ÿWPCø Ês«u- ×5Œ/w|öðácf€û -&bÊ)Þ’éÔðé³ïapâ‘áì{ÙÒ&`4(¬îbÏÜ 7ïo¤G~@úëªóó®ðZ鶬žÁ/–cË|'F áûcmwtÔ=xÑ!‰¯òK°$Ö¾J»Î ´‰d=¢Ò l3;áŹ}¨¤µ€öLVžL50­¿óÙø„J¿ÏÿEcµ²iIïyW'6¸O28AEeŽ;»T݉`–DÝ>МµP[§ŽÌçñ\å­Ž^M”¶¡ç¢ß/ úW%‰Ïc $G/³°j .QŽèÉgȨë·CܾbÕž'€F õÝqòuY:ÑÈ2;xµVoüÂ÷Z…# F U>Q % 0í• UB‚ 4Ä Ø n­ç U:” U:Î  " w@2 -r æŸ U:……………………………………………………… B¿¿¿¿¿ D3ÜÜÜ 0D AOSÆ¢¢ 0Dh D/¬ BÛ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(ÅÕÐ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÑ7€'CXXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiuM%3|x“ «<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regularß"Arial Regular Ñ Ü ÑÑ  Ñ ‚ Dƒ D„ … D† D‡ ˆ D‰ qeŠ Ó€ #Ñ#€ i Xÿÿd#Ñ ÜÔ€X\¸XXXÔÔ€ø XX\¸ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X\¸Xø ÔÐ  ÐÌApril€23,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒÕÐ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ7€{çXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÝ  Ýñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ñѰÑÑܰÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÑ€ í:ÑÔ€ X\¸XXXÔÑ7€ \¸ XXdæXXdÈ7Ññ‰ ñœñ‰ ñÑ€|0Ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññŠ ñœßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@E  ` 8ttxPXð  rß›ñŠ ñ€à8 ¸ àà@Ñ Ñ D¸ x¸ xàIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðà@#Dà€€€€AT€NASHVILLEà@@66-Rà€€€€€€€€€ˆÌà ¸ àà  à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€AUGUST€1998€SESSIONÌÌÓÓJACK€JOSEPH€EADS€andà À à)Ð 80 ÐCHRISTINE€EADS,€€€€€€€€€€€€€à À à)à  àÐ   Ѐà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ð ü  Ðà ¸ àAppellants,à h àà À à)à  àNo.€01C01„9710„CC„00485Ð êâ  Ðà ¸ à€€€€€à  àà h à€€à À à)Ð ÐÈ  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à€Williamson€CountyÐ ¶®  Ðv.à ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)€€€€€€€€€Ð œ”  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à€Honorable€Donald€P.€Harris,€Judge€Ð ‚z  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à h à€€€à À à)à  à€(Post„Conviction)Ð NF Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)€€€€€€€€Ìà ¸ àAppellee.à h àà À à)Ð  Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à  àà h àà À àà  àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:Ð ÌÄ ÐÌTrippe€Steven€Friedà h àà À àà  àJohn€Knox€Walkupà  àà x àÐ ˜ Ð302€Third€Avenue€Southà h àà À àà  àAttorney€General€of€TennesseeÐ ~v ÐFranklin,€TN€37064à  àà h àà À àà  àà p àandà È àà  àà x àà Ð àÐ d\ Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àLisa€A.€NaylorÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€General€of€Tennessee€¼à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à425€Fifth€Avenue€Northà x àà Ð àÐ ! Ðà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àJoseph€D.€Baugh,€Jr.Ìà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àP.O.€Box€937Ìà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àFranklin,€TN€37064Ìà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àñ‰ ñœ›ñ‰ ñÌà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJoseph€M.€TiptonÌJudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ >:639 ЇÓÓà@õõ)Dàòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óˆÐ  ÐÌà ¸ àThe€petitioners,€Jack€Joseph€Eads€and€Christine€Eads,€appeal€as€of€rightÏfrom€the€Williamson€County€Circuit€Courtððs€denial€of€their€petition€for€post„convictionÏrelief.€€The€petitioners€seek€relief€from€their€1992€convictions€for€aggravated€rape€andÏattempted€aggravated€sexual€battery,€for€which€Jack€Eads€received€concurrentÏsentences€of€twenty„five€years€and€two€years,€and€Christine€Eads€received€concurrentÏsentences€of€fifteen€years€and€one€year,€respectively.€€Both€petitioners€were€fined€threeÏthousand€dollars€for€the€attempted€aggravated€sexual€battery€convictions.€€This€courtÏaffirmed€the€judgments€of€conviction€in€òòState€v.€Jack€Joseph€Eads€and€Chris€Eadsóó,€No.Ð @8 Ð01C01„9307„CC„00229,€Williamson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€June€28,€1995).€€TheÏpetitioners€now€contend€that€they€received€the€ineffective€assistance€of€trial€andÏappellate€counsel,€arguing€that:ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 ¸ à(1)€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcounselñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€for€Jack€Eads€was€ineffective€on€appeal€forÏfailing€to€raise€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€andÏcounsel€for€Christine€Eads€was€ineffective€on€appeal€forÏfailing€to€argue€that€the€evidence€was€insufficientÏbecause€of€lack€of€medical€proof;Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ¸ à(2)€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcounselñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€for€both€petitioners€were€ineffective€at€trialÏand€on€appeal€for€failing€to€argue€that€the€petitionersÏwere€denied€a€unanimous€jury€verdict;Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ¸ à(3)€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcounselñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€for€both€petitioners€were€ineffective€at€trialÏand€on€appeal€for€failing€to€argue€that€the€indictmentsÏwere€invalid€and€that€they€were€amended€after€jeopardyÏattached€and€without€the€petitionersðð€consent;Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ¸ à(5)€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcounselñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€for€both€petitioners€were€ineffective€at€trialÏand€on€appeal€for€failing€to€argue€that€the€juryÏinstruction€on€reasonable€doubt€was€erroneous.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌÓÓÓ  ÓWe€affirm€the€post„conviction€courtððs€dismissal€of€the€petition.ÌÌà ¸ àThis€case€involved€sexual€encounters€between€the€petitioners€and€theÏminor€victim,€who€is€Jack€Eadsðð€granddaughter€and€Christine€Eadsðð€step„granddaughter.€ÏThe€two€incidents€for€which€the€defendants€were€convicted€were€described€in€thisÏcourtððs€opinion€on€direct€appeal€as€follows:Ð ~8v17 ÐÓÓÓ  Óà8 ¸ àThe€victim€recounted€that€.€.€.€.€Mr.€Eads€introduced€aÏvibrator€into€their€encounters.€€She€stated€that€duringÏone€of€the€encounters€her€grandfather€rubbed€her€withÏthe€vibrator€and€penetrated€her€vagina€with€the€vibratorÏuntil€she€screamed.€€She€testified€that€her€step„¼grandmother€was€present€while€this€occurred€and€ð ðððjustÏwatched.ððððÐ ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8 ¸ à.€.€.€.€She€stated€that€on€one€occasion€Mrs.€Eads€tried€toÏget€her€to€fellate€her€grandfather.€€The€victim€recountedÏthat€Mrs.€Eads€demonstrated€and€tried€to€convince€herÏto€participate€but€she€refused.€€Then€Mrs.€Eads€told€theÏvictim€that€she€ð ðððcan€do€it€with€her€hand€insteadðððð€andÏencouraged€her€to€participate€in€that€manner.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌòòÓÓÓ  ÓState€v.€Jack€Joseph€and€Chris€Eadsóó,€slip€op.€at€3„4.Ð ‚z  ÐÌà ¸ àAt€the€post„conviction€hearing,€Lionel€Barrett€testified€that€he€representedÏJack€Eads€at€trial€and€in€the€direct€appeal.€€He€testified€that€the€two€main€issues€heÏraised€in€his€appellate€brief€were€the€propriety€of€the€convictions€based€upon€theÏuncorroborated€testimony€of€an€accomplice€and€the€propriety€of€the€length€of€theÏsentences.€€He€admitted€that€he€did€not€raise€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€as€anÏñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñissue€becauseñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€he€believed€that€the€issue€had€no€chance€of€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñprevailingñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€and€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñthat€it€wasÏnotñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ñ€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñinñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€Jack€Eadsðð€best€interest€to€raise€the€issue.€€He€admitted€that€the€state€presentedÏno€medical€proof€at€trial,€but€he€said€he€remembered€making€a€strategic€decision€not€toÏraise€the€issue€on€appeal.€€He€said€that€the€fact€that€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñthe€state€presentedñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€no€medicalÏproof€of€the€offense€did€not€mean€that€the€offense€did€not€occur.€€ÌÌà ¸ àMr.€Barrett€admitted€that€he€did€not€challenge€the€indictments€or€anyÏamendment€to€the€indictments.€€He€said€that€his€method€for€determining€what€issues€toÏraise€on€appeal€was€to€examine€the€arguments€that€might€have€legitimate€success€onÏappeal,€and€limit€the€issues€raised€to€those€arguments.€€He€said€he€thought€theÏevidence€against€Mr.€Eads€was€strong.€€He€said€he€thought€the€accomplice€testimonyÏissue€and€the€sentencing€issue€were€his€strongest€arguments€for€appeal.€€He€admittedÏthat€he€did€not€object€to€the€language€of€the€reasonable€doubt€jury€instruction€at€trial€norÏdid€he€challenge€the€unanimity€of€the€verdict.Ð r8j17 ÐÑ í:ÑÑÜÜÑÑÑÑ  Ñà ¸ àJohn€Henderson€testified€that€he€represented€Christine€Eads€at€trial€andÏon€appeal.€€He€testified€that€the€two€main€issues€he€submitted€in€his€appellate€briefÏwere€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€and€the€propriety€of€the€verdicts€in€light€of€theÏuncorroborated€accomplice€testimony.€€He€admitted€that€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñthe€state€presentedñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€no€medicalÏproof€of€the€victimððs€injuries€at€trial,€but€he€said€that€he€did€not€recall€raising€that€issueÏon€appeal€as€a€part€of€the€sufficiency€argument.€€He€stated€that€he€did€not€attack€theÏindictments€or€any€amendments€to€the€indictments,€he€did€not€raise€the€issue€of€theÏunanimity€of€the€verdicts,€and€he€did€not€challenge€the€language€of€the€reasonableÏdoubt€jury€instruction.€€He€said€that€his€process€for€determining€which€issues€to€raise€onÏappeal€was€to€evaluate€the€case€and€decide€which€issues€might€be€most€successfulÏwith€the€appellate€court.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€theÏpetition.ÌÌà ¸ àUnder€the€Sixth€Amendment,€when€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€is€made,€the€burden€is€upon€the€petitioner€to€show€(1)€that€counsel'sÏperformance€was€deficient€and€(2)€that€the€deficiency€was€prejudicial€in€terms€ofÏrendering€a€reasonable€probability€that€the€result€of€the€trial€was€unreliable€or€theÏproceedings€fundamentally€unfair.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687,€104€S.Ð ”%Œ" ÐCt.€2052,€2064€(1984);€òòseeóó€òòLockhart€v.€Fretwellóó,€506€U.S.€364,€368„72,€113€S.€Ct.€838,Ð `'X $ Ð842„44€(1993).€€The€òòStricklandóó€standard€has€been€applied,€as€well,€to€the€right€toÐ ,)$"& Ðcounsel€under€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñConstitution.€ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€772Ð ø*ð#( ÐS.W.2d€417,€419€n.2€(Tenn.),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€493€U.S.€874€(1989).€€Ð Ä,¼%* ÐÌà ¸ àIn€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975),€our€supreme€courtÐ \0T). Ðdecided€that€attorneys€should€be€held€to€the€general€standard€of€whether€the€servicesÏrendered€were€within€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminalÏcases.€€Further,€the€court€stated€that€the€range€of€competence€was€to€be€measured€byÏthe€duties€and€criteria€set€forth€in€òòBeasley€v.€United€Statesóó,€491€F.2d€687,€696€(6th€Cir.Ð Œ7„06 Ð1974)€and€òòUnited€States€v.€DeCosteróó,€487€F.2d€1197,€1202„04€(D.C.€Cir.€1973).€€Also,Ð  Ðin€reviewing€counsel's€conduct,€a€"fair€assessment€of€attorney€performance€requiresÏthat€every€effort€be€made€to€eliminate€the€distorting€effects€of€hindsight,€to€reconstructÏthe€circumstances€of€counsel's€challenged€conduct,€and€to€evaluate€the€conduct€fromÏcounsel's€perspective€at€the€time."€€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñòòStricklandóó,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€466€U.S.€at€689,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2065;€òòseeóóÐ 80 ÐòòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982)€(counsel's€conduct€will€not€be€measuredÐ ü  Ðby€"20„20€hindsight").€€Thus,€the€fact€that€a€particular€strategy€or€tactic€failed€or€evenÏhurt€the€defense€does€not,€alone,€support€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance.€€DeferenceÏis€made€to€trial€strategy€or€tactical€choices€if€they€are€informed€ones€based€uponÏadequate€preparation.€€òòSeeóó€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñòòHellardóó,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ñ€629€S.W.2d€at€9;€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñòòDeCosteróó,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ñ€487€F.2d€at€1201.€€Ð 4, ÐÌà ¸ àAlso,€we€note€that€the€approach€to€the€issue€of€the€ineffective€assistanceÏof€counsel€does€not€have€to€start€with€an€analysis€of€an€attorney's€conduct.€€If€prejudiceÏis€not€shown,€we€need€not€seek€to€determine€the€validity€of€the€allegations€aboutÏdeficient€performance.€€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñòòStricklandóó,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€466€U.S.€at€697,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2069.€€Ð 0 ( ÐÌà ¸ àThe€burden€is€on€the€petitioner€in€the€trial€court€to€prove€the€factualÏallegations€that€would€entitle€him€to€relief€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f)€(1995).€€On€appeal,€we€are€bound€by€the€trial€court's€findingsÏof€fact€unless€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€in€the€record€preponderates€against€thoseÏfindings.€€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€755€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€In€this€respect,Ð ø*ð#( Ðthe€petitioner,€as€the€appellant,€has€the€burden€of€illustrating€how€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€judgment€entered.€€òòId.Ð .ˆ', ÐÌÓ  Óò òóóI.€€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEÐ (2 +0 Ðòòó óÓ  Óà ¸ àóóJack€Eads€contends€that€his€attorney€was€ineffective€for€failing€to€raise€theÐ 4ø,2 Ðsufficiency€of€the€evidence€on€appeal.€€Christine€Eads€contends€that€her€attorney€wasÏineffective€because,€although€he€did€raise€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€on€appeal,€heÐ ˜706 ÐÑ|0ÑÑ7€ O­ XXdð XXdæ7ÑÑ  Ññ‰ ñÑ|0ÑÑ7€ O­ XXdð XXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ|0ÑÑ7€ O­ XXdð XXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ|0ÑÑ7€ O­ XXdð XXdæ7ÑÑ  Ññ‰ ñdid€not€argue€the€fact€that€there€was€no€medical€proof€of€the€victimððs€injuries.€€The€stateÐ  Ðargues€that€the€petitioners€received€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel.ÌÌà ¸ àInitially,€we€note€that€there€is€no€constitutional€requirement€that€anÏattorney€argue€every€issue€on€appeal.€€òòJones€v.€Barnesóó,€463€U.S.€745,€750„51,€103€S.Ð 80 ÐCt.€3308,€3312€(1983);€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€747€(Tenn.€1993).€€AttorneysÐ ü  Ðhave€discretion€to€make€tactical€decisions€regarding€what€issues€to€raise€on€appeal,€andÏtheir€decisions€should€not€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñbeñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñsecond„guessedñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€by€the€appellate€courts.€€òòCooperóó,€849Ð œ”  ÐS.W.2d€at€747.ÌÌà ¸ àWe€conclude€that€the€petitioners€have€failed€to€show€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€determination€that€their€attorneys€were€notÏineffective€for€failing€to€raise€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€on€appeal.€€We€note€thatÏboth€a€jury€and€a€panel€of€this€court€on€direct€appeal€found€the€evidence€sufficient,Ïdespite€the€fact€that€there€was€no€medical€evidence.€€The€petitioners€have€failed€toÏshow€how€their€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñattorneysððñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€failure€to€raise€this€issue€on€appeal€constitutes€ineffectiveÏassistance€or€how€they€were€prejudiced.€€€€Ìà ¸ àÌÓ  Óò òII.€€JURY€UNANIMITYÐ `'X $ Ðó óÓ  Óà ¸ àNext,€the€petitioners€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcontendñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€that€their€attorneys€were€ineffective€at€trialÐ 8)0"& Ðand€on€appeal€for€failing€to€argue€that€they€were€denied€a€unanimous€jury€verdict.€ÏSpecifically,€the€petitioners€argue€that€their€attorneys€were€ineffective€for€failing€to€objectÏat€trial€and€raise€on€appeal€the€fact€that€the€state€never€elected€which€petitioner€was€theÏprincipal€and€which€was€the€aider€and€abettor.ÌÌà ¸ àWe€conclude€that€there€is€no€requirement€that€the€state€elect€between€aÏtheory€of€prosecution€of€each€petitioner€as€either€a€principal€or€an€aider€and€abettor.€ÏUnder€the€law€applicable€to€this€case,€aiders€and€abettors€were€deemed€principalÐ ˜706 Ðoffenders.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„1„303€(1982)€(repealed).€€The€liability€of€both€forÐ  Ðan€offense€is€the€same.€€The€exact€role€played€by€each€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñdefendant€isñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€inconsequential€asÏlong€as€the€jury€finds€that€both€had€the€requisite€mental€state€and€were€involved€in€theÏcommission€of€the€crime.ÌÌà ¸ àIn€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€920€S.W.2d€247€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995),€Williams€Ð ü  Ðwas€convicted€of€aggravated€rape€when€the€victim€identified€him€as€one€of€herÏassailants,€although€she€was€unsure€which€of€her€assailants€sexually€penetrated€her.€ÏThe€defendant€claimed€that€he€was€denied€his€constitutional€right€to€a€unanimous€juryÏverdict€because€the€verdict€did€not€indicate€whether€the€jury€found€him€to€be€the€actualÏperpetrator€of€the€offense€or€only€criminally€responsible€for€the€conduct€of€another.€€ThisÏcourt€affirmed€the€conviction.€€It€noted€that€jury€unanimity€problems€generally€relate€toÏthe€failure€to€elect€among€different€offenses.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€851€S.W.2dÐ ˜ Ð134€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Hoytóó,€928€S.W.2d€935€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñ1995).ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€€However,€itÐ d\ Ðdistinguished€Williamsðð€case€in€that€it€involved€one€particular€offense€occurring€duringÏone€criminal€event.€€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñòòWilliamsóó,€920ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€S.W.2d€at€257„58.€€It€concluded€that€WilliamsððÐ ü!ô Ðconstitutional€right€to€a€unanimous€jury€verdict€was€not€violated.€€ÌÌà ¸ àIn€the€present€case,€the€state€elected€two€separate€offenses€upon€whichÏto€proceed.€€The€stateððs€failure€to€elect€which€petitioner€was€the€principal€and€which€wasÏthe€aider€and€abettor€did€not€deny€the€petitioners€their€right€to€a€unanimous€jury€verdict.€ÏBecause€the€state€was€not€required€to€elect€and€the€trial€court€was€not€required€toÏinstruct€the€jury€that€whether€a€defendant€was€a€principal€or€an€aider€and€abettor€mustÏbe€decided€by€a€unanimous€verdict,€the€petitioners€have€not€demonstrated€that€theirÏattorneys€were€ineffective€for€failing€to€raise€the€issue€at€trial€or€on€appeal.€ÌÌÓ  Óñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñò òÐ  À5¸.4 ÐIII.ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€€VALIDITY€OF€INDICTMENTSÌó óÓ  Óà ¸ àThe€petitioners€contend€that€their€attorneys€were€ineffective€for€failing€toÐ àØ Ðargue€at€trial€and€on€appeal€that€(1)€the€indictments€against€them€were€invalid€and€(2)Ïthe€indictments€were€amended€without€their€consent€and€after€jeopardy€had€attached.€ÏSpecifically,€the€petitioners€contend€that€at€the€time€the€offenses€took€place,€aggravatedÏrape€and€attempted€aggravated€sexual€battery€were€general€intent€crimes.€€TheÏpetitioners€argue€that€the€indictments€failed€to€state€the€proper€mens€rea€and€that€theÏtrial€court€essentially€amended€the€indictments€by€instructing€the€jury€that€it€had€to€findÏthat€the€petitioners€acted€knowingly€or€intentionally.€€The€state€argues€that€the€issuesÏare€waived€because€the€petitioners€failed€to€raise€them€at€trial,€and€it€further€argues€thatÏthe€petitioners€have€failed€to€show€prejudice.ÌÌà ¸ àFirst,€we€note€that€the€petitioners€have€not€waived€the€issues€for€failing€toÏraise€them€at€trial.€€Waiver€might€be€an€appropriate€argument€if€this€were€a€directÏappeal,€but€now,€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñinñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñpost„conviction€proceedings,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€the€petitioners€argue€that€the€failure€toÏraise€the€issues€at€trial€resulted€in€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€These€issues€haveÏnot€been€waived€for€purposes€of€considering€the€effectiveness€of€the€petitionersððÏcounsel.ÌÌà ¸ àNevertheless,€the€issues€are€without€merit.€€First,€the€petitioners€argueÏthat€the€indictments€ð ðfailed€to€state€a€mens€rea€consistent€with€the€law€applicable€at€theÏtime€of€the€alleged€incidents.ðð€€The€indictments€charged€the€petitioners€with€ð ðunlawfullyÏand€feloniouslyðð€committing€the€offenses.€€The€offenses€occurred€in€1987€and€1988.€€AtÏthat€time,€aggravated€rape€was€defined€as€the€ð ðunlawful€sexual€penetration€of€anotherððÏaccomplished€under€certain€aggravating€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„Ð 42,+0 Ð603€(1982)€(repealed€1989).€€In€òòDykes€v.€Comptonóó,€978€S.W.2d€528€(Tenn.€1998),€ourÐ 4ø,2 Ðsupreme€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñcourtñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñconsideredñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€an€aggravated€rape€indictment€worded€the€same€as€the€oneÏbefore€us€under€the€same€aggravated€rape€statute.€€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñThe€courtñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€held€that€the€indictmentÐ ˜706 Ðsufficiently€alleged€aggravated€rape.€€Thus,€the€aggravated€rape€allegations€before€usÏare€sufficient.ÌÌà ¸ àAggravated€sexual€battery€was€defined€as€ð ðunlawful€sexual€contact.ðð€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„606€(1982)€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñ(repealed€1989).ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€€ð ðSexual€contactðð€requires€ð ðtheÏintentional€touching€of€the€victimððs€or€actorððs€intimate€parts€or€the€intentional€touching€ofÏthe€clothing€covering€the€immediate€area€of€the€victimððs€or€actorððs€intimate€parts,€if€thatÏintentional€touching€can€reasonably€be€construed€as€being€for€the€purpose€of€sexualÏarousal€or€gratification.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„602€(1982).€€This€reflects€a€specificÏintent.€€Obviously,€the€attempt€to€commit€a€sexual€battery€requires€a€specific€intent.€ÏHowever,€historically,€the€word€ð ðfeloniouslyðð€has€meant€ð ð[p]roceeding€from€an€evil€heartÏor€purpose;€done€with€a€deliberate€intention€of€committing€a€crime.ðð€€òòBlackððs€LawÐ ÌÄ ÐDictionaryóó€(6th€ed.€1990).€€As€our€supreme€court€has€previously€noted,€ð ðone€meaningÐ ˜ Ðattached€to€the€word€is:€ððIn€a€legal€sense,€done€with€the€intent€to€commit€a€crime.ðððð€òòStateÐ d\ Ðv.€Smithóó,€119€Tenn.€521,€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñ526,ñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€105€S.W.€68,€70€(1907).€€We€believe€that€the€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñindictmentsñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñÐ 0 ( Ðin€the€present€case€sufficiently€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñallegeñ€ ñ€theñ€ ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€offenses.ÌÌà ¸ àNext,€the€petitioners€argue€that€the€trial€courtððs€instruction€to€the€jury€thatÏthe€petitioners€must€have€acted€intentionally€or€knowingly€amended€the€indictmentÏwithout€their€consent.€€Again,€the€petitioners€have€failed€to€demonstrate€how€theirÏattorneysðð€failure€to€object€to€the€instruction€resulted€in€any€prejudice.€€We€agree€withÏthe€trial€court€that,€if€anything,€the€instruction€helped€the€petitioners€by€requiring€theÏstate€to€prove€a€more€culpable€mental€state€than€was€actually€required.€€This€issue€isÏwithout€merit.€€€€€€€€ÌÌÓ  Óà @¸ à€€€€€€ò òIV.€€JURY€INSTRUCTIONÐ ô3ì,2 Ðó óÓ  Óà ¸ àThe€petitioners€contend€that€their€attorneys€were€ineffective€at€trial€and€onÐ Ì5Ä.4 Ðappeal€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ññ‡ ñforñ‡ ññˆ ñbyñˆ ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€failing€to€argue€that€the€trial€courtððs€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ññ ñreasonabñ ññ‚ ññ ñañ ññ‚ ññ ñle€doubt€ñ ñinstructionñƒ ñ›€to›€the›€jury›€on›€reasonable›€doubtñƒ ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€wasÐ ˜706 Ðerroneous€because€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ññ„ ñitñ„ ññ… ñthe›€trial›€courtñ… ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñincludedñ† ñ€in›€the›€jury›€instructionsñ† ññ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ññ‰ ññ‰ ñ€the€phrase€ð ðmoral€certainty.ðð€€The€state€contends€that€theÏtrial€court€correctly€determined€that€the€instruction€was€proper,€thus€counsel€did€not€errÏby€not€raising€the€issue.€€We€agree.ÌÌà ¸ àThe€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€as€follows:ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 ¸ àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,Ïafter€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€toÏthe€certainty€of€guilt.€€Reasonable€doubt€does€not€meanÏa€captious,€possible€or€imaginary€doubt.€€AbsoluteÏcertainty€of€guilt€is€not€demanded€by€the€law€to€convictÏof€any€criminal€charge,€but€moral€certainty€is€required,Ïand€this€certainty€is€required€as€to€every€proposition€ofÏproof€requisite€to€constitute€the€offense.Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌÓÓÓ  ÓThis€is€a€correct€statement€of€the€burden€of€proof€for€criminal€trials€in€Tennessee.€€òòSeeóóÐ ø ÐòòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€734€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Sextonóó,€917€S.W.2d€263,Ð ÌÄ Ð266€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364,€366€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð ˜ ÐApp.€1994).€€Thus,€the€trial€court€correctly€determined€that€the€attorneysðð€failure€toÏobject€at€trial€and€to€raise€the€issue€on€appeal€did€not€result€in€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel.ÌÌà ¸ àIn€consideration€of€the€foregoing€and€the€record€as€a€whole,€we€affirm€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÓÓà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È à__________________________Ìà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________ÌJoe€G.€Riley,€Jr.,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_______________________ÌThomas€T.€Woodall,€ñ‰ ñœñ‰ ñJudgeñ‰ ñ›ñ‰ ñ