences,€neither€Mr.€nor€Mrs.€Bain€sought€medical€or€psychological€treatmentÏfor€their€daughter.€€Mrs.€Bain€confirmed€that€the€appellant€ð ðself„medicatedðð€herselfÏwith€an€over„the„counter€stimulant,€MaxAlert.€€Both€parents€admitted€that€they€wouldÏhave€gladly€watched€the€appellantððs€children€had€the€appellant€asked.€€Despite€theÏappellantððs€problems€as€a€teenager,€Mrs.€Bain€thought€that€the€appellant€was€fullyÏcapable€of€taking€care€of€her€children.€€After€the€death€of€her€children,€the€appellantÏattempted€suicide.€€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Bain€placed€their€daughter€under€a€ð ðsuicide€watch,ððÏwhere€they€tried€to€watch€her€at€all€times.€€However,€Mrs.€Bain€admitted€that€theÏappellant€had€recently€left€the€house€at€three€oððclock€in€the€morning€to€visit€MicahÏMajors.€€€Soon€thereafter,€her€mother€took€her€daughter€to€see€Dr.€Terry€Holmes,€aÏpsychiatrist€in€McMinnville.€€ÌÌà ` àDr.€Holmes€testified€that,€based€upon€his€evaluation€of€the€appellant€inÏAugust,€1995,€she€suffered€from€ð ðBipolar€Disorder,ðð€marked€by€periods€ofÏdepression€and€mania,€which€in€her€case€included€a€sleep€disorder.€He€stated€that€ÌÓÓà8 ` àBipolar€mania€are€very€uncomfortable€people.€€They€have€lots€and€lotsÏof€agitation,€and€they€tend€to€say,€ððDoctor,€my€nerves€are€killing€me.ððÏYou€can€have€several€kinds€of€manifestations€of€psychosis€which€isÏloosely€defined€as€loss€of€contact€with€reality;€hallucinations.€.€.€.€€Also,Ïthere€is€a€disturbance€with€the€efficiency€of€thought.€.€.€.€Logic€andÏreasoning€are€compromised€to€a€great€extent.€€People€donððt€thinkÏbefore€they€act.€.€.€.€Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÓÓÌà ` àDuring€cross„examination,€Dr.€Holmes,€in€rejecting€the€contention€that€theÏappellant€was€insane,€stated,€ÌÓÓÐ ¦6ž/5 Ðà8 ` àThis€lady€definitely€knows€the€difference€between€right€and€wrong.€€MyÏpoint€is€she€simply€didnððt€think.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` à.€.€.€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àI€think€she€thought€[that€leaving€her€children€in€the€locked€car]€was€aÏreasonable€thing€to€do€at€the€time,€if€she€thought€at€all.€€And€I€donððtÏthink€she€thought€about€it€.€.€.€she€has€remarkable€impairments€in€[herÏconcentration].Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` à.€.€.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` à[S]he€may€have,€from€time€to€time,€thought€about€it,€but€her€mind€wentÏquickly€on€to€other€things.€€This€is€a€woman€who€is€pretty€driven€to€doÏwhatever€it€was€she€was€doing€upstairs.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓÌà ` àThe€appellant,€taking€the€stand€on€her€own€behalf,€testified€that€she€would€notÏmake€any€excuses€for€what€had€happened€to€her€children.€€Despite€making€thisÏstatement,€the€appellant€testified€that€she€did€not€see€any€danger€in€leaving€herÏthirteen€month€old€and€twenty„three€month€old€sons€in€her€locked€car€for€over€nineÏhours€while€she€visited€with€Micah€Majors€in€his€motel€room.€€Despite€the€previousÏtestimony€of€the€four€young€men€that€were€in€the€motel€room€that€night,€theÏappellant€claimed€that€ð ð[she]€checked€on€the€kids€four€to€five€times.ðð€€However,€sheÏcould€not€explain€why€she€did€not€tell€the€others€that€her€children€were€in€her€car€orÏthat€she€needed€to€check€on€them.€ÌÌà ` àThe€State€called,€as€a€rebuttal€witness,€Pam€Rhea,€who€had€babysat€theÏappellantððs€children€from€August€1994€until€March€1995.€€Ms.€Rhea€testified€that,Ïduring€the€period€that€she€watched€the€appellantððs€children,€the€appellant€workedÏsecond€shift€at€Calsonic.€€The€appellant€would€drop€off€the€children€at€2:30€p.m.€andÏwould€pick€them€up€at€1:00€a.m.€€On€February€20,€1995,€the€appellant€advised€Ms.ÏRhea€that€she€had€been€terminated€from€Calsonic.€€Despite€the€appellantððsÏunemployment,€Ms.€Rhea€continued€to€care€for€the€appellantððs€children€throughoutÏMarch€1995.€€Ms.€Rhea€recalled€one€incident,€on€March€22,€where€the€appellantÏdropped€her€children€off€at€1:00€a.m.€and€did€not€return€for€them€until€the€followingÏmorning€at€2:00€a.m.€(approximately€twenty„five€hours).€€During€the€appellantððsÏunexplained€absence,€she€never€called€Ms.€Rhea€to€check€on€her€children.€€WhenÏthe€appellant€finally€returned€for€her€children,€she€informed€Ms.€Rhea€that€she€hadÐ X9P28 Ðbeen€out€with€some€friends€and€that€she€needed€to€go€somewhere€and€sober€upÏbefore€picking€up€the€children.ÌÌà ` àBased€upon€this€evidence,€the€jury€returned€guilty€verdicts€as€to€two€counts€ofÏaggravated€child€abuse.ÌÌÌà@˜˜#®àò òI.€€Motion€to€Suppressó óˆÐ œ”  ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€admitting€into€evidence€(1)Ïthe€appellantððs€statement€to€Agent€Gwyn,€(2)€the€seizure€of€a€blood€sample€from€theÏappellantððs€person€and€the€subsequent€results€of€the€blood€alcohol€test,€and€(3)€theÏseizure€of€her€vehicle€and€its€contents.€€Additionally,€the€appellant€asserts€that,Ïbecause€the€trial€court€failed€to€enter€sufficient€findings€of€facts€upon€denying€herÏmotion€to€suppress,€this€court€must€exercise€an€independent€òòde€novoóó€review€€of€theÐ < 4 Ðconstitutional€questions€presented.ÌÌà@——®àò òA.€€Standard€of€Appellate€Reviewó óˆÐ ¤%œ" ÐÌà ` àThe€evidence€presented€in€support€of€motions€to€suppress€are€generallyÏdetermined€by€the€facts€and€circumstances€surrounding€the€challenged€event.€€InÏother€words,€such€issues€are€factually€driven.€€Where€resolution€of€factual€issues€areÏcentral€to€the€determinations€made€by€the€trial€court,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12(e)Ïrequires€the€trial€court€to€state€its€essential€findings€on€the€record.€€In€the€caseÏbefore€us,€the€trial€court€made€no€specific€oral€or€written€findings€of€fact.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РD2<+0 ЇÌà ` àBecause€of€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€articulate€its€findings€on€the€record,€theÏappellant€asks€this€court€to€become€the€finders€of€fact,€the€arbitrators€of€credibility,Ïand€the€assessors€of€the€evidence.€€However,€this€court€lacks€the€jurisdiction€to€doÏso.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€16„5„108€(1994).€€Thus,€we€are€constrained€in€reviewing,€òòdeÐ 80 Ðnovoóó,€the€application€of€the€law€to€the€facts,€while€we€accredit€the€ruling€of€the€trialÐ   Ðcourt,€if€such€ruling€is€supported€by€the€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Bridgesóó,€963Ð ØÐ  ÐS.W.2d€487,€490€(Tenn.€1997).€€òòSee€alsoóó€€òòOrnelas€v.€United€Statesóó,€517€U.S.€690,Ð ¤œ  Ð699,€116€S.Ct.€1657,€1663€(1996)€(ð ða€reviewing€court€should€take€care€both€toÏreview€findings€of€historical€fact€òòonly€for€clear€erroróó€and€to€give€due€weight€toÐ <4 Ðinferences€drawn€from€those€facts€by€resident€judges€.€.€.€.ðð).€€If€the€trial€courtððsÏfindings€of€fact€are€not€precise€and€cannot€be€òòsubstantially€supplementedóó€by€theÐ ÔÌ Ðrecord,€an€appellate€court€is€prevented€from€completing€any€meaningful€review€ofÏthe€law€applicable€to€those€pertinent€facts.€€However,€we€find€that€the€evidenceÏintroduced€at€the€suppression€hearings,€relative€to€the€issues€now€before€us,€wasÏsufficiently€developed.׃F×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€Accordingly,€we€proceed€with€a€òòde€novoóó€review€of€the€lawÐ "ü Ðapplicable€to€the€facts€viewed€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State.ÌÌà@®àò òB.€€Appellantððs€Statement€to€Agent€Gwynó óˆÐ l'd $ ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€contends€that€her€statement€to€Agent€Gwyn€was€obtained€inÏviolation€of€her€state€and€federal€constitutional€rights.€€Specifically,€she€asserts€thatÏshe€was€never€provided€her€òòMirandaóó€warnings€and€that€her€statement€resulted€fromÐ ¨. ', Ðan€unlawful€detention.€€òòSee€generallyóó€òòMiranda€v.€Arizonaóó,€384€U.S.€436,€444,€86Ð t0l). ÐS.Ct.€1602,€1612€(1966);€òòFlorida€v.€Royeróó,€460€U.S.€491,€103€S.Ct.€1319€(1993).€€Ð  ЀÌà ` àThe€Fifth€Amendment€protection€against€self„incrimination€ð ð€privileges€aÏperson€not€to€answer€official€questions€put€to€him€in€any€proceeding,€civil€or€criminal,Ïwhere€the€answers€might€incriminate€him€in€future€criminal€proceedings.ðð€€òòMinnesotaÐ 80 Ðv.€Murphyóó,€465€U.S.€420,€426,€104€S.Ct.€1136,€1141€(1984).€€In€fact,€the€statementsÐ ü  Ðof€an€accused€made€during€the€course€of€custodial€interrogation€are€inadmissible€asÏevidence€unless€the€State€establishes€that€the€accused€was€advised€of€certainÏconstitutional€rights€and€waived€those€rights.€€òòState€v.€Andersonóó,€937€S.W.2d€851,Ð h` Ð853€(Tenn.€1996).€€Although€we€acknowledge€an€individualððs€constitutional€rightÏagainst€self„incrimination€and€right€to€be€forewarned€of€these€rights,€we€likewiseÏrecognize€that€voluntary€statements,€even€if€incriminating,€are€not€barred€by€the€FifthÏAmendment.€€òòSeeóó€òòMiranda€v.€Arizonaóó,€384€U.S.€at€436,€86€S.Ct.€at€1602;€òòsee€alsoóóÐ ˜ ÐòòCalifornia€v.€Beheleróó,€463€U.S.€1121,€103€S.Ct.€3517€(1983);€€òòOregon€v.€Mathiasonóó,Ð d\ Ð429€U.S.€492,€97€S.Ct.€€711€(1977);€€òòBeckwith€v.€United€Statesóó,€425€U.S.€341,€96Ð 0 ( ÐS.Ct.€1612€(1976).€€It€is€only€ð ðwhen€an€individual€is€taken€into€custody€or€otherwiseÏdeprived€of€his€freedom€by€the€authorities€in€any€significant€way€and€is€subjected€toÏquestioning€[that]€the€privilege€against€self„incrimination€is€jeopardizedðð€requiring€theÏauthorities€to€adequately€advise€the€individual€of€his€constitutional€protections.€ÏòòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€at€444,€86€S.Ct.€at€1612.€€In€other€words,€before€òòMirandaóóÐ ,)$"& Ðwarnings€are€required,€the€accused€must€be€the€subject€of€custodial€interrogation.€ÏòòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€at€444,€86€S.Ct.€at€1612.€Ð Ä,¼%* ÐÌà ` àIn€determining€whether€an€individual€is€ð ðin€custodyðð€as€contemplated€byÏòòMirandaóó,€it€is€incumbent€upon€the€reviewing€court€to€decide€whether,€ð ðunder€theÐ (2 +0 Ðtotality€of€circumstances,€a€reasonable€person€in€the€suspectððs€position€wouldÏconsider€himself€or€herself€deprived€of€freedom€of€movement€to€a€degree€associatedÏwith€formal€arrest.ðð€€òòAndersonóó,€937€S.W.2d€at€855.€€Factors€relevant€to€thisÐ Œ7„06 Ðdetermination€include,€but€are€not€limited€to€the€following:Ð X9P28 Ðà8 ` àÓÓðð€the€time€and€location€of€the€interrogationÐ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€duration€and€character€of€the€questioningÐîæ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€officerððs€tone€of€voice€and€general€demeanorÐÔÌ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€suspectððs€method€of€transportation€to€the€place€of€€€€€questioning;к ²` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€number€of€police€officers€presentР ˜` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€any€limitation€on€movement€or€other€form€of€restraint€imposed€on€€€Ð † ~ Ðthe€suspect€during€the€interrogation;Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€any€interactions€between€the€officer€and€the€suspectÐR J` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€suspectððs€verbal€or€nonverbal€responsesÐ80` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€extent€to€which€the€suspect€is€confronted€with€the€law€€€€Ð   Ðenforcement€officerððs€suspicions€or€evidence€of€guiltÐ ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àðð€the€extent€to€which€the€suspect€is€made€aware€that€he€or€she€is€€€€Ð êâ  Ðfree€to€refrain€from€answering€questions€or€to€end€the€interview€at€€€€Ïwill.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÓÓÌòòAndersonóó,€937€S.W.2d€at€855€(citations€omitted).€€Ð h` ÐÌà ` àConsidering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€now€before€us,€we€hold€that€theÏevidence,€taken€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€supports€a€conclusion€thatÏthe€appellant€was€not€in€custody€when€she€gave€her€statement€to€Agent€Gwyn.€€TheÏappellant€was€already€sitting€in€the€physiciansðð€lounge€when€approached€by€AgentÏGwyn€and€she€made€no€attempt€to€leave.€€Agent€Gwyn€repeatedly€told€the€appellantÏthat€she€was€not€under€arrest€and€that€she€was€free€to€leave€at€any€time.€€Indeed,€atÏthe€time€of€the€interview,€Agent€Gwyn€was€not€certain€that€the€deaths€of€the€childrenÏwere€the€result€of€criminal€conduct.€€€At€no€time€did€Gwyn€threaten€or€coerce€theÏappellant€into€providing€a€statement.€€In€fact,€the€appellant€agreed€to€talk€with€Gwyn,Ïand€was€responsive€to€the€questions€posed€to€her.€€Although€defense€witnessesÏtestified€that€they€were€prevented€from€entering€the€physiciansðð€lounge€by€deputiesÏduring€the€interview,€they€were€only€prevented€from€entering€pursuant€to€theÏappellantððs€request€that€she€did€not€wish€to€see€any€family€members.€€Under€theseÏcircumstances,€a€reasonable€person€in€the€appellantððs€position€would€not€haveÏconsidered€himself€or€herself€deprived€of€freedom€of€movement€to€a€degreeÏassociated€with€formal€arrest.€€Therefore,€the€appellantððs€statement€did€not€ariseÏfrom€a€custodial€environment€with€the€attendant€entitlement€to€òòMirandaóó€warnings.€Ð À5¸.4 ÐMoreover,€despite€the€apparent€emotional€state€of€the€appellant€at€the€time€of€theÏinterview,€the€evidence€at€the€suppression€hearing€indicates€that€the€appellantððsÐ X9P28 Ðresponses€were€voluntary.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ÉÉ®àò òC.€€Seizure€of€the€Blood€Sampleó óˆÐ   ˜ ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€also€contests€the€seizure€of€the€blood€sample€taken€from€herÏperson€and€the€ensuing€results€of€the€blood€alcohol€tests€performed€on€that€sample.€€Ï€The€appellantððs€argument€is€twofold.€€First,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€bloodÏsample€was€seized€as€a€result€of€her€unlawfully€obtained€statement,€and€thus,Ïshould€have€been€excluded€under€the€ð ðfruit€of€the€poisonous€tree€doctrine.ðð€€As€weÏhave€concluded€that€the€appellantððs€statement€was€not€obtained€in€€violation€of€anyÏof€her€constitutional€rights,€this€claim€is€without€merit.€€Second,€the€appellantÏcontends€that€the€blood€sample€was€taken€without€her€consent€and€was€the€effectiveÏresult€of€coercive€police€tactics.€€We€disagree.ÌÌà ` à€The€withdrawal€of€blood€from€a€subject€for€purposes€of€serological€testing€forÏthe€presence€of€alcohol€or€drugs€constitutes€a€search€within€the€constraints€of€theÏFourth€Amendment€and,€therefore,€a€search€warrant€is€generally€required.€€òòSeeóó€Ð Ô#Ì  ÐòòSchmerber€v.€Californiaóó,€384€U.S.€757,€767„72,€86€S.Ct.€1826,€1833„37€(1966);€òòseeÐ  %˜" Ðalsoóó€òòState€v.€Jacksonóó,€889€S.W.2d€219,€221€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€òòperm.€toÐ l'd $ Ðappeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1994).€€Unless€it€œfalls›€within€a€specifically€established€andÐ 8)0"& Ðwell„delineated€exception,€a€search€conducted€without€a€warrant€is€òòper€seóóÐ +ü#( Ðunreasonable.€€òòSchneckloth€v.€Bustamonteóó,€412€U.S.€218,€219,€93€S.Ct.€2041,€2043Ð Ô,Ì%* Ð(1973)€(citations€omitted).€€ð ðOne€of€the€specifically€established€exceptions€to€both€aÏwarrant€and€probable€cause€is€a€search€that€is€conducted€pursuant€to€a€voluntarilyÏgiven€consent.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€219,€93€S.Ct.€at€2043„2044€(citations€omitted);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòStateÐ 820+0 Ðv.€Bartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€227,€230€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€burden€of€proof€rests€upon€theÐ 4ü,2 ÐState€to€show,€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€that€the€consent€to€aÏwarrantless€search€was€given€freely€and€voluntarily.€€òòSchnecklothóó,€412€U.S.€at€248„Ð œ7”06 Ð49,€93€S.Ct.€at€2059;€òòBumper€v.€North€Carolinaóó,€391€U.S.€543,€548,€88€S.Ct.€1788,Ð h9`28 Ð1792€(1968);€òòBartramóó,€925€S.W.2d€at€230.€€The€question€of€whether€the€appellantÐ  Ðvoluntarily€consented€to€the€search€is€a€question€of€fact€which€focuses€upon€theÏtotality€of€the€circumstances.€€òòSchnecklothóó,€412€U.S.€at€248„249,€93€S.Ct.€at€2059.Ð   ˜ ÐÌà ` àIn€the€present€case,€the€testimony€revealed€that,€upon€observing€an€odor€ofÏalcohol€on€the€appellant,€Agent€Gwyn€requested€that€the€appellant€provide€a€bloodÏsample.€€The€appellant€agreed€on€the€condition€that€ð ðyou€stick€me€one€time€and€takeÏone€vial€of€blood.ðð€€The€appellant€ð ðput€her€arm€out€there;€she€voluntarily€gave€it.€ÏAnd,€when€the€nurse€stuck€the€needle€in€there,€she€showed€no€signs€that€it€hurt€orÏanything.ðð€€A€trial€courtððs€finding€that€a€search€is€consensual€is€presumed€correct€andÏis€conclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€ruling.€€òòStateÐ ø Ðv.€Woodsóó,€806€S.W.2d€205,€208€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,Ð ÌÄ Ð(Tenn.€1991),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€502€U.S.€1079,€112€S.Ct.€986€(1992);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.Ð ˜ ÐDoughertyóó,€930€S.W.2d€85,€86€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).€€We€conclude€that€theÐ d\ Ðevidence€in€the€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€finding.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@ææ®àò òD.€€Search€of€the€Appellantððs€Vehicleó óˆÐ ”%Œ" ÐÌà ` àIn€her€final€suppression€issue,€the€appellant€asserts€that€the€warrantlessÏseizure€of€her€vehicle€and€the€subsequent€search€and€seizure€of€its€contents€wereÏunlawful.€€Specifically,€the€appellant€adopts€her€argument€previously€relied€upon€forÏsuppression€of€the€blood€sample:€that€the€search€was€the€product€of€illegallyÏobtained€statements.€€Again,€this€claim€is€without€merit€as€we€have€determined€theÏappellantððs€statement€to€be€voluntarily€given.€€The€appellant€also€asserts€that€theÏsearch€was€unlawful€because€the€search€was€conducted€without€a€warrant€and€noÏwarrant€exception€was€presented€by€the€State€to€justify€the€search.ÌÌÐ d9\28 Ðà ` àThe€record€before€this€court€reveals€that,€after€obtaining€the€appellantððsÏstatement,€probable€cause€existed€for€Agent€Gwyn€to€search€the€vehicle€forÏð ðproperty€that€constitutes€evidence€of€the€commission€of€a€criminal€offense.ðð€€òòSeeóóÐ   ˜ ÐTenn.R.Crim.P.€41(b)(1).€€€At€that€time,€the€appellantððs€vehicle€was€parked€outsideÏthe€emergency€room€entrance€to€the€hospital.€€The€vehicle€was€unlocked€and€theÏwindows€were€rolled€down.€€Agent€Gwyn€instructed€officers€to€secure€the€vehicleÏwith€crime€scene€tape.€€However,€because€a€crowd€of€people€were€gathering€aroundÏthe€vehicle€and€because€the€vehicle€was€blocking€the€emergency€entrance,€he€laterÏmade€arrangements€for€the€vehicle€to€be€moved€to€the€McMinnville€PoliceÏDepartment€impound€lot.€€The€actual€search€of€the€vehicle€was€conducted€one€orÏtwo€days€later€without€a€warrant,€revealing€a€one„third€full€750€milliliter€bottle€ofÏwhiskey.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€appellantððs€motion€to€reconsider€the€search€of€theÏvehicle,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€œð ðthe›€exigencies€did,€based€upon€the€proof€IÏheard,€permit€[the€vehicle]€to€be€searched€in€the€fashion€and€way€it€was.ðð€€ÌÌà ` àAs€previously€stated,€the€analysis€of€any€warrantless€search€and€seizureÏbegins€with€the€proposition€that€such€searches€are€òòper€seóó€unreasonable€under€theÐ È#À  ÐFourth€Amendment,€unless€it€falls€within€a€specifically€delineated€exception.€ÏòòSchnecklothóó,€412€U.S.€at€219,€93€S.Ct.€€at€2043€(citations€omitted).€€Our€supremeÐ d'\ $ Ðcourt€has€recognized€that€a€warrantless€search€of€a€vehicle€in€a€public€place,€in€theÏaftermath€of€a€crime,€and€when€there€is€probable€cause€to€believe€the€vehicleÏcontains€items€that€are€subject€to€seizure,€is€entitled€to€a€conclusive€presumption€ofÏexigency,€€permitting€the€warrantless€search,€even€absent€actual€likelihood€of€risk€ofÏdelay€in€obtaining€€a€warrant.€€òòState€v.€Leveyeóó,€796€S.W.2d€948,€952€(Tenn.€1990)Ð `0X). Ð(adopting€the€rule€of€òòCalifornia€v.€Carneyóó,€471€U.S.€386,€105€S.Ct.€2066€(1985)).€€If€aÐ ,2$+0 Ðwarrantless€search€at€the€scene€is€permissible,€then€the€police€may€seize€the€vehicleÏand€later€conduct€the€search€at€the€station.€€òòSeeóó€€òòFlorida€v.€Myersóó,€466€U.S.€380,Ð Ä5¼.4 Ð182,€104€S.Ct.€1852,€1853€(1984);€€òòMichigan€v.€Thomasóó,€458€U.S.€259,€261,€102Ð 7ˆ06 ÐS.Ct.€3079,€3080€(1982).€€In€the€present€case,€Agent€Gwyn€was€aware€that€theÐ \9T28 Ðappellant€had€brought€her€two€children€to€the€emergency€room€in€her€vehicle.€€AfterÏinterviewing€the€appellant,€he€determined€that€the€vehicle€was€the€scene€of€theÏcrime€and€probable€cause€existed€to€believe€that€the€vehicle€contained€evidence€ofÏthat€crime.€€Thus,€a€warrantless€search€of€the€vehicle€was€permissible.€€Moreover,Ïdue€to€the€location€of€the€vehicle€and€the€crowd€of€people€gathering€around€it,€AgentÏGwyn€was€justified€in€securing€and€transporting€the€vehicle€to€the€impound€lot.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€appellant€additionally€argues€that€the€delay€in€conducting€the€search€ofÏthe€vehicle€is€òòper€seóó€unreasonable.€€We€disagree.€€There€is€no€requirement€that€theÐ h` Ðwarrantless€search€of€the€vehicle€occur€contemporaneously€with€its€lawful€seizure.€ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Johnsóó,€469€U.S.€478,€484,€105€S.Ct.€881,€885€(1985)€(citing€òòTexasÐ ü Ðv.€Whiteóó,€423€U.S.€67,€68,€96€S.Ct.€304,€305€(1975)€(òòper€curiumóó);€òòChambers€v.Ð ÐÈ ÐMaroneyóó,€399€U.S.€42,€52,€90€S.Ct.€1975,€1981€(1970)).€€The€ð ðjustification€toÐ  ˜ Ðconduct€such€a€warrantless€search€òòdoes€notóó€vanish€once€the€car€has€beenÐ ld Ðimmobilized.ðð€€òòThomasóó,€458€U.S.€at€261,€102€S.Ct.€at€3081.€€A€vehicle€lawfully€inÐ 8 0 Ðpolice€custody€may€be€searched€on€the€basis€of€probable€cause€to€believe€that€itÏcontains€contraband,€and€there€is€no€requirement€of€exigent€circumstances€to€justifyÏsuch€a€warrantless€search.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Johnsóó,€469€U.S.€at€484,€105€S.Ct.€atÐ œ%”" Ð885€(citations€omitted).€€Although€police€officers€may€not€indefinitely€retainÏpossession€of€a€vehicle€and€its€contents€before€they€complete€a€vehicle€search,€weÏconclude€that€a€search€conducted€within€two€days€of€the€lawful€seizure€is€notÏunreasonable€and€is€consistent€with€precedent€involving€searches€of€impoundedÏvehicles.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„6„107€(1990)€(ð ð[a]€search€warrant€shall€beÐ ˜.', Ðexecuted€and€returned€to€the€magistrate€by€whom€it€was€issued€within€five€(5)€daysÏafter€its€date,€after€which€time,€unless€executed,€it€is€void.ðð)€€This€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌÌÐ `9X28 Ðà@ ®àò òII.€€Constitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401€and€ðð€39„15„402ó óˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€contends€that€ð ðTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401€(child€abuse)€andÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402€(aggravated€child€abuse)€are€unconstitutionally€vagueÏon€their€face.ðð€€Specifically,€she€asserts€that€ð ðthe€phrases€ððinflict€injuryðð€andÏððadversely€affect€the€childððs€health€and€welfareðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401€andÏððact€of€abuseðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402€are€so€vague€that€persons€ofÏcommon€intelligence€must€necessarily€guess€at€their€meaning€and€differ€as€to€theirÏapplication.ðð€€Alternatively,€she€argues€that,€even€if€the€statutes€are€constitutional€onÏtheir€face,€they€have€been€unconstitutionally€applied€under€the€facts€of€the€presentÏcase.ÌÌà ` àA€basic€principle€of€due€process€is€that€an€enactment€whose€prohibitions€areÏnot€sufficiently€or€clearly€defined€is€void€for€vagueness.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Maladyóó,€No.€Ð ph Ð02C01„9506„CR„00166€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Jul.€26,€1996).€€However,€dueÏprocess€does€not€require€that€a€statute€be€drafted€with€unequivocal€certainty.€€òòStateÐ " Ðv.€McDonaldóó,€534€S.W.2d€650,€651€(Tenn.€1976),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€425€U.S.€955,€96Ð Ô#Ì  ÐS.Ct.€1733€(1976).€€All€that€is€required€is€that€the€law€give€sufficient€warning€so€thatÏmen€may€conduct€themselves€so€as€to€avoid€that€which€is€forbidden.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.Ð l'd $ ÐBaghdadióó,€No.€03C01„9403„CR„00112€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€Nov.€27,Ð 8)0"& Ð1995),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€May€13,€1996)€(citing€òòRose€v.€Lockeóó,€423Ð +ü#( ÐU.S.€48,€50,€96€S.Ct.€243,€244€(1976)).€€ÌÌà ` àWhen€reviewing€a€statute€for€a€possible€constitutional€infirmity,€we€areÏrequired€to€indulge€every€presumption€and€resolve€every€doubt€in€favor€of€theÏconstitutionality€of€the€statute.€€òòPetition€of€Bursonóó,€909€S.W.2d€768,€775€(Tenn.Ð 4ø,2 Ð1995)€(citation€omitted).€€Nevertheless,€to€survive€a€constitutional€challenge€forÏvagueness,€ð ð[a€penal]€statute€must€ððgive€the€person€of€ordinary€intelligence€aÏreasonable€opportunity€to€know€what€is€prohibited,€so€that€he€may€act€accordingly.ðððð€Ð d9\28 ÐòòState€v.€Lakatosóó,€900€S.W.2d€699,€701€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€òòperm.€to€appealÐ  Ðdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1995)€(citing€òòGrayned€v.€City€of€Rockfordóó,€408€U.S.€104,€108,€92Ð ÔÌ ÐS.Ct.€2294,€2298€(1972)).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòKolender€v.€Lawsonóó,€461€U.S.€352,€357,€103Ð   ˜ ÐS.Ct.€1855,€1858€(1983);€òòDavis„Kidd€Booksellers,€Inc.€v.€McWherteróó,€866€S.W.2dÐ l d Ð520,€532€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Lyonsóó,€802€S.W.2d€590,€591€(Tenn.€1990).€€ð ðNo€oneÐ 80 Ðmay€be€required€at€peril€of€life,€liberty,€or€property€to€speculate€as€to€the€meaning€ofÏpenal€statutes.€€All€are€entitled€to€be€informed€as€to€what€the€state€commands€orÏforbids.ðð€€òòLanzetta€v.€State€of€New€Jerseyóó,€306€U.S.€451,€453,€59€S.Ct.€618,€619Ð œ”  Ð(1939).€€Moreover,€the€statute€should€not€encourage€arbitrary€or€discriminatoryÏenforcement.€€òòLakatosóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€701.€€òòSee€alsoóó€€òòKolenderóó,€461€U.S.€at€357,Ð 4, Ð103€S.Ct.€at€1858;€òòDavis„Kiddóó,€866€S.W.2d€at€532;€òòLyonsóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€591.€Ð ø ÐFinally,€the€standard€of€certainty€required€in€criminal€statutes€is€generally€moreÏexacting€than€in€noncriminal€statutes.€€òòLeech€v.€American€Booksellers€Assððn,€Inc.óó,Ð ˜ Ð582€S.W.2d€738,€746€(Tenn.€1979)€(citation€omitted).ÌÌà ` àThe€challenged€statutes€read,€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓò òà8 ` àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401.€€Child€Abuse€and€neglect.ó 󀄄€(a)€AnyÐ È#À  Ðperson€who€knowingly€other€than€by€accidental€means,€treats€a€childÏunder€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age€in€such€a€manner€as€to€òòinflict€injuryóó€orÐ š%’" Ðneglects€such€a€child€so€as€to€òòadversely€affect€the€childððs€health€andÐ €&x# Ðwelfareóó€is€guilty€of€a€Class€A€misdemeanor€provided,€that€if€the€abusedÐ f'^ $ Ðchild€is€six€(6)€years€of€age€or€less,€the€penalty€is€a€class€D€felony.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌò òà8 ` àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402.€€Aggravated€child€abuse.ó 󀄄€(a)€AÐ *#' Ðperson€is€guilty€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse€who€commitsÏthe€offense€of€child€abuse€as€defined€in€ðð€39„15„401€and;€(1)€The€òòactÐ ê+â$) Ðof€abuseóó€results€in€serious€bodily€injury€to€the€child.ÐÐ,È%*` ü!` ü! ÐÓÓÌ(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà ` àAgain,€the€appellant€challenges€Tennesseeððs€child€abuse€statute€on€theÏgrounds€that€the€phrases€ð ðinflict€injuryðð€and€ð ðadversely€affect€the€childððs€health€andÏwelfareðð€are€unconstitutionally€void€for€vagueness.€€Specifically,€she€asserts€that€theÏterm€ð ðinjuryðð€ð ðcould€include€physical,€emotional€or€pecuniary€injury.€.€.€.€€Thus,€theÏphrase€ððinflict€injuryðð€is€entirely€subjective€and€does€not€give€a€person€of€commonÐ J:B39 Ðintelligence€fair€warning€or€reasonable€notice€of€what€conduct€is€prohibited.ðð€€ThisÏsame€argument€was€rejected€by€a€panel€of€this€court€in€òòState€v.€Baghdadióó,€No.Ð ÔÌ Ð03C01„9403„CR„00112.€€In€òòBaghdadióó,€Judge€Tipton,€writing€on€behalf€of€aÐ   ˜ Ðunanimous€panel€of€this€court,€held€that€ð ð[w]e€do€not€judge€the€constitutionality€of€aÏstatute€by€theorizing€all€of€its€possible€applications€to€determine€if€any€application€ofÏthe€statute€could€be€unconstitutional.ðð€€Moreover,€because€ð ða€statute€may€prohibitÏsome€conduct€with€sufficient€clarity,€although€it€may€be€vague€if€applied€to€otherÏconduct,€.€.€.€a€defendant€may€be€limited€to€challenging€only€his€own€conduct€underÏthe€statute.ðð€òòBaghdadióó,€No.€03C01„9403„CR„00112.€€ð ðInjuryðð€as€contemplated€withinÐ h` Ðthe€meaning€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401(a),€encompasses€ð ðany€reasonableÏdefinition€of€the€term.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Clearly,€bodily€€injury€resulting€in€death€is€necessarilyÐ ø Ðincluded€within€this€definition.€€This€challenge€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àThe€appellant€also€contends€that€the€challenged€statute€fails€to€define€whatÏconduct€may€ð ðadversely€affect€the€childððs€health€and€welfare.ðð€€€Again,€we€find€herÏclaim€to€be€without€merit.€€In€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€C.C.A.€No.€1153€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€atÐ ü!ô ÐKnoxville,€Sept.€20,€1990),€a€panel€of€this€court€held€that€ð ð[t]he€neglect€of€ðða€child€soÏas€to€adversely€affect€its€health€and€welfareðð€presents€a€plain€and€certain€meaning.€ÏThe€warning€of€the€prohibited€conduct€is€.€.€.€sufficiently€clear.ðð€€We€are€in€accordÏwith€the€previous€rulings€of€this€court.€This€issue€is€likewise€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àFinally,€the€appellant€claims€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402(a)(1)€and€(2)Ïonly€defines€as€an€offense€an€ð ðact€of€abuse,ðð€whereas,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„¼401€refers€to€both€ð ðabuseðð€and€ð ðneglect.ðð€€Accordingly,€she€argues€that€ð ðit€is€unclearÏwhether€the€neglect€that€adversely€affects€the€childððs€health€and€welfare€that€resultsÏin€serious€bodily€injury€constitutes€aggravated€child€abuse€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„402(a)(1).ðð€€In€other€words,€the€appellant€argues€that€ð ð[l]eaving€a€childÏunattended€in€a€car€is€possibly€child€neglect€but€it€may€not€be€an€affirmative€ððact€ofÏabuse.ðððð€€Ð X9P28 Їà ` àThis€courtððs€primary€goal€in€interpreting€statutes€is€to€determine€the€legislativeÏintent€behind€the€statute.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€893€S.W.2d€908,€917€(Tenn.€1994),€òòrehððgÐ ÔÌ Ðdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1995),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€516€U.S.€829,€116€S.Ct.€99€(1995).€€In€doing€so,Ð   ˜ Ðwe€look€first€to€the€statute€itself€and€rely€upon€the€plain€meaning€of€the€language€andÏterms€used.€€òòIdóó.€€The€challenged€statute€clearly,€from€its€plain€language,€includes€asÐ 80 Ðacts€of€aggravated€child€abuse€any€offense€defined€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„¼401(a)€which€results€in€serious€bodily€injury,€as€in€the€present€case,€òòoróó€is€committedÐ ÐÈ  Ðwith€a€deadly€weapon.€€€òòCf.óó€òòCommentsóó,€Tennessee€Attorneys€Memo€LegislationÐ œ”  ÐService,€p.25€(June€16,€1998).€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401€includes€both€childÏabuse€and€child€neglect.€€Although€this€statute€could€have€been€drafted€with€greaterÏprecision,€this€alone€does€not€invalidate€the€statute€under€the€vagueness€doctrine.€ÏòòLyonsóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€592.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Lunatióó,€665€S.W.2d€739€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð ÐÈ ÐApp.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1983),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€466€U.S.€938,€104€S.Ct.Ð œ” Ð1913€(1984).€€The€appellant€is€correct€in€her€assertion€that€ð ðthis€is€not€an€academicÏdebate.ðð€€The€statute€in€question€is€clear€and€unambiguous€and€it€is€our€duty€toÏconstrue€it€as€it€was€written€by€the€General€Assembly,€and€not€as€the€appellantÏdesires.€€òòGabel€v.€Lermaóó,€812€S.W.2d€580,€583€(Tenn.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appealÐ Ì#Ä  Ðdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1990)€(citing€òòJackson€v.€Jacksonóó,€210€S.W.2d€332€(1948)).€€WeÐ ˜%" Ðremain€mindful€that€penal€statutes€are€to€be€construed€according€to€the€fair€import€ofÏtheir€terms,€to€promote€justice,€and€to€effect€the€objective€of€the€criminal€code.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„104€(1991).€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€a€commonÏsense€reading€of€the€challenged€provision€fails€to€support€the€appellantððs€argument.€ÏThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@N N ®àò òIII.€€Aggravated€Child€Abuse€as€Lesser€Included€Offenseó óˆÐ ø3ð,2 ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€was€indicted€and€charged€with€two€counts€of€first€degreeÏmurder€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„202(a)(4)€(1994€Supp.),€which€defines€firstÐ h9`28 Ðdegree€murder€as€the€ð ðreckless€killing€of€a€child€less€than€sixteen€years€of€age,€if€theÏchildððs€death€results€from€aggravated€child€abuse,€as€defined€by€ðð€39„15„402,Ïcommitted€by€the€defendant€against€the€child.ðð€€The€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€asÏto€the€elements€of€this€offense€and€as€to€the€elements€of€the€offense€of€aggravatedÏchild€abuse€as€defined€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402.€€The€jury€returned€a€verdictÏof€not€guilty€as€to€the€two€counts€of€first€degree€murder.€€However,€they€did€find€theÏappellant€guilty€of€two€counts€of€aggravated€child€abuse€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„402.ÌÌà ` àThe€appellant€now€contends€that€her€convictions€for€aggravated€child€abuseÏare€void€ð ðsince€[aggravated€child€abuse]€is€not€an€included€offense€of€first€degreeÏchild€murder.ðð€€Specifically,€the€appellant€argues€that,€because€she€was€chargedÏwith€the€ð ðrecklessðð€killing€of€her€children,€ð ðaggravated€child€abuse€cannot€be€a€lesserÏincluded€offense€of€this€species€of€homicide€since€child€abuse€requires€the€higherÏmental€state€of€ððknowingly.ðððð׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Although€the€appellant€concedes€that,€by€statute,Ð 0 ( Ðmisdemeanor€child€abuse€may€be€a€lesser€included€offense€to€homicide,€€òòseeóó€€Tenn.Ð ü!ô ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401(d);׃F×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òòState€v.€Robersonóó,€No.€02C01„9503„CC„00059€(Tenn.Ð È#À  ÐCrim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Dec.€28,€1995),€she€argues€that€aggravated€child€abuse€isÏnot,€as€it€contains€no€comparable€provision.€ÌÌÓÓà8 ` àTennessee€law€recognizes€two€types€of€lesser€offenses€that€may€beÏincluded€in€the€offense€charged€in€an€indictment€and,€may,€therefore,Ïform€the€basis€for€a€conviction:€a€lesser€grade€or€class€of€the€chargedÏoffense€and€a€lesser€included€offense.€€The€two,€though€similar,€areÏnot€synonymous.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÐ B1:*/ ÐÓÓòòState€v.€Trustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305,€310€(Tenn.€1996).€€An€offense€is€ð ðlesser€includedððÐ  Ðin€another€ð ðif€the€elements€of€the€greater€offense,€as€those€elements€are€set€forth€inÏthe€indictment,€include€but€are€not€congruent€with,€all€the€elements€of€the€lesser.ðð€ÏòòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310„311€(quoting€òòHoward€v.€Stateóó,€578€S.W.2d€83,€85€(Tenn.Ð l d Ð1979)).€€However,€a€lesser€ð ðgrade€or€classðð€of€offense€is€established€by€theÏlegislature€and€is€determined€simply€by€reading€the€statutory€provisions.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòTrustyóó,Ð ü  Ð919€S.W.2d€at€310.€€ÌÌà ` àNecessarily€included€within€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse,€as€definedÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð39„15„402,€is€the€offense€of€child€abuse€and€neglect,€asÏdefined€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401(d)€providesÏthat,€if€fairly€raised€by€the€evidence,€child€abuse€is€a€lesser€offense€of€first€degreeÏmurder.€€òòSeeóó€€òòRobersonóó,€No.€02C01„9503„CC„00059.€€This€provision,€despite€theÐ ˜ Ðappellantððs€assertions,€is€necessarily€encompassed€within€the€aggravated€childÏabuse€statute.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that,€in€the€present€case,€aggravated€childÏabuse€is€a€lesser€included€offense€of€first€degree€murder€as€defined€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„13„202(a)(4).€€òòSeeóó€€òòRobersonóó,€No.€02C01„9503„CC„00059€(holding€byÐ È#À  Ðimplication€that€aggravated€child€abuse€is€a€lesser€offense€of€first€degree€murder).€ÏThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@®àò òIV.€Sufficiency€of€the€Evidenceó óˆÐ Ä,¼%* ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€next€contends€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€herÏconvictions€for€aggravated€child€abuse€because€the€State€failed€to€prove€ð ðknowingÐ 42,+0 Ðconductðð€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€òòi.e.óó,€that€she€ð ðwas€actually€aware€that€herÐ  Ðconduct€was€reasonably€certain€to€cause€the€resulting€injury€to€her€children.ðð€ÏSpecifically,€the€appellant€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€instructions€to€the€jury€as€theyÏrelate€to€the€requisite€mental€state€of€ð ðknowingðð€as€the€definition€of€this€term€appliesÏto€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€She€argues€that€the€erroneous€chargeÐ <4 Ðaltered€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proving€the€elements€of€the€offense€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.ÌÌà ` àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€the€appellantððs€issue€by€first€noting€that€theÏimplications€of€this€issue€extend€beyond€the€boundaries€of€this€case.€€TheÏappellantððs€challenge€assails€the€method€by€which€juries€are€currently€instructed€asÏto€the€requisite€mental€state€of€the€charged€offense.€€With€this€in€mind,€we€write€notÏwith€the€purpose€of€reaching€a€desired€result€but,€rather,€of€effecting€the€intent€of€ourÏlegislature€as€expressed€in€œits€enactment›€of€our€criminal€code.ÌÌà@””®àò òA.€€Theories€of€Culpable€Mental€Statesó óˆÐ "ø ÐÌà ` àCentral€to€the€concept€of€criminal€liability€is€that,€before€there€can€be€a€crime,Ïthere€must€be€an€act,€or€òòactus€reusóó,€which€must€be€accompanied€by€a€criminal€mind,Ð p'h $ Ðor€òòmens€reaóó.€€The€early€concept€of€òòmens€reaóó€meant€little€more€than€a€ð ðgeneral€notionÐ @)8"& Ðof€blameworthiness,ðð€or€an€ð ðevil€meaning€mind.ðð€€òòSeeóó€€21€òòAm.€Jur.€2d€óóòòCriminal€Lawóó€òòÐ +$( Ðóóðð€129€(1981).€€Over€time,€this€general€concept€shifted€from€this€vague€notion€ofÐ à,Ø%* Ðwickedness€to€a€more€definite€requirement€of€a€specific€state€of€mind€to€do€thatÏwhich€is€prohibited€by€the€criminal€law.€€Thus,€no€longer€could€the€requirement€ofÏð ðwickednessðð€suffice.€€Rather,€a€different€state€of€mind€was€required€for€each€crime.€ÏThis€development€in€the€common€law€culminated€in€the€creation€of€eighty€or€soÐ 4-2 Ðculpability€terms.€€òòSee€generallyóó€€Paul€H.€Robinson,€òòElement€Analysis€in€DefiningÐ  ÐCriminal€Liability:€The€Model€Penal€Code€and€Beyondóó,€35€Stan.€L.€Rev.€681,€691€(Ð ØÐ Ð1983).€€Even€with€a€specific€mental€state€existing€for€each€offense,€under€thisÏð ðoffense€analysis,ðð€of€culpability,€it€was€soon€recognized€that€each€specific€mentalÏstate€was€multifaceted.€€òòIdóó.€€€In€a€traditional€ð ðoffense€analysisðð€offenses€wereÐ @8 Ðreferred€to€simply€in€terms€of€one€encompassing€mental€state€for€the€offense,€òòi.e.óó,Ð    Ðan€intentional€offense,€a€knowing€offense€or€a€reckless€offense.€€Prior€to€theÏenactment€of€our€1989€code,€this€state€employed€ð ðoffense€analysis.ðð€€However,Ïwhere€different€culpability€requirements€are€appropriate€for€different€elements,Ïoffense€analysis€fosters€definitions€that€obscure€the€requisite€mental€state.€€òòId.óó€€As€inÐ @8 Ðthe€case€of€the€offense€of€possession€of€a€controlled€substance€with€the€intent€toÏsell,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„417(4)€(1997),€proof€of€different€mental€states€areÏrequired€for€the€respective€elements€of€(1)€the€òòknowingóó€possession€of€a€controlledÐ ¤œ Ðsubstance€and€(2)€the€òòintentóó€to€sell€the€same.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ph Ѐ€€€Ìà ` àThe€plethora€of€òòmentes€reaeóó€originating€from€the€common€law€created€muchÐ " Ðconfusion€and€ambiguity.€Thus,€in€1955,€the€drafters€of€the€Model€Penal€CodeÏsought€to€eliminate€this€confusion€and€narrowed€the€multitude€of€existing€culpabilityÏterms€to€four:€purpose,€knowledge,€recklessness,€and€negligence.€€òòSeeóó€€òòModelÐ p'h $ ÐPenal€Code€óóðð€2.02€(1985);€òòsee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„301(a)(1)€(1991)Ð <)4"& Ð(delineating€the€levels€of€culpability€and€providing€that€ð ða€person€commits€an€offenseÏwho€acts€intentionally,€knowingly,€recklessly,€or€with€criminal€negligence).ðð€€€InÏâ âfurtherance€of€this€concept,€the€Model€Penal€Code€and,€subsequently€theÐ  .˜', ÐTennessee€Criminal€Code,׃)×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€provide€that,€with€the€exception€of€strict€liabilityÐ  Ðâ âoffenses,€some€mental€culpability€ð ðmust€be€faced€separately€òòwith€respect€to€eachÐ ÔÌ Ðmaterial€element€of€the€crimeóó,ðð€otherwise,€no€valid€conviction€may€be€obtained.׃$þ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р  ˜ ÐòòComments,€Model€Penal€Code€óóðð€2.02€(emphasis€added);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„Ð l d Ð301(a)(1).€€Moreover,€the€Model€Penal€Code€and€the€Tennessee€Criminal€Code€bothÏrequire€that€one€of€four€levels€of€culpability€must€be€proven€with€respect€to€eachÏð ðmaterial€elementðð€of€the€offense€which€may€involve€ð ð(1)€the€nature€of€the€forbiddenÏconduct;€(2)€the€attendant€circumstances;€or€(3)€the€result€of€the€conduct.ðð€ÏòòComments,€Model€Penal€Code€óóðð€2.02;€òòsee€alsoóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„Ð h` Ð201(a)(1)€(1991)€(providing€that€ð ðno€person€may€be€convicted€of€an€offense€unlessÐ 4, Ðeach€of€the€following€is€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt:€(1)€The€conduct,Ïcircumstances€surrounding€the€conduct,€or€a€result€of€the€conduct€described€in€theÏdefinition€of€the€offense.ðð).€€ÌÌà ` àThe€definition€of€each€culpability€term€with€respect€to€each€ð ðconduct€elementððÏof€an€offense€reflects€a€fundamental€and€critical€principle€of€the€Model€Penal€CodeððsÏculpability€scheme,€the€application€of€an€ð ðelement€analysisðð€of€culpabilityÏrequirements,€òòi.e.óó,€different€degrees€of€culpability€may€be€required€with€respect€toÐ œ”  Ðdifferent€elements€of€the€same€offense.€€òòSeeóó€€Robinson,€òòElement€Analysis€inÐ ld ÐDefining€Criminal€Liability:€The€Model€Penal€Code€and€Beyondóó,€35€Stan.€L.€Rev.€atÐ <4 Ð699.€€Judicial€construction€or€interpretation€is€not€necessary€to€determine€whetherÏour€legislature€intended€to€employ€ð ðelement€analysisðð€within€our€criminal€code.€ÏRather,€the€legislatureððs€enactment€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„301(a)(b),€requiringÏproof€of€a€culpable€mental€state€ð ðwith€respect€to€each€element€of€the€offense,ððÏexpressly€provides€for€the€application€of€element€analysis.׃"×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€We€acknowledge€thatÐ < 4 Ðour€conclusion€is€in€accord€with€the€decisions€reached€by€other€Model€Penal€CodeÏstates,€including€Texas,€which€have€likewise€incorporated€the€Codeððs€innovation€of€Ìâ âelement€analysis€into€their€statutory€schemes.׃#H×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Accordingly,€we€proceed€utilizing€anÐ  %˜" Ðelement€analysis€approach.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  Ðâ âÌà@ÙÙ$®àò òB.€€Element€Analysisó óˆÐ   ˜ ÐÌà ` àAs€stated€previously,€the€Model€Penal€Code€recognizes€that€each€culpabilityÏterm€is€defined€in€relation€to€each€ð ðconduct€elementðð€of€an€offense:€(1)€nature€of€theÏconduct;€(2)€the€circumstances€at€the€time;€and€(3)€the€result€of€the€conduct.€€TheÏfirst€element,€conduct,€involves€the€nature€of€the€proscribed€act€or€the€manner€inÏwhich€the€defendant€acts,€òòe.g.óó,€the€physical€act€of€committing€an€assault,€or€theÐ tl Ðphysical€restraint€of€another€person€(kidnapping).€€òòSeeóó€€òòPeople€v.€Derreraóó,€667€P.2dÐ D< Ð1363,€1367€(€Colo.€1983)€(citing€Feinberg,€òòToward€a€New€Approach€to€ProvingÐ  ÐCulpability:€Mens€Rea€and€the€Proposed€Federal€Criminal€Codeóó,€18€Am.Crim.L.Rev.Ð àØ Ð123,€128€(1980);€òòPeople€v.€Nobleóó,€635€P.2d€203€(Colo.€1981);€òòPeople€v.€Andrewsóó,Ð °¨ Ð632€P.2d€1012€(Colo.€1981);€òòPeople€v.€Curtisóó,€627€P.2d€734€(Colo.€1981)).€TheÐ |t Ðsecond€element,€circumstances€surrounding€the€conduct,€refers€to€a€situation€whichÏrelates€to€the€actorððs€culpability,€òòe.g.óó,€lack€of€victimððs€consent€or€stolen€status€ofÐ "  Ðproperty.€€òòIdóó.€€The€result€of€the€defendantððs€conduct€constitutes€the€final€element,€inÐ ä#Ü  Ðother€words,€the€accusedððs€conduct€must€at€least€be€a€physical€cause€of€the€harmfulÏresult,€òòe.g.óó,€causing€the€death€of€another.€€òòIdóó.€€Ð |'t $ ÐÌà ` àMany€crimes€are€made€up€of€not€only€one,€but€of€several€ð ðconduct€elements,ððÏincluding€not€only€an€act€or€omission,€but€also€some€specific€result€of€that€act€orÏomission,€or€some€prescribed€attendant€circumstances,€or€perhaps€both€result€andÏcircumstances.€€òòSeeóó€€òòWayne€R.€LaFave€&€Austin€W.€Scott€Jr.,€SubstantiveÐ |0t). ÐCriminal€Lawóó€ðð€3.4(d)€(1986).€€In€other€words,€an€offense€may€contain€one€or€moreÐ H2@+0 Ðof€these€conduct€elements€which,€alone€or€in€combination€with€the€others,€form€theÐ 4 -2 Ðoverall€behavior€which€the€Legislature€has€intended€to€criminalize,€and€it€is€thoseÏessential€conduct€elements€to€which€a€culpable€mental€state€must€apply.€ÏCorrespondingly,€each€culpability€term€is€defined€with€respect€to€each€of€the€threeÏkinds€of€ð ðconduct€œelementsññ"ñññññŽñ€ñŽññññŽñððñŽñ:›€conduct,€circumstances,€and€result.€€òòModel€PenalÐ l d ÐCode€óó€ðð€2.02.€€òòSee€alsoóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302.€€For€example,€where€aÐ 80 Ðspecific€act€is€criminalized€because€of€its€very€nature,€a€culpable€mental€state€mustÏapply€to€committing€the€act€itself,€òòi.e.óó,€awareness€of€conduct.€€On€the€other€hand,Ð ÐÈ  Ðunspecified€conduct€which€is€criminalized€because€of€the€result€requires€culpabilityÏas€to€that€result,€òòi.e.óó,€result€of€conduct.€€Finally,€where€otherwise€innocent€behavior€isÐ ld Ðcriminalized€due€to€the€circumstances€under€which€it€occurs,€a€culpable€mental€stateÏis€required€as€to€those€surrounding€circumstances,€òòi.e.óó,€awareness€ofÐ  Ðcircumstances.€€€€In€other€words,€the€analysis€of€the€applicable€òòmens€reaóó€variesÐ ØÐ Ðaccording€to€the€conduct€elements€of€the€offense.€Ìò òÌà ` àó óIn€the€present€offense,€the€applicable€òòmens€reaóó€is€ð ðknowingly.ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÐ L D ÐAnn.€ðð€39„11„302(b)€defines€ð ðknowingðð€as:ÌÓÓà8 ` à[A]€person€who€acts€knowingly€with€respect€to€the€conduct€or€toÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€conduct€when€the€person€is€aware€ofÏthe€nature€of€the€conduct€or€that€the€circumstances€exist.€€A€personÏacts€knowingly€with€respect€to€a€result€of€the€persons€conduct€whenÏthe€person€is€aware€that€the€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€theÏresult.[׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×]Ðf(^!%` ü!` ü! ÐÓÓÌWhen€a€criminal€statute€requires€a€òòmens€reaóó€of€knowingly,€it€may€speak€to€conduct,Ð +$( Ðor€to€circumstances,€or€to€result,€or€to€any€combination€thereof,€but€not€necessarilyÏto€all€three.€€òòWayne€R.€LaFave€&€Austin€W.€Scott€Jr.,€Substantive€Criminal€Lawóó€ððÐ ´.¬', Ð3.4(d).€€In€essence,€three€theories€of€ð ðknowinglyðð€exist,€òòi.e.óó,€(1)€conduct;€(2)Ð €0x). Ðcircumstances;€and€(3)€result€of€conduct,€to€correspond€to€the€three€conductÏelements€of€a€criminal€offense.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„302.€€€€Since€a€crimeÐ 4-2 Ðmay€consist€of€more€than€one€ð ðconduct€element,ðð€there€may€be€different€òòmens€reaóóÐ è5à.4 Ðrequirements€as€to€the€different€ð ðconduct€elementsðð€that€constitute€the€crime,€even€ifÏthe€required€culpability€is€the€same,€òòe.g.€óóð ðknowingly.ðð€€€€€€€€òò€Ð ÔÌ Ðóóà ` àBecause€the€applicable€definition€of€ð ðknowingðð€is€element€specific,€a€blanketÐ ¤ œ Ðinstruction€as€to€each€theory,€generally,€will€invite€error.€€In€other€words,€the€courtÏcannot€instruct€the€jury€that€it€could€employ€either€(1)€conduct€òòoróó€(2)€circumstances;òòÐ <4 Ðoróó€(3)€result€of€conduct.€€To€do€so€would€effectively€alter€the€Stateððs€burden€ofÐ   Ðproving€each€element€of€the€offense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòSeeóó€œòòState›€v.Ð ÔÌ  ÐLambertóó,€929€P.2d€846,€850€(Mont.€1996).€€For€example,€the€offense€of€secondÐ  ˜  Ðdegree€murder€is€a€result€of€conduct€offense,€that€is,€the€intent€of€the€legislature€is€toÏpunish€a€person€for€the€killing€of€another.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€€The€trial€court€may€only€instruct€the€juryÐ 80 Ðas€to€the€result€of€conduct€theory€of€knowingly.€€If€the€court€instructed€the€jury€as€toÏð ðawareness€of€conductðð€or€ð ðawareness€of€circumstances,ðð€the€jury€could€find€aÏdefendant€guilty€on€less€proof€than€that€needed€to€show€that€the€defendant€engagedÏin€conduct€with€knowledge€that€his€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€the€result.€ÏThe€dangers€of€a€full€instruction€of€the€applicable€òòmens€reaóó€€diminishing€the€StateððsÐ 4 , Ðburden€was€illustrated€in€òòAlvarado€v.€Stateóó,€704€S.W.2d€36€(Tex.€Crim.€App.),€òòrehððgÐ "ü Ðdeniedóó,€(1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€514€U.S.€1112,€115€S.Ct.€1967€(1995),€the€same€caseÐ Ð#È  Ðthat€the€appellant€contends€that€this€court€is€bound€to€follow,€òòinfraóó.€€In€œòòAlvarañ†ñoñ†ñdoóó,›€theÐ œ%”" Ðdefendant€was€charged€with€injury€to€her€child€by€placing€the€child€in€a€bathtub€ofÏscalding€water.€€At€trial,€she€defended€on€the€ground€that€she€did€not€know€that€theÏwater€was€hot€enough€to€cause€burning,€even€though€she€admitted€that€she€wasÏangry€at€her€child€for€resisting€his€bath€and€refusing€to€disrobe,€and€placed€him,€fullyÏclothed,€into€the€water,€without€first€testing€it.€€òòIdóó.€at€39.€€The€trial€court€provided€aÐ œ.”', Ðgeneral€instruction€as€to€the€applicable€culpability€requirement€and€refused€toÏinstruct€on€the€result€of€the€conduct€definition.€€The€appellate€court€reversed€theÏdefendantððs€conviction€finding€that€the€courtððs€charge€permitted€the€jury€to€convictÏthe€defendant€if€they€found€that€she€knowingly€placed€the€child€in€ð ða€tub€of€hot€waterððÐ Ì5Ä.4 Ðwithout€requiring€a€finding€that€she€intended€or€knew€serious€bodily€injury€wouldÏresult.€€òòIdóó.€at€39„40.€€€Ð ÔÌ ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€argues€that,€because€our€criminal€code€is€derived€from€theÏTexas€adoption€of€the€Model€Penal€Code,׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú17Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€the€appellate€courts€of€this€state€areÐ 80 Ðnecessarily€bound€to€follow€the€same€conclusion€as€reached€by€the€appellate€courtsÏof€Texas.׃P×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú18Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Specifically,€she€relies€upon€the€decision€of€the€Texas€Court€of€CriminalÐ ÐÈ  ÐAppeals,€the€court€of€last€resort€for€criminal€appeals,€in€òòAlvarado€v.€Stateóó,€704Ð œ”  ÐS.W.2d€at€36,€which€held€that€the€trial€court,€in€instructing€the€jury,€must€limit€itsÏcharge€of€the€applicable€mental€state€to€the€ð ðconduct€elementðð€or€elements€of€theÏoffense€charged,€because€to€provide€a€blanket€charge€as€to€the€applicableÏculpability€requirement€would€effectively€alter€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proof.€€WeÏconcede€that€Texas€and€Tennessee€have€traveled€similar€paths€regarding€culpabilityÏrequirements.€€Furthermore,€while€we€acknowledge€that€Tennessee€is€now€at€theÏsame€crossroads€previously€confronted€by€the€Texas€court,׃!Î×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú19Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€we€decline€to€adoptÐ 0 ( Ðthe€explicit€holding€in€œòòAlvarñ‡ñañ‡ññˆñoñˆñdoóó›€as€this€holding€may€be€distinguished€under€theÐ ü!ô Ðcircumstances€of€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó.€€Although€we€agree€with€the€appellate€court€ofÐ È#À  ÐTexas€regarding€the€principal€and€theory€behind€element€analysis,€we€decline€toÏapply€its€holding€of€reversible€error€in€the€case€now€before€us.ÌÌà ` à€We€agree€with€the€appellant€that€to€provide€the€jury€with€the€option€that€theÏappellant€was€aware€of€her€conduct,€aware€of€the€circumstances,€òòoróó€was€reasonablyÐ È,À%* Ðaware€that€her€conduct€was€€reasonably€certain€to€cause€the€result,€is€to€relieve€theÏState€of€their€burden€of€proof.€To€prove€that€a€defendant€is€aware€of€her€conduct€isÏone€thing;€to€prove€that€the€defendantððs€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€produce€aÏcertain€result€is,€although€subtle,€another.€€œòòAlvarñ‰ñañ‰ññŠñoñŠñdoóó,›€704€S.W.2d€at€39.€€òòIdóó.€€TheÐ l d Ðcourt€cannot€give€the€jury€the€choice€of€which€definition€to€apply€to€the€crimeÏcharged,€rather€the€statute€defining€the€crime€dictates€which€definition€of€ð ðknowinglyððÏis€appropriate€as€to€each€element.€€òòSeeóó€€òòLambertóó,€929€P.2d€at€852€(Leaphart,€J.Ð ÐÈ  Ðconcurring).€€€Ìò òÌó óà ` àThe€appellant€asserts€that€the€offense€of€ð ðaggravated€child€abuse,ðð€as€definedÐ @8 Ðin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402€and€as€charged€in€the€present€case,€only€containsÏthe€element€of€ð ðresult€of€conduct,ðð€as€was€determined€in€œòòAlvarñ‹ñañ‹ññŒñoñŒñdoóó.›€€We€do€notÐ ØÐ Ðagree.€€Upon€analysis€of€our€statutory€provision,€a€purview€into€the€legislative€intentÏbehind€the€enactment€of€the€offense€leads€us€to€conclude€that€the€offense,€asÏcharged€in€the€case€presently€before€this€court,€contains€the€elements€of€(1)Ïawareness€of€conduct,€(2)€awareness€of€circumstances;€and€(3)€result€of€conduct.ÌÌà ` àThe€trial€court€provided€the€jury€with€the€following€instruction:ÌÓÓà8 ` àò òAny€person€who€commits€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuseÐ l'd $ Ðis€guilty€of€a€felony.€€For€you€to€find€the€Defendant€guilty€of€thisÏoffense,€the€State€must€have€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubtÏthe€existence€of€the€following€essential€elements:Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€€The€Defendant€acted€knowingly;€ANDÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€€That€the€Defendant€did:Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà8¸ ¤¸ ¤à(a)€Other€than€by€accidental€means,€treatÏa€child€in€such€a€manner€as€to€inflictÏinjury;€ORÐ LL Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àó óÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà8¸ ¤¸ ¤àò ò(b)€Other€than€by€accidental€means,Ð ž0–). Ðneglect€a€child€so€as€to€adversely€affectÏthe€childððs€health€and€welfare;€ANDÐ LL ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(3)€(a)€€The€Defendant€used€a€deadly€weapon€toÏaccomplish€the€act€of€abuse;€ORÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà ` àà8 ¸ à€€€€€(b)€€The€act€of€abuse€resulted€in€serious€bodily€injury€toÏthe€childÐ ¸ ü!¸ ü! ÐÌà8 ` àThe€requirement€of€ð ðknowinglyðð€is€also€satisfied€if€it€is€shown€thatÏthe€Defendant€acted€intentionally.ÐÖ9Î28` ü!` ü! Їà8 ` àòòA€person€acts€ð ðknowinglyðð€if€that€person€acts€with€an€awarenessÐ  Ðeither:Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€That€his€or€her€conduct€is€of€a€particular€nature;ÏorÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€That€a€particular€circumstance€exists.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA€person€acts€knowingly€with€respect€to€a€result€ofÏthe€personððs€conduct€when€the€person€is€aware€thatÏthe€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€a€result.óóÐh`¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àó óÐ ` ü!` ü! Ð(Emphasis€added).€€ÓÓA€reading€of€this€instruction€implies€that,€for€a€jury€to€find€thatÏthe€defendant€acted€knowingly,€the€jury€must€find€that€the€defendant€was€(1)€awareÏof€her€conduct€or€aware€of€the€circumstances€ò òòòandóóó ó€(2)€aware€that€the€conduct€wasÐ ¾¶  Ðreasonably€certain€to€cause€a€certain€result€as€to€each€material€element€of€theÏoffense.׃'×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú20Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Although€this€instruction€is€erroneous€in€that€it€did€not€charge€the€specificÐ bZ Ðòòmens€reaóó€definition€applicable€to€each€ð ðconduct€element,ðð€we€conclude€that€anyÐ .& Ðsuch€error€is€harmless.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€€36(a).€€ÌÌà ` àThe€prejudice€in€not€providing€a€ð ðconduct€elementðð€specific€definition€of€theÏapplicableòò€mens€rea€óóis€the€alteration€of€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proof.€€The€instructionÐ b!Z Ðin€the€present€case€did€not€relieve€the€Stateððs€burden€of€proof.€€The€jury€wasÏinstructed€that€it€must€find€òòeach€elementóó€of€the€offense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€Ð þ$ö! ÐThe€definition€of€ð ðknowinglyðð€provided€by€the€court€supplied€a€two„prong€definition€ofÏthe€term,€resulting€in€an€added€burden€of€proof€upon€the€State,€for€which€theÏappellant€cannot€now€complain.€€Although€the€preferred€instruction€would€be€oneÏthat€is€ð ðconduct€elementðð€specific,€we€conclude€that€the€instruction€provided€in€theÏpresent€case€did€not€prejudice€the€appellant.€Accordingly,€any€such€error€in€theÏinstruction€is€harmless.€€ÌÐ ’1Š*/ Ðà ` àBecause€we€have€determined€that€the€jury€instruction€constitutes€harmlessÏerror,€we€must€determine€whether€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€sustain€the€conviction.€ÏA€jury€conviction€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€with€which€a€defendant€isÏinitially€cloaked€and€replaces€it€with€one€of€guilt,€so€that€on€appeal€a€convictedÏdefendant€has€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient.€€òòState€v.Ð 80 ÐTuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€It€is€the€appellate€court's€duty€to€affirmÐ ü  Ðthe€conviction€if€the€evidence€viewed€under€these€standards€was€sufficient€for€anyÏrational€trier€of€fact€to€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€offense€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€317,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2789Ð h` Ð(1979);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€259€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„,Ð 4, Ð115€S.Ct.€743€(1995);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€toÏthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€legitimate€or€reasonableÏinferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€75Ð ˜ Ð(Tenn.€1992),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€507€U.S.€954,€113€S.Ct.€1368€(1993).Ð d\ ÐÌà ` àBefore€a€jury€can€find€a€defendant€guilty€of€aggravated€child€abuse€asÏcharged€in€the€present€case,€the€State€must€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€thatÏthe€defendant€ð ðknowingly,€other€than€by€accidental€means,€treats€a€child€underÏeighteen(18)€years€of€age€in€such€a€manner€as€to€inflict€injury€or€neglects€such€aÏchild€so€as€to€adversely€affect€the€childððs€health€and€welfare.€.€.ðð€and€such€abuseÏresults€in€serious€bodily€injury.׃(×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú21Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„401;€„402.€Ð ø*ð#( Ðð ðKnowingðð€is€applicable€to€the€situations€in€which€the€accused,€while€not€having€theÏactual€intent€to€accomplish€a€specific€wrongful€purpose,€is€consciously€aware€of€theÏexistence€of€facts€which€makes€his€conduct€unlawful.€€òòSeeóó€òòPeople€v.€Weissóó,€635Ð \0T). ÐN.E.2d€635,€639€(Ill.€App.€1994).€€ð ðKnowingðð€is€ordinarily€established€byÐ (2 +0 Ðcircumstantial€evidence€rather€than€by€direct€proof.€€òòPeople€v.€Hallóó,€652€N.E.2dÐ  Ð1266,€1269€(Ill.€App.)€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Ill.€1995).€€The€undisputed€proofÐ ÔÌ Ðreveals€that€the€appellant€strapped€her€two€children,€Dustin€and€Devin,€into€their€carÏseats,€secured€the€windows€and€doors,€and€left€her€children€alone€in€the€car€for€overÏnine€hours,€never€returning€to€check€on€them.€€The€children€died€as€a€result€ofÏsystemic€œhyperthermia›€triggered€by€being€locked€in€the€hot€vehicle.€€Obviously,€byÏreturning€a€guilty€verdict,€the€jury€did€not€accredit€the€appellantððs€theory€of€the€caseÏthat€the€deaths€of€her€children€were€an€accident.€€Nor€did€the€jury€accredit€defenseÏtestimony€of€the€appellantððs€psychological€problems.€€We€conclude€that€a€rationalÏtrier€of€fact€could€find€that€the€appellant€knew€the€ages€of€her€childrenÏ(circumstances),€knowingly€strapped€her€children€in€the€car€(conduct),€knowinglyÏneglected€them€over€the€next€nine€hours€(conduct),€and€was€aware€that€her€conductÏwas€reasonably€certain€to€cause€harm€or€injury€to€her€children€(result€of€conduct).€ÏThus,€the€facts€are€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction€for€aggravated€child€abuse€onÏeach€count.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@Ü Ü ®àò òV.€€Prior€Sexual€Relationship€with€Micah€Majorsó óˆÐ ”%Œ" ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€improperly€permitted€theÏprosecutor€to€elicit€testimony€from€the€Stateððs€witness,€Micah€Majors,€regarding€hisÏprior€sexual€relationship€with€the€appellant.€€Specifically,€she€contends€that€theÏevidence€was€inadmissible€because€it€related€to€specific€proof€of€character€or€trait,Ïprohibited€by€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€404,€and€because€it€provided€a€ð ðspecific€instance€ofÏconduct€of€a€witness€for€the€purpose€of€attacking€or€supporting€the€witnessððÏcredibilityðð€by€extrinsic€evidence,€prohibited€by€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€608.€€We€find€thatÏthese€arguments€are€misplaced.€€As€evidence€of€the€nature€of€appellantððsÏrelationship€with€Majors€was€properly€admitted€to€establish€bias€on€behalf€of€Majors,Ïwe€need€not€address€the€appellantððs€404€and€608€concerns.Ð d9\28 Їà ` àRule€616,€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€permits€a€party€to€ð ðoffer€evidence€by€cross„¼examination,€extrinsic€evidence,€or€both,€that€a€witness€is€biased€in€favor€of€orÏprejudiced€against€a€party€or€another€witness.ðð׃:×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú22Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Bias€is€an€important€ground€forÐ   ˜ Ðimpeachment€of€a€witness€and€is€an€aid€for€the€trier€of€fact€in€assessing€the€weightÏto€be€afforded€the€witnessðð€testimony.€€òòSeeóó€€Advisory€Commission€Comments,€Tenn.Ð 80 ÐR.€Evid.€616;€òòState€v.€Reidóó,€882€S.W.2d€423,€427€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€AnyÐ ü  Ðrelationship€of€a€party€to€a€witness€which€might€influence€the€testimony€of€theÏwitness€is€a€proper€subject€of€impeaching€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€827Ð œ”  ÐS.W.2d€804,€808€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Our€courts€have€long€since€recognizedÏthat€witnesses€are€often€as€much€influenced€in€testifying€by€feelings€of€friendship€orÏhostility€to€parties€to€the€case€as€by€direct€pecuniary€interest€in€the€result€of€the€trial,Ïand€for€this€reason,€proof€of€the€relations€of€the€witness€to€the€parties€may€beÏshown.€€òòSeeóó€€òòWilliamsóó,€827€S.W.2d€at€808€(citing€òòCreeping€Bear€v.€Stateóó,€113€Tenn.Ð ˜ Ð322,€87€S.W.€653€(1905)).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Lewisóó,€803€S.W.2d€260€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð d\ ÐApp.€1990);€òòState€v.€Horneóó,€652€S.W.2d€916€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983)).€€It€is€a€wellÐ 0 ( Ðestablished€principle€that€bias€or€prejudice€of€a€witness€is€always€relevant€regardlessÏof€whether€the€matter€stems€from€a€sexual€relationship.€€Thus,€the€nature€of€theÏappellantððs€relationship€with€Mr.€Majors€was€relevant€to€show€bias.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€R.Ð ”%Œ" ÐEvid.€401.€€Additionally,€we€cannot€conclude€that€evidence€of€the€nature€of€theÏappellantððs€relationship€with€Mr.€Majors€was€more€prejudicial€than€probative.€€òòSeeóó€Ð ,)$"& ÐTenn.€R.€Evid.€403.€€The€jury€was€already€aware€of€circumstances€from€which€theyÏcould€infer€the€nature€of€the€relationship€between€the€appellant€and€Majors.€ÏAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€this€evidence€was€properly€admitted€by€the€trial€court.€ÏThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌÌÐ Œ7„06 Ðà@t t ®àò òVI.€Prosecutorial€Misconduct€During€Closing€Argumentó óˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àDuring€closing€argument€by€the€State,€the€prosecutor€made€the€followingÏremarks:ÌÓÓà8 ` àThen,€when€everyone€left€that€room€but€Micah€Majors,€she€hadÏanother€opportunity€to€care€for€these€children.€€If€she€was€just€going€toÏtalk€to€Micah€Majors,€she€could€have€taken€those€children€to€the€room.€ÏShe€had€done€that€many€times.€€I€submit,€ladies€and€gentlemen,€thatÏmore€went€on€in€that€room€than€just€talk.€€Use€your€common€sense.€ÏYou€know€what€they€did.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓThe€defense€objected€to€this€statement,€€but€was€overruled€by€the€trial€court.€€TheÏappellant€contends€that€the€statements€made€by€the€prosecutor€were€clearlyÏerroneous€since€he€was€arguing€facts€which€were€refuted€by€the€evidence€elicited€atÏtrial.ÌÌà ` àOur€state€courts€have€recognized€that€closing€argument€is€a€valuable€privilegeÏfor€both€the€State€and€the€defense€and,€accordingly,€have€afforded€wide€latitude€toÏcounsel€in€presenting€final€argument€to€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Cribbsóó,€967€S.W.2d€773,Ð "! Ð783€(Tenn.€1998);€òòState€v.€Cauthernóó,€967€S.W.2d€726,€736€(Tenn.€1998).€Ð î"æ ÐNotwithstanding,€closing€argument€is€subject€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court,€whichÏwill€be€affirmed€on€appeal€absent€an€abuse€thereof,€€òòseeóó€€òòState€v.€Tateóó,€No.€02C01„Ð †&~# Ð9605„CR„00164€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Dec.€3,€1997)€(citing€òòState€v.€Suttonóó,Ð R(J!% Ð562€S.W.2d€820,€823€(Tenn.€1978)),€€and€must€be€temperate,€predicated€onÏevidence€introduced€during€the€trial,€and€relevant€to€the€issues€being€tried.€ÏòòCauthernóó,€967€S.W.2d€at€736.€€The€bounds€of€proper€argument€largely€depend€uponÐ ¶-®&+ Ðthe€facts€in€evidence,€the€character€of€the€trial,€and€the€conduct€of€opposing€counsel,€ÏòòState€v.€Townesóó,€No.€02C01„9505„CC„00140€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Nov.Ð N1F*/ Ð19,€1996),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Jul.€21,€1997)€(citations€omitted),€andÐ 3,1 Ðmay€address€any€relevant€and€proper€subject.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú23Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€29.1(b).€Ð æ4Þ-3 ÐMoreover,€both€the€prosecution€and€the€defense€must€be€allowed€to€argue€not€onlyÏthe€facts€in€evidence,€but€also€any€reasonable€inferences€therefrom.€€òòTateóó,€No.Ð ÔÌ Ð02C01„9605„CR„00164€(citing€òòRussell€v.€Stateóó,€532€S.W.2d€268,€271€(Tenn.€1976));Ð   ˜ ÐòòState€v.€Hallóó,€No.€01C01„9311„CC„00409€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Nashville,€Mar.€5,Ð l d Ð1997),€òòas€correctedóó,€(Mar.€20,€1997)€(citing€òòState€v.€Coneóó,€665€S.W.2d€87,€94Ð 80 Ð(Tenn.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€467€U.S.€1210,€104€S.Ct.€2400€(1984)).Ð   ÐÌà ` àMicah€Majors€admitted€on€direct€examination€by€the€State€that€he€and€theÏappellant€had€previously€shared€an€intimate€sexual€relationship.€€However,€heÏdenied€that€he€and€the€appellant€had€sexual€intercourse€on€the€date€of€the€presentÏoffenses.€€No€proof€was€introduced€at€trial€to€either€confirm€or€dispel€Mr.€MajorsððÏassertion.€€Thus,€a€reasonable€inference€could€be€made€as€to€the€nature€of€theÏappellantððs€visit€to€Majorsðð€hotel€room.€€Additionally,€in€its€charge€to€the€jury,€the€trialÏcourt€informed€the€jury€that€closing€argument€does€not€constitute€evidence.€ÏRegardless€of€the€inference€implied€by€the€prosecutorððs€argument,€the€proof€wasÏmore€than€sufficient€to€find€the€appellant€guilty€of€aggravated€child€abuse€as€to€bothÏcounts.ÌÌà ` àWe€conclude€that€the€prosecutorððs€statement€was€within€the€scope€of€properÏargument,€òòi.e.óó,€he€made€an€arguable€inference€from€the€evidence€presented€at€trial.€Ð 0)("& ÐòòSeeóó€€òòTownesóó,€€No.€02C01„9505„CC„00140€(citing€òòRussellóó,€532€S.W.2d€at€271).€€TheÐ +ø#( Ðappellant€has€not€shown€that€the€inference€raised€by€the€prosecutor€during€closingÏargument€was€so€improper€or€inflammatory€as€to€warrant€reversal.€€Moreover,€weÏcannot€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€admitting€the€statement.€Ð d0\). ÐAccordingly,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@$®àò òVII.€€Prior€Bad€Acts€ó óˆÐ l d ÐÌà ` àPrior€to€trial,€defense€counsel€filed€a€motion€in€limine€to€suppress€anyÏevidence€of€the€appellantððs€alleged€bad€character€or€prior€misconduct.€€The€trialÏcourt€reserved€resolution€of€the€matter€until€it€was€raised€at€trial.€€At€trial,€the€StateÏoffered€proof€of€the€testimony€of€two€witnesses,€Pam€Rhea€and€Connie€Medley,€toÏtestify€as€to€prior€incidents€of€misconduct€by€the€appellant.€€The€trial€court,€afterÏconducting€a€proper€404(b)€hearing,€prohibited€the€proffered€testimony€of€Rhea€andÏMedley.ÌÌà ` àDuring€cross„examination€of€the€appellant,€the€prosecutor€asked€her€whetherÏthere€had€been€prior€incidents€during€which€she€was€ð ðtoo€busy€or€too€distracted€toÏproperly€care€for€[her]€children.ðð€€The€appellant€stated€that€there€had€been€no€priorÏincidents.€€The€prosecutor€then€asked€the€appellant€about€an€incident€during€whichÏshe€left€her€two€children€with€Pam€Rhea€for€twenty„five€hours.€€Defense€counselÏobjected€to€the€question,€at€which€time,€the€prosecutor€stated€that€the€question€wasÏjust€for€purposes€of€credibility.€€The€trial€court€overruled€the€objection€and€permittedÏthe€question.€€The€appellant€responded€that€ð ðshe€knew€they€were€okay€when€theyÏwere€with€her.€.€.€.€I€was€.€.€.€a€little€confused.ðð€She€further€denied€the€allegation€thatÏshe€had€informed€Ms.€Rhea€that€her€state€of€intoxication€prevented€her€from€pickingÏup€her€children.€€ÌÌà ` àAfter€the€defense€rested,€the€State€sought€to€offer€the€testimony€of€threeÏrebuttal€witnesses,€including€Pam€Rhea.€€The€trial€court€sustained€the€appellantððsÏobjection€as€to€two€of€the€rebuttal€witnesses,€but€permitted€the€State€to€present€theÏtestimony€of€Pam€Rhea,€restricting€her€testimony€to€attacking€the€credibility€of€theÐ d9\28 Ðappellant.€€€Ms.€Rhea€testified€that€she€cared€for€the€appellantððs€two€children€fromÏAugust€1994€until€March€1995,€during€which€time€the€appellant€worked€the€secondÏshift€at€Calsonic.€€The€appellant€would€ð ðdrop€[the€children]€off€at€two„thirty€and€wasÏsupposed€to€pick€them€up€at€one€oððclock€in€the€morning.ðð€€Ms.€Rhea€stated€that,Ïalthough€the€appellant€was€terminated€from€her€employment€on€February€20th,€Ms.ÏRhea€continued€keeping€her€children.€€Specifically,€Ms.€Rhea€recalled€that,€onÏMarch€22,€the€appellant€dropped€the€children€off€at€one€oððclock€in€the€morning€andÏdid€not€return€for€the€children€until€two€oððclock€the€following€morning,€a€total€ofÏtwenty„five€hours.€€During€her€unexplained€absence,€the€appellant€never€called€Ms.ÏRhea€to€check€on€her€children.€€When€she€finally€returned€to€pick€up€her€children,Ïshe€told€Ms.€Rhea€that€ð ðshe€had€been€out€with€some€friends€and€needed€to€goÏsomewhere€and€sober€up€before€picking€up€the€children.ðð€€Following€Ms.€RheaððsÏtestimony,€the€trial€court€gave€the€jury€the€following€instruction:ÌÓÓà8 ` àLadies€and€gentlemen€of€the€Jury,€I€have€allowed€this€witnessððÏtestimony€for€a€limited€purpose€only.€€You€may€consider€her€testimonyÏto€this€extent€only.€€It€is€for€the€purpose€of€testing€the€credibility€or€theÏbelievability€of€the€defendantððs€testimony€and€for€no€other€reason.€€YouÏcannot€consider€it€for€the€question€of€whether€or€not€the€defendant€wasÏdisposed€or€not€to€commit€the€crime€for€which€she,€now,€standsÏcharged;€only,€however,€for€the€limited€purpose€of€testing€the€.€.€.Ïdefendantððs€credibility€or€believability.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓÌà ` àThe€appellant€now€contends€that€the€questioning€of€the€appellant€regardingÏthe€March€babysitting€incident€was€ð ðinadmissible,€totally€irrelevant,€and€highlyÏprejudicial.ðð€€She€further€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€permitting€the€State€toÏintroduce€the€rebuttal€testimony€of€Pamela€Rhea€regarding€a€specific€instance€ofÏbad€conduct€by€the€appellant.€€ÌÌà ` àGenerally,€character€evidence€is€not€admissible€for€the€purpose€of€provingÏthat€a€person€has€acted€in€conformity€with€that€character€trait€on€a€particularÏoccasion.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€404(a).€€However,€several€exceptions€to€the€general€ruleÏbarring€character€evidence€exist.€€Specifically,€in€a€criminal€case,€if€and€when€theÏaccused€places€his€or€her€ð ðcharacter€in€issue,ðð€the€prosecution€may€cross„examineÐ >:639 Ðthe€accused€to€show€that€the€accusedððs€character€is€not€really€good.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.Ï404(a)(1);€òòState€v.€Phippsóó,€883€S.W.2d€138,€153€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994);€òòNeilÐ ÔÌ ÐCohen€et€al..,€Tennessee€Law€of€Evidence€ðð€óó404.3€(3d€ed.€1995).€€Specifically,€theÐ   ˜ ÐState€may€inquire€as€to€specific€instances€of€bad€conduct€by€the€accused,€providedÏthat€the€prosecutor€has€a€good€faith€basis€for€believing€that€the€appellant€reallyÏcommitted€the€specific€bad€act€and€the€specific€bad€act€is€relevant€to€the€specificÏcharacter€trait€testified€to€by€the€witness.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€405(b);€òòNeil€Cohen€etÐ ÐÈ  Ðal..,€Tennessee€Law€of€evidence€óóðð€404.3.€€However,€the€prosecutorððs€ability€to€showÐ œ”  Ðspecific€bad€acts€is€limited€to€cross„examination.€€€€He€may€not€put€on€extrinsicÏevidence€(e.g.€other€witnesses)€to€prove€that€the€specific€acts€took€place,€òòif€theÐ 4, Ðaccused€denied€that€they€didóó.€€òòSeeóó€€òòNeil€Cohen€et€al.,€Tennessee€Law€of€evidenceÐ ø Ðóóðð€405.3.€€Conversely,€the€defendant€may€not€put€on€other€witnesses€to€show€that€theÐ ÌÄ Ðspecific€act€referred€to€by€the€prosecutor€on€cross„examination€never€took€place.ÌÌà ` àThroughout€the€appellantððs€case„in„chief,€defense€counsel€presentedÏtestimony€which€portrayed€the€appellant€as€an€extremely€loving€and€nurturingÏmother.€€Thus,€ð ðopening€the€doorðð€for€the€prosecution€to€offer€relevant€characterÏevidence€to€rebut€the€appellantððs€proof.€€Accordingly,€the€questioning€of€theÏappellant€as€to€the€events€of€March€1995€was€proper.€€However,€since€the€appellantÏdenied€the€specific€conduct€of€which€she€was€asked€on€cross„examination,€the€StateÏhad€to€accept€the€answer€that€was€given.€€Accordingly,€the€questioning€of€Ms.€RheaÏas€to€the€same€instance€of€conduct€was€improper€because€it€was€extrinsic€evidenceÏof€a€prior€bad€act.€€Nonetheless,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€improper€questioningÏof€Ms.€Rhea€and€her€responses€prejudiced€the€outcome€of€the€trial.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.Ð \0T). ÐEvid.€403.€€Considering,€specifically,€the€trial€courtððs€instruction€that€Ms.€RheaððsÏtestimony€was€only€to€be€used€in€determining€the€appellantððs€credibility€and,Ïgenerally,€the€overwhelming€evidence€supporting€the€juryððs€guilty€verdict€as€to€eachÏcount€of€aggravated€child€abuse,€we€find€that€the€error€was€harmless€beyond€anyÏdoubt.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(a).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ð X9P28 Їà@˜˜#®àò òVIII.€€Cumulative€Erroró óˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€combination€of€errors€arising€from€theÏclosing€argument€of€the€prosecution€and€testimony€regarding€prior€bad€actsÏconstituted€an€improper€ð ðcharacter€assignationðð€of€the€appellant€(issues€V,€VI,€VII),Ïresulting€in€cumulative€error.€€As€we€have€concluded€that€any€error€arising€from€theÏintroduction€of€any€character€evidence,€if€any€at€all,€is€harmless,€this€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌÌà@t t ®àò òIX.€€Class€A€Sentence€for€Aggravated€Child€Abuseó óˆÐ   ÐÌà ` àIn€her€final€issue,€the€appellant€contends€that,€because€the€trial€court€failed€toÏinstruct€the€jury€as€to€the€class€A€felony€version€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€childÏabuse,€òòi.e.óó,€child€is€under€six€years€of€age,€there€is€no€conviction€for€the€class€AÐ H @ Ðversion€of€the€offense.€€Rather,€she€argues,€the€jury€could€only€have€found€her€guiltyÏof€the€class€B€version€of€aggravated€child€abuse€because€the€trial€court€onlyÏinstructed€the€jury€that€ð ða€child€means€a€person€under€eighteen€years€of€age.ðð€€Thus,Ïshe€concludes€that€her€class€A€sentences€(eighteen€years€on€each€count)€areÏunlawful.€€In€support€of€her€argument,€the€appellant€asserts€that€the€age€of€the€child,Ïprovided€in€subsection€(b),€constitutes€an€element€of€the€crime€charged.€ÏConversely,€the€State€contends€that€the€age€requirement€of€ðð€39„15„402(b)€is€merelyÏa€punishment€provision.€ÌÌà ` àOur€duty,€as€the€reviewing€court,€is€to€look€at€the€statute€before€us€andÏdetermine€what€the€legislature€intended.€€òòSeeóó€€òòSmithóó,€893€S.W.2d€at€917.€€ToÐ 4-2 Ðcomplete€our€task,€we€must€look€to€the€statuteððs€language,€its€structure,€the€subjectÏmatter,€and€the€context€of€the€challenged€provision.€€òòSeeóó€€òòNational€Gas€Distribs.€v.Ð ¨7 06 ÐStateóó,€804€S.W.2d€66,€67€(Tenn.€1991).€€At€the€time€of€the€present€offenses,€theÐ t9l28 Ðstatute€defining€aggravated€child€abuse€provided:ÌÓÓà8 ` à(a)€A€person€is€guilty€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse€whoÏcommits€the€offense€of€child€abuse€as€defined€in€ðð€39„15„401€and:Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€The€act€of€abuse€results€in€serious€bodily€injury€to€theÏchild;€orÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€€A€deadly€weapon€is€used€to€accomplish€the€act€ofÏabuse.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` à(b)€€A€violation€of€this€section€is€a€Class€B€felony;€òòprovided,€that,€if€theÐ   Ðabused€child€is€six€(6)€years€of€age€or€less,€the€ò òpenaltyó ó€is€a€Class€AÐ þ  Ðfelony.óóÐòê ` ü!` ü! ÐÓÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402€(emphasis€added).€€Additionally,€the€SentencingÏCommission€Comments€to€this€offense€advise€that€ð ð[a]ggravated€child€abuse€is€aÏclass€B€felony;€however,€if€the€child€is€age€6€or€less,€the€offense€is€òòpunishedóó€as€aÐ >6 ÐClass€A€felony.ðð€€Sentencing€Commission€Comments,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402Ï(emphasis€added).ÌÌà ` à€As€recently€recognized€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€there€areÏð ðcertain€circumstances€[under]€which€fundamental€fairness€would€require€that€aÏparticular€fact€be€treated€as€an€element€of€the€offense€.€.€.,€but€there€are€also€casesÏin€which€fairness€calls€for€defining€a€fact€as€a€sentencing€factor.ðð€€òòMonge€v.Ð Ò#Ê  ÐCaliforniaóó,€No.€97„6146€(U.S.€June€26,€1998).€€In€so€holding,€the€Supreme€CourtÐ ž%–" Ðrefused€to€adopt€an€absolute€rule€that€an€ð ðenhancement€constitutes€an€element€ofÏthe€offense€any€time€that€it€increases€the€maximum€sentence€to€which€a€defendantÏis€exposed.ðð€€òòMongeóó,€No.€97„6146€(citing€òòAlmendarez„Torresóó,€523€U.S.€at€„„„,€118Ð +ú#( ÐS.Ct.€at€1219€(1998)).€€Rather,€the€basic€rule€is€that€ð ð[a]€statutory€provision€is€aÏpenalty€enhancer€if€its€proof,€while€raising€the€felony€level€of€an€offense,€is€notÏnecessarily€required€to€secure€a€conviction.ðð€€òòPeople€v.€Leskeóó,€No.€96SC693€(Colo.Ð f0^). ÐApr.€13,€1998),€òòrehððg€deniedóó,€(May€18,€1998)€(òòfor€publicationóó)€(citing€òòAlmendarez„Ð 22*+0 ÐTorresóó,€523€U.S.€at€„„,€118€S.Ct.€at€1229).Ð 4ú,2 ÐÌà ` àGuided€by€these€principles,€we€conclude€that,€under€the€presentÏcircumstances,€fundamental€fairness€requires€that€the€fact€be€treated€as€a€penaltyÐ f9^28 Ðenhancer.€Considering€the€structure€and€plain€language€of€the€statute€and€theÏaccompanying€Commission€Comments,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€legislatureÏintended€to€create€an€additional€element€to€the€offense.€€€By€adding€the€ð ðprovidedððÏclause€in€subsection€(b),€the€legislature€did€not€create€an€offense€that€requires€proofÏof€elements€different€from€the€offense€proscribed€under€the€preceding€provisions€ofÏthe€statute.€€The€offense€proscribed€by€the€ð ðprovidedðð€clause€is€precisely€the€sameÏoffense€that€is€proscribed€by€the€main€portion€of€the€statute.€€The€legislature€merelyÏauthorized€an€enhanced€punishment€for€those€offenders€who€victimize€a€certainÏsubclass,€òòi.e.óó,€children€under€six€years€of€age,€of€those€individuals,€òòi.e.óó,€personsÐ h` Ðunder€eighteen€years€of€age,€sought€to€be€protected€by€criminalizing€such€abuseÏand/or€neglect.€€òòSee€,e.g.òòóó,€€óóòòAlmendarez„Torres€v.€United€Statesóó,€523€U.S.€at€„„,€118Ð ü ÐS.Ct.€at€1219€(interpreting€€8€U.S.C.€ðð€1326(b)(2)€as€a€penalty€provision€rather€thanÏan€additional€element);€òòChaine€v.€Commonwealthóó,€436€S.E.2d€187,€190€(Va.€App.Ð  ˜ Ð1993),òò€òòaffiððd€on€rehððgóóóó,€(Nov.€17,€1993)€(clause€setting€forth€age€requirement€inÐ ld Ðsodomy€statute€establishes€penalty€provision).€Ìà ` à€€Ìà ` àAdditionally,€in€the€present€case,€the€appellant€could€have€anticipated€aÏsentence€for€a€class€A€felony.€€Both€counts€of€the€indictment€provided€the€appellantÏwith€notice€of€the€age€of€the€children.€€At€trial,€there€was€no€factual€dispute€regardingÏthe€age€of€the€two€children.€€Although€the€trial€court€did€not€explicitly€instruct€the€juryÏregarding€subsection€(b)€of€the€offense,€the€court€did€instruct€the€jury€that€ð ðtheÏpunishment€for€this€offense€is€not€less€than€fifteen€years€nor€more€than€twenty„fiveÏyears€imprisonment,ðð€the€sentencing€range€for€a€class€A€felony.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€CodeÐ œ.”', ÐAnn.€ðð€40„35„112(a)(1)€(1990).€€€No€objection€was€made€to€this€charge.€€òòCfóó.€€òòState€v.Ð h0`). ÐPalmeróó,€No.€01C01„9607„CR„00285€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Nashville,€Nov.€20,€1997).€€Ð 42,+0 ÐIn€light€of€our€interpretation€that€subsection€(b)€merely€constitutes€a€punishmentÏprovision€and€considering€the€circumstances€at€trial,€we€cannot€conclude€that€anyÏerror€exists.€€The€appellantððs€claim€is€without€merit.€€ÌÐ d9\28 Ðà@)®àò òConclusionó óˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àFinding€no€reversible€error€committed€by€the€trial€court,€we€affirm€theÏappellantððs€convictions€and€sentences€imposed€for€two€counts€of€aggravated€childÏabuse.Ìà ` àÌÌÌà ` àÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JudgeÌ