ÿWPCù …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 0lH 0D´ ø 0J 0TJ 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh 0dÝ U>AU*B)©DCÒ AMbs D3s B¦v~à 0@AvÓ AOTÆ£ 0Di D/­ BܘHP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ÌÍDÎDÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÓ€Ô¡¨ 3|xÞ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌFebruary€28,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó öÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ôÔ€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„13„213(a)(2)€and€„213(a)(1).Ì++++'ÿÿdxd dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#ŠÔÔ€$ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€·TXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€'(&A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌNOVEMBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9510„CR„00348Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JAMES€R.€EVERETT,€JR.ó óÌò òJERRY€DOUGLAS€à àà à)à àJUDGE€(Deceased)ó ó€Ìò òFRANKLIN,à àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àó ó(Vehicular€Homicide)ò òÌó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌPROBATE€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌC.€EDWARD€FOWLKESà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌ172€Second€Avenue€Northà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌSuite€214ÌNashville,€TN€37201à àà àà àJANIS€L.€TURNERÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àVICTOR€S.€JOHNSONÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àBERNARD€MCEVOYÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWashington€Square,€Suite€500Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à222€Second€Avenue€NorthÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37201„1649ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€$°ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€$ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThis€is€an€appeal€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€of€the€Tennessee€RulesÏof€Appellate€Procedure.€€The€Defendant,€Jerry€Douglas€Franklin,€was€convictedÏby€a€Davidson€County€jury€of€one€count€of€vehicular€homicide.€€He€wasÏsentenced€to€three€years€split€confinement,€with€one€year€of€confinement€to€beÏserved€at€œone€hundred›€percent.€€His€driverððs€license€was€revoked€for€threeÏyears.€€He€challenges€both€his€conviction€and€sentence.ÌÌà àIn€this€appeal,€the€Defendant€presents€seven€issue€for€review:Ìà à(1)€That€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€the€Defendantððs€motion€toÏsuppress€the€results€of€a€blood€alcohol€test€because€the€sample€had€beenÏdestroyed€and€the€Defendant€was€unable€to€conduct€an€independent€bloodÏtest;à àÌà à(2)€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€dismissing€the€motion€to€suppress€theÏresults€of€the€blood€alcohol€test€without€a€hearing;Ìà à(3)€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€admitting€an€excerpt€of€a€television€interviewÏgiven€by€the€Defendant;Ìà à(4)€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€the€Defendantððs€motion€toÏsuppress€his€statement€made€to€the€investigating€police€officer€at€the€accidentÏscene;Ìà à(5)€that€the€sentence€imposed€was€excessive;Ìà à(6)€that,€without€the€blood€test€results,€the€evidence€is€insufficient€toÏsupport€a€verdict€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt;€andÌà à(7)€that€the€trial€judge€committed€prejudicial€error€by€commenting€on€theÏevidence.Ì€After€careful€consideration€of€the€issues€on€appeal,€we€find€no€reversible€errorÏand€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€We€remand€solely€for€the€purpose€ofÏentering€an€order€consistent€with€our€findings€regarding€the€Defendantððs€driverððsÏlicense€revocation.ÌÌà àWe€begin€with€a€discussion€of€the€facts.€€On€January€9,€1994,€theÏDefendant€and€a€friend,€Dwight€Tankersley,€spent€the€evening€socializing.€TheÏDefendant€visited€Mr.€Tankersley€at€his€parentsðð€house€sometime€around€10:00Ïp.m.,€where€they€watched€television.€€The€Defendant€denies€drinking€anyÏalcoholic€beverages€while€he€was€there.€€At€some€point,€the€two€decided€to€goÏto€Rodeos,€a€Nashville€country„western€bar.€€When€they€arrived,€they€spokeÏbriefly€with€the€Defendantððs€uncle,€who€worked€as€a€security€guard€in€theÏparking€lot€of€the€bar.€€They€then€entered€the€bar,€walked€around€theÍestablishment,€played€darts€and€shot€pool.€€The€Defendant€admits€to€drinkingÏthree€beers€and€one€ð ðshooter.ðð€€The€Defendant€met€his€girlfriend€at€the€bar€andÏmade€plans€to€see€her€later€at€his€house.ÌÌà àAt€some€point€after€midnight,€the€Defendant€decided€to€return€home€andÏhe€and€Mr.€Tankersley€left€the€bar.€€Several€witnesses€testified€that€theÏDefendant€either€was€not€drinking€or€that€he€did€not€appear€intoxicated.€€TheÏDefendant€was€driving€his€sisterððs€vehicle,€a€grey,€Nissan€sports€car,€and€Mr.ÏTankersley€was€in€the€front€passenger€seat.€€€Mr.€Tankersley€lived€several€milesÏfrom€the€bar€and€they€proceeded€on€Murfreesboro€Road€and€turned€left€onÏMcCory€Creek€Road.€€It€is€at€this€point€that€the€Defendant€and€the€victim,€Mr.ÏTankersley,€were€involved€in€a€one„car€accident.€€The€Defendant€testified€that€heÏdoes€not€remember€any€of€the€events€that€caused€his€car€to€veer€off€the€road.ÌÌà àAt€approximately€1:30€a.m.€on€January€10,€1994,€Michael€Crockett€wasÏtraveling€on€McCory€Creek€Road€and€noticed€a€car€in€a€ditch.€€He€had€gotten€offÏwork€shortly€before€that€time,€stopped€briefly€at€Rodeos€and€had€one„half€beerÏbefore€going€home.€€He€saw€the€car€on€the€left€side€of€the€road,€pulled€his€truckÏover€on€the€shoulder€and€turned€his€high„beam€headlights€on€the€car.€€He€sawÏthe€Defendant€in€the€driverððs€seat€and€went€over€to€the€vehicle.€€He€knocked€onÏthe€window€and€attempted€to€awaken€the€Defendant,€who€was€initiallyÍunresponsive,€but€who€eventually€rolled€down€his€window.€€Mr.€Crockett€helpedÏthe€Defendant€from€the€car,€at€which€time€he€heard€a€noise€from€the€passengerÏseat.€€Mr.€Crockett€had€the€Defendant€sit€in€his€truck€while€he€returned€to€the€car.€ÏHe€flagged€down€a€passing€motorist€to€call€911,€then€attempted€to€help€theÏvictim€in€the€passenger€seat.€€He€testified€that€it€was€apparent€that€the€victimÏhad€sustained€severe€injuries€to€his€chest€and€head.€€He€was€unable€to€elicit€aÏresponse€from€the€victim,€who€was€having€difficulty€breathing.€€The€paramedicsÏarrived€and€the€victim€was€transported€to€the€hospital.€€Mr.€Tankersley€wasÏpronounced€dead€upon€arrival€to€the€hospital€as€a€result€of€injuries€to€his€chestÏand€head.ÌÌà àThe€officer€who€responded€to€the€call€proceeded€to€investigate€theÏcircumstances€of€the€accident.€€He€approached€the€Defendant,€still€seated€in€Mr.ÏCrockettððs€truck.€€The€officer€opened€the€passenger€door,€and€noticed€a€strongÏodor€of€alcohol.€The€Defendantððs€eyes€appeared€watery.€He€asked€theÏDefendant€for€his€license.€€He€was€initially€unresponsive,€then€attempted€toÏreach€for€his€wallet.€€It€was€also€apparent€that€he€was€injured.€€The€officer€thenÏasked€him€whether€he€had€been€drinking.€€Although€at€œtrial›€it€was€disputedÏwhether€the€officer€asked€ð ðhave€you€been€drinking?ðð€or€ð ðhow€much€have€youÏhad€to€œdrink?,ð𛀀œthe›€Defendant€€replied:€ð ðYes,€Iððve€been€drinking.€€I€wonððt€denyÍthat.€€But€I€didnððt€start€out€drinking€and€driving.ðð€€The€officer€conducted€no€fieldÏsobriety€tests€because€€he€did€not€want€to€exacerbate€the€Defendantððs€injuries.ÌÌà àThe€officer€summoned€the€paramedics€and€the€Defendant€wasÏtransported€to€a€hospital€for€evaluation€and€treatment€of€his€injuries.€€BecauseÏthere€had€been€an€accident€involving€a€fatality€and€there€was€evidence€ofÏalcohol€use,€the€officer€ordered€a€blood€alcohol€test.€€Two€samples€were€drawn,Ïone€for€medical€purposes€at€the€hospital,€and€one€for€testing€at€the€TennesseeÏBureau€of€Investigation€laboratory.€€The€hospital€blood€test€revealed€a€.20%Ïblood€alcohol€level.€€The€T.B.I.€test€showed€a€level€of€.19%.€€The€expertÏtestifying€for€the€State€stated€that€these€levels€suggest€that€the€Defendant€hadÏconsumed€at€least€ten€alcoholic€œbeverages.›ÌÌà àAn€accident€investigator€for€the€police€department€evaluated€the€scene€ofÏthe€incident€and€determined€that€the€car€the€Defendant€was€driving€skidded€off€Ïat€a€curve€in€the€roadway.€€The€vehicle€left€the€road€and€hit€several€trees.€€TheÏprimary€impact€was€sustained€on€the€passenger€side€of€the€car.€€The€estimatedÏspeed€the€car€was€traveling€at€the€time€it€left€the€road€was€59€miles€per€hourÏwhile€the€speed€limit€was€40€miles€per€hour.ÌÌà àOn€May€4,€1994,€the€Defendant€was€indicted€for€vehicular€homicide€byÏintoxication€and€vehicular€homicide€by€reckless€driving,€both€Class€C€felonies.œ× ƒ) ××  ×›€ÏThe€Defendant€attempted€a€plea€bargain€agreement€which€the€trial€courtÏrejected.€€He€was€tried€by€a€Davidson€County€jury€and€convicted€of€vehicularÏhomicide€by€intoxication€on€May€17,€1995.€€He€was€fined€œfive€thousand›€dollarsÏ($5000)€by€the€jury.€The€Defendant€was€sentenced€on€June€13,€1995€to€threeÏyears€split€confinement,€to€be€incarcerated€for€one€calendar€year€with€theÏremainder€to€be€served€on€probation.€His€driverððs€license€was€revoked€for€threeÏyears,€although€the€judgment€filed€by€the€trial€court€on€July€3,€1995,€states€thatÏthe€Defendant€received€a€œten€year›€revocation.ÌÌÓ  Óà àI.ÌÌÓ  Óà àAs€his€first€issue,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏdenying€his€motion€to€suppress€the€results€of€the€blood€alcohol€test€conductedÏby€the€TBI€laboratory.€€He€asserts€that€he€attempted€to€obtain€a€sample€of€theÏblood€collected€by€the€TBI,€but€was€informed€that€the€blood€was€not€availableÏbecause€it€had€been€destroyed€in€accordance€with€a€laboratory€policy.€€TheÏDefendant€subsequently€filed€a€motion€to€suppress€the€blood€alcohol€testÍresults.€€€He€alleged€that€because€the€sample€had€been€destroyed€before€heÏwas€charged€and€he€was€thus€unable€to€conduct€his€own€test,€€this€deprivedÏhim€of€due€process€and€the€right€to€confrontation€guaranteed€by€the€Fifth€andÏSixth€Amendments€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Sections€8Ïand€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€he€has€a€right€to€a€sample€of€the€bloodÏspecimen€with€which€to€conduct€an€independent€test.€€This€is€supported€byÏrules€of€discovery€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€ProcedureÏ16(a)(1)(C)€which€provides€that€a€defendant€has€a€right€to€ð ðtangible€objects€.€.€.Ïwhich€are€within€the€possession,€custody,€or€control€of€the€State.ðð€€This€includesÏthe€production€of€a€blood€sample€for€independent€testing.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Gaddisóó,Ï530€S.W.2d€64€(Tenn.€1975).€€Furthermore,€an€accused€has€a€statutory€right€toÏdemand€and€receive€such€a€specimen€of€blood€when€the€State€procures€aÏsample€for€testing€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€55„10„410(e).€€The€Defendant€acknowledges€that€the€State€is€not€required€to€preserveÏsamples€extracted€only€for€a€blood€alcohol€test.€€òòSeeóó€òòCalifornia€v.€Trombettaóó,Ï467€U.S.€479,€104€S.Ct.€2528,€81€L.Ed.2d€413€(1984);€òòState€v.€Gilbertóó,€751ÏS.W.2d€454,€461€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€œ1988).›€€Furthermore,€there€is€no€statutoryÏright€to€be€advised€of€the€privilege€to€obtain€a€sample€of€blood€for€independentÏtesting.€€òòState€v.€McKinneyóó,€605€S.W.2d€842,€846€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that,€unlike€òòGilbertóó€in€which€the€defendant€did€notÏfile€a€Rule€16€request€for€discovery,€he€has€filed€a€motion€to€produce€a€bloodÏsample€for€testing.€€However,€we€find€in€the€record€no€motion€for€discovery€filed€inÏthe€trial€court.€€There€is€evidence€that€the€Defendant€filed€an€affidavit€and€aÏmotion€to€suppress€the€blood€test€results€because€the€sample€had€beenÏdestroyed.€€The€Defendant€had€a€statutory€right€to€request€a€sample€at€anyÏpoint€after€which€it€was€obtained€and€could€have€submitted€a€Rule€16€motion.€ÏHe€complains€that€the€State€did€not€contact€the€TBI€laboratory,€but€we€cannotÏconclude€this€was€an€error€if€the€State€had€no€discovery€request.€€€ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€destruction€of€the€blood€sample€after€sixtyÏdays€was€an€improper€procedure€that€prejudiced€him,€particularly€because€theÏState€did€not€indict€him€until€May€4,€1994,€and€he€had€no€reason€to€request€aÏsample€prior€to€that€time.€€As€a€result,€he€asserts€that€this€infringed€upon€hisÏconstitutional€rights.€A€distinction€exists€between€a€statutory€right€to€discovery,Ïand€the€constitutional€right€to€the€production€of€exculpatory€evidence.€òòState€v.ÏBrownellóó,€696€S.W.2d€362,€363€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985);€òòHamilton€v.€Stateóó,€555ÏS.W.2d€724,€730€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1977).€€€The€suppression€by€theÏprosecution€of€evidence€favorable€to€an€accused€upon€request€violates€dueÏprocess€where€the€evidence€is€material€either€to€guilt€or€to€punishment,Íregardless€of€whether€the€prosecution€acts€in€good€faith€or€bad€faith.€€€òòBrady€v.ÏMarylandóó,€373€U.S.€83,€83€S.Ct.€1194,€1197,€10€L.Ed.2d€215€(1963).€€€Yet,€thereÏis€no€general€constitutional€right€to€discovery€in€a€criminal€case,€òòseeóó€€òòWeatherfordÏv.€Burseyóó,€429€U.S.€545,€97€S.Ct.€837,€846,€51€L.Ed.2d€30€(1977),€and€theÏState€is€not€obligated€to€make€an€investigation,€or€to€gather€evidence,€for€theÏdefendant.€€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Reynoldsóó,€671€S.W.2d€854,€856€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.1984).€€€€ÌÌà àHere,€the€Defendant€implies€that€the€State€failed€to€contact€the€laboratory€Ïto€determine€whether€the€sample€existed€because€TBI€Agent€Harrison€testifiedÏthat€he€did€not€recall€any€such€request.€€However,€we€are€not€convinced€that€aÏrequest€from€the€State€to€produce€the€blood€sample€was€mandated€becauseÏwe€have€no€evidence€that€the€Defendant€submitted€such€a€motion.€ÏFurthermore,€failure€to€produce€a€blood€sample€for€independent€testing€does€notÏnecessarily€implicate€a€òòBradyóó€violation.€€òòSeeóó€òòArizona€v.€Youngbloodóó,€488€U.S.Ï51,€109€S.Ct€333,€102€Led€2d€281€(1988).€€When€the€State€fails€to€preserveÏevidentiary€material€of€which€no€more€can€be€said€than€that€it€could€have€beenÏsubjected€to€tests,€the€Defendant€must€demonstrate€bad€faith€on€the€part€of€theÏpolice.€€œòòYoungbloodóó,€488›€U.S.€at€58,€109€S.Ct€at€337.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€Agent€Harrison€of€the€T.B.I.,€testified€concerning€theÏroutine€practice€of€the€laboratory€to€destroy€blood€samples€after€sixty€days.€€HeÏdid€admit€that€some€samples€may€be€preserved€for€several€months,€or€may€notÏbe€destroyed€exactly€at€the€sixty„day€point.€€The€Defendant€submitted€anÏaffidavit€from€an€independent€laboratory€that€states€that€blood€may€beÏpreserved€for€testing€for€as€long€as€ten€months.€€The€T.B.I.€agent€could€not€sayÏwith€certainty€when€the€Defendantððs€blood€sample€was€destroyed,€but€saidÏthat€it€was€destroyed€within€the€parameters€of€the€laboratory€policy.€€TheÏDefendant€suggests€that€this€practice€is€undesirable€and€resulted€in€prejudice€toÏhim.€€We€do€agree€that€the€lack€of€documentation€regarding€when€samples€areÏdestroyed€invites€confusion€and€a€lack€of€confidence.€€It€seems€more€prudent€toÏdocument€when€each€sample€is€destroyed.€€Yet,€we€cannot€conclude€that€theÏT.B.I.€or€the€police€acted€in€bad€faith€regarding€the€blood€sample€extracted€fromÏthe€Defendant.ÌÌà àBeyond€this,€the€Defendant€also€complains€that€the€timing€of€hisÏindictment,€well€after€sixty„days€from€when€the€blood€sample€was€drawn,Ïprecluded€him€from€€obtaining€an€independent€test.€€The€offense€occurred€onÏJanuary€10,€1994€and€the€indictment€was€issued€on€May€4,€1994.€€In€order€forÏthe€Defendant€to€establish€a€violation€of€his€due€process€rights€caused€by€aÏdelay€of€presenting€charges€against€him,€the€evidence€must€show€three€things:€Í(1)€That€there€was€a€delay;€€(2)€that€the€Defendant€was€prejudiced€by€theÏdelay;€€and€(3)€that€the€State€intentionally€delayed€the€prosecution€in€order€toÏgain€a€tactical€advantage.€€€òòState€v.€Tuttleóó,€914€S.W.2d€926,€930€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1995);€òòState€v.€Paul€Ray€Jonesóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01„C„01„9212„CR„00384,ÏDavidson€County,€slip€op.€at€3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Sept.€9,€1993)Ï(citing€òòUnited€States€v.€Marionóó,€404€U.S.€307,€92€S.Ct.€455,€30€L.Ed.2d€468Ï(1971));€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990);€òòsee€alsoóóÏòòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352€(Tenn.1981).€€The€State€is€not€constitutionallyÏrequired€to€prosecute€as€soon€as€probable€cause€exists€nor€must€the€State€fileÏcharges€when€evidence€exists€to€prove€the€offense€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Lovascoóó,€431€U.S.€783,€791,€97€œS.Ct.›€2044,€52€œL.›ÏœEd.2d›€752€(1976).€€An€investigative€delay€does€not€deprive€a€defendant€of€dueÏœprocess›€absent€bad€faith.€€œòòLovascoóó,€431›€U.S.€at€796,€97€œS.Ct.›€at€2052.€ÏAlthough€the€Defendant€did€not€obtain€a€blood€sample€for€testing,€there€is€noÏindication€that€an€independent€test€would€have€yielded€exculpatory€evidence,Ïespecially€when€a€test€conducted€by€the€hospital€produced€a€consistent€result.€€ÏHe€has€demonstrated€no€actual€prejudice.€€òòSeeóó€œòòLovascoóó,€431›€U.S.€at€790,€97ÏœS.Ct.›€at€2049.€€Furthermore,€the€Defendant€has€not€provided€any€evidence€thatÏthe€State€delayed€indictment€to€gain€a€tactical€advantage,€even€if€the€bloodÏsample€was€destroyed.ÌÌà àAfter€careful€consideration,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€DefendantððsÏinability€to€procure€a€blood€sample€infringed€upon€his€rights€under€theÏTennessee€and€United€States€constitutions.€€Nor€does€it€warrant€theÏsuppression€of€the€T.B.I.€blood€test€results.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ìà àÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÌÓ  Óà àNext,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€striking€hisÏmotion€to€suppress€on€the€grounds€that€the€Defendant€was€not€present€in€theÏcourtroom.€€The€trial€court€cited€Rule€14.03€of€the€Davidson€County€Local€RulesÏof€Practice,€which€states:€ð ðIf€counsel€for€a€movant€does€not€appear€at€aÏscheduled€hearing€on€a€motion€or€any€other€matter€scheduled€to€be€heard€on€theÏmotion€docket,€the€court€may€strike,€deny€or€otherwise€dispose€of€the€motion.ðð€ÏThe€Defendant€notes,€and€we€agree,€that€Rule€14.03€refers€to€òòcounselóó€not€beingÏpresent€and€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€applying€Rule€14.03.€€Yet,€the€StateÏcontends€that€the€trial€court€was€warranted€in€striking€the€motion€to€suppressÏpursuant€to€Rule€43€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure.€€The€ruleÏprovides€that€the€Defendantððs€presence€is€not€required€ð ð(3)€At€a€conference€orÏargument€upon€a€question€of€law.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€43(c)(3).€€The€State€claimsÏthat€the€motion€hearing€consisted€of€determinations€of€fact,€while€the€DefendantÏargues€€that€the€motion€was€purely€an€issue€of€law.ÌÌà àIn€our€view,€the€disposition€of€this€issue€does€not€depend€upon€theÏinterpretation€of€Rule€43.€€Rather,€we€are€reluctant€to€find€that€a€Defendant€mayÏwaive€a€constitutional€right€simply€because€he€is€not€present€when€aÏsuppression€motion€is€argued.€Courts€should€indulge€every€reasonableÏpresumption€against€waiver€of€fundamental€constitutional€rights.€€òòJohnson€v.ÏZerbstóó,€€304€U.S.€458,€464,€58€S.Ct.€1019,1023,€€82€L.Ed.€1461€(1938);€€òòLee€v.ÏStateóó,€560€S.W.2d€82€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1977).€€€€ÌÌà àHowever,€we€have€reviewed€the€Defendantððs€claim€on€the€merits€andÏhave€concluded€that€the€blood€sample€was€properly€admitted€at€trial.€€Therefore,Ïalthough€the€trial€court€committed€error€by€striking€the€motion€based€solely€on€theÏDefendantððs€absence,€after€considering€the€entire€record€in€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,Ïwe€are€satisfied€that€this€was€harmless€error.€€T.R.A.P.€36(b);€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.Ï52(a).ÌÌÓ  ÓÇIII.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àAs€his€third€issue,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏadmitting€into€evidence€an€excerpt€of€a€statement€the€Defendant€made€in€aÏtelevision€interview.€€€€He€contends€that€the€entire€interview€should€have€beenÏmade€available€to€the€defense€and€that€the€portion€shown€to€the€jury€was€anÏadmission€or€evidence€of€a€prior€bad€act€which€was€improperly€admitted€duringÏthe€Stateððs€case€in€chief.ÌÌà àJust€prior€to€an€appearance€at€court€for€consideration€of€a€pleaÏagreement,€the€Defendant€made€a€statement€to€a€television€news€reporter.€ÏTwo€sections€of€the€Defendantððs€statement€were€aired€as€part€of€a€news€storyÏwith€accompanying€commentary€about€the€Defendantððs€criminal€case.€€At€trial,Ïthe€State€elected€to€introduce€a€portion€of€the€Defendantððs€statement€as€part€ofÏits€case€in€chief.€€Defense€counsel€was€notified€and€requested€that€the€StateÏproduce€the€entire€interview€with€the€Defendant.€€This€included€parts€of€theÏinterview€that€were€not€aired€on€television.€€The€€trial€court€granted€the€StateððsÏmotion€for€a€subpoena€for€the€television€station€to€produce€the€additional€footageÏpursuant€to€Rule€17(c)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure.ÌÌà àThe€State€was€unable€to€procure€the€rest€of€the€videotaped€interviewÏbecause€the€television€station€administrators€refused€to€produce€the€tape.€€TheÏDefendant€contends€that€he€was€prejudiced€because€he€did€not€have€accessÏto€the€entire€interview€to€clarify€the€context€in€which€he€made€the€statement.€€TheÏstatement€in€question€which€was€introduced€by€the€state€reads:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ S ÒÓÓWell,€I€feel€I€should€do€jail€time€if€it€was€an€innocent€bystander.€ÏIf€I,€you€know,€skipped€a€curb€and€hit€the€lawyer€down€onÏChurch€Street€or€if€I€hit€a€car€head€on,€you€know,€but€we€hadÏboth€driven€drunk.€€I€was€a€passenger,€he€was€a€passenger.€ÏI€mean,€my€luck€ran€out€and€his€luck€ran€out,€you€know.€€It€justÏhappened€to€me€while€I€was€driving.ÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àWe€first€address€whether€this€videotaped€statement,€standing€alone,Ïshould€have€been€admitted€by€the€trial€court.€€Before€a€photograph€or€videotapeÏmay€be€admitted€as€evidence,€it€must€be€relevant€to€an€issue€that€the€jury€mustÏœdecide,›€and€the€probative€value€of€the€photograph€or€video€tape€must€outweighÏany€prejudicial€effect€that€it€may€have€upon€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Aucoinóó,€756ÏS.W.2d€705,€710€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1988),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€489€U.S.€1084,€109€S.Ct.Ï1541,€103€L.Ed.2d€845€(1989).€€€The€question€of€whether€a€photograph€orÏvideotape€should€be€introduced€into€evidence€addresses€itself€to€the€soundÏdiscretion€of€the€trial€court.€òòState€v.€Banksóó,€564€S.W.2d€947,€949€(Tenn.1978).€€ÏYet,€beyond€its€relevance,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€videotaped€statementÏmade€by€him€is€proof€of€other€crimes,€wrongs€or€acts€which€are€not€admissibleÍto€prove€his€character€such€that€it€conformed€with€the€criminal€act€in€question.€ÏHe€cites€Rule€404(b),€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence,€to€support€his€argument.€ÏWe€do€not€agree.€€Rather,€it€is€clear€that€the€taped€statement€the€DefendantÏmade€is€a€party€admission€highly€relevant€to€the€issues€at€trial.€€An€admissionÏby€a€party„opponent€may€be€introduced€at€trial€when€it€is€ð ð[a]€statement€offeredÏagainst€a€party€that€is€(A)€the€partyððs€own€statement€in€either€an€individual€orÏrepresentative€capacity.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€803(1.2).€€Here,€the€State€offered€theÏDefendantððs€own€statement€regarding€his€opinion€and€the€circumstancesÏsurrounding€the€incident.€€The€trial€court€did€not€err€by€admitting€the€DefendantððsÏstatement.ÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà à€ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àAlthough€the€statement€was€admissible,€the€Defendant€contends€thatÏbecause€the€jury€did€not€hear€the€question€asked€by€the€interviewer,€jurors€couldÏnot€understand€the€proper€context€in€which€he€made€the€statement.€€As€a€result,Ïhe€claims€he€was€required€to€testify€to€explain€the€situation€surrounding€theÏstatement,€and€that€this€infringed€upon€his€Fifth€Amendment€right€against€self„incrimination.€€ÌÌ€à àHe€complains€that€the€State€failed€to€but€should€have€followed€throughÏwith€the€Rule€17€subpoena,€regardless€of€the€resistance€on€the€part€of€theÏtelevision€station.€€€However,€news€organizations€are€protected€by€a€statutoryÍprivilege,€which€states€that€a€news€reporter€ð ðshall€not€be€required€by€a€court€.€.€.Ïto€disclose€before€.€.€.€any€Tennessee€court€.€.€.€any€information€or€the€source€ofÏany€information€procured€for€publication€or€broadcast.ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„208(a).€€This€applies€to€nonconfidential€as€well€as€confidential€information.€ÏòòAustin€v.€Memphis€Publððg€Co.óó,€655€S.W.2d€146,€150€(Tenn.€1983).€The€portionsÏof€the€videotaped€interview€with€the€Defendant€that€were€not€broadcast€consistÏof€information€procured€by€a€news€reporter.€€Although€the€format€is€videotape,Ïthe€questions€and€answers€elicited€by€the€news€reporter€and€preserved€on€tapeÏare€not€unlike€notes€that€were€made€or€other€information€known€by€theÏnewsgatherer€that€would€be€protected€under€the€statute.€€Therefore,€even€if€theÏState€served€the€Rule€17€subpoena,€it€might€well€have€been€fruitless€becauseÏthe€television€station€intended€to€invoke€the€statutory€shield.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€claims€that€the€failure€to€provide€the€entire€interview€forcedÏhim€to€testify€in€violation€of€his€Fifth€Amendment€right€against€self„incrimination€inÏorder€to€explain€the€context€in€which€he€made€the€statement.€€However,€he€citesÏno€authority€for€this€proposition€and€thus€we€are€unable€to€adequately€addressÏthe€issue€in€this€appeal.€€Because€the€defendant€has€failed€to€cite€authority€toÏsupport€his€argument,€we€consider€this€issue€to€be€waived.€€Tenn.€Ct.€Crim.ÏApp.€R.€10(b);€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2d€228,€231€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp.Ï1988).›€œÌ›ÌÓ  ÓIV.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏadmitting€a€statement€he€made€to€the€investigating€officer€at€the€scene€of€theÏaccident.€€He€asserts€that€before€the€officer€elicited€any€incriminating€statementsÏfrom€him,€òòMirandaóó€warnings€should€have€been€issued.€€Because€no€warningsÏwere€administered,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€use€of€his€statementÏviolated€his€€rights€under€the€Fifth,€Sixth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà àThe€privilege€against€self„incrimination€protects€an€accused€from€beingÏcompelled€to€testify€against€himself.€€òòSeeóó€òòMiranda€v.€Arizona,óó€384€U.S.€436,€86ÏS.Ct.€1602,€16€L.Ed.2d€694€(1966).€€Theòò€Mirandaóó€court€held€that€"the€prosecutionÏmay€not€use€statements,€whether€exculpatory€or€inculpatory,€stemming€fromÏcustodial€interrogation€of€the€defendant€unless€it€demonstrates€the€use€ofÏprocedural€safeguards€effective€to€secure€the€privilege€against€self„incrimination."€ÏòòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€at€444,€86€S.Ct.€at€1612,€16€L.Ed.2d€at€706.€€€At€a€minimum,Ïthe€Court€held€that€the€procedural€safeguards€must€include€warnings€prior€to€anyÏcustodial€questioning€that€the€accused€has€the€right€to€remain€silent,€that€anyÏstatement€he€makes€may€be€used€as€evidence€against€him,€and€that€he€hasÍthe€right€to€have€an€attorney€present€during€questioning,€whether€retained€orÏappointed.€€òòId.óóÌÌ€à àThe€test€for€determining€whether€the€òòMirandaóó€warnings€should€have€beenÏgiven€by€a€law€enforcement€officer€in€this€state€is€whether€there€has€been€aÏ"custodial€interrogation."€€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Joe€L.€Andersonóó,€„„€S.W.2d€„„,€No.€02„S„01„9511„CC„00121€(Tenn.,€Jackson,€œSept.›€16,€1996).€€The€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€has€defined€this€phrase€as€"questioning€initiated€by€lawÏenforcement€officers€after€a€person€has€been€taken€into€custody€or€otherwiseÏdeprived€of€his€freedom€of€action€in€any€significant€way."€€€òòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€atÏ444,€86€S.Ct.€at€1612,€16€L.Ed.2d€at€706.€€€In€other€words,€òòMirandaóó€warningsÏare€required€when€"there€[has€been]€a€'formal€arrest€or€restraint€on€freedom€ofÏmovement'€of€the€degree€associated€with€a€formal€arrest.'€"€€òòCalifornia€v.€Beheleróó,Ï463€U.S.€1121,€1125,€103€S.Ct.€3517,€3520,€77€L.Ed.2d€1275,€1279€(1983)Ï(quoting€òòOregon€v.€Mathiasonóó,€429€U.S.€492,€495,€97€S.Ct.€711,€714€50€L.Ed.2dÏ714,€719€œ(1977)).›€€ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€the€first€officer€at€the€scene€of€a€serious€accidentÏconducted€an€investigation€to€determine€the€facts€surrounding€the€incident.€€ThisÏincluded€assisting€the€paramedics€and€talking€with€the€driver€of€the€wreckedÏvehicle,€the€Defendant.€€The€Defendant€contends€that€the€officerððs€questionÍð ðHow€much€have€you€had€to€drink?ðð€was€intended€to€elicit€a€statement€by€theÏDefendant€for€the€purpose€of€a€criminal€prosecution€and€was€not€merelyÏinvestigatory.€€He€cites€òòPennsylvania€v.€Munizóó,€496€U.S.€582,€110€S.Ct.€2638,Ï110€L.Ed.2d€528€(1990)€for€the€proposition€that€the€statement€he€made€to€theÏofficer€was€testimonial€in€nature€and€should€have€properly€been€suppressed.€ÏHowever,€the€nature€of€the€statement€elicited€from€the€Defendant€is€not€theÏdeterminative€factor€in€this€case;€it€is€clear€that€his€statement€ð ðYes.€Iððve€beenÏdrinking.€€I€wonððt€deny€that.€€But€I€didnððt€start€out€drinking€and€driving.ðð€isÏtestimonial.€€What€determines€whether€the€Defendantððs€rights€were€violated€byÏthe€lack€of€òòMirandaóó€warnings€is€whether€the€incriminating€statement€was€madeÏwhile€he€was€ð ðin€custody.ððÌÌà àThe€U.S.€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€questioning€pursuant€to€a€routineÏtraffic€stop€does€not€implicate€the€protections€required€by€òòMirandaóó.€€òòBerkemer€v.ÏMcCartyóó,€468€U.S.€420,€104€S.Ct.€3138,€82€L.Ed€2d€317€(1983).€€€In€such€aÏsituation,€an€officer€is€permitted€to€ð ðask€the€detainee€a€moderate€number€ofÏquestions€to€determine€his€identity€and€to€try€to€obtain€information€confirming€orÏdispelling€the€officerððs€suspicions.ðð€œ€òòMcCartyóó,€468›€U.S.€at€439;€€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.ÏSnappóó,€696€S.W.2d€370€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€œ1985).›€€In€òòState€v.€Randall€L.ÏMcFarlinóó,€œC.C.A.€No.›€01C01„9406„PB„00202,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.,€Nashville,€June€13,€œ1995),›€œan›€officer€stopped€a€truck€driver€œwhom›€heÍobserved€driving€erratically.€€After€the€stop,€but€before€any€arrest,€the€defendantÏadmitted€to€drinking€two€beers.€€òòIdóó.€at€3,€7.€€This€Court€held€that€because€theÏstatement€was€elicited€before€the€defendant€was€in€custody,€òòMirandaóó€warningsÏwere€not€required.€òòIdóó.€at€6,€7.€€Likewise,€in€the€case€at€bar,€the€DefendantððsÏstatement€about€drinking€was€not€made€while€he€was€in€custody.€€In€fact,€noÏtraffic€stop€was€initiated.€€The€Defendant€was€sitting€in€a€witnessðð€truck€whileÏthe€officer€asked€a€few€investigatory€questions.€€We€cannot€conclude€that,€whenÏconsidering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances,€the€Defendant€would€reasonablyÏconsider€himself€deprived€of€freedom€such€that€it€functioned€as€an€arrest.€ÏTherefore,€we€find€this€issue€to€be€without€merit.Ìà àÌÓ  ÓV.ÌÌÓ  Óà àIn€his€fifth€issue,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏdetermining€his€sentence.€€When€an€accused€challenges€the€length,€range,€orÏthe€manner€of€service€of€a€sentence,€this€court€has€a€duty€to€conduct€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóóÏreview€of€the€sentence€with€a€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€theÏtrial€court€are€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€This€presumption€isÏ"conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€courtÏconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances."€ÏòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àIn€conducting€a€de€novo€review€of€a€sentence,€this€court€must€consider:Ï(a)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€at€the€trial€and€the€sentencing€hearing;€(b)€theÏpresentence€report;€(c)€the€principles€of€sentencing€and€arguments€as€toÏsentencing€alternatives;€(d)€the€nature€and€characteristics€of€the€criminal€conductÏinvolved;€(e)€any€statutory€mitigating€or€enhancement€factors;€(f)€any€statementÏthat€the€defendant€made€on€his€own€behalf;€and€(g)€the€potential€or€lack€ofÏpotential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€$XÔððððÔ€$ŠÔ€40„35„102,€„103,Ïand€„210;€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€735€S.W.2d€859,€863€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).ÌÌà àIf€our€review€reflects€that€the€trial€court€followed€the€statutory€sentencingÏprocedure,€imposed€a€lawful€sentence€after€having€given€due€consideration€andÏproper€weight€to€the€factors€and€principals€set€out€under€the€sentencing€law,Ïand€that€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€are€adequately€supported€by€the€record,Ïthen€we€may€not€modify€the€sentence€even€if€we€would€have€preferred€aÏdifferent€result.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).Ìà àÌà à€In€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€the€trial€court€sentenced€the€Defendant€to€a€threeÏyear€sentence€to€be€served€in€split€confinement,€one€year€incarceration€at€aÏCCA€facility€at€one„hundred€percent€(100%)€followed€by€two€œyears›€probation.ÏHe€was€also€to€complete€an€alcohol€abuse€rehabilitation€program.€€€The€juryÍfined€the€Defendant€œfive€thousand›€dollars€($5000).€€Also,€the€trial€judge€revokedÏthe€Defendantððs€driverððs€license€for€three€years,€although€the€judgment€reflects€aÏten„€year€revocation.€€The€Defendant€does€not€challenge€the€length€of€hisÏsentence,€but€questions€the€trial€courtððs€requiring€him€to€serve€one€year€inÏconfinement.€€He€notes€that€in€prior€plea€agreement€negotiations,€the€StateÏoffered€a€three„year€suspended€sentence€with€only€120€days€to€be€served€inÏconfinement.€€He€contends€that€the€trial€court€offered€no€explanation€why€itÏimposed€a€sentence€of€one€year€incarceration.€€We€agree€that€the€trial€court€didÏnot€properly€follow€the€sentencing€guidelines;€there€is€no€affirmative€showing€onÏthe€record€that€the€trial€judge€considered€the€applicable€factors.€€Therefore,€weÏreview€the€Defendantððs€sentence€òòde€novoóó€without€the€presumption€ofÏcorrectness.ÌÌà àNevertheless€,€we€believe€that€the€record€and€the€applicable€sentencingÏguidelines€support€the€sentence€imposed€by€the€trial€court.€€€The€presentenceÏreport€reflected€that€the€Defendant€was€a€25€year„old€unmarried€male.€€He€hadÏsome€college€education€and€had€a€steady€work€history.€He€had€lived€in€anÏapartment€prior€to€the€offense,€but€afterwards€moved€in€with€his€father€and€wasÏliving€there€at€the€time€the€report€was€prepared.€€He€reports€that€his€family€isÏsupportive.€€The€Defendant€began€drinking€alcohol€at€age€17€and€he€drankÏsocially€and€with€varied€frequency.€€He€reported€drinking€three€beers€and€oneÍð ðshooterðð€on€the€night€of€the€incident.€€The€Defendant€denies€illegal€drug€use.€ÏThere€are€no€prior€convictions.ÌÌà àThe€evidence€at€trial€showed€that€the€Defendant€consumed€alcoholicÏbeverages€and€was€driving€his€sisterððs€car€home€after€leaving€the€nightclub.€€AtÏsome€point,€the€Defendant€lost€control€of€the€vehicle€and€ran€off€the€road,€hittingÏseveral€groups€of€trees.€€The€passenger€died€as€a€result€of€injuries€suffered€inÏthe€accident.€€The€Defendantððs€blood€alcohol€level€tested€by€the€TBI€was€.19%.€ÏThe€Defendant€admitted€to€a€history€of€drinking€and€driving.€€€Prior€to€trial€and€atÏthe€sentencing€hearing,€the€Defendant€indicated€that€he€regretted€the€accidentÏbut€felt€he€should€not€spend€time€in€jail.ÌÌà àDefense€counsel€filed€notice€of€four€mitigating€factors€for€consideration€byÏthe€court.€€First,€that€the€Defendant€ð ð€because€of€his€youth€.€.€.€lacked€substantialÏjudgment€in€committing€the€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(6).€€TheÏDefendant€was€twenty„five€years€old€at€the€time€of€the€offense,€had€someÏcollege€education€and€held€a€job.€€We€do€not€believe€that,€when€considering€theÏevidence,€the€Defendant€did€not€have€the€capacity€to€make€a€judgmentÏregarding€his€actions.€€The€second€factor€presented€was€that€the€DefendantÏwas€suffering€from€a€mental€condition€which€reduced€culpability€for€the€offense.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(8).€€However,€he€has€presented€no€evidence€ofÍmental€impairment€and€the€voluntary€use€of€intoxicants€is€excluded€from€thisÏfactor.€€The€Defendant€also€raised€two€other€factors€for€consideration;€that€heÏhad€no€prior€criminal€record€and€that€he€attempted€to€accept€responsibility€byÏaccepting€a€plea€agreement.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(13).€€WeÏbelieve€that€it€is€appropriate€to€consider€the€Defendantððs€lack€of€a€prior€criminalÏrecord€as€a€factor€bearing€on€his€sentence.€€However,€there€is€evidence€in€theÏrecord€which€contradicts€the€Defendantððs€desire€to€take€responsibility€for€theÏincident.€€Namely,€the€statements€made€before€trial€and€at€the€sentencingÏhearing€in€which€he€maintained€that€he€should€serve€no€time€for€the€offense.€ÏWe€find€this€proposed€factor€inapplicable.ÌÌà àThe€State€presented€two€enhancement€factors€for€the€trial€courtððsÏconsideration.€€First,€it€argued€that€the€Defendant€ð ðhad€no€hesitation€in€committingÏan€offense€in€which€the€risk€to€human€life€is€high.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(10).€€In€order€to€apply€this€enhancement€factor,€we€must€determine€whetherÏthere€was€risk€to€the€life€of€a€person€other€than€the€victim.€€òòState€v.€Binghamóó,Ï910€S.W.2d€448,€452„53€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€In€òòBinghamóó,€the€driver€wasÏconvicted€of€vehicular€homicide€by€recklessness€after€crossing€a€four„lane€majorÏthoroughfare€in€Sevier€County€in€the€early€morning€hours.€The€court€appliedÏenhancement€factor€(10).€€òòId.óó€at€453.€€Here,€the€Defendant€was€traveling€on€aÏtwo„lane€rural€road€around€1:30€a.m.€€Although€late€at€night,€there€is€evidence€ofÍat€least€two€other€cars€traveling€on€that€road,€that€the€Defendant€was€drivingÏnearly€twenty€miles€over€the€speed€limit,€and€that€the€potential€for€crossing€theÏcenter€line€placed€other€drivers€at€great€risk.€€Therefore,€we€find€that€the€recordÏsupports€the€application€of€this€enhancement€factor.ÌÌà àThe€State€also€proposed€the€application€of€the€Defendantððs€past€criminalÏbehavior€as€an€enhancement€factor.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„144(1).€ÏHowever,€the€only€evidence€presented€at€trial€was€the€Defendantððs€ownÏadmission€that€he€had€ð ðdriven€drunk.ðð€€There€is€no€indication€of€specific€instancesÏof€drunk€driving,€and€without€more,€we€cannot€conclude€that€enhancement€factorÏ(1)€should€be€applied.€€After€consideration€of€the€other€statutory€mitigating€andÏenhancement€factors,€we€find€no€other€factors€applicable.ÌÌà àWhen€there€are€both€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors€present,€theÏsentencing€court€must€start€at€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€Range,€enhance€theÏsentence€within€the€Range€as€appropriate€for€the€enhancement€factors,€andÏthen€reduce€the€sentence€within€the€Range,€as€appropriate,€for€the€mitigatingÏfactors.€€€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(e).€€€Upon€òòde€novoóó€review,€weÏconclude€that€the€presumptive€minimum€sentence€of€three€years€is€appropriate.ÌÌà àA€defendant€who€ð ðis€an€especially€mitigated€or€standard€offenderÏconvicted€of€a€Class€C,€D,€or€E€felony€is€presumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidateÏfor€alternative€sentencing€options€in€the€absence€of€evidence€to€the€contrary.ðð€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€$XÔððÔ€$ŠÔ€40„35„102(6).€€Our€sentencing€law€also€provides€thatÏð ðconvicted€felons€committing€the€most€severe€offenses,€possessing€criminalÏhistories€evincing€a€clear€disregard€for€the€laws€and€morals€of€society,€andÏevincing€failure€of€past€efforts€at€rehabilitation,€shall€be€given€first€priorityÏregarding€sentences€involving€incarceration.ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€$XÔððÔ€$ŠÔ€40„35„102(5).€ÏThus,€a€defendant€sentenced€to€eight€years€or€less€who€is€not€an€offender€forÏwhom€incarceration€is€a€priority€is€presumed€eligible€for€alternative€sentencingÏunless€sufficient€evidence€rebuts€the€presumption.€€However,€the€act€does€notÏprovide€that€all€offenders€who€meet€the€criteria€are€entitled€to€such€relief;€rather,€itÏrequires€that€sentencing€issues€be€determined€by€the€facts€and€circumstancesÏpresented€in€each€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Tayloróó,€744€S.W.2d€919,€922€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1987).€€Ìà àAdditionally,€the€principles€of€sentencing€reflect€that€the€sentence€shouldÏbe€no€greater€than€that€deserved€for€the€offense€committed€and€should€be€theÏleast€severe€measure€necessary€to€achieve€the€purposes€for€which€theÏsentence€is€imposed.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€œðððð›€40„35„103(3)€„€(4).€€The€court€shouldÏalso€consider€the€potential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment€of€the€defendant€inÏdetermining€the€sentence€alternative.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(5).€€Ì€Ìà àHere,€the€trial€court€imposed€a€sentence€alternative€consisting€of€splitÏconfinement,€but€the€Defendant€argues€that€he€should€œserve€only›€œ120›€daysÏincarceration€rather€than€the€full€year.€€He€contends€that€his€situation€is€like€that€inÏòòBinghamóó,€where€the€defendant€received€120€days€incarceration.€€òòBinghamóó,€910ÏS.W.2d€at€457.€€He€also€notes€that€serving€120€days€was€also€offered€as€partÏof€the€plea€agreement€rejected€by€the€trial€court.€€The€State€argues€that€òòBinghamóóÏdiffers€from€the€Defendantððs€situation€because€Bingham€showed€great€remorseÏand€had€spoken€to€high€school€student€groups.€€The€State€contends€that€theÏDefendant,€on€the€other€hand,€has€expressed€little€remorse,€has€not€spoken€toÏthe€victimððs€family€and€maintains€that€he€deserves€no€jail€time.€€We€find€theÏStateððs€argument€persuasive.€€In€addition,€the€guidelines€for€split€confinementÏsentences€support€the€trial€courtððs€imposition€of€one€œyear€of›€incarceration.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„306(a).€€Likewise,€we€agree€that€one€year€œof€confinement›Ïfollowed€by€two€œyears€of›€probation€is€an€appropriate€sentence€that€avoidsÏdepreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense€and€will€facilitate€deterrence€andÏrehabilitation.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€œðððð›€40„35„103(1)(B),(5).€€We€also€mustÏemphasize€that€trial€judges€possess€significant€discretion€in€determiningÏappropriate€sentences,€and€here€we€defer€to€that€discretion.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€Defendant€challenges€the€ten„year€revocation€of€theÏDefendantððs€driverððs€license€as€is€reflected€on€the€judgment.€€The€StateÏconcedes€€and€it€is€apparent€from€the€record,€that€the€trial€court€intended€toÏimpose€the€three„year€statutory€minimum,€not€a€ten„year€revocation.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„13„213(c).€€It€appears€that€the€ten„year€revocation€was€aÏtypographical€error.€€The€State€does€not€argue€that€a€longer€period€should€beÏimposed.€€Therefore,€the€Defendantððs€license€shall€be€revoked€for€a€period€ofÏthree€years.€ÌÌÓ  Ó€VI.ÌÌÓ  Óà àIn€his€sixth€issue,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€evidence€wasÏinsufficient€to€support€a€guilty€verdict€for€vehicular€homicide€by€means€ofÏintoxication.€€He€states€that,€without€the€blood€alcohol€test€results,€the€evidenceÏdoes€not€support€the€verdict.€€However,€the€evidence€presented€included€theÏblood€test€results.€€We€decline€to€reassess€the€evidence€in€this€manner,Ïbecause€we€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€properly€admitted€the€bloodÏalcohol€test.€€Therefore,€we€consider€the€evidence€presented€including€thoseÏresults.ÌÌà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,Ïthe€standard€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorableÏto€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443ÏU.S.€307,€319€(1979).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€theÏweight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raisedÏby€the€evidence,€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.ÏPappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp.€1987).€€Nor€may€this€courtÏreweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835Ï(Tenn.€1978).€€Ìà àA€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€Stateððs€witnessesÏand€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,Ï476€(Tenn.€1973).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimateÏview€of€the€evidence€and€all€inferences€therefrom.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€atÏ835.€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€andÏreplaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused€has€the€burden€in€this€courtÏof€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€byÏthe€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982);€òòGraceóó,€493ÏS.W.2d€at€476.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€evidence€regarding€his€intoxication€wouldÏnot€support€a€verdict€of€guilt€for€vehicular€homicide€by€means€of€intoxication.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„213(a)(2).€€He€claims€that€Mr.€Crockett,€the€personÏwho€first€discovered€the€wrecked€vehicle€and€helped€the€Defendant,€did€notÏtestify€that€he€smelled€alcohol€on€him.€€Also,€he€notes€that€Mr.€Crockett€also€hadÏone„half€beer€to€drink€before€he€found€the€Defendant.€€He€asserts€that€the€officerÏon€the€scene€could€not€indicate€whether€the€smell€of€alcohol€came€from€theÏDefendant€or€from€Crockettððs€truck€when€he€first€opened€the€vehicleððs€door.€€TheÏofficer€who€was€present€with€the€Defendant€at€the€hospital€stated€he€smelledÏalcohol€on€the€Defendant,€but€did€not€testify€regarding€intoxication.ÌÌà àHowever,€there€was€testimony€at€trial€confirming€that€the€Defendant€wasÏat€Rodeos€nightclub€and€that€he€was€seen€consuming€alcoholic€beverages.€ÏThere€is€a€statement€by€the€Defendant€that€he€had€driven€drunk€in€the€past€andÏthat€with€the€offense€charged,€his€ð ðluck€ran€out.ðð€Two€police€officers€smelledÏalcohol€when€in€contact€with€the€Defendant.€€€Furthermore,€the€results€of€twoÏseparate€blood€alcohol€tests€revealed€a€.19%€(from€the€TBI)€and€.20%€(from€theÏhospital)€level€for€the€Defendant.€€These€results€were€consistent€and€well€aboveÏthe€presumptive€limit€of€.10%.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„408(b)(1990€repl.).€ÏWe€conclude€that€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€support€the€verdict€of€guilt€beyondÏa€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌÓ  ÓVII.ÌÌÓ  Óà àAs€his€final€issue,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€judge€commented€onÏthe€evidence€and€made€negative€comments€directed€at€defense€counsel,Ïdepriving€him€of€a€fair€trial.€€€He€refers€to€several€statements€the€trial€judge€madeÏthat€reflected€negatively€on€defense€counsel.€€Specifically,€that€the€trial€judgeÏadmonished€him€in€front€of€the€jury€in€this€manner:€ð ðNow€Mr.€Fowlkes,€you€know.€ÏYouððve€got€how€many€clients,€500?€€Could€you€tell€everything€about€that€oneÏclient€if€I€called€the€name€out?€€No,€you€couldnððt.€€This€police€officer€has€got€IÏdonððt€know€how€many.€€And€you€want€him€to€tell€us€by€independentÏrecollection.ðð€ÌAlso,€the€Defendant€claims€that€the€judge€improperly€commented€on€theÏevidence.€€The€trial€judge€interjected€comments€regarding€evidence€on€twoÏisolated€occasions.€€The€first€comment€was€made€in€response€to€testimony€by€aÏnurse€regarding€the€proper€procedure€for€drawing€a€blood€sample.€€The€trial€courtÏstated:€ð ðThatððs€what€it€says.€€It€doesnððt€say€use€soap€and€water.ðð€€€DefenseÏcounsel€clarified€this€by€examination€of€the€witness€who€stated€that€ð ðsoap€andÏwater€is€preferred.ðð€€Also,€when€the€Defendant€was€being€cross„examinedÏregarding€whether€he€had€consumed€alcohol€on€prior€occasions,€defenseÏcounsel€asked€about€ð ðwhat€occasionðð€and€the€trial€judge€stated€ð ðThe€night€of€theÍaccident.ðð€€However,€this€was€an€inaccurate€statement€that€the€Stateððs€attorneyÏcorrected€as€ð ðprior€occasions.ðð€€The€Defendant€argues€that€this€disparagedÏdefense€counsel.€€However,€these€were€isolated€incidents€and€the€inaccuraciesÏwere€corrected€immediately€after€the€trial€judge€made€the€statements,€arguably€inÏfavor€of€the€Defendant.€€The€Defendant€also€notes€the€trial€judgeððs€statementÏabout€a€witness:€ð ðSheððs€doing€alright,€General.ðð€€Yet,€in€context,€this€was€moreÏan€admonishment€of€the€State€and€beneficial€to€the€Defendant.€€Finally,€theÏDefendant€claims€the€statement€ð ðThe€Court€will€admit€the€copy,€the€T.B.I.€isÏgoing€to€give€us€the€original,€go€ahead.ðð€made€an€assumption€not€in€evidence.€ÏYet€the€Defendant€inaccurately€cites€the€record,€which€reads:€ð ðthe€T.B.I.€is€òònotóóÏgoing€to€give€us€the€original.ðð€€This€appears€merely€a€ruling€on€admissibility€of€aÏduplicate,€rather€than€any€comment€about€the€evidence.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€cites€òòBrooks€v.€Stateóó,€187€Tenn.€67,€213€S.W.2d€7€(Tenn.Ï1948),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€340€U.S.€837,€71€S.Ct.€21,€95€Led€614€(1950),€for€theÏproposition€that€ð ðthe€jurors€were€likely€influenced€by€the€actions€of€the€judge€andÏthe€feeling€manifested€in€his€words€and€rulings€during€the€trial.ðð€€187€Tenn.€at€74,Ï213€S.W.2d€at€10.€€A€trial€judge€should€avoid€expression€of€thoughts€that€wouldÏindicate€to€the€jury€his€opinion€either€against€or€in€favor€of€a€defendant.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àWe€obviously€agree€that€a€trial€judge€should€exercise€care€not€to€expressÏany€thought€that€might€lead€the€jury€to€infer€that€the€judge€is€in€favor€of€or€againstÏthe€defendant€in€a€criminal€trial.€€€òòBrooksóó,€187€Tenn.€at€74,€213€S.W.2d€at€10.€ÏYet,€ð ð[t]he€issue€to€be€determined€is€not€the€propriety€of€the€judicial€conduct€of€theÏtrial€judge,€but€whether€he€committed€an€error€which€resulted€in€an€unjustÏdisposition€of€the€case.ðð€€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€785€S.W.2d€132,€135€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1989).€€While€we€caution€restraint€in€a€trial€court's€interjections€andÏcomments€during€trial,€in€the€overall€context€of€this€case,€the€trial€court's€behaviorÏin€the€cited€instances€did€not€so€clearly€violate€the€mandate€of€impartiality€as€toÏinfringe€upon€the€Defendant's€right€to€a€fair€trial.€€Any€comments€regarding€theÏevidence€were€isolated€incidents€that€were€clearly€corrected€on€the€record.€ÏAlthough€the€trial€judge€appeared€ð ðtestyðð€on€occasion,€his€statements€did€notÏpermeate€the€trial€such€that€the€that€the€Defendant€did€not€receive€a€fair€trial.€€ÏFurthermore,€the€Defendant€has€shown€no€prejudice.€€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Caughronóó,Ï855€S.W.2d€526,€537€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Jenkinsóó,€733€S.W.2d€528,€532Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987);€òòState€v.€Howellóó,€698€S.W.2d€84,€86„87€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.1985);€òòState€v.€Hardinóó,€691€S.W.2d€578,€581€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985).€ÏThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àThe€Judgment€is€affirmed.€€This€case€is€remanded€solely€for€the€purposeÏof€correcting€the€period€of€revocation€of€the€driverððs€license€to€reflect€three€years.ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÇCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGE