ÿWPC{" …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µw@Ý4 1 @ 0†H 0DÎ 0J 0T\ 0^° 0h 0rv 0|è 0†d 0ê 1uz 0dï BSU>pB)®DC×U* AMDÝ‘ D3nÄ¡ e 0@rZ² [*v~…vÓ AOÖ Æ%! 0Dë! D//" B^"˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ 5 D6 7 8 9 : ; D< U= U> Ó€Ô¡¨ xyz{|}~˜ˆ3|xG (6(2Õ4$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó('Ã$3òòÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd< Œ 9p`(Arial€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÓÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌMay€7,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó""""'ÿÿdxd ºÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝOur€reading€of€òòGangeróó€does€not€reveal€a€listing€of€limitations€for€specialÏprosecutors€who€are€handling€a€civil€case€arising€out€of€the€same€offense.€€òòGangeróóÏunequivocally€condemns€such€a€practice€as€violative€of€due€process.€€òòGangeróó€at€714.€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€1995€amendment€to€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401€authorizes€a€defendant€to€object€to€theÏemployment€of€special€prosecutors€and€directs€the€court€to€make€a€specific€finding€as€toÏwhether€they€have€a€conflict€of€interest€as€provided€by€law.€€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401(b)(Supp›.1996).€€The€amendment€was€not€in€effect€at€the€time€of€this€trial.€€Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò PÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€the€event€the€special€prosecutors€had€the€civil€case€on€a€contingency€fee€basis,Ïthen€they€would€have€a€direct€financial€interest€in€the€criminal€proceeding€leading€to€anÏirreconcilable€conflict.€The€trial€court€made€no€finding€regarding€this€issue;€therefore,Ïneither€do€we.€€Regardless€of€the€method€of€compensation,€counsel€derives€advantagesÏfrom€a€conviction.€€Moran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutorsóó€at€1158.€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAs€stated€in€Footnote€1,€òòGangeróó€flatly€prohibits€prosecution€under€theseÏcircumstances.€€Ì QÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€statute€only€requires€that€the€public€prosecutor€give€the€final€rebuttal€argument.€ÏòòState€v.€Bennettóó,€798€S.W.2d€783,€786€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ќـ€ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€'ÔßR€()&A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àJANUARY€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9604„CC„00106Ìà àà àAppellee,à àà àà à)à àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àPUTNAM€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€LEON€BURNS,€JR.,ÌFABIEN€ELDRIDGE,à àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant.à àà àà à)à à(Attempted€Second€Degree€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Murder)ÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌóóFRANK€BUCKà àà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€œBURSONÌó ó124€West€Main€Streetà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌSmithville,€TN€37166ÌÌò òALAN€M.€DERSHOWITZà àà àà àà àKATHY€MORANTEÌó ó1575€Massachusetts€Avenueà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌCambridge,€MA€02138à àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òWILLIAM€EDWARD€GIBSONÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òBEN€FANNó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÏGeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à145€South€Jefferson€AvenueÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCookeville,€TN€38501ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìóóó óÌÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌJOE€G.€RILEY,ÌJUDGEÌó óÌÑ7€ îXXdðXXdð7Ñà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€ONó óÌÌÌÓÓóóà àThis€is€a€direct€appeal€from€a€jury€verdict€of€guilty€of€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder.€€The€defendant€was€sentenced€as€a€standard€offender€to€nineÏand€one„half€(9€ðð€)€years€in€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Correction€andÏfined€in€the€amount€of€$25,000.€€Defendant€presents€the€following€issues€for€ourÏreview:ÌÓÓà àà à1.€€whether€the€stateððs€failure€to€preserve€a€knife€andÌà àà àfailure€to€notify€the€defense€of€its€disappearance€violatedÌà àà àdefendantððs€constitutional€rights;ÌÌà àà à2.€€whether€the€trial€courtððs€jury€instruction€on€attemptedÌà àà àsecond€degree€murder€was€erroneous€due€to€the€failure€Ìà àà àto€include€specific€intent€to€kill€as€a€required€element€of€Ìà àà àthe€offense;€andÌÌà àà à3.€€whether€the€participation€as€special€prosecutors€of€Ìà àà àattorneys€who€also€represented€the€victim€in€a€Ìà àà àpending€civil€lawsuit€arising€from€this€incident€violatedÌà àà àdefendantððs€due€process€rights.ÌÌÓÓWe€find€the€prosecutorial€participation€of€attorneys€who€also€represented€theÏvictim€in€a€pending€civil€lawsuit€arising€from€the€same€incident€violatedÏdefendantððs€due€process€rights€and€was€prejudicial€to€the€judicial€process;Ïtherefore,€we€reverse€and€remand€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌà@ àò òI.€EVIDENCE€AT€TRIALó óòòÌÌà àóóAlthough€the€defendant€does€not€contest€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,Ïa€cursory€examination€of€the€stateððs€proof€is€appropriate.€€Ìà àThe€stateððs€proof€showed€that€the€defendant€was€angry€with€the€victimÏover€€something€that€had€happened€to€the€defendantððs€sister.€€The€defendantÏentered€the€victimððs€residence€with€what€appeared€to€be€a€knife.€€Upon€beingÏsummoned€to€the€scene,€the€officers€discovered€the€defendant€beating€theÏvictim.€€The€victim€was€covered€with€blood€and€had€lacerations€on€his€face.€€AÏknife€was€found€on€the€couch.€€Ìà àThe€defendant€was€convicted€of€attempted€second€degree€murder.€€ÌÌÌÌà@ àò òII.€€òòTHE€MISSING€KNIFEóóó óÌÌà àThe€defendant€claims€that€his€rights€under€the€Constitutions€of€the€UnitedÍStates€and€the€State€of€Tennessee€were€violated€by€the€stateððs€loss€of€anÏallegedly€blood„covered€knife.€€He€specifically€argues€that€the€state€violated€theÏstandards€for€disclosing€exculpatory€evidence€set€forth€in€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,Ï373€U.S.€83€(1963).›€€Alternatively,€he€alleges€that€the€state€acted€in€bad€faith€inÏits€handling€of€the€knife€in€violation€of€òòArizona€v.€œYoungblood›óó,€488€U.S.€œ51›Ïœ(1988).›Ìà àWhen€the€defendant€was€arrested,€Deputy€Sam€Lee€allegedly€recoveredÏfour€knives€from€the€home€of€the€victim.€€Deputy€Lee€apparently€never€sent€theÏknives€to€be€tested€for€blood€and€fingerprints.€€When€the€defense€viewed€theÏphysical€evidence€prior€to€trial,€one€of€the€knives€was€missing.ÌÌà@ àò òA.€€òòBRADY€V.€MARYLANDó óóóÌÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€state€did€not€disclose€that€the€fourth€knife€Ïrecovered€from€the€home€of€the€victim€was€blood„covered€and€had€beenÏmisplaced.€€He€contends€that€Deputy€Lee€knew€of€the€possibly€exculpatoryÏnature€of€the€knife€by€placing€it€in€a€separate€bag€from€the€other€knives.€€HeÏclaims€the€blood€on€the€knife€could€be€that€of€the€co„defendant€who€intervenedÏto€protect€the€defendant€from€the€victim,€thereby€supporting€the€defense€that€theÏvictim€was€the€first€aggressor.€€Thus,€he€urges€that€ð ð[œt]hese›€facts€were€plainlyÏððfavorableðð€to€the€defendant€and€would€have€been€ððmaterialðð€to€his€defense.ððÌà àIn€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€ð ðsuppression€by€theÏprosecution€of€evidence€favorable€to€an€accused€upon€request€violates€dueÍprocess€where€the€evidence€is€material€either€to€guilt€or€to€punishment,Ïirrespective€of€good€faith€or€bad€faith€of€the€prosecution.ðð€€373€U.S.€at€œ87›œ;›€œòòsee›Ïalsoóó€òòHartman€v.€Stateóó,€896€œS.W.2d›€94€(Tenn.€1995).€€However,€the€state€is€notÏrequired€to€disclose€information€that€the€defendant€already€possesses.€€òòState€v.ÏMarshallóó,€845€œS.W.2d›€228€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1992).Ìà àThe€defendant€knew€as€early€as€the€preliminary€hearing€that€four€knivesÏœactually›€existed€and€that€one€or€two€of€the€knives€had€blood€on€them.€€DefenseÏcounsel€asked€Deputy€Lee€about€the€knives€at€the€preliminary€hearing€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà àQ:à8 àð ðDid€you€find€four€kitchen„type€knives€at€the€sceneÏwith€blood€on€them?ððÌà àA:à8 àð ðI€found€one€I€know€for€sure,€I€think€possibly€two,Ïkitchen€knives€in€the€living€room€area€with€blood€onÏthem.ððÌœà à.›€.€.€.ÌÌà àQ:à8 àð ðDid€you€take€into€your€possession€four€„„€a€total€ofÏfour€kitchen€knives?ððÌà àA:à8 àð ðYes,€I€did.ððÌà àQ:à8 àð ðOne€of€which€was€blood€covered€and€the€other€oneÏyou€think€had€blood€on€it?ððÌà àA:à8 àð ðYes.ððÌÌÓÓà àSimilarly,€the€defense€was€also€aware€at€trial€that€one€of€the€knives€wasÏmissing.€€The€defense€investigator€viewed€the€physical€evidence€the€day€beforeÏtrial.€€Although€he€knew€that€four€knives€had€been€seized€by€the€SheriffððsÏDepartment,€only€three€knives€were€produced.€€All€of€the€knives€were€dirty,€butÏonly€one€had€what€appeared€to€be€blood,€food,€or€rust€on€it.Ìà àWe€conclude€that€òòBradyóó€was€not€violated€in€this€case.€€The€defense€wasÏaware€that€four€knives€were€seized€from€the€scene€and€that€there€was€blood€onÍat€least€one€of€the€knives.€€Further,€the€defense€knew€at€trial€that€one€of€theÏknives€was€missing€from€the€physical€evidence.€€The€state€did€not€suppress€anyÏof€this€information.€€The€defense€made€no€objections€during€trial,€nor€did€theyÏask€that€any€of€the€knives€be€tested.€€Therefore,€we€find€no€merit€to€this€issue.ÌÌà@ àò òB.€€òòARIZONA€V.€œYOUNGBLOOD›óóó óÌÌà àIn€the€alternative,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€state€exhibited€bad€faithÏin€its€failure€to€preserve€the€fourth€knife€as€potentially€useful€evidence.€ÏTherefore,€he€claims€that€the€state€infringed€on€his€right€to€due€process€of€lawÏunder€òòArizona€v.€œYoungblood›óó,€488€U.S.€œ51€(1988).›Ìà àIn€òòArizona€v.€œYoungblood›óó,€the€Supreme€Court€majority€held€that€failure€toÏpreserve€potentially€useful€evidence€can€be€a€denial€of€due€process€if€theÏdefendant€can€show€bad€faith€on€the€part€of€the€police.€€The€Court€noted€that€theÏpresence€of€bad€faith€necessarily€turns€on€the€policeððs€knowledge€of€theÏexculpatory€nature€of€the€evidence€at€the€time€it€is€lost€or€misplaced.€€òòIdóó.€at€œ56.›Ìà àIn€this€case,€we€are€confronted€with€many€differing€stories€as€to€the€nature€Ïof€the€missing€knife.€€It€is€unclear€from€the€preliminary€hearing,€the€testimony€atÏtrial,€and€the€post„trial€testimony€and€affidavits€whether€or€not€there€was€bloodÏon€the€knife.€€Deputy€Lee€stated€at€the€preliminary€hearing€that€maybe€twoÏknives€were€covered€in€blood.€€However,€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€newÏtrial,€Deputy€Lee€claimed€that€only€one€knife€had€blood€on€it,€and€he€kept€itÏseparate€from€the€others.€€Furthermore,€the€day€before€trial,€the€defense€sawÍonly€three€knives,€one€of€which€possibly€had€blood€on€it.€€Consequently,€we€areÏleft€to€speculate€as€to€the€exculpatory€nature€of€this€missing€knife.Ìà àIn€any€event,€the€defendant€has€not€demonstrated€that€the€police€acted€inÏbad€faith€in€its€misplacement€of€the€knife.€€The€mere€fact€that€it€is€missing€is€notÏan€indicia€of€bad€faith.€€Deputy€Lee€was€not€aware€of€any€exculpatory€value€ofÏthe€knife€at€the€onset.€€Any€€error€on€the€part€of€the€state€was€merely€negligence.€ÏAccordingly,€we€find€no€violation€of€òòArizona€v.€œYoungblood›óó.ÌÌòòò òà@ àóóIII.€€JURY€CHARGE€ON€ATTEMPTED€SECOND€DEGREE€MURDERòòÌÌà àó óóóDefendant€contends€the€jury€charge€on€attempted€second€degree€murderÏwas€deficient€by€failing€to€include€the€specific€intent€to€kill€as€an€element€of€theÏoffense.€€Ìà àThe€jury€charge€as€to€attempted€second€degree€murder€required€the€stateÏto€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€the€following:ÌÓÓà àà àð ð(1)€that€the€defendant€acted€knowingly€to€commit€the€Ìà àà à€offense€of€second€degree€murder;€andÌÌà àà à€(2)€that€the€defendant€acted€with€intent€to€complete€a€courseÌà àà à€of€action€or€cause€a€result€that€would€constitute€second€Ìà àà à€degree€murder€under€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€Ìà àà à€conduct€as€the€person€believed€them€to€be€and€the€conduct€Ìà àà à€constituted€a€substantial€step€toward€the€commission€ofÌà àà à€second€degree€murder.€€ÌÌÌÌà àà à€Conduct€does€not€constitute€a€€substantial€step€unless€Ì€à àà à€the€defendantððs€entire€course€of€action€is€corroborative€of€theÏintent€à àà à€to€commit€the€offense.ÌÌà àà à€Before€you€find€the€defendant€guilty€of€attemptedÌà àà à€second€degree€murder,€you€must€be€satisfied€beyond€a€Ìà àà à€reasonable€doubt€that€the€attempt€was€of€such€a€characterÌà àà à€and€made€under€such€circumstances€that€had€deathÌà àà à€resulted,€the€defendants€would€have€been€guilty€of€secondÌà àà à€degree€murder.ððÌÌThe€jury€charge€then€defined€the€elements€of€second€degree€murder€as€follows:ÌÌà àà à(1)€that€the€defendant€unlawfully€killed€the€alleged€victim;€andÌÌà àà à(2)€that€the€killing€was€knowing.ÌÌà àà à....ÌÌà àà àThe€requirement€of€ð ðknowingðð€is€also€established€if€it€is€shownÌà àà àthat€the€defendant€acted€intentionally.ÌÌà àà àð ðIntentionalðð€means€that€a€person€acts€intentionally€with€respectÌà àà àto€the€nature€of€the€conduct€or€to€a€result€of€the€conduct€whenÌà àà àit€is€the€personððs€conscious€objective€or€desire€to€engage€in€the€Ìà àà àconduct€or€cause€the€result.ÌÌà àà àð ðKnowingðð€means€that€a€person€acts€knowingly€with€respectÌà àà àto€the€conduct€or€to€circumstances€surrounding€the€conductÌà àà àwhen€the€person€is€aware€of€the€nature€of€the€conduct€and€thatÌà àà àthe€circumstances€exist.€€A€person€acts€knowingly€with€respect€Ìà àà àto€a€result€of€the€personððs€conduct€when€the€person€is€Ìà àà àaware€that€the€conduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€the€result.ÌÌÓÓÌà àThe€jury€charge€used€by€the€trial€court€was€identical€to€the€pattern€juryÏcharge€on€criminal€attempt.€€œT.P.I.›€„€œCrim›.€4.01€(œ3rd›€ed.€1992).€€This€patternÏcharge€does€not€expressly€state€that€a€defendant€must€intend€to€commit€theÏspecific€offense€of€second€degree€murder.€€The€new€edition,€œT.P.I.›€„€œCrim›.€4.01Ï(œ4th›€ed.€1995),€expressly€includes€the€defendantððs€intent€to€commit€the€specificÏoffense€as€an€essential€element.€€Unfortunately,€this€pattern€charge€had€notÍbeen€published€at€the€time€of€trial.€€Ìà àFurthermore,€òòState€v.€œKimbrough›óó,€924€œS.W.2d›€888€(Tenn.€1996)€had€notÏbeen€decided€at€the€time€of€trial.€€òòœKimbrough›óó€definitively€holds€that€an€attempt€toÏcommit€murder€requires€a€specific€intent€to€kill.€€òòIdóó.€at€891.Ìà àThe€alleged€omission€from€the€jury€charge€was€not€brought€to€theÏattention€of€the€trial€judge.€€Nevertheless,€the€failure€to€make€such€an€objectionÏdoes€not€bar€the€defendant€from€using€it€as€a€basis€of€the€motion€for€new€trial.€€T.ÏR.€œCr›.€P.€30(b).€€Although€counsel€must€raise€a€contemporaneous€objection€toÏan€incomplete€jury€charge,€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Haynesóó,€720€œS.W.2d›€76€(Tenn.€œCrim›.ÏœApp›.€1986),€there€is€no€requirement€for€an€objection€to€the€inclusion€of€anÏerroneous€instruction€or€otherwise€inaccurate€charge.€€òòState€v.€Staffordóó,€670ÏœS.W.2d›€243€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1984).Ìà àCertainly,€the€language€in€the€new€pattern€charge€requiring€as€anÏelement€of€the€offense€ð ðthat€the€defendant€intended€to€commit€the€specificÏoffense€of€[second€degree€murder]ðð€is€preferable.€€However,€the€jury€charge€inÏthe€instant€case€implicitly€required€a€finding€of€the€intent€to€commit€secondÏdegree€murder.€€The€charge€required€the€jury€to€find€that€ð ðthe€defendant€òòactedÏwith€intentóó€to€complete€a€course€of€action€or€cause€a€result€that€would€constituteÏsecond€degree€murder...ðð€(emphasis€added).€€The€charge€further€required€aÏfinding€that€the€defendantððs€ð ðconduct€constitute€a€substantial€step€toward€theÏcommission€of€second€degree€murderðð€with€the€defendantððs€entire€course€ofÏaction€ð ðcorroborative€of€the€òòintentóó€to€commit€the€offense.ðð€(emphasis€added).€ÏThis€can€only€be€interpreted€to€require€an€intent€to€commit€second€degreeÍmurder.Ìà àIn€determining€that€criminal€attempt€requires€a€specific€intent,€òòœKimbrough›óóÏemphasized€the€language€ð ðintent€to€complete€a€course€of€action€or€cause€aÏresultðð€in€our€criminal€attempt€statute.€€òòSupraóó€at€889„890;€€T.€C.€A.€ðð€39„12„101(a)(3).€€We€conclude€this€language€in€the€statute,€which€was€expresslyÏcharged€to€the€jury,€€sufficiently€encompasses€the€specific€intent€required€forÏcriminal€attempt.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àThis€issue€is€without€merit.€€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà@ àòòò òSPECIAL€PROSECUTORSóóó óÌÌà àDefendant€next€asserts€that€the€participation€as€special€prosecutors€of€theÏvictimððs€attorneys€who€were€actively€litigating€a€related€pending€civil€lawsuitÏviolated€his€rights€to€due€process€of€law.€€We€agree.ÌÌÌà@ àò òA.€€Involvement€of€the€Special€ProsecutorsÌÌà àó óApproximately€seven€(7)€months€prior€to€the€criminal€trial,€the€victimððsÏprivate€attorneys€filed€a€civil€lawsuit€against€the€defendant€seeking€$1,000,000Ïin€compensatory€damages€and€$2,000,000€in€punitive€damages€for€injuriesÏarising€from€the€same€incident€prosecuted€in€the€criminal€case.€€ApproximatelyÏtwo€(2)€weeks€prior€to€trial€the€district€attorney€general€œby€letter€to€the€specialÍprosecutors€(1)€confirmed›€œthe›€participation€œof€the€special›€œprosecutors;›€œ(2)Ïadvised€that€various›€items€of€evidence€œwould€be€delivered€to›€the€specialÏœprosecutors;›€œ(3)€stated›€that€defense€discovery€would€be€completed€through€theÏoffice€of€the€special€œprosecutors;›€œ(4)€enclosed›€a€copy€of€òòœGanger›€v.€œPeyton›óó,€379ÏF.œ2d›€709€(œ4th›€Cir.€œ1967),€ð ðsetting›€forth€œsome›€limitations€for€special€prosecutorsÏwho€are€œhandling›€a€civil€case€arising€out€of€the€same€œoffense,ðð× ƒ+ ××  ×›€and€œ(5)Ïð ðdecline[d›]€any€further€involvement€due€to€our€busy€schedules,€other€than€theÏrequirements€of€òòœGanger›óó€and€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401.ðð€€Ìà àPrior€to€trial€the€special€œprosecutors›€served€several€motions€on€defenseÏcounsel.€€œAt›€trial€the€special€prosecutors€conducted€the€voir€dire,€argued€all€pre„trial€motions,€gave€the€opening€statement,€handled€motions€and€objections,Ïexamined€every€witness€for€the€prosecution€and€defense,€and€delivered€theÏprimary€closing€argument.€€The€only€active€involvement€by€the€assistant€districtÏattorney€general€was€making€the€rebuttal€argument€required€by€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401€at€which€time€the€assistant€district€attorney€œstated€to€the€jury:›ÌÓÓà àà àð ð...€Iððve€been€here€watching€two€young€prosecutors,Ìà àà àspecial€prosecutors,€and€three€young€defense€attorneys,Ìà àà àbut€the€law€says€I€have€to€come€up€here€and€give€the€Ìà àà àlast€argument€because€Iððm€an€Assistant€District€Attorney.ððÌÌÓÓà àAt€no€time€prior€to€trial€or€during€trial€did€defense€counsel€raise€anyÏobjection€to€the€participation€by€the€special€prosecutors.€€It€was€not€until€theÏdefendant€retained€other€counsel€to€represent€him€on€the€motion€for€new€trialÍthat€the€issue€was€first€raised€in€the€trial€court.€€In€denying€the€motion€for€newÏtrial,€the€trial€judge€found€that€the€œspecial€prosecutor€issue›€had€been€waived€byÏthe€failure€to€œobject.€€›€œBased›€upon€the€ð ðaffidavits€and€oral€testimony€of€the€DistrictÏAttorney€and€the€Special€Prosecutors€given€in€response€to€this€motion,ðð€the€trialÏjudge€found€that€the€district€attorney€maintained€appropriate€control€of€theÏprosecution€of€the€case.€€ÌÌà@ àò òB.€€Other€Jurisdictions€and€Tennesseeó óÌÌà àBeing€aware€of€the€special€dangers€inherent€in€private€œprosecutions,›Ïsome€states€prohibit€the€practice€œaltogether.›€€òòSeeóó€œPatricia€Moran,›€òòPrivateÏProsecutors€in€Criminal€Contempt€Actions€Under€Rule€42(b)€of€the€FederalÏRules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€54€œFordham›€L.€Rev.€1141,€1152€œ(1986)Ïóó[hereinafter€Moran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutorsóó].òò›Ìóóà àThe€majority€of€jurisdictions€that€allow€œthe€use›€of€private€prosecutors,€byÏstatute€or€case€law,€require€the€public€prosecutorððs€consent€and€retention€ofÏcontrol€over€the€case.€€òòSee€óóJohn€D.€œBessler›,€òòThe€Public€Interest€and€theÏUnconstitutionality€of€Private€Prosecutorsóó,€47€Ark.€L.€Rev.€511,€529€œ(1994)Ï[hereinafter›€œBessler,€òòThe€Public€Interestóó]€(citing›€numerous€cases€from€otherÏœjurisdictions).›€€œAnother›€restriction€that€is€placed€upon€the€use€of€privateÏprosecutors€in€most€states€is€the€prohibition€of€their€participation€in€related€civilÏmatters.€€œòòIdóó.›€at€529„530;€œMoran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutors›€óóat€1154,€n.€œ54›€(citingÏòòPeterson€v.€Petersonóó,€278€Minn.€275,€281,€153€œN.W.2d›€825,€830€(1967);€òòBorn€v.ÍStateóó,€397€P.œ2d›€œ924,€927€(Okl›.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1964),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€379€U.S.€1000Ï(1965);€òòCommonwealth€œv.€Musto›óó,€348€Pa.€300,€303„04,€35€A.œ2d›€307,€310Ï(1944);€òòState€v.€œBasham›óó,€84€S.D.€œ250,›€256,€170€œN.W.2d›€238,€241€(1969);ÏòòœCantrell›€v.€Commonwealthóó,€229€Va.€387,€œ393„94,€329›€œS.E.2d›€œ22,€26„27›€(1985);ÏòòState€ex€rel.€œKoppers›€Co.€œv.›€International€Union€of€Oil,€Chem.€&óó€òòAtomic€Workersóó,Ï298€œS.E.2d›€827,€831€(œW.Va›.€1982);€òòPeople€v.€Whiteóó,€365€Ill.€499,€511,€6€œN.E.2d›Ï1015,€1021€(1937).€€œWe€are€aware€of›€only€one€twentieth€century€case€holdingÏunequivocally€that€a€private€prosecutor€who€also€represents€plaintiffs€in€a€civilÏaction€arising€out€of€the€same€proceeding€presents€no€inherent€due€process€orÏethical€problems.€€œMoran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutorsóó›€at€n.€57€œ(citing›€òòHopkins€v.€Stateóó,Ï429€So.€œ2d›€1146,€1154€œ(Ala.›€œCrim›.€œApp›.€œ1983)).›Ìà àThere€is€statutory€authority€in€Tennessee€for€the€participation€of€specialÏprosecutors€retained€by€victims€of€crime.€€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401(1993)€provides€œas›Ïfollows:€ÌÓÓà àà àA€victim€of€crime€or€the€family€members€of€a€victimÌà àà àof€crime€may€employ€private€legal€counsel€to€act€asÌà àà àco„counsel€with€the€district€attorney€general€or€the€districtÌà àà àattorney€generalððs€deputies€in€trying€cases,€with€theÌà àà àextent€of€participation€of€such€privately€employed€counselÌà àà àbeing€at€the€discretion€of€the€district€attorney€general.€€Ìà àà àThe€district€attorney€general€or€a€deputy€shall€make€Ìà àà àthe€final€and€concluding€argument.€The€privately€retainedÌà àà àcounsel€shall€immediately€inform€the€district€attorney€Ìà àà àof€such€counselððs€œemployment.× ƒ, ××  ×›ÌÌÌÓÓThere€is€no€requirement€that€a€district€attorney€general€show€cause€for€theÏparticipation€of€a€special€prosecutor€in€a€criminal€action.€€òòState€v.€œVoltz›óó,€626ÏœS.W.2d›€291€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1981).€€ÌÌà@ àò òC.€Conflict€of€Interest€/Ethical€Dilemmas€Ìœó óÌ›à àThere€are€certain€inherent€conflicts€that€arise€due€to€the€differing€roles€ofÏthe€government€prosecutor€and€private€œprosecutor.›€€The€responsibility€of€aÏpublic€prosecutor€differs€from€that€of€the€usual€advocate€in€that€it€is€the€publicÏprosecutorððs€duty€to€seek€justice,€not€merely€to€convict.€€òòCode€of€ProfessionalÏResponsibilityóó,€Tenn.€œS.Ct.›€Rule€8,€œEC›€7„13.€€Unlike€a€private€prosecutor,€theÏpublic€prosecutor€is€not€only€an€advocate€but€also€must€make€decisionsÏnormally€made€by€an€individual€client,€and€those€affecting€the€public€interestÏshould€be€fair€to€all.€€òòIdóó.€€A€public€prosecutor€represents€the€government.€€AÏpublic€prosecutor€is€required€to€make€timely€disclosure€of€exculpatory€materials.€ÏœDR›€7„103(B).€€œÌà àOn›€the€other€hand,€private€counsel€has€an€obligation€to€zealouslyÏrepresent€the€client€so€as€not€to€prejudice€or€damage€the€client€during€theÏcourse€of€the€professional€relationship.€€œDR›€7„101.€€Counsel€has€a€duty€ofÏœfidelity,›€unquestioned,€continuing€fidelity€to€the€client.€€òòBrotherhood€ofÏLocomotive€Firemen€&€œEnginemen›€v.€United€Statesóó,€411€F.œ2d›€312,€319€(œ5th›€Cir.Ï1969).€€œA€special€prosecutor€is€placed€in€the€awkward€position€of€representingÏboth€the€government€and€the€individual€victim€or€family€of€the€victim.€€Ìà àThe›€dual€role€of€a€special€prosecutor€presents€other€ethical€dilemmas;Ïnamely,€œDR›€5„105€provides€that€a€lawyer€should€refuse€to€accept€or€continueÏemployment€if€the€interest€of€another€client€may€impair€the€exercise€ofÏindependent€judgment;€œEC›€5„1€provides€that€the€professional€judgment€of€aÏlawyer€should€be€exercised€solely€for€the€benefit€of€the€client,€free€ofÏð ðcompromising€influences€and€loyalties;ðð€œEC›€5„2€provides€that€a€lawyer€shouldÏnot€accept€employment€if€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that€personal€interestÏwill€ð ðaffect€adversely€the€advice€to€be€given€or€services€rendered€theÏprospective€client;ðð€œand€EC›€5„14€provides€that€independent€professionalÏjudgment€is€compromised€when€a€lawyer€is€asked€to€represent€two€(2)€or€moreÏclients€with€differing€interests.€€œIn€the€event€a€special€prosecutor€represents€theÏvictim€in€a€civil€case€arising€from€the€alleged€criminal€incident,€DR€7„105€wouldÏprohibit€participating€in€presenting€or€threatening€to€present€criminal€chargesÏsolely€to€obtain€an€advantage€in€a€civil€matter.€€Just›€as€a€special€prosecutor€mayÏbe€tempted€to€bring€a€tenuously€supported€prosecution€if€such€a€rewardÏpromises€financial€or€legal€rewards€for€the€private€client,€a€special€prosecutorÏmay€also€be€tempted€to€suggest€the€abandonment€of€a€meritorious€prosecutionÏif€a€settlement€providing€benefits€to€the€private€client€is€conditioned€on€aÏrecommendation€against€criminal€charges.€€òòYoung€v.€United€States€ex€rel.ÏœVuitton›óó,€481€U.S.€œ787,€805›€(1987).€€œÌ̛̜à@ àò òD.€òòYoungóóó óÌÌà àThe€most€compelling€analysis€of€the€inherent€conflicts€experienced€byÏspecial€prosecutors€is€set€forth€in€òòYoung€v.€United€States,€ex€rel.€Vuittonóó,€481ÏU.S.€787€(1987).€€Acting€through€its€supervisory€authority,€the€Court€citedÏnumerous€statutory€and€ethical€duties€giving€rise€to€conflicts€of€interest€and€heldÏthat€the€appointment€of€an€interested€special€prosecutor€in€a€criminal€contemptÏproceeding€is€so€fundamental€and€pervasive€that€the€conviction€requiresÏreversal€without€regard€to€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€particular€case.€€òòIdóó.Ïat€809„810.€€€€ÌÌ›à@ àœò òE.›€Due€Process€ViolationÌÌó óà àAlthough€òòYoungóó€strongly€condemned€interested€counsel€serving€asÏspecial€prosecutors,€the€Court€avoided€the€necessity€of€reaching€theÏconstitutional€issue€since€it€relied€upon€its€inherent€supervisory€authority€inÏcondemning€the€practice.€€œòòYoungóó,€481€U.S.›€at€œ809.›€€Obviously,€this€does€notÏpreclude€and€probably€only€foreshadows€a€constitutional€bar€with€respect€to€theÏuse€of€interested€private€prosecutors.€€œBessler,€òòThe€Public€Interestóó€at€571.€€In›Ïfact,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€had€earlier€considered€the€due€processÏimplications€of€prosecutorial€functions.€€œInòò›€óóòòMarshall€v.€œJerrico›,€Inc.óó,€446€U.S.€238Ïœ(1980),›€œthe›€court€found€no€due€process€violation€since€œno›€prosecutorial€officialsÏstood€to€benefit€œfinancially,›€and€œthere€was€no€realistic€possibility›€thatÏprosecutorial€decisions€would€be€ð ðdistortedðð€by€improper€œinfluences.€€òòIdóó.€at€250.€ÍHowever,€the€Court€left€open€the€possibility€of€due€process€violations€whereÏenforcement€decisions€are€motivated€by€personal€interest,€financial€orÏotherwise.€€òòIdóó.€at€249„250.›€€€€€€€Ìà àNumerous€cases€have€either€found€express€due€process€violations€orÏdue€process€implications€relating€to€the€participation€of€an€interestedÏprosecutor.€€œMoran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutorsóó›€at€1157€(citing€òòœGanger›€v.€œPeyton›óó,€379ÏF.œ2d›€709,€œ714€(4th›€Cir.€1967);€òòBrotherhood€of€Locomotive€Firemen€v.€UnitedÏStatesóó,€411€F.œ2d›€312,€319€(œ5th›€Cir.€œ1969);€òòDavenport›€v.€Stateóó,€157€œGa.€App›.€704,Ï705„06,€278€œS.E.›€œ2d›€440,€441;€òòState€ex€rel.€œKoppers›€Co.€œv.›€International€UnionÏOil,€Chem.€&€Atomic€Workersóó,€298€œS.E.2d›€827,€832€(œW.Va›.€1982);€òòPoloÏFashions,€Inc.€œv.›€Stock€Buyers€œIntððl›,€Inc.óó,€760€F.œ2d›€698,€704€(œ6th›€Cir.€1985);ÏòòPeople€v.€œZimmer›óó,€51€œN.Y.2d›€390,€395,€414€œN.E.2d›€705,€708,€434€œN.Y.S.2d›€206,Ï209€(1980);€òòPeople€v.€Superior€Ct.óó,€19€Cal.€œ3d›€255,€268„69,€561€P.œ2d›€1164,Ï1173,€137€Cal.€œRptr›.€476,€485€(1977);€òòœCantrell›€v.€Commonwealthóó,€229€Va.€387,Ï394,€329€œS.E.2d›€22,€26„27€(1985).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòWright€v.€United€Statesóó,€732€F.œ2d›Ï1048€(œ2d›€Cir.€œ1984).€€›€Ìà àWe€have€no€hesitation€in€concluding€that€the€participation€by€specialÏprosecutors€who€represent€the€victim€in€a€civil€matter€arising€from€the€sameÏincident€giving€rise€to€the€criminal€prosecution€is€a€violation€of€the€œdefendantððsÏrights€under€the€Due›€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€as€well€as€the€Law€of€the€Land€provision€in€Article€I,€ððÏ8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€Ìà àÌœà@ àò òF.€òòBennettóóÌÌà àó óThe€controlling€Tennessee€case€relating€to€special€prosecutors€is€òòState€v.ÏBennettóó,€798€S.W.2d€783€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€òòBennettóó€held€that€T.€C.€A.€ððÏ8„7„401,€the€statute€authorizing€the€employment€of€special€prosecutors,€doesÏnot€violate€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€or€the€Law€of€the€Land€Clause€contained€in€Article€I,€ðð€8€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Constitution.€€Notwithstanding€the€facial€constitutionality€of€theÏstatute,€the€Court€examined€the€actions€of€the€special€prosecutors€inÏdetermining€whether€their€actions€resulted€in€a€deprivation€of€a€constitutionalÏright.€€In€finding€no€constitutional€violation,€the€Court€found€as€follows:ÌÓÓà àà à(1)€the€special€prosecutors€did€not€engage€in€prosecutorialÌà àà àmisconduct;ÌÌà àà à(2)€òòthe€special€prosecutors€did€not€represent€the€familyóó€Ìà àà àòòof€the€victim€in€a€civil€case€arising€out€of€the€occurrenceóó€Ìà àà àòòwhich€gave€rise€to€criminal€prosecutionóó€(emphasis€added);ÌÌà àà à(3)€this€was€not€a€contempt€proceeding€which€arose€outÌà àà àof€a€civil€prosecution;€andÌÌà àà à(4)€the€district€attorney€general€maintained€control€overÌà àà àthe€prosecution€as€required€by€our€statute.ÌÌÓÓà àAlthough€òòBennettóó€upheld€the€constitutionality€of€the€statute,€the€actions€ofÏthe€special€prosecutors€must€be€examined€in€order€to€determine€whether€theÏapplication€of€the€statute€in€a€particular€case€results€in€constitutional€deprivation.ÌÌà@ àò òG.€€Due€Process€Application€to€Instant€CaseÌÌó óà àAn€analysis€of€the€activities€of€the€special€prosecutors€in€the€instant€caseÏclearly€reveals€a€due€process€violation.€€It€is€undisputed€that€the€specialÏprosecutors€represented€the€victim€in€a€civil€case€arising€from€the€incident€givingÏrise€to€the€criminal€prosecution.€€This€distinguishes€the€case€from€òòState€v.ÏBennettóó,€798€S.W.2d€at€786.€€As€zealous€advocates€representing€the€victim€inÏthe€civil€case,€counsel€would€best€serve€the€victim€by€securing€a€criminalÏconviction.€€Evidence€of€the€final€judgment€of€conviction€would€be€admissible€inÏthe€civil€trial€to€prove€the€facts€essential€to€sustain€the€judgment.€€òòTennesseeÏRules€of€Evidenceóó€ðð€803(22).€€In€addition€the€victimððs€position€in€the€civilÏlitigation€relating€to€the€request€for€punitive€damages€would€be€more€readilyÏprovable€with€a€criminal€conviction.€€Ìà àThe€special€prosecutors€endeavored€to€take€an€audio/visual€depositionÏof€defendant€in€the€civil€case€just€prior€to€the€criminal€trial.€€€This,€of€course,€is€notÏallowable€in€the€criminal€prosecution.€€It€resulted€in€an€order€from€the€civilÏtribunal€authorizing€the€taking€of€the€depositions;€provided,€however,€the€stateÏwould€not€be€permitted€to€use€at€the€criminal€trial€any€portion€of€the€depositionsÏinvolving€Fifth€Amendment€assertions.€€Ìà àThere€was€a€factual€dispute€as€to€whether€the€special€prosecutors€hadÏoffered€to€settle€both€the€civil€and€criminal€proceedings€for€a€sum€certain;Ïhowever,€this€factual€dispute€was€not€resolved€by€the€trial€court.€€Nevertheless,Ïthe€affidavit€of€one€of€the€special€prosecutors€indicates€that€he€discussed€theÏpossibility€of€Ñ  Ñsettlement€with€the€victim€and€was€advised€that€the€victim€wouldÍsettle€for€$250,000€to€$300,000,€ð ðbut€he€wanted€Mr.€Eldridge›€to€do€some€time€inÏjail.ðð€€The€affidavit€reveals€that€the€special€prosecutor€then€advised€defenseÏcounsel€of€the€settlement€offer€of€$250,000€to€$300,000€for€the€civil€case,€ð ðandÏthat€we€would€have€no€objection€to€Mr.€œEldridge›€pleading€to€a€lesser€includedÏfelony€offense,€possibly€aggravated€assault,€but€that€settlement€of€the€criminalÏmatter€would€be€left€up€to€the€district€attorneyððs€office.ðð€€Therefore,€it€is€apparentÏthat€payment€of€this€sum€of€money€by€the€defendant€would€result€in€a€favorableÏrecommendation€of€the€special€prosecutors€in€the€criminal€matter.€€œÌà àAlso€of€significance€are€the€pecuniary€advantages€that€could€benefit€theÏspecial€prosecutors.€€òòSeeóó€Moran,€òòPrivate€Prosecutorsóó€at€1158.€€Although›€it€isÏunclear€from€the€record€how€the€special€prosecutors€were€to€be€compensated€inÏœeither›€the€civil€œor›€criminal€case,€the€special€prosecutors€certainly€had€a€directÏinterest€in€the€outcome€of€the€criminal€proceeding.œ× ƒ. ××  ×›€€œÌà àThe›€inherent€conflicts€of€interest€of€the€special€prosecutors€are€indeedÏœobvious€and€irreconcilable.›€€Furthermore,€although€it€is€unnecessary€to€reachÏthe€issue€as€to€whether€the€district€attorney€general€retained€adequate€control€ofÏthe€prosecution,€it€is€at€least€apparent€that€the€special€prosecutors€had€virtuallyÏtotal€control€of€the€trial€proceeding.€€The€only€participation€by€the€assistantÏdistrict€attorney€general€was€in€making€the€rebuttal€argument€which€heÏacknowledged€to€the€jury€he€was€doing€since€ð ðthe€law€says€I€have€to€come€upÍhere€and€give€the€last€argument€because€Iððm€an€Assistant€District€Attorney.ðð€€œItÏwould€appear€the€public€prosecutor€followed€his€commitment€set€forth€in€hisÏletter€to€the€special€prosecutor€declining€ð ðfurther€involvement€due€to€our€busyÏschedules,€other€than€the€requirements€of€òòGangeróó× ƒ/ ××  ×€and€T.€C.€A.€ðð€8„7„401.ðð× ƒ0 ××  ×Ìà àWe,›€therefore,€conclude€that€defendantððs€rights€under€the€United€StatesÏand€Tennessee€Constitutions€were€violated€under€these€circumstances.€ÌÌà@ àœò òH.›€WaiverÌÌó óà àThe€state€contends€any€error€with€regard€to€the€participation€of€theÏspecial€prosecutors€was€waived€due€to€the€failure€to€object€prior€to€or€duringÏtrial.€€Ordinarily,€the€failure€to€take€available€action€to€prevent€or€nullify€theÏalleged€error€waives€the€issue.€€œT.R.A.P.›€36(a);€òòState€v.€Gregoryóó,€862€œS.W.2d›Ï574€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€œApp›.€1993).€€However,€an€error€which€has€affected€theÏsubstantial€right€of€a€defendant€may€be€noticed€at€any€time€in€the€discretion€ofÏthe€appellate€court€where€€necessary€to€do€substantial€justice.€€œT.R.Cr.P.›€52(b).€€Ìà àœð ðPlain›€œerrorðð›€or€œð ðfundamental›€œerrorð𛀜is›€recognized€under€œT.R.Cr.P.›€52(b).€ÏòòState€v.€œStephenson›óó,€878€œS.W.2d›€530€(Tenn.€œ1994);›€€œòòState€v.€Adkissonóó,€899ÏS.W.2d€626€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Plain›€error€is€an€egregious€error€thatÏstrikes€at€the€ð ðfairness,€integrity€or€public€reputation€of€judicial€proceedings.ðð€ÍòòUnited€States€v.€Rodriguezóó,€882€F.œ2d›€1059,€1064€(œ6th›€Cir.€1989).€€œSome›€errorsÏare€so€fundamental€and€pervasive€that€they€require€reversal€without€regard€toÏthe€facts€or€circumstances€of€the€particular€case.€€òòDelaware€v.€Van€œArsdall›óó,€475ÏU.S.€673€(1986).€€œÌà àIn›€determining€whether€the€appointment€of€an€interested€prosecutor€wasÏharmless€error,€òòYoungóó€declared€the€error€was€so€fundamental€and€pervasiveÏthat€it€could€not€be€harmless€error.€€òòYoung€v.€United€States,€ex€rel.€œVuitton›óó,€481ÏU.S.€at€œ810.€€What›€is€at€stake€is€the€public€perception€of€the€integrity€of€ourÏcriminal€justice€system.€€œòòIdóó.›€at€œ811.€€Some›€violations€represent€defects€in€theÏstructure€of€the€trial€mechanism€and€thus€defy€analysis€by€the€harmless€errorÏstandards.€€òòArizona€v.€œFulminanteóó,€499€U.S.€279€(1991);€òòState€v.€Boboóó,€814ÏS.W.2d€353€(Tenn.€1991).€€Although€we€are€conducting€a€ð ðplain€errorðð€analysisÏand€not€a€ð ðharmless€errorðð€analysis,€the€pervasive€error€that€goes€to€the€integrityÏof€our€judicial€process€is€relevant€under€either€analysis.€€›€€Ìà àWe,€therefore,€conclude€the€due€process€violation€is€plain€error€affectingÏthe€very€integrity€of€our€system€of€justice€to€the€extent€that€a€new€trial€is€the€onlyÏœremedy.›€€œÌÌà@ àò òConclusionó óÌÌà àIt€is€indeed€regretable€that€a€new€trial€must€be€conducted€for€reasonsÏunrelated€to€the€actual€merits€of€the€charge.€€It€is€further€regretable€thatÏdefendantððs€trial€counsel€did€not€raise€an€objection€before€trial€so€that€the€trialÍjudge€would€have€had€an€opportunity€to€timely€deal€with€the€issue€and€avoid€re„trial.€€We€certainly€do€not€fault€the€trial€judge€for€the€inaction€of€defense€counsel.€€Ìà àNevertheless,€the€issue€was€raised,€albeit€post„trial.€€Since€the€issueÏstrikes€at€the€heart€and€integrity€of€our€system€of€justice,€we€must€address€it€inÏspite€of€defense€counselððs€inaction.€€The€fundamental€right€to€due€process€mustÏbe€recognized€in€the€interest€of€justice.€€ÌÌ›à àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed,€and€this€cause€is€remandedÏfor€a€new€œtrial.€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóóJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGE›